Now ain't that bloody hell interestin'!
I found this very, very revealing article on the political dimensions of the Arjun tank on FrontierIndia:
Passion of the Arjun Tank
February 8th, 2010
For those who don’t know, I have titled the headline based on “The Passion of the Christ,” which is a religious film produced in 2004. It is based on the New Testament accounts of the arrest, trial, torture, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, events commonly known as The Passion. Before some hackles are raised, I am not trying to compare the Arjun Tank with the bible story.
One more point I would like to emphasize is that I am not against the Russian T-90 Tank. This is for my friends who have repeatedly pointed out “the fact” that I am anti T-90. Most of the time, I have put up the other side of the fence, whenever there has been attempt to malign the Arjun Tank. Many a times, I have been informed that Frontier India Strategic and Defence” has the most comprehensive collection of data, facts and stories. While I always take it as an compliment, some indicated that it proves I am anti T-90.
For starters, whoever is working overtime on the anti-Arjun Tank campaign has been responsible for the demonization of the T-90 in Indian service. There are some points to be considered: The anti Arjun Tank camp is normally Indians. If there are Russians behind it, then I would say these Russians are doing their job and doing it for the best of their country. Russia has great generals who make these tanks and great statesmen who would like India to posses these toys for its defense. On the other hand, we have Indian generals. They could or could not be thinking about their own country. Let me give them the benefit of the doubt and say that, they indeed want the best for their country. But, having said that, even with the best of thei intentions, we have clearly very “vision” challenged generals when compared to Russian, American or Israeli generals who make their own stuff and fight.
I have seen the arguments that the DRDO has not made tanks up to standards, and hence we import. At the same time, we have seen the development histories of tanks around the world. Majority of the tanks have been adopted by their armies when these tanks were not up to the mark. Subsequently, they have evolved into tanks at a state that, Indian generals drool over them. Infact, our generals wanted an Israeli company to evaluate if the Arjun was good or bad. Then, they wanted the DRDO to improve the tank as per the recommendations of the Israeli company. Is the Army incapable of making a qualitative requirement for itself and to evaluate it themselves?
The habit of changing qualitative requirements to suit imports was the brain child of General Gopal Gurunath Bewoor. While he was the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (1967 – 1973), he earned a dubious distinction of changing the qualitative requirement that led to the purchase and license production of SS11B1 and the death of the Indian Anti-Tank Missile program. Who can argue that General Gopal Gurunath Bewoor was not a good Army Chief? Was there any foreign lobby involved?
I must admit that the Indian Army has an history of using Indian equipment. Most of them were originally shoddy quality from the Indian public sector units and defence production units (DPSU). DRDO was in infancy then. So was the Indian Navy. I am not trying to pitch the Indian Army vs the Indian Navy. But let me give you an example: The Indian Air force, wanted a replacement for the MiG-21’s. The light combat aircraft, though has not achieved the newly formed “air staff requirement,” the IAF is willing to take a specified number of LCA’s. Why? Because they think that the LCA, even in its current form, is better than the MiG-21’s in service. Indian Army had a similar chance back in the 1980’s when they scuttled the induction of the Arjun Tank in favour of T-72 tanks. Look at Akaash Missile induction into the IAF and recent orders.
Armed Forces Chiefs can make or break history. IAF chief’s have been not very dynamic in this respect. I am not implying that they were not competent in other departments. It took former Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major to push the much needed change in Indian Air Force mentality. In the Indian Army, Gen. Shankar Roy Chowdhury was the only general who made a difference. Most other Army chiefs were not in his grade in this respect. There is an argument that the Indian Army is the user and not an R&D or production unit. An argument which is flawed. The mismanagement and frequent attacks on the Arjun Tank project by the Army has attracted worldwide attention. The Arjun Tank project detractors were largely responsible for the popularity of the project. I would like to give you an example: When the media is invited to any of the armed forces events, they expect the media not to ask ugly questions, eat refreshments and then print their press releases. But media always seeks sensation. Press releases don’t sell. Look then who is bad mouthing the Arjun project? It is the 'anonymous' Army officers and some retired army officers. They succeed in feeding sensational news about constant failures of the project. Then the media totally somersaulted. When it was pointed out to them that there was a likely sabotage of Arjun Tank trials, they realized that it was a bigger sensation than the regular news feature. It was a matter of DRDO establishing its Public Interface Directorate that the anti Arjun Tank camp faltered. Under strict media and political glare, Arjun Tank showed up its mettle. Naysayers could not manipulate the results. I had previously written that the Indian Army would cook up during the AUCRT trials. It came as no surprise then that the Indian Army reported in parliament that Arjun Tanks failed.
Hypothetically, if the Russians were very concerned about the image of the T-90, then they should be sacking their Indian agents (both the official and unofficial ones). T-90 tank purchase was a knee jerk reaction to T-80 sale by Ukraine to our 'pesky neighbor'. The T-90 tanks came with their set of inefficiencies which were greater than the Arjun tanks advertised deficiencies. There is another aspect to T-90 purchase. The Indian Army gives the linage argument. T-90 is a logical successor to the T-72, they say, an argument which the Russian army does not buy.The Russians want the Black Eagle, a fifth generation tank. Now, if you read carefully the press reports after the acquisition of T-72, these tanks were always under performing. Retired Tankers have said so. They prefer the Chieftains and Centurions. The T-72 tank was an interim main battle tank in 1979. Since the tanks were worse at the other side of the border, it was okay. Subsequently it was the DRDO which improved the T-72 and it was called the combat-improved 'Ajeya'. When Pakistan acquired T-80 tanks, Russia gave a proposal to improve T-72. Since the DRDO came up with the Tank-Ex upgrade, the Indian Army did not want a T-72 upgrade. (you can read Indian Armies reaction
here.) So, the Indian Army pushed for the T-90. It was not the issue that the enemy Pakistan had bought T-80’s, the issue was the enemy DRDO came up with the Tank-Ex upgrade.
I would like to add one more point here: A lot has been said about Indian Army problems with the DRDO. Less has been said about the DRDO’s problem with the Indian Army. It is not just the egos Indian Army officers have inherited from the British. They have also acquired the traits of colonial British masters when dealing with other Indians. I am sure, I have generalized this. But, how far is it away from the truth? Some time ago a DRDO project manager wanted to demonstrate equipment to the Indian Army. His main concern was not the demonstration, which was sanctioned, but, where he and his teammates would stay. The place was a remote place, distant from civilization. “You see, they (the Indian Army) have quarters there, but not for us” he explained defensively. After some discussion on Indian Army attitude, he sought to defend the Indian Army by saying that “customers are never satisfied.” DRDO has bent backwards to accommodate the Army’s daunting requests, which later goes on to boomerang on the DRDO. The relationship is equally strained both ways.
Then there is the other argument that the Arjun Tank was not available when the Army needed it. Some time back, I was chatting with two retired senior army officers. The point came up. One of the officers observed dryly that “ the Army did not induct the Arjun Tank.” Actually, this example can be seen in the sequence of events after 1996, when Arjun Tanks displayed that they was fit for induction as per the last of the Army's qualitative requirements.
The Army has not been entirely out of the loop in developing the tank. There are two names of Indian Army personnel whom I wish to mention or my article will not be complete: One is Lt.Gen Ajai Singh who is the governor of Assam state in India. He was responsible for the rejuvenation of the Arjun Tank project. The other is Retired Major General H.M Singh. He has been with the Arjun Tank project for in excess of 20 years. A die-hard Arjun Tank backer. The 43rd armored regiment have been involved in the development and testing of the Arjun Tanks. They have seen various versions of this tank. They say every cloud has its silver lining.
Some sections feel the Arjun Tank will not get a fair trial by the Army. Some say even that the Army does not have the competency pr is not willing to evaluate the Arjun Tank. There is an anecdote. While the Arjun Tank was on trial, the engine compressor broke down. The engine was replaced in less than 30 minutes and the tank was up and running. The engine can be repaired and put on to the next tank. Where as if the same thing happens to the T-90, it is grounded till the repairs are effected. It may take in excess of 3 hours. So, finally when the report reached the Army HQ, it stated:
Arjun Tank: engine broken. Complete replacement
T-90: engine broken, repaired.
There is yet another anecdote. The Advanced Light helicopters built by the HAL in Army service were running huge repair bills inspite of the Army being specifically told that ALH does not need as many services as a Chetak helicopter.
There is a view that the Army had issued a GSQR to see that the Arjun Tank does not fructify ever. DRDO pulled a fast one on them by importing all it cannot make in time and put together the Arjun tank. If the Army orders it, it will indigenise it as much as possible. So, Arjun detractors ended up blaming it for its imported content. They forgot that the T-90 was not even an Indian design.
In India, there is no professional independent agency that can interface between the R&D, production and the user. The US has it. The Russians have the military backing their R&D centers. So do others.
Like the rest of us apprehensive Indians, I am eagerly looking forward to the Arjun Tank vs T-90 comparative trials. Is the anti Arjun Tank lobby avoiding these trials for obvious reasons?
http://frontierindia.net/tank-ex-ideal-t-72-upgrades
) but once if IA orders DRDO has to put there socks up and make a concentrated effort towards making in house engine and transmission system. I feel optimistic about more orders but not total to 500 (means 376 more) but I think another 124 to take total level to approx 250 and then mark 2 to come
