Afghanistan Shelves Arms Request: India's Strategic Folly?
November 10, 2014 | Vivek Mishra
The Politics of the Decision
The essence of 'to do or not to do' seems to be at the centre of India's external defence cooperation dilemma. If not anything else, India's latest approach involving procrastination cum ignorance vis-Ã -vis the supply of small arms to Afghanistan, consequently leading to the latter's shelving of the demand, corroborates this quandary beyond doubt. India did not show a clear interest in changing its stance towards the decision to supply small arms to Afghanistan. Interestingly, neither did it fully deny it. To keep a country like Afghanistan, for which a decision impacting the supply of arms for its homeland security could result in immense and immediate fallouts, on tenterhooks was never a viable option for India. Despite two reminders to the Indian government, including one through the highest office of the erstwhile President Hamiz Karzai, when he personally voiced the request on his trip to India early this year, the South Bloc sat on the request. Chances are, that the recent decision of the new establishment in Afghanistan, led by the new president Ashraf Ghani, to revisit the country's request for arms is going to prove a lost opportunity for expanding defence cooperation and largely for India's strategic calculus, in retrospect.
The decision of Afghanistan to call off/shelve the request for direct arms supply and other facilities from India should be seen by India as a warning, both for its lack of clarity on expanding its defence cooperation regionally and beyond and more importantly, for the delays in decision-making. Especially the latter has unfortunately been a quintessential characteristic of defence production and management until recently. At least two cases prove this point beyond doubt; Project 751, through which the Indian Navy is seeking an undersea force of 24 submarines by 2015 through a line to set up to manufacture French Scorpene Submarines at Mazagoan docks in Mumbai, expected that the first of these submarines were expected to roll out by 2012. The project is far from being on track. The second delay has been in the much ballyhooed Rafale deal with France. Despite French insistence that the ongoing negotiations for the finalisation of the multi-billion dollar contract for the 126 medium multi- role combat aircraft (MMRCA) was moving in the "right direction" the delay in the deal is more than obvious. Air chief marshal Arup Raha has said that it is critical to keep the $25 billion French Rafale fighter deal on schedule as the IAF cannot afford any more delays. These and some other delays have hindered very serious and timely benefits to the Indian Armed Forces. The more unfortunate part of the story is that the silhouette of delay-in-decision-making has cast its shadow on India's external defence cooperation and engagements, with the failure of arms supply to Afghanistan being its first major cost.
Afghanistan might have weighed its decision to do away with the arms supply demand from India on the basis of at least two possible reasons. First, undoubtedly, is the political one. The change of guard in Afghanistan brings at the helm a different president than Hamid Karzai who was believed by many to be an Indophile. He saw India's strategic involvement in Afghanistan as essential, especially in the post US troop pullout phase. The new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, apart from showing that his decisive administration would not sit on non-performing and stagnant decisions of the last government, does not want to complicate relations with its neighbour Pakistan, than it already is. A parallel between India and Afghanistan, in that both the countries have new governments at the helm, therefore making the request for arms supply an issue of a different government, could have played its own role in jeopardising the arms supply deal. A possible second reason, for Afghanistan's calling of the request, is more important and is strategic in character. It was a strategic folly for India to sit on the request of Afghanistan, especially when it was concomitantly announcing with gusto that India is likely to coach Vietnam Air Force pilots in flying Sukhoi fighters as well, in keeping with the stepped-up defence cooperation between the two countries. Careful observation will show that almost immediately after New Delhi's extension of defence cooperation with Vietnam recently, Afghanistan announced its decision to shelve the request for supply of arms from India.
Afghanistan, a country in geographical proximity with India, would not have missed New Delhi's supposed master stroke vis-a-vis China by going out of its way to build cooperation with Vietnam in military training. India's promise to train Vietnam Air Force pilots in flying Sukhoi fighters is on the back of submarine training for Vietnamese sailors initiated last year. New Delhi also announced the transfer of four naval offshore patrol vessels to Vietnam under a $100 million credit line. India, also has been engaged in supplying spares for the Russian-origin Petya class warships and OSA-II class missile boats of the Vietnamese Navy, apart from continuing to train its military personnel in information technology and English language skills. Clearly, there is an emphasis on expanding defence cooperation on its eastern flank by India. In this regard, much has to do with India's recent emphasis on its "Look East Policy." But many have talked about India's much needed "Look West Policy" which is completely missing from the country's strategic priorities flier.
The Modi government in India has been pro-defence reforms. Recently, it cleared defence projects worth INR 80, 000 crore (close to $13 billion) and has chosen Israeli Spike missiles over the favourite and much lobbied Javelin missiles from the US thereby, albeit inadvertently, addressing the strategic imbalance between India's eastern and western flanks, apropos its strategic outreach.
Sometimes silence is construed as assent, but India's silence over arms supply with Afghanistan was just untimely and tantamount to 'no', primarily enunciated through the bureaucratic delay and a lack of 'yes.' After affirmative reports about New Delhi's intention to pay Russian firms to supply small arms, mortars and air support facilities/equipment to Afghanistan, India could not decide. The three primary demands of Afghanistan were choppers, retrofitting of six AN-32 transport aircraft and A2.A18 105-milimetre howitzers. It would not have been extremely difficult for India to deliver on these Afghan requests. It was simply a lack of the politico-strategic will. The supply of two promised Cheetah helicopters would not have been impossible as it is license-produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) in India. The upgrade of the transport aircraft fleet was precisely asked by Afghanistan as India too is currently upgrading its fleet in Ukraine. Together, it was nothing more than mere load-increase. The third demand of Afghanistan comprising light howitzers would have been the easiest of the lot as India is on the verge of phasing out the A2.A18 105-milimetre howitzers. For Afghanistan, the lot would still have come in handy. Consequently, India squandered three opportunities that would have had long term impacts on its regional strategic cooperation clout.
Weighing the loss for India
For a country with strong emphasis on indigenisation of defence production, the production of Cheetah helicopters at HAL would have been a win-win situation, especially when it is to be supplied to a country that holds immense strategic interests for India. Maintenance in the India's defence sector has always been a problem as it is not well equipped in the area. The series of accidents involving Indian submarines last year, especially INS Sindhurakshak, had exposed the limited capabilities of management and maintenance in the defence sector. Here was an opportunity to help Afghanistan upgrade its transport aircraft fleet, while it was still upgrading its own. It would have been a great learning experience for India's own technicians in a situation that would have had the idiomatic significance of 'earning while learning.' The option of supplying Afghanistan with its supply of light howitzers would have been a regional game-changer. Not only would it have ended India's politico-moral impasse over direct arms supply to another country, it would have addressed Afghanistan's own concerns about arms deficit in the face of a renewed Taliban insurgency. The cost that Afghanistan has to bear in the event of fresh arms supply is held to be non-viable by many. For India, it is highly unlikely that an opportunity like this will present itself in future where the cost of gaining the strategic trust of a regional partner will be so low, particularly, because the arms lot is on its way out in India. It was simply a failure to comprehend, for India, that even today in international relations, one country's luxury could be another's necessity.
As a country that is culturally close to India and which shares common values and goals, Afghanistan deserved a chance for strategic help from India. If not direct arms supply, it would have been wise to consider helping Afghanistan through improving maintenance and logistics. At least, India should move beyond the nominal training of Afghan soldiers as a countable asset for its 2011 Strategic Partnership with Afghanistan. The Modi government has taken a few important decisions, including increasing strategic partnership with Vietnam, despite Chinese objections and concerns. There is a need for replication of this approach on India's western flank. Despite objections raised by Pakistan, India should bolster its strategic partnership with Afghanistan, especially in the post-US troop pullout phase. For India, with its already strong domestic support and presence in Afghanistan, a strong strategic partnership with the latter would help reduce the strategic depth vis-Ã -vis Pakistan. In all of these, the internal factors and cross-border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan is certainly an issue that has the potential to prove an impediment, but that can be overcome by the depiction of a strong political will from New Delhi.
India's untimely silence has complicated the matters not just for Afghanistan but for itself. The latter's shelving the request means that the probability for the new government in Afghanistan to get back to India is very meager and the probability for it to approach another regional stronghold (probably China) increases just that much. Its time New Delhi shows an unsolicited strategic grace to Kabul.
Afghanistan Shelves Arms Request: India's Strategic Folly? - The Daily Outlook Afghanistan
