Afghanistan News and Discussions

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Afghan, NATO troops pursue Haqqani fighters​

By DEB RIECHMANN (AP) – 9 hours ago
KABUL, Afghanistan — More than 20 insurgents including Arab, Chechen and Pakistani fighters have been killed by NATO and Afghan forces who are ramping up operations in the east against a Taliban faction linked to al-Qaida, the international coalition said Saturday.
Separately, three more NATO troops — an American, a Briton and an Australian — were killed in separate insurgent attacks in the volatile south, officials of the three countries said Saturday.
The joint force operation began Wednesday against dozens of insurgents holed up in a mountainous area of Zadran district of Paktia province. The operation focused on disrupting the Haqqani network's movement in an area used to stage attacks in the capital, Kabul, and along a highway that links Khost province and Gardez, the provincial capital of Paktia, NATO said.
More than 20 insurgents have been killed, the coalition said. Combined security forces also discovered and destroyed multiple explosive devices and bomb-making equipment, including trip wire and blasting caps, weapons and ammunition. A coalition airstrike destroyed an enemy ammunitions bunker, NATO said.
Three small children were killed and their mother was wounded when a civilian house was hit by an insurgent rocket in Khost city late Friday, provincial spokesman Mubarez Zadran said. He said the insurgents appeared to have been aiming at a coalition base but missed.
The U.S. considers the Haqqani group, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin, as one of the most dangerous Taliban networks because of its links to al-Qaida. The group is suspected of playing a major role in the Dec. 30 bombing of a CIA base in Khost as well as a series of attacks in Kabul. It is based in the western border area of Pakistan, where U.S. forces cannot operate on the ground.
"The Haqqani network continually seeks to establish strongholds in the Khost-Gardez pass, disrupting the local government and facilitating the movement of foreign fighters, explosives and weapons into Afghanistan," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, a NATO spokesman.
Two other operations in June resulted in the deaths of more than 50 Haqqani fighters. Afghan and coalition forces killed 17 fighters including a commander, Fazil Subhan, during a fierce firefight in Khost province June 9, NATO said.
A week later, in the Jani Khel district of Paktia province, Afghan and coalition forces killed at least 35 insurgents including several key leaders for both the Haqqani and Taliban networks. The security force killed Hamiddullah, a Haqqani commander for Sabari district in Khost province who had direct ties to Haqqani senior leadership based in Pakistan and was reportedly responsible for an ambush of an Afghan National Army unit in March, which killed three Afghan soldiers.
In the two-day offensive on the largest foreign fighter camp in the area, assault forces also killed Qari Ismail, a Taliban leader for Jani Khel district, and Maulvi Sadiq, who worked to bring foreign fighters into Afghanistan, NATO said.
Elsewhere, two private security guards and two militants were killed in a gunbattle late Friday in the Karukh district of Herat province, police spokesman Noor Khan Nekzad said. He said 12 other guards were wounded in the skirmish.
NATO officials had no further details about the death of the American service member Saturday. But the Australian military said a member of the country's elite Special Air Service Regiment was shot early Saturday while assisting in a "disruption operation" in the northern part of Kandahar province.
The British Ministry of Defense said Saturday that a British soldier serving with a mine-clearing unit died in a firefight the day before in the Nad-e-Ali district of Helmand province.
Four police were killed and four others were wounded when their vehicle hit a roadside bomb Saturday in Gereshk district in Helmand province, provincial spokesman Daud Ahamdi said.
Also in the south, three Afghan civilians were killed and another was wounded by insurgents in three separate incidents in Kandahar province on Friday. Two of the civilians were killed when a rocket-propelled grenade hit their vehicle in Arghandab district. Another was fatally stabbed by insurgents near the governor's compound in Kandahar city.
In the north, NATO and coalition troops killed two insurgents Saturday after a patrol came under small arms and rocket-propelled grenade fire in Kunduz province, NATO said.

 

[ajtr]

Taliban deputy commander captured in Afghanistan​

KABUL: A Talibandeputy commander was captured in southern Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said on Saturday.

The militant was held in Lashkar Gah, capital of Helmand province, Xinhua reported.

"The deputy commander along with several additional suspected insurgents had been detained by joint forces," ISAF said in a statement without revealing his name and date of arrest.

"We're happy to announce another key capture of Taliban leadership operating in southern Afghanistan," it said, adding more than 100 fighters were under his command.

Read more: Taliban deputy commander captured in Afghanistan - South Asia - World - The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...anistan/articleshow/6312463.cms#ixzz0wcXBG0J4

 

[ajtr]

Afghan refugees mull return home after Pakistan floods​

Pakistan (Reuters) - Floods ravaged tens of thousands of Afghan refugees who have been living in Pakistan for decades after fleeing Soviet occupation and civil war.

Now as they survey kilometers of flattened mud and brick houses in a refugee camp in northwest Pakistan, some contemplate returning to an Afghanistan still gripped by violence.

Roaring waters shattered dreams.

"The river swallowed everything. We have no house no business, nothing to eat, nothing to wear," said Nizam Ali who just passed his 12th grade exams and was planning to pursue further studies in the nearby city of Peshawar.

"No one is helping us, it now looks as if we have no other choice but to go back to Afghanistan."

(For a picture slideshow on floods, click here)

Men who were busy spreading soaked bed-sheets and mattresses over a dry patch of land nodded in agreement. "This is what we have left," said Khair Mohammad, carrying a stack of clothes and bed-sheets on his back in Aza Khel refugee camp,

Millions of Afghans fled to Pakistan and Iran in the 1980s after the Soviet invasion and, while many of them went home after the U.S.-led forces overthrew the Taliban in 2001, an estimated 1.7 million remain in Pakistan, mostly in refugee camps.

Last year Pakistan agreed to let the displaced Afghans stay until the end of 2012, after a resurgence of violence along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border hindered repatriation efforts.

PAST AND PRESENT UNCERTAINTY

Going back to Afghanistan could mean exposure to some of the conditions they fled in the first place. Many left while the Afghan mujahideen were fighting Soviet troops. That was followed by civil war. Now, the Taliban battle U.S.-led NATO troops.

The floods have forced the refugees to move about 100 metres away from Aza Khel, along a railroad track and a highway median. It's not far but perhaps as traumatic as leaving Afghanistan since that has been their home for decades.

"No one has come to this area, there might still be bodies lying in there, under the rubble," said 24-year-old Sultan Habib, a cook who worked in a restaurant in a nearby city.

"I know two or three boys who are still missing."

Aza Khel began as a small settlement along a railway track about 30 years ago. It gradually grew into a village, with merchant shops, tea stalls and grocery and food shops.

Stability the refugees had established over many years simply vanished with the floods.

One mosque, where perhaps they prayed for the future of Afghanistan, is surrounded by three feet of water, along with the cleric's podium.

Kitchen pots, mattresses and ceiling fans were strewn in thick mud. Children splashed and swam in a pool of muddy water created by the floods, oblivious of the hazards of stagnant water that could give rise to fatal diseases. Dead animals lay in the open.

There are other dangers. Armed men come around at night and steal, leaving refugees few opportunities to salvage what it was not swept away.

Like in many other parts of Pakistan, the Afghan refugees were furious over the government's perceived slackness in the crisis. Some could not fathom the magnitude of the crisis.

""In fact the government opened the gates of a nearby dam without telling us. They never warned us. They are responsible for this disaster. We only ask help from Allah," said Jawad Khan.

(Editing by Michael Georgy and Sanjeev Miglani)

(For more news on Reuters India, click in.reuters.com)

 

[Daredevil]

It took just one visit to Kabul to appreciate what we take so much for granted

I went to Kabul eight years ago. That's a long time ago, but perhaps not long enough. Has anything changed there? One doesn't know. Kabul is situated at the bottom of a tea cup, with the sides of the cup rising in hilly mystery. The roads are wide and flat; the Russians, wherever they went, made sure that transportation was efficient and modern and fully functional. No one knew any traffic rules, and it was only through trial and error, and extreme bodily danger, that you learnt whether it was left hand drive or right hand. Traffic policemen carried light machine guns, and that was the only way that cars—all Toyota taxis—would maintain some semblance of decorum. An Afghan sense of decorum. The key word, of course, is Afghan.

When I landed at Kabul airport, I was the first in the queue at the emigration (immigration? Tourism?) counter. The man did not have a ball pen to sign on my passport, and I gave him one and left it with him: he needed it more than I did.

I asked a man who was hanging around: "Where is Mullah Omar?"

"In Pervez Musharraf's house in Islamabad," he said.

We went to a restaurant for lunch and were shocked by the lack of service, sheer rudeness. Finally, it came to a point when I went up to the owner, who was sitting at the cash counter, and asked him what the hell was wrong. "Pakistani, no service," he told me. "But we are Hindustani," I told him. His demeanour changed miraculously. "Hindustani!" he said. "Half price, double service!":happy_8: And he insisted on charging us only half of what was mentioned in the menu.

We went to the football stadium where the Taliban used the goal posts to hang people. The newly-formed Afghan football team was training there. Tata trucks were a crowd. The most common stores in Kabul were drugs and pharma stores: after all, in 20 years of combat, people had lost a lot of arms and legs; the water had been contaminated, contagious diseases were the order of the day. But the second most common stores were photo studios. The Taliban had banned photography for two decades; two entire generations had grown up with no visual record of their childhood. The Taliban were mendacious: a few years ago, The Daily Telegraph revealed how they had their own photos clicked in heroic poses, but for the average Afghan, no pictorial record was allowed; it was against the laid-down faith.

Wherever we went, little children would run up to us and ask to be photographed. But we are going back to India, we told them, you will never see these pictures. They didn't mind. They simply didn't mind. The very fact that their photos were being taken, that there would be a record of them somewhere, perhaps in an obscure hard disk in some foreign country, was good enough for them. I have never felt such—I don't know what (don't have the words)—for these little happy smiling children.

And of course every taxi plays Hindi film music. Every shop plays Hindi film music. Kabul is Hindi film musicland. From Dum dum diga diga to Likhe jo khat tujhe to Dum maro dum, the city reverberates, resonates and recharges you with all the songs that you grew up with and thought you had outgrown. And you realise you were just misleading yourself, needlessly.

And then you see a girls' school session get over. And you see hundreds of young girls running out of school, in total joy and playfulness, enjoying their innocence, and you want to cry. Just a little bit.

And at every open space, every field, every gully, you see boys playing cricket. They are all chucking. All. One of the greatest regrets of my life will always be that I didn't go up to them and tell them, "Boss, this is not cricket, you have to turn your arm over, like this, like this"¦ watch me. Try. This is how to do it." On the other hand, who gives a damn? Let them chuck the hell out of their batsmen. They have suffered enough to earn just a simple right.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

AFP: India to reopen Kabul mission: report

India to reopen Kabul mission: report

NEW DELHI — India is to reopen a medical mission in the Afghan capital Kabul that was hit by militant suicide attacks in February, a report in New Delhi said Wednesday.

Nine Indians were killed in one of the deadliest Taliban strikes on foreigners in Kabul. A total of 16 people died and 20 were critically injured when suicide bombers targeted two guesthouses in the Afghan capital.

India blamed Pakistan-based militants for targeting the medical mission in a power struggle between the two rival countries in Afghanistan that many analysts fear will erupt into a "proxy war" when foreign troops withdraw.

"The medical mission in Kabul will resume full-scale operations shortly," an anonymous source told the Times of India. "The staff who had been injured are being replaced."

India suspended medical aid and a number of teaching programmes in Afghanistan after the attack and Indian businesses and charities were reported to have slashed staff over fears they would be targeted by militants.

Indian interests in Afghanistan have been repeatedly targeted. Its embassy was bombed in October last year and on July 7, 2008.

The New Delhi government believes the attacks on its medical mission on February 26 were launched by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the same group that it blames for the Mumbai attacks in November 2008.

India, which has repeatedly urged the global community to "stay the course" in Afghanistan, is worried that Pakistan and the Islamist Taliban will assume key roles once international forces pull out.

 

[SHASH2K2]

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan sign agreement on TAPI gas pipeline

Turkmenistan and Afghanistan have signed an agreement on construction of the Trans-Afghanistan (TAPI) gas pipeline for the transfer of Turkmen gas to Pakistan and India, local media said on Tuesday.
The TAPI project, first put forward in 1995, was promoted by the country's late leader, Saparmurat Niyazov, in the early 2000s.
It secured strong support from Washington after a U.S.-led offensive ended the Taliban's five-year rule over Afghanistan in 2001.
The Turkmen delegation is expected to visit Pakistan and India to sign agreements with the two countries in the near future.
Local media said earlier that Turkmen President Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and his Afghan counterpart Hamid Karzai have agreed to discuss the project at the 65th United Nations General Assembly in New York in September.

 

[Patriot]

What Next in Afghanistan?

The Diplomat speaks with Matthew Hoh, director of the Afghanistan Study Group, about the group's report on the future of US forces in the country.

The Afghan War has often been dubbed by supporters as the 'good war' by those contrasting it with military action in Iraq. At what point would you say it became clear that this was no longer the case, or should that have been clear from the start?

Our involvement in Afghanistan in its current form began nine years ago this month, so nearly a decade's worth of involvement. Importantly, it must be remembered, recognized and understood that we entered into a conflict—a civil war—that had been continuous in one form or another since the mid to late seventies. So while we view the conflict as being primarily about us, because of al-Qaeda's attacks on the US in 2001, the Afghans understand the conflict to be about themselves, with a good deal of regional involvement—Pakistan, India and Iran—and a conflict that predates 2001 and al-Qaeda.

I do believe we went there in 2001 for justifiable reasons and our initial presence did stabilize the country for a short period of time. However, our failure to understand the nature of the conflict, a civil war, and our failure to address the underlying political issues of that conflict, plus the establishment of a strong central government the like of which had never been successful in a country where governance traditionally resides at the lowest levels possible resulted in the conflict resurfacing and then worsening over these past five or six years.

So in short, I think the initial reason we went there—al-Qaeda—was a success. However, we also entered into a conflict which we didn't fully understand and are now still there.

The report you co-authored and which is being released at the New America Foundation today, A New Way Forward for Afghanistan, is pretty scathing about the Hamid Karzai regime, stating that: 'President Karzai has had nearly six years to build a legitimate and minimally effective government, and he has manifestly failed to do so. His re-election last year was marred by widespread fraud. Karzai has been unable or unwilling to crack down on corruption or rein in the warlords on whom his government still depends.' Could we have been in a very different situation had the Afghan leadership been more effective?

I think so. Some of the problem is the form of government we created. In a country that hasn't had a traditionally strong central government—the monarchy did keep the country stable for the majority of the 20th century, but reigned by not reigning in a manner of speaking—and in a country that has multiple fractures and schisms along ethnic, regional, tribal, etc lines, we created a very strong executive and a very weak legislature.

The result of this is that power is centralized with Karzai and so, if you aren't in his clique then you're outside of it. Additionally, as I said, the situation in Afghanistan is a civil war, and this form of government has continued that conflict as one element of the civil war. The rural Pashtuns, from which the Taliban draw their support, are effectively excluded from the government, its resources and security forces.

If we'd created a more inclusive government—let alone this current one, which is the very definition of a kleptocracy—and had created a government much more localized and not centralized, I think many of the issues that form the bulk of the political grievances of those groups that support the Taliban may have been reconciled. Remember also the Taliban isn't a monolithic organization, but composed of multiple local groups with local grievances.

The report emphasizes the idea of reconciliation and says preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, shouldn't be required. Should there be any preconditions for negotiations?


I'd stick with the renunciation of al-Qaeda and international terror groups. However, I wouldn't call for participants to recognize the Afghan Constitution, as I believe it needs to be reformed in order to make the government more inclusive and to devolve power. I also believe that in its current form, our pre-conditions for negotiations essentially ask for the other side to surrender. All participants in the conflict are tired, I saw this when I was there, and I think there's a willingness to negotiate, but I don't believe that they will surrender.

The report also talks about decentralizing power in Afghanistan. Does this mean in your view that a unified Afghan state simply isn't viable?

No Afghan I met ever spoke about partition or dividing the country, for example such as creating a 'Pashtunistan,' and most Afghans identify themselves as Afghans first. Ultimately, it must be an Afghan solution and effort. However, very real and very serious schisms exist within the country along regional and ethnic lines. Devolving power to district and provincial levels to include possibly creating regional governments would create a system of governance more akin to traditional Afghan forms of governance—and this includes the very real and logical possibility of the establishment of governance institutions not common in the West, such as shuras. It needs to be an Afghan solution that will create buffers or barriers within the country that allow for less intrusion into parts of the country by other parts

What kind of role do you see for a central security force in Afghanistan? Should the US be responsible for training one?

The army should eventually be smaller, if for no other reason than its cost and the ability of Afghanistan to sustain such a force. And the police force needs to be local or provincial in nature and not so stove-piped.

But the most important and immediate aspect for the security forces is that they need to be ethnically and regionally balanced. They currently aren't, and are a key reason why the rural Pashtuns support the Taliban—much like the Sunnis in Iraq who turned to the Sunni insurgency when large numbers of the Shia dominated Iraqi National Guard and then Iraqi Army showed up in Sunni parts of Iraq in 2003-6.

The rural Pashtuns see the Afghan Army as outsiders and many of them see the current Afghan Army as the extension of the Northern Alliance against which the rural Pashtuns fought under the banner of the Taliban in the 90s and up until Sep 2001. The security forces need to be much more representative of the Afghan population and much more localized. But this isn't the same as arming local groups and militias and should include elements of groups who are now allied under the Taliban banner, akin to what we did with the Sons of Iraq.

I think training could be shifted to regional partners or to the United Nations for some parts of the country where a US presence may continue to be seen as a catalyst. Also, for a period of time, peacekeepers will be needed in Afghanistan, along ethnic fault lines and areas.

One of the recommendations in the report is providing subsidies and loans to local agricultural producers, construction and companies and artisans as part of reconstruction efforts. Would you envisage bypassing central government with these kinds of initiatives?


I think it's important to work through the government in order to strengthen and legitimize it, however, I think this should be done at provincial levels. This also provides an argument for a regional system of government to provide for economies of scale in assisting multiple provinces without having it be administered nationwide from Kabul. Ultimately, efforts like this should be facilitated by NGOs and international organizations as US and European government institutions—USAID and DFID for example—have proven to be ineffective.

Aside from reducing the footprint in Afghanistan the report says the US should move more broadly to improve its overall image in the Islamic world. What would you like to see done?


We need to be much more consistent in our actions, thinking longer term rather than shorter term and understanding events in other nations for their root causes and not for the issues that affect us or that we impose. For example, understanding the conflict in Yemen as having decades-long causes and not linking it explicitly to al-Qaeda, as I fear we are currently doing. The same with Somalia. With al-Shabaab, we automatically assume extreme international Jihadism as motivation for their supporters, when it's very likely that the current popular support al-Shabaab enjoys among some elements of the population is caused by the actions of an invading Ethiopian army or Uganda peacekeepers.

By conflating al-Qaeda with opposition groups to Muslim governments, we're letting al-Qaeda hijack issues and narratives that aren't theirs. Additionally, we must be much less hypocritical. We can't criticize last year's Iranian elections but then condone and support the stolen Afghan elections by sending more troops. Likewise, we can't say we are in Afghanistan because of al-Qaeda when there are only 50 to 100 al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, while we leave Iraq where last month the State Department reported 1000 to 2000 al-Qaeda members. This discredits our efforts and our message.



Matthew Hoh is a former Afghanistan-based official with the US State Department and US Marine Corps and director of the Afghanistan Study Group.









What Next in Afghanistan? | The Diplomat

 

[ajtr]

Now, an India-Iran-Afghanistan tri-summit​

After months of under-the-radar discussion, India will be part of a regional initiative on Afghanistan along with Iran. It's learnt that foreign ministers of India, Iran and Afghanistan are working on meeting on the margins of the UN General Assembly in New York to signal the start of this trilateral.
Significantly, the formal proposal for the meeting came from Iran last week and, sources said, the three countries have agreed and officials are busy setting it up. Also, Tehran has sent a letter supporting New Delhi's candidature for a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council.

The trilateral initiative will be an important breakthrough for India because it has been left out of every other regional effort at the behest of Pakistan. Islamabad's discomfiture is what led to Turkey not inviting India to a regional meet last year. Then, of course, India was quite taken aback with Russia not including India at the quartet — Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan — meet in Sochi last month.India discussed this proposal at length with Afghanistan Foreign Minister Zalmai Rassoul when he was here last month and then followed it up with the Afghanistan NSA Rangin Dadfar Spanta. If all goes by plan, External Affairs Minister S M Krishna, Iran Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Rassoul will meet in New York during the next 10 days.

With Pakistan making its intentions clear to block Indian efforts, India began quiet talks with Iran given how both are in sync on Afghanistan. Both countries worked closely when the Taliban was in power in Kabul and are now cooperating on key infrastructure projects. Given that Pakistan does not allow transit rights to India, most Indian equipment and goods are transported via Iranian ports.

However, the chill in India-Iran ties following New Delhi's decision to vote against its nuclear programme in the IAEA upset equations in the relationship. At that time, India was also pursuing closure of its nuclear deal with the US and other western powers. More so, India has maintained that another nuclear armed country in the region was not in its interests.

Despite these reservations, New Delhi has often put a rider that Iran has a right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as it abides by its international treaty obligations. Two actions on the part of India in the past month, sources said, have sent out the signal to Iran that New Delhi does not always toe the US line on the Iranian nuclear programme.

First, India decided to approach the UN on removing Iran-o-Hind, an Indo-Iranian shipping joint venture, from the list of entities that UN recently sanctioned in Iran. Second, India supported a strongly worded NAM resolution against the IAEA on the DG's recent report on the Iran programme. New Delhi seemed to have agreed with the NAM view that proper procedures were not be followed.

India had also floated the idea of a India-US-Afghanistan trilateral, the fate of which is still not known, said sources.

 

[ajtr]

Talk to the Haqqanis, before it's too late​

BY TOM GREGG, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010 Wednesday, September 22, 2010 - 3:56 PM Share

Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.

One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is 'the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.

In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as 'succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability

It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.

However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.

Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.

Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.

Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.

Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.

The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for 'peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.

For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.

Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.

In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.

However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.

Tom Gregg is a Fellow and Senior Program Coordinator of the Afghanistan Regional Project at NYU's Center on International Cooperation. Prior to joining CIC he served for four years with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) as Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and as the Head of UNAMA's Southeast Region.

 

[ajtr]

Arithmetic on the frontier​

BY DECLAN WALSH, SEPTEMBER 22, 2010 Wednesday, September 22, 2010 - 12:33 PM Share

The following is an excerpt from an article by Declan Walsh, the Afghanistan and Pakistan correspondent for The Guardian newspaper. It appears in the current issue of Granta, which in this issue features original art, fiction, and reporting from Pakistan. The full article is available for purchase here.

There are, by his own admission, two Anwar Kamals. One is the 'polished gent' of Peshawar, a leading member of the Pashtun elite with a taste for frontier bling. His pied-à-terre is a spacious house in Hayatabad, the city's best suburb, where he frequently dines with his three university-educated sons. He drives an imposing white Japanese jeep with dashboard television (and prayer counter for Islamic recitations), carries the latest mobile phone and, being a qualified pilot, keeps a small plane at the local aerodrome. Some years back he imported a pair of greyhounds from England for the purpose of hunting boar on the family lands. A fading portrait of a serious-looking man on his living-room wall is testimony to his rich political pedigree. Khan Habibullah Khan, Kamal's father, was a minor star in the early decades of Pakistan, serving as Home Minister in the 1960s and chairman of the Senate in the 1970s. At one point he was Acting President of the country. Kamal has had a less prominent, yet also distinguished, career in public service. He was a provincial minister twice and a national senator once; in 1990 he addressed the United Nations General Assembly in New York, during which time he lodged at the luxury Roosevelt Hotel in Manhattan.

The second Anwar Kamal emerges when he jumps into his jeep and heads for Lakki Marwat, a bumpy four-hour ride to the south. Lakki is his constituency, but also his land, his power, and his identity. Here, Kamal sleeps with a rocket launcher under his wood-frame bed, in a sprawling, draughty fortress guarded by dozens of tribesmen, spends his time in lengthy confabulation with bearded elders and generally acts in a manner that seems to contradict everything the other Anwar Kamal stands for.

The first time we met, in June 2007, we were sitting in his living room in Peshawar, which is adorned with pinkish, flowery wallpaper. On the table between us was a photo album, the sort that might contain snaps of foreign holidays or grinning grandchildren. Instead it was a gallery of war: dozens of images of fierce-looking tribesmen, bristling with weapons, against a harsh backdrop of arid hills. Kamal featured in several of the pictures; in one he sat at the controls of a long, menacing weapon. It was an ack-ack, he explained: a 12.8cm anti-aircraft gun of the kind used by the British to fend off German bombers during the Second World War. A most satisfying weapon, he added, recounting its most recent use.

'You see, we were being fired on from three sides by some individuals who were hiding in a burj,' he said in his gravelly voice. 'So I called up my driver, Akhtar' - a smiling young chap I'd met earlier - 'and I said, "Bastard! Get that ack-ack and fire back!" So he grabbed it and gave it a burst of seven or eight rounds. What a noise - the whole ground started shaking! The bullets went right through that burj, killing two of those individuals who were sitting there.' He paused for effect, and then chuckled.

'Within a split of a second there was absolute silence. Everyone was calm and cool.'

This dramatic exchange had taken place in 2004 at the height of some particular aggravation with the Bhittanis, the Marwats' nearest neighbors and oldest rivals. A row had erupted and for the next year hotheads from both sides engaged in the usual needle tactics - tit-for-tat shootings, kidnappings, hostage executions - when things got out of hand. In a brash upping of the ante, the Bhittanis snatched two Marwat women. Kamal was outraged. 'Now, kidnapping men we don't mind. That is usual. But taking our ladies - that was totally unprecedented!'

In retaliation, first the Marwats kidnapped six Bhittani women and three children. Then they roused a lashkar - a tribal fighting force - with the aim of sweeping into the Bhittani lair, retrieving the abducted damsels and teaching their insolent neighbours a sharp lesson. Kamal led from the front, binoculars in one hand and pistol in the other. It was, by several accounts, a messy affair. The Pakistan Army, which was conducting operations in the nearby tribal belt, mistook the tribesmen for al-Qaeda fugitives and fired a few artillery rounds at them. 'A genuine misunderstanding,' said Kamal.

Combat was sporadic. The most dramatic confrontation occurred when Kamal's guards shot dead a pair of Bhittanis racing towards them on a motorbike. 'Two hundred bullets in each!' he recalled with relish. And the hostages were less lucky. One of the abducted women was burned alive with lamp oil (some said it was suicide, others murder); the second was spirited deep into the tribal belt. When the matter was finally resolved a year later, an inter-tribal jirga ordered the Marwats to pay 16 million rupees - about $260,000 - in blood money. It was expensive, Kamal admitted as we polished off our tea, but worth every cent. 'It's not about money. The question is: "Did you restore your honour?" And we did.'

 

[Patriot]

China: Checkmating India in Afghanistan | Indian Defence Review

China has shown interest in the construction of two railway lines—-one in Pakistan via the Gilgit-Baltistan region and the other in Afghanistan. While the railway line through Gilgit-Baltistan, ultimately extending up to Gwadar on the Mekran coast, will meet the external trade requirements of Chinese-controlled Xinjiang and other regions of Western China, the proposed line in Afghanistan will meet the requirements of a copper mine which China is developing in the Aynak area in Afghanistan.

A pre-feasibility study by a Chinese company has already been done in respect of the railway line through Gilgit-Baltistan and an agreement was reached during the visit of President Asif Ali Zardari to China in July to undertake a joint feasibility study by the railways of the two countries. In Afghanistan a joint feasibility study is to be undertaken by the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), which is developing the copper mine, and the Ministry of Mines of the Government of Afghanistan.
The total value of the Chinese investment in the copper mine alone will be almost three times the total value of the Indian investments in all projects in Afghanistan.

On September 22,2010, representatives of the Afghan Ministry of Mines and the MCC signed at Kabul an agreement to undertake the feasibility study. The MCC has, however, cautioned that a final decision on the construction of the railway line would depend on the security situation in Afghanistan. If the security situation deteriorated, the MCC may not go ahead with the proposal. While the Chinese do not anticipate any security problem in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, they do anticipate problems in Afghanistan.

Till now, the Taliban has not come in the way of the development of the copper mine. But, in January last, the Taliban kidnapped two Chinese road construction workers. One does not know what happened to them. Probably, the Chinese got them back after secretly paying a ransom.

The Chinese Communist Party-controlled " Global Times" wrote on January 19 last as follows: "The situation in war-torn Afghanistan is deteriorating as Taliban gunmen and suicide bombers attacked buildings across the heart of Kabul , killing at least five people and claiming that they had kidnapped two Chinese engineers working in the country. The kidnappings indicate that China must prepare to cope with crimes targeting overseas Chinese citizens as the country's presence expands worldwide, especially in some trouble spots, experts say. The engineers, who had been helping to build a road, were seized in the northern province of Faryab with four Afghans.

The Taliban claimed responsibility for the abductions. A spokesman of the militia said that a Taliban Islamic court would decide their fate. "¦.The Taliban's demands for the latest kidnapping are not clear. Reuters reported that the Taliban often kidnap foreigners as part of their campaign against coalition forces, but abductions have also become a lucrative business for criminal gangs and rival tribes.

A Chinese observer with years of experience working in Afghanistan told the Global Times that Chinese nationals had not been specifically targeted by the Taliban and the kidnapping may be in response to growing Chinese economic interests in the neighboring country. "Chinese enterprises have hired many armed security guards and tightened security measures to ensure safety for Chinese employees there," said the source, who asked to remain anonymous. "However, potential threats cannot be eliminated amid such a chaotic situation in the country." As China builds up its interests in Afghanistan, it faces a dilemma, the observer suggested. "Western nations raised their voice to call on China to offer military assistance.

Afghanistan is a thorny issue for the US. It might be one for China in the future," he warned. Afghan Minister for Mines Muhammad Ibrahim Adel told the Daily Telegraph in November that China has a growing role in the country. He said Chinese projects are likely to triple the Afghan government's revenues within five years. China Metallurgical Group and China's top integrated copper producer, Jiangxi Copper Corporation, in July started work in Logar, a province southeast of Kabul, to explore and develop the vast Aynak copper mines. The $4 billion investment was the biggest in Afghanistan's history and provided thousands of Afghans with jobs."

A question worrying the Chinese is whether the Taliban, which has close relations with the Islamic Movement of East Turkestan (IMET), will honour the agreements signed by the Hamid Karzai Government with China if it comes to power after the withdrawal of the US-led NATO troops. The Chinese are hoping that the Pakistan Government would persuade the Taliban to honour the agreements.

It has been stated that the railway line proposal is to connect China with Uzbekistan through Kabul and Aynak, which is to the south of Kabul. It is not clear wherefrom the proposed line will enter Afghanistan from China. The construction of the line, which is unlikely to start for another three years, might require the stationing of troops of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Afghanistan to protect the Chinese construction personnel. It is not clear how this could affect the functioning of Indian-aided projects in Afghanistan.

Speaking on the occasion of the signing of the agreement on the feasibility study, Mr.Zou Jianhui, President of the MCC, is reported to have stated as follows: . "We are still at an early stage. This feasibility study will take two, or two-and-a-half years. If over this period the Afghan security situation gets more stable, and the feasibility study results are good, then we can move ahead with the investment immediately. If the security situation gets worse, then at that time the investors will have to assess how to go forward. The MCC has to ensure the security of investors' assets, but felt the project would help Afghanistan's stability and economic development, and is keen to push ahead."

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According to the Reuter's news agency, a commitment to building the railway was included in a contract that the MCC won in 2008 to develop the Aynak copper deposit. China's top integrated copper producer Jiangxi Copper has a 25 per cent share holding in the project and the MCC the remaining 75 per cent. The two firms started construction of the project in July last year and expect it to produce 320,000 tonnes of copper concentrate annually, with production to begin in 2013 or 2014.

In his address to the London Conference on Afghanistan held in the last week of January,2010, Mr.Yang Jiechi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, said that since 2002, China has provided more than 900 million RMB yuan (132 million U.S. dollars) in grants to the Afghan Government and canceled all its mature debts. China announced in 2009 that an additional 75 million U.S.dollars in concessional loans which it had previously committed would also be converted into grants, to be provided over a five-year period. The first instalment of 15 million dollars was given in 2009.The remaining 60 million U.S. dollars will be made available in the coming four years.

By the end of 2009, China had trained over 500 Afghan government officials in areas such as diplomacy, economy and trade, medical and health care, finance, tourism, agriculture and counternarcotics. On August 16,2009, Mr.Karzai inaugurated at Kabul a 350-bed hospital called the Republic Hospital costing US Dollars 25 million constructed by the Chinese.

Since 2002, President Hamid Karzai has visited China four times. He paid his fourth visit in March last, accompanied by 20 businessmen. Premier Wen Jiabao reportedly told Mr. Karzai in their meeting that China would continuously provide aid to Afghanistan and pledged to enhance security and economic cooperation. In a joint statement issued at the end of the visit, China reiterated its support for peaceful reconstruction in Afghanistan. The two countries also agreed to expand economic cooperation and trade, increase mutual investment and technology transfer, and deepen cooperation in areas of transportation, agriculture and irrigation, energy, mining and infrastructure.

During the visit, Mr.Karzai and President Hu Jintao witnessed the signing of three documents on economic and technological cooperation, favorable tariffs for Afghan exports to China and bilateral training programs. The two way trade between the two countries reached 155 million US dollars in 2008.

The total value of the Chinese investment in the copper mine alone will be almost three times the total value of the Indian investments in all projects in Afghanistan. Pakistan, which has been repeatedly expressing concern over the Indian role in helping the Karzai Government, welcomes the Chinese role and would like it to increase further. It even wants the Chinese to join in training the Afghan National Army. The US, which has strongly opposed any Indian role in training the ANA, has no such objection to a Chinese role. But, Beijing itself, despite prodding from the US, is reluctant. It wants to see how the ground situation develops. It does not want to incur the wrath of the Taliban by any major role in training the ANA despite Pakistani assurances that there would be no retaliation from the Taliban.

Addressing a meeting at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington DC on September 20, Mr.James Steinberg, the US Deputy Secretary of State, reportedly said that China could play a role in bringing stability to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Indian role in Afghanistan—-yes, but. Chinese role in Afghanistan—yes, absolutely. That is the policy of the Obama Administration. The Chinese policy in Afghanistan has two objectives—-to enhance its strategic presence and influence and to checkmate the Indian strategic presence and influence. The US support for the Chinese policy will be to the detriment of India.

 

[Patriot]

21 Russian Mi-17 Helicopters for Afghan National Army Air Force
By Frontier India | September 29th, 2010 |

Defense Technology Inc. says that its procuring twenty-one new Mi-17 helicopters for Afghan National Army Air Force (ANAAF). DTI says that Russian Government has approved the plan. DTI is procuring the civilian variant Mi-17 aircraft on behalf of US Navy. The MI-17 medium lift helicopters are expected to be deployed as primary support aircraft for the ANAAF.

DTI in 2009 procured four new Mi-17 helicopters for Afghanistan in 2009 under the US Navy procurement program. All the four helicopters were delivered within 46 days after contract award. DTI also trains and maintains the Afghan Mi-17 helicopters.

The new contract is expected to be worth approximately $370M, and is expected to be awarded in October 2010.





21 Russian Mi-17 Helicopters for Afghan National Army Air Force | Frontier India Defense News

 

[SHASH2K2]

Chinese firm bags deal to link Pak, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan by rail


BEIJING: China is brokering a massive political and business deal that will result in rail links between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan in Central Asia. A Chinese company has bagged a contract from the Afghan government to carry out feasibility studies for the proposal line.

The proposed 700 kilometers line will run right through the hotly contested Taliban areas while connecting the Aynak copper mines in northern Afghanistan with Kabul and the two neighboring countries.

India has been eager to help Afghanistan build its railway system as part of the reconstruction efforts. But it has apparently been checkmated by China because of its influence as an investor in the local copper mines and Pakistan's aggressive support for the Chinese firm, sources said.

"This northern railway is part of a wider plan to extend the Afghan rail network to connect Afghanistan to ports in Iran and Pakistan," Wahidullah. Shahrani, Afghanistan's minister of mines. The rail link was essential for the transportation of iron ore and copper, he said.

The China Metallurgical Group Corporation, which has been involved in the development of Aynak copper mines, has been entrusted the task of carrying out feasibility studies, and work out the construction program.

MCC has estimated that the line will cost $5 billion and take five years to be completed, and half of the time would be spent on the feasibility study. It is obvious that the long two and half years kept aside for feasibility study is actually the waiting period required to ensure that the Taliban areas are peaceful enough to begin construction work.

The agreement with Afghan government specifies that MCC will lay the line under a build own, operate and transfer concession after the local government approves the feasibility study. MCC president Zou Jianhui recently said that the security factor was something his company was watching closely because it would put its investment to grave risks.

Read more: Chinese firm bags deal to link Pak, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan by rail - The Times of India Chinese firm bags deal to link Pak, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan by rail - The Times of India

 

[SHASH2K2]

I fail to understand how we fail to counter Chinese influence in Afganistan which is supposed to be our own backyard. We fail to get stake in huge mineral reserve there we fail to get Railways construction contract that too despite spending more than 1 billion in that country. Chinese on other hand are bagging important contracts despite spending not even a single penny.

 

[ajtr]

Ignatius, Kaplan, and Klein just don't get it: Petraeus is changing the Afghan war's intensity, not its overall strategy​

Here is a comment from Paula Broadwell, who is just your typical Army Reserve officer who is doing a PhD and writing a biography of General Petraeus on the side.

David Martin probably also should be on her corrections list.

By Paula Broadwell
Best Defense guest columnist

Some pretty smart columnists have written this week about a "shift in the strategic effort" in Afghanistan under Gen. David Petraeus from a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach to a counter-terrorism (CT) effort, but that strikes me as an overstatement.

Fred Kaplan of Slate states that "a shift in emphasis is"¦ altering the character of the war." David Ignatius of the Washington Post writes, "Petraeus is experimenting with another mix," and says that over the last four months, he has become "a CT wolf in a counterinsurgent in sheep's clothing." He hypothesizes that the "protean" Petraeus has rewritten "the playbook." Time's Joe Klein cites the same alleged "change" from counterinsurgency (COIN) toward heavy counterterrorism (CT), stating that CT is separate from COIN. What these guys don't get: CT has always been a part of Petraeus's comprehensive COIN strategy.

Here's what Kaplan, Ignatius and Klein should actually be observing: Since Petraeus has arrived in Afghanistan, he has increased the intensity of every element of a comprehensive civil-military COIN campaign, not just the so-called CT element. After my trip to Afghanistan last month, during which I visited at the battalion, division, and ISAF headquarters levels, it is clear to me that the "shift" is not one of focus, but of energy and increased intensity across all lines of the counterinsurgency effort. The Kaplan, Ignatius and Klein observations are based loosely on a recent increase in both air strikes and Special Operations Forces (SOF) targeted killing -- and they are certainly right about that. But take a deep breath, guys: CT operations have always been a key part of the kinetic component of COIN. In his speeches, articles, and doctrine over the past nine years, Petraeus has always been clear on this point. It was evident during his command in Iraq, and is equally so now in Afghanistan. For the record: CT is a subset of COIN. Here's a visual explanation:

As the Anaconda Slide illustrates, there is more than just a CT effort. The COMISAF Anaconda Strategy's seven lines of effort include kinetics, politics, intelligence, detainee operations, non-kinetics, international issues, and information operations. Collectively, these efforts seek to "choke" the eight key "needs" of the insurgency

The following provides some evidence of Petraeus's increased initiatives along each of these critical lines of effort:

The kinetic line of effort includes CT operations, and in this arena, as Kaplan, Ignatius and Klein point out, one cannot deny results. In a 90-day accumulated effects roll-up in late September 2010, ISAF SOF had conducted 2,795 "kinetic" operations (including targeted killing night raids and air strikes), captured or killed 285 insurgent "leaders," captured 2084 insurgents, and killed 889. As impressive as these numbers are, caution is always advised in determining their precise meaning when dealing with an insurgency as determined as the Taliban.

In any event, killing and capturing are not the only component of the kinetic line. From July to late September, ISAF SOF forces also conducted 1,823 population-centric non-kinetic operations. Petraeus's comprehensive COIN strategy clearly states that these CT and population-centric operations must be complemented by clear/hold/build operations of conventional forces, training of host nation elements, and local security initiatives. This comprehensive approach is a mantra Petraeus continues to push on his battlefield circulations and in his morning update briefs to field commanders. And ISAF troops appear to be doing it, though some would clearly prefer a steadier diet of kinetics.

During my visit with the 3/187th Rakkasans in Ghazni Province last month, a "CT plus conventional clear/hold/build approach" seemed very much in evidence. Task Force Iron, led by Lt. Col. David Fivecoat, has worked hard to clear the new area of operations and dismantle insurgent networks in the Ghazni area. They did this in cooperation with their Special Operations brethren, Task Force 3-10. But they quickly followed that CT and "clearing" efforts with "hold" and non-kinetic "build" initiatives right out of the Petraeus playbook. In the last eight months, the Rakkasans have spent over $150,000 in economic development, basic service provision, and jobs program efforts to rebuild Khezer Khell School, support Mata Khan Clinic, and institute other important capacity building efforts to empower the sub-district governors.

One potential capacity building "game changer," adopted this summer under President Hamid Karzai with Petraeus's "relentless prodding," is the Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative. The long-term impact of this program remains to be seen, but early reviews seem encouraging as it moves toward a goal of 20,000 recruits. Along with the Village Stability Operations, Petraeus has pushed hard to promote the ALP. The ALP program, for which there are 68 sites identified in eastern and central Afghanistan, now has around 250-350 police located at each site. Run by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior and mentored by U.S. Special Forces teams, the ALP have already helped with the disruption of insurgency IED networks. The ALP has yet to hit a tipping point, but it is an important component of the stabilization and transition plans that didn't gain traction under previous ISAF commanders.

The training of host nation elements is another critical component of the Anaconda Strategy that Petraeus has promoted over the past 100 days, especially that of professionalizing the force. Again, there are signs of progress, though much still remains to be done. One of the big ideas Petraeus embraced when he moved to Afghanistan last summer was "the need to change the COIN math, to figure out how to increase the numbers of ISAF/ANSF and to reduce the numbers" of fighters. The kill/capture roll-up rate mentioned above is one side of that ledger, and the other side is the now-complete surge of ISAF troops and the increase in ANSF troops. Though questions remain regarding their quality, the military and police training program is, in fact, ahead of October 2010 goals (Afghan National Army, Goal: 134K, Actual: 139K; Afghan National Police, Goal: 109K, Actual: 122K). As Petraeus acknowledges in his own presentations, thanks are due in part to the ground work laid by General McChrystal and ongoing efforts by Lt. Gen William B. Caldwell, but Petraeus has also accelerated efforts on this front. His trip to Brussels, London, and Rome this past week, and his effort to rally international support (especially for military and police trainers) seem to be yielding results. Back in Kabul, staff officers in the CJ5 claim that while sometimes it feels like "NATO has culminated," Petraeus is working to energize and refocus the contributions of allied nations. Again, time will tell how successful he is. And he's certainly not going to bat 1.000, with Italy, Holland and Canada already having announced near-term departure dates. But his efforts seem to be having an effect with most other NATO members.

To garner additional international support, Petraeus has formed a healthy partnership with his civilian counterpart, Ambassador Mark Sedwill, as he did with Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Iraq. This week, the two conducted a "relentless communication" campaign in Europe, briefing NATO/ISAF Ambassadors in Brussels. Petraeus met with the Belgian and British prime ministers. He also met with the Belgian, British, and Italian ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs; and various chiefs of Defense in their respective countries. In Italy, he briefed the senior representatives for Afghanistan and Pakistan at an International Contract Group on Af-Pak in Rome. It appeared a dizzying pace, but maybe not for vintage Petraeus, who puts as much emphasis on diplomacy and strategic communications as he does on counterterrorism. This belief in communication continues in routine meetings with coalition ambassadors in Afghanistan.

These efforts have been complemented by an accelerated political line of effort that include reconciliation, reintegration, governance, and -- under Brig. H.R. McMaster -- a focus on inclusivity, transparency, and anti-corruption. One initiative where Petraeus has focused immense attention and effort, for example, is a focus on fixing COIN contracting. As Petraeus's new October COIN Contracting Guidance says, "With proper oversight, contracting can spur economic development and support collective Afghan and ISAF objectives. But by spending large quantities of international contracting funds quickly and with insufficient oversight, some of those funds have unintentionally fueled corruption, financed insurgent organizations, strengthened criminal patronage networks, and undermined our efforts in Afghanistan." Petraeus made anti-corruption efforts "commander's business" and has focused equal attention on this aspect of the campaign as he has the CT effort. Now, in partnership with Karzai, he's trying to hold contractors accountable. It's a task that has defeated most everyone who has taken on corruption in Afghanistan, but Petraeus remains determined to make progress.

Petraeus has also placed increased emphasis on reconciliation and reintegration efforts in his first four months. "Reconciliation" focuses on senior Afghan leaders, most of who are hiding in Pakistan leading by cell phone. News of recent negotiations with senior Taliban this week indicates that small reconciliation efforts may be underway. "Reintegration" is conducted with those who are on the ground in Afghanistan -- mid-level leaders including district shadow governors and below. The objective, Petraeus said in a recent interview, "is to take away as many of the rank and file, take them off the battlefield again turn them from bad guys to good guys" or at least prevent them from "trying to kill our troopers and our Afghan partners and civilians." Intel chatter interdicted via low-level voice intercepts has shown that some senior-level insurgents feel coalition force pressure across their networks. Some reports indicate they may be willing to "cut a deal," as the recent negotiations between the Afghan government and Taliban portend. Speculation about negotiations has cast some doubt in the minds of low-level insurgents who speculate that "senior insurgent leaders are defecting," according to a senior ISAF official in October.

Gathering that type of atmospheric about the Taliban has only been possible through increased intelligence efforts, another area of emphasis. Some of these intelligence initiatives were initiated under McChrystal while Petraeus was still CENTCOM Commander. These efforts included acquiring 2,000 more intelligence officials for the command, and pushing intelligence analyst out on raids because "if you want them to know what is going on, they have to know what is going on," according to CJ2, MG Mike Flynn. Petraeus has also promoted the "fusion cell" concept from the strategic to the tactical levels; he deems this more important even than the other enablers like ISR platforms, SIGINT intercepts, and full-motion videos. Additionally, the biometrics program, which overlaps with the detainee operations line of effort and now has over one million Afghans registered, has helped empower the Afghan government in its correction, detention, rule of law efforts, and local intelligence gathering efforts.

The comprehensive COIN effort would not be complete without credible voices and strategic communications plan, both of which fall under the information operations line of effort. In that vein, Petraeus's COIN guidance says simply that U.S. forces should "be the first with truth." His Information Operations Task Force has condemned the brutal Taliban killing of sub-district governors or Taliban attacks on sacred mosques, and he has ordered an investigation into the botched rescue attempt that killed Linda Norgrove. Petraeus is also candid about the many challenges in this war, admitting that his 15-hour days, 7 days a week are sustainable but he doesn't have "much of a reserve." Petraeus conscientiously avoids the word "optimistic," labeling himself instead as a qualified realist.

For the other realists who are watching Afghanistan, there has not been a shift in the war strategy. The strategy that President Obama sent Petraeus there to execute hasn't changed, and neither has Petraeus's momentum: this is a multi-pronged comprehensive COIN strategy, intensified across all lines of effort -- and Petraeus is "all in."

Paula Broadwell, a West Point graduate, is the author of the forthcoming book, All In: The Education of General David Petraeus (Penguin Press, 2011). The views expressed here are her own and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or Derek Jeter.

 

[ajtr]

The road to peace in Afghanistan is blocked by Western ignorance​

The Afghan experience during the past years shows that an escalation of American and NATO fighting in Afghanistan, and promises from Pakistan to do more, have done little to bring a change on the battleground.
There are two reasons for this. First, the Taliban are predominantly a Pashtun movement. The Pashtuns, who have traditionally ruled Afghanistan, make up half the population.The power balance in the country was destroyed by the US-led invasion in 2001. Since then, there has been a growing sense among the Pashtuns that the foreign military presence is aimed solely at alienating and marginalising them. The Taliban manipulation of the situation, plus Western backing of the Karzai regime, has convinced them that their future is with the Taliban, regardless of whether they agree with the Taliban's mediaeval ideology.

It is undeniably true that Western forces continue to back a coalition of warlords that sprang from Afghan ethnic minorities known as the Northern Alliance. The warlords use the Western presence to undermine the Pashtuns' traditional status, politically and socially. That's why such tenacious antagonism on the part of tens of millions of Pashtuns towards the West remains an unending source of recruitment for the Taliban.

In the most recent example, President Hamid Karzai formed a High Council for Peace and made former president Burhanuddin Rabbani its chairman. Rabbani and many members of the council were on one side of the civil war in post-Soviet Afghanistan that left, according to the UN, about 80,000 civilians dead. His Northern Alliance was militarily defeated and ousted from Kabul by the Taliban in 1994. It is most likely that Rabbani would move the Taliban even further away from any negotiating table.

The Russians never isolated the Pashtuns during their occupation in the 1980s and, despite their tilt towards the Afghan ethnic minorities, they followed a policy of Pashtun fighting Pashtun. Even though most of Karzai's cabinet members are now Pashtuns, it is largely symbolic for they have no power.It should come as no surprise that the West is finding it increasingly difficult to manage the explosive issue of the Afghan internal power balance. We should not consider the Taliban to be merely an extremist religious entity such as Hamas or Hezbollah. Their religious conservatism is deeply interwoven with Pashtun nationalism.

The second factor is Pakistan's double-dealing. Pakistani leaders know the situation better than any stakeholder in the war in Afghanistan. The Pakistani military would never confront Pashtuns who are now able, militarily, to end Pakistan's control over its north-western tribal belt. So Pakistan's gesture about Northern Waziristan is just like its other empty promises.Many Taliban bases are in the tribal areas side by side with Pakistani police stations. The Pakistani military might at best transfer the Afghan Taliban forces to some other location and try to launch some mock operations in order to keep money flowing into the country from Washington.These two factors have been largely ignored by the West. And because of that, there is little hope that the strategy of fighting for peace is going to work in Afghanistan.

An estimated 50 million Pashtuns straddling both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border sympathise with the Taliban.In the months to come, we may see Western military successes, but we should not forget that the winter is a time of respite for the Taliban, and they bounce back in spring.The two narratives at work now in Afghanistan are unlikely to produce a favourable outcome for the Western coalition forces. The military pursuit to bring the Taliban to heel has failed in the past. Clearing Afghanistan of the Taliban, while their regeneration powerhouse is thriving, seems to be a lost cause.

 

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US dug in for long haul in Afghanistan ​

By Nick Turse

Some go by names steeped in military tradition like Leatherneck and Geronimo. Many sound fake-tough, like Ramrod, Lightning, Cobra, and Wolverine. Some display a local flavor, like Orgun-E, Howz-e-Madad, and Kunduz. All, however, have one thing in common: they are US and allied forward operating bases, also known as FOBs.

They are part of a base-building surge that has left the countryside of Afghanistan dotted with military posts, themselves expanding all the time, despite the drawdown of forces promised by President Barack Obama beginning in July 2011.

The US military does not count the exact number of FOBs it has built in Afghanistan, but forward operating bases and other



facilities of similar or smaller size make up the bulk of US outposts there. Of the hundreds of US bases in the country, according to Gary Younger, a US public affairs officer with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 77% house units of battalion size (approximately 500 to 1,000 troops) or smaller; 20% are occupied by units smaller than a Brigade Combat Team (about 3,000 troops); and 3% are huge bases, occupied by units larger than a Brigade Combat Team, that generally boast large-scale military command-and-control capabilities and all the amenities of Anytown, USA. Younger tells TomDispatch that ISAF does not centrally track its base construction and upgrading work, nor the money spent on such projects.

However, Major General Kenneth S Dowd - the director of logistics for US Central Command for three years before leaving the post in June - offered this partial account of the ongoing Afghan base build-up in the September/October issue of Army Sustainment, the official logistics journal of the army:

"Military construction projects scheduled for completion over the next 12 months will deliver four new runways, ramp space for 8 C-17 transports, and parking for 50 helicopters and 24 close air support and 26 intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. This represents roughly one-third of the airfield paving projects currently funded in the Afghanistan theater of operations. Additional minor construction plans called for the construction of over 12 new FOBs and expansion of 18 existing FOBs."

If Dowd offered the barest sketch of some of the projects planned or underway, a TomDispatch analysis of little-noticed US government records and publications, including US Army and Army Corps of Engineers contracting documents and construction-bid solicitations issued over the past five months, fills in the picture. The documents reveal plans for large-scale, expensive Afghan base expansions of every sort and a military that is expecting to pursue its building boom without letup well into the future. These facts-on-the-ground indicate that, whatever timelines for phased withdrawal may be issued in Washington, the US military is focused on building up, not drawing down, in Afghanistan.

Jobs on FOBs
A typical forward operating base set to undergo expansion is FOB Salerno, a post located near the Afghan city of Khost, not far from the Pakistani border. According to documents from the US Army Corps of Engineers, plans are in the works for an expansion of that base's fuel facilities. Estimated to cost $10 million to $25 million, these upgrades will increase fuel storage capacity to one million gallons to enhance land and air operations, and may not be completed for a year and a half; that is, until well into 2012.

In June, work was completed on a new, nearly $12 million runway at FOB Shank, near the city of Puli Alam in Logar province, south of Kabul. The base was formerly accessible only by road and helicopter, but its new 1.4-mile-long airstrip can now accommodate large Lockheed C-130 Hercules and Boeing C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, enabling ever larger numbers of personnel to be deployed to the site.

Not surprisingly, government documents released in August show that FOB Shank is also set for a major boost in troop housing. Already home to approximately 4,500 military personnel, it will be adding a new two-story barracks, constructed of containerized housing units known as "relocatable buildings" or RLBs, to accommodate 1,100 more troops.

Support facilities, access roads, parking areas, new utilities, and other infrastructure required to sustain the housing complex will also be installed for an estimated $5 million to $10 million. In addition, the army Corps of Engineers just began seeking contractors to add 452,000 square feet (419,000 square meters) of airfield parking space at the base. It's meant for Special Operations Forces' helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. New aircraft maintenance facilities and 80,000 square feet more of taxiways will also be built at the cost of another $10 million to $25 million.

Documents reveal that this sort of expansion is now going on at a remarkably rapid pace all over the country. For instance, major expansions of infrastructure to support helicopter operations, including increased apron space, taxiways, and tarmac for parking, servicing, loading, and unloading are planned for facilities like FOB Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan province, FOB Dwyer, a Marine base in Helmand province, and FOB Sharana, a Paktika province base near the Pakistani border, where the army also announced plans for the construction of an ammunition supply facility, with storage space for one million pounds of munitions, and related infrastructure.

In late August, Walter Pincus of the Washington Post reported that construction was slated to begin on at least three $100 million base projects, including FOB Dwyer, that were not "expected to be completed until the latter half of 2011". In addition to enhancing helicopter operations infrastructure, plans were also announced for the construction of a new, large-scale wastewater treatment facility at Dwyer, a project estimated to cost another $10 million to $25 million and, like so much of what is now being built by the US military in the backlands of Afghanistan, it is not expected to be completed and put fully into use until well into the second half of 2011, if not later , that is, after Obama's theoretical due date for beginning to lessen the mission in that country.

And whenever you stumble on a document indicating that work of a certain sort is taking place at one FOB, you can be sure that, sooner or later, you will find similar work at other FOBs. In this case, for example, FOB Frontenac in Kandahar province and Tarin Kowt, north of Kandahar, are, like Dwyer, slated to receive new wastewater plants.

Much of this work may sound mundane, but the scale of it isn't. Typical is another of the bases identified by Pincus, FOB Shindand in western Afghanistan, which is to receive, among other things, new security fencing, new guard towers, and new underground electrical lines. And that's just to begin the list of enhancements at Shindand, including earthen berms for four 200,000-gallon "expeditionary fuel bladders and a concrete pad suitable for parking and operating fourteen R-11 refueling vehicles" - tanker trucks with a 6,000-gallon capacity - as well as new passenger processing and cargo handling facilities (an $18 million contract) and an expansion of helicopter facilities (another $25 million to $50 million).

Multiply this, FOB by FOB, the length and breadth of Afghanistan, and you have a building program fit for a long war.

Permanent bases?
This building boom has hardly been confined to FOBs. Construction and expansion work at bases far larger than FOBs, including the mega-bases at Bagram and Kandahar, is ongoing, often at a startling pace. The army, for example, has indicated it plans to build a 24,000 square-foot, $10-million command-and-control facility as well as a "Joint Defense Operations Center" with supporting amenities - from water storage tanks to outdoor landscaping - at Bagram Air Base.

At bustling Kandahar air field, the military has offered contracts for a variety of upgrades, including a $28.5 million deal for the construction of an outdoor shelter for fighter aircraft, as well as new operations and maintenance facilities and more apron space, among a host of other improvements.

In June, Noah Shachtman of Wired.com's Danger Room reported on the army's plans to expand its Special Operations headquarters at Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan and cited documents indicating that construction would include a "communications building, tactical operations center, training facility, medical aid station, vehicle maintenance facility ... dining facility, laundry facility, and a kennel to support working dogs." A contract for that work, worth $30 million, was awarded at the end of September.

Similarly, according to a recent article in the Marine Corps Times, Camp Leatherneck, which expanded in late 2009 from a 660-acre (267 hectares) facility to 1,550 acres, or approximately 2.4 square miles (6.21 square kilometers), is slated to add three new gyms to the one already there, as well as a chapel complex with three separate buildings (one big enough to accommodate up to 200 people), a second mess hall (capable of serving 4,000 marines at a time), a new PX housed in a big-top tent, with 10,000 square feet of sales space - the current base facility only has 3,000 square feet - and the installation of a $200 million runway that can accommodate C-5 cargo planes and 747 passenger jets.

Despite a pledge from the Obama administration to begin its troop drawdowns next July, this ongoing base-construction splurge, when put together with recent signals from the White House, civilians at the Pentagon, and top military commanders, including Afghan war chief General David Petraeus, suggests that the process may be drawn out over many years. During a recent interview with ABC News senior foreign affairs correspondent Martha Raddatz, for instance, Petraeus affirmed the president's July 2011 timeline, but added a crucial caveat. "It will be a pace that is determined by conditions," he said.

Almost a decade into the Afghan War, he claimed, the US military had "finally gotten the inputs right in Afghanistan." Raddatz then asked if the "counter-insurgency clock" had just restarted - if, that is, it could be another nine or 10 years to achieve success. "Yeah," replied Petraeus, hastening to add that American soldiers killed there over the previous nine years had not simply died for nothing. "But it is just at this point that we feel that we do have the organizations that we learned in Iraq and from history are necessary for the conduct that this kind of campaign."

The building boom occurring on US bases across Afghanistan and the contracts for future construction being awarded at the moment seem to confirm that, whatever the White House has in mind, the military is operating on something closer to the Petraeus timeline. The new special operations base at Mazar-e-Sharif, to take but one of many examples, may not be completed and fully occupied for at least a year and a half. Other construction contracts, not yet even awarded, are expected to take a year or more to complete. And military timelines suggest that, if the Pentagon gets its way, American troop levels may not dip below the numbers present when Obama took office, approximately 36,000 troops, until 2016 or beyond.

At the moment, the American people are being offered one story about how the American war in Afghanistan is to proceed, while in Afghanistan their tax dollars are being invested in another trajectory entirely. The question is: How permanent are US bases in Afghanistan? And if they are not meant to be used for a decade or more to come, why is the Pentagon still building as if they were?

Recently, the army sought bids from contractors willing to supply power plants and supporting fuel systems at forward operating bases in Afghanistan for up to five years. Power plants, fuel systems, and the bases on which they are being built are facts on the ground. Such facts carry a weight of their own, and offer a window into US designs in Afghanistan that may be at least as relevant as anything Barack Obama or his aides have been saying about draw-downs, deadlines, or future withdrawal plans.

If you want to ask hard questions about America's Afghan war, start with those bases.

Nick Turse is the associate editor of TomDispatch.com. An award-winning journalist, his work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, and regularly at TomDispatch. His latest book, The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Verso Books), which brings together leading analysts from across the political spectrum, has just been published. Turse is currently a fellow at Harvard University's Radcliffe Institute. You can follow him on Twitter @NickTurse, on Tumblr, and on Facebook. His website is NickTurse.com.

 

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Smoke and Mirrors in Kabul​

Don't believe the hype about reconciliation talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban -- this war isn't even close to over.

For the past two weeks, reputable U.S. and British newspapers have been filled with articles touting progress in negotiations between the government in Kabul and Afghanistan's major insurgent groups. On Oct. 20, for example, the New York Times reported that Afghan reconciliation talks "involve extensive, face-to-face discussions with Taliban commanders from the highest levels of the group's leadership." These articles have been accompanied by optimistic reports that the United States and its NATO allies have decimated the Taliban's leadership in southern Afghanistan.

As someone who has fought in Afghanistan on two occasions and served briefly as a civilian advisor to the NATO command group there in 2009, I hope the reports are true. The idea that an end to the fighting in Afghanistan and the involvement of the 100,000 U.S. troops in the country might be just around the corner is seductive. However, there is good reason to be skeptical of the reporting coming out of Kabul and Washington.

Civil wars and insurgencies such as the one in Afghanistan usually end through some kind of negotiated settlement between the antagonists. The United States' war-weary public is clearly eager to bring the majority of U.S. troops home, and the NATO command in Afghanistan has prioritized reconciliation just as much as fighting the Taliban and training the Afghan national security forces. Much time has been spent determining both the red lines of NATO and its Afghan partners and those areas in which they could compromise with the insurgent groups.

But Afghans are perfectly comfortable talking while still fighting. So too, at least in practice, are the United States and its allies: In insurgencies from Vietnam to Northern Ireland, we have negotiated with insurgents while combat operations were ongoing. In the American public's mind, however, wars take place sequentially: First, you fight; second, you negotiate a settlement. The word "negotiations" conjures up hopes for an end to the conflict in the minds of Americans and other Westerners -- when all that really might be occurring is another round of jockeying for position between Afghanistan's warring political forces.

U.S. President Barack Obama, who carried out an otherwise responsible review of U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in the fall of 2009, blundered when he publicly announced that the United States would begin a withdrawal from Afghanistan in July 2011. Within the ranks of Afghanistan's insurgent groups and even among our allies and the civilians in the country, this date was interpreted to mean that a total withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces was imminent. No insurgent group, to paraphrase defense analyst Stephen Biddle, was about to accept a loaf of bread when the bakery was on offer. Why would the Taliban and other insurgent groups negotiate when the United States was on its way out already?

The problem of Afghanistan's varied insurgent groups also complicates reconciliation talks. Of the three principal insurgent groups, only Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) might be considered ripe for any kind of reconciliation with the government in Kabul. But the HIG is arguably the least significant of the major insurgent groups, and even then, Gulbuddin himself would not likely be allowed to play a role in an Afghan government.

Of the other two groups, the Haqqani network, under the leadership of Sirajuddin Siraj Haqqani, maintains strong ties to al Qaeda and is considered more or less irreconcilable, while the Quetta Shura Taliban is thought to be reconcilable only if Mullah Mohammed Omar himself approves of the reconciliation process. The insurgents in Afghanistan are no more unitary an actor than the Afghan government or the NATO coalition, further complicating negotiations.All that, to make matters worse, assumes the insurgent groups are independent actors. The reality, though, is that negotiations between the insurgent groups and the government in Kabul will only go so far as the Pakistani security services allow. Some Western analysts took heart in Pakistan's decision in February to arrest Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. At the time, however, the arrest of Mullah Baradar, who was in negotiations with the government in Kabul, was interpreted by the Taliban rank and file to be a stark warning to those who would negotiate without the permission of the Pakistani government, under whose patronage and protection the Taliban has operated east of the Durand Line since 2005. Today it is widely accepted that this was indeed the case and that Pakistan deliberately thwarted negotiations between the Quetta Shura Taliban and the government in Kabul to serve its own parochial interests. Since that event, there is no sign that Pakistan's powerful military has taken a softer line on negotiations between the Taliban and the government in Kabul.

Finally, if one surveys the history of civil wars and insurgencies, the evidence for negotiations leading to a more secure environment -- without robust security operations first setting the conditions for those negotiations -- is weak. The way the U.S. military established control over the population in Baghdad in 2007, by contrast, contributed to an environment that not only led formerly malign Sunni insurgents to join local security forces, but also provided time and space for a more peaceful political process to move forward.

But here a sliver of hope remains. Although the reporting of how the United States and its allies have "routed" the Taliban in southern Afghanistan has been very thinly sourced, it is clear the U.S. military has been attempting, in Afghanistan, to replicate the success it had in Iraq in 2007 -- destroying the mid-level operational leadership of the insurgent groups, which in turn collapsed the networks and rendered them ineffective.

However, very little of what is taking place in southern Afghanistan can be known with any certainty. Journalists have been denied access to ongoing military operations and, though it is believed that the U.S. military and its allies have indeed been degrading the Taliban and its ability to reconstitute its organization once the fighting season resumes in the spring, questions remain: Did the U.S. military wait until too late in the fighting season to inflict serious damage on the Taliban before its fighters withdrew for the winter? Is the current drop in insurgent attacks any different from the normal seasonal drop in attacks that precedes the onset of winter? Is the degradation of the Taliban's organization forcing it to the negotiation table? And has the Taliban realized that the United States is not, in fact, leaving in July 2011?

It might be quite some time before we know the answers to these questions. For now, though, we can be sure of one thing: The two hopeful front-page articles in the New York Times this week relied heavily, almost exclusively, on sources within the International Security Assistance Force command in Kabul. Both articles suggest that the ability of Gen. David Petraeus, the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, to deliver the message he wants via the U.S. media has followed him intact from Iraq. It is still unclear whether the United States and its allies have managed to capture momentum in Afghanistan. In Washington, however, this narrative already appears to have won the day.

 

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'Peace with Honor' in Afghanistan? The problem with historical amnesia

I'd like to believe that the United States and its(remaining) allies have got their act together and turned a corner inAfghanistan. Really. That's more-or-less what New York Times reporter Carlotta Galltold us in a front-page piece yesterday, and it was the key theme of retiredgeneral Jack Keane's appearance on Charlie Rose a couple of nights ago.

It would obviously be better for nearly everyone if theTaliban were routed, if order and security were restored in Afghanistan, and ifthe United States could extricate itself from this costly and seemingly open-endedcommitment. But there are at leasttwo good reasons to view these upbeat reports with some skepticism.

First, U.S. commanders have emphasized in the past that thisconflict is largely one of perceptions. If everyone thinks we're winning, so the argument runs, then fence-straddlers inAfghanistan will tilt our way and popular support in the United States will remain high enough to keep us in the war. If everyone thinks we're losing, by contrast, momentum will swing theother way, more Afghans will gravitate toward the Taliban, and support back here will evaporate. Unfortunately, this situation meanswe can't really believe anything that our military leaders tell us about theprogress of the war, because they have an obvious incentive to spin an upbeatstory to reporters, or to people like Charlie Rose.

Second, as critics of the war have repeatedly pointed out,defeating the Taliban on the battlefield is nearly impossible as long as theycan go to ground in local areas or flee across the border into Pakistan. And Gall's story in the Times makes it clear that this isprecisely what is happening now. This is undoubtedly why the Obama administration is makingyet another effort to get Pakistan to do more on its side of the border, anddangling a fat new military aid package as inducement. And at the same time, we're supposedly supportingnegotiations with certain Taliban leaders, and we might even be willing to back some sort of deal.

So let me tell you what I think is going to happen. The United States is going to spend thenext few months trying to clear out or kill as many Taliban as we can find,accompanied by a lot of optimistic reports about how well we are doing. Thiswon't be about a "hearts and minds" approach or even a long-term strategy of nation-building;it will be about creating the appearance of momentum and success. At the same time, we're going to try to shepherd a politicalprocess that can be sold as "peace deal" between the Karzai government and somemoderate Taliban. If we're reallylucky and offer big enough bribes (oops, I mean foreign aid), we might getPakistan to pretend to be on board too.And then Obama will claim "the Afghan surge worked" sometime in thelatter half of 2011, and begin withdrawing U.S. troops.

As our numbers fall, the Taliban will regroup, Pakistan willhelp rearm them covertly, and the struggle for power in Afghanistan will resume. Afghanistan's fate will once again be primarily in the handsof the Afghan people and the nearby neighbors who meddle there for their ownreasons. I don't know who willwin, but it actually won't matter very much for U.S. national securityinterests.

There are ample historical precedents for this sort ofoutcome. The Soviet Unionconcocted a peace deal before they withdrew in 1988, but their chosensuccessor, Najibullah, didn't last long once they had left. (Notice, however, that their enemies in Afghanistan didn't "follow them home" either). The United States achieved "peace withhonor" in the 1973 Vietnam peace accords, but then Saigon fell two yearslater. No matter; the United States ended up winning the Cold War anyway. And then there's Iraq,where the 2007 "surge" was hailed as a great military victory but is nowunraveling. In each case, thepeace deal was mostly a fig leaf designed to let a great power get out of acostly war without admitting it had been beaten.

Petraeus & Co. are trying to pull off something similarhere, and it may well be the best that can be made of a bad situation. But there is a subtle, long-term dangerin this sort of sleight-of-hand. If we tell ourselves we won and then get out, we will end up learningthe wrong lessons from the whole experience. By portraying the Iraqi and Afghan "surges" as victories, wefool ourselves into thinking that this sort of war is something we are good atfighting, that the benefits of doing so are worth the costs, and that all it takes to win this sortof war is the right commander, the right weapons, and the right FieldManual. And if we indulge in this familiarform of historical amnesia, we'll be more likely to make similar errors downthe road.

Update: According to McClatchey, those recent stories about the United States facilitating peace talks between Taliban leaders and the Karzai government are part of an elaborate "psychological operation" designed to sow dissension within Taliban ranks. I don't know if that's true or not, but if it is, it suggests that the U.S. military is either still hoping for a decisive victory over the Taliban (which would make negotiations unnecessary), or it thinks that the Taliban has to be weakened a lot more before negotiations are likely to work. I think the latter is more likely, but it still leaves open the possibility of "declaring victory" and getting out, starting next summer. We'll see.

 

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Pakistan to walk tightrope on Afghan peace​

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan will need to walk a tightrope to secure its interests in US-backed reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan, at risk of being sidelined by the Taliban and the Kabul government, analysts say.

British and US newspapers have been awash with reports on the nature of peace efforts needed to end the nine-year Taliban insurgency and allow the 150,000 US-led Nato contingent in Afghanistan to withdraw.

The Taliban have denied any talks are taking place, and Afghan and Pakistani experts on insurgent groups dismiss such reports as Western propaganda.

But Pakistan is determined to ensure that an allied government is in power in Kabul once the United States and its allies have withdrawn their troops from Afghanistan.

Washington and Kabul agree there can be no peace in Afghanistan without cooperation from Pakistan, which has repeatedly offered to facilitate reconciliation efforts.

For 10 years, Islamabad has been America's ally in the war, despite widespread public opposition and militant bomb attacks across the country that have killed more than 3,740 people in three years.

But Pakistan is supposedly not trusted fully by either the Afghan and US governments, which accuse its powerful military of continuing to foster the Afghan Taliban it allegedly spawned during the 1980s resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Pakistan and Afghanistan also share a large ethnic Pashtun population, which traditionally does not recognise the border drawn between the two countries in the British colonial era and from whom the bulk of the Taliban are drawn.

"We are in contact with all ethnic groups, not just Pashtuns, in Afghanistan," said one Pakistani official on condition of anonymity.

Yet Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani said late last month that Afghan President Hamid Karzai had yet to brief the government on his plans.

"It is not necessary that we're in the loop at every stage or kept informed of all developments or meetings," said the Pakistani official.

Pakistan considers Afghanistan a strategic asset, where a friendly government in Kabul can help offset the increasing power flexed by arch rival India, hence its diplomatic recognition of the 1996-2001 Taliban regime.

Afghan insurgents with rear bases in Pakistan's tribal belt, which are subject to an escalating US drone war, criss-cross the porous border with ease.

The Afghan government's High Council for Peace has included Pakistan, along with Iran and Saudi Arabia in the list of Muslim countries it has asked for assistance, according to its spokesman Mualavi Qeyamudin Kashaf.

But Rahimullah Yusufzai, one of Pakistan's foremost experts on militant groups, warns that Islamabad needs to confront its limitations.

"We should be very careful. It is possible that we won't get anything at the end of the day.

"Some Taliban commanders may not agree to a Pakistani role because they still believe Islamabad betrayed them by siding with the Americans after 9/11."

Afghan analyst and former Taliban foreign ministry official, Waheed Mujda, agreed that Pakistan's influence is in decline.

"The Taliban are now almost an independent Islamic movement, supported by many Islamic groups in the world. Pakistan knows that it does not have the same level of influence over the Taliban that they once enjoyed," he told AFP.

Pakistan also has to navigate the pressures from the United States.

Keen to end the war and weaken the Taliban as much as possible, the US drone campaign has stepped up attacks in Pakistan's tribal belt and Nato helicopters from Afghanistan have pursued militants into Pakistani territory.

Pakistan will have to deal with whoever fills the power vacuum left by departing American troops.

"Pakistan cannot walk away from this neighbourhood," said Imtiaz Gul, a Pakistani analyst and author on the tribal belt.

"America can think of an end game when they think of a draw down, but being neighbours, our priority should be to think of improving relationship with Afghanistan. For Pakistan, it will be a major challenge."

Retired lieutenant general Talat Masood said he believes, for example, that Pakistan has no choice but protect itself from US pressure for an offensive in North Waziristan — an alleged bastion of the Afghan Taliban and its allied Haqqani network.

"The US wants to convince the Taliban that dialogue is perhaps the only solution"¦they (America) know our limitations (in terms of an offensive)."