Pakistan Failed State must read

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    Pakistan
    Failed State
    Shiv Sastry
    2
    COPYLEFT LICENCE
    Licence is hereby granted to make as many copies of
    this book as needed, and for the book to be
    distributed to anyone free of charge on condition that
    no modifications are made and no profit is made from
    the sharing of this work.
    3
    Dedicated to the memory of my cousin,
    late Wg Cdr. Kukke Suresh, VrC
    4
    FOREWORD
    The reason for writing this book is explained in the
    first chapter. Once I had collected the reference
    material it took me only three months to write the book.
    It then took me two years to refine and release the book
    as a freely downloadable e-book.
    I must take this opportunity to thank members of the
    forum at www.bharat-rakshak.com for their invaluable and
    selfless help in digging up material that served as
    references for this book.
    Furthermore I wish to thank the dozen or so people who
    helped me proof read the book and came up with useful
    suggestions. Prominent among these are ramana, acharya,
    kgoan and sudhir.
    Shiv
    January 20, 2007
    5
    CHAPTERS
    1 Why Pakistan? Page 6
    2 The people of Pakistan Page 14
    3 Education Page 20
    4 Industries and Economy of Pakistan Page 35
    5 Pakistani psyche general observations Page 43
    6 Women and Minorities of Pakistan Page 65
    7 Partition and the two-nation theory Page 71
    8 Islam and Pakistan Page 80
    9 Attitudes toward India and Indians Page 93
    10 The Pakistani Army Page 99
    11 Kashmir, plebiscite, Wars and genocide Page 117
    12 Provinces and Assorted Fragments Page 131
    13 Pakistan, Jihad and Terrorism Page 135
    14 The Government and criminal activity Page 147
    15 Pakistan - Failed state Page 160
    Appendix 1 Page 174
    Appendix 2 Page 177
    Appendix 3 Page 180
    Appendix 4 Page 183
    References Page 186
    6
    Chapter 1
    WHY PAKISTAN?
    Why write about Pakistan?
    Pakistan is a huge, populous and diverse nation that has
    the curious distinction of having been suddenly born in
    1947, and it has been an aggressive and implacable
    neighbor of India.
    Most Indians do not understand Pakistan or Pakistanis.
    Many tend to look at the similarities and remark,
    "Pakistanis are just like us". That may appear true but
    it is important to understand that Pakistanis do not feel
    like Indians and do not like to say "Indians are just
    like us". In fact Pakistanis have spent all those decades
    since independence trying to show how Pakistan is not
    like India. And in the intervening years Pakistan,
    Pakistani institutions and Pakistanis have developed
    certain unique and recognizable defining features. While
    these features have been noted time and again by
    innumerable people in a large number of books, newspaper
    reports and magazines, no effort been made to collect
    this information and put it all together between the
    covers of a single book.
    More that anything else, this book can be considered a
    Review of the literature on Pakistan. In the field of
    medical research, a Review of the literature is often
    used to collect and collate information about a disease
    from various sources. Such a review collects up all the
    available information about a given disease from all the
    medical papers available on the subject and consolidates
    the information in one document. That document then
    serves as a comprehensive reference point for information
    about the subject.
    7
    This book is a collection and review of what has been
    written about Pakistan in various sources over many
    years. It is a summary of the experiences and
    descriptions of many people who have reported or written
    about Pakistan. The book carries many direct quotes from
    various authors and these quotes are in italics, while
    the sources from which the quotes have been taken are
    listed in the reference section at the end of the book.
    There are a few things that Indian readers should keep in
    mind while reading this book.
    First, referring to Pakistan does not mean that we are
    obliquely referring to Indian Muslims. Indians often
    become embarrassed or angry in discussions about Pakistan
    and Pakistanis. Indians who talk about Pakistan or Islam
    are often considered to be opponents of secularism and
    tolerance, and are sometimes called saffron sympathisers.
    For this reason Pakistan and Islamic extremism emanating
    from Pakistan have almost been taboo subjects in India,
    not to be discussed by secular non-Muslim Indians, lest
    they should hurt the sentiments of Muslims in India. An
    automatic and needless mental connection is made between
    the subject of Pakistan and the Muslims of India. This is
    both unfortunate and unfair to Indian Muslims. Today,
    Indian Muslims are quite different from Pakistanis, and
    it is an insult to Indian Muslims to refer to them as
    being associated with Pakistan.
    Vir Sanghvi, the managing editor of the Hindustan Times
    has written about this (1):
    At a sub-conscious level, some Indians make the
    simplistic assumption that because (nearly) all
    Pakistanis are Muslims, so all Muslims must be Pakistanis
    in their hearts. This is an obvious logical fallacy and
    it is also deeply insulting to all Indian Muslims -
    8
    including Zaheer Khan and Irfan Pathan who are setting
    out for Pakistan, determined to keep the Indian flag
    flying on the cricket field, to say nothing of the
    thousands of Muslims who have died fighting Pakistan.
    It requires a deliberate act of mental re-orientation for
    non-Muslims in India to learn to talk about Pakistanis
    without equating them with Indian Muslims. This vestigial
    thought process remains in many Indian minds like a dark
    cloud, a hangover from partition, and that is
    unfortunate. Pakistan is Pakistan, a separate nation, and
    Pakistanis are Pakistanis, not Indians. Pakistanis are no
    longer Indians. Indians are Indians, not Pakistanis.
    Muslims in India are not Pakistanis, they are Indians.
    Confusion and misunderstanding in Indian attitudes more
    than five decades after independence are certainly a
    factor in the Indian inability to develop a coherent
    Pakistan policy.
    Another point to note is that no discussion or
    description of Pakistan can even begin to be meaningful
    without considering the role that Islam plays on the mind
    of the Pakistani. Here again, we must remember that when
    we speak of Pakistan and Islam we are not referring to
    Indian Muslims and the vastly different way in which
    Islam has evolved in India since independence. One of the
    purposes of this book is to show precisely what has been
    done with Islam in Pakistan. The situation and attitudes
    of Muslims in India are no longer comparable to those in
    Pakistan. There are many assumptions and misconceptions
    that need to be reviewed, and these will become clear in
    subsequent chapters.
    As the Indian economy forges ahead there is an increasing
    constituency of Indians who feel that Pakistan is a small
    problem that can be ignored, and call for an avoidance of
    what seems to be an Indian obsession with Pakistan. But
    9
    Pakistan cannot be ignored by India for many reasons.
    The events of independence and partition had a deep
    effect on the Indian psyche. The appearance of the new
    nation Pakistan as a neighbor, with people who were
    brothers and compatriots until very recently created a
    complex conflict, a love-hate relationship that affected
    Indian society. With Pakistani leaders attempting to
    speak for the Muslims in India, many non-Muslim Indians
    got polarized mainly into two groups, neither of whom
    were able to look upon Indian Muslims as they should have
    been looked at, as Indians like everyone else. One group
    of Indians began to view their Muslim compatriots with
    hostility as recessed Pakistanis who were always seen
    cheering for Pakistan in cricket matches. Another group
    of Indians took the opposite viewpoint that Indian
    Muslims, unless treated in an especially favorable and
    kind manner, would somehow feel upset enough to want to
    side with Pakistan. Pakistan has thus had a great impact
    on Hindu-Muslim relations in India, and has put a great
    strain on the ancient Indian tradition of tolerance and
    pluralism.
    Apart from the deep mental scar that partition left on
    the Indian psyche, the importance of Pakistan lies in its
    extreme hostility to India. In the first 55 years after
    independence, the Indian armed forces have had to fight
    wars on eight occasions (2). In five of those wars armed
    forces from Pakistan have been the adversary that Indian
    civilians and Indian soldiers have had to face. Four of
    these conflicts are discussed in chapter 11, and the
    fifth engagement with Pakistan still continues at the
    time of writing, with the infiltration of armed
    terrorists from Pakistan into India as part of a lowgrade
    war to bleed India (chapter 12). From 1965, the
    Indian armed forces and paramilitary have had to expand
    to keep pace with the massive build up and continuing
    10
    assaults from Pakistan.
    Indians cannot afford to forget the lessons that can be
    learned from events like the India-China conflict of
    1962, or the naive policy of appeasement of Adolf Hitler
    followed by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.
    Unilateral pacifism displayed by one nation state when
    another nation shows every sign of being ready for war is
    a policy that begs for defeat and disaster. No matter how
    well intentioned and peaceable a nation state may be, the
    presence of a belligerent neighbor is a signal that
    military strength must be adequate to meet any aggressive
    intent, and if necessary take the battle into the
    aggressor's territory. But this build up must not come in
    the way of urgently needed development and modernization.
    A policy of ignoring Pakistan's military intent and might
    would be a formula for a disaster of unimaginable
    proportions, while a policy that puts too much emphasis
    on hurriedly delivering a total military defeat on
    Pakistan could divert too large a proportion of meager
    resources towards a war machine. That is one of the
    mistakes that Pakistani leaders committed, and India
    would do well to learn from that.
    By studying what Pakistan has done, or has not done since
    independence, Indians have a lot to learn. It is still
    possible for Indians to make the mistakes Pakistanis have
    made. Pakistan has made a whole tapestry of errors that
    Indians can choose to repeat or avoid. Overconfidence,
    underestimation of problems and hurdles, blindness to the
    impact of religious discrimination, discrimination
    against minorities and maldistribution of wealth,
    ignoring corruption, a population explosion and social
    inequity, and attempting to play great power games in the
    absence of a matching military-industrial-economic
    capability are some of the mistakes that Pakistan has
    made, mistakes that India could still make.
    11
    Finally, every attempt has been made in this work to
    avoid direct comparisons between India and Pakistan,
    except where it is unavoidable. There is a very important
    reason for that, and it requires elaboration. Although
    both India and Pakistan started off as having been part
    of one nation in the pre-Independence era, the two
    entities cannot really be compared. India is four times
    larger than Pakistan in land area and currently has a
    population that is over seven times the size of
    Pakistan's population. This means that all numbers and
    figures relating to India are automatically bigger than
    those of Pakistan.
    To illustrate why a direct comparison between India and
    Pakistan can be misleading we need to use an analogy:
    Imagine India to be a box with 100 eggs in it, but 30 of
    those eggs are broken. Imagine Pakistan to be a smaller
    box with 10 eggs in it, and 5 of those eggs are broken. A
    direct comparison will show that the India box has 30
    broken eggs, and the Pakistan box has only 5 broken eggs,
    and it would seem that the India box is in a far worse
    shape, with many more broken eggs. But what is hidden
    from this comparison, is that the India box has 70 intact
    eggs while the Pakistan box has only 5 intact eggs.
    Direct comparisons of numbers regarding Pakistan and
    India are misleading because of the difference in size,
    but Pakistani leaders have persistently tried to hide
    problems within Pakistan such as poverty and illiteracy
    by saying that India has more problems than Pakistan. All
    references to Pakistani problems are referred to by
    Pakistani spokespersons as South Asian problems, South
    Asian poverty, South Asian hunger, and South Asian
    illiteracy. All that this does is to hide the magnitude
    of the problems in Pakistan, and hide the chronic
    12
    mismanagement of Pakistan.
    India and Pakistan do share many of the same problems,
    but a comparison of the real figures between India and
    Pakistan shows that Pakistan is not doing well, and is
    falling behind, even though the number of people who are
    poor in Pakistan, and the number of people requiring
    education in Pakistan are far smaller than the number in
    India.
    Pakistan's task should have been easier, but Pakistan is
    failing even to achieve a smaller task. For every child
    that Pakistan educates, India has to educate seven
    children in order to "match Pakistan". But India is not
    merely matching Pakistan, it has moved ahead in literacy
    and is racing ahead in other parameters. A direct
    comparison of numbers will not reveal this and such
    direct comparisons are useful only to hide Pakistan's
    increasing problems.
    And while these figures get worse, a quick comparison of
    the Pakistani armed forces and the Indian armed forces is
    illustrative of what the two countries have been doing
    since Independence. With India having a population that
    is seven times as big as that of Pakistan, the Indian
    army should have been at least three or four times the
    size of the Pakistan army. But that is not the case; the
    Indian army is less than one and a half times as big as
    the Pakistani army. That is because, since independence
    India has spent relatively more on development and less
    on defence while Pakistan has spent almost everything on
    arms and very little on development.
    Pakistan of course was amply aided by other nations, but
    these details will be discussed later. In this book we
    will examine the state that Pakistan has got itself into
    and deal with how it got into its current crisis. In 2007
    13
    Pakistan is not in an enviable state. Anyone who has
    wished for anything bad to happen to Pakistan is likely
    to find great joy in the condition that Pakistan has
    reached.
    14
    Chapter 2
    THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN
    Pakistan is currently estimated to have between 160 and
    170 million people. Pakistan's internal turmoil prevented
    a routine census from taking place in 1991, but it was
    finally conducted in 1998. Pakistan's population is
    currently thought to be increasing at the rate of between
    2.1% and 2.8% per year. Nobody knows exactly, but even at
    the lower estimate 8000 children are being born every day
    in Pakistan, or one Pakistani is born every 10 seconds.
    Some estimates say that Pakistan's population will double
    to over 300 million, by the year 2050.
    The Pakistani paper the Jang reported in September 2003
    (3):
    Pakistan's population will swell to 349 million by year
    2050, making it the fourth most populated country in the
    world
    The report goes on to say:
    The population growth has caused an eight-time increase
    in the unemployment...With almost one third of the
    population living in abject poverty, 54 million people do
    not have access to safe drinking water ... 53.5 million
    are illiterates. The population explosion has led to the
    shortage of educational facilities, health services,
    housing units, food, living space, arable land and clean
    water
    The vast majority of Pakistanis are villagers, living in
    rural areas. The "average Pakistani" is poor and
    uneducated. According to some estimates, 70% of the
    population of Pakistan is uneducated, and education among
    women is very low since few women are allowed to acquire
    15
    an education in a society that believes the women should
    not be seen in public places, mixing with strangers.
    These facts may seem surprising considering the smartly
    dressed, well spoken Pakistani men and women that one may
    see on television. But that is another curious hidden
    fact about Pakistan.
    The "smartly dressed, well spoken Pakistani men and women
    that one may see on television" form a small, wealthy
    elite group that have been described by the expression
    "Rich, Anglophone, Pakistani Elite". As the description
    suggests, they are rich, they speak English and they form
    the elite, the cream of Pakistani society. They actually
    form a very small minority, numbering perhaps 25,000 in
    all. Most of the wealth, land and industries of Pakistan
    are said to be concentrated among about 43 top families
    of Pakistan, who, along with top army officers, form the
    cream of Pakistan(4).
    In an editorial in the Indian Express that appeared on
    January 28th 2002, VP Dutt wrote:
    Another fundamental flaw is the very narrow social base
    of the ruling elite. Pakistan is ruled by four interest
    groups or their coalition: military, bureaucracy, the
    feudal lords and the industrial barons. Making up the
    nucleus of these four interest groups, it is believed,
    are a dozen corps commanders, nearly 2,000 landlords
    owning more than half the cultivable land, a cadre of
    nearly 1,000 officers and less than 50 industrial
    families. It is they who own Pakistan and rule in the
    name of the people.
    A report in the Jang (5) on Dec 5th 2003 says:
    Top 20 per cent of the population has 50 per cent of
    16
    national income, while the bottom 20 per cent has only 6
    percent,
    The Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite have a great
    influence on the image of Pakistan abroad. The elite of
    Pakistan come from rich, feudal landowning families as
    well as from the armed forces. They drive the Pajeros and
    the Mercedes-Benz cars of Pakistan, and they own much of
    the land, with some feudal lords owning over 20,000 acres
    of land in a Pakistan that is full of impoverished
    people. Their children go to the best schools in
    Pakistan, and often study abroad in the best institutions
    of the US and UK, such as Harvard, Oxford and Cambridge.
    On October 2nd 2001, the New York Times carried a report
    about Pakistan:
    In the cities, the turn of a street corner can seem to be
    time travel between centuries. Wide boulevards clogged
    with expensive cars become narrow lanes where shrouded
    women carry jugs of water on their heads. About 75
    percent of all Pakistanis reside in rural areas. Most are
    sharecroppers, eking out a subsistence. In some areas,
    feudal families still hold sway, making private laws and
    operating private jails. While the wealthy send their
    children to college in America or Britain, many of the
    poor are deprived of even an elementary education. The
    literacy rate is below 40 percent. A fifth of Pakistan's
    government schools are "ghosts," with buildings but no
    students or teachers
    A third curious anomaly of Pakistan is the almost
    complete absence of a "middle class". The middle class in
    Pakistan have been estimated as being about 10 to 12
    million in total (6,7) forming about 8% of the
    population. The contrast with India now is stunning with
    estimates of the middle class in India forming about 25
    17
    to 30% of the population. A large middle class is an
    indicator of the development of a society from the
    traditional feudal pattern into a more modern society.
    The old feudal structure of society which Pakistan still
    retains, consists of a small, very rich elite governing a
    large mass of poor people. A large middle class is an
    essential component of a ‘modern’ state and its absence
    marks a feudal state.
    A large middle class creates a society in which people
    have the economic clout to break the economic
    stranglehold of a rich elite and ensure that their rights
    are looked after. A report by Pakistani researcher
    Masooda Bano carried in the News International Pakistan
    on 31st August 2001 said:
    Pakistan's middle class is shrinking while India's middle
    class is growing. More and more people in Pakistan are
    slipping in to poverty. This is a dangerous trend as the
    middle class is the backbone for any progressive society.
    On top of that the rising of the fundamentalist groups in
    Pakistan is a fact, which the nation cannot keep denying
    anymore.
    Nine out of ten Pakistanis are poor and uneducated. Less
    than one out of ten belongs to the middle class and a
    very small number are extremely rich. Fitting in
    perfectly well with these facts are other items of
    information about the life of Pakistanis. The whole of
    Pakistan has only about 400,000 cars. Pakistan has only 3
    million TV sets, for a population of 145 million. (8,9)
    We can thus define the "average Pakistani". The average
    Pakistani is an illiterate and poor Muslim. Being a
    Muslim is important to the Pakistani citizen because it
    brings a semblance of order to his otherwise miserable
    and unenviable existence.
    18
    Religion also helps to define the psyche of the
    Pakistani, which is dealt with in chapter 5.
    Paradoxically, religion also helps in the survival of the
    rich, tyrannical and corrupt leaders of Pakistan. Islam
    teaches its followers to accept their lives as being preordained
    by God, and, as a result of this belief, the
    poor and deprived Pakistani does not question or complain
    about his miserable life. This stoic acceptance has
    allowed the rapacious elite and the resource-swallowing
    army of Pakistan to carry on with their atrociously rich
    lifestyles and blatant corruption for decades, without
    having to be answerable to an angry or demanding
    population.
    19
    20
    Chapter 3
    EDUCATION
    Through the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan was believed to be
    a leading light among developing nations, and the
    unquestioned technological leader among "Islamic nations"
    A closer look at the facts suggests that this was only an
    impression created by the fortuitous alliance between the
    suave, English speaking Pakistani elite and the postworld
    war superpower, the United States of America, and
    the world's most powerful media apparatus that came with
    the US.
    Development and technology require education. Most people
    who take education for granted tend to forget the highly
    organized and civilized system that needs to be set up
    for an underdeveloped nation to build up a group of
    educated citizens who can serve as the pioneers of
    development.
    For example, imagine a small town or village that needs a
    school. A building is required, with electricity for
    light bulbs. Teachers are needed and for this the teacher
    himself must be educated - a separate education system
    must exist to have a supply of teachers. The people of
    the village or town need to understand the value of
    sending their children to be educated in school as
    opposed to keeping them at home for help in the fields or
    other work.
    The low literacy rate in Pakistan is an indicator of the
    facts that these fundamental investments have been
    ignored or sidelined for decades. The precise manner in
    which lack of education and a runaway increase in
    population affects a country needs to be understood by
    leaders in power. But it appears that a series of
    21
    Pakistani leaders have never really understood how the
    twin facts of population explosion and lack of education
    feed upon each other leading to the population-illiteracy
    cycle getting worse at a faster and faster rate as time
    passes, making it increasingly difficult to catch up.
    A report on reforming education in Pakistan on NBC said
    (10):
    Two years ago, the Pakistani government tried to estimate
    how many schools it would take to handle the 8 million
    kids of primary age not in class now. "The numbers that
    came up is 8,500 primary schools. That's the kind of
    numbers we needed two years earlier. They can become
    10,000 in 2004, maybe more," said Zubaida Jalal,
    Pakistan's minister for education.
    In the 20th century, rapid advances in the development and
    application of vaccination of people against killer
    diseases like smallpox and diphtheria led to a
    significant reduction in the number of children dying
    from these diseases. Effective means were developed to
    reduce complications and deaths during pregnancy and
    childbirth, and simple treatments were devised to save
    lives in cases of deadly killer diarrheas. Until these
    developments occurred, populations in many countries
    remained relatively stable, because the number of people
    dying was approximately equal to the number of babies
    being born. But once these scientific changes affected
    human society, populations began to rise rapidly. The
    UNFPA has recognized this and says in a report on
    Pakistan:
    The major contributing factor to population growth has
    been the sustained gap between low mortality and high
    fertility levels for the last three decades or so. As a
    result, Pakistan has today a very young population
    22
    structure, with 43 per cent below the age of 15 and 63
    per cent below the age of 25.
    Populations grow by what is called "geometric
    progression". That means that if a population of 1
    million people doubles to 2 million in ten years, it will
    double to 4 million in a further ten years, and then
    become 8 million in ten more years and so on. In fifty
    years, a population of 1 million can increase to 32
    million. If the original 1 million people lived in a
    poor, developing country that is barely able to feed and
    provide employment for 1 million people, it will have to
    look after 32 million people just fifty years later.
    Unless a great deal of money and effort is put into
    planning for population growth such as food production,
    healthcare and education, a rapid rise in population
    typically leads to more hunger, more poverty, more
    diseases from malnutrition and more unemployment. That
    means more people who are unhappy and have reason to be
    angry.
    This is exactly what is happening in Pakistan (11,12).
    The population has increased by 50 million people in the
    last 15 years and the number of poor has doubled.
    All these extra people have to have food and
    opportunities for employment, and they need to be
    educated regarding the importance of birth control and
    family planning, since that is essential for slowing down
    the population explosion.
    Unfortunately Pakistan's leaders have never put in the
    required amount of money and effort into education of the
    Pakistani masses. Generations of Pakistanis have been
    born into poverty and deprivation without the knowledge
    or the means to slow down population growth or earn a
    living though a modern job from a modernizing economy.
    23
    A report in the San Francisco Chronicle (13) in Oct 2002
    on the state of education in Pakistan states:
    According to government statistics for this year, the
    literacy rate is 49 percent overall, 61.3 for men and
    36.8 for women .. putting Pakistan among the 20 least
    literate countries, according to World Bank's World
    Development Index. A government study commissioned last
    year demonstrated a clear cause-and- effect relationship
    between the lack of basic education and increasing
    poverty.
    A study of education in Pakistan reveals many reasons to
    be concerned, and few reasons to be happy.
    The state of education in Pakistan was described by
    Raymond Bonner in the New York Times on 31st March 2002:
    Pakistan's literacy rate ranks below that of countries
    like Haiti, Rwanda and Sudan, according to the most
    recent United Nations Development Program report...
    Pakistan's most recent budget sets aside $107 million for
    education, compared with $2 billion for the military.
    Madrassa education in Pakistan:
    Over large areas of Pakistan, the lack of schools was
    made up to some extent by madrassas or Islamic schools.
    Madrassas exist in all nations with a Muslim population,
    but what is taught in a madrassa can vary significantly
    depending on the country and government. The madrassas of
    Pakistan have played a prominent role in making Pakistan
    the unstable, recessed theocratic state that it is today.
    Columnist ABS Jafri wrote in the Dawn (14):
    24
    ...in Sindh province we have more than a quarter of a
    million students in the religious Madaris. In Karachi
    alone there are well over 226,000 children in these
    religious seminaries.. In the whole of the province there
    are only 1,500 middle schools. Compare this with 869
    Madaris in Karachi alone.
    Nadeem Iqbal, writing for the Asia Times reported (15):
    Currently there are some one million to 1.7 million
    students enrolled in madrassas in Pakistan, most of them
    between the ages of five to 18 and from poor families.
    According to Dr. Tariq Rahman, Professor of Linguistics
    and South Asian Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University,
    Islamabad, Pakistan had only 137 madrassas in 1947. Dr.
    Rahman writes of Pakistani madrassas (16):
    In 1950 there were 210 of them while in 1971 they
    increased to 563. Nowadays there are at least 7000 of
    them.
    After the 1971 war of liberation of Bangladesh, the
    process of making Pakistanis more Islamic, the so called
    Islamization of Pakistan was given impetus. It was
    initiated by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the
    Pakistani General Zia ul Haq who removed Bhutto in a coup
    and later hanged him, accelerated the process. The exact
    number of madrassas cannot be known because of the lack
    of registration or census.
    Analyst Alexei Alexiev writes(17):
    While no official nation-wide study of these madrassas
    exists, estimates of their overall number range between
    25
    10,000 and 20,000; unregistered seminaries may add
    another 10,000 to the total. As for the number of
    students, here the estimate ranges from a conservative
    half-million to over 2 million. (By comparison, some 1.9
    million Pakistani children reportedly attended primary
    schools in 2002.)
    In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and this
    gave the US an opportunity to utilize its Cold War
    alliance with Pakistan to battle the Soviet invasion. The
    US pumped in large amounts of money and arms into
    Pakistan, much of it channeled via Saudi Arabia. The
    Saudi connection enabled the setting up of a vast number
    of madrassas in Pakistan. Because of the great poverty
    and lack of schools in Pakistan, madrassas were a natural
    attraction for the average Pakistani, as being schools
    that adhered to Islamic values while feeding and housing
    students, and taking over the burden of looking after one
    or more sons from a large, poor and ill-fed Pakistani
    family.
    Pamela Constable, a columnist for the Washington Post
    wrote on 20th September 2001 (18), just days after the
    attacks on the World Trade Center in New York:
    In recent years, however, a number of religious parties
    and groups have been rapidly gaining influence throughout
    Pakistani society. Based in thousands of mosques and
    Islamic academies called madrassas, they spread their
    message in part by offering services, especially low-cost
    education, that millions of poor Pakistani families
    cannot obtain any other way.
    The name madrassa merely connotes a school. Aijazz Ahmed
    wrote about madrassas in the Asia Times (19) in January
    2003:
    26
    Madrassas were introduced about 300 years ago on the
    Indian subcontinent by then Muslim monarchs and rulers to
    produce a bureaucracy capable of running the day-to-day
    affairs of state, especially in terms of financial and
    legal issues, according to the wishes and pleasure of the
    king.
    Ahmed continues:
    Professor Dr Manzoor, a renowned scholar, writer and
    researcher, comments that nowadays many madrassas have
    taken an unfortunate direction. "The new role of the
    madrassas and [the influence] of religious elements has
    added nothing but hatred against non-Muslims and
    different sects of Islam. Although some major schools
    produced better results and play their role for religious
    harmony, many inject the poison of extremism,
    sectarianism and ignorance and have become a source of
    increasing ignorance and religious intolerance in
    Pakistani society."
    At he best of times, the normal curriculum in madrassas
    did not offer a well rounded education that included
    maths, science and information technology. The subjects
    were frozen 300 years ago, and included logic, Arabic
    literature and grammar, and Koranic teachings.
    But during the Cold War, the number of madrassas
    burgeoned rapidly and tens of thousands were set up
    offering only a narrow interpretation of Islam in which
    young people were indoctrinated into the concept of a
    violent jihad against unbelievers, and taught to believe
    that death on the battlefield fighting against the
    enemies of Islam such as the Soviet Union would ensure
    eternal paradise for the Islamic fighters.
    The preparation of young men for jihad and death in the
    27
    battlefield was surely very useful and convenient to
    provide an endless supply of soldiers to fight in
    Afghanistan, and such fighters under the name Taliban
    took over when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. But
    even after this, the madrassas that had supplied all
    these fanatical men did not close down, and indeed could
    not be closed down. The curriculum teaching jihad did not
    change either. Having nowhere else to go, thousands of
    madrassa trained students in Pakistan collected up, ready
    for jihad in any part of the world, including Kashmir,
    Bosnia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Palestine,
    Iraq and Turkey.
    Pamela Constable wrote in the Washington Post:
    During the 1980s, some radical Sunni groups in Pakistan
    sent young men to fight in Afghanistan against Soviet
    occupation, and many members of the Taliban graduated
    from their madrassas. More recently, a...number of
    Islamic students have been sent to fight against Indian
    troops in Kashmir..
    In addition, Pakistan columnist Khaled Ahmed wrote in the
    Friday Times in November 21-27, 2003:
    What better example than the one found in Pakistan whose
    private armies interfered in Central Asia and China with
    public acclaim? Let's take a look at the Harkat al-Jahad
    al-Islami, Pakistan's biggest jihadi militia
    headquartered in Kandahar before it was scattered by the
    Americans. The Harkat was one of the militias boasting
    international linkages. It called itself 'the second line
    of defence of all Muslim states' and was active in Arakan
    in Burma, and Bangladesh, with well organised seminaries
    in Karachi, Chechnya, Sinkiang, Uzbekistan and
    Tajikistan. Its fund-raising was largely from Pakistan,
    but an additional source was its activity of selling
    28
    weapons to other militias
    Schools in Pakistan:
    Education in Pakistani schools outside of madrassas is
    not available to most Pakistanis. But even in the few
    schools that exist, the curriculum is deeply flawed. The
    following quotes are taken from an in depth study of what
    Pakistani school children are being taught in a
    compilation entitled The Subtle Subversion - The State
    of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan by A.H. Nayyar and
    Ahmed Salim (20):
    Madrassas are not the only institutions breeding hate,
    intolerance, a distorted world view, etc. The educational
    material in the government run schools do much more than
    madrassas. The textbooks tell lies, create hate, incite
    for jehad and shahadat, and much more.
    ...children are now taught that the history of Pakistan
    starts from the day the first Muslim set foot in India.
    History and Pakistan studies textbooks rarely mention
    the ancient and non-controversial cultures of the Indus
    valley (Moenjodaro, Harrappa and Kot Diji), and
    completely bypass the entire Buddhist and Hindu periods
    of history. They suddenly jump to the advent of Mohammed
    bin Qasim in India and treat it as the beginning of
    history... this structuring is to make children regard
    the Muslim part of the history as the .. most significant
    part.'
    From about 1972 onwards, history taught in Pakistan was
    detached from history as we know it.
    Quoting further from the Nayyar and Salim report:
    29
    Four themes emerge most strongly..
    1. ... Pakistan is for Muslims alone;
    2. ...Islamiat is to be forcibly taught to all the
    students, whatever their faith, including a compulsory
    reading of Qur'an;
    3. that Ideology of Pakistan is to be internalized as
    faith, and hate be created against Hindus and India;
    4. and students are to be urged to take the path of Jehad
    and Shahadat (martrydom).
    Associated with the insistence on the Ideology of
    Pakistan has been an essential component of hate against
    India and the Hindus...the existence of Pakistan is
    defined only in relation to Hindus, and hence the Hindus
    have to be painted as black as possible.
    Curriculum documents ask the following as the specific
    learning objectives:
    The child should be able to understand the Hindu and
    Muslim differences...India's evil designs against
    Pakistan ..Hindu has always been an enemy of Islam.
    The class II Urdu book has a lesson on "Our Country", the
    first sentences of which read: Our country is Pakistan.
    ...Pakistan is an Islamic country. Here Muslims live.
    Muslims believe in the unity of Allah. They do good
    deeds.
    The Class 6 book says: Who am I? I am a Muslim. I am a
    Pakistani...you are a Muslim and your religion is Islam.
    A book lists "Acchi baten" (good deeds). Among them:
    "Good people are those who read the Qur'an and teach the
    Qur'an to others" implying that those of another faith
    cannot be good people.
    30
    Other things taught in state school texts:
    After the partition of the subcontinent the Hindus and
    Sikhs started a properly planned campaign of exploiting
    the Muslims.. as a result of which the Hindu and Sikh
    enemies of mankind killed and dishonoured thousands, nay
    hundreds of thousands of women, children, the old and the
    young with extreme cruelty and heartlessness.
    And Pakistani children are taught about war as follows:
    Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced a full two-year course on
    'Fundamentals of War' and 'Defence of Pakistan' for class
    XI and XII respectively.In the 'Fundamentals of War'
    themes like objects and causes, conduct, nature, modern
    weapons, operations, principles ethics, the means short
    of war and modern Warfare were thoroughly discussed.
    ...The subject of hate in Pakistani educational material
    is Hindu and India, reflecting both the perceived sense
    of insecurity from an 'enemy' country, and an attempt to
    define one's national identity in relation to the
    'other'. The first serves the military and the second the
    political Islamists.
    In another article on Pakistani education AH Nayyar wrote
    (21):
    The class 4 text book states: The religion of the Hindus
    did not teach them good things -- Hindus did not respect
    women...
    Another book tells the students:
    Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark
    places, where they worship idols. Only one person can
    enter the temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other
    31
    hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together.
    For another, the Hindus as a monolith were always
    cunning, scheming, and conspiring to deprive the Muslims
    of their due rights.. The Hindus always desired to crush
    the Muslims as a nation. Several attempts were made by
    the Hindus to erase the Muslim culture and civilization
    ...
    If the Hindus had any national aspirations then these
    were clearly a sign of their prejudices, while if the
    Muslim kings and invaders plundered Hindu temples then
    presumably they did so with very noble intentions.
    The experience of colonialism is described in a textbook
    as a British-Hindu conspiracy: The British joined forces
    with the Hindus to bring harm to the Muslims. Muslims
    tried in every way to maintain good relations with the
    British and Hindus, but they did not allow it to be so.
    Regarding history as taught to Pakistani children Kamila
    Hyat wrote in the Jang in August 2003 (22):
    .. the terrible events that led to the breaking away of
    East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh are never
    mentioned...
    Members of the generation who grew up after 1971 often
    have no idea at all of what issues underpinned the civil
    war or why it took place. The genocide committed in the
    territory that now constitutes Bangladesh .. are hardly
    ever discussed or even spoken off on passing within the
    Pakistan of today.
    Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani scientist writes (23):
    At the completion of Class-V, the child should be able to
    32
    ...
    "Make speeches on Jehad and Shahadat"
    "Understand Hindu-Muslim differences and the resultant
    need for Pakistan."
    "India's evil designs against Pakistan."
    Hoodbhoy goes on to say in the same article:
    A moronic, incompetent, self-obsessed, corrupt, and
    ideologically charged education bureaucracy today
    squarely blocks Pakistan's entry into the 21st century.
    It is clear from this that it is not only the madrassas
    that offer a curriculum of hatred to Pakistani children.
    Even children who study in Pakistani state schools imbibe
    a curriculum of discrimination and hate.
    The real worry in having such a faulty educational system
    that actively encourages hatred is that millions of
    Pakistani children are growing up to be adults thinking
    that India and Indians exist to subjugate Muslims and
    should be hated for that. There seems to be no way in
    which a child in Pakistan can grow up without fearing or
    hating India in particular and non-Muslims in general.
    This mindset cannot be wiped out overnight. The problem
    is so serious that the Pakistani government must be
    engaged and encouraged to change the curriculum in
    Pakistani schools. It is surprising that faults in an
    education system that may have such great an impact on
    Indian-Pakistani relations in future are not being
    addressed at all at the highest governmental level in
    India.
    Meanwhile, in the first sign that a glimmering of
    realization of the consequences of a curriculum of hate,
    an acknowledgment of the existence of a biased curriculum
    33
    and a call for change was made by Pakistani Federal
    Minister for Education Ms Zobaida Jalal in a statement
    published in the Pakistan Tribune online in March 2004
    (24):
    a committee has been constituted to work out
    recommendations for deletion of material from curricula
    which is aimed at fomenting hatred against India adding
    that the committee will submit its recommendations within
    a month. Several social organizations have raised
    objection that hatred is fanned against India through the
    curricula of educational institutions in Pakistan.
    Government has set up a committee to look into the matter
    and send its recommendations within a month
    But such change cannot come easily in Pakistan. More than
    half of Pakistan's population of nearly 170 million are
    thirty years old or younger and have been exposed to a
    hate-India curriculum from childhood. As a result these
    people are likely to form a strong body of anti-India,
    anti-Hindu opinion for decades to come. Besides there is
    strong opposition to change. In a sternly worded reaction
    to the idea of reform of the hate curriculum, the
    influential director of the Pakistan Institute of
    Strategic Studies, Dr. Shireen Mazari accused the authors
    of the report on Pakistan's biased school books as being
    biased and having been written for the handsome payment
    the authors received (25):
    Dr. Mazari, commenting on the Nayyar report said:
    the authors take exception to the fact that the present
    curriculum documents suggest that children should be able
    to understand the Hindu-Muslim differences and the need
    for the creation of Pakistan. The authors' warped logic
    is that knowing the differences breeds hatred! So one
    should really do away with inculcating the rationale
    34
    behind the struggle for Pakistan! Of course, there is no
    doubt that some of the texts do denigrate the Hindus but
    this should not be a pretext for not creating an
    awareness of the differences that led to the creation of
    Pakistan.
    In the same article, Dr. Mazari dismissed criticism of
    madrassas as having an anti-Islam motive - a time honored
    diversion used by the Pakistani elite to deflect
    criticism (see chapter 8). Dr. Mazari's words:
    "Also, with the madrassahs now a central target of the
    West, Islam seems to have also become fair game.
    With influential Pakistanis opposing change in the
    curriculum, efforts at change are in serious danger of
    being quashed even before they commence.
    35
    Chapter 4
    INDUSTRIES AND ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN
    In a report about the Pakistani economy, economist
    Sreedhar states (26):
    Pakistan's economy during the past fifty years can be
    described as a classic example of a case where artificial
    prosperity was maintained by heavy doses of foreign aid
    and overseas remittances of Pakistanis...Easy and cheap
    availability of goods and services through foreign aid
    discouraged the development of a large scale indigenous
    industry. At another level, Pakistan failed to do even
    the basics of economic development which most of the
    developing countries have done.
    More than fifty years after independence, Pakistan
    remains primarily an agricultural economy. Not a single
    wrist-watch, scooter or motorcycle has appeared on the
    international market with a Made in Pakistan label on it.
    This level of industrial technology in Pakistan is in
    keeping with the overall picture of Pakistan as a nation
    in which almost 70% of the people are illiterate.
    Goods manufactured in Pakistan are mostly no more complex
    than bicycles, sports goods such as footballs and cricket
    balls, clothes, textiles and agricultural products like
    sugar. Pakistan has survived for over 50 years giving the
    impression that it is somehow a powerhouse in its depth
    and breadth of manufacturing and industrial capacity.
    That is far from the truth.
    Still, a sophisticated Pakistani public relations machine
    has managed to build up the idea, at least in the minds
    of Indians, that Pakistani industry is producing some
    state of the art high technology goods. It is worth
    looking at some of these items and Pakistani claims in
    36
    some detail. In keeping with the Pakistani psyche of
    according the highest importance to the armed forces
    Pakistani claims of high technology indigenous
    manufacture have revolved around armament, specifically
    missiles and Pakistan's nuclear program.
    Pakistani spokespersons never tire of speaking of
    Pakistan's indigenous missiles - given names like Hatf,
    Ghauri and Shaheen. These brave names may perhaps be
    essential for national pride, but even a cursory search
    of authoritative sources shows that Pakistan's Hatf,
    Ghauri and Shaheen missiles are Chinese M-9 or M-11
    missiles, or North Korean No-Dong missiles (27).
    The idea is not to downplay the considerable risk that
    Pakistan's missiles pose to India and other nations, but
    to point out the compulsion that Pakistani authorities
    have to maintain a facade of indigenous production for
    items that are widely known to be imported. The most
    likely reason for maintaining this charade of indigenous
    development of missiles is to obscure the fact that
    dangerous, nuclear capable missiles are being supplied by
    countries like China and North Korea to Pakistan ignoring
    international treaties that forbid such exports.
    In a detailed report on Pakistani missiles from NTI -
    Nuclear Threat Initiative, a private body aimed at
    studying the risk of nuclear conflict it was reported
    that (28):
    Pakistan is still dependent on China for specialty
    materials, guidance systems, and other critical missile
    components...Pakistan will remain dependent on North
    Korea for importing complete liquid engines, or at least
    their major component parts, as well as the liquid
    propellants to fuel its missiles
    37
    Even more peculiar is Pakistan's nuclear program. The
    strong Pakistani insistence that the program is entirely
    indigenous is contradicted by the facts. A news report
    about this in a New Zealand news portal reads (29):
    The father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan,
    worked at the Urenco uranium enrichment facility in the
    Dutch city of Almelo in the 1970s.
    After his return to Pakistan he was convicted in absentia
    of nuclear espionage by an Amsterdam court..He has
    acknowledged he did take advantage of his experience of
    many years of working on similar projects in Europe and
    his contacts with various manufacturing firms."
    A report from the Netherlands, from which Abdul Qadeer
    Khan got his designs for Uranium enrichment says Khan
    received a MSc degree in metallurgy from Delft in 1967
    and later stole nuclear secrets from his Dutch employer,
    helping Pakistan develop its first nuclear bomb...In
    1976, Khan suddenly left Europe before his espionage was
    detected. Back home in Pakistan, then Prime Minister
    Zulfikar Ali Bhutto gave Khan the job of organizing
    Pakistan's nuclear program
    Pakistan can hardly be expected to publicly proclaim that
    the Father of Pakistan's nuclear program stole the
    technology. Experts have argued that it does not matter
    if Pakistan's atomic bombs are stolen or made in
    Pakistan. They are a serious risk either way. This is
    true, but it is important to place on record the fact
    that the designs were stolen and not the result of some
    prolonged research effort in Pakistan.
    The designs that Abdul Qadeer Khan obtained from the
    URENCO labs were for centrifuges. Centrifuges are devices
    that are used to rotate something at high speed to
    38
    separate out heavier from lighter components. For
    example, a rotating centrifugal dryer in a washing
    machine is a centrifuge that separates water from clothes
    and makes wet clothes much more dry. Obtaining
    centrifuges was necessary for Pakistan to start enriching
    Uranium. Uranium occurs naturally primarily in two forms,
    the heavier U238 and lighter U235. The latter, U235 is
    needed for nuclear bombs but occurs in very small
    quantities mixed with U238. For this reason Uranium needs
    to be enriched to get material that contains 90% or more
    of U235, which can then be used for making a nuclear
    bomb. Several techniques exist for this and Pakistan
    chose the route of Uranium enrichment by centrifuges
    using the technology stolen by Qadeer Khan from the
    URENCO labs.
    But making a nuclear bomb goes far beyond merely
    enriching Uranium. Making a workable and reliable nuclear
    bomb requires further technology. Indian analyst
    K.Subrahmanyam quotes Nobel Laureate Abdus Salam as being
    skeptical about Pakistani ability to actually produce a
    working nuclear bomb. Subrahmanyam goes on to indicate
    similar skepticism of Pakistani ability in Indian
    scientific circles by saying (30):
    Their scepticism was based on their judgement that
    Pakistan did not have the critical mass of scientific and
    engineering talent necessary for the project.
    This is where Pakistan's role as a Cold War ally of the
    US and its role in helping China and the US get closer
    came in handy. China provided Pakistan with the necessary
    technology to make its nuclear bomb. It is widely
    reported that China gave to Pakistan the complete design
    of a nuclear bomb that it had tested in 1964 (31).
    One week after the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998, and
    39
    a one week before the official Pakistani nuclear test an
    announcement was made at a G8 meeting that Pakistan had
    tested a nuclear device. It is said that the device
    failed to detonate. After this there was a flurry of
    activity when Pakistani officials visited China. The next
    week, on the 28th of May 1998, Pakistan conducted a
    nuclear test in Chagai. Some experts believe that the
    device tested was a ready made device provided to
    Pakistan by China after the failure of an earlier test.
    During this period mysterious news reports surfaced that
    Plutonium was detected in the atmosphere over Chagai in
    Pakistan (32). Since Pakistani bomb designs were Uranium
    based ones, there is no way Plutonium could have
    appeared. If the Plutonium story is true, it lends
    credence to the theory that Pakistan may actually have
    tested a ready made Chinese nuclear device.
    At the time of writing this, the father of Pakistan's
    nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan stands discredited and
    accused of selling equipment and the plans for Uranium
    enrichment centrifuges to Libya, Iran and North Korea, in
    exchange for missiles from North Korea and great personal
    wealth for himself. It appears that this was done with
    the knowledge and tacit approval of the military
    government of Pakistan, and its army chiefs of staff
    (chapter 13). News reports indicate that Pakistan's
    nuclear program was based on a network of clandestine
    imports from a network of proliferators personally built
    up by Abdul Qadeer Khan, funded by unlimited financial
    support from the Pakistani government, as well as from
    Libya and other sources. It seems clear that Pakistan's
    entire nuclear weapons manufacturing program was based on
    a clandestine black-market of contacts with companies all
    over the world who produced components that could not be
    fashioned in Pakistan.
    Pakistan does not currently produce any fighter, bomber
    40
    or civilian aircraft and does not have a noteworthy
    aerospace research or design team. But in 1981 Pakistan
    imported the entire assembly line for the manufacture of
    a 1969 vintage Swedish designed, single engine, two
    seater trainer aircraft from Sweden. The aircraft,
    called the Saab Supporter in Sweden is assembled in
    Pakistan under the name Mushshak. Another trainer
    aircraft that Pakistan became involved in is a Chinese
    designed K-8 jet trainer. Current reports indicate that
    the trainers will be manufactured in China, and not in
    Pakistan.
    Pakistan's industrial sophistication today is arguably
    not much higher than that of Britain in the early 20th
    century, but Pakistan has continuously maintained,
    possibly for domestic consumption that it is a leader in
    many technologies. This pretence probably does Pakistan
    more harm than anyone else. Pakistani leaders, convinced
    by the exaggerated claims of their own countrymen have
    allowed their nation to lapse into a state of
    underdevelopment in which Pakistan is now being compared
    with the other countries at the bottom of the development
    ladder, such as Haiti and Rwanda.
    On March 31st 2002, a report in the The New York Times
    stated, Barely a third of Pakistan's population is
    literate, Even using a very low standard, the State
    Department said in its most recent human rights report.
    Pakistan's literacy rate ranks below that of countries
    like Haiti, Rwanda and Sudan, according to the most
    recent United Nations Development Program report.
    Furthermore A UNDP report in 2003 ranked Pakistan a low
    138th, in a list of 174 countries (33).
    Pakistan's labor force is growing at the rate of 2.4% per
    year, but the number of unemployed people in Pakistan is
    rising at more than twice that rate - 6% (34). The
    41
    Pakistan Human Condition report of 2003 says that between
    1998-99 and 2000-01, population increased by 6 million
    people (4.46 per cent), while the population of the poor
    during the period under review increased by 10 per cent.
    The report warns that population is shifting from upper
    poverty bands to lower ones, showing a decline in their
    welfare level
    On February 5th 2003, the San Francisco Chronicle
    reported: Pakistan's powerful military has ruled the
    country for more than half of the nation's 56-year
    history, fully integrating itself into every facet of the
    economy and draining state coffers with generous benefit
    plans for its officers....corrupt military officers have
    siphoned off more than $1.2 billion in the last 10 years
    to purchase such amenities as land, mansions and luxury
    cars, according to a recent report by Pakistan's auditor
    general.
    A large number of reports speak of all the economic
    problems that Pakistan has (35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40) Some
    of these problems, regarding industries and poverty have
    been listed above. But many other factors contribute to
    the decrepit state of the Pakistani economy. Aid and loan
    money has been constantly misused for personal gain by
    the Pakistani army, army run businesses and private
    enterprise due to rampant corruption at the highest
    places. There is an extremely wealthy class of Pakistani
    at the top of the economic pyramid and this class
    includes Army Officers as well as feudal landowners -
    some owning as much as 45,000 acres of land. In the
    Punjab province, one percent of the landowners own 26
    percent of the land.
    One report (36) says only one million Pakistanis pay tax
    in a country of over 150 million people. The Karachi
    Stock Exchange has trading in only about 30 stocks - with
    42
    over 700 other stocks listed for tax advantages. The
    Exchange is run by a handful of crooked brokers and scams
    are rampant. The same report goes on to say, Estimates of
    the size of the country's black-market economy, which
    includes everything from underground banking to narcotics
    to the smuggling of consumer goods, range up to 100% of
    the so-called formal sector. That ratio "is probably the
    most severe" of any country in the world, says Muhammad
    Mansoor Ali, one of Pakistan's leading economists. "It is
    essentially a parallel economy."
    The number of such damning reports is enormous, and they
    help build up a picture of Pakistan as a country of
    predominantly poor people, whose number is increasing by
    the year as the population rises. Governing these people
    is a small elite of wealthy, corrupt and self-serving
    army officers and feudal lords who literally rule over
    their subjects like medieval kings. The population is
    kept busy with jihad, being told that India is forever
    planning to attack Pakistan and kill all Muslims, while
    the rulers of Pakistan build up their personal fortunes
    and protect their lucre with an army whose upper ranks
    are like a Mughal court, while the lower ranks are the
    bodyguards to protect the powerful from both external
    enemies and opponents within Pakistan.
    43
    Chapter 5
    PAKISTANI PSYCHE - GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
    Very few studies exist on the subject of the mind of the
    Pakistani or the Pakistani psyche. Pakistan has been too
    low on the priority of sociologists and psychologists,
    while most Indians, including Indian leaders and
    strategists have been content with describing Pakistanis
    as being “Just like us” - i.e. just like Indians.
    Pakistanis, like all other people, display the usual
    range of human behavioral patterns: joy, sorrow, anger,
    pain and other emotions which are indistinguishable from
    anyone else on an individual level. But groups of
    thousands or millions of people anywhere in the world,
    who live together in nations tend to develop certain
    unique patterns of behavior based on the stresses,
    experiences and history of their particular society.
    Sometimes these unique patterns of behavior are very
    difficult to recognise, because the behavior is very much
    like that of anyone else. Even so, it is worth
    recognizing minor differences because this knowledge has
    some value in understanding behavior, and in negotiation
    and reaching agreements.
    For example, communication between cultures becomes
    difficult if negotiators from different cultures cannot
    understand each others' behavior. A deep understanding of
    Japanese culture was required before international
    agreements could be reached with Japan on the issue of
    whaling and protection of endangered species of whales.
    Some cultures, such as Japanese culture have been well
    studied (41). The important role of saving face and
    avoiding shame is well recognised, and must be taken into
    account in negotiation. Another well known example of the
    consequences of an inability to understand cultural
    nuances comes from a transcript of a telephone
    44
    conversation in Arabic between Egyptian President Gamel
    Abdel Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan when Egyptian
    forces were being defeated by Israeli forces in 1967. The
    cultural need to avoid shame forced Nasser to state that
    his forces were fighting well against their enemy, but
    King Hussein was unable to understand the nuances by
    which Nasser hinted that his forces were being defeated.
    That left Hussein, and Jordan unprepared for their defeat
    in the war subsequently (42).
    There are few studies of unique behavioral patterns among
    Pakistanis. But such patterns do exist, and their
    importance must not be underestimated. In his testimony
    to the United States' Senate Committee on Foreign
    Relations in January 2004 (43) Stephen Cohen, speaking on
    India-Pakistan relations quoted a Pakistani army officer
    saying how important the question of pride was in
    Pakistani actions relating to India.
    In the words of one Pakistani officer, the army
    understands it cannot wrest Kashmir from India, but it
    cannot turn its back on a 55 year struggle. At stake is
    its pride, and it literally calls the shots
    But the subject of a specific and defined Pakistani mind
    has not gone unnoticed among Indian observers. J. N.
    Dixit, former Indian foreign secretary has spoken of the
    psychological hurdles that come in the way of Indian and
    Pakistani relations. These are listed in a review of his
    book (44):
    Dixit identifies a series of Pakistani traits that refuse
    to live amicably with India. First, "artificially
    nurtured memories of Muslim superiority and a
    subconscious desire to rectify the unfair arrangements of
    partition". Second, a certain envy Pakistanis would not
    acknowledge openly about the failure of their civil
    45
    society to solidify democratic and tolerant traditions in
    comparison to an India where khakis and bayonets follow
    popularly elected representatives. Third, assumption by
    Pakistan of the role of protector and overseer of the
    welfare of Indian Muslims, who in the words of Maulana
    Azad, could be exploited from forces across the border
    owing to their "socio-political schizophrenia" since
    partition. Fourth, avenging the military defeat of 1971,
    which is a formal objective declared in the official
    oath-taking ceremony of every Pakistani officer-cadet
    when he graduates. Fifth, irrational faith in the
    "profound capacity for commitment to jihad amongst the
    momin", as was publicly declared by Foreign Minister
    Gauhar Ayub Khan at a press conference in Delhi. Sixth,
    confidence that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is an
    instrumentality to further geopolitical objectives in
    Kashmir. Seventh, widespread belief in the Pakistani
    establishment and media circles that India is getting
    exhausted in Kashmir and would not be able to hold on to
    it for long (a presumption of Musharraf in Kargil).
    Eighth, and most significantly, "the unarticulated
    ambition and hope that if India broke up, Pakistan will
    emerge as the strongest and most powerful political
    entity in South Asia".
    Of course, in 1947 and a few years after that it would
    have been perfectly valid and accurate to describe
    Pakistanis as being just like Indians. But after over
    50 years of being a separate nation with different threat
    perceptions, problems and priorities, and with 75 % of
    present day Pakistanis having been born after 1947, it
    can easily be observed that there are certain behavioral
    characteristics that can be called Purely Pakistani There
    is, in effect a Pakistani psyche or a Pakistani mindset,
    that is separate from the old Indian identity.
    It is useful to be aware of this in dealing with Pakistan
    46
    as a nation and in predicting Pakistani responses to
    events. There are certainly some parallels in Pakistani
    behavior to Arab behavior described by Raphael Patai in
    his seminal book on The Arab Mind (42). These
    similarities are striking, and the most likely
    explanation is the internalization of Arab culture in
    Islam, leading to a degree of Arabization of behavior
    among devoutly Islamic people such as some Pakistanis who
    have actively sought to reject their earlier Indian
    culture (see chapter 9).
    Certain types of behavior stand out among Pakistanis and
    are best demonstrated by studying examples of statements
    and actions by prominent Pakistani leaders and
    spokespersons. It would be wrong to assume that every
    Pakistani displays all the characteristics described
    here. No single characteristic is unique to Pakistanis
    alone, but careful observations of Pakistani statements
    and actions show that a sufficiently large proportion of
    Pakistanis, especially their leadership, display one or
    more of the following characteristics to make them
    recognizable as general guidelines to Pakistani psyche.
    Certain statements and actions are repeated time and
    again, and a pattern can be seen in the way Pakistanis
    react to people and events.
    Hospitality and generosity:
    The characteristic of being extremely hospitable and
    generous to guests has stood Pakistanis and Pakistan in
    good stead. No visitor to Pakistan goes away without
    being touched by this, and this characteristic has been
    used to good effect by Pakistan over the years.
    An article in the American magazine, The Weekly Standard
    had this to say in its Nov 5th 2001 edition:
    47
    ..the attractive character of elite Pakistani officials.
    Compared with their haughty Indian and chaotic Afghan
    neighbors, Pakistani VIPs are often wittier, warmer, and
    more knowledgeable about the insider gossip of U.S.
    politics. American diplomats and spooks often have a good
    deal of fun with their Westernized Pakistani
    counterparts. As one congressional staffer, who
    frequently visits south-central Asia, succinctly put it,
    "I like 'em; the Indians are jerks."
    A series of Western writers and prominent people have
    been hosted and feted in Pakistan, and have later served
    as honorary ambassadors for Pakistan in the Western
    media.
    One prominent example is the famous American pilot, Chuck
    Yeager, who was a guest of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
    and who later went on to write paeans about the PAF For
    many years after the PAF was comprehensively defeated in
    successive wars with India, Yeager's words of praise of
    the Pakistan Air Force continued to be quoted,
    maintaining a reputation for the PAF that extended far
    beyond its real performance.
    Pakistani hospitality has charmed a large number of
    prominent writers to write positively about Pakistan, and
    some have gone as far as to make needlessly hostile and
    malicious references to India in their writings despite
    strong evidence that their words are misinformed at best,
    and often just plain wrong. Prominent among people who
    have written warm words for Pakistan are writers like
    Brian Cloughley, Eric Margolis and John Fricker.
    As recently as June 2002, the Washington Post reported:
    It was mid afternoon Tuesday, and Anwar Mahmood,
    48
    Pakistan's information secretary, was on the phone
    discussing with an underling how to keep more than 100
    foreign journalists happy for the rest of the week...if
    it keeps the reporters satisfied, he figured, it's worth
    the $3,000 it will cost his ministry to rent the plane
    from Pakistan International Airlines...The Pakistani
    government, eager to make its voice heard, has ordered
    foreign embassies to expedite visas for
    journalists...Five times in the past month, the
    Information Ministry has rented air-conditioned buses to
    carry journalists to the Line of Control... There they
    are treated to hour-long military briefings, complete
    with maps, displays of Indian mortar shells -- and tea
    sandwiches served on trays by white-gloved soldiers. You
    won't get such hospitality from the Indian army.
    Honour and Dignity:
    The need to maintain honour and dignity is a fundamental
    pillar in the mind of the Pakistani. It is often more
    important to maintain honour and avoid shame than
    anything else. At a rural, tribal level in Pakistan,
    maintenance of honour often relates to women and doubts
    about fidelity or adultery. Death, in the form of an
    honour killing is often the sentence carried out on a
    woman who is thought to have shamed the family. David
    Pryce Jones has written (45) that the key to
    understanding some Islamic societies is to recognise the
    need for acquisition of honour, pride, dignity, respect,
    and the converse avoidance of shame,disgrace, and
    humiliation. The powerful codes of shame and
    honour...enforce identity and conformity of behaviour.
    Everything is permitted in order to safeguard the family
    or tribal honour, lying, cheating, and even murder.
    49
    But honour and dignity play an equally important role
    among the richer and apparently liberated Pakistani elite
    rulers of Pakistan. The need to maintain honour and avoid
    the perceived national shame of appearing weak in front
    of India has led to the sacrificing of all developmental
    effort towards arms purchases to pursue military parity
    with India. Stephen Cohen's quote of a Pakistan army
    officer's words in this regard has already been alluded
    to at the beginning of this chapter.
    The importance of honour is evident from the words used
    by US deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage after a
    meeting with the President of Pakistan, General Musharraf
    on the 6th of June 2002:(46) ..I would note that the
    conversations we had with President Musharraf made it
    very clear to me that he wants to do everything that he
    can to avoid war... Of course he wants to do this,
    keeping intact the honour and dignity of the nation and
    the armed forces,...
    On 14th March 2003, General Musharraf, military leader of
    Pakistan said about Pakistan's nuclear weapons
    aspirations (47) "We only want the deterrence capability
    to preserve our honour and dignity."
    The need to maintain honour and avoid shame by Pakistani
    military commanders goes to the extent of suppressing any
    news of a defeat or setback suffered by the military,
    while insisting that victory was always achieved. A brief
    study of the way Pakistan's wars with India have been
    reported in Pakistan are illustrative of this.
    The 1965 war with India started with the infiltration of
    Pakistani special forces into Kashmir for sabotage and to
    incite acts of violence. As the conflict evolved war
    broke out over a wide front and by the time a cease fire
    50
    was declared both India and Pakistan had captured small
    areas of each other's territory. Significantly, Indian
    forces were well within striking range of the Pakistani
    city of Lahore, with Indian troops in the towns on the
    outskirts of Lahore, and Pakistani General Ayub Khan's
    plans to take Srinagar were foiled. But the 1965 war has
    always been portrayed from the Pakistani side as a war in
    which attacking Indian forces were defeated. The need to
    maintain honour and dignity is so important to the
    Pakistani, that any available fact may be either picked
    up or selectively forgotten in order to save face and
    maintain the pretence of victory.
    In 1971, the triumph of an East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
    based political party in an election would have meant
    that a Bengali, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would have become
    Prime Minister of Pakistan. This was disliked by the West
    Pakistani Punjabi dominated army of Pakistan, who
    commenced a genocide in East Pakistan. Millions of
    refugees poured into India to escape this. In a
    humanitarian move, Indian forces entered East Pakistan
    and defeated the Pakistani military and a new nation,
    Bangladesh, was born. More than ninety thousand
    Pakistani soldiers were taken prisoner of war. The Indian
    victory, unparalleled since the German Blitzkrieg that
    overran Poland was described by historian Brigadier
    Shelford Bidwell (48) as follows:
    The operations of 1971 finally dispelled any vain dreams
    that the 'sword-arm' of old India could, despite its
    numerical inferiority, sweep aside the armies of the
    effete Hindus and win another battle of Panipat outside
    the walls of Delhi. Not an Indian brigade had to be moved
    West. General Jagjit Singh Aurora's daring concentric
    attack on East Pakistan went forward uninterrupted and on
    16 December he received the surrender of the Pakistani
    commander in Dacca.
    51
    The ignominious defeat of the Pakistan armed forces in
    1971 and the formation of Bangladesh almost went
    unreported in Pakistan. An editorial in the Pakistani
    newspaper The Jang recalled the 1971 reports in Pakistan
    (49):
    So great was the ignorance and absence of principles in
    West Pakistan that the government of the day had the
    temerity to issue a disgraceful statement casually
    mentioning that "by agreement between local commanders,
    fighting had ceased in East Pakistan and that Indian
    troops had entered Dacca."
    Pakistani children are not taught about the 1971 war.
    Mistakes made by the Pakistan army in the war were never
    investigated or made public, neither were the failures
    admitted or analysed. Some of the defeated Generals in
    that war even received gallantry awards and honours in
    later years. The Pakistani need to maintain honour and
    dignity at the expense of truth is a fault that has done
    Pakistan no good. It may even be a characteristic that
    can be used to predict Pakistani behavior or provoke
    desired responses from Pakistanis, when used in a psy-ops
    role.
    The Kargil conflict of 1999 ended with the rapid
    withdrawal of Pakistani forces facing rout. By the time
    the withdrawal started the Indian forces had wiped out
    almost the entire Northern Light Infantry of the Pakistan
    army. Nawaz Sharif, who was Prime Minister of Pakistan
    during this conflict, said in an interview to the Weekly
    Independent from his place of exile in Saudi Arabia,
    ..when the battle began, the whole Northern Infantry was
    blown up and 2,700 soldiers were martyred and hundreds
    were injured. The death toll exceeds even that of the
    52
    1965 and 1971 full-scale wars.
    But the only history that is acknowledged by Pakistan is
    that the Kargil conflict was a great victory for
    mujahideen who held the Indian army at bay. Pakistanis do
    not admit the involvement of their armed forces, and yet
    do not explain how the Pakistan army withdrew from the
    conflict zone if they were not involved. In doing this,
    face has been saved and honour retained by the Pakistani
    army, but it is difficult to imagine how the Pakistani
    army can learn critical lessons from a disastrous war if
    the sole aim of its officer class is the save face and
    maintain honour and dignity
    An explanation exists for the tendency of the Pakistani
    elite and officer class to protect each other's honour
    even after embarrassing or disastrous events. A study of
    Pakistani society and kinship patterns (50) notes that
    the household is the primary unit for kinship and the
    male descendants, (the biradari) are under pressure to
    maintain a picture of unity, because disunity means
    dishonour. A quote from the study says:
    There is considerable pressure for patrilineal kin to
    maintain good relations with one another. Biradari
    members who quarrel will try to resolve their differences
    before major social occasions so that the patrilineage
    can present a united front to the village.
    It has been observed that Pakistan itself is ruled by a
    small group of between 22 and 43 families (4). With the
    entire ruling apparatus of Pakistan under control of a
    small group of family units, the family obligations of
    Pakistani society to avoid shame creates the need for
    whitewashing military disasters and other mistakes. The
    deeply Islamic fervor of the average Pakistani comes in
    handy here as all errors and defeats can be explained
    53
    away as God's will - an explanation that most devout
    Pakistanis will accept without question.
    It is possible that the Pakistani need to maintain honour
    and dignity and somehow appear equal or superior to India
    was understood and exploited by Indian leaders in 1998,
    when India conducted a series of nuclear weapon tests,
    breaking a 24 year self-imposed moratorium.
    Even before the 1998 tests Pakistan was widely
    acknowledged to possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan need
    not have tested immediately after India's tests. If
    Pakistan had not tested, it would have put India in a
    very tight situation, with international censure and
    sanctions, while Pakistan could have basked in the
    sympathy it would surely have got for having an
    aggressive nuclear neighbor in India.
    But the need to save Pakistani honour was too great after
    the Indian tests. The national sense of shame in being
    unable to publicly match India was so intense that Prime
    Minister Nawaz Sharif acknowledged that he would not
    survive unless he sanctioned nuclear tests by Pakistan.
    Pakistan did test a nuclear device of its own two weeks
    after India's tests and although there is some
    controversy about the real origin of the device tested by
    Pakistan, the test greatly diluted the international
    attention that India was getting after its tests, and put
    the spotlight on Pakistan, a spotlight that has only
    become brighter after the September 11th 2001 terrorist
    attacks in the US.
    Rhetoric and Hyperbole:
    The Pakistani need for the maintenance of honour and
    avoidance of shame ideally involves and outright military
    54
    victory. When such victory is not possible or unlikely,
    the war needs to be continued verbally to avoid shame.
    Every accusation is made to show that an adversary is
    cowardly, weak and untruthful, with Pakistanis being
    courageous, righteous and heading for victory.
    Such hyperbole seems to be necessary psychological
    support for the Pakistani mind, although it often sounds
    hollow and unconvincing. Only a total victory or a
    mediator leading to a solution on Pakistani terms can
    maintain honour enough to allow such hyperbole to die
    down. David Pryce Jones has described the connection
    between honour, shame and rhetoric (45): Honour makes
    life worth living whereas shame is a living death. Shame
    and honour involve publicity; success involves bragging,
    and shame means public humiliation.
    Stemming directly from this rhetoric and hyperbole is the
    decades old campaign of misinformation that Pakistan has
    maintained about itself, its armed forces, its wars and
    about India. The degree of misinformation is astonishing,
    but easy to understand in the light of the deep Pakistani
    need to maintain honour and avoid shame.
    For example, wars are never lost, and any defeats are
    temporary setbacks. Arms built under licence are always
    shown as indigenous. Ballistic missiles imported from
    China and North Korea are repainted and given Pakistani
    names to be flaunted as missiles designed and
    manufactured in Pakistan. Indians are always depicted as
    being conniving and scheming, never as courageous and
    honourable. The Indian armed forces are always referred
    to by Pakistan as being weak and dishonourable and always
    accused of raping and murdering civilians. Indian leaders
    are often referred to as scheming high caste Brahmins or
    Banias who are plotting to either dominate or eliminate
    people of all other religions and social groups.
    55
    An example of this tendency can be seen in a two part
    article on the events of 1971 that appeared in the online
    edition of the Pakistani paper the Jang as recently as
    2004, written by a former Pakistani army officer,
    Brigadier Anjum (51, 52). In a farcical and fanciful
    description Brigadier Anjum does not say a word about the
    1971 elections in Pakistan that were won by the East
    Pakistani Awami league party, and denies the well
    documented genocide of ethnic East Pakistani Bengalis by
    West Pakistani troops (chapter 11). Anjum's explanation
    of why reports of genocide by Pakistani troops are false
    is as follows:
    Senator Edward Kennedy, having a pro-India prejudice
    ..addressed a press conference in New Delhi to say that
    he was convinced that Pakistan army had committed
    genocide in East Pakistan. This was enough to disparage
    Pakistan Army
    Brigadier Anjum makes this record of India's role:
    India with a mission in hand to destroy Pakistan was
    first to demolish its basis..
    The Indian intervention to stop the genocide by Pakistani
    troops is described in the following way:
    it was an act of military piracy at the highest level to
    destroy the professional propriety of soldiers who were
    on lawful duty...The interference of Indian army in East
    Pakistan was a well thought out conspiracy hatched by
    India and vociferously backed by the Soviet Union
    Many sources (53, 54, 55) have documented the surrender
    of 90,000 Pakistani troops in East Pakistan at the end of
    the 1971 war. Brigadier Anjum records his version of
    56
    history as:
    The number of combatant soldiers out of the 90.000 socalled
    prisoners of war was just over forty thousands.
    The rest of PoWs were civilians and their families,
    mostly children.
    The need to appear superior to and better than India is
    fundamental for the Pakistani. That is what justifies the
    formation and existence of Pakistan. Accepting that India
    and Indians may be in any way better than Pakistan is
    deeply dishonourable and shameful to the Pakistani. The
    feeling threatens the very existence of Pakistan and is a
    feeling that must avoided at all cost.
    Disputes and mediation:
    Pakistani leaders have initiated war against India mainly
    when they have assessed India as being weak. On every
    occasion, the Pakistani assessment of Indian weakness has
    led to a situation in which Pakistan is faced with
    military defeat. But to the Pakistani leadership, an
    offer of peace by any party is considered as a sign of
    weakness. Courage and a willingness to fight are
    honourable, and offering peace is a sign of cowardice and
    an unwillingness to fight.
    When faced with a situation in which Pakistan is the
    weaker party, the need to maintain honour and avoid shame
    requires that Pakistan must not sue for peace by directly
    negotiating with India. This calls for the introduction
    of a mediator or middleman. It is cowardly to call for
    peace directly, but it is honourable to agree to peace
    when mediated by a respected third party, which avoids
    the need for defeat and dishonour. Any concessions that
    Pakistan is forced to make can be conveniently blamed on
    57
    the mediating party. The important need here is for
    Pakistani leaders to appear to be strong and retain their
    honour in front of their own people. It does not matter
    if anyone else considers that Pakistan was defeated, weak
    or dishonoured as long as the Pakistani people see their
    leaders as having pulled off some kind of victory, and
    are not seen as having lost their honour to the weaker
    party India.
    This explains the tendency that Pakistani leaders have to
    call for third party mediation in settling a dispute
    between India and Pakistan by appealing to the US, the
    UN, the International community or any other third party
    rather than facing shame by negotiating for settlement
    directly with India. In the Kargil conflict, when
    Pakistani forces were facing rout, the Pakistani Prime
    Minister Nawaz Sharif demanded an audience with President
    Clinton of the US and then ordered withdrawal of the
    remnants of the Pakistani forces to give the appearance
    that it was not a clear defeat, but a respected third
    party's request from President Clinton of the US that
    made a triumphant Pakistan pull back from defeating
    India.
    Because talk of peace is considered to be a sign of
    weakness, it is likely that peace offers from India have
    been misinterpreted by Pakistani leaders. Indian peace
    initiatives are seen as a sign of weakness, which must be
    met with threats and demands for concessions. But an
    India that appears to be showing weakness by talking
    about peace mystifies Pakistan by refusing third party
    mediation. For India, third party mediation is
    unacceptable in what is essentially a bilateral dispute
    with Pakistan. This confuses and angers the Pakistani
    leadership, because on the one hand India appears weak to
    them by asking for peace, but on the other hand India
    refuses third party mediation which a weak nation should
    58
    accept with gratitude to save its own face.
    One more factor that must be taken into account in
    negotiation with Pakistan is that Pakistan may fail to
    honour prior agreements as it has done with the UN
    resolutions and the subsequent Simla agreement of 1972
    with India. It is possible that Pakistani leaders
    consider all agreements and treaties as temporary
    instruments to buy time. When faced with the stark choice
    of being with America, or against America after the
    September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, President
    General Musharraf explained to his people in a speech in
    Urdu that his aligning with the US would be a temporary
    alliance with the devil. In support of this plan General
    Musharraf used the analogy of the charter of Madina and
    the treaty of Hudaibiya signed by the Prophet Mohammad in
    his September 19th 2001 speech (56).
    The Martial Mind:
    One of the enduring myths to have come out of Pakistan is
    that Pakistanis are somehow a martial race - with
    military tradition in their blood, with the courage and
    valor that such a military tradition suggests being
    somehow enshrined in the Pakistani's genes.
    General Ayub Khan who led Pakistan into the 1965 war with
    India had boasted that One Pakistani soldier is equal to
    six Indian soldiers The genesis of this attitude is
    interesting.
    In 1857, soldiers of the British Indian army rose up in a
    rebellion in what is now known as the first war of Indian
    Independence. That rebellion was eventually quelled by
    the British with troops mainly from the Punjab
    particularly Muslim troops from what is now the Pakistani
    59
    Punjab, assisted by Pashtun troops. After this event, the
    British greatly changed the composition of the Indian
    army forces, by recruiting mainly Muslim Punjabi troops
    and Pashtun troops from the North Western parts of preindependence
    India, which are now part of Pakistan. These
    troops were subsequently in the thick of all the
    campaigns that Imperial Britain was fighting. The British
    gradually began to refer to these groups as martial
    races. Retired Pakistani army Major Agha Humayun Amin
    wrote about the Pakistani army feeling of martial
    superiority (57):
    The "Martial Races Theory" in reality was an Imperial
    gimmick to boost the ego of the cannon fodder. Various
    British writers like Philip Mason frankly admitted that
    the real reason for selective recruitment was political
    reliability in crisis situations, which the Punjabis had
    exhibited during the 1857-58 Bengal Army rebellion.
    Pakistan the nation was formed with the belief that its
    army was, from the beginning, somehow superior by virtue
    of its being composed of martial races. Maj. Amin goes on
    to write:
    The Pakistani nation had been fed on propaganda about
    martial superiority of their army...the Pakistani GHQ
    placed entire reliance on the Superior Valour and Martial
    Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim
    soldier) vis a vis the Hindu Indian soldier, as proved in
    1965 war and felt that somehow, in the next war to
    miracles would occur and the Pakistan Army would do well
    Hard as it may be for a rational thinking person to
    believe, Pakistani military adventurism has been guided
    by a firm belief in the innate racial superiority of the
    Pakistani soldier and supported by a belief that Pakistan
    and Pakistanis are somehow performing Allah's will and
    60
    that God would therefore be on their side no matter how
    preposterous or ill advised the action.
    Positive Self-image:
    One remarkable feature noticeable among Pakistanis,
    especially Punjabi Pakistanis is an extremely good and
    positive self-image of themselves and their people. Their
    self-esteem is unshakable to the extent that no factor is
    allowed to get in the way of identifying themselves as
    superior and excellent.
    Hamid Hussain wrote of Pakistani military officers' selfimage
    in Pakistan's defence journal (58):
    these military officers also have dangerously selfexaggerated
    opinion of their capacities both in terms of
    defence of the country's frontiers and their ability as
    an organized body to fix all problems of the society.
    Confidence in one's abilities, pride and constant
    struggle to excel professionally are essential elements
    of a good officer's corps. The problem starts when these
    positive traits are stretched to unrealistic limits,
    which now enter the zone of grandiose ideas and selfrighteousness.
    A good self-image can be a useful personality attribute
    if it is not carried to extreme lengths in which all
    others are considered inferior. Unfortunately that has
    occurred among Pakistan's elite, to the detriment of
    Pakistan. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir
    Bhutto, herself a Sindhi, recalls having been taught as a
    child that West Pakistanis are tall, fair-complexioned
    and eat wheat, while East Pakistanis (Bengalis) are
    short, dark-complexioned and eat rice. The East
    Pakistanis were held in contempt by West Pakistanis.
    Major Amin writes(57):
    61
    the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek
    to ever challenge the martial Punjabi or Pathan
    Muslim..The Bengalis were despised as non martial by all
    West Pakistanis.
    This contempt with which West Pakistanis viewed their own
    countrymen contributed to the secession of East Pakistan
    and the formation of Bangladesh in 1971. In one of the
    few elections held in Pakistan, the 1971 elections gave a
    thumping majority to the Awami League, an East Pakistan
    based political party headed by a Bengali, Sheikh Mujibur
    Rehman. If the results of these elections had been
    carried through to their logical conclusion, Mujibur
    Rehman and his party should have formed the government of
    Pakistan in Islamabad. But the Punjabi generals of the
    Pakistani army, who considered themselves superior to the
    short, dark and non-martial Bengalis could not face the
    idea of being ruled by an inferior Bengali as Prime
    Minister. The results of the election were annulled and
    martial law was clamped in East Pakistan. A subsequent
    genocide of over three million East Pakistanis led to the
    Indian military intervention in East Pakistan, and the
    liberation of Bangladesh.
    If Bengali Muslim East Pakistanis were considered
    racially inferior by West Pakistanis, it is not
    surprising to note that Pakistanis have considered
    themselves racially superior to the “dark, ugly”
    Hindustani Indians. This feeling was a carry over from
    the pre-Independence days when the British relied on the
    martial race for their army recruits. Maj. Amin writes,
    To Kiplings contemporaries, the taller and fairer a
    native, the better man he was likely to be
    A visible symbol of the contempt with which Indians are
    taught to be regarded in Pakistan can be seen from some
    62
    Pakistani textbooks for small children to learn the Urdu
    alphabet. The word kafir means unbeliever, but in the
    Pakistani context it is a derogatory term for a non-
    Muslim. Children's alphabet books carry the word kafir as
    an example of a word that starts with the Urdu equivalent
    of the letter k. Associated with the word is a picture of
    a kafir - which is often the picture of a Hindu of a
    Sikh. Even today, in the 21st century it is possible to
    visit Pakistani chat-rooms and discussion fora on the
    Internet to find references to Indians as short, dark,
    ugly, weak or cowardly.
    Stemming from the self-image of the Pakistani is his
    sense of entitlement. Spokespersons for Pakistan never
    tire of pointing out that Pakistan is not getting its
    due. Pakistan is always portrayed as being just, fair and
    sacrificing, and that India, the US or the world owe
    Pakistan a lot more that it is getting. At every step,
    Pakistan is said to have already done, or already given
    more than necessary and that the onus is on the other
    party to pay Pakistan back for services rendered and
    sacrifices made.
    Islamic overlay in Pakistani behavior:
    The obvious question is “Why would anyone's religion make
    his behavior different or peculiar?” It is better to
    answer the question than ignore it and assume that
    religion has, or does not have any bearing on behavior.
    Arab scholar Raphael Patai, in his seminal work on Arab
    psyche (42) lists a few characteristics of Arab
    personality that arise from Islamic beliefs. From the
    profound application of Islamic beliefs among Pakistanis,
    63
    it seems that the same characteristics can be seen among
    Pakistanis, with evidence of the same in their behavior.
    One powerful Islamic belief is that of predestiny; the
    belief that all events are predestined or decided
    beforehand by God and cannot be avoided or changed in any
    way. Patai quotes this Islamic belief as the requirement
    that Man has no choice but to go through the course of
    events, which have been written down for him in God's
    Book to the smallest detail. Not even in everyday life
    can a man do anything, either to hasten or otherwise
    influence events.
    These beliefs are referred to in the words kismat and
    naseeb that occur in Urdu, but stem from Arabic and
    Persian respectively.
    The average, poor uneducated Pakistani believes that his
    life is pre-ordained by Allah to be the way it is, and
    that he will be rewarded for his piety in an afterlife
    with an assured place in a well-stocked heaven. The
    average citizen's life may be lived in poverty in
    someone's service because that is what God has willed for
    him and attempting to change that would be against the
    will of God. For this reason, the average Pakistani is
    unlikely to revolt against his lot in life, or even to
    try to fight to make it better. He will do what his
    feudal master, local lord, or religious leader tells him
    to do, so long as it does not go against his Islamic
    conscience.
    The docility of the average Pakistani in day-to-day life
    is probably beneficial to the stability of feudal
    Pakistani society, but does not augur well for
    development. Development requires effort and change and
    the belief in predestiny rules that conditions and events
    that the Pakistani experiences in life are ordained by
    64
    Allah to be as they are and must not be changed or
    tampered with in any way.
    Such beliefs also make the average Pakistani male citizen
    a prime candidate for motivation into leading a life as
    an Islamic warrior. Such a life is tempting because it
    meets all his human and psychological requirements. He is
    well looked after during the indoctrination and training
    period, and any subsequent violence he takes part in
    would ensure for him a respected place in his society as
    an Islamic warrior, or ensure a place in heaven if he
    were, as is quite likely, to die in action.
    Unless there is a fundamental and deep rooted effort
    within Pakistan to change the relationship of the
    Pakistani with his religion, a relationship deliberately
    cultivated by the Pakistani elite for their own ends,
    there can be virtually no hope of achieving a sea-change
    in the internal situation of Pakistan, and the external
    consequences of that.
    65
    Chapter 6
    WOMEN AND MINORITIES OF PAKISTAN
    With 108 men for every 100 women in Pakistan (59), the
    women of Pakistan could probably be called a minority, to
    be counted along with other minorities of Pakistan such
    as Shia Muslims, Ahmedis, Hindus and Christians.
    The state of Pakistani women has a powerful bearing on
    the condition of Pakistan. For example, two out of three
    women in Pakistan are uneducated. The importance of this
    fact lies in that many studies show that poverty,
    malnutrition and child labor are higher in societies
    where the women are uneducated.
    Pakistani women's rights activist Ameera Javeria, in an
    article entitled To be a woman in Pakistan is to ask for
    a life of subservience (60) wrote:
    Pakistani women continue to be victims of an unjust
    society rooted in history and tradition. Lack of
    awareness about their rights and their need for education
    has added to their predicament. Most Islamic communities
    are averse to the idea of giving women social status
    equal to that of men. That a strong feudal elite still
    rules the roost in the vast countryside is a major
    impediment to enlightenment and democracy, while a
    powerful clergy rejects all notions of equality and
    freedom for women. Those women who rebel by asserting
    their rightful place in society are punished and
    considered immoral; many have been the victims of
    domestic violence, rape, and murder.
    Another report (50) on Pakistani society says this about
    women:
    A woman's life is difficult during the early years of
    66
    marriage. A young bride has very little status in her
    husband's household; she is subservient to her mother-inlaw
    and must negotiate relations with her sisters-inlaw....
    A wife gains status and power as she bears sons.
    Sons will bring wives for her to supervise and provide
    for her in her old age. Daughters are a liability, to be
    given away in an expensive marriage with their virginity
    intact. Therefore, mothers favor their sons.
    A gender bias toward boys is clear from this description.
    With girls being a liability to be given away after
    marriage, education of girls has a low priority in
    Pakistan. Among some groups it is believed that education
    of girls leads to immorality.
    The woman of the family is considered fundamental to
    maintaining the honour of the family group. A woman must
    be chaste and subservient to the man, and failure to do
    this can lead to dishonour a crime punishable by death.
    honour killings in which a father or a brother kill a
    woman for having dishonoured the family are common in
    Pakistan.
    A report on family violence in Pakistani society (61)
    says:
    (sic)The Male dominant society of Pakistan with strong
    sense of complete " Mastery " feel's pride to Dictate his
    terms of Physical and Mental Torture to his Wife, Sister,
    or Daughter in front of other adult and small members of
    the family.
    Particularly egregious is the Hudood ordinance - a law
    that is in effect in Pakistan. One of the purposes of the
    Hudood ordinance is apparently to discourage extramarital
    sex. An explanation of how this law is applied can be
    seen in the following quote (62):
    67
    Since the passage of the Hudood Ordinance in 1979 under
    the military government of Zia al Haq, "zina" or extramarital
    intercourse, has been considered a crime against
    the state in Pakistan...this law often prescribes cruel
    and devastating punishments, such as whipping or stoning
    the individual(s) in question, and explicitly
    discriminates against women...the Hudood Ordinance has
    legally blurred the distinction between rape and
    extramarital sex, resulting in the imprisonment and/or
    physical punishment of numerous women who have come
    forward with charges of rape without witnesses.
    Consequently, many rape victims are deemed criminals in a
    Pakistani court of law.
    Pakistan is stuck in a vicious circle in which the elite
    corner all the resources, leaving little for education of
    the poor. And among this class the women are the worst
    off, uneducated and discriminated; and this leads to
    further poverty and degradation in society. No force in
    Pakistan seems to have the wisdom, will or power to
    change this.
    Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan is said to
    have had a vision for Pakistan in which people of all
    religions in Pakistan would co-exist. In his 11th August
    1947 speech to the constituent assembly of Pakistan,
    Jinnah said (63):
    You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that
    has nothing to do with the business of the state ... in
    the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and
    Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious
    sense, because that is the personal faith of each
    individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the
    state."
    68
    A few months later, in 1948, Jinnah reiterated his
    vision:
    We have many non-Muslims-Hindus, Christians and Parsis
    ... but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same
    rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play
    their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan."
    But Jinnah's vision for Pakistan died with Jinnah.
    Pakistan's record in the treatment of its religious
    minorities is shameful and unapologetic.
    In his landmark paper (64), possibly the first scientific
    statistical analysis of the question of ethnic cleansing
    in Pakistan, researcher Sridhar notes:
    ..almost 89% of the minorities in West Pakistan were
    ethnically cleansed, i.e. killed, converted or driven out
    of the country. Almost 54% of the minority population
    ended up as refugees in India, while a very high 35% of
    the minority population is simply unaccounted for. These
    are people who were likely killed or converted into
    Islam.
    Population researcher P.H. Reddy has noted that at the
    time of formation of Pakistan, there were over 20 million
    non-Muslims in the areas that formed Pakistan mostly
    Hindus. After the migration of partition, approximately 7
    million non-Muslims remained in what is now West Pakistan
    making up approximately ten per cent of the population of
    West Pakistan. In the years since independence,
    Pakistan's population has more than doubled to nearly 150
    million, but only three per cent, or 4.5 million people
    are non Muslims in modern day Pakistan. About half of
    that number are Hindus and the other half are Christian.
    In simple terms, in 56 years since independence the
    69
    population of Muslims in Pakistan went up from about 60
    million to 145 million, while the population of non-
    Muslims fell from 7 million to 4.5 million. Hindus formed
    the largest minority in Pakistan at independence and
    their number has reduced to around 1.5 million.
    In November 2002, the Times of India (65) quoted Noor Naz
    Agha, a prominent Pakistani lawyer and rights activist as
    saying:
    Minorities are not safe in Pakistan. Recently, several
    attacks have been made on churches, hospitals, even on
    human rights organisations. And several people have been
    killed,"
    The treatment of religious minorities in Pakistan leaves
    a lot to be desired. The problem stems from an attitude
    that Pakistan is for Sunni Muslims alone, and people of
    other religions, and even Shia Muslims are to be looked
    upon with contempt. The discrimination extends to
    derogatory references to non-Islamic people in school
    textbooks, as noted in chapter 3.
    M.H. Aksari, writing in the Pakistani paper Dawn (66)
    said,
    The former Indian foreign secretary, J.N. Dixit,
    recalling his days as ambassador in Islamabad says that
    once when he called on a Pakistani friend, the latter's
    six-year old daughter on discovering that Dixit was a
    Hindu skipped around the table chanting 'Hindu Kutta',
    'Hindu Kutta.'
    Hindu Kutta means Hindu Dog. But it is not Hindus alone
    who are discriminated against in Pakistan. Over the years
    the Pakistan army leadership has encouraged a
    70
    particularly intolerant Islamic mindset to prevail and
    thrive in Pakistan. Shia Muslims in Pakistan are
    subjected to terrorist attacts and discrimination, and
    the Ahmediya sect have been declared as non-Muslims in
    Pakistan for their beliefs. Pakistan is busy changing
    Islam to suit the needs of a small elite.
    The role of the Pakistani army leaders in this is clear
    from a report that was carried in the paper Dawn in
    November 2003 (67).
    Ziaul Haq actively encouraged this misguided Islamic
    fervour...Ziaul Haq's advice led to widespread religious
    riots ... Many people, mostly Shias, were killed and
    their houses burnt. The local administration did little
    to control the situation. A foreign diplomat, who
    happened to be travelling by road from Skardu to
    Islamabad a couple of days after all this started, told
    me that he saw houses en-route burning and that the route
    provided a spectacle of war and destruction.
    There is a movement in Pakistan to have Shias declared
    non-Muslim. Following a massacre of Shia Muslims in a
    Pakistani mosque on the Islamic holy day of Moharram in
    2004, senior analyst B. Raman wrote about anti-Shia
    hostility in Pakistan (68):
    The last years of the Zia regime saw the Shias of Gilgit
    come out with a demand for a separate Shia State
    consisting of Gilgit and the Shia majority areas of
    Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). They
    wanted the Shia state to be called the Karakoram Province
    and remain part of a confederation of Pakistan. The Zia
    regime crushed the Shia movement ruthlessly. In August
    1988, the Pakistan Army inducted a large Sunni tribal
    force from the NWFP and the Federally-Administered Tribal
    Areas (FATA), led by Osama bin Laden, into Gilgit and it
    71
    massacred hundreds of Shias and crushed their revolt.
    The hatred of the Shias for Osama bin Laden and his Al
    Qaeda dates from this period.
    Successive governments in Pakistan, mostly military, but
    civilian as well, have consistently fought and opposed
    anyone and everyone, foreign nations as well as their own
    people. The only things that have been preserved intact
    and untouched in Pakistan are the power and wealth of the
    elite of the army, a few businessmen and the feudal lords
    and their allies, the preachers of a narrow brand of
    Sunni Islam, who are responsible for a rising tide of
    Islamic fundamentalism.
    72
    Chapter 7
    PARTITION AND THE TWO-NATION THEORY
    When Indians and Pakistanis meet, one is struck by their
    similarity. Indians are fond of saying “Pakistanis are
    just like us” but one will find that Pakistanis do not
    tend to say “Indians are just like us”. Being different
    from Indians is a fundamental requirement that defines
    the Pakistani.
    Before India was partitioned in 1947, some of the Muslim
    elite in India, who were later to go to Pakistan,
    considered themselves the descendants of the Mughals who
    had ruled vast tracts of India. When the British were set
    to leave India, it was realised by these real or
    perceived descendants of Mughals that in a democratic
    India, they would not automatically regain control of the
    lands they had lost to the British. The demand for a
    separate nation was a natural extension of this Mughal
    mindset. This group of individuals formed a migrant
    nation.
    The Weekly Standard reported in October 2001 (69):
    Created on August 15, 1947, from the northern, primarily
    Muslim provinces of British India, Pakistan isn't really
    a nation-state. It is a geographic expression of an ageold
    Islamic ideal: Muslims should not, if at all
    possible, live under non-Muslim rule. Living under the
    all-mighty British was unpleasant for many.. Living under
    the far more numerous Hindus, whom the Muslim Mogul
    dynasty had dominated for centuries before the arrival of
    the English, was worse. For the English-educated Muslim
    elite, it was intolerable.. Gandhi's Indian democracy was
    going to be Hindu, so a Muslim "Land of the Pure"--the
    literal meaning of Pakistan--was essential to protect and
    nurture the faithful.
    73
    MB Naqvi wrote in the Jang of Pakistan (70):
    Historically the majority of Muslims, originally lowcaste
    Hindus, affected a superiority complex, especially
    in Northern India. They feared being falling down into
    the vast assimilative sea of Hindudom surrounding them
    wherein they will be at the bottom of social heap. May be
    they would be punished for former uppishness and for real
    or imagined wrongs. That explained their demonstrative
    adherence to Islam, which is what distinguished them from
    Hindus. Their religious exhibitionism and a superiority
    complex led to emphases on differences with Hindus and
    regarding themselves as rulers' kith and kin deserving
    privileges and safeguards -- the leitmotif of preindependence
    Indian Muslim politics.
    Others' refusal to accept Muslims demands, calculated to
    preserve imagined privileges, angered them and an
    adversarial attitude vis-a-vis Hindus developed. Muslims
    thus demanded weightage - actually equality of treatment
    with Hindus - reservations and separate electorate. These
    came from, and strengthened, two traits: first, not to
    accept democracy's implications, especially the equality
    with Hindus. The second was to depend on a ruling or
    hegemonic power to get them their due.
    But Pakistan was not formed merely by people with this
    Mughal mindset. Another root of partition lay with the
    defeat of the Turkish Caliphate by the British in 1918.
    When that occurred, Muslims all over the world, and
    certainly in pre-independence India attempted to go back
    to their Islamic roots. One of the consequences was that
    they discouraged their children from attending secular
    schools, and encouraged education in Islamic schools,
    madrassas. The end of the Caliphate was a symbolic blow
    to Muslims who has grown up to look at the Islamic empire
    74
    as extending from Arabia in the center to North Africa in
    the West, Southern Europe to the North and Central Asia,
    India and South East Asia to the East. The Caliph was the
    symbolic head of this empire, although he by no means
    controlled even a fraction of that empire. The word
    Caliph means deputy in Arabic, and the first Caliph had
    been appointed by the Prophet Mohammad, and the end of
    the Caliphate was the end of a long line of Caliphs that
    extended from antiquity.
    A concept in Islam speaks of a dar ul Islam, a house of
    Islam - a house or a group of followers of Islam, and a
    dar ul harb or house of war, consisting of unbelievers -
    people who were not followers of Islam. Inherent in the
    concept of dar ul harb was that Islam, and Muslims would
    always be under threat in the dar ul harb. The concept
    probably dates back to the early years of Islam, when
    there was a central but rapidly expanding Islamic empire,
    around which were lands with non-Muslims who were at war
    with the followers of the new religion. For Muslims who
    could not have their way with separate representation in
    pre-independence India, staying in India would be
    tantamount to living under subjugation in the dar ul
    harb, a completely unacceptable situation, The demand for
    a separate state for Muslims only was a logical extension
    of this thought process.
    The Friday Times had this to say (71):
    In India, Muslim existence was deemed a kind of
    permanent emergency (dar-ul-harb) and migration was
    considered an option in the defiance of British raj.
    Allama Iqbal, the poet who composed the popular Indian
    patriotic song Saare Jahaan se achcha, Hindustan hamara
    later paradoxically endorsed the need for a separate
    nation for Muslims (72):
    75
    Allama Iqbal asserted that there is only one nation
    opposed to the Muslim Umma, and that is the nation of
    non-Muslims! In other words, the world is divided into
    two camps, the Muslims and Non-Muslims.
    Another key player in the call for Pakistan was Maulana
    Maududi, the ideological founder of Pakistan (73):
    (The) Pakistan Movement was based on the theory that
    Muslims are entirely separate people from Hindus in every
    respect... This theory is popularly known as two-nation
    theory. Under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali
    Jinnah, the movement, in less than a decade gave birth to
    Pakistan The man who is most credited as an intellectual
    force behind the two-nation theory and a front against
    united Indian nationalism is Maulana Abul Ala Maududi.
    A third factor that contributed to the formation of
    Pakistan was the political power aspiration of Mohammad
    Ali Jinnah who saw in the formation of the new nation of
    Pakistan a ready made constituency of Muslims, in
    addition to power and glory for himself and the new
    nation.
    The result, as eloquently documented by Rajiv Malhotra,
    was (74):
    Without any concrete 'dispute' between Hindus and
    Muslims, the logic that prevailed was that Muslims
    require segregation of political and social life in order
    to be in compliance with the demands of sharia. The Two-
    Nation Theory was a manifestation of the doctrine of darul-
    islam versus dar-ul-harb.
    With Islam, and Islamic reasons being the basis for the
    formation of Pakistan, Pakistanis have, right from the
    76
    beginning, been taught to regard themselves as Muslims
    first and foremost, and as opposed to being citizens of
    the nation, Pakistan. Pakistan was supposed to be a
    homeland for Muslims of India and its formation was
    pushed through by the groups who wanted it, over the
    wishes of other groups, including some such as the
    Jamaat-i-Islami who did not favor the formation of
    Pakistan.
    Not much thought was put into whether a state based on
    religion alone would be able to survive. With Jinnah as
    leader the heady success of nation formation in 1947 was
    enough. Pakistan had come into existence. It was Islamic.
    It was not Indian. It was a victory of Islam over the
    British and the Hindus. The fact of being Pakistani
    brought with it a liberal dose of pride, satisfaction,
    honour and dignity. For the new Pakistanis India was a
    land of kafirs, unbelievers. It was a land of
    superstition, discrimination, hunger and poverty. A
    nation in decline. Pakistan would not be like India.
    Pakistan would be progressive, strong and Islamic. And
    Pakistan would claim to represent the Muslims who had
    stayed behind in India. Pakistan would represent Islam
    itself it would be a leading light of Islam in the world.
    It was the first Islamic state to be created in the
    modern era ab initio.
    Although the purpose of this book is to present a study
    of Pakistan after partition, it would not be out of place
    to mention briefly the civilizational effect that
    partition had on India. When studied over centuries,
    civilizations can often be seen to behave like live
    beings. In civilizational terms, the splitting up of
    British India into modern India and Pakistan can be
    compared to an act of auto-amputation. This is a
    condition in which a live human body spontaneously
    discards and casts off a dead or diseased part, such as a
    77
    toe or a fingertip so that the body itself can survive
    and not be affected by the disease that damaged the toe
    or finger. For India partition was akin to that - a
    civilizational auto-amputation.
    In one convulsive act, the people of the Indian
    subcontinent agreed to place all the people who wanted to
    live and work in a united India in one place, and and all
    the people who did not wish to live and work in India
    were placed in Pakistan.
    Strange as it may sound, this tumultuous self-mutilating
    act was a profoundly democratic one, in which those who
    wanted to opt out of India were allowed to opt out, and
    those who wanted to stay, stayed. The actual act of
    partition was accompanied by horrifying suffering and
    death, but after five decades the memories of the pain
    are beginning to fade; more than two-thirds of the
    population of India having been after 1947, after the
    painful events of partition. It is easier for these
    younger Indians to see that for India, partition was not
    so much an act of separation of all Hindus from all
    Muslims, but it merely segregated a sub-group of Indians
    who did not want to co-exist with other Indians. The vast
    majority of Indians rooted for India and worked for
    India.
    Pakistanis did not see things that way. They saw
    themselves as Muslims, and Pakistani leaders assumed that
    the Muslims remaining in India would automatically rise
    up and revolt, and that India would fragment and break.
    They were wrong. The initial fragmentation and breaking
    that occurred at partition, continued in Pakistan, with
    the formation of Bangladesh. Pakistan had filled itself
    with people whose intent was less to live and work in
    harmony, and more to live away from some group or the
    other.
    78
    It was only after the formation of Pakistan that all the
    assumptions made about Islam as a unifying concept began
    to break down. There were contradictions at every turn.
    The 15 million mohajirs who migrated to Pakistan from
    India were not welcomed. But they were educated and held
    all the important bureaucratic posts. The mohajirs found
    that their survival in Pakistan would be made easier by
    creating and maintaining an India scare - a phobia
    against the scheming Hindu who was out to subjugate or
    kill all Muslims. The mohajirs, the Muslim elite of India
    who had migrated to Pakistan were in an ideal position to
    concoct any stories they wished about the bestial Hindus
    they had left behind.
    Apart from the mohajirs was the other half of Pakistan,
    East Pakistan, with its people, the Bengalis. The fact
    that East Pakistani Bengalis were Muslim did not help to
    stop the West Pakistani disdain for the short, dark, fish
    and rice-eating Bengali, as opposed to the tall, fair,
    wheat eating Pakistani Punjabi. The possibility of
    democracy in Pakistan brought with it the threat of a
    short, dark, rice-eating Bengali becoming Prime Minister
    of Pakistan. That would have been totally unacceptable to
    the Pakistani Punjabi. Punjabis made up 90% of the
    Pakistani army, and the army had no intention of seeing
    its Punjabi dominance being subordinate to the inferior
    Bengali.
    This complex web of factors kept Pakistanis from uniting
    with each other but the Islam argument was used for
    unity. Any threat, and any setback to Pakistan, even when
    caused by internal politics and mismanagement was blamed
    on India. India and Indians were continuously and
    bitterly accused of being anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim.
    It was drummed into ordinary Pakistanis that they must be
    good Muslims, and while Pakistanis struggled to meet the
    79
    standards set for them, the ruling elite lived as they
    pleased.
    In his book, Among the Believers(75), Nobel Prize winning
    author V.S. Naipaul describes travels through Pakistan,
    and records interviews with a diverse group of
    Pakistanis. A repeated observation that comes out is that
    the ordinary Pakistani citizen is under pressure to be a
    good Muslim. The Pakistani citizen is judged by whether
    he is a good Muslim or not. Every act or event in
    Pakistan has to be seen through the prism of whether it
    is Islamic or not. One of the problems that crops up from
    this is the definition of “Who is a good Muslim?”.
    Naipaul says, To be a devout Muslim was always to have
    distinctive things to do; it was to be guided constantly
    by rules; it was to live in a fever of the faith and
    always to be aware of the distinctiveness of the faith.
    And Pakistanis believed that this was all that was
    needed. It was only necessary for everyone to be a good
    Muslim, and everything else would look after itself.
    After all Islam had given them a nation. It would now
    provide for that nation.
    80
    Chapter 8
    ISLAM AND PAKISTAN
    In the end, it could perhaps be said that Islam was too
    big for Pakistan to keep as its private domain. Pakistan
    was unable to grab and hold Islam as though Islam and
    Pakistan were one and the same.
    To be sure, Pakistani leaders, for decades behaved as
    though Pakistan was Islam and Islam was Pakistan. Even
    before independence, Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan had
    called the flag of his political party, the Muslim League
    as the Flag of Islam and had said you cannot separate the
    Muslim League from Islam. (76). A very popular slogan in
    Pakistan was, "Pakistan ka matlab kya, La ilaha
    illallah". The slogan combines a few words taken from the
    the Islamic call to prayer La ilaha illallah - meaning
    there is no God but God and attaches those words to
    Pakistan to make the meaning What does Pakistan mean
    there is no God but God - implying that Pakistan and
    Islam are one and the same.
    But this charade could only last a few years before the
    fallacies began to show.
    It is endlessly and erroneously repeated that Pakistan
    was formed for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.
    This is a shameful piece of fiction that needs to be set
    right. Pakistan was formed for some, and not all Muslims
    of the Indian subcontinent.
    Demographer P.H. Reddy noted in the Times of India on 8th
    April 2003 (77):
    According to the 1941 census, out of a total of 435
    districts in undivided India, there were 76 in which more
    than 50 per cent of the people were Muslims. Based on
    81
    this demographic fact, the Sir Cyril Radcliffe's Boundary
    Commission allotted these 76 districts to Pakistan. The
    76 Muslim-majority districts were grouped together in two
    clusters. One cluster was in north-west India and the
    other in north-east India. Western Pakistan comprised the
    north-west part of the sub-continent and Eastern Pakistan
    comprised eastern part of Bengal and one district in
    Assam...In 1951, Muslims numbered 3.54 crore, making up
    9.9 per cent of the total population of India.
    Over the centuries Islam reached a balance with the
    cultures of the people who adopted Islam. Arab culture
    had existed in Arabia for centuries before Islam was
    born, and Arab culture adopted and internalized Islam,
    which was born in Arabia. Egyptians live in peace with
    their past, and do not seek to deny the ancient, pre-
    Islamic Egyptian civilization of Pharaohs who built the
    Pyramids. An entire literature and culture of Islam
    developed in Persia, using the Persian language. Islam
    spread peacefully into Indonesia and was absorbed and
    rationalized by the local culture.
    Similarly Islam developed and flowered in India with its
    own unique literature, arts and architecture produced by
    an intermingling of two rich cultures. The formation of
    Pakistan sought to deny this vibrant entity. Jinnah
    exploited a cleavage in Indian society to proclaim:
    Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious
    philosophies, social customs, literature", "to two
    different civilizations", that they "derive their
    inspiration from different sources of history"... (with)
    different epics, different heroes and different
    episodes." "We wish our people", he declared, "to develop
    to the fullest our spiritual, cultural, economic, social
    and political life in a way that we think best and in
    consonance with our own ideals and according to the
    82
    genius of our people."
    Perhaps Jinnah did not mean to strip Pakistan of the rich
    culture that Islam had developed in its centuries of
    interaction in India (78).
    But the leaders of the new Pakistan who took over after
    Jinnah died in 1948, certainly felt that Pakistan should
    be stripped of all its connections with India. In an
    experimental and unparalleled act of ignorance, Pakistan
    was deliberately set on the path of being an orphan,
    culture-less nation. Pakistan was not Arabic; it was not
    Egyptian or Persian; it was not Indonesian, but it was
    definitely not going to be Indian any more. The India
    connection had to be stripped clean, leaving Pakistan
    purely Islamic. Islamic, for Muslims alone, free from
    India or any Indian roots. Indian culture had to be
    actively cleaned out of the minds of millions of
    Pakistani citizens - a culture of centuries was to be
    washed clean, and nobody had any idea of what would
    replace the void. The only thing people knew was that
    Pakistanis would have to be Islamic, and good Muslims.
    The formation of Pakistan was considered a great victory.
    But there were inconsistencies and contradictions right
    from the beginning and the confusion has remained to this
    day.
    Was Pakistan a nation for Muslims only? But why did
    Jinnah say:
    ..we have many non-Muslims - Hindus, Christians, and
    Parsis - but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the
    same rights and privileges as any other citizens... You
    are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are
    free to go to your mosques or to any other places of
    worship in this State of Pakistan...You will find that in
    83
    course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and
    Muslims would cease to be Muslims.. (76)
    Was Pakistan a nation for all Muslims of the Indian
    subcontinent? If so, Pakistan had failed at birth, as the
    majority of Muslims chose to remain in India.
    Was Pakistan the leader of all Islamic nations, an
    example for Islamic nations to follow as the leader of
    the ummah, a modern day Caliphate? But if that was the
    case Pakistan should not have had any boundaries. That is
    indeed what some Pakistani Islamists believe:
    Muslims all over the world must realize that
    nationalism is kufr, and that the modern nation-states
    are a creation of that period in history when Muslims
    were defeated and dominated by kufr. (79) (kufr refers to
    unbelievers i.e. People who are not Islamic.)
    Pakistani leaders, in their confusion as to what Pakistan
    was and what it should do, ended up trying to make
    Pakistan take all the routes that it could possibly take
    simultaneously. And like a man whose arms and legs are
    being pulled apart by horses moving in different
    directions, parts of Pakistan, and social and ethnic
    groups of Pakistan have all headed in different
    directions, resulting in the chaos that Pakistan is
    today.
    Pakistani leaders claimed that they, and Pakistan, were
    purely Islamic, and represented Islam. Islam was and
    still remains the ultimate excuse, the lever that is used
    in Pakistan to justify anything. For Pakistan, Islam has
    served as a tool to be used when convenient, to get aid,
    or to deflect blame or to accuse an adversary of
    misdeeds. As long as Pakistani leaders hid behind the
    Islam excuse for their actions, nobody could question
    84
    them. After all, Pakistan was Islamic, and therefore
    anything that Pakistan did, from waging wars, avoiding
    elections, genocide, corruption could not be criticized
    by anyone. Any criticism of Pakistan was criticism of
    Islam. If Pakistan obtained military and economic aid
    from the US, it was because Islam was naturally anticommunist.
    India did not dare question Pakistani claims
    no matter how preposterous or obscene they were, because
    Pakistan was Islamic. Opposing Pakistan was anti-Islamic.
    And in this manner, instead of consolidating and unifying
    the new state of Pakistan, its leaders set about using
    Islam to divert attention to India, and to meddle with
    Indian territory and Indian Muslims. India was the source
    of all problems; the enemy of Pakistan, and therefore the
    enemy of Islam. The India problem had to be solved, and
    that took priority over everything else in Pakistan, be
    it development, democracy or common sense. The threat
    from India became the common denominator for all
    Pakistani actions, for postponing elections and for
    postponing development of Pakistan indefinitely. And
    conveniently, aid and funds poured into Pakistan in the
    early years as part of US aid to Pakistan as a cold war
    ally. As long as the money kept coming in, there was no
    pressure to change policy. India could be fought and
    opposed, the people of Pakistan could be kept busy, and
    elections postponed. Money and the economy were not a
    problem. Allah (God), who had given Pakistan to the
    faithful, was providing funds and arms via the US. India
    would be defeated. Pakistan could do no wrong.
    But as repeated Pakistani assaults against India failed,
    Islam could not fail. Pakistanis had failed the faith.
    They were not Islamic enough they had to strive to be
    better Muslims. They had to starve, sacrifice and allow
    their army to get stronger, so that Islam could be upheld
    against India, the number one threat to Pakistan, and
    85
    therefore to Islam. No method was ruled out, no sacrifice
    could be too great in opposing India, because opposing
    India meant devotion to Islamic ideals. Muslims in
    Kashmir, and later all the Muslims in India would be
    rescued from Hindu tyranny by Pakistan.
    Islam gradually became the tool, the prop, used in
    Pakistan to make every opinion or move. The Islam card
    was used by everybody in Pakistan to suit their own
    purpose. The Pakistani elite, migrants from India,
    holding all the important government posts, saw their
    positions threatened by the prospect of elections which
    would unseat them in favor of locals. Elections were a
    threat that had to be postponed or canceled and an
    imaginary threat to Islam was invoked. In his essay on
    the role of the power structure in Pakistan (80),
    Mohammad Waseem wrote:
    Muslim migrants from East Punjab and further East in
    India shaped the psyche of the new nation along feelings
    of insecurity at the hands of India, commitment to
    Islamic ideology and the need to unite against all
    odds...the migrant elite...dreaded the prospects of their
    exit from power in the event of elections.
    A report in Pakistan's Friday Times (81) carried this
    scathing message on the role of the migrant elite in
    using Islam:
    On Feb 21, 1952 the historic Bengali language movement
    erupted spontaneously all over East Bengal...it remained
    a major potential challenge. Foolishly our ruling elite,
    instead of going some way to meet Bengali demands,
    thought they could isolate the Bengali nationalists by
    raising religious slogans of Islamic ideology and Islamic
    identity to counter Bengali anger.
    86
    The army of Pakistan was initially subservient to the
    government. After 1971 Zia-ul-Haq started a campaign of
    Islamization of the Pakistani army, and strengthened the
    process of Islamization of Pakistan started by Zulfikar
    Ali Bhutto, whom Zia had deposed in a coup. Rajiv
    Malhotra wrote (74):
    Islamic texts are being introduced into Pakistani
    military training. Middle ranking officers must take
    courses and examinations on Islam. There are even serious
    attempts under way to define an Islamic military
    doctrine, as distinct from the international military
    doctrines, so as to fight in accordance with the Koran.
    And as Islam was stirred into the mindset of the
    Pakistani army, the army started seeing Islam in more and
    more of its actions. Columnist Hamid Husain has this to
    say about Islamization of the Pakistan army (58):
    Brigadier Gulzar Ahmad explaining the role of celestial
    powers to lessen his troop casualties in 1965 war stated,
    'There was a hidden hand deflecting the rounds'..General
    Mahmud Ahmad during Pakistani ambassador's conference
    reprimanded the ambassadors for not relying on the
    intercession of Providence while analyzing Pakistan's
    Afghan policy. Another compelling reason to be very
    cautious about overuse of religion is to avoid seeping of
    sectarian tendencies into the armed forces.
    Finally, for the mullahs (Islamic scholars) of Pakistan,
    anything less than an Islamic state in Pakistan was a
    threat. Only in an Islamic state could mullahs be
    influential and prominent. Pluralism or Western-style
    democracy was incompatible with the mullah's world view,
    and they supported every measure to make Islam the basis
    of the existence of all Pakistanis. M. A. Hussain wrote
    (82):
    87
    Imam, Mozin, Mo-alim, Maulavi, etc...have a vested
    interest in establishing an Islamic state where they are
    locus of power and have tremendous scope for employment.
    It explains why even those Ulamas and Maulavis (like
    Moulana Maudoodi), who had opposed Jinnah, went to
    Pakistan as they saw no role in India for themselves.
    With everyone in Pakistan, the people, the bureaucracy
    and government, the army and the mullahs seemingly being
    in agreement with each other on the question of the
    Islamic status of Pakistan, there really should have been
    no problem. Everything should have fallen in place, and
    gone without a hitch.
    But that did not happen. Every group in Pakistan needed
    Islam only for their narrow self interest. The idea of an
    Islamic state seemed noble enough, but making it reality
    was easier said than done.
    The Ideal Islamic state existed at the time of the
    Prophet Mohammad. The desire for an ideal Islamic state
    has been described as follows (83):
    The quest for it reflects the desire to model Muslim
    politics on the original Islamic community in Medina,
    which remains to this day the blueprint for a genuinely
    Islamic society. No Muslim polity has measured up to the
    combination of piety and social justice achieved by the
    Medinese community...But trying to replicate the Medinese
    polity remains an ideal.
    When the Prophet Mohammad died in AD 632, he left behind
    a tradition, but there were no written guidelines on how
    a state should be run. In the absence of such guidelines,
    Islamic people often ended up being controlled by the
    nearest strongman. The men who controlled the sword,
    88
    controlled the ulema (scholars) and the people.
    Tamara Sonn, a Professor of religious studies, wrote
    (84):
    (The Prophet) Muhammad's prophetic mantle was not
    inherited by his successors, and he did not leave behind
    a specific political system or designate a successor...In
    general, the Prophet's successors were expected to be
    personally pious and to behave according to the guidance
    left by the Prophet, but there were no formal criteria
    for determining the community's leadership or judging its
    legitimacy.
    Succession of leadership among Islamic people has been a
    bone of contention ever since that time. And Pakistan is
    no exception.
    In a report on the relationship of the mullahs and the
    military in Pakistan by the International Crisis Group,
    (a non-profit multinational organization committed to
    resolving conflict) the introduction carries the
    following quote (85):
    The Muslim state in India was a theocracy...In theory the
    sultan's authority in religious matters was limited by
    the holy law of the Qu'raan and no sultan could clearly
    divorce religion from politics. But in practice the
    Muslim sultan of India was a perfect autocrat and his
    word was law. The real source of the sultan's authority
    was military strength, and this was understood and
    acquiesced in...by the soldiers, the poets and the ulema
    of the age.
    The precedent of the strongman - the military ruler
    taking absolute control over Islamic people had already
    existed in Mughal India, and was implemented and
    89
    perpetuated in Pakistan. The Pakistan army was invited to
    take power, liked it, and held on to power. Other forces
    in Pakistan who wanted power and influence, such as the
    politicians, bureaucrats and the ulema used the army, or
    reached some accommodation with the army. And it was all
    done in the name of Islam.
    Anything that Pakistan did was done in the name of Islam.
    It was done, Pakistani leaders claimed, to uphold Islam
    and represent Islam. It was to be assumed by all who were
    watching that Pakistan itself was the embodiment of
    Islam. After all Pakistan was formed for Islam. Criticism
    of Pakistan was criticism of Islam. Pakistani leaders
    were always right, always Islamic and they compelled
    their people to be more and more Islamic.
    Gradually the non-Muslim minorities of Pakistan were
    squeezed out (chapter 6) They had no role in Islamic
    Pakistan. East Pakistanis their minds poisoned by India
    according to some West Pakistani commentators, revolted,
    seceded and formed Bangladesh (chapter 11). This blow to
    Pakistan was explained on the basis of Pakistan not being
    Islamic enough. More and more Islamic laws had to be
    passed and implemented. The sharia, zakat, and the Hudood
    ordinance were brought in. Islamic fervor, it was
    implied, would solve all of Pakistan's problems, and put
    and end to the people's misery.
    The effort to make Pakistan purely Islamic has been
    described by V.S Naipaul in his book “Among the
    believers”(75)
    This Islamic state couldn't simply be decreed; it had to
    be invented, and in that invention faith was of little
    help. Faith, at the moment, could only supply the simple
    negatives that answered emotional needs: no alcohol, no
    feminine immodesty, no interest in the banks. But soon in
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    Pakistan these negatives were to be added to: no
    political parties, no parliament, no dissent, no law
    courts. So existing institutions were deemed to be un-
    Islamic and undermined or undone; the faith was asserted
    because only the faith seemed to be whole; and in the
    vacuum only the army could rule.
    However, the army, the rulers and influential people of
    Pakistan did not have to be all that Islamic. Pure Islam
    was for the hoi-polloi, the serfs and underlings. The
    elite stayed rich, and the army became richer, and their
    modern, liberal lifestyle conveyed the impression of a
    progressive society to Western aid givers. Pakistan's
    alliance with the U.S., ensured that foreign aid poured
    in and the economy of the wealthy in Pakistan boomed. The
    rich got money, the army got weapons, while the poor of
    Pakistan got madrassas (Islamic schools) to ensure that
    they became more Islamic.
    The mullahs of Pakistan were doubly happy. The burgeoning
    of madrassas and ensured that they would have jobs and
    influence. They took charge of the madrassas with gusto
    and preached with fervor. They preached jihad, Jihad
    against the enemies of Islam. In order to be good
    Muslims, Pakistanis were urged to do jihad - not the
    internal, self correcting jihad of the Koran, but the
    external violence of the Generals and their games of
    military domination. More and more Pakistanis were needed
    to fight Pakistan's wars. Men were needed to fight India.
    Men were needed to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
    The army brass, getting richer, needed men to do their
    fighting, and the mullahs, secure and happy in their
    newly funded madrassas, ensured the delivery of any
    number of men to fight for Pakistan, for Islam.
    Each Islamic jihadi, brought up with fervor in a
    madrassa, was ready to die for a cause, ready to embrace
    91
    and accept the guaranteed benefits of dying in jihad in
    an afterlife to be enjoyed in a well-stocked heaven.
    And as these men prepared for and died fighting for the
    cause that they had been told was Islamic - the people
    who trained them and sent them to die the army and the
    mullahs, got fatter, and more powerful.
    This glorious scene became Pakistan's version of Islam.
    Rich generals doing office jobs while men from the poor
    classes with little to live for were trained,
    indoctrinated and prepared for death; their families
    accepting that the death of their son would bring glory
    and honour. The Islam of Pakistan's mullahs, in league
    with lazy Generals, aiding the Generals' wars, preaching
    an Islam that would keep the mullahs comfortable in this
    life, while their wards and students were encouraged to
    seek the pleasures of an afterlife, obtainable only by
    violence and death.
    As the institutions of Pakistan failed in this unique and
    unorthodox concept of a nation, the faith Islam, grew
    stronger.
    In a remarkably prescient passage Naipaul observes (75),
    The state withered, but faith didn't. Failure only led
    back to the faith. The state had been founded as a
    homeland for Muslims. If the state failed it wasn't
    because the dream was flawed, or the faith flawed; it
    could only be because men had failed the faith. And in
    that quest of the Islamic absolute the society of
    believers, where every action was instinct with worship
    men lost sight of the political origins of their
    state...Extraordinary claims began to be made for
    Pakistan: it was founded as the land of the pure; it was
    to be the first truly Islamic state since the days of the
    Prophet and his close companions
    92
    The average Pakistani citizen was coerced or co-opted by
    putting Islam first. Pakistan, it was stressed, was
    created by Muslims for Muslims. Every Pakistani had to
    strive to be a good Muslim. To be Pakistani was to be a
    good Muslim. Muslim clerics, the mullahs and the ulema
    were necessarily allowed to exercise spiritual control
    over the Pakistani masses to ensure that Pakistan
    remained adequately and properly Islamic in all arenas.
    It was drummed in that this was necessary because India
    was always there to swallow up Pakistan. India had been
    held in check only by God and the Pakistani army, which
    presented itself as the savior, ‘the army of Islam,’
    upholding the faith and protecting Pakistan. Co-opting
    the Pakistani citizen under the Islam banner eminently
    served the interests of the rich and corrupt elite of
    Pakistan in maintaining their grip and preserving their
    business and territorial interests. And the Pakistani
    state died. In his characteristically astute manner V.S,
    Naipaul concludes (75):
    Step by step, out of its Islamic striving, Pakistan had
    undone the rule of law it had inherited from the British,
    and replaced it with nothing
    93
    Chapter 9
    ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIA AND INDIANS
    Career diplomat-turned-politician Mani Shankar Aiyer
    served as India's first Consul General in Karachi, and he
    has published his collected writings on Pakistan in a
    book entitled Pakistan Papers (86). Aiyer says that the
    best definition for Pakistani is “One who is not Indian”.
    Pakistanis define their identity as being non-Indian, and
    go on further to define themselves as pure Muslims.
    Pakistan itself means “Land of the Pure” and Pakistani
    identity has been sought to be defined on the basis that
    Pakistan is a land of pure Muslims. In their effort to
    ensure that Pakistanis are not Indian, Pakistani
    authorities have done everything in their power to
    discourage any Pakistani from displaying cultural traits
    that are seen as Indian in character, and encouraged the
    replacement of that culture by an invented Islamic
    culture. This experiment is unique in the world. No other
    nation has attempted to so totally reject its existing
    culture while retaining only the faith or religion.
    In his book, Among the Believers, (75) Naipaul quotes the
    words of a man describing Pakistan. I will tell you the
    story of this country in two sentences. In the first
    quarter of this century the Hindus of India decided that
    everything that was wrong had to do with foreigners and
    foreign influence. Then in the second quarter, the
    Muslims of India woke up. They had a double hate. They
    hated the foreigners and they hated the Hindus. So the
    country of Pakistan was built on hate and nothing else.
    The predominant Pakistani attitude toward India is
    hatred. The birth, and survival of Pakistan required the
    rejection of all that was Indian. But Mani Shankar Aiyer
    has recognised a gradual change of attitudes to India
    94
    among Pakistanis. Up until 1971 it was hate and contempt,
    but after 1971, Pakistani attitudes have changed to hate
    and fear. Aiyer writes (86):
    ..all but the most blind Pakistani today looks back on
    what happened to his country in 1971 at the hands of
    India as a great defeat; till 1971 he looked back on what
    happened .. as a great victory.
    Aiyer continues:
    From 1947 to 1971 the general belief (in Pakistan) was:
    'hans hans ke liya tha Pakistan,
    lad lad ke lengey Hindustan'
    We got Pakistan with a triumphant smile
    We fill fight and take Hindustan (India)
    Myths about a single Muslim soldier being the equal of
    four, or ten or whatever number of Kafirs was widely
    believed; it was put about and accepted implicitly that
    in a matter of days, perhaps hours, the flag of Islam
    would be imparted on the ramparts of the Red Fort.
    Columnist Hamid Hussain describes the Pakistani army
    officer corps' attitude toward Indians prior to the 1965
    war (58):
    The general despise (sic) of Hindus and doubting their
    capacity of able (sic) to give a good fight was almost
    universal
    Over the years, India struggled but improved; while
    Pakistan split up and tottered. And hatred of India grew.
    Dislike and distrust of India became an industry in
    Pakistan. Like life itself, which evolved from simple
    95
    one-celled organisms into a multitude of life forms, huge
    Banyan trees, fragrant flowers, tigers, elephants,
    insects and men, hatred of India was nurtured to evolve,
    grow and metamorphose into a multitude of reasons and
    justifications.
    Pakistanis evolved a plethora of reasons to hate India.
    The act of partition at independence left Pakistanis with
    a small moth-eaten nation. This was a source of
    resentment to many elite Pakistanis who had left
    everything in India to be in Pakistan. For these people
    nothing would be better than exacting revenge for their
    lost lives. It was worth defeating India for this reason
    alone. For others, India was a hateful nation of people
    who caused the trauma of partition. Hatred and mistrust
    of India was the reason for the creation of Pakistan.
    Pakistan existed because Muslims would be suppressed in
    India, and opposition to India was the reason for
    Pakistan's birth. India was the enemy, to be fought,
    defeated and brought to its knees.
    Hatred for India and Indians has been made into a
    national purpose, a national obsession in Pakistan, with
    active hatred being taught in Pakistani schools as
    described in Chapter 3.
    In an article written for Pinnacle magazine (87), Brig.
    Raychaudhuri sums up Pakistani attitudes to India:
    This shattering of the psychological indoctrination,
    based on assumed religious superiority, makes it
    difficult for the Pakistanis to accept the reality of
    India's intrinsic superiority in size and economy. The
    fact that in 1965 and also in Kargil it was the Moslems
    of India who alerted the country is too insulting to
    believe. The cup of Pakistani hatred brims over and
    India, in the Pakistani mindset, is the cause of their
    96
    nation('s) deprivations..
    Pakistanis were poor because of Indian aggression.
    Pakistan could not develop because of India. Furthermore,
    hatred of India was needed as the justification for the
    wealth of the Pakistan army, and for the health of army
    businesses surviving on state handouts. India had to be
    hated to keep Pakistanis in line, to make them more
    Islamic, to make them good Muslims. Pakistanis had to be
    good Muslims to survive; they had to give up Indianness,
    because India was there to subjugate or kill all Muslims,
    just like India was accused of killing or raping 30,000
    or 70,000 or whatever number of people in Kashmir. And as
    India grew stronger, hatred and fear of India had to grow
    stronger, and Islamic fervor had to be increased to
    oppose India.
    As recently as December 2003, a retired Colonel of the
    Pakistan Army wrote the following accusations against
    India (88):
    There is a long list of other hostile Indian actions
    against Pakistan, some of which are:
    • Indian usurpation of Jammu and Kashmir, the
    continued occupation of that state against the will of
    its people, and the merciless killing of thousands of
    innocent Kashmiris by the Indian occupation forces;
    • Constant efforts to destabilize Pakistan through
    its agents, who are always at work to create
    disgruntlement in Pakistan's smaller provinces;
    • Conducting terrorist activities in various parts
    of Pakistan to exploit ethnic and religious differences;
    • Developing Pakistan-specific nuclear and
    conventional arsenal, thus forcing this country to enter
    into a suicidal arms race with the consequent irreparable
    damage to its economy;
    97
    • Keep bullying Pakistan by concentrating Indian
    armed forces on its borders and on the Line of Control in
    Kashmir on trumped up grounds, having previously imposed
    three wars on Pakistan.
    Expecting an enemy with such a criminal record to change
    its heart overnight and become friendly toward us is
    nothing but inanity.
    And while some Pakistanis have reacted to India with this
    degree of hatred and suspicion, others try to urge
    Pakistan to virtually move out of the Indian subcontinent
    into Central Asia or even the Middle East. Ahmad Quraish
    wrote in the Pakistani paper the Nation (89):
    ...the following steps are necessary:
    • Political: Pakistan's...ministries must...deemphasize
    Pakistan's inclusion in South Asia and play up
    Pakistan's role in Central and West Asia.
    • Cultural: Islamabad's cultural cooperation with
    West Asian and Central Asian countries must be
    revitalized..
    • Changing the name of Pakistan's national
    monetary unit .. by adopting either the Riyal or the
    Dinar..instead of the Rupee, which has exclusive Indian
    connotations.
    • Educational: The other major facets of
    Pakistan's identity - the Arab, Persian, Turkic and
    Central Asian - must be emphasized in our schoolbooks. If
    this requires drafting new books on Pakistan studies, so
    be it, and these must be compulsory reading for Pakistani
    students
    It is both ludicrous and sad to see Pakistani loathing
    for India covering the full spectrum - from the perigee
    of wanting to occupy and subjugate parts of India, to the
    apogee of wiping out memories of India, even denying
    98
    Pakistan's links with India and claiming imagined links
    with Central and West Asia. And all this while Indian
    children are taught to recognise Pakistanis as just like
    us.
    99
    Chapter 10
    THE PAKISTANI ARMY: POWER AND GLORY IN THE FAMILY
    The word Army for the Pakistan army is a pitifully
    inadequate description for an organization that does
    vastly more, and has diversified into more ventures than
    most armies in the world could dream of doing. Calling
    the Pakistan army by that name is akin to describing a
    30-course meal as a light snack. There is almost no
    activity in Pakistan that the army is not involved in
    doing, and there is no group in Pakistan or among
    Pakistan's neighbors that the Pakistani army has not
    fought, antagonised or disagreed with. But yet, the
    Pakistani army leads a charmed existence, being admired
    by most of Pakistan, although that has begun to change
    recently.
    Time and time again, and from many sources, one can find
    people who have made the quote: Pakistan is not a nation
    with an army; it is an army with a nation
    Of course, the Pakistani army started off as a regular
    army, with soldiers, guns, generals, tanks and valor. But
    its tentacles have spread into politics, power, industry,
    business, religion, terrorism, fighting by proxy, crime,
    greed, deception, lucre and self preservation. How the
    Pakistani army changed from a regular army into this
    Hydra-headed monster has an interesting history.
    It has been noted in an earlier chapter (Chapter 5) that
    due to historic reasons dating from the 1857 war of
    Indian independence, the British increasingly recruited
    people from the Northwest of undivided India, which
    included a large number of Punjabi Muslims from the area
    that was to later become Pakistan. Because of their
    loyalty and docility under British leadership, these
    troops began to be known as hailing from a martial race
    100
    (57). Thus the Pakistani army was dominated by Punjabis,
    who began to see themselves as being of a superior
    martial race.
    Apart from the predominance of Muslim Punjabis in the
    Pakistani army, several other unique observations can be
    made about the Pakistani province of Punjab (West Punjab)
    at the time of independence and partition(80).
    • Punjab was the most populous province of
    Pakistan.
    • Pakistani Punjab was militarized because of the
    large number of Punjabis in the military,
    • As part of the settlement of retired army
    personnel, vast tracts of land in West Punjab had been
    awarded to them.
    • 70% of the voters in Pakistani Punjab had some
    connection with the military
    • Punjab itself was partitioned so a lot of army
    personnel had relatives or friends in Punjab who were
    affected by the events of partition.
    • Pakistani army units from Punjab were tasked
    with the protection of civilians in the post-partition
    violence, so the personnel in these army units served
    both as protectors of the civilians as well as sufferers
    as their villages or families were affected during
    partition.
    • Punjabi units were also utilised in Pakistan's
    unsuccessful attack to wrest Kashmir from India in 1947.
    For these reasons, the military in Pakistan was not
    merely the military, but had political clout as well as
    political opinions, especially a deep hatred for India.
    The military also actually owned a lot of land because of
    the policy of settling retired soldiers by gifting land.
    The Punjabi dominated army also considered itself a
    101
    martial race with superior fighting and leadership
    qualities compared to the East Bengalis (East Pakistanis)
    who were considered effeminate, and the Hindu Indians.
    The army, having been tasked to protect Pakistanis during
    partition began to consider itself as the protector and
    savior of Islam. All these tendencies were present or had
    set in shortly after independence in 1947.
    But there was an additional factor that led to the
    induction of the Pakistani army into the role of absolute
    rulers of Pakistan.
    The areas that constituted West Pakistan were largely
    rural, and apart from the Punjabi dominated Army, there
    were not many educated local people to make up the
    bureaucrats, legal experts, engineers and technocrats
    that were required in the government of the new Pakistan.
    These posts were filled by the educated elite migrants
    from British India, largely mohajirs and Punjabis. These
    people suddenly had a nation to lead, a new nation,
    Pakistan - one of the biggest countries on earth. It was
    a victory for them, and for Islam. They were not about to
    fritter away that victory by allowing power to pass into
    the hands of the more numerous uneducated locals in
    democratic elections, in the same way as they would later
    refuse to hand over power, and the rule of Pakistan to a
    Bengali party from faraway East Pakistan. After all, the
    reason these migrants had left India was precisely
    because they feared democracy attenuating their
    privileges.
    Democracy was inconvenient for the ruling elite of
    Pakistan. It was also inconvenient for the feudal lords
    in Pakistan, who stood to lose their lands and influence.
    And democracy also brought with it the danger that the
    more numerous Bengalis, considered an inferior race,
    might actually end up ruling all of Pakistan. Besides
    102
    these facts, the migrant elite faced some resistance from
    the locals in West Pakistan, who had to give up space and
    resources to the migrants from India.
    The ruling elite of Pakistan therefore had a deep vested
    interest in not handing power to the people of Pakistan.
    And what better way to do that than to declare a threat
    to Pakistan, and to Islam itself, from their huge
    neighbor India. Elections were constantly postponed and
    the civilian authority used the Army to stay in power
    until the first bloodless military coup of 1958. And
    although that was the first year that the Pakistani army
    officially came into power, the army nevertheless had
    shared power with the elite in Pakistan for nearly a
    decade before that.
    A report from the International Crisis Group (53) has
    this to say:
    In the first decade of Independence, Pakistan was
    nominally a parliamentary democracy but civil bureaucrats
    ruled the state with the military as junior partner. No
    elections were held ..the President had power to dismiss
    the Prime Minister and used it liberally. (Governor-
    General Iskander) Mirza...ruled in league with Army
    Chief, general Mohammad Ayub Khan. Dispensing even with
    the pretence of democracy, Ayub ousted Mirza and imposed
    martial law in October 1958
    The military coup by Gen Ayub Khan was a watershed of
    sorts as it marked the first step by the Pakistani
    military to gain and retain control of Pakistan. In the
    period from 1958 to 1971 the Pakistan Army gradually
    consolidated its hold on power in Pakistan, and stopped
    being a junior partner to the civil bureaucracy in
    government. It seems virtually certain that no single
    individual in the Pakistani army could have been a
    103
    strongman without the connivance and cooperation of the
    Punjabi and feudal lord dominated military brass of the
    Pakistani army. The Pakistani army is like a close-knit
    fraternity, a family or brotherhood, a biradari, that
    protects its own from harm and disrepute, while ensuring
    that its interests, be they power, finances or honour are
    not harmed. It is a cooperative system, rather than power
    handed down from a single supremo.
    Pakistani security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha writes
    (90):
    It is important to note that Pakistan's armed forces
    especially the army operates like a fraternity. In this
    environment, severe punishments to individuals or
    extraordinary treatment of a similar nature are viewed as
    undermining the morale of the institution. Sidelining
    undesirable individuals or rewarding others discreetly
    is, thus, a preferred choice.
    Ayub exercised total control of Pakistan before, during
    and after 1965 when he launched and lost a war with
    India. The Army replaced Ayub Khan when it was sensed
    that popular opposition to Ayub Khan would harm the
    Army’s interests, and General Yahya Khan, who oversaw the
    splitting away of East Pakistan and the formation of
    Bangladesh after the worst defeat that the Pakistani
    armed forces have ever faced replaced him.
    The International Crisis Group's paper on democracy in
    Pakistan (53) refers to the Pakistani Army's role in this
    period as follows:
    Fearing that its defeat would translate into popular
    demands for accountability, the (army) high command
    transferred power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto..The military's
    defeat in the 1971 war with India had, however, been
    104
    limited to East Pakistan. Despite 93,000 prisoners of war
    in India, its infrastructure in the West was untouched.
    Military leaders quickly recouped losses and closed ranks
    against perceived civilian threats to their personal and
    institutional interests
    It is clear that even as early as 1971 the Pakistan Army
    had enough of a vested interest in retaining power in
    Pakistan to pretend to hand over power to a civilian
    government in order to maintain the reputation and
    interests of the Pakistan army from public scrutiny and
    accountability. In fact a damning report on the actions
    and defeat of the Pakistani army in the 1971 war, the
    Hamoodur Rehman report was never made public until a copy
    was obtained and published by the Times of India.
    All military governments in Pakistan, including the one
    currently headed by General Musharraf have grabbed power
    to save Pakistan and bring in a sound democratic system.
    But the Pakistani army has always grabbed power from
    elected governments or prevented democracy from actually
    being established, and have prevented all attempts to
    check the finances or power of the military in any way.
    It is informative to look at the perquisites, businesses
    and non-military interests of the Pakistan army that are
    so keenly protected and preserved.
    The army ensures that its officer class live in great
    style and luxury. A report in the Washington Post in 2002
    (91) described army life in the following words:
    The officer class in Pakistan has always had a strong
    sense of entitlement stemming from its dominant role in
    defending the country and in running it... One of the
    fanciest clubs in Karachi is the Defense Housing
    Authority County and Golf Club, a sparkling new facility
    105
    with lush fairways, a two-story driving range and a
    gracious stone clubhouse overlooking an inlet of the
    Arabian Sea. Active-duty military personnel can join the
    club for an initiation fee of $16, compared with $9,166
    for civilians, according to the club's fee schedule
    The same paper goes on to say:
    the military also rewards its senior officers by
    allowing them to purchase agricultural and urban land
    from the army's vast inventory of real estate at prices
    far below market value...One of Pakistan's most coveted
    addresses, for example, is the blandly named Army Housing
    Scheme II...in the upscale Karachi suburb of Clifton. A
    gated community protected by paramilitary troops, the
    development consists of spacious, Mediterranean-style
    villas grouped around a playground and an elaborately
    landscaped Japanese-style garden. Nearby are clothing
    boutiques, jewelry stores, restaurants and a yoga studio
    Describing the decrepit and run-down state of most
    schools in Pakistan, the Washington Post goes on to
    compare that with a Pakistani army run school:
    Geared toward preparation for the competitive O Level
    exams required by British universities, the handsome
    school is an educational showpiece whose computer,
    physics and biology labs would not seem out of place in
    an American suburb
    There are an enormous number of news media reports of the
    money and businesses that the Pakistani army controls.
    The Independent of London described the contrast between
    a Pakistani army establishment and the rest of Pakistan
    (92):
    106
    Outside in the street, Afghan refugees and Pakistan's
    urban poor root through garbage tips and crowd on to
    soot-pumping buses to work in sweatshops and brick
    factories. Inside, behind the ancient, newly painted
    cannons and battalion flags, rose bushes surround welltended
    lawns and officers' messes decorated with polished
    brass fittings. No rubbish litters this perfect world of
    discipline. Why should anyone living here want a return
    to corrupt democracy?
    A report in the online edition of the Pakistani newspaper
    Dawn said (93):
    The perks don't end here: military personnel are entitled
    to a 50 per cent discount on air and rail fares as well
    as cinema tickets. Their children have a quota at most
    public universities, and serving and retired officers are
    routinely inducted into civilian jobs.
    The Pakistan Weekly reported (94):
    ..in relation to country's per capita income Pakistani
    senior military officers are one of the best paid in the
    world. No other career, with equivalent academic
    qualifications and so little productivity produces
    comparable personal affluence as that of the officer
    cadre of the Pak military....
    Where does the money for all this come from?
    A report in the Daily Times of Pakistan in August 2002
    says, All countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army
    has a country. Defense expenditures consume between onethird
    and one-half of the national budget. In recent
    decades, senior military officers have been transformed
    into powerful landlords through grants of choice
    agricultural lands and real estate. Retired officers head
    107
    many, if not most, public corporations. This garrison
    economy is increasingly unsustainable, as Pakistan's poor
    multiply and the economy falters.
    Part of the army's wealth is from the extremely high
    defence budget that Pakistan has maintained for decades,
    at the expense of all other expenditure and all other
    groups in Pakistan. The excuse for the high defence
    expenditure has been the external threat from India, but
    the army ensures great personal wealth for its serving
    and retired personnel especially those of the higher
    ranks, and those seen as cooperative people who toe the
    line.
    The News International, Pakistan reported on Sunday
    September 09, 2001:
    As a % of GDP, from among the poorest of countries ..
    Pakistan, at 4.4% of GDP, spends the highest on defence.
    Shaheen Sehbai wrote in the Weekly Independent in 2002
    (95),
    For decades almost 35 to 40 per cent of Pakistan's
    revenues have been going into un-audited and noquestions-
    asked defence budget.
    For this report and other reports on the activities of
    the Pakistani army, Shaheen Sehbai, former editor of the
    English language daily the News was threatened by the
    army and forced to flee Pakistan and live in exile (96).
    The high defence budget is not the only source of income
    for the luxury loving Pakistani army. It also controls a
    huge business empire. In her study of the Pakistan
    military's economic activities, security analyst Dr.
    Ayesha-Siddiqa Agha describes why the businesses were
    108
    started in the first place (90).
    ..the military's business empire in Pakistan was created
    to guarantee welfare of retired and serving personnel. It
    was a pattern inherited from the pre-independence days.
    The Pakistani army's business enterprises were started
    for the welfare of retired personnel. Initially only the
    army had its businesses, with a small quota for the Air
    Force and Navy. Later these two branches started off
    their own businesses, and the vast enterprise has grown
    to gargantuan proportions. They are not necessarily
    profitable, but they survive on government subsidies and
    grants; competition is scared off by military threats,
    and the senior employees make fat salary packets, safe
    from accountability and questions.
    The four key armed-forces run business organizations in
    Pakistan are The Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare
    Trust, the Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation.
    The Fauji Foundation's businesses include sugar mills,
    cereal and corn, Natural gas, plastics, fertilizer,
    cement, power and education and healthcare. The Fauji
    foundation's assets have grown from Pakistani Rs. 152
    million in 1970, to 9,800 million according to Dr.
    Siddiqa-Agha, and employs 6 to 7 thousand military
    personnel, mostly in middle and upper management
    positions.
    The Army Welfare Trust has 26 projects including farms,
    stud farms, fish farms, rice and sugar mills, cement
    factories, pharmaceuticals, shoes, wool, hosiery, travel
    agencies, aviation, commercial complexes, banking,
    insurance and security with many bearing the name Aksari.
    Aksari aviation was set up merely to accommodate retired
    army helicopter pilots who could not get a job in the
    109
    private sector.
    Not to be outdone, the Pakistan air force established the
    Shaheen foundation which is now involved in air
    transportation, cargo, airport services, pay TV, FM
    radio, insurance, knitwear and commercial complexes.
    That left Pakistan's smallest force, the navy, to start
    its own venture, the Bahria Foundation in 1981. The
    Bahria Foundation deals in commercial complexes, trading,
    construction, a travel agency, paints, deep sea fishing,
    dredging, ship breaking, salvage and even a university.
    There is no nation in the world whose armed forces are
    involved in as many non-military business ventures as the
    Pakistan armed forces. Banking, insurance, commercial
    complexes and radio stations are ventures that do not
    obviously appear to be an essential part of the armed
    forces of any nation and would not be justifiable in any
    other nation on earth. But they are normal and routine
    for the Pakistani armed forces. Like a core business
    that has diversified, the Pakistani armed forces have
    diversified into fields well outside the mandate of an
    armed force.
    Dr. Farrukh Saleem, a freelance Pakistani columnist wrote
    in the Pakistani daily Jang (97):
    Fauji Cereal has been part of my daily breakfast for as
    long as I can remember. The only wrapping that Fauji
    Cereal ever uses comes from Fauji Poly Propylene
    Products. During my days at the village, milk use to come
    from the nearby Okara Military Farms, the 17,000-acre
    dairy, meat and grain-producing project. The only sugar
    that I ever liked was either from the four Fauji Sugar
    Mills or Army Welfare Sugar Mills. Not too long ago, my
    wife wanted to build a house. I didn't want to be
    110
    anywhere but in one of the six Askari Housing Schemes.
    The only cement I will use is Fauji Cement. I wish I was
    right next to Fauji Kabirwala Power Company because I
    hate the power that Wapda comes out with. The paint for
    my house must come from no one but Bahria Paints. Fauji
    also owns and operates Fauji Corn Complex, FONGAS, Fauji
    Fertilizer Company, Fauji Jordan Company, Fauji Oil
    Terminal Company Project and Mari Gas Company.
    The army also operates what is called the National
    Logistic Cell (NLC) which is a trucking and
    transportation giant in Pakistan, employing thousands of
    serving and retired army personnel. The web page of the
    NLC describes its army connection euphemistically as a
    unique logistic based Public Sector Organisation which
    has [a] blend of corporate culture and Army's
    discipline. (98)
    With the military in government, and the defence ministry
    manned by retired military officers, the military run
    businesses of Pakistan are above all accountability.
    In her study of the Army's businesses, Dr. Ayesha
    Siddiqa-Agha makes a scathing indictment(90):
    The top management of the armed forces jealously guard
    their interests. Over the years the interests have
    narrowed down from the greater benefit of the institution
    to the personal welfare of the generals. A feature
    peculiar to a number of cases is, the ventures were
    started not based on any feasibility study but on the
    whims of the top management to accommodate certain highranking
    officers.
    The businesses run by the Pakistani armed forces are
    marked by inefficiency, corruption and self-interest, and
    are preserved by intimidation that scares away
    111
    competitors or people who try to question their
    activities. Corruption in running these businesses has
    been noted by Siddiqa-Agha and others (96):
    "When you dig into them, you find out they are
    inefficient, and there is evidence of corruption,"
    Siddiqa-Agha said. "There is also evidence of corruption
    linked to monopolization of government contracts.
    In another report in August 2002, the South Asia Tribune
    reported (99):
    ..a list of over 100 armed forces men who allotted to
    themselves at least 400 or more acres of prime land in
    Bahawalpur, heart of Punjab, "to defend it from the
    enemy," at the throw away rate of Rs 380 per acre (US
    Dollars Six & 50 cents). The list is only of one
    District. Such lists exist all over Punjab and Sindh
    where a new breed of landlords has already been created
    through similar allotments...This conversion of generals
    into landlords also explains why no serious effort has
    been made by the military to introduce land reforms in
    the country, which could cure many political and social
    imbalances in the Pakistani society.
    An online report in the Crescent International revealed a
    list of Pakistani billionaires and millionaires with
    accounts in Swiss banks. Nearly half the billionaires
    were from the army or close relatives of senior army
    personnel.
    With this degree of money, wealth and power, the Pakistan
    army's main problem shifts away from the defence of
    Pakistan to the defence of their own wealth and power.
    Which wealthy army general living in the lap of luxury
    would want to give up his good life for the hardship and
    travails of war? Besides, the risk to this life is not so
    112
    much from an attack by India, but by anger and opposition
    to the corrupt and wealthy army from the desperately poor
    people of Pakistan, a staggering 85% of whom live on less
    than US $2 per day (100).
    Increasingly under pressure within Pakistan for their
    greed the Pakistani army has used Islam and the external
    threat from India to retain their power and wealth. The
    people must be more Islamic, because the sacrifice of
    jihad is required to fight India. Poverty and destitution
    in Pakistan are because India is trying to attack
    Pakistan and kill Muslims. This Islamization of Pakistan
    and the Pakistani army accelerated after the 1971 defeat
    of the Pakistani army by India in the war of liberation
    of Bangladesh.
    Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi noted in an article in
    the Friday Times of Pakistan (101):
     
  2.  
  3. smartindian

    smartindian Regular Member

    Joined:
    Aug 17, 2010
    Messages:
    612
    Likes Received:
    52
    Location:
    Mysore, Karnataka, India
    100
    (57). Thus the Pakistani army was dominated by Punjabis,
    who began to see themselves as being of a superior
    martial race.
    Apart from the predominance of Muslim Punjabis in the
    Pakistani army, several other unique observations can be
    made about the Pakistani province of Punjab (West Punjab)
    at the time of independence and partition(80).
    • Punjab was the most populous province of
    Pakistan.
    • Pakistani Punjab was militarized because of the
    large number of Punjabis in the military,
    • As part of the settlement of retired army
    personnel, vast tracts of land in West Punjab had been
    awarded to them.
    • 70% of the voters in Pakistani Punjab had some
    connection with the military
    • Punjab itself was partitioned so a lot of army
    personnel had relatives or friends in Punjab who were
    affected by the events of partition.
    • Pakistani army units from Punjab were tasked
    with the protection of civilians in the post-partition
    violence, so the personnel in these army units served
    both as protectors of the civilians as well as sufferers
    as their villages or families were affected during
    partition.
    • Punjabi units were also utilised in Pakistan's
    unsuccessful attack to wrest Kashmir from India in 1947.
    For these reasons, the military in Pakistan was not
    merely the military, but had political clout as well as
    political opinions, especially a deep hatred for India.
    The military also actually owned a lot of land because of
    the policy of settling retired soldiers by gifting land.
    The Punjabi dominated army also considered itself a
    101
    martial race with superior fighting and leadership
    qualities compared to the East Bengalis (East Pakistanis)
    who were considered effeminate, and the Hindu Indians.
    The army, having been tasked to protect Pakistanis during
    partition began to consider itself as the protector and
    savior of Islam. All these tendencies were present or had
    set in shortly after independence in 1947.
    But there was an additional factor that led to the
    induction of the Pakistani army into the role of absolute
    rulers of Pakistan.
    The areas that constituted West Pakistan were largely
    rural, and apart from the Punjabi dominated Army, there
    were not many educated local people to make up the
    bureaucrats, legal experts, engineers and technocrats
    that were required in the government of the new Pakistan.
    These posts were filled by the educated elite migrants
    from British India, largely mohajirs and Punjabis. These
    people suddenly had a nation to lead, a new nation,
    Pakistan - one of the biggest countries on earth. It was
    a victory for them, and for Islam. They were not about to
    fritter away that victory by allowing power to pass into
    the hands of the more numerous uneducated locals in
    democratic elections, in the same way as they would later
    refuse to hand over power, and the rule of Pakistan to a
    Bengali party from faraway East Pakistan. After all, the
    reason these migrants had left India was precisely
    because they feared democracy attenuating their
    privileges.
    Democracy was inconvenient for the ruling elite of
    Pakistan. It was also inconvenient for the feudal lords
    in Pakistan, who stood to lose their lands and influence.
    And democracy also brought with it the danger that the
    more numerous Bengalis, considered an inferior race,
    might actually end up ruling all of Pakistan. Besides
    102
    these facts, the migrant elite faced some resistance from
    the locals in West Pakistan, who had to give up space and
    resources to the migrants from India.
    The ruling elite of Pakistan therefore had a deep vested
    interest in not handing power to the people of Pakistan.
    And what better way to do that than to declare a threat
    to Pakistan, and to Islam itself, from their huge
    neighbor India. Elections were constantly postponed and
    the civilian authority used the Army to stay in power
    until the first bloodless military coup of 1958. And
    although that was the first year that the Pakistani army
    officially came into power, the army nevertheless had
    shared power with the elite in Pakistan for nearly a
    decade before that.
    A report from the International Crisis Group (53) has
    this to say:
    In the first decade of Independence, Pakistan was
    nominally a parliamentary democracy but civil bureaucrats
    ruled the state with the military as junior partner. No
    elections were held ..the President had power to dismiss
    the Prime Minister and used it liberally. (Governor-
    General Iskander) Mirza...ruled in league with Army
    Chief, general Mohammad Ayub Khan. Dispensing even with
    the pretence of democracy, Ayub ousted Mirza and imposed
    martial law in October 1958
    The military coup by Gen Ayub Khan was a watershed of
    sorts as it marked the first step by the Pakistani
    military to gain and retain control of Pakistan. In the
    period from 1958 to 1971 the Pakistan Army gradually
    consolidated its hold on power in Pakistan, and stopped
    being a junior partner to the civil bureaucracy in
    government. It seems virtually certain that no single
    individual in the Pakistani army could have been a
    103
    strongman without the connivance and cooperation of the
    Punjabi and feudal lord dominated military brass of the
    Pakistani army. The Pakistani army is like a close-knit
    fraternity, a family or brotherhood, a biradari, that
    protects its own from harm and disrepute, while ensuring
    that its interests, be they power, finances or honour are
    not harmed. It is a cooperative system, rather than power
    handed down from a single supremo.
    Pakistani security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha writes
    (90):
    It is important to note that Pakistan's armed forces
    especially the army operates like a fraternity. In this
    environment, severe punishments to individuals or
    extraordinary treatment of a similar nature are viewed as
    undermining the morale of the institution. Sidelining
    undesirable individuals or rewarding others discreetly
    is, thus, a preferred choice.
    Ayub exercised total control of Pakistan before, during
    and after 1965 when he launched and lost a war with
    India. The Army replaced Ayub Khan when it was sensed
    that popular opposition to Ayub Khan would harm the
    Army’s interests, and General Yahya Khan, who oversaw the
    splitting away of East Pakistan and the formation of
    Bangladesh after the worst defeat that the Pakistani
    armed forces have ever faced replaced him.
    The International Crisis Group's paper on democracy in
    Pakistan (53) refers to the Pakistani Army's role in this
    period as follows:
    Fearing that its defeat would translate into popular
    demands for accountability, the (army) high command
    transferred power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto..The military's
    defeat in the 1971 war with India had, however, been
    104
    limited to East Pakistan. Despite 93,000 prisoners of war
    in India, its infrastructure in the West was untouched.
    Military leaders quickly recouped losses and closed ranks
    against perceived civilian threats to their personal and
    institutional interests
    It is clear that even as early as 1971 the Pakistan Army
    had enough of a vested interest in retaining power in
    Pakistan to pretend to hand over power to a civilian
    government in order to maintain the reputation and
    interests of the Pakistan army from public scrutiny and
    accountability. In fact a damning report on the actions
    and defeat of the Pakistani army in the 1971 war, the
    Hamoodur Rehman report was never made public until a copy
    was obtained and published by the Times of India.
    All military governments in Pakistan, including the one
    currently headed by General Musharraf have grabbed power
    to save Pakistan and bring in a sound democratic system.
    But the Pakistani army has always grabbed power from
    elected governments or prevented democracy from actually
    being established, and have prevented all attempts to
    check the finances or power of the military in any way.
    It is informative to look at the perquisites, businesses
    and non-military interests of the Pakistan army that are
    so keenly protected and preserved.
    The army ensures that its officer class live in great
    style and luxury. A report in the Washington Post in 2002
    (91) described army life in the following words:
    The officer class in Pakistan has always had a strong
    sense of entitlement stemming from its dominant role in
    defending the country and in running it... One of the
    fanciest clubs in Karachi is the Defense Housing
    Authority County and Golf Club, a sparkling new facility
    105
    with lush fairways, a two-story driving range and a
    gracious stone clubhouse overlooking an inlet of the
    Arabian Sea. Active-duty military personnel can join the
    club for an initiation fee of $16, compared with $9,166
    for civilians, according to the club's fee schedule
    The same paper goes on to say:
    the military also rewards its senior officers by
    allowing them to purchase agricultural and urban land
    from the army's vast inventory of real estate at prices
    far below market value...One of Pakistan's most coveted
    addresses, for example, is the blandly named Army Housing
    Scheme II...in the upscale Karachi suburb of Clifton. A
    gated community protected by paramilitary troops, the
    development consists of spacious, Mediterranean-style
    villas grouped around a playground and an elaborately
    landscaped Japanese-style garden. Nearby are clothing
    boutiques, jewelry stores, restaurants and a yoga studio
    Describing the decrepit and run-down state of most
    schools in Pakistan, the Washington Post goes on to
    compare that with a Pakistani army run school:
    Geared toward preparation for the competitive O Level
    exams required by British universities, the handsome
    school is an educational showpiece whose computer,
    physics and biology labs would not seem out of place in
    an American suburb
    There are an enormous number of news media reports of the
    money and businesses that the Pakistani army controls.
    The Independent of London described the contrast between
    a Pakistani army establishment and the rest of Pakistan
    (92):
    106
    Outside in the street, Afghan refugees and Pakistan's
    urban poor root through garbage tips and crowd on to
    soot-pumping buses to work in sweatshops and brick
    factories. Inside, behind the ancient, newly painted
    cannons and battalion flags, rose bushes surround welltended
    lawns and officers' messes decorated with polished
    brass fittings. No rubbish litters this perfect world of
    discipline. Why should anyone living here want a return
    to corrupt democracy?
    A report in the online edition of the Pakistani newspaper
    Dawn said (93):
    The perks don't end here: military personnel are entitled
    to a 50 per cent discount on air and rail fares as well
    as cinema tickets. Their children have a quota at most
    public universities, and serving and retired officers are
    routinely inducted into civilian jobs.
    The Pakistan Weekly reported (94):
    ..in relation to country's per capita income Pakistani
    senior military officers are one of the best paid in the
    world. No other career, with equivalent academic
    qualifications and so little productivity produces
    comparable personal affluence as that of the officer
    cadre of the Pak military....
    Where does the money for all this come from?
    A report in the Daily Times of Pakistan in August 2002
    says, All countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army
    has a country. Defense expenditures consume between onethird
    and one-half of the national budget. In recent
    decades, senior military officers have been transformed
    into powerful landlords through grants of choice
    agricultural lands and real estate. Retired officers head
    107
    many, if not most, public corporations. This garrison
    economy is increasingly unsustainable, as Pakistan's poor
    multiply and the economy falters.
    Part of the army's wealth is from the extremely high
    defence budget that Pakistan has maintained for decades,
    at the expense of all other expenditure and all other
    groups in Pakistan. The excuse for the high defence
    expenditure has been the external threat from India, but
    the army ensures great personal wealth for its serving
    and retired personnel especially those of the higher
    ranks, and those seen as cooperative people who toe the
    line.
    The News International, Pakistan reported on Sunday
    September 09, 2001:
    As a % of GDP, from among the poorest of countries ..
    Pakistan, at 4.4% of GDP, spends the highest on defence.
    Shaheen Sehbai wrote in the Weekly Independent in 2002
    (95),
    For decades almost 35 to 40 per cent of Pakistan's
    revenues have been going into un-audited and noquestions-
    asked defence budget.
    For this report and other reports on the activities of
    the Pakistani army, Shaheen Sehbai, former editor of the
    English language daily the News was threatened by the
    army and forced to flee Pakistan and live in exile (96).
    The high defence budget is not the only source of income
    for the luxury loving Pakistani army. It also controls a
    huge business empire. In her study of the Pakistan
    military's economic activities, security analyst Dr.
    Ayesha-Siddiqa Agha describes why the businesses were
    108
    started in the first place (90).
    ..the military's business empire in Pakistan was created
    to guarantee welfare of retired and serving personnel. It
    was a pattern inherited from the pre-independence days.
    The Pakistani army's business enterprises were started
    for the welfare of retired personnel. Initially only the
    army had its businesses, with a small quota for the Air
    Force and Navy. Later these two branches started off
    their own businesses, and the vast enterprise has grown
    to gargantuan proportions. They are not necessarily
    profitable, but they survive on government subsidies and
    grants; competition is scared off by military threats,
    and the senior employees make fat salary packets, safe
    from accountability and questions.
    The four key armed-forces run business organizations in
    Pakistan are The Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare
    Trust, the Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation.
    The Fauji Foundation's businesses include sugar mills,
    cereal and corn, Natural gas, plastics, fertilizer,
    cement, power and education and healthcare. The Fauji
    foundation's assets have grown from Pakistani Rs. 152
    million in 1970, to 9,800 million according to Dr.
    Siddiqa-Agha, and employs 6 to 7 thousand military
    personnel, mostly in middle and upper management
    positions.
    The Army Welfare Trust has 26 projects including farms,
    stud farms, fish farms, rice and sugar mills, cement
    factories, pharmaceuticals, shoes, wool, hosiery, travel
    agencies, aviation, commercial complexes, banking,
    insurance and security with many bearing the name Aksari.
    Aksari aviation was set up merely to accommodate retired
    army helicopter pilots who could not get a job in the
    109
    private sector.
    Not to be outdone, the Pakistan air force established the
    Shaheen foundation which is now involved in air
    transportation, cargo, airport services, pay TV, FM
    radio, insurance, knitwear and commercial complexes.
    That left Pakistan's smallest force, the navy, to start
    its own venture, the Bahria Foundation in 1981. The
    Bahria Foundation deals in commercial complexes, trading,
    construction, a travel agency, paints, deep sea fishing,
    dredging, ship breaking, salvage and even a university.
    There is no nation in the world whose armed forces are
    involved in as many non-military business ventures as the
    Pakistan armed forces. Banking, insurance, commercial
    complexes and radio stations are ventures that do not
    obviously appear to be an essential part of the armed
    forces of any nation and would not be justifiable in any
    other nation on earth. But they are normal and routine
    for the Pakistani armed forces. Like a core business
    that has diversified, the Pakistani armed forces have
    diversified into fields well outside the mandate of an
    armed force.
    Dr. Farrukh Saleem, a freelance Pakistani columnist wrote
    in the Pakistani daily Jang (97):
    Fauji Cereal has been part of my daily breakfast for as
    long as I can remember. The only wrapping that Fauji
    Cereal ever uses comes from Fauji Poly Propylene
    Products. During my days at the village, milk use to come
    from the nearby Okara Military Farms, the 17,000-acre
    dairy, meat and grain-producing project. The only sugar
    that I ever liked was either from the four Fauji Sugar
    Mills or Army Welfare Sugar Mills. Not too long ago, my
    wife wanted to build a house. I didn't want to be
    110
    anywhere but in one of the six Askari Housing Schemes.
    The only cement I will use is Fauji Cement. I wish I was
    right next to Fauji Kabirwala Power Company because I
    hate the power that Wapda comes out with. The paint for
    my house must come from no one but Bahria Paints. Fauji
    also owns and operates Fauji Corn Complex, FONGAS, Fauji
    Fertilizer Company, Fauji Jordan Company, Fauji Oil
    Terminal Company Project and Mari Gas Company.
    The army also operates what is called the National
    Logistic Cell (NLC) which is a trucking and
    transportation giant in Pakistan, employing thousands of
    serving and retired army personnel. The web page of the
    NLC describes its army connection euphemistically as a
    unique logistic based Public Sector Organisation which
    has [a] blend of corporate culture and Army's
    discipline. (98)
    With the military in government, and the defence ministry
    manned by retired military officers, the military run
    businesses of Pakistan are above all accountability.
    In her study of the Army's businesses, Dr. Ayesha
    Siddiqa-Agha makes a scathing indictment(90):
    The top management of the armed forces jealously guard
    their interests. Over the years the interests have
    narrowed down from the greater benefit of the institution
    to the personal welfare of the generals. A feature
    peculiar to a number of cases is, the ventures were
    started not based on any feasibility study but on the
    whims of the top management to accommodate certain highranking
    officers.
    The businesses run by the Pakistani armed forces are
    marked by inefficiency, corruption and self-interest, and
    are preserved by intimidation that scares away
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    competitors or people who try to question their
    activities. Corruption in running these businesses has
    been noted by Siddiqa-Agha and others (96):
    "When you dig into them, you find out they are
    inefficient, and there is evidence of corruption,"
    Siddiqa-Agha said. "There is also evidence of corruption
    linked to monopolization of government contracts.
    In another report in August 2002, the South Asia Tribune
    reported (99):
    ..a list of over 100 armed forces men who allotted to
    themselves at least 400 or more acres of prime land in
    Bahawalpur, heart of Punjab, "to defend it from the
    enemy," at the throw away rate of Rs 380 per acre (US
    Dollars Six & 50 cents). The list is only of one
    District. Such lists exist all over Punjab and Sindh
    where a new breed of landlords has already been created
    through similar allotments...This conversion of generals
    into landlords also explains why no serious effort has
    been made by the military to introduce land reforms in
    the country, which could cure many political and social
    imbalances in the Pakistani society.
    An online report in the Crescent International revealed a
    list of Pakistani billionaires and millionaires with
    accounts in Swiss banks. Nearly half the billionaires
    were from the army or close relatives of senior army
    personnel.
    With this degree of money, wealth and power, the Pakistan
    army's main problem shifts away from the defence of
    Pakistan to the defence of their own wealth and power.
    Which wealthy army general living in the lap of luxury
    would want to give up his good life for the hardship and
    travails of war? Besides, the risk to this life is not so
    112
    much from an attack by India, but by anger and opposition
    to the corrupt and wealthy army from the desperately poor
    people of Pakistan, a staggering 85% of whom live on less
    than US $2 per day (100).
    Increasingly under pressure within Pakistan for their
    greed the Pakistani army has used Islam and the external
    threat from India to retain their power and wealth. The
    people must be more Islamic, because the sacrifice of
    jihad is required to fight India. Poverty and destitution
    in Pakistan are because India is trying to attack
    Pakistan and kill Muslims. This Islamization of Pakistan
    and the Pakistani army accelerated after the 1971 defeat
    of the Pakistani army by India in the war of liberation
    of Bangladesh.
    Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi noted in an article in
    the Friday Times of Pakistan (101):
    Since the late 1970s, the Pakistan army has maintained a
    mutually profitable relationship with Islamic elements in
    the country. The Islamicists have offered two critical
    inputs to the military: they have provided armed manpower
    for the military's security agendas in the neighborhood,
    as in Afghanistan since 1979 and in India since 1989. And
    they have been ever ready to join hands with the military
    to undermine popularly elected and mainstream civilian
    governments inimical to the military's corporate view of
    Pakistan's interests in one way or another.
    A report in the Washington Times recognised this (102):
    The Pakistani army, the center of anti-Indian sentiment,
    rallied radical Islamic forces to the cause. Pakistan is
    a poor country, and recruitment to the army benefits the
    poor who are inclined to Islamic fundamentalism. In fact,
    the hundreds of Islamic seminaries have become breeding
    113
    grounds for terrorism and centers for the recruitment of
    junior officers to the Pakistan army. Thus, the army has
    become a harbinger for Islamic ideological orientations.
    Another report in the Asia Times in 2003 (103) reveals
    the depth to which the Pakistan army's fighting forces
    have become intertwined with Islamic jihadis.
    The jihadi outfits...purpose was to develop a paramilitary
    force that would assist the Pakistan army in the
    event of war. However, in the course of the 1989 uprising
    in Kashmir, these jihadis played so vital a role that
    they outdid the army, so in the 1990s it was decided that
    they would act as a front-line force in any India-
    Pakistan war. First-hand observations by this
    correspondent in Azad Kashmir camps confirm that the
    jihadi outfits are in fact paramilitary troops. Each unit
    has a commander who reports to an army officer. Each
    jihadi commander is given funds and the brief to devise a
    strategy for his unit's combat operations. The commanders
    have lap top computers in which they store their data,
    from which they generate summaries of their operations
    for their military officers.
    The Pakistan army has, over the course of the last few
    decades, subcontracted its fighting to the jihadis.
    Former Indian Intelligence analyst B.Raman was quoted in
    the online portal Rediff (104):
    Pakistan has two armies... a regular army of around
    500,000. But there is an Army of Islam, so-called by
    Pakistan itself, with a total strength of about 200,000.
    As the Pakistani army generals consolidated their
    financial and business empires, they gradually
    subcontracted the actual fighting to Islamist irregular
    forces. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, Pakistan
    114
    refused to admit that any of their forces were involved
    in the fighting, saying that Kashmiri mujahideen were
    doing the fighting. But as Pakistani soldiers bodies
    began appearing in Pakistan the truth leaked out.
    Pakistani troops withdrew in the face of defeat, but not
    before the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry was
    virtually wiped out. The latter fact was confirmed in an
    interview with deposed Former Pakistani Prime Minister
    Nawaz Sharif in an interview at his place of exile in
    Saudi Arabia (105).
    Finally, information regarding the Pakistani army would
    be incomplete without mention of the criminal activities
    and genocide that they have been involved in:
    G. Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to
    Pakistan wrote (106):
    The Pakistan army is today the largest investor in the
    Karachi Stock Exchange, controls the largest network of
    elite public schools, owns the largest construction
    company and the largest transportation company the
    National Logistics Cell— that has the dubious distinction
    of not only transporting weapons for the ISI and the CIA,
    but also heroin from Peshawar for export from Karachi.
    In another article, Parthasarathy outlines the role of
    the Pakistani army in genocides and the killing of its
    own people(107):
    The Pakistan army has killed more of its own citizens in
    the past three decades than any other armed force, except
    the Khmer Rouge led by the genocidal Pol Pot. Documented
    evidence of the numbers of Pakistani citizens killed
    following the carnage by the Pakistan army in Bangladesh
    (1971), Baluchistan (1972-1974), rural Sind (1983
    onwards) and the urban centres of Sind against the MQM
    115
    (in the 1990s), confirms this fact.
    In conclusion, it may be said that the Pakistani army
    retained a great degree of respect among the people of
    Pakistan from the time of independence. Based on this the
    army repeatedly took power in Pakistan with the promise
    of setting things right, promising to bring back
    democracy and to fight and defeat the number one enemy,
    India. But the army did none of these things. It started
    unwinnable wars, and built up a huge business empire for
    its senior officers and sycophants while the actual
    fighting was given over to jehadis fired up with Islamic
    zeal. This Islamic zeal has gradually entered the ranks
    of the Pakistani army. A large number of men in the lower
    ranks of the Pakistani army now have fundamentalist
    Islamic leanings, and these lower ranks will be senior
    officers with the passage of time. In late 2003, Indian
    Intelligence analyst B.Raman was quoted in a report
    (108):
    ..two or three of the 10 corps commanders are seen as
    Islamicists. B. Raman, RAW's former Pakistan expert, says
    only one of the 30 officers of lieutenant-general rank
    and above is definitely a jehadi.
    The Pakistani army has set itself on the course of a
    serious split. On the one hand are the rich and corrupt
    generals, with their businesses and lands. On the other
    hand are the Islamists, who are indoctrinated on the
    exclusivity and superiority of their brand of religion.
    In short the Pakistani army has people who are serving
    two masters, the army commanders on the one hand and
    Allah on the other. One of these masters will lose out,
    and it is unlikely that the followers of God as the
    supreme army commander will give up without a fight. With
    the Pakistani army being the only viable institution that
    seems to be represented almost all over Pakistan, it is
    116
    difficult to imagine what could be in store for Pakistan
    other than serious instability when differences begin to
    show up between the Islamists and the corrupt mafia of
    the Pakistani army.
    117
    Chapter 11
    KASHMIR, PLEBISCITE, WARS AND GENOCIDE
    It is beyond the scope of this book to enter into a
    detailed military discussion of the wars that Pakistan
    has fought with India. Much has been written on this
    subject and many references are available, including some
    excellent online references complete with photographs,
    documents and video clips on the Internet (109, 110,
    111).
    But a brief description of the background and outcome of
    the wars that have been fought give an insight into how
    Pakistani leaders have viewed the world around them and
    their relationship with India.
    The 1947-48 war:
    The first conflict started in 1947, shortly after
    independence and the formation of Pakistan. The exact
    circumstances under which this war started is generally
    lost in a maze of rhetoric, myth and misinformation, and
    needs to be described.
    Demographer PH Reddy pointed out in an article in the
    newspaper The Deccan Herald on January 25th 2002 that the
    basis of division of British India into India and
    Pakistan was Sir Cyril Radciffe's Boundary Commission
    which had been tasked with demarcating the districts in
    India that had a Muslim majority of more than 75% which
    were to be allotted to Pakistan. The commission found 76
    out of 435 districts with such a majority, in two
    clusters that were to form West and East Pakistan. It is
    interesting to note that, Kashmir was not one of them.
    Pre-independence India (British India) consisted of
    present day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Within this
    118
    area were also about 600 states that were not directly
    ruled by Britain, but were Princely States with kings or
    rulers of their own. When it was decided that British
    India was to be split up into India and Pakistan and
    given independence, the 600 Princely States were given
    the option of joining either India or Pakistan by signing
    a document called the Instrument of Accession. The
    Instrument of Accession was a legal document saying that
    a state ruled by a Prince or King had acceded - or agreed
    to join India or Pakistan.
    The dominion of Kashmir was one such Princely State that
    was ruled by a King (Maharaja Hari Singh) who had to make
    the decision of joining India or Pakistan. This King had
    not made up his mind about signing the Instrument of
    Accession at the time of Indian independence on 15th
    August 1947. He was hoping to retain his kingdom, and he
    therefore requested both India and Pakistan to sign a
    treaty called a standstill agreement to maintain supplies
    and postal services to his landlocked state while he made
    up his mind. India wanted to formalize this agreement
    with a representative of the King. Pakistani leaders
    suspected that this was a ploy by India to make the
    Maharaja of Kashmir accede to India, and hastily
    commenced an invasion of Kashmir to take over the Kingdom
    before the Maharaja made up his mind (112).
    In a tradition that was to be repeated in 1965 and 1999,
    the Pakistani army sent in irregular non-army forces as
    well as army personnel in civilian attire at the
    forefront of the invasion of Kashmir. Faced with this
    invasion from Pakistan, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed
    the instrument of accession to India and requested
    assistance from the Indian Armed forces in protecting his
    people who were being subjected to rape and pillage by
    the invading Pakistani forces.
    119
    The letter of accession to India written by the Maharaja
    of Kashmir (113) is as chilling as it is telling. The
    entire text of the letter is reproduced in Appendix 1,
    but an excerpt follows:
    The Dominion of India desired further discussion with
    representatives of my Government... Though we have got a
    standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, the
    Government permitted a steady and increasing
    strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to
    my State.
    Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with
    modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the
    State...it has become difficult to stop the wanton
    destruction of life and property and the looting of the
    Mahura power house, which supplies electric current to
    the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The
    number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes
    my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the
    State are marching on with the aim of capturing
    Srinagar... armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot
    possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial
    Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the
    Government of Pakistan.
    After the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the
    Indian armed forces started their process of evicting the
    invading Pakistani marauders in a war that continued till
    an official UN sponsored cease fire was declared in 1949,
    at a time when Pakistani forces still occupied about onethird
    of Kashmir in the North West.
    The United Nations resolution on Kashmir (Appendix 2)
    called for a withdrawal of military forces within five
    months from the date of the resolution, 14th March 1950,
    after which a plebiscite, (meaning a vote, or a
    120
    referendum) could be held to poll the people of the state
    of Kashmir on the issue.
    History has shown that Pakistani forces have not
    withdrawn from the portions of Kashmir that they occupied
    even 600 months, or 50 years after the UN resolution was
    passed. In the meantime, a portion of Kashmir that
    Pakistani forces occupied was gifted away to China it
    appears that no plebiscite of the people of Kashmir was
    required for giving away a part of the state to China.
    Pakistan's failure to get Kashmir on their terms, and the
    failure to bend the terms of the now defunct UN
    resolution to suit Pakistan has been the basis for all
    further attempts by Pakistan to take Kashmir by force,
    deception, subversion or diplomacy.
    The Pakistan-India war of 1965:
    The early 1960s were great years for Pakistan. Under
    military rule, Pakistan allied itself with the United
    States of America in the cold war against the Soviet
    Union. The US in the 1960s had just emerged from the
    Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when Soviet nuclear
    missiles were placed in Cuba right under the nose of the
    US. The US was also fighting communist forces in Vietnam,
    and communism was considered the most serious threat by
    the US. Any ally was welcomed as long as he declared that
    he was opposed to communism.
    Pakistan's alliance with the US allowed a great deal of
    aid money to flow into Pakistan, as well as the most
    sophisticated arms that were available. These included
    state-of-the-art supersonic F-104 Starfighter aircraft,
    armed with Sidewinder air to air missiles. Pakistan could
    do no wrong, and was lauded as a progressive leader among
    developing nations. The economy was booming, held afloat
    121
    by aid dollars.
    India on the other hand was smarting from a military
    defeat in the hands of the Chinese in the 1962 war, after
    having naively trusted China to do good. Indian forces in
    1962 fought valiantly but valor is no substitute for
    planning and equipment in a war that the Indian Army had
    not been given the funds or strategy to prepare for.
    Pakistan's military leader felt that the 1960s offered
    him a chance to invade and take over Kashmir from India.
    In the heady 1960s, Pakistanis, starting from their
    military supremo Ayub Khan, genuinely believed that one
    Pakistani soldier equals six Indian soldiers (68), and
    that the Muslims of India were waiting to rise up in
    revolt and join Pakistan. Pakistani leaders were wrong on
    both counts. Columnist Hamid Hussain quotes from a letter
    written by Ayub Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan
    (58):
    General Ayub Khan in his letter to C-in-C General
    Muhammad Musa stated, as a general rule Hindu morale
    would not stand more than a couple of hard blows
    delivered at the right time and place.
    Through August 1965 Pakistani forces in civilian clothes
    were infiltrated into Kashmir as part of Operation
    Gibralter (sic). The plan was to conduct acts of sabotage
    and create mayhem after which a radio broadcast was to be
    made saying that Kashmir had been taken over by
    revolutionary liberation forces, who would ask for
    international assistance, mainly from Pakistan, against
    India. In the event, the infiltration of Pakistani forces
    was not welcomed with the pro-Pakistan rebellion of
    Indians in Kashmir that the Pakistanis had expected. The
    planned broadcast did not take place, though leaflets
    were distributed.
    122
    At this stage, on September 1st 1965 Pakistan launched
    Operation Grand Slam, a massive armor attack on India,
    beating back Indian defences. The attackers were planning
    to take the town of Akhnoor, en route to the taking of
    Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. In order to
    relieve the intense Pakistani pressure in Kashmir, India
    opened a second front by attacking Pakistan across the
    border in Punjab, and advancing toward the Pakistani city
    of Lahore.
    By the time a cease fire was declared on 23rd September
    1965, Gen. Ayub Khan's plan of annexing Kashmir had been
    foiled. India ended the war holding about 1,100 square
    kilometers of Pakistani territory in the Poonch and
    Lahore regions, with Indian troops occupying the
    Pakistani town of Barki in the Lahore sector. Pakistan
    occupied about 490 square kilometers of Indian territory
    in the Akhnoor region. The cease fire was formalized with
    the Tashkent declaration of January 10th 1966 (Appendix 3)
    The 1971 war of liberation of Bangladesh:
    The 1971 war was one of the most shameful episodes in the
    history of Pakistan. At the time of writing of this, the
    instability that Pakistan displays more than three
    decades after the 1971 war is indicative of the deeply
    dysfunctional internal forces that have kept Pakistan in
    turmoil since then.
    The lessons and punishment suffered by Pakistan should
    really have been an eye-opener for any responsible and
    patriotic forces in Pakistan, but no such awakening has
    occurred. Pakistan appears to be repeating the same
    mistakes again and again.
    West Pakistanis always considered their East Pakistani
    123
    Bengali compatriots as somehow inferior and weak. But
    East Pakistan had a population greater than that of West
    Pakistan, which meant that true democracy in Pakistan
    could pave the way for an East Pakistani Bengali to
    become leader of Pakistan. That was unacceptable to the
    ruling elite of West Pakistan as well as the Pakistani
    army. Elections were somehow postponed or avoided until
    1971, when General Yahya Khan, the incumbent military
    dictator of Pakistan allowed an election to be held,
    gambling that no party would get an overall majority.
    He was wrong. An East Pakistani party, the Awami league,
    headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman won a landslide victory
    and should have formed the government of all of Pakistan,
    East and West. The Pakistani army could not countenance
    this, and martial law was clamped in East Pakistan,
    followed by a genocide of East Pakistani Bengalis. This
    was the beginning of the Pakistani army's darkest and
    most shameful phase to date. The killing of Bengalis, who
    were all Muslims and fellow Pakistanis was shocking and
    brutal.
    One description, by Prof. Rafiqul Islam of Dhaka
    University reads(114):
    Just after midnight on the night of 25th March, the
    Pakistani Army began their attack on the Student Halls
    and Staff Quarters of the University...Just after
    midnight Iqbal Hall came under a barrage of heavy mortar
    and machine-gun attack from near the pond in front and
    the police barracks behind it....I don't have the words
    to express the bestiality and barbarity that was
    perpetrated on the Dhaka University area, especially
    Iqbal Hall, Jagannath Hall, and adjoining residential
    areas, for a period of 36 hours from the night of the
    25th till the 26th night. What transpired around Iqbal
    Hall, I saw with my own eyes. Raging infernos everywhere;
    124
    the slum was burning, the cars parked around the
    residences were burning. The heaped bodies of the dead
    from the slum were also set on fire near the Nilkhet rail
    gate petrol pump. The sound of shells bursting and guns
    firing, the smoke and fire, the smell of gun-powder and
    the stench of the burning corpses all transformed the
    area into a fiery hell.
    The genocide by the Pakistani army in East Pakistan was
    the worst seen after the holocaust of Jews by the Nazis
    in the second World War. One online source (115) has a
    collection of references to this and the descriptions are
    horrific:
    R.J. Rummel likewise writes that "the Pakistan army
    [sought] out those especially likely to join the
    resistance -- young boys. Sweeps were conducted of young
    men who were never seen again. Bodies of youths would be
    found in fields, floating down rivers, or near army
    camps.
    Bangladesh is a nation criss-crossed by rivers, and the
    Pakistan army tended to line up men along river-banks at
    night and shoot them, allowing their bodies to float
    down-river (115)
    They were in batches of six or eight, and in the light of
    a powerful electric arc lamp, they were easy targets,
    black against the silvery water. The executioners stood
    on the pier, shooting down at the compact bunches of
    prisoners wading in the water. There were screams in the
    hot night air, and then silence. The prisoners fell on
    their sides and their bodies lapped against the shore.
    Then a new bunch of prisoners was brought out, and the
    process was repeated. In the morning the village boatmen
    hauled the bodies into midstream and the ropes binding
    the bodies were cut so that each body drifted separately
    125
    downstream. (Payne, Massacre [Macmillan, 1973], p. 55.)
    Descriptions of rape and killing of Hindus abound and
    over over 3 million people were killed over a 267 day
    period an average of one murder committed every 8
    seconds by Pakistani army personnel for nearly 9 months.
    The killings in East Pakistan led to a massive influx of
    refugees into India. More than 10 million people were
    accommodated in refugee camps in India, putting a great
    strain on resources, while Bengali resistance fighters
    sought Indian help. Unable to stand by and watch the
    horrific events in East Pakistan, the Indian Prime
    Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Armed
    forces into East Pakistan on the humanitarian mission of
    stopping the killing. A two-front war broke out when the
    Pakistani Air Force commenced hostilities in the West
    with air raids on Indian targets on December 3rd 1971. In
    a whirlwind war the Indian armed forces overran East
    Pakistan, comprehensively defeating the Pakistani army,
    taking 93,000 prisoners of war. At the end of this
    action, the new nation of Bangladesh was born out of the
    ravaged remains of East Pakistan. The army of the martial
    races of Pakistan had capitulated and surrendered a
    nation of 144,000 square kilometers along with 93,000 of
    its men in a mere 16 days.
    Military historian Brig. Shelford Bidwell summarized the
    military action as follows(48):
    A close study of this campaign will edify military
    students for a long time to come. Bengal, now Bangladesh
    (literally Land of Bengal), is an eminently defensible
    country cut up by rivers five miles wide and obstructed
    by marshes. The Indian plan was a masterly combination of
    airborne, guerrilla and conventional forces, based on
    complete mobility and the bypassing of all centres of
    126
    resistance. The advance was not held up for bridging
    operations; troops and guns were ferried over the rivers
    by helicopter, and 'supply and transport' was by air,
    boat, canoe or country cart as suitable. An astonishing
    momentum was maintained from start to finish - it was a
    Blitzkrieg without tanks.
    The 1999 Kargil conflict:
    It was a while before anyone realized that a war had
    erupted between India and Pakistan in 1999, albeit a war
    limited in area. For the third time since independence,
    the Pakistan army had sent soldiers disguised as
    civilians into Indian territory, and tried to deny any
    involvement with the conflict.
    One of the major disadvantages of a state trying to deny
    involvement in a war is that neither escalation nor
    pullout are possible without admitting involvement or
    conceding that the earlier denial of involvement was a
    lie in the first place. This ultimately has a great
    bearing on credibility and international standing.
    Pakistan seems to have gleaned more shame than honour
    from this action.
    Pakistani soldiers in civilian garb occupied and
    fortified themselves within Indian territory in the
    heights of the mountains in the Kargil region of Kashmir.
    These soldiers were then in an advantageous position to
    defend their positions and to direct accurate artillery
    fire to cut off a major Indian highway and Indian army
    supply route.
    While the entry of these Pakistani forces had gone
    undetected, the war started after their discovery, when
    Indian forces began the process of evicting the
    127
    Pakistanis from their positions within India. Using the
    overwhelming firepower at the disposal of the Indian army
    and air force, mountain bunkers and supply depots
    occupied by Pakistani forces were systematically
    destroyed. Pakistan denied any involvement in the war
    until coffins of their soldiers started turning up at
    their hometowns in Pakistan, accompanied by Indian media
    coverage of captured Pakistani army identity papers and
    weapons. The war ended when the last few surviving
    Pakistani soldiers were pulled out in a humiliating
    retreat that Pakistan conducted under the fig-leaf of
    American mediation - the retreat being announced after a
    visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to meet US
    President Clinton. By the time the last abandoned
    Pakistani soldiers' corpses had been buried by the Indian
    army, Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry had been all but
    wiped out in a war that Pakistan denied till the last
    moment (105).
    The Kargil conflict is very difficult to explain from the
    Pakistani viewpoint. Why did Pakistan do it? And having
    done it, why was it done so half-heartedly? If they
    wanted to be involved in the conflict, why did they deny
    involvement? If they did not want to be identified as
    being involved, why did they admit to involvement later?
    What was it that Pakistani leaders hoped would be
    achieved by this action?
    While there are more questions than answers, any answers
    that fit the known facts suggest a frightening disconnect
    between perception and reality among the seniormost
    leaders of Pakistan, and an equally frightening lack of
    communication and cooperation between the leaders
    themselves. Small organizations, let alone nations cannot
    function if leaders display a disconnect between their
    actions and reality.
    128
    What could have been Pakistan's motive and ultimate
    objective in sending army troops dressed in mufti to
    fortify themselves and occupy positions above 15,000 feet
    high on mountains just within the Indian border? One
    explanation is that they sought to salami slice into
    Indian territory by surreptitiously occupying unguarded
    Indian territory. But did they not expect Indian
    retaliation when they were discovered? Were they so
    worried about the possibility of discovery that they
    refused to allow their men to wear uniforms? But that was
    futile, since they could not prevent their men from
    carrying identification papers in their personal effects.
    Another theory, the more commonly quoted one, is that the
    men on the mountains were there to help cut off the
    Srinagar-Leh highway, after which a Pakistani attack
    would have isolated and encircled Indian positions in the
    Siachen glacier region. If that was the case, why was
    Pakistan so concerned about keeping the identity of its
    men secret, and pretending not to be involved? Why did
    the Pakistani military not plan a counter-offensive to
    blunt or stop India from relentlessly clearing the
    heights as it did?
    The logic defies explanation, and some of the
    explanations are ludicrous enough to be unbelievable. It
    has been said that after Pakistan's nuclear tests in
    1998, Pakistani military leaders believed India to be
    very afraid of Pakistan. Furthermore, it was believed
    that the morale of the Indian armed forces was at
    breaking point and that Indian soldiers would be ready to
    run away from battle at the slightest threat. In the 1965
    war, India had taken Pakistani pressure off Kashmir by
    opening a second front in Punjab. It appears that
    Pakistani generals believed that India would be afraid to
    repeat that in 1999 because they feared nuclear
    retaliation from Pakistan. And within Kashmir it was
    129
    expected that the Indian army would capitulate and run
    away.
    In February 1999, at about the time when Pakistani army
    men were secretly taking up their positions in the
    mountains near Kargil, senior Pakistani General Javid
    Nasir wrote in the prestigious Pakistani Defence Journal
    (116):
    I say with all the authority and professionalism that
    'The Indian army is incapable of undertaking any
    conventional operations at present what to talk of
    enlarging conventional conflict'
    It is inconceivable that a professional Pakistani soldier
    and senior officer should deliberately and publicly
    choose to underestimate an adversary without paying the
    slightest heed to the possibility that the assessment may
    be wrong, or that there may be alternate, less reassuring
    assessments.
    This statement by a senior Pakistani army general eerily
    echoes the assessment made by Pakistani dictator Ayub
    Khan 34 years earlier when he stated that Indian morale
    would break after a couple of hard blows. As indicated in
    the description of the Pakistani mind in chapter 5, such
    assessments are more indicative of the psychological
    state of the Pakistani army officer, with a self-image
    amounting to delusions of grandeur rather than objective
    and rational military judgment. It is interesting to note
    that the large and powerful army of Pakistan has
    cultivated a leadership that somehow believes that the
    Indian military will be a pushover in battle. Such an
    attitude can be termed as nothing short of suicidal, as
    events have shown.
    After the Kargil conflict, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, the
    130
    Indian Chief of Army Staff who oversaw the defeat of
    Pakistani forces in the Kargil conflict wrote about Gen
    Javid Nasir's article and misperception within the
    Pakistani army's high command that led them to attempt
    the Kargil misadventure (117):
    This was not only a gross underestimation of a possible
    adversary but also a poor assessment and misperception.
    Some other assumptions and misperceptions which led to
    the Pakistani offensive operation in Kargil were:
    1.Nuclear umbrella allows offensive action without risk.
    2.International community would intervene or stop the war
    at an early stage.
    3.The coalition government in India, weak and indecisive,
    will either over-react or under-react.
    4.India is militarily weak and unprepared.
    5.Indian frustration will lead to escalation, putting the
    onus of escalation on India.
    6.Military operation under the garb of Mujahideen would
    focus attention on Kashmir and Pakistan would be able to
    claim this as a victory.
    Assumptions regarding enemy weakness and fear can only be
    termed as high hopes unless they are balanced out by
    other, less rosy scenarios. But it does not appear that
    the Pakistani army had planned for anything but easy and
    cheap victory in Kargil. That is a disquieting thought.
    If Pakistani Generals persist in thinking of war and easy
    victories against India, the chance of Pakistan viewing
    India with any sanity or objectivity can also be
    dismissed as high hopes.
    131
    Chapter 12
    PROVINCES AND ASSORTED FRAGMENTS
    The word “provinces” calls to the mind the idea of a
    nation that has been divided into smaller blocks for
    administrative reasons. Each province is one part that
    contributes to the whole.
    In the case of Pakistan this idea is misleading –
    Pakistan’s provinces belong to the Pakistani state in
    name only, with vast swathes of Pakistan falling outside
    the bounds of any control. Indeed more than half the land
    area of Pakistan is outside the control of the Pakistan
    government. Much of this area is sparsely populated, but
    the peoples in such areas have either declared
    independence, or are seeking separation from Pakistan.
    The state of Pakistan can be compared to a shattered
    cookie within an intact wrapper – each fragment is
    separate, but held together forcibly by the wrapper. The
    “wrapper” that holds the Pakistan state together is the
    Pakistan army, which has regularly massacred people
    within those provinces in an effort to maintain control.
    In 2006 Amnesty International published a report (159)
    about human rights violations in the tribal areas of
    Pakistan. An excerpt from the report says:
    “..In the "war on terror", Pakistan has violated a wide
    array of human rights, including the right to life, to
    the security of the person, to freedom from arbitrary
    arrest and detention, to freedom from torture, other illtreatment
    and enforced disappearance, and to legal
    remedies and reparations.”
    Pakistan has four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan
    and the Northwest Frontier Province. The map below
    132
    depicts the provinces of Pakistan.
    Punjab, Sindh and the Northwest frontier provinces
    (N.W.F.P.) form the “core provinces” of Pakistan. These
    were the provinces that voted to be part of Pakistan from
    the outset. These provinces form less than half the land
    area of Pakistan, but are home to over 80% of Pakistan’s
    population, which, in the absence of any reliable recent
    census is estimated to be between 160 and 170 million in
    2006.
    Punjab is by far the dominant province, with Punjabis
    comprising over 50% of Pakistan’s total population, and
    contributing over 60% of the personnel in the Pakistan
    armed forces. The fact that most of the population and
    economic activity of Pakistan occurs in these three
    provinces can be seen in the photograph below, which
    shows a map of Pakistan super-imposed on a satellite
    133
    photograph of the Indian subcontinent at night. Almost
    all of Pakistan is dark, except for a strip close to the
    Indian border representing the provinces of Punjab, Sindh
    and N.W.F.P., which show lights and population activity.
    BALOCHISTAN: Balochistan is the largest province of
    Pakistan, comprising 42% of the land area, but it has a
    population of only about 7 million – or just over 4% of
    Pakistan’s population. Balochistan became part of
    Pakistan after it was forcibly annexed by the Pakistani
    army after Pakistan was created in 1947.
    Balochistan is rich in natural resources, including
    natural gas and minerals. The people of Balochistan have
    long fought for independence of their land from Pakistani
    rule, and more recently for a fair share of the proceeds
    from the natural resources being exploited in
    Baluchistan.
    In return, the Pakistan army and successive governments
    have shown that they want the natural resources more than
    134
    they want the people of Balochistan. Despite a long
    struggle the sparse population of Balochistan cannot
    match the firepower of the Pakstani army. A series of
    massacres of Balochi tribals have occurred with the use
    of deadly force, including helicopter gun ships. This has
    resulted in the death in 2006 of a prominent and
    respected Balochi leader and a fierce opponent of
    Pakistani occupation, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.
    F.A.T.A. The F.A.T.A. – or Federally Administered Tribal
    Areas is a euphemism for a completely lawless area that
    does not come under Pakistani control at all. It is a
    strip of land on the Northwest border of Pakistan with
    Afghanistan populated by tribes, of whom less than 2%
    live in urban areas. They do not recognize Pakistan’s
    border with Afghanistan and the area is home to a
    thriving arms industry in which clones of almost any type
    of small arms are made in small workshops (139).
    The Pakistan army actually entered the F.A.T.A. for the
    first time in its history in 2002 on the pretext of
    helping the US in its war on terror. In 2006 the same
    army made an ignominious retreat from the area after
    suffering hundreds of casualties, signing a peace deal
    with the Taliban who control an area of the F.A.T.A.
    called Waziristan (see map on page 136). The “peace deal”
    (160) made by the Pakistani Army with people who are
    supposed to be Pakistani citizens guarantees that the
    Pakistani army will never return to Waziristan and a
    return of confiscated weapons, as well as the payment of
    reparations for damage. This has been described as a defacto
    acceptance of an independent “Islamic Emirate of
    Waziristan” – ruled by the Taliban, in an area that
    serves as a safe harbor for the Al Qaeda and other
    assorted Islamist militia personnel.
    135
    Chapter 13
    PAKISTAN, JIHAD AND TERRORISM
    When it was declared by the US Treasury department that
    two thirds of all terrorist groups had a link with
    Pakistan, the statement came as sweet music to the ears
    Indians who have been fighting terrorism from Pakistan
    for over a decade (118).
    About two-thirds of all designated terrorist groups in
    the world have a Pakistani connection, according to the
    U.S. Treasury Department.
    The statement was a vindication of long-standing Indian
    concerns. Since 1989, India had been ploughing a lonely
    furrow in the diplomatic capitals of the world calling
    attention to Pakistan's role in terrorism. The terrorist
    attacks of September 11th 2001 in the US, in which
    aircraft were hijacked and crashed into the twin towers
    of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
    Washington were a wake-up call to the somnolent and
    blinkered intelligence communities of the West about the
    deep changes taking place in Pakistan.
    A charming tale for children is told in an animated film
    called “The Sorcerer's Apprentice” featuring Walt
    Disney's cartoon character Mickey Mouse. The sorcerer
    (magician) is Mickey himself and has the task of drawing
    water from a well to fill a tub. Being too lazy to do the
    job himself, the sorcerer uses his magic powers to make a
    broom grow hands and legs to draw water to fill the tub.
    As Mickey relaxes and falls asleep the Sorcerer's
    Apprentice, the magic broom, working tirelessly,
    transfers enough water to cause a flood and does not
    stop. A panicky Mickey wakes up and chops the magic broom
    into small pieces but each piece then becomes a new
    apprentice that carries water and the flooding starts to
    136
    get out of control.
    Pakistan and jihad are like the story of the Sorcerer's
    Apprentice. The Pakistani army tried to use jihad to do
    it's work but jihad, and terrorism associated with jihad
    now has a life of its own and may be getting out of
    control of the Pakistani army.
    Jessica Stern, an expert on terrorism wrote (119):
    Pakistani militant groups are killing civilians and
    engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the
    guise of holy war. The government in Islamabad supports
    these militants and their religious schools as cheap ways
    to fight India and educate Pakistan's youth. But this
    policy is creating a culture of violence that exacerbates
    internal sectarianism and destabilizes the region.
    Without change, this monster threatens to devour
    Pakistani society.
    Islamic scholars, especially from Pakistan, have
    repeatedly tried to point out that jihad is not
    terrorism. It is stated that jihad is an internal
    struggle and not external violence. But this assertion
    goes against the facts on the ground. Terrorism and
    senseless violence are being routinely committed in the
    name of jihad. In the Pakistani context, terrorism and
    jihad are one and the same. In his study of jihadi groups
    in Pakistan, Ehsan Ansari says of jihad (120):
    various Islamic groups have been interpreting it to mean
    'holy war' against everything the perceive as being 'non
    Islamic'
    An interview with a leading Pakistani expert on jihad,
    Arif Jamal, was published by the Asia Times online. Jamal
    has this to say about jihad (121):
    137
    The main objective of jihad even today is to defeat the
    infidels and establish Islamic states all over the world.
    One of the ideological founding fathers of Pakistan,
    Maulana Maududi, placed a great emphasis on jihad, (120)
    so Pakistanis are not strangers to the concept of jihad.
    And with jihad being defined as holy war to defeat
    infidels, acts of terrorism are considered normal and par
    for the course by a large number of Pakistanis. The
    extent to which the system to promote violent jihad
    against non-Muslims has spread in Pakistan may be gauged
    from the following reports:
    Terrorism expert Jessica Stern writes (119):
    Only about 4,350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000
    madrasahs in Pakistan have registered with the
    government... Madrasahs are the supply line for jihad...
    A report from the US council of Foreign Relations said:
    According to The Washington Post, some 7,000 madrasas
    currently operate in Pakistan, with enrollment at more
    than 650,000 students. Pakistani officials estimate that
    10 to 15 percent of the madrasas in Pakistan promote
    extremist ideologies.
    The New York Times reported on May 27, 2002:
    there are as many as 500,000 members of jihadi - Muslim
    holy war organizations - in Pakistan, including many
    thousands committed to the cause of forcing India out of
    the sector of Kashmir that it controls.
    Jihad became a driving force in Pakistan under General
    Zia ul Haq in the 1980s.
    138
    Quoting Jessica Stern (119):
    Pakistani dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted
    the madrasahs as a way to garner the religious parties'
    support for his rule and to recruit troops for the anti-
    Soviet war in Afghanistan.
    This is supported by a report in the Asia Times (122):
    The jihadi outfits were in fact a part of the ISI's
    operations and the brainchild of late dictator General
    Zia ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. The purpose
    was to develop a para-military force that would assist
    the Pakistan army in the event of war.
    Jihad in Pakistan received a lot of funding from the US
    and Saudi Arabia. Stern reports that Pakistan received US
    $ 3.5 billion from these countries in the 1985 to 1989
    period. Jihad became an important business in Pakistan,
    with funds coming in from diverse sources such as Libya,
    Iraq, Iran and other Gulf states. Along with the money
    came guns and drugs, mainly heroin, to fund the US backed
    war against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. With US arms,
    Saudi funds and Jihad recruits from Pakistan, the Soviet
    Union was put under sufficient military pressure to
    withdraw from Afghanistan, paving the way for the
    Pakistan sponsored Taliban to form a government in
    Afghanistan.
    Tariq Ali wrote in The Independent of the UK (123):
    religious fundamentalism is the legacy of a previous
    military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq...During his rule
    (1977-89), a network of madrassahs (religious boarding
    schools), funded by the Saudi regime, were created...The
    2,500 madrassahs produced a crop of 225,000 fanatics
    139
    ready to kill and die for their faith when asked to do so
    by their religious leaders. Dispatched across the border
    by the Pakistan Army, they were hurled into battle...The
    Taliban creed is an ultra-sectarian strain, inspired by
    the Wahhabi sect that rules Saudi Arabia...The Taliban
    could not, however, have captured Kabul on their own
    ..They were armed and commanded by "volunteers" from the
    Pakistan Army
    For the Pakistani army, control of Afghanistan with its
    puppet, the Taliban government was a double blessing. The
    forces of jihad provided a huge supply of trained and
    experienced soldiers to fight India in a low cost war.
    The Pakistani army could describe the jihadi-terrorists
    as freedom fighters and deny any link with them, while
    Pakistan claimed to provide only moral and diplomatic
    support to them.
    Meanwhile Afghanistan itself was seen by Pakistan as
    strategic depth - that is, if India ever attacked
    Pakistan, Pakistani forces and leaders could withdraw
    into Afghanistan and continue to fight. Afghanistan also
    served as a safe place to continue to train jihadis to
    fight Pakistan's war against India.
    RAND, a US based non-profit organization that helps
    policy and decision making, carried the following passage
    in a commentary (124):
    Sponsoring militancy in Kashmir is regarded as a
    relatively cheap and effective way of offsetting existing
    power symmetries (essentially through the philosophy of a
    'war of a thousand cuts') while simultaneously ...
    ensuring that Pakistan has sufficient strategic depth to
    undertake a protracted conventional war on the subcontinent,
    should this ever become necessary.
    140
    A report in the New York Times (27th May 2002) describes
    how the jihadis from Afghanistan were applied against
    India:
    drawing on the 80,000 fighters whom Pakistan had trained
    and armed to fight the Soviet forces in
    Afghanistan...Pakistan's military and intelligence
    services struck upon the idea of employing jihadis to
    wrest control of the Kashmir from India. "We have fought
    three wars with India and have not won even one of them,"
    said an expert on the country's jihad movements. "The
    success of the jihadi strategy in Afghanistan compelled
    the generals to try it on India, too. The Kashmir jihadis
    are our cannon fodder because they are willing to die for
    their cause in a way that no paid soldiers would."
    And even today as Pakistani jihadis continue to be used
    as cannon fodder against India, the recruitment has to go
    on. Jihad is advertised in Pakistan as a career path to
    follow. Shahid Nadeem wrote in the Daily Times of
    Pakistan (125):
    The moment we left Fortress Abbottabad, it was jehadi
    territory. Wall chalking after wall chalking advertised
    jehadi outfits and announced recruitment for jehadi
    fighters. Just a few kilometers from the Havelian
    cantonment, there are slogans such as Jehad is the
    shortest route to Paradise and Contact us for commando
    Jehadi training. Walls between Havelian and Haripur are
    full of jehadi slogans and adverts
    Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani scientist and columnist
    wrote(126):
    Islam, Pakistan, Jihad became emblazoned on banners at
    Pakistani army recruitment centers, ... A new ethos was
    created; this was to be an army not just for Pakistan,
    141
    but for the greater glory of Islam.
    Jihad has been made attractive and financially rewarding.
    The rewards of waging jihad include the following, among
    more worldly rewards (127):
    The mujahideen were assured of entering Paradise before
    the first drop of their blood fell to earth. The Holy
    Scriptures of Islam also say that houris [beautiful
    virgins of the Koranic Paradise] come down to Earth to
    take the spirit of the mujahid who is about to die before
    the first drop of his blood falls to earth. The martyrs
    are promised 72 houris in Paradise. These houris are more
    beautiful than all the beauties of the world combined.
    There are salary and pension rules in place as well. A
    RAND report quotes Indian Intelligence estimates of the
    budget of the Pakistani agency responsible for training
    and coordinating jihad-terrorist action in India the so
    called Inter Services Intelligence or I.S.I. (124):
    annual ISI expenditure to the main militant organisations
    runs to between US$125 and $250 million a year. These
    funds are used to cover salaries for fighters (which run
    from 5,000 to 10,000 rupees a month), support to next of
    kin, cash incentives for high-risk operations and
    retainers for guides, porters and informers.
    Appendix 4 reproduces an article carried in the online
    paper Mid-Day listing details of incentives and salaries
    offered to terrorists from Pakistan. The article is
    revealing in the extent to which Pakistan has been
    organizing and funding terrorists who have long been said
    to receive only moral and diplomatic support from
    Pakistan.
    With jihad and terrorism being Pakistan's main industry,
    142
    the effect on India has been murderous.
    A paper published by the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG)
    carries examples of newspaper headlines resulting from
    terrorist acts sponsored by Pakistan in India(128). A few
    samples are quoted below:
    • "Suspected Islamic militants axed to death six
    members of a shepherd's family overnight. The attackers
    killed four women and two children, the officer said."
    • "Militants slit the throats of two women, shot
    dead another person and set off two explosions damaging a
    bridge "
    • "Terrorists have slit the throats of two of the
    four policemen abducted after the attack on a police post
    in Udhampur on Sunday.
    Statistics of deaths of Indians in Kashmir show that over
    17,000 civilians have been killed by Pakistani trained
    terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir from 1990 to 2003.
    Over the same period Indian security forces have
    intercepted and killed 17,000 terrorists who were found
    committing acts of terrorism or infiltrating into India
    from Pakistan, along with the staggering recovery of over
    27,000 assault rifles and machine guns, and over 59,000
    hand grenades, 6 million rounds of ammunition and 34,000
    kilograms of explosives (129).
    The US army discovered in Vietnam that groups of armed
    men carrying machine guns and explosives, hiding in
    jungles in mountainous regions cannot be fought with
    tanks and attack aircraft. Men have to be met by men in
    deadly face to face encounters at the end of long vigils
    or cordon and search operations. The US in Vietnam had
    the luxury of being able to withdraw from Vietnam, but
    Indians do not have the option of withdrawing from their
    143
    own land. Terrorism, with hundreds of thousands of
    jihadis entering from Pakistan required a robust
    response, and India met the threat by building a powerful
    counter-insurgency apparatus, and by starting to fence
    the India-Pakistan boundary where possible.
    As the Indian strategy proved effective, jihadis started
    getting eliminated in increasing numbers, and the average
    life-span of a jihadi-terrorist entering India from
    Pakistan was reduced to weeks or months rather than years
    (130). One Indian army major is quoted in an interview as
    saying (131):
    Once somebody picks up the gun then his family knows that
    it is only a matter of days before they hear that he has
    been killed in an encounter. We put the average lifespan
    of a terrorist at two-and-half years. Within this period
    we are bound to eliminate him.
    This seems to have had a significant effect on the morale
    of Pakistan's army backed jihadi-terrorist apparatus,
    because the Pakistani government started protesting
    against the presence of large numbers of Indian counterinsurgency
    personnel within India, and diplomatic
    protests grew shriller as Indian security forces chalked
    up success after success.
    In many areas, terrorists from Pakistan were unable to
    enter India at all or were able to infiltrate through in
    the smallest numbers. A backlog of violent, trained and
    indoctrinated terrorists built up in Pakistan, and
    gradually, these terrorists began to target other nations
    of the world.
    Once again, the only country that tried to alert the
    world about the global terrorist threat emanating from
    Pakistan's jihad factory was India, but Indian
    144
    information fell on deaf ears, until the September 11th
    2001 terrorist attacks on the US. That woke up the
    intelligence communities of the world with a jolt. Since
    then terrorist links leading back to Pakistan have been
    found in countries like Burma, Nepal, Chechnya,
    Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, Kuwait,
    Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Turkey, Latvia,
    Australia, UK, Canada, Indonesia and the Philippines.
    (119,132). A detailed study exists in an online portal of
    the evidence of Pakistani links to terrorism against the
    US, including links to the September 11th attacks (133).
    Pakistan has now become the home base of global
    terrorism. Terrorism Central would not be an
    inappropriate name for Pakistan, and it is by no means
    certain that anybody in Pakistan can control the forces
    that have been unleashed. The Sorcerer's Apprentice is
    out of control. The entire world, and Pakistan itself is
    being targeted by the Islamist groups spawned and
    nurtured by the Pakistani army and its intelligence cell,
    the I.S.I.
    In an article on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the
    magazine India Today, referring to the L-e-T (Lashkar-e-
    Tayeba), a powerful and deadly Pakistan based jihad
    group, had this to say in its December 2003 edition
    (132):
    There is a terrible price to pay for this facilitation
    because the same forces that drive jehad in Jammu and
    Kashmir drive it in other lands too...Indian authorities
    reckon that groups like the LeT could, in time, become
    more dangerous. Not only would they become too large for
    the ISI to manage but also their strong links with the
    underworld would create a sort of double whammy.
    This view is echoed by one of India's premier anti145
    terrorism experts, K.P.S. Gill, who warned (134):
    There is now mounting evidence of a loss of control as
    these autonomous religious groups challenge, not only
    their Army and ISI handlers, but the Government itself.
    In an indication of increasing international
    understanding of how jihad threatens to eat up Pakistan,
    a report carried by RAND said (124):
    it is no longer apparent that the army or ISI exercise
    complete control over the proxies they have helped to
    create, some of which are now openly talking about
    fomenting a fundamentalist revolution in Pakistan itself.
    In Decemeber 2003, General Pervez Musharraf, President of
    Pakistan survived two attempts to assassinate him that
    occurred within days of each other (135, 136). The fact
    that the route of the motorcade he was travelling in was
    known to the people who wanted to kill him suggests that
    someone close to General Musharraf was involved in these
    attempts. In an interview quoted in the BBC (137),
    Musharraf blamed the Al Quaeda for attempting to
    assassinate him. Other reports too have pointed to
    Islamist forces within Pakistan as being responsible for
    wanting to replace General Musharraf. Although the first
    of the two assassination attempts was thought to have
    been stage managed by Musharraf's supporters to win
    greater sympathy for him (138), the second one, a suicide
    bombing involving multiple bomb laden trucks was a very
    real indicator of the sort of forces that exist in
    Pakistan today.
    These forces will not be easy to eliminate. Apart from
    multiple Islamist groups, Pakistan is awash with weapons.
    There are an estimated 18 million illegal firearms in
    Pakistan, in addition to 2 million registered ones (139).
    146
    Pakistan is home to a Kalashnikov culture with hundreds
    of firearm manufacturing workshops making weapons,
    including inexpensive clones of the Kalashnikov AK-47
    assault rifle, a reliable weapon of choice for
    terrorists, being able to spray a high volume of fire at
    targets. In a coherently functioning nation-state, the
    government retains coercive power. That means that the
    government, (the army, in Pakistan's case) retains the
    armed power to suppress and control all other groups. But
    that monopoly over coercive power may have slipped out of
    the hands of the Pakistani army, into the hands of
    Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan.
    147
    Chapter 14
    THE GOVERNMENT AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
    There is probably no government in the world which does
    not have one or more people in power who are either
    themselves criminals or have links to criminals. However,
    successive Pakistani governments and the army have been
    unique in actively supporting and participating in
    international criminal activity as an integral component
    of the Pakistani economy and foreign policy.
    Heroin smuggling and Narco terrorism:
    Heroin is a drug that is a derivative of the medically
    used pain-killer morphine. It is obtained from the Opium
    Poppy plant. Although heroin itself has medicinal value
    as a potent pain-killer, it is extremely addictive when
    administered to normal people. People are said to crave
    for the drug after experiencing its effects just once. In
    most countries of the world, heroin is illegal to
    manufacture or possess because of its dangerous potential
    to cause addiction. Heroin addicts become so physically
    dependent on the drug, and crave the drug so much that
    they are willing to pay very high prices to obtain it,
    making heroin the star compound of the illegal drug
    trade.
    In October 1994, US Senator Frank Pallone brought to the
    attention of the US house of representatives a news
    report in the Washington Post (140):
    Mr Pallone said:
    Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to the attention of my
    colleagues a report that appeared in the Washington Post
    of September 12, 1994, which describes a disturbing link
    between narcotics and terrorism. The report from Karachi,
    Pakistan, headlined `Heroin Plan by Top Pakistanis
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    Alleged' quotes Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz
    Sharif saying that `drug deals were to pay for covert
    operations' brings to mind other reports not so long ago
    of Pakistani involvement in using the Bank of Credit and
    Commerce International [BCCI] to launder drug money that
    was eventually believed to have been used in financing
    terrorist groups involved in the New York World Trade
    Center bombing. The report cites Pakistan's army chief
    and head of intelligence agency proposing to then-Prime
    Minister Sharif `a detailed blueprint for selling heroin
    to pay for the country's covert military operations in
    early 1991.
    The news report said that three months after Nawaz Sharif
    became Prime Minister of Pakistan he was approached by
    the Pakistan army chief of staff, Gen. Aslam Beg and Gen.
    Asad Durrani, the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence
    (ISI) with the blueprint for a plan to export heroin to
    raise money for the Pakistan army's covert foreign
    operations a euphemism for Pakistan sponsored terrorism
    in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
    Indian analyst, B. Raman writes (141) that money earned
    through Pakistan's heroin trade was used to fund
    Pakistan's arms purchases, including missiles from North
    Korea, submarines from France and components for
    Pakistan's covert nuclear program. During the late years
    of Gen. Zia ul Haq's rule and in the early years of
    Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a special cell
    was set up by Pakistan's ISI for the use of heroin for
    covert action, under one Brigadier Imtiaz.
    Raman writes:
    Pakistan's illegal heroin economy has kept its legitimate
    State economy sustained since 1990 and prevented its
    collapse. It has also enabled it to maintain a high
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    level of arms purchases from abroad and to finance its
    proxy war against India through the jehadi organisations.
    The Indian army's 15th Corps, which is in the thick of
    action against terrorists from Pakistan has this to say
    in an article on Narco-Terrorism on its website (142):
    Both the Pakistan Army and the Inter Services
    Intelligence (ISI) agency are known to be extensively
    involved in narcotics trade. The primary reason for
    indulging in narcotics trade by these two premier
    institutions of Pakistan is the need for money to finance
    covert foreign operations, which the otherwise cash
    strapped economy of Pak could ill afford to pay for. The
    nexus between Pak ISI and Pak Army with the drug mafia is
    a well documented and established fact. Pak trucks are
    used by the drug mafia for narcotics smuggling. Even
    during the Afghan crisis Pak trucks and National
    Logistic Cell (NLC) vehicles transporting arms to Afghan
    Mujahideen were used for shipping large consignments of
    drugs from the drug producing areas to Karachi,
    Islamabad, Rawalpindi and other such city centres, where
    the drugs were processed, packaged and despatched towards
    their destination.
    In a one and a half year period from January 1997 to May
    1998, the Indian army captured from Pakistani
    infiltrators about 19 Kilograms of Heroin with a street
    value of US $ 5 million. Also recovered was 60 Kilograms
    of Charas - a drug derived from Cannabis (Ganja).
    Nuclear Proliferation:
    Nuclear weapons, also known as atomic bombs are extremely
    destructive. They have been used only twice in August
    1945 when the Unites States dropped a bomb on each of the
    Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A single bomb
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    reduced each city to rubble, killing hundreds of
    thousands of people, causing Japan to surrender within
    days. That brought the second World War to an end. The
    destructive potential of nuclear weapons made them
    attractive to nations as a deterrent - a weapon of
    terrifying power to scare a potential attacker from
    waging war for fear of being hit by nuclear weapons. And
    because of their destructive potential, the technology
    for manufacturing nuclear weapons remained a closely
    guarded secret, available to only a handful of nations in
    the world.
    As described in chapter 4, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a
    Pakistani metallurgist stole the blueprints for making
    Uranium enrichment centrifuges from a Dutch concern
    called URENCO that he worked for. Enrichment of Uranium
    is one of the first steps in making one type of nuclear
    bomb. Upon his return to Pakistan, Khan was encouraged
    and funded by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the time,
    Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to set up facilities to enrich
    Uranium manufacture nuclear bombs. Abdul Qadeer Khan
    became a hero and achieved cult status in Pakistan as the
    father of Pakistan's Islamic bomb
    In late 2003 and early 2004, it became clear that
    Pakistani nuclear technology to enrich Uranium had been
    supplied to North Korea, Libya and Iran, along with
    actual blueprints of nuclear bomb designs in order to
    help these nations manufacture atomic bombs. Centrifuges
    made from the very designs Qadeer Khan had stolen from
    URENCO were found in Iran, and these centrifuges had
    radioactive contaminants that unmistakably bore the
    signature of a Pakistani source. Shipments of centrifuge
    components to North Korea and Libya were intercepted.
    Pakistan had obtained funds from Libya in exchange for
    this technology and North Korea paid for the technology
    by supplying Pakistan with ballistic missiles capable of
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    carrying nuclear weapons (143).
    In early 2004 the world was witness to an incredible
    drama on Pakistan television in which Abdul Qadeer Khan
    made a public confession of having sold nuclear weapons
    technology to other nations entirely on his own, with no
    knowledge of the Pakistani army or government. This
    confession was followed by a prompt presidential pardon
    for Dr. Khan by President and army chief Gen. Musharraf.
    It would be naive to imagine that successive Pakistani
    governments and the military were unaware of Khan's
    activities.
    An article in the online edition of the L.A. Times said
    (143):
    U.S. officials, nuclear experts and a former prime
    minister of Pakistan expressed doubts Monday about how
    Khan and a handful of associates could have circumvented
    the extraordinary controls on the country's nuclear
    technology without the military's blessings.
    Benazir Bhutto, who served twice as prime minister before
    going into exile in the face of corruption charges, said
    she doubted that the transfers could have taken place
    without the knowledge of senior military officials.
    "It is difficult to accept that the scientists could have
    violated government policy on their own," she told the
    Los Angeles Times. "Those who violated the policy are now
    hiding behind the scientists."
    On February 4th 2004, the New York Times reported (144):
    experts inside and outside the government say it is
    difficult to believe that Pakistan's nuclear secrets
    could have been exported without the knowledge of some in
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    the military and the Pakistani Inter-Services
    Intelligence agency, especially since some shipments were
    made on Pakistani military aircraft.
    Four days later, the New York Times carried a report in
    which it was said (145):
    Few of Mr. Bush's aides believe Pakistan's story that Dr.
    Khan operated alone. He has the deepest ties to the
    military, which oversaw the Khan Research Laboratories,
    and supplied it with a cargo fleet. Pakistan got missiles
    from North Korea, investigators believe, in return for
    uranium enrichment technology. Clearly, the Pakistani
    government must have known something about how its new
    missile fleet materialized.
    It is virtually certain that the televised drama of
    Qadeer Khan absolving the army of all responsibility for
    proliferation while taking all the blame, only to be
    pardoned by the army is in keeping with the Pakistan
    army's time honoured tradition of protecting its self
    interest and attempting to appear farcically squeakyclean
    in the face of contrary evidence.
    Airliner hijacking:
    The most blatant case of an airliner hijacked with
    Pakistani army and government complicity is the shameful
    episode of Indian Airlines Flight number IC 814 that was
    hijacked in December 2000 by five Pakistani nationals who
    boarded the flight in Kathmandu in Nepal. If it had not
    been for the murder that the hijackers committed and
    their success in achieving their aim of securing the
    release of jailed terrorists in India terrorists who were
    later to enter Pakistan and mastermind further murders
    and play a role in the suicide attacks of September 11th
    2001 in New York, this whole hijacking story could have
    153
    come out of a B-grade semi-comic motion picture.
    The five hijackers actually received their weapons in a
    diplomatic bag checked in by Pakistani First Secretary in
    Nepal, Mohammad Arshad Cheema (146). The hijacked
    aircraft was flown to the UAE, Amritsar and Lahore, and
    the newlywed husband of a honeymooning couple was
    murdered by slashing his throat, and his body thrown out
    of the aircraft while his wife remained on board for the
    rest of the duration of the hijack. The plane was then
    flown to Kandahar in Afghanistan, where it came under
    control of Pakistan's puppet Taliban government. In a
    surreal turn of events, the hijackers were provided with
    new weapons in Kandahar, as reported by a French tourist
    hostage who survived the ordeal (147).
    Indian intelligence agencies who monitored and recorded
    the communications of the hijackers on the aircraft in
    Kandahar found them receiving instructions from Lt. Gen.
    Mohammad Aziz, a Pakistani Corps commander (148). On
    Aziz's instructions the hijackers demanded a ransom of
    nearly one million US dollars, which was to be delivered
    in cash. When that was decided to be impracticable, the
    money was deposited in the account of a Pakistani
    diplomat in Delhi. The hijackers also secured the release
    of three dangerous Pakistani terrorists in prison in
    India, including Maulana Masood Azhar the founder of the
    Pakistan based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Omar
    Shaikh. The released terrorists disappeared from Kandahar
    and resurfaced in Pakistan. Omar Shaikh was later
    implicated in helping to fund the attacks on the World
    Trade center in New York, and was finally arrested for
    the murder of the Jewish-American reporter Daniel Pearl.
    Pakistan's record with reference to Indian airliners
    hijacked to Pakistan has been condemnable. After a 1971
    hijack the hijackers were granted asylum in Pakistan, and
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    the aircraft blown up on the ground. After a 1976 hijack,
    the hijackers were imprisoned for a token one month in
    Pakistan for entering Pakistan without due documents. In
    two instances of hijacking in 1981 and 1984, the
    hijackers were given refuge in Pakistan. And in an
    unbelievable second hijacking event in 1984, the
    hijackers received a weapon along with snacks in Lahore
    (149).
    Refuge for Criminals:
    Pakistan has positioned itself as an ideal place for any
    criminal from India to seek, and obtain refuge. India
    has a list of 20 most wanted criminals who are living in
    Pakistan.
    The following is a list of names of the twenty, and a
    brief description of their activities (150):
    1. Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-i-Mohammad, man
    behind the attack on India's parliament on December 13,
    2001. He is also wanted for an attack on the J&K Assembly
    on Oct 1, 2001 in which 38 people were killed. He
    currently lives in and operates from Bahawalpur,
    Pakistan.
    2. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, co-founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba,
    also blamed for the attack on parliament in New Delhi. He
    operates from Muridke town, near Lahore in Pakistan.
    3. Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian underworld don, man behind
    the planning and financing of 13 explosions in Mumbai in
    1993 in which almost 300 people died. Ibrahim is wanted
    in connection with cases of arms supply, counterfeiting,
    drugs trade, funding alleged criminals, murder and
    smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi,
    Pakistan.
    155
    4. Chhota Shakeel, a key associate of Dawood Ibrahim.
    Wanted for murder, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail of
    businessmen and film stars in India. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    5."Tiger" Ibrahim Memon, accused of executing the 1993
    Mumbai blasts. He is wanted in cases of murder,
    extortion, kidnapping, terrorism and smuggling arms and
    explosives in India. He is currently living in Pakistan.
    6. Ayub Memon, accused of executing the 1993 Mumbai
    blasts. He is alleged to have helped his brother Ibrahim
    Memon carry out the blasts. He is wanted in cases of
    terrorism and smuggling. He lives in and operates from
    Karachi, Pakistan.
    7. Abdul Razzak, accused of involvement in the Mumbai
    blasts. He is wanted in cases of terrorism and arms
    smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi,
    Pakistan.
    8. Syed Salahuddin, head of Hizbul Mujahideen, which has
    claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on Indian
    forces in Kashmir, India. He currently lives in and
    operates from Muzaffarabad, Pakistan.
    9. Ibrahim Athar, an associate of Maulana Azhar Masood
    and was one of the hijackers of Indian Airlines flight
    IC-814 from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1999. He is a member of
    Jaish-i-Mohammad and is wanted for hijacking, kidnapping
    and murder. He currently lives in and operates from
    Bahawalpur, Pakistan.
    10. Zahoor Ibrahim Mistri, a member of Harkat-ul-Ansar,
    which later changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. He
    is wanted in connection with the hijacking of IC-814 and
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    in cases of kidnapping and murder. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    11. Shahid Akhtar Sayed, is wanted for the IC-814
    hijacking and for kidnapping and murder. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    12. Azhar Yusuf, wanted in the IC-814 hijacking case and
    in cases of kidnapping and murder. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    13. Abdul Karim, a Kashmiri terrorist blamed for more
    than 30 bomb blasts in Delhi and parts of northern India
    in 1996-97. He lives in and operates from Lahore,
    Pakistan.
    14. Ishaq Atta Hussain, an associate of Dawood Ibrahim,
    is wanted in connection with a conspiracy to kill Indian
    Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister L.K. Advani. He
    lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    15. Sagir Sabir Ali Shaikh, an associate of Dawood
    Ibrahim, is also wanted in connection with the conspiracy
    to kill Advani. He lives in and operates from Karachi,
    Pakistan.
    16. Wadhawan Singh Babbar, chief of Sikh group Babbar
    Khalsa International, which was involved in an insurgency
    in East Punjab during the 1980s. He is wanted in over a
    dozen cases of sedition, murder and in connection with
    the assassination of East Punjab's then chief minister
    Beant Singh. He lives in and operates from Lahore,
    Pakistan.
    17. Ranjit Singh Neeta, chief of Khalistan Zindabad
    Force. He is wanted in cases of murder, bomb blasts and
    smuggling of arms in India. He lives in and operates from
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    Lahore, Pakistan.
    18. Paramjit Singh Panjwar, leader of the Khalistan
    Commando Force. He is accused of trying to revive the
    Sikh insurgency in East Punjab and is wanted in more than
    a dozen cases of murder, treason, conspiracy and arms
    smuggling. He lives in and operates from Lahore,
    Pakistan.
    19. Lakhbir Singh Rode, leader of the International Sikh
    Youth Federation, is wanted in cases of arms smuggling,
    conspiracy to attack government leaders in Delhi and
    inciting religious hatred in East Punjab. He lives in and
    operates from Lahore, Pakistan.
    20 .Gajinder Singh, leader of Sikh group Dal Khalsa, is
    accused of hijacking an Indian Airlines plane from
    Srinagar to Delhi in 1981. He was arrested by Pakistan
    after he hijacked the plane to Lahore and tried. He lives
    in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.
    Pakistan admitted the presence of the third man on the
    list, Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan in September 2003 after
    news of a bomb blast in Karachi. Rediff reported (151):
    Pakistan has admitted gangster Dawood Ibrahim's presence
    in the country, according to a report. The admission came
    after a bomb blast at a Karachi business centre, the
    Kawish Crown Plaza, which the inspector general of Sindh
    police said was "ostensibly owned by Ahmed Jamal but
    actually belonged to Dawood Ibrahim", Pakistani journal
    The Herald said.
    Dawood Ibrahim was subsequently designated a global
    terrorist by the US for his links with Al Quaeda and the
    Lashkar-e-Tayeba, the Islamist extremist group that was
    founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, the first man on India's
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    Most wanted list, one of the prisoners released by India
    after the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft
    to Kandahar in Afghanistan.
    Printing and circulation of counterfeit currency:
    In January 2000, a staffer from the visa section of the
    Pakistan embassy in Nepal was arrested in Kathmandu
    (Nepal) after passing counterfeit Indian currency to
    Nepalese police in a sting operation. The Pakistani
    ambassador tried to stop the arrest claiming diplomatic
    immunity for the staffer but it turned out that he did
    not have diplomatic immunity.
    The Indian Express reported (152):
    Officials said the quality of fake notes was "such that
    it could only be printed in security presses", in an
    apparent hint that Pakistan was indulging in massive
    printing of fake notes to abet its terrorist activities
    against India.
    With Indian currency being valid in Nepal, that country
    was a natural choice for anti-India activities from
    Pakistan, which apparently intended to destabilize the
    Indian economy by flooding India with fake currency. One
    report (153) quoted the street value of the Pakistan made
    counterfeit currency in India:
    The prevailing price for counterfeit currency in Punjab
    is Rs 40-60 (83 US cents-$1.25) in exchange for every
    Pakistani-made Rs 100 note - the range depending on the
    buyers' bargaining skills and the volume required. The
    right contacts can ensure that Pakistani counterfeit
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    currency is available even cheaper..
    Another report of the arrest of a man carrying
    counterfeit currency said (154):
    The racket was being remote controlled by Aftab Butki
    from Dubai in United Arab Emirates (UAE). Butki is a
    front man of notorious mafia don Dawood Ibrahim and
    controls the gang for pumping fake currency into India
    through the porous Indo-Nepal border. Inter Services
    Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan has been providing
    logistical support to the underworld dons for flooding
    the Indian market with counterfeit currency with the sole
    aim of creating panic in the Indian market. Joint
    Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, U K Katna said,
    "The counterfeit currency notes were sent for damaging
    the Indian economy.
    The high quality of the counterfeit notes and official
    sponsorship of this and other criminal activities by
    Pakistani governmental agencies is a frightening
    indicator of the chaotic state that Pakistan is in with
    no expense being spared to prepare for war or jihad
    against India and very little being spent on development
    and education within Pakistan.
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    Chapter 15
    PAKISTAN FAILED STATE
    The credit for coining the name Pakistan probably goes to
    one Choudhry Rehmat Ali who is said to have thought of
    the name in 1933 as an acronym containing letters from
    the names of all the areas which this man thought were
    representative of the ancestry of his people. Another
    theory is that the acronym was composed by a group of
    students in Cambridge in England. It is not clear if
    Rehmat Ali was one of these students. A passage
    attributed to him says (155):
    "Pakistan" is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is
    composed of letters taken from the names of all our
    homelands - "Indian" and "Asian". That is, Punjab,
    Afghania (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran,
    Sindh (including Karachi and Kathiawar), Tukharistan,
    Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. It means the land of the
    Paks-the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the
    religions, beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people;
    and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our
    original Fatherland.
    The theory that Pakistan is an acronym does not stand up
    to scrutiny. In the first place, the Pakistan described
    by the acronym includes Iran and Central Asia
    (Tukharistan) as part of Pakistan and makes no mention of
    East Bengal, which was part of Pakistan until it seceded
    with the creation of Bangladesh. A second curious anomaly
    is that the name of this nation that is claimed to be
    derived from Urdu and Persian is composed of letters in
    the English alphabet with the English letters forming
    the acronym. Such an acronym is non-existent when the
    name is written in Urdu. It seems more likely that the
    acronym theory of the name is a confabulation, a
    plausible but imagined memory that fills in gaps in what
    161
    is remembered as to how Pakistan got its name.
    Ultimately, the stress on pure Islam and a nation purely
    for Muslims, that has Urdu as its official language
    suggests that the real origin of the name Pakistan
    derives from the Urdu word Paki. The dictionary of Urdu,
    Classical Hindi and English defines Paki as Purity - with
    stan meaning country (156).
    That stress on purity - or purity with a narrow
    definition has certainly played a role in Pakistan's
    undoing. Purity is a subjective concept, and can only be
    grasped in relation to something else that is impure. To
    define purity, one must simultaneously define what is
    impure, and Pakistanis have spent the years since 1947
    years struggling to weed out anything that they consider
    impure, rather than concentrate on nation building.
    India, and Indians were impure and were rejected.
    Minorities and religious groups in Pakistan were impure
    Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Ahmediyas and later even Shia
    Muslims in Pakistan were not pure enough for Pakistan.
    Further purity was required by fighting wars and making
    sacrifices. Social imbalance, corruption, poverty and
    greed were all minor blips in the route to Pakistan's
    mythical purity.
    Conditions of life for a Pakistani depend on what class
    of society one belongs to and whether one lives in a
    rural or urban area. As noted in chapter 2, there are
    only two main classes of society in Pakistan, the very
    rich and the very poor and these classes comprise 90% of
    Pakistan's population.
    There is a very small, very rich class of Pakistani. They
    are the Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite, sometimes
    facetiously referred to by the acronym of that name. The
    acronym R.A.P.E. is perhaps an apt description of what
    162
    this class have been doing to Pakistan. They are the
    feudal lords, who may own thousands of acres of land.
    They might be rich industrialists and businessmen, or
    they might be serving or retired army officers.
    The lifestyles of these people can be compared to that of
    the rich and famous anywhere. They live in fabulous
    mansions, maintained and supported by armies of servants.
    These are the beautiful people, the handsome men clad in
    lounge suits or traditional sherwanis, the mascara and
    lipstick adorned women in designer dresses. No burkha
    (veil) for these women.
    The elite are educated, often in the best schools and
    universities of the world. They travel, and are familiar
    with all the major cities that a man of this world should
    know about New York, London, Paris, Rome, Geneva. They
    are seen in parties and receptions attended by friends
    and diplomats, actors and society people. Their
    photographs appear in glossy magazines and on the
    Internet. These charmed people are the Pakistanis that we
    see and hear.
    Irfan Husain wrote in the Dawn:
    An old friend was recently invited to a serving general's
    official residence for a small dinner party, and came
    away hugely impressed by the acres of immaculate lawns,
    the discreet lighting, the tasteful furnishings and the
    overall level of luxury...The food and refreshments were
    of the highest quality, and the army staff who served the
    small gathering had apparently been trained at a fivestar
    hotel...
    But 90 percent of Pakistanis are rarely seen or heard
    outside Pakistan. They are the servants, the sweepers,
    the waiters, the casual laborers and sharecroppers, the
    163
    goatherds and the cleaners with their wives and their
    children. They can be seen on Pakistani streets and in
    the villages. The men wear crumpled and seemingly
    unwashed salwar suits. The women, if seen at all, are
    covered in burqas as expected of women in Islamic
    Pakistan. The women do not work outside the home and may
    have four or more children to bring up. More than half
    these people do not earn enough money for a decent life.
    Most earn less than the equivalent of US $1 per day. Even
    those who earn more than that often sink below poverty
    level at certain times of the year, or in times of
    illness or drought.
    Malnutrition is rampant, as is lack of education. Any
    education that can be gained, can be gained only from
    madrassas that often provide food and shelter for its
    students. That is a welcome source of relief for a very
    poor family with many children to care for. But girls are
    not allowed, and girls are not sent to schools either, in
    the few places where schools exist.
    Life is harsh, and many try to find work in the Middle
    East to earn a living as menial laborers. Others try to
    migrate to Europe and beyond. The hard life, hunger,
    poverty and destitution are accepted by some people as
    the will of Allah that cannot be questioned or mitigated.
    Others are angry and frustrated at their lot and these
    people are told by their elite masters that poverty and
    hardship are because of Indian aggression or some other
    extraneous factor. Pakistani leaders, being Islamic and
    who appear forever busy to defend Pakistan, are above
    blame.
    And that has been an integral part of Pakistan's problem.
    For more than five decades since independence, Pakistani
    leaders have sacrificed enormous and fruitless amounts of
    money, time, human life and effort to somehow equal,
    164
    match or defeat India. The build up of Pakistani armed
    forces into a formidable war machine was initially to
    defeat India and take Kashmir, and later to defend
    against an India that had no intention of attacking
    Pakistan. Money and effort that should have gone into
    building schools, roads and hospitals in Pakistan was
    spent on building a war machine that could never
    overwhelm an India that was just too big. Pakistan was
    halved when Bangladesh seceded, but even then the
    wasteful expenditure did not stop. The bloated ranks of
    army retirees had to be accommodated, and businesses were
    custom made for employing them, and development of the
    poor was bypassed as usual. Money from any source was
    poured developing nuclear weapons to deter India. Money
    was diverted to training Islamist operatives for covert
    operations against India, and a system of salaries and
    pensions had to be set up for them, while the stoic
    Pakistani public, with women and children at the bottom
    of the pile received little. Even criminal activity aimed
    against India, gun running or currency counterfeiting
    swallowed funds that should have gone into schools and
    healthcare in Pakistan.
    In the midst of this, the poor of Pakistan are left with
    the only succour they can get - Islam. And even that is
    used against Pakistan's arch enemy, India. Popular
    devotion to Islam is channelled to provide an endless
    supply of men for jihad. Anger is carefully re-directed
    away from the ruling elite, to be directed at India,
    Israel, the US or other Western nations, or is
    internalised as people not being "Islamic" enough. The
    anger is compounded by what is taught in schools and
    madrassas following curricula that actively teach hatred
    and discrimination to impressionable children.
    The madrassa is the place where students' physical hunger
    is assuaged, but their emotional hunger for explanations
    165
    about the miserable existence of their families is often
    met by a call for violent jihad against forces that are
    blamed for hunger and misery. Every son sent to a
    madrassa is one mouth less to feed for a poor family, and
    sending one son to die for jihad brings honour and
    financial reward to the family.
    Girls grow up uneducated, live at home until they come of
    age, marry and produce children. Boys are preferred in
    all ways in this male-dominated society. The girl child
    gets less food and is more likely to die of malnutrition
    and disease. The ratio of men to women in Pakistan is
    grossly skewed with many more men than women.
    But women hold the key to family honour. A woman's place
    is in the home - she is not supposed to be seen outside,
    either alone, or in the company of a man who is not her
    husband or father. A woman who breaks rules by exposing
    herself or by being seen with a non-approved male
    companion, or a woman who marries against the wishes of
    her family is considered to be committing a crime by
    bringing dishonour on the family - an act that is
    punishable by death.
    Pakistani society has both extremes. On the one hand the
    society has a small minority of wealthy and emancipated
    people among whom women can get educated and work. The
    other extreme is the harsh life of a woman living under
    the burden of strict discriminatory rules. Between these
    two extremes are a vast mass of Pakistanis who are more
    or less generally poor; they are generally uneducated,
    and the level of education for women is invariably less
    than that of men.
    The people are docile, as the British had found them.
    They do not easily rise up in revolt against tyranny or
    injustice, but individuals in such a society grow up in
    166
    conditions that make their minds receptive to
    indoctrination into a life of terrorism and jihad.
    The people need clean drinking water, roads, schools,
    health care, and access to family planning so that births
    can be spaced out, giving a mother time to recover and
    nurse an earlier child before bearing another child. But
    the money, people and will to provide these things never
    reach the population. All the money in Pakistan, be it
    government funds, aid money or export profits is split up
    and shared by a small percentage of wealthy people at the
    top. The Army gets money; the army businesses do well;
    the businessmen and feudal lords get money, and very
    little reaches the Pakistani on the ground. The only
    funding that reaches this level comes from unaccounted
    and unaccountable sources funding the madrassas that
    preach an agenda of hatred and jihad.
    Pakistan is controlled by an oligarchy of a thousand
    individuals or so (157) in a few dozen families. This
    ruling elite is composed of senior army officers,
    business magnates controlling key businesses such as
    transport, fuel oil and cement, as well as feudal
    landowners. For the survival of corrupt business
    interests in Pakistan the elite must remain in power and
    not be bothered by rebellion or the uncertainties of
    democracy. The 140 million mostly poor people of Pakistan
    are kept in check with the excuse that their faith,
    Islam, is under threat from India, and other nations.
    Pakistanis have been told that the army and the ruling
    elite have protected Pakistan and Islam from these
    external threats. For aid givers like the US and rich
    Western nations, the ruling elite of Pakistan behave like
    moderate, secular and well-intentioned democrats who are
    keeping Islamic fundamentalism at bay.
    Time and again Pakistani leaders change masks depending
    167
    on whom they are addressing. They appear in Western suits
    or crisp army uniforms, speaking in English to aid givers
    and donors. To their deprived population, they appear in
    traditional Pakistani salwar suits, and speak in Urdu.
    Western aid givers are told what they want to hear; that
    the ruling elite are fighting to hold fundamentalist
    forces at bay and that more aid and lifting of sanctions
    are essential for the prevention of a Islamic
    fundamentalist takeover of Pakistan.
    In the meantime the ruling clique in Pakistan ensures its
    own survival. Each member of this elite community knows
    that too much action in curbing or controlling the vast
    business empires of their rivals will upset one's own
    business interests. Opponents are rarely killed, punished
    severely or publicly humiliated. They are gently
    sidelined, along with sops to keep them happy. This
    mechanism was clearly illustrated after the father of
    Pakistan's nuclear bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan made a public
    confession that he was responsible for the proliferation
    of nuclear technology (chapter 13). Within a day, he was
    publicly pardoned by Pakistani President General
    Musharraf, and allowed to keep all the wealth that he had
    earned from nuclear proliferation activities. The ruling
    clique of Pakistan stands to gain from this form of loose
    cooperation in which all the business interests survive
    at the expense of the constitution and law, while people
    are constantly fed with the anti-Muslim India threat.
    The threat that is held up is that if the ruling clique
    goes, Pakistan will sink into an uncontrollable morass of
    160 million hankering for an Islamic state. Whether this
    is likely or not, the US administration and some US think
    tanks seem to believe this providing the ideal setting
    for Pakistani rulers to play a double game of pretending
    to be devoutly Islamic for their people, while appearing
    moderate to aid givers.
    168
    When Pakistani President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf
    was given an ultimatum by the US government in September
    2001 that he could be With the US or against the US in
    its war on terror, he made his decision to support the US
    in a speech (56) that used the time tested Pakistani
    mask-changing routine to address different groups of
    people. He spoke in English initially, knowing that this
    would be understood by viewers in the US, saying words of
    support to please the US. But in the course of the same
    speech, he addressed Pakistanis in Urdu and, using
    Islamic examples, told them that his alliance with the US
    was akin to a temporary alliance with the devil to deter
    an immediate threat. This ploy is a fail safe formula
    that has allowed the survival of the Pakistani oligarchy
    so far, even as the human condition of the people in
    Pakistan has gradually deteriorated.
    The average poor Pakistani is taught that his misery is
    because of Indian aggression, or more recently, because
    of the US' war on terror. External anti-Islamic forces
    are always to blame. The powerful and wealthy groups of
    Pakistan stand to lose their money and lifestyles if
    funds are diverted to education, health care and
    development of the poor. As long as the poor can be left
    to vent their anger against some external foe by joining
    jihad or accepting their misery as Allah's will the rich
    army, elite and feudal leadership of Pakistan will be
    under no pressure to change.
    No power on earth can coax this small group of rich and
    powerful Pakistanis that wealth in a nation has to be
    shared and spread around for development of society and
    the nation as a whole. The rich get richer and the poor
    get poorer, and the population of the poor is rising
    rapidly, and their level of education is falling. These
    people will form a huge mass of uneducated and unemployed
    169
    people in a few years' time.
    The ruling elite of Pakistan are engaged in a strange
    experiment in which they seem out of touch with reality.
    They exist on a different plane from the poor and they do
    not seem to understand that the burgeoning population of
    the poor, and the anger that is now being channeled
    against India or the West can turn inwards. The poor are
    over 100 million strong now but will be twice that number
    in a single generation, and they will be jobless, hungry
    and angry.
    Nations like India, China, Russia and Western countries,
    who have all had to face the violent consequences of
    trained jihadi fighters from Pakistan are vigorously
    resisting and neutralizing them. The forces of jihad are
    unlikely to receive sanctuary or be allowed to survive in
    these nations in the current geo-political scenario.
    Faced with such pressure outside Pakistan, thousands of
    indoctrinated, armed and dangerous young men could well
    turn inwards at Pakistani rulers, blaming them for their
    inability to help in the victory of jihad over
    unbelievers. If Pakistani leaders can show constant
    military victories, it is likely that their population
    will at least temporarily continue to be happy at the
    successes. But when low-tech irregular Islamic militias
    spawned by the Pakistani army and governments are unable
    to achieve victories despite tremendous losses, they are
    increasingly likely to ask the leaders of Pakistan, the
    army and the elite why they are being defeated.
    From the beginning Pakistanis, rich or poor have had no
    sense of nationhood, no sense of whom and what they are
    other than being a group of Muslims who have escaped from
    India. Every effort at development and good governance
    has been destroyed by a vested interest, always living in
    the vain hope that some Western nation, or rich Islamic
    170
    nation will bail the country out. Democracy was first
    derailed by the migrant bureaucracy who had moved to
    Pakistan from India. Later it was the army that stood to
    lose from democracy. Political parties have been
    disempowered, and the judiciary lives under the shadow of
    the army.
    The only forces that are gaining strength are those of
    fundamentalist Islam, the forces that seek to fight India
    or the US, or even Shias within Pakistan. The two most
    powerful groups in Pakistan today are the army and
    Islamic groups, Pakistan is getting to the stage when the
    Islamic groups have infiltrated into the ranks of the
    army and appear set to take control of Pakistan. The
    Islamic groups themselves are divided, and their unity
    may only last as long as it takes for them to gain
    control of Pakistan.
    None of these powerful groups seems to be interested in
    development or progress. No group seems set to allow
    modern education, peace with India, women's rights or
    birth control in Pakistan, all essential for progress.
    The political parties and democratic forces did not do
    this. The army did not do it and the Islamic groups do
    not show any intent of fostering a progressive Pakistan.
    Predictably, they too are careening down the path of more
    and purer Islam as the answer to Pakistan's problems. And
    worse for Pakistan, Islamist groups, with trans-national
    loyalties, cannot be guaranteed to be interested in the
    territorial integrity and borders of Pakistan as they
    exist. And so the disease eating Pakistan from the inside
    continues.
    Jessica Stern wrote (119):
    Pakistan is a weak state, and government policies are
    making it weaker still. Its disastrous economy,
    171
    exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders, is at the
    root of many of its problems. Yet despite its poverty,
    Pakistan is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on
    weapons instead of schools and public health. Ironically,
    the government's "cost-saving" measures are even more
    troubling. In trying to save money in the short run by
    using irregulars in Kashmir and relying on madrasahs to
    educate its youth, Pakistan is pursuing a path that is
    likely to be disastrous in the long run, allowing a
    culture of violence to take root.
    Pakistan is in an unstable state and there appears to be
    no leader who can show Pakistan a way out. Too many
    Pakistanis have been taught that they exist only for
    Islam and for jihad and these people are now caught
    between the twin pincers of the global war on terror
    being conducted by many nations on the one hand, and by
    the rich and corrupt Pakistani rulers on the other. The
    long term outlook for Pakistan does not appear
    encouraging.
    In a paper on Pakistan, Stephen Cohen wrote (158):
    When security, human services, justice, and basic
    necessities are not provided, states fail.
    Pakistan can be compared to a broken biscuit whose pieces
    are held together by some wrapping paper. The area
    labelled as Pakistan on maps is called Pakistan, but that
    area is not wholly under the control of any single
    government or leadership, as one would expect of a
    normally functioning nation-state. The first fragment of
    the biscuit that broke off was Bangladesh, in 1971. There
    is no guarantee that the other fragments of this
    dysfunctional state will hold together.
    Pakistan is already a nation that is only partially under
    control of its government which is basically the army.
    172
    Only 5% of Baluchistan, Pakistan's largest province, is
    under Pakistani control. Tribal law rules the sparsely
    populated land. The Pakistani government has little or no
    control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas the
    so called FATA. Areas of Pakistan's first city, Karachi,
    are outside government control.
    Gaining control of Pakistan is easier said than done. As
    indicated in Chapter 12, Pakistan is awash with illegal
    weapons. The FATA areas are home to hundreds of small
    arms factories and shops that sell them (151). With 18
    million illegal firearms, Pakistanis outside the military
    and government have enough weapons to equip several
    armies, and anyone trying to bring heavily armed private
    militias under control will have to contend with a lot of
    firepower.
    But as the history of nations shows, if the Pakistan
    government is unable to control its own territory,
    someone else is likely to step in to fill the vacuum
    sooner or later. Therein lies the real significance of
    having large areas in a country that are out of
    governmental control. The fact that a government can only
    govern areas that it controls means that areas beyond
    government rule are ripe for control by some other force
    or alternate government. These schisms are begging to be
    exploited. The United States already has a powerful
    military presence in Pakistan, and perhaps that is an
    eerie harbinger of yet another civilization set to rule
    this lawless land.
    Pakistan is perhaps fortunate that the nation state of
    India is not yet as adept and conscious of international
    hegemonic games and how India can interfere to bring law
    and order to the fraying edges of Pakistan. But that may
    be changing as the lawlessness of Pakistan continues to
    spill into an increasingly powerful India as terrorism,
    173
    forcing India to become conscious of its role and
    responsibility in the region.
    174
    APPENDIX 1
    http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/Maharaja_letter.html
    Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh
    to Lord Mountbatten
    on the eve of Pak invasion on J&K in 1947
    My dear Lord Mountbatten,
    I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in
    my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As
    Your Excellency is aware,the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not
    acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically
    my State is contiguous wit h both of them. Besides, my State has a
    common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with
    China. In their external relations the Dominion of India and Pakistan
    cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which
    Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interests
    of both the Dominions and of my State to stand independent, of course
    with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly
    approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into
    standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted
    this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion
    with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in
    view of the developments indicated below. ln fact the Pakistan
    Goernment under the standstill agreement is operating the post and
    telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill
    agreement with the Pakistan Government, lhe Govemment permitted a
    steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and
    petrol to my State.
    Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes wnh modern
    weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in
    the Poonch area, then from Sia1kot and finally in a mass in the area
    adjoining-Hazara district on the Ramkote side. The result has been
    that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to
    175
    be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points
    simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton
    destruction of life ad property and the looting of the Mahura power
    house, which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and
    which has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnpped and
    raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the
    State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer
    capital of my government, as a first step to overrunning the whole
    State.The mass infiltration of tribesman drawn from distant areas of
    the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motortrucks,
    using the Manwehra-Mazaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date
    weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the
    Provincial Govemment of the North-West Frontier Province and the
    Government of Pakistan. Inspite of repeated appeals made by my
    Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop
    them from coming into my State. In fact, both radio and the Press of
    Pakistan have reported these occurences. The Pakistan radio even put
    out the story that a provisional government has been set up in
    Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims,
    generally have taken no part at all.
    With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great
    emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask
    for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the
    help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of
    India. I have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the
    instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government. The other
    alternative is to leave my state and people to free booters. On this
    basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained.
    This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the
    ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country. I may also
    inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once
    to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry
    the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
    If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at
    Srinagar. Mr. V.P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the
    situation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is
    needed.
    176
    In haste and with kindest regards,
    Yours sincerely,
    Hari Singh
    October 26, 1947
    177
    APPENDIX 2
    http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun80.htm
    Resolution 80 (1950)
    Concerning the India-Pakistan question, submitted by the
    Representatives of Cuba, Norway, United Kingdom and United States and
    adopted by the Security Council on March 14, 1950.
    (Document No. S/1469), dated the 14th March, 1950).
    THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
    Having received and noted the reports of the United Nations
    Commission for India and Pakistan establishing its resolutions 39
    (1948) of 20 January and 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948.
    Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L.
    McNaughton on the outcome of his discussions with the representatives
    of India and Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the
    decision taken by the Security Council on December 17, 1949,
    Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesman
    like action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations
    Commission's resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 for a
    cease-fire, for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and
    Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in
    accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method
    of a free and impartial plebiscite, and commending the parties in
    particular for
    their action in partially implementing these Resolutions by
    (1) The cessation of hostilities effected January 1, 1949,
    (2) The establishment of a cease-fire line on July 27, 1949, and
    (3) The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be
    Plebiscite Administrator,
    Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties
    should be based upon the substantial measure of agreement of
    fundamental principles already reached, and that steps should be
    taken forthwith for the demilitarisation of the State and for the
    expeditious determination of its future in accordance with the freely
    expressed will of the inhabitants,
    178
    1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make
    immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims
    and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare
    and execute within a period of five months from the date of this
    resolution a programme of demilitarisation on the basis of the
    principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton proposal or of such
    modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;
    2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the
    following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions
    in such place or places as he may deem appropriate;
    (a) to assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation
    of the programme of demilitarisation referred to above and' to
    interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarisation;
    (b) to place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India
    and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security
    Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to
    contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute
    which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State
    of Jammu and Kashmir; to exercise all of the powers and
    responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission for
    India and Pakistan by reason of existing resolutions of the Security
    Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the
    Resolutions of the United Nations Commission of August 13, 1948 and
    January 5, 1949; to arrange at the appropriate stage of
    demilitarisation for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator
    of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between
    the parties; to report to the Security Council as he may consider
    necessary, submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which
    he may desire to make;
    3. Requests the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to
    ensure that (heir agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue
    to be faithfully observed, and "calls upon them to take all
    possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of 'in
    atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations;
    4. Extends its best thanks to the members of the United Nations
    Commission for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton
    for their arduous and fruitful labours;
    5. Agrees that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
    179
    shall be (terminated, and decides that this shall take place one
    month after both parties have informed the United Nations
    Representative of their acceptance of the transfer to him the powers
    and responsibilities of the United Nations Commission referred to in
    paragraph 2 (c) above.
    The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 14-3-50 with the
    following result:
    In favour: China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Norway, U.K. and
    U.S.A.
    Against: None
    Abstaining: India and Yugoslavia
    Absent : USSR
    180
    APPENDIX 3
    http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/Tashkent_Declaration_January_
    10_1966.html
    Tashkent Declaration
    January 10, 1966
    The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan was formally
    brought to an end by signing this declaration at Tashkent, the
    capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union. Prime
    Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed it on
    behalf of their respective countries in the presence of the Soviet
    Premier Alexi Kosygin who mediated between them.
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met
    at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India
    and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and
    peaceful relations between their countries and to promote
    understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They
    consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for
    the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.
    I
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that
    both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations
    between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations
    Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have
    recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful
    means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region
    and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent and, indeed, the
    interests of the people so India and Pakistan were not served by the
    continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this
    background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the
    sides set forth its respective position.
    II
    181
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not
    later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5
    August, 1965, and both sides all observe the cease-fire terms on the
    cease-fire line.
    III
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the
    principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
    IV
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the
    other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the
    development of friendly relations between the two countries.
    V
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High
    Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that
    the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will
    be restored. Both Government shall observe the Vienna Convention of
    1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.
    VI
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade
    relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between
    India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing
    agreements between India and Pakistan.
    182
    VII
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to
    carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
    VIII
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating
    to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigrations. They
    also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent
    the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of
    the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with
    the conflict.
    IX
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at
    other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both
    sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani
    bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what
    further steps should be taken.
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded
    their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of
    the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the
    Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their
    constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present
    meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They
    also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan
    their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and
    generous hospitality.
    They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to
    183
    witness this declaration.
    APPENDIX 4
    http://web.mid-day.com/news/nation/2003/november/67781.htm
    Terrorists earn a peon's wage By: M K Tayal November 2, 2003
    What motivates a young man to take up terrorism, enrol himself at a
    training camp in Pakistan, infiltrate India, fire at the Army and
    possibly never return home?
    It is a small pay package that equals the wage of a peon or driver.
    The lure of a mere Rs 3,000 per month ensures that the Inter-Services
    Intelligence (ISI) meets its manpower requirements.
    However, not every terrorist gets Rs 3,000. Payments relate directly
    to performance, area of operation, number of casualties the terrorist
    has inflicted upon Indian security forces, motivation level and other
    HR criterion.
    In short, the ISI maintains dossiers and gives annual marks to its
    cadres very much like the Pakistan Army does for its regular
    employees.
    The pay scale is not rigid as it varies depending on the risks one is
    willing to take and his commitment to the cause. Some of the more
    'enthusiastic' Kashmiri youth get around Rs 5,000. With the number of
    years one puts in, the annual increment increases.
    A Kashmiri company or battalion gets from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000. A
    district commander gets around Rs 20,000.
    Nevertheless, one thing is clear that Kashmiri youth get a raw deal
    compared to the Pakistani or foreign counterpart. The Kashmiri
    mujahideen is paid less by the ISI than a Pakistani terrorist.
    The rank and file from Pakistan or Afghanistan or any other country
    gets a starting salary of Rs 5,000 that can go up to Rs 7,000.
    Commanders get much more. A commander starts at anything above Rs
    25,000. The higher they go, the heftier the pay package and the more
    discreet it becomes.
    Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) Doda district commander Mohd Shahzad, a
    184
    Pakistani national, captured by the Army after a fierce encounter in
    September 2003, said he came to Jammu & Kashmir to be a jehadi and
    was paid nearly Rs 20,000 per month but that limit was waived off as
    a special case.
    "Money didn't matter. I could get as much as I wanted," Shahzad had
    said. However, he remained silent when asked what was the amount his
    parents were getting in Pakistan.
    But it is sure that the money Shahzad got was for operations in his
    area and his logistical support. His monthly emoluments were being
    directly sent to his home in Pakistan.
    The main attraction in joining the ISI is the initial offer. A
    Kashmiri gets Rs two lakh as one-time payment to join. There is a
    catch. One must go over to Pakistan to get the complete four to five
    month training and then work his way back into India from the 120
    launch pads.
    The basic training at the 85 training camps is the same and involves
    handling small arms (AK-47) and explosives, small unit tactics of
    raid and ambush and radio communication. The second term involves
    training of special
    operations-explosives.
    The fidayeens (soldiers on a suicide mission) get highly
    sophisticated training but their emoluments remain a mystery, since
    naturally none survive to tell their tale.
    "Poor economic conditions in the Valley force some to cross over to
    Pakistan for their training. The amount is too tempting for anyone to
    say 'no'," explains an official.
    There are other factors too at work. Competition and style for
    instance drive most youth into the realm of the AK-47. "It has become
    a style. If you don't have a gun you don't get good girlfriends and
    nobody respects you," a militant said to an army officer serving in
    the Valley.
    Sources also point to the presence of foreign militants who come to
    the Valley after sessions of intense motivation and psychological
    drills. LeT's Shahzad said he came to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) to fight
    jehadis as he was told harrowing stories of atrocities being
    committed on the Muslims in the Valley.
    185
    I felt I had to take revenge but now after fighting the army for more
    than three years I realise the futility of this 'freedom' movement,"
    he said in a heart-to-heart talk.
    However, the ISI makes sure that those who help recruit while on the
    job are not neglected. It rewards handsomely. "If a militant
    motivates and enrols another youth, he can make upto Rs 1.5 lakh,"
    explained a source.
    However, initially the ISI made sure the money was delivered to the
    militant's parents but as the numbers started dwindling, so did it
    the commitment.
    Though no one complains publicly, there have been reports of parents
    of the deceased militant not getting a single penny. Realising this,
    Kashmiri youths are now averse to taking up the gun while recruitment
    from Pakistan remains high.
    186
    SOURCES AND REFERENCE MATERIAL
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    Sunday 7th March 2004
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    2. The eight conflicts that the Indian armed forces have
    been involved in since 1947 are the four conflicts with
    Pakistan described in Chapter 11, the long running lowgrade
    war of cross border terrorism from Pakistan
    described in Chapter 12; Operation Vijay against the
    Portuguese occupation of Goa in 1961, the India-China war
    of 1962, and Operation Pawan, the Indian peacekeeping
    operations in Northern Sri Lanka in the late 1980s.
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    Ali and Muddassir Rizvi KARACHI/ISLAMABAD: The Daily
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    2003, online edition, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-
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    187
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    sets per 1000 population
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    Report According to London's Financial Times, the
    combined circulation of Pakistan's entire Englishlanguage
    press is no more than 150,000 in a population of
    134 million.
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    10. Reforming Pakistan's madrassas, Musharraf determined
    to change Muslim schools' 'indoctrination', By Tom Brokaw
    Anchor, NBC News
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    12.
    http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/pocket_b
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    13. Deplorable schools angering Pakistanis
    Issue at the top of voters' agenda Juliette Terzieff,
    Chronicle Foreign Service, Thursday, October 10, 2002,
    The San Francisco Chronicle, online edition,
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    The Asia Times online edition, 29 Aug 02
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    Professor of Linguistics and South Asian Studies, Quaidi-
    Azam University, Islamabad, The News - Jang :
    Opinion, Saturday September 08, 2001 - "At the time of
    the partition there were 137 madrassas.In 1950 there were
    210 of them while in 1971 they increased to 563. Nowadays
    there are at least 7000 of hem. Out of the registered
    ones - and most are still unregistered - the Barelvis
    have 1400; the Deobandis 550 and the Ahl-e-Hadith 347.
    These are the Sunni madrassas"
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    17. The Pakistani Time Bomb, Alexei Alexiev, Center for
    Security Policy
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    18. Pamela Constable, The Washington Post, September 19th
    2001, online edition,
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    dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A59220-
    2001Sep19&notFound=true
    19. Madrassas: A make-believe world. By Aijazz Ahmed
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EA14Df01.html
    20. "The Subtle Subversion - The State of Curricula and
    Textbooks in Pakistan", A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim,
    http://www.sdpi.org/archive/nayyar_report.htm
    21. Conflict and Violence in the Educational Process,
    Khurshid Hasanain and A. H. Nayyar,
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    22. Others, as we know them, Kamila Hyat, The Daily Jang,
    Pakistan, August 10th 2003, online edition
    http://jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2003-weekly/nos-10-08-
    2003/enc.htm#1
    23.THE MENACE OF EDUCATION What Are They Teaching In
    Pakistani Schools Today? by Pervez Hoodbhoy,
    http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2000-
    09/14hoodbhoy.htm
    24. Zobaida says anti-India material from curricula to be
    deleted, Monday March 08, 2004 (1520 PST)
    http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=57435
    25. A not-so-subtle subversion, Shireen M Mazari,
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2004-daily/10-03-
    2004/oped/o3.htm
    26.Pakistan's Economic Dilemma, Sreedhar, Sr. Fellow,
    IDSA, June 18, 1998,
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    27. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non
    Proliferation Project: Countries Possessing Ballistic
    Missiles
    http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/BallisticMissileCh
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    Initiative, April 2004
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    ndex_3066.html
    29.http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,2741933a12,00.html
    30. K. Subrahmanyam, The Pretence is Over - Pak Link with
    Nuclear Black Market, Editorial, The Times of India, Feb
    1st 2004
    31. China Nuclear Milestones, The Risk Report
    Volume 6 Number 6 (November-December 2000),
    http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/china/nukemiles.
    htm : U.S. intelligence discovers China gave
    Pakistan a tested nuclear bomb design.
    32. Strategic Affairs Analysis, No 003/Issue Aug 16
    http://www.stratmag.com/issueAug-15/page06.htm
    "According to a report leaked out of the Los Alamos
    Nuclear Laboratory, in the autumn of 1998, the air
    samples acquired over Chagai by US intelligence agencies,
    contained traces of plutonium. Pakistan, around the
    period of the tests, had not had time to develop a
    warhead from the minimal quantities of plutonium
    191
    generated by the research reactor at PINSTECH. Therefore,
    there is evidence that the devices tested were either
    plutonium supplied by non-Pakistani sources, or the
    device itself was not a Pakistani warhead but that of
    another nuclear weapons state which needed to validate a
    modernized warhead, given the moratorium on nuclear
    testing"
    33. HOW POOR ARE THE POOR, By KHURRAM FAHEEM, Feb 03 -
    09, 2003,
    http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/page/c-issue/etc4.htm)
    34.Jobs or jihad, thats the question, Shalini Chawla, Fri
    19 July 2002,
    http://www.indianexpress.
    com/full_story.php?content_id=6224.
    35. Truth about Zia's 'status quo' era, By Special
    Correspondent,
    http://www.dawn.com/2002/09/02/ebr7.htm
    36. Kidnapped Nation, Richard Behar, FORTUNE, Monday,
    April 29, 2002,
    http://meadev.nic.in/ind-ter/for-med/fortune-
    29apr2002.htm
    37. When will Pakistan get an apology?, Shaheen Sehbai, 6
    Aug 2002
    http://www.satribune.com/archives/aug03_09_02/opinion_edi
    torsdesk.htm
    38. The confusion in our minds, By Zubeida Mustafa,
    http://www.dawn.com/2002/08/05/op.htm
    39. John Lancaster, Washington Post Foreign Service
    Tuesday, April 8, 2003; Page A29
    192
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52556-
    2003Apr7.html
    40. Musharraf and the Jihad industry, Pervez hoodbhoy
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-8-
    2002_pg3_5
    41. Cross-Cultural Face-Negotiation: An Analytical
    Overview" by Professor Stella Ting-Toomey,
    http://www.cic.sfu.ca/forum/ting-too.html
    42. "The Arab Mind", Raphael Patai
    43. Testimony of Professor Stephen P. Cohen, Senate
    Committee on Foreign Relations, January 28th 2004, India
    and Pakistan: Steps towards Rapproachement.
    44. India-Pakistan in War & Peace, by J N Dixit, review
    in the Asia Times
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DI14Df04.html
    45. Islam and Secularization,
    http://www.secularislam.org/separation/secularization.htm
    46. http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhse1421.html
    47. No intention to enter into nuclear race: Musharraf,
    http://www.nci.org/02/03f/14-06.htm
    48."The Encyclopedia of Land Warfare in the 20th
    Century", Part 5, Asian Wars of Imperial Succession,
    Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, Pages 164-173, Leisure Books,
    Salamander Books Ltd 1977, 27 Old Gloucester St, London
    WC1N 3AF, UK
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    group.com/thenews/jul2002-daily/11-07-2002/oped/o4.htm
    50. Prospects for social cohesion,
    http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guidestudy/
    pakistan/pakistan45.html
    51: Fall of Dhaka-the true face, Brig (r) A Q Anjum
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/16-12-
    2003/oped/o5.htm
    52. Fall of Dhaka: the true face-2, Brig (r) A Q Anjum
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/17-12-
    2003/oped/o6.htm
    53. Pakistan:Transition to Democracy?" 3rd Oct 2002,
    report from the International Crisis Group,
    http://www.ecoi.net/pub/nz194_00900pak.pdf
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    http://www.historychannel.com/speeches/archive/speech_19.
    html On December 17, 1971, 90,000 West Pakistani troops
    surrendered to Indian forces in Bangladesh and the war
    came to an end.
    55. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2001.
    India-Pakistan Wars
    http://www.bartleby.com/65/in/IndiaPak.html
    Pakistan lost its eastern half, an army of 100,000
    soldiers,
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    http://www.laclave.net/docs/documentos/pakistan.doc
    57. DEFENCE NOTES, The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971,
    Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN,
    http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/pak-army.htm
    194
    58. Martial Mind - Pakistan Officer Corps thought-process
    about Defence, Columnist Hamid Hussain explores the
    Pakistan military mind-set.
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    59. How poor are the poor, Khurram Faheem
    http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/page/c-issue/etc4.htm
    60."TO BE A WOMAN IN PAKISTAN IS TO ASK FOR A LIFE OF
    SUBSERVIENCE" By Ameera Javeria,
    http://www.mjfellows.org/journal/winter01/javeria.html
    61. International Perspective on Family Violence in
    Pakistani Society, Zafar Abbas, Social Work Group, Pains
    Welfare Trust International, Karachi, Pakistan
    http://wcfv.confex.com/wcfv/2003/preliminaryprogram/abstr
    act_2380.htm
    62.
    http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/3251/spri
    ng99/pakistan.html
    63 Islamic Pakistan illusions and reality, Abdus
    Sattar Ghazali,
    http://ghazali.net/book1/body_chapter_1.htm
    64. Ethnic Cleansing in Pakistan during Partition: A
    Preliminary Statistical Analysis, Sridhar N.,
    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-
    2/sridhar.html
    65. Pak army siphoning off US aid in Swiss accounts,
    Times of India, online edition, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2002
    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/ar
    195
    ticleshow?artid=27859526
    66. Some obstacles in normalization, M. H. Askari
    http://www.dawn.com/2003/12/12/op.htm#2
    67. Jihad and the United States, By M. Asghar Khan,
    http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/15/fea.htm#1
    68. Massacres of shias in Iraq & Pakistan - the
    background, by B.Raman, Paper no. 941, 03. 03. 2004
    http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper941.html
    69. Pakistan's Taliban Problem, By Reuel Gerecht, Monday,
    October 29, 2001, The Weekly Standard,
    http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.13288/news_detail.asp
    70.http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jan2003-daily/22-01-
    2003/oped/o5.htm
    71.The Friday Times online, 28th March 2003 28 March 2003
    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/
    72.http://www.tolueislam.com/Bazm/misc/pkk_04.htm
    73.http://www.witnesspioneer.
    org/vil/Articles/politics/mawdudi2.html
    74 The Root of India-Pakistan Conflicts, Rajiv
    Malhotra, Monday, February 11, 2002,
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    75. Among the Believers, V.S. Naipaul, Picador, 1981,
    page 87, page 102, page 112, page 116, page 159
    76. Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan, Sharif al Mujahid
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    196
    77. P.H. Reddy, Demographer, The Times of India, 8th
    April 2003.
    78. Explore Pakistani culture,
    http://ny.essortment.com/pakistanicultur_rrme.htm
    "Pakistani culture can be called as "Mixed Culture".
    Although the majority of people in Pakistan are Muslims
    by birth and faith, there is a strong influence of Hindu
    culture on the present Pakistani culture. The shadows of
    this influence are quite visible on the marriage
    ceremonies and festivals like "Basant"
    79. Islamic Revolution: the only possible future for
    Pakistan, Dr Kalim Siddiqui, Crescent International,
    Sunday August 5, 2001
    80. Military in the Power structure of Pakistan, Mohammad
    Waseem:
    81. Social forces and ideology in the making of
    Pakistan, By Hamza Alavi, Prof Karrar Hussain Memorial
    Lecture Nov 2, 2002, The Friday Times, Dec 6-12, 2002
    82. Understanding Political Islam, M.A.Hussain, Wed Jun
    25 '03
    http://jakarta.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=1642&g
    roup=webcast
    83. The reality of an Islamic state, Asad Latif JAN 21,
    2002
    http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/usattack/story/0,1870,98
    039,00.html
    84 Political Authority in Classical Islamic
    Thought, Tamara Sonn
    197
    http://www.islamonline.net/iol-english/qadaya/islamic-
    3/islamic3.asp
    85. An Advanced History of India, Vol 1, (Lahore, 1980),
    p 391), Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Datta,
    86."Pakistan Papers", Mani Shankar Aiyer, UBSPD, 1994,
    page 10.
    87. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL 'DEVELOPMENT'
    OF PAKISTAN AND ITS RATIONALE, Brig. S.K Raychaudhuri VSM
    (Retd), ARTRAC [Army Training Command] magazine, PINNACLE
    Vol 2 No 2 October 2003.
    88. Know thy enemy!, Masud Akhtar Shaikh,
    http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/19-12-
    2003/oped/o4.htm
    89.Change the Rupee into Riyal or Dinar, Ahmed Quraishi
    http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Dec-2003/19/EDITOR/op5.asp
    90. Soldiers in business, "Power, Perks, Prestige and
    Privileges: Military's economic activities in Pakistan -
    Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
    91. Pakistanis Question Perks of Power, By John Lancaster
    Washington Post Foreign Service, Friday, November 22,
    2002; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/
    articles/A23614-2002Nov21.html
    92. Robert Fisk: Farewell to democracy in Pakistan, 26
    October 2001
    http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=101459
    93. Whose land is it anyway? Irfan Husain,
    198
    http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/mazdak.htm
    94. Rightsizing of the Armed Forces
    http://www.pakistanweekly.com/Opinion.htm
    95. The Weekly Independent, Issue #48, May 23-29, 2002
    96. Military Inc. Dominates Life in Pakistan, PAUL
    WATSON, TIMES STAFF WRITER
    http://www.satribune.com/archives/oct7_13_02/LATIMES_stor
    y.htm
    97. Oped by Dr. Farrukh Saleem
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2003-daily/25-05-
    2003/oped/o5.htm
    98 Official Web Page of the National Logistic Cell
    of Pakistan, http://www.nlc.com.pk/
    99. A first hand list of Army land lords, Special SAT
    Report
    http://www.satribune.com/archives/Aug17_23_02/P1_landgrab
    bing.htm
    100. Pakistan struggles with poverty reduction, Nadeem
    Iqbal
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DL12Df01.html In
    its "World Development Indicators-2002", the World Bank
    says that 31 percent of Pakistan's population lives off
    $1 a day, while the percentage of people living below $2
    a day is a staggering 84.7 percent.
    101. Era of mullah coddling is over, Najam Sethi, The
    Friday Times, Pakistan
    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/front.shtml
    199
    102. The Pakistan army and Islamic radicals, By Amos
    Perlmutter, The Washington Times, November 17, 1999,
    reproduced on the website of the Indian Embassy
    http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/news_us/pak
    _army_radicals%20_nov_17_99.htm
    103. Pakistan-India: Same game, new rules, Syed Saleem
    Shahzad
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK27Df03.html
    104. B.Raman, quoted in the online portal Rediff:
    http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/01arvind.htm
    105. Interview with Nawaz Sharif, Weekly Independent, Vol
    1, No 7, March 7-13, 2002
    106. Pakistan's privileged army Quest for hegemony at
    home, abroad, G. Parthasarathy
    http://www.hinduonnet.com/bline/stories/2003081400020800.
    htm
    107. The rogue army of Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy,
    Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications
    Thursday, Jan 02, 2003
    http://www.blonnet.com/stories/2003010200060800.htm
    108. What if Pervez Musharraf is killed, Pramit Pal
    Chaudhuri
    http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_510850,0008.htm
    109.Indian Army History, http://www.bharatrakshak.
    com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Link3.html
    110. Indian Navy History, http://www.bharatrakshak.
    com/NAVY/Link3.html
    200
    111. Indian Air Force History, http://www.bharatrakshak.
    com/IAF/History/Link-Hist.html
    112. KASHMIR AND PARTITION OF INDIA (Part II)
    by Prof. Ram Krishen K. Bhatt, http://www.kashmirinformation.
    com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt2.html
    113. Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten
    on the eve of Pak invasion on J&K in 1947.
    http://www.kashmirinformation.
    com/LegalDocs/Maharaja_letter.html
    114. Virtual Bangladesh : History : Eyewitness accounts,
    Rafiqul Islam, Professsor Rafiqul Islam
    http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/rafiqul_islam.html
    115. Case Study: Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971
    http://www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html
    116. Calling the Indian Army Chief's Bluff, Lt Gen (Retd)
    JAVED NASIR http://www.defencejournal.com/febmar99/
    chief-bluff.htm
    117. Lessons from Kargil, Gen VP Malik PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-
    6/malik.html
    118. Terrorists plan to pose as disabled travelers
    Pakistani nationals behind U.S. plot, warns new Homeland
    Security memo, Paul Sperry
    http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=3633
    4
    119. Pakistan's Jihad Culture, Jessica Stern, Foreign
    Affairs, November/December 2000
    http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20001101faessay940/jessica201
    stern/pakistan-s-jihad-culture.html
    120. Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great
    Game, M. Ehsan Ansari, published by the Strategic Studies
    Institute, page 5
    121. THE ROVING EYE Jihad: 'The ultimate thermonuclear
    bomb', Pepe Escobar http://www.atimes.com/indpak/
    CJ10Df01.html
    122.Pakistan-India: Same game, new rules, Syed Saleem
    Shahzad, Asia Times Online, Nov 27th 2003
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK27Df03.html
    123. The Taliban's Pakistan connection, Excerpts from a
    Sept. 15 article by Tariq Ali, in The Independent (UK)
    http://www.tao.ca/~mayworks/911/1/pakistan.shtml
    124. Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency, Peter
    Chalk
    http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/090101JIR.html
    125. The spirit of Gandhar, Shahid Nadeem
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-8-
    2002_pg3_7
    126. Musharraf and the Jihad industry, Pervez hoodbhoy
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-8-
    2002_pg3_5
    127. Jihad: 'The ultimate thermonuclear bomb', Pepe
    Escobar.
    http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CJ10Df01.html
    128. Indo-Pakistan Talks Myths, Delusions and Fantasies!!
    Guest Column: Arindam Banerji, South Asia Analysis Group,
    202
    Paper no. 710, 09. 06. 2003
    http://www.saag.org/papers8/paper710.html
    129. The Truth About Kashmir, a website maintained by the
    Indian Army's 15th Corps. http://www.armyinkashmir.org/
    130.PROFILE OF A MILITANT: Based on the statistics
    available the average life span of a militant / mercenary
    does not exceed 20 months from the time he returns to J&K
    to participate in the so called Jihad. A period in which
    he is a fugitive, moving from one hide to another, trying
    to avoid contact with the security forces
    http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/profile.html
    131. Harvest of Terror, By Ghazala Wahab,
    http://www.forceindia.net/harvest.asp
    132. Beyond Control, Indrani Bagchi with Anil
    Padmanabhan. India Today, December 8th 2003
    133. Pakistani Role in Terrorism Against the U.S.A,
    Narayanan Komerath, BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 5(2)
    September-October 2002
    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-
    2/narayanan.html
    134.The Politics of Islam in Pakistan, K.P.S. Gill, The
    Pioneer, March 2, 2001
    135. Musharraf eludes assassination bid - Dec 14th 2003,
    http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/12/14/bl
    ast.musharraf/
    136. Musharraf escapes second assassination attempt,
    http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/dec26/i1.asp
    203
    137. Musharraf admission on secrets, BBC News online,
    Friday, 23 January, 2004, 18:30 GMT
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3424007.stm
    138. Assassination 'windfall' for Musharraf, Syed Saleem
    Shahzad
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EL19Df05.html
    139. Pakistan has 18 million illegal firearms-report,
    quoting Reuters Alertnet
    http://www.pakistanfacts.
    com/article.php/20030115094510198
    About 18 million firearms are held illegally in Pakistan
    in addition to the two million weapons that are legally
    registered.. The main concentrations of illegal arms in
    Pakistan are in semi-autonomous tribal regions bordering
    Afghanistan. Many of the weapons have been imported from
    Afghanistan, awash with arms after more than 23 years of
    war. Guns are also produced locally, notably in the
    tribal town of Darra Adamkhel, which is famous for
    imitation weapons from all over the world. The Dawn
    report said Darra Adamkhel still had around 900 arms
    factories, all of them illegal and about 150 shops
    selling arms and ammunition
    140. Hon. Frank Pallone, JR. in the House of
    Representatives, Monday, October 3, 1994
    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_cr/h941003-terrorpak.
    htm
    204
    141. Heroin, Taliban & Pakistan, by B.Raman,
    http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper288.html
    142. NARCO TERRORISM IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND PAKISTAN'S
    ROLE, http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/narco.html
    143. Pakistan Caught in Web of Evidence, By Douglas
    Frantz, Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi,
    http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgpaknukes3feb03,1,1265066.
    story?coll=la-home-headlines
    144. Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan
    Figure By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER,
    Published: February 4, 2004,
    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/04/politics/04NUKE.html
    145. Confronting the Nuclear Threat America Didn't Want
    to Be True, By DAVID E. SANGER, Published: February 8,
    2004
    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/weekinreview/08sang.htm
    l?hp
    146. IC 814 Hijack,
    http://users.senet.com.au/~wingman/hijack.html
    147. Plane hijackers received new weapons in Afghanistan:
    French hostages, Agence France-Presse, Sunday, January 2,
    2000, http://pak-terror.freeservers.com/webarticle50.htm
    148. Aziz hand seen in Kandahar hijacking, Public Affairs
    Magazine, newsnight.net,
    http://www.indiareacts.com/archivefeatures/nat2.asp?recno
    =23&ctg=community
    149. Pakistan's role in hijacking, By Samuel Baid
    http://meadev.nic.in/OPn/2000jan/11ht.htm
    205
    150. 20 Most Wanted Terrorists that India has demanded
    Pakistan to extradite back to India, Kashmir Herald on
    the Web, Volume 3, No. 6 - November 2003
    http://www.kashmirherald.com/nov03/top20.html
    151.Dawood in Karachi, admits Pakistan, September 21,
    2003 15:13 IST,
    http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/21dawood.htm
    152. Pak embassy official in Nepal held selling fake
    Indian currency, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA,
    http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000104/ifr04015.h
    tml
    153. Rahul Bedi, April 4, 2002 from the Asia Times:
    http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/2002/0404ramp
    ant.htm
    154. International currency racket busted, Extracted from
    'The Pioneer', New Delhi, Dated 24th September 2002
    http://www.alphalasertek.com/programs/news4.asp
    155. How did the word "Pakistan" come into existence?
    http://www28.brinkster.com/pakistan4ever/wordpakistan.htm
    l
    156. "A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English"
    Author: John T. Platts, ISBN: 81-215-0098-2, Publisher:
    (Indian Edition) Mushiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
    Page: 218.
    157. Stepehen Cohen, Financial Times (London,England)
    January 16, 2004, Friday Europe Edition 1#
    158. The Nation and State of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen
    http://www.twq.com/02summer/cohen.pdf
    206
    159. Pakistan Human Rights ignored in the ‘War on
    Terror’, Executive summary,
    http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa330352006
    160. Pakistan Surrenders The Taliban control the border
    with Afghanistan, by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill
    Roggio ,10/02/2006, Volume 012, Issue
    03http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/0
    00/000/012/738ijawx.asp
     
  4. smartindian

    smartindian Regular Member

    Joined:
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    52
    Location:
    Mysore, Karnataka, India
    100
    (57). Thus the Pakistani army was dominated by Punjabis,
    who began to see themselves as being of a superior
    martial race.
    Apart from the predominance of Muslim Punjabis in the
    Pakistani army, several other unique observations can be
    made about the Pakistani province of Punjab (West Punjab)
    at the time of independence and partition(80).
    • Punjab was the most populous province of
    Pakistan.
    • Pakistani Punjab was militarized because of the
    large number of Punjabis in the military,
    • As part of the settlement of retired army
    personnel, vast tracts of land in West Punjab had been
    awarded to them.
    • 70% of the voters in Pakistani Punjab had some
    connection with the military
    • Punjab itself was partitioned so a lot of army
    personnel had relatives or friends in Punjab who were
    affected by the events of partition.
    • Pakistani army units from Punjab were tasked
    with the protection of civilians in the post-partition
    violence, so the personnel in these army units served
    both as protectors of the civilians as well as sufferers
    as their villages or families were affected during
    partition.
    • Punjabi units were also utilised in Pakistan's
    unsuccessful attack to wrest Kashmir from India in 1947.
    For these reasons, the military in Pakistan was not
    merely the military, but had political clout as well as
    political opinions, especially a deep hatred for India.
    The military also actually owned a lot of land because of
    the policy of settling retired soldiers by gifting land.
    The Punjabi dominated army also considered itself a
    101
    martial race with superior fighting and leadership
    qualities compared to the East Bengalis (East Pakistanis)
    who were considered effeminate, and the Hindu Indians.
    The army, having been tasked to protect Pakistanis during
    partition began to consider itself as the protector and
    savior of Islam. All these tendencies were present or had
    set in shortly after independence in 1947.
    But there was an additional factor that led to the
    induction of the Pakistani army into the role of absolute
    rulers of Pakistan.
    The areas that constituted West Pakistan were largely
    rural, and apart from the Punjabi dominated Army, there
    were not many educated local people to make up the
    bureaucrats, legal experts, engineers and technocrats
    that were required in the government of the new Pakistan.
    These posts were filled by the educated elite migrants
    from British India, largely mohajirs and Punjabis. These
    people suddenly had a nation to lead, a new nation,
    Pakistan - one of the biggest countries on earth. It was
    a victory for them, and for Islam. They were not about to
    fritter away that victory by allowing power to pass into
    the hands of the more numerous uneducated locals in
    democratic elections, in the same way as they would later
    refuse to hand over power, and the rule of Pakistan to a
    Bengali party from faraway East Pakistan. After all, the
    reason these migrants had left India was precisely
    because they feared democracy attenuating their
    privileges.
    Democracy was inconvenient for the ruling elite of
    Pakistan. It was also inconvenient for the feudal lords
    in Pakistan, who stood to lose their lands and influence.
    And democracy also brought with it the danger that the
    more numerous Bengalis, considered an inferior race,
    might actually end up ruling all of Pakistan. Besides
    102
    these facts, the migrant elite faced some resistance from
    the locals in West Pakistan, who had to give up space and
    resources to the migrants from India.
    The ruling elite of Pakistan therefore had a deep vested
    interest in not handing power to the people of Pakistan.
    And what better way to do that than to declare a threat
    to Pakistan, and to Islam itself, from their huge
    neighbor India. Elections were constantly postponed and
    the civilian authority used the Army to stay in power
    until the first bloodless military coup of 1958. And
    although that was the first year that the Pakistani army
    officially came into power, the army nevertheless had
    shared power with the elite in Pakistan for nearly a
    decade before that.
    A report from the International Crisis Group (53) has
    this to say:
    In the first decade of Independence, Pakistan was
    nominally a parliamentary democracy but civil bureaucrats
    ruled the state with the military as junior partner. No
    elections were held ..the President had power to dismiss
    the Prime Minister and used it liberally. (Governor-
    General Iskander) Mirza...ruled in league with Army
    Chief, general Mohammad Ayub Khan. Dispensing even with
    the pretence of democracy, Ayub ousted Mirza and imposed
    martial law in October 1958
    The military coup by Gen Ayub Khan was a watershed of
    sorts as it marked the first step by the Pakistani
    military to gain and retain control of Pakistan. In the
    period from 1958 to 1971 the Pakistan Army gradually
    consolidated its hold on power in Pakistan, and stopped
    being a junior partner to the civil bureaucracy in
    government. It seems virtually certain that no single
    individual in the Pakistani army could have been a
    103
    strongman without the connivance and cooperation of the
    Punjabi and feudal lord dominated military brass of the
    Pakistani army. The Pakistani army is like a close-knit
    fraternity, a family or brotherhood, a biradari, that
    protects its own from harm and disrepute, while ensuring
    that its interests, be they power, finances or honour are
    not harmed. It is a cooperative system, rather than power
    handed down from a single supremo.
    Pakistani security analyst Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha writes
    (90):
    It is important to note that Pakistan's armed forces
    especially the army operates like a fraternity. In this
    environment, severe punishments to individuals or
    extraordinary treatment of a similar nature are viewed as
    undermining the morale of the institution. Sidelining
    undesirable individuals or rewarding others discreetly
    is, thus, a preferred choice.
    Ayub exercised total control of Pakistan before, during
    and after 1965 when he launched and lost a war with
    India. The Army replaced Ayub Khan when it was sensed
    that popular opposition to Ayub Khan would harm the
    Army’s interests, and General Yahya Khan, who oversaw the
    splitting away of East Pakistan and the formation of
    Bangladesh after the worst defeat that the Pakistani
    armed forces have ever faced replaced him.
    The International Crisis Group's paper on democracy in
    Pakistan (53) refers to the Pakistani Army's role in this
    period as follows:
    Fearing that its defeat would translate into popular
    demands for accountability, the (army) high command
    transferred power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto..The military's
    defeat in the 1971 war with India had, however, been
    104
    limited to East Pakistan. Despite 93,000 prisoners of war
    in India, its infrastructure in the West was untouched.
    Military leaders quickly recouped losses and closed ranks
    against perceived civilian threats to their personal and
    institutional interests
    It is clear that even as early as 1971 the Pakistan Army
    had enough of a vested interest in retaining power in
    Pakistan to pretend to hand over power to a civilian
    government in order to maintain the reputation and
    interests of the Pakistan army from public scrutiny and
    accountability. In fact a damning report on the actions
    and defeat of the Pakistani army in the 1971 war, the
    Hamoodur Rehman report was never made public until a copy
    was obtained and published by the Times of India.
    All military governments in Pakistan, including the one
    currently headed by General Musharraf have grabbed power
    to save Pakistan and bring in a sound democratic system.
    But the Pakistani army has always grabbed power from
    elected governments or prevented democracy from actually
    being established, and have prevented all attempts to
    check the finances or power of the military in any way.
    It is informative to look at the perquisites, businesses
    and non-military interests of the Pakistan army that are
    so keenly protected and preserved.
    The army ensures that its officer class live in great
    style and luxury. A report in the Washington Post in 2002
    (91) described army life in the following words:
    The officer class in Pakistan has always had a strong
    sense of entitlement stemming from its dominant role in
    defending the country and in running it... One of the
    fanciest clubs in Karachi is the Defense Housing
    Authority County and Golf Club, a sparkling new facility
    105
    with lush fairways, a two-story driving range and a
    gracious stone clubhouse overlooking an inlet of the
    Arabian Sea. Active-duty military personnel can join the
    club for an initiation fee of $16, compared with $9,166
    for civilians, according to the club's fee schedule
    The same paper goes on to say:
    the military also rewards its senior officers by
    allowing them to purchase agricultural and urban land
    from the army's vast inventory of real estate at prices
    far below market value...One of Pakistan's most coveted
    addresses, for example, is the blandly named Army Housing
    Scheme II...in the upscale Karachi suburb of Clifton. A
    gated community protected by paramilitary troops, the
    development consists of spacious, Mediterranean-style
    villas grouped around a playground and an elaborately
    landscaped Japanese-style garden. Nearby are clothing
    boutiques, jewelry stores, restaurants and a yoga studio
    Describing the decrepit and run-down state of most
    schools in Pakistan, the Washington Post goes on to
    compare that with a Pakistani army run school:
    Geared toward preparation for the competitive O Level
    exams required by British universities, the handsome
    school is an educational showpiece whose computer,
    physics and biology labs would not seem out of place in
    an American suburb
    There are an enormous number of news media reports of the
    money and businesses that the Pakistani army controls.
    The Independent of London described the contrast between
    a Pakistani army establishment and the rest of Pakistan
    (92):
    106
    Outside in the street, Afghan refugees and Pakistan's
    urban poor root through garbage tips and crowd on to
    soot-pumping buses to work in sweatshops and brick
    factories. Inside, behind the ancient, newly painted
    cannons and battalion flags, rose bushes surround welltended
    lawns and officers' messes decorated with polished
    brass fittings. No rubbish litters this perfect world of
    discipline. Why should anyone living here want a return
    to corrupt democracy?
    A report in the online edition of the Pakistani newspaper
    Dawn said (93):
    The perks don't end here: military personnel are entitled
    to a 50 per cent discount on air and rail fares as well
    as cinema tickets. Their children have a quota at most
    public universities, and serving and retired officers are
    routinely inducted into civilian jobs.
    The Pakistan Weekly reported (94):
    ..in relation to country's per capita income Pakistani
    senior military officers are one of the best paid in the
    world. No other career, with equivalent academic
    qualifications and so little productivity produces
    comparable personal affluence as that of the officer
    cadre of the Pak military....
    Where does the money for all this come from?
    A report in the Daily Times of Pakistan in August 2002
    says, All countries have armies, but in Pakistan the army
    has a country. Defense expenditures consume between onethird
    and one-half of the national budget. In recent
    decades, senior military officers have been transformed
    into powerful landlords through grants of choice
    agricultural lands and real estate. Retired officers head
    107
    many, if not most, public corporations. This garrison
    economy is increasingly unsustainable, as Pakistan's poor
    multiply and the economy falters.
    Part of the army's wealth is from the extremely high
    defence budget that Pakistan has maintained for decades,
    at the expense of all other expenditure and all other
    groups in Pakistan. The excuse for the high defence
    expenditure has been the external threat from India, but
    the army ensures great personal wealth for its serving
    and retired personnel especially those of the higher
    ranks, and those seen as cooperative people who toe the
    line.
    The News International, Pakistan reported on Sunday
    September 09, 2001:
    As a % of GDP, from among the poorest of countries ..
    Pakistan, at 4.4% of GDP, spends the highest on defence.
    Shaheen Sehbai wrote in the Weekly Independent in 2002
    (95),
    For decades almost 35 to 40 per cent of Pakistan's
    revenues have been going into un-audited and noquestions-
    asked defence budget.
    For this report and other reports on the activities of
    the Pakistani army, Shaheen Sehbai, former editor of the
    English language daily the News was threatened by the
    army and forced to flee Pakistan and live in exile (96).
    The high defence budget is not the only source of income
    for the luxury loving Pakistani army. It also controls a
    huge business empire. In her study of the Pakistan
    military's economic activities, security analyst Dr.
    Ayesha-Siddiqa Agha describes why the businesses were
    108
    started in the first place (90).
    ..the military's business empire in Pakistan was created
    to guarantee welfare of retired and serving personnel. It
    was a pattern inherited from the pre-independence days.
    The Pakistani army's business enterprises were started
    for the welfare of retired personnel. Initially only the
    army had its businesses, with a small quota for the Air
    Force and Navy. Later these two branches started off
    their own businesses, and the vast enterprise has grown
    to gargantuan proportions. They are not necessarily
    profitable, but they survive on government subsidies and
    grants; competition is scared off by military threats,
    and the senior employees make fat salary packets, safe
    from accountability and questions.
    The four key armed-forces run business organizations in
    Pakistan are The Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare
    Trust, the Shaheen Foundation and the Bahria Foundation.
    The Fauji Foundation's businesses include sugar mills,
    cereal and corn, Natural gas, plastics, fertilizer,
    cement, power and education and healthcare. The Fauji
    foundation's assets have grown from Pakistani Rs. 152
    million in 1970, to 9,800 million according to Dr.
    Siddiqa-Agha, and employs 6 to 7 thousand military
    personnel, mostly in middle and upper management
    positions.
    The Army Welfare Trust has 26 projects including farms,
    stud farms, fish farms, rice and sugar mills, cement
    factories, pharmaceuticals, shoes, wool, hosiery, travel
    agencies, aviation, commercial complexes, banking,
    insurance and security with many bearing the name Aksari.
    Aksari aviation was set up merely to accommodate retired
    army helicopter pilots who could not get a job in the
    109
    private sector.
    Not to be outdone, the Pakistan air force established the
    Shaheen foundation which is now involved in air
    transportation, cargo, airport services, pay TV, FM
    radio, insurance, knitwear and commercial complexes.
    That left Pakistan's smallest force, the navy, to start
    its own venture, the Bahria Foundation in 1981. The
    Bahria Foundation deals in commercial complexes, trading,
    construction, a travel agency, paints, deep sea fishing,
    dredging, ship breaking, salvage and even a university.
    There is no nation in the world whose armed forces are
    involved in as many non-military business ventures as the
    Pakistan armed forces. Banking, insurance, commercial
    complexes and radio stations are ventures that do not
    obviously appear to be an essential part of the armed
    forces of any nation and would not be justifiable in any
    other nation on earth. But they are normal and routine
    for the Pakistani armed forces. Like a core business
    that has diversified, the Pakistani armed forces have
    diversified into fields well outside the mandate of an
    armed force.
    Dr. Farrukh Saleem, a freelance Pakistani columnist wrote
    in the Pakistani daily Jang (97):
    Fauji Cereal has been part of my daily breakfast for as
    long as I can remember. The only wrapping that Fauji
    Cereal ever uses comes from Fauji Poly Propylene
    Products. During my days at the village, milk use to come
    from the nearby Okara Military Farms, the 17,000-acre
    dairy, meat and grain-producing project. The only sugar
    that I ever liked was either from the four Fauji Sugar
    Mills or Army Welfare Sugar Mills. Not too long ago, my
    wife wanted to build a house. I didn't want to be
    110
    anywhere but in one of the six Askari Housing Schemes.
    The only cement I will use is Fauji Cement. I wish I was
    right next to Fauji Kabirwala Power Company because I
    hate the power that Wapda comes out with. The paint for
    my house must come from no one but Bahria Paints. Fauji
    also owns and operates Fauji Corn Complex, FONGAS, Fauji
    Fertilizer Company, Fauji Jordan Company, Fauji Oil
    Terminal Company Project and Mari Gas Company.
    The army also operates what is called the National
    Logistic Cell (NLC) which is a trucking and
    transportation giant in Pakistan, employing thousands of
    serving and retired army personnel. The web page of the
    NLC describes its army connection euphemistically as a
    unique logistic based Public Sector Organisation which
    has [a] blend of corporate culture and Army's
    discipline. (98)
    With the military in government, and the defence ministry
    manned by retired military officers, the military run
    businesses of Pakistan are above all accountability.
    In her study of the Army's businesses, Dr. Ayesha
    Siddiqa-Agha makes a scathing indictment(90):
    The top management of the armed forces jealously guard
    their interests. Over the years the interests have
    narrowed down from the greater benefit of the institution
    to the personal welfare of the generals. A feature
    peculiar to a number of cases is, the ventures were
    started not based on any feasibility study but on the
    whims of the top management to accommodate certain highranking
    officers.
    The businesses run by the Pakistani armed forces are
    marked by inefficiency, corruption and self-interest, and
    are preserved by intimidation that scares away
    111
    competitors or people who try to question their
    activities. Corruption in running these businesses has
    been noted by Siddiqa-Agha and others (96):
    "When you dig into them, you find out they are
    inefficient, and there is evidence of corruption,"
    Siddiqa-Agha said. "There is also evidence of corruption
    linked to monopolization of government contracts.
    In another report in August 2002, the South Asia Tribune
    reported (99):
    ..a list of over 100 armed forces men who allotted to
    themselves at least 400 or more acres of prime land in
    Bahawalpur, heart of Punjab, "to defend it from the
    enemy," at the throw away rate of Rs 380 per acre (US
    Dollars Six & 50 cents). The list is only of one
    District. Such lists exist all over Punjab and Sindh
    where a new breed of landlords has already been created
    through similar allotments...This conversion of generals
    into landlords also explains why no serious effort has
    been made by the military to introduce land reforms in
    the country, which could cure many political and social
    imbalances in the Pakistani society.
    An online report in the Crescent International revealed a
    list of Pakistani billionaires and millionaires with
    accounts in Swiss banks. Nearly half the billionaires
    were from the army or close relatives of senior army
    personnel.
    With this degree of money, wealth and power, the Pakistan
    army's main problem shifts away from the defence of
    Pakistan to the defence of their own wealth and power.
    Which wealthy army general living in the lap of luxury
    would want to give up his good life for the hardship and
    travails of war? Besides, the risk to this life is not so
    112
    much from an attack by India, but by anger and opposition
    to the corrupt and wealthy army from the desperately poor
    people of Pakistan, a staggering 85% of whom live on less
    than US $2 per day (100).
    Increasingly under pressure within Pakistan for their
    greed the Pakistani army has used Islam and the external
    threat from India to retain their power and wealth. The
    people must be more Islamic, because the sacrifice of
    jihad is required to fight India. Poverty and destitution
    in Pakistan are because India is trying to attack
    Pakistan and kill Muslims. This Islamization of Pakistan
    and the Pakistani army accelerated after the 1971 defeat
    of the Pakistani army by India in the war of liberation
    of Bangladesh.
    Pakistani journalist Najam Sethi noted in an article in
    the Friday Times of Pakistan (101):
    Since the late 1970s, the Pakistan army has maintained a
    mutually profitable relationship with Islamic elements in
    the country. The Islamicists have offered two critical
    inputs to the military: they have provided armed manpower
    for the military's security agendas in the neighborhood,
    as in Afghanistan since 1979 and in India since 1989. And
    they have been ever ready to join hands with the military
    to undermine popularly elected and mainstream civilian
    governments inimical to the military's corporate view of
    Pakistan's interests in one way or another.
    A report in the Washington Times recognised this (102):
    The Pakistani army, the center of anti-Indian sentiment,
    rallied radical Islamic forces to the cause. Pakistan is
    a poor country, and recruitment to the army benefits the
    poor who are inclined to Islamic fundamentalism. In fact,
    the hundreds of Islamic seminaries have become breeding
    113
    grounds for terrorism and centers for the recruitment of
    junior officers to the Pakistan army. Thus, the army has
    become a harbinger for Islamic ideological orientations.
    Another report in the Asia Times in 2003 (103) reveals
    the depth to which the Pakistan army's fighting forces
    have become intertwined with Islamic jihadis.
    The jihadi outfits...purpose was to develop a paramilitary
    force that would assist the Pakistan army in the
    event of war. However, in the course of the 1989 uprising
    in Kashmir, these jihadis played so vital a role that
    they outdid the army, so in the 1990s it was decided that
    they would act as a front-line force in any India-
    Pakistan war. First-hand observations by this
    correspondent in Azad Kashmir camps confirm that the
    jihadi outfits are in fact paramilitary troops. Each unit
    has a commander who reports to an army officer. Each
    jihadi commander is given funds and the brief to devise a
    strategy for his unit's combat operations. The commanders
    have lap top computers in which they store their data,
    from which they generate summaries of their operations
    for their military officers.
    The Pakistan army has, over the course of the last few
    decades, subcontracted its fighting to the jihadis.
    Former Indian Intelligence analyst B.Raman was quoted in
    the online portal Rediff (104):
    Pakistan has two armies... a regular army of around
    500,000. But there is an Army of Islam, so-called by
    Pakistan itself, with a total strength of about 200,000.
    As the Pakistani army generals consolidated their
    financial and business empires, they gradually
    subcontracted the actual fighting to Islamist irregular
    forces. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, Pakistan
    114
    refused to admit that any of their forces were involved
    in the fighting, saying that Kashmiri mujahideen were
    doing the fighting. But as Pakistani soldiers bodies
    began appearing in Pakistan the truth leaked out.
    Pakistani troops withdrew in the face of defeat, but not
    before the Pakistani Northern Light Infantry was
    virtually wiped out. The latter fact was confirmed in an
    interview with deposed Former Pakistani Prime Minister
    Nawaz Sharif in an interview at his place of exile in
    Saudi Arabia (105).
    Finally, information regarding the Pakistani army would
    be incomplete without mention of the criminal activities
    and genocide that they have been involved in:
    G. Parthasarathy, former Indian High Commissioner to
    Pakistan wrote (106):
    The Pakistan army is today the largest investor in the
    Karachi Stock Exchange, controls the largest network of
    elite public schools, owns the largest construction
    company and the largest transportation company the
    National Logistics Cell— that has the dubious distinction
    of not only transporting weapons for the ISI and the CIA,
    but also heroin from Peshawar for export from Karachi.
    In another article, Parthasarathy outlines the role of
    the Pakistani army in genocides and the killing of its
    own people(107):
    The Pakistan army has killed more of its own citizens in
    the past three decades than any other armed force, except
    the Khmer Rouge led by the genocidal Pol Pot. Documented
    evidence of the numbers of Pakistani citizens killed
    following the carnage by the Pakistan army in Bangladesh
    (1971), Baluchistan (1972-1974), rural Sind (1983
    onwards) and the urban centres of Sind against the MQM
    115
    (in the 1990s), confirms this fact.
    In conclusion, it may be said that the Pakistani army
    retained a great degree of respect among the people of
    Pakistan from the time of independence. Based on this the
    army repeatedly took power in Pakistan with the promise
    of setting things right, promising to bring back
    democracy and to fight and defeat the number one enemy,
    India. But the army did none of these things. It started
    unwinnable wars, and built up a huge business empire for
    its senior officers and sycophants while the actual
    fighting was given over to jehadis fired up with Islamic
    zeal. This Islamic zeal has gradually entered the ranks
    of the Pakistani army. A large number of men in the lower
    ranks of the Pakistani army now have fundamentalist
    Islamic leanings, and these lower ranks will be senior
    officers with the passage of time. In late 2003, Indian
    Intelligence analyst B.Raman was quoted in a report
    (108):
    ..two or three of the 10 corps commanders are seen as
    Islamicists. B. Raman, RAW's former Pakistan expert, says
    only one of the 30 officers of lieutenant-general rank
    and above is definitely a jehadi.
    The Pakistani army has set itself on the course of a
    serious split. On the one hand are the rich and corrupt
    generals, with their businesses and lands. On the other
    hand are the Islamists, who are indoctrinated on the
    exclusivity and superiority of their brand of religion.
    In short the Pakistani army has people who are serving
    two masters, the army commanders on the one hand and
    Allah on the other. One of these masters will lose out,
    and it is unlikely that the followers of God as the
    supreme army commander will give up without a fight. With
    the Pakistani army being the only viable institution that
    seems to be represented almost all over Pakistan, it is
    116
    difficult to imagine what could be in store for Pakistan
    other than serious instability when differences begin to
    show up between the Islamists and the corrupt mafia of
    the Pakistani army.
    117
    Chapter 11
    KASHMIR, PLEBISCITE, WARS AND GENOCIDE
    It is beyond the scope of this book to enter into a
    detailed military discussion of the wars that Pakistan
    has fought with India. Much has been written on this
    subject and many references are available, including some
    excellent online references complete with photographs,
    documents and video clips on the Internet (109, 110,
    111).
    But a brief description of the background and outcome of
    the wars that have been fought give an insight into how
    Pakistani leaders have viewed the world around them and
    their relationship with India.
    The 1947-48 war:
    The first conflict started in 1947, shortly after
    independence and the formation of Pakistan. The exact
    circumstances under which this war started is generally
    lost in a maze of rhetoric, myth and misinformation, and
    needs to be described.
    Demographer PH Reddy pointed out in an article in the
    newspaper The Deccan Herald on January 25th 2002 that the
    basis of division of British India into India and
    Pakistan was Sir Cyril Radciffe's Boundary Commission
    which had been tasked with demarcating the districts in
    India that had a Muslim majority of more than 75% which
    were to be allotted to Pakistan. The commission found 76
    out of 435 districts with such a majority, in two
    clusters that were to form West and East Pakistan. It is
    interesting to note that, Kashmir was not one of them.
    Pre-independence India (British India) consisted of
    present day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Within this
    118
    area were also about 600 states that were not directly
    ruled by Britain, but were Princely States with kings or
    rulers of their own. When it was decided that British
    India was to be split up into India and Pakistan and
    given independence, the 600 Princely States were given
    the option of joining either India or Pakistan by signing
    a document called the Instrument of Accession. The
    Instrument of Accession was a legal document saying that
    a state ruled by a Prince or King had acceded - or agreed
    to join India or Pakistan.
    The dominion of Kashmir was one such Princely State that
    was ruled by a King (Maharaja Hari Singh) who had to make
    the decision of joining India or Pakistan. This King had
    not made up his mind about signing the Instrument of
    Accession at the time of Indian independence on 15th
    August 1947. He was hoping to retain his kingdom, and he
    therefore requested both India and Pakistan to sign a
    treaty called a standstill agreement to maintain supplies
    and postal services to his landlocked state while he made
    up his mind. India wanted to formalize this agreement
    with a representative of the King. Pakistani leaders
    suspected that this was a ploy by India to make the
    Maharaja of Kashmir accede to India, and hastily
    commenced an invasion of Kashmir to take over the Kingdom
    before the Maharaja made up his mind (112).
    In a tradition that was to be repeated in 1965 and 1999,
    the Pakistani army sent in irregular non-army forces as
    well as army personnel in civilian attire at the
    forefront of the invasion of Kashmir. Faced with this
    invasion from Pakistan, the Maharaja of Kashmir signed
    the instrument of accession to India and requested
    assistance from the Indian Armed forces in protecting his
    people who were being subjected to rape and pillage by
    the invading Pakistani forces.
    119
    The letter of accession to India written by the Maharaja
    of Kashmir (113) is as chilling as it is telling. The
    entire text of the letter is reproduced in Appendix 1,
    but an excerpt follows:
    The Dominion of India desired further discussion with
    representatives of my Government... Though we have got a
    standstill agreement with the Pakistan Government, the
    Government permitted a steady and increasing
    strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol to
    my State.
    Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with
    modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the
    State...it has become difficult to stop the wanton
    destruction of life and property and the looting of the
    Mahura power house, which supplies electric current to
    the whole of Srinagar and which has been burnt. The
    number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes
    my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the
    State are marching on with the aim of capturing
    Srinagar... armed with up-to-date weapons, cannot
    possibly be done without the knowledge of the Provincial
    Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the
    Government of Pakistan.
    After the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, the
    Indian armed forces started their process of evicting the
    invading Pakistani marauders in a war that continued till
    an official UN sponsored cease fire was declared in 1949,
    at a time when Pakistani forces still occupied about onethird
    of Kashmir in the North West.
    The United Nations resolution on Kashmir (Appendix 2)
    called for a withdrawal of military forces within five
    months from the date of the resolution, 14th March 1950,
    after which a plebiscite, (meaning a vote, or a
    120
    referendum) could be held to poll the people of the state
    of Kashmir on the issue.
    History has shown that Pakistani forces have not
    withdrawn from the portions of Kashmir that they occupied
    even 600 months, or 50 years after the UN resolution was
    passed. In the meantime, a portion of Kashmir that
    Pakistani forces occupied was gifted away to China it
    appears that no plebiscite of the people of Kashmir was
    required for giving away a part of the state to China.
    Pakistan's failure to get Kashmir on their terms, and the
    failure to bend the terms of the now defunct UN
    resolution to suit Pakistan has been the basis for all
    further attempts by Pakistan to take Kashmir by force,
    deception, subversion or diplomacy.
    The Pakistan-India war of 1965:
    The early 1960s were great years for Pakistan. Under
    military rule, Pakistan allied itself with the United
    States of America in the cold war against the Soviet
    Union. The US in the 1960s had just emerged from the
    Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when Soviet nuclear
    missiles were placed in Cuba right under the nose of the
    US. The US was also fighting communist forces in Vietnam,
    and communism was considered the most serious threat by
    the US. Any ally was welcomed as long as he declared that
    he was opposed to communism.
    Pakistan's alliance with the US allowed a great deal of
    aid money to flow into Pakistan, as well as the most
    sophisticated arms that were available. These included
    state-of-the-art supersonic F-104 Starfighter aircraft,
    armed with Sidewinder air to air missiles. Pakistan could
    do no wrong, and was lauded as a progressive leader among
    developing nations. The economy was booming, held afloat
    121
    by aid dollars.
    India on the other hand was smarting from a military
    defeat in the hands of the Chinese in the 1962 war, after
    having naively trusted China to do good. Indian forces in
    1962 fought valiantly but valor is no substitute for
    planning and equipment in a war that the Indian Army had
    not been given the funds or strategy to prepare for.
    Pakistan's military leader felt that the 1960s offered
    him a chance to invade and take over Kashmir from India.
    In the heady 1960s, Pakistanis, starting from their
    military supremo Ayub Khan, genuinely believed that one
    Pakistani soldier equals six Indian soldiers (68), and
    that the Muslims of India were waiting to rise up in
    revolt and join Pakistan. Pakistani leaders were wrong on
    both counts. Columnist Hamid Hussain quotes from a letter
    written by Ayub Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan
    (58):
    General Ayub Khan in his letter to C-in-C General
    Muhammad Musa stated, as a general rule Hindu morale
    would not stand more than a couple of hard blows
    delivered at the right time and place.
    Through August 1965 Pakistani forces in civilian clothes
    were infiltrated into Kashmir as part of Operation
    Gibralter (sic). The plan was to conduct acts of sabotage
    and create mayhem after which a radio broadcast was to be
    made saying that Kashmir had been taken over by
    revolutionary liberation forces, who would ask for
    international assistance, mainly from Pakistan, against
    India. In the event, the infiltration of Pakistani forces
    was not welcomed with the pro-Pakistan rebellion of
    Indians in Kashmir that the Pakistanis had expected. The
    planned broadcast did not take place, though leaflets
    were distributed.
    122
    At this stage, on September 1st 1965 Pakistan launched
    Operation Grand Slam, a massive armor attack on India,
    beating back Indian defences. The attackers were planning
    to take the town of Akhnoor, en route to the taking of
    Srinagar, the capital of Jammu and Kashmir. In order to
    relieve the intense Pakistani pressure in Kashmir, India
    opened a second front by attacking Pakistan across the
    border in Punjab, and advancing toward the Pakistani city
    of Lahore.
    By the time a cease fire was declared on 23rd September
    1965, Gen. Ayub Khan's plan of annexing Kashmir had been
    foiled. India ended the war holding about 1,100 square
    kilometers of Pakistani territory in the Poonch and
    Lahore regions, with Indian troops occupying the
    Pakistani town of Barki in the Lahore sector. Pakistan
    occupied about 490 square kilometers of Indian territory
    in the Akhnoor region. The cease fire was formalized with
    the Tashkent declaration of January 10th 1966 (Appendix 3)
    The 1971 war of liberation of Bangladesh:
    The 1971 war was one of the most shameful episodes in the
    history of Pakistan. At the time of writing of this, the
    instability that Pakistan displays more than three
    decades after the 1971 war is indicative of the deeply
    dysfunctional internal forces that have kept Pakistan in
    turmoil since then.
    The lessons and punishment suffered by Pakistan should
    really have been an eye-opener for any responsible and
    patriotic forces in Pakistan, but no such awakening has
    occurred. Pakistan appears to be repeating the same
    mistakes again and again.
    West Pakistanis always considered their East Pakistani
    123
    Bengali compatriots as somehow inferior and weak. But
    East Pakistan had a population greater than that of West
    Pakistan, which meant that true democracy in Pakistan
    could pave the way for an East Pakistani Bengali to
    become leader of Pakistan. That was unacceptable to the
    ruling elite of West Pakistan as well as the Pakistani
    army. Elections were somehow postponed or avoided until
    1971, when General Yahya Khan, the incumbent military
    dictator of Pakistan allowed an election to be held,
    gambling that no party would get an overall majority.
    He was wrong. An East Pakistani party, the Awami league,
    headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman won a landslide victory
    and should have formed the government of all of Pakistan,
    East and West. The Pakistani army could not countenance
    this, and martial law was clamped in East Pakistan,
    followed by a genocide of East Pakistani Bengalis. This
    was the beginning of the Pakistani army's darkest and
    most shameful phase to date. The killing of Bengalis, who
    were all Muslims and fellow Pakistanis was shocking and
    brutal.
    One description, by Prof. Rafiqul Islam of Dhaka
    University reads(114):
    Just after midnight on the night of 25th March, the
    Pakistani Army began their attack on the Student Halls
    and Staff Quarters of the University...Just after
    midnight Iqbal Hall came under a barrage of heavy mortar
    and machine-gun attack from near the pond in front and
    the police barracks behind it....I don't have the words
    to express the bestiality and barbarity that was
    perpetrated on the Dhaka University area, especially
    Iqbal Hall, Jagannath Hall, and adjoining residential
    areas, for a period of 36 hours from the night of the
    25th till the 26th night. What transpired around Iqbal
    Hall, I saw with my own eyes. Raging infernos everywhere;
    124
    the slum was burning, the cars parked around the
    residences were burning. The heaped bodies of the dead
    from the slum were also set on fire near the Nilkhet rail
    gate petrol pump. The sound of shells bursting and guns
    firing, the smoke and fire, the smell of gun-powder and
    the stench of the burning corpses all transformed the
    area into a fiery hell.
    The genocide by the Pakistani army in East Pakistan was
    the worst seen after the holocaust of Jews by the Nazis
    in the second World War. One online source (115) has a
    collection of references to this and the descriptions are
    horrific:
    R.J. Rummel likewise writes that "the Pakistan army
    [sought] out those especially likely to join the
    resistance -- young boys. Sweeps were conducted of young
    men who were never seen again. Bodies of youths would be
    found in fields, floating down rivers, or near army
    camps.
    Bangladesh is a nation criss-crossed by rivers, and the
    Pakistan army tended to line up men along river-banks at
    night and shoot them, allowing their bodies to float
    down-river (115)
    They were in batches of six or eight, and in the light of
    a powerful electric arc lamp, they were easy targets,
    black against the silvery water. The executioners stood
    on the pier, shooting down at the compact bunches of
    prisoners wading in the water. There were screams in the
    hot night air, and then silence. The prisoners fell on
    their sides and their bodies lapped against the shore.
    Then a new bunch of prisoners was brought out, and the
    process was repeated. In the morning the village boatmen
    hauled the bodies into midstream and the ropes binding
    the bodies were cut so that each body drifted separately
    125
    downstream. (Payne, Massacre [Macmillan, 1973], p. 55.)
    Descriptions of rape and killing of Hindus abound and
    over over 3 million people were killed over a 267 day
    period an average of one murder committed every 8
    seconds by Pakistani army personnel for nearly 9 months.
    The killings in East Pakistan led to a massive influx of
    refugees into India. More than 10 million people were
    accommodated in refugee camps in India, putting a great
    strain on resources, while Bengali resistance fighters
    sought Indian help. Unable to stand by and watch the
    horrific events in East Pakistan, the Indian Prime
    Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Armed
    forces into East Pakistan on the humanitarian mission of
    stopping the killing. A two-front war broke out when the
    Pakistani Air Force commenced hostilities in the West
    with air raids on Indian targets on December 3rd 1971. In
    a whirlwind war the Indian armed forces overran East
    Pakistan, comprehensively defeating the Pakistani army,
    taking 93,000 prisoners of war. At the end of this
    action, the new nation of Bangladesh was born out of the
    ravaged remains of East Pakistan. The army of the martial
    races of Pakistan had capitulated and surrendered a
    nation of 144,000 square kilometers along with 93,000 of
    its men in a mere 16 days.
    Military historian Brig. Shelford Bidwell summarized the
    military action as follows(48):
    A close study of this campaign will edify military
    students for a long time to come. Bengal, now Bangladesh
    (literally Land of Bengal), is an eminently defensible
    country cut up by rivers five miles wide and obstructed
    by marshes. The Indian plan was a masterly combination of
    airborne, guerrilla and conventional forces, based on
    complete mobility and the bypassing of all centres of
    126
    resistance. The advance was not held up for bridging
    operations; troops and guns were ferried over the rivers
    by helicopter, and 'supply and transport' was by air,
    boat, canoe or country cart as suitable. An astonishing
    momentum was maintained from start to finish - it was a
    Blitzkrieg without tanks.
    The 1999 Kargil conflict:
    It was a while before anyone realized that a war had
    erupted between India and Pakistan in 1999, albeit a war
    limited in area. For the third time since independence,
    the Pakistan army had sent soldiers disguised as
    civilians into Indian territory, and tried to deny any
    involvement with the conflict.
    One of the major disadvantages of a state trying to deny
    involvement in a war is that neither escalation nor
    pullout are possible without admitting involvement or
    conceding that the earlier denial of involvement was a
    lie in the first place. This ultimately has a great
    bearing on credibility and international standing.
    Pakistan seems to have gleaned more shame than honour
    from this action.
    Pakistani soldiers in civilian garb occupied and
    fortified themselves within Indian territory in the
    heights of the mountains in the Kargil region of Kashmir.
    These soldiers were then in an advantageous position to
    defend their positions and to direct accurate artillery
    fire to cut off a major Indian highway and Indian army
    supply route.
    While the entry of these Pakistani forces had gone
    undetected, the war started after their discovery, when
    Indian forces began the process of evicting the
    127
    Pakistanis from their positions within India. Using the
    overwhelming firepower at the disposal of the Indian army
    and air force, mountain bunkers and supply depots
    occupied by Pakistani forces were systematically
    destroyed. Pakistan denied any involvement in the war
    until coffins of their soldiers started turning up at
    their hometowns in Pakistan, accompanied by Indian media
    coverage of captured Pakistani army identity papers and
    weapons. The war ended when the last few surviving
    Pakistani soldiers were pulled out in a humiliating
    retreat that Pakistan conducted under the fig-leaf of
    American mediation - the retreat being announced after a
    visit by Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to meet US
    President Clinton. By the time the last abandoned
    Pakistani soldiers' corpses had been buried by the Indian
    army, Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry had been all but
    wiped out in a war that Pakistan denied till the last
    moment (105).
    The Kargil conflict is very difficult to explain from the
    Pakistani viewpoint. Why did Pakistan do it? And having
    done it, why was it done so half-heartedly? If they
    wanted to be involved in the conflict, why did they deny
    involvement? If they did not want to be identified as
    being involved, why did they admit to involvement later?
    What was it that Pakistani leaders hoped would be
    achieved by this action?
    While there are more questions than answers, any answers
    that fit the known facts suggest a frightening disconnect
    between perception and reality among the seniormost
    leaders of Pakistan, and an equally frightening lack of
    communication and cooperation between the leaders
    themselves. Small organizations, let alone nations cannot
    function if leaders display a disconnect between their
    actions and reality.
    128
    What could have been Pakistan's motive and ultimate
    objective in sending army troops dressed in mufti to
    fortify themselves and occupy positions above 15,000 feet
    high on mountains just within the Indian border? One
    explanation is that they sought to salami slice into
    Indian territory by surreptitiously occupying unguarded
    Indian territory. But did they not expect Indian
    retaliation when they were discovered? Were they so
    worried about the possibility of discovery that they
    refused to allow their men to wear uniforms? But that was
    futile, since they could not prevent their men from
    carrying identification papers in their personal effects.
    Another theory, the more commonly quoted one, is that the
    men on the mountains were there to help cut off the
    Srinagar-Leh highway, after which a Pakistani attack
    would have isolated and encircled Indian positions in the
    Siachen glacier region. If that was the case, why was
    Pakistan so concerned about keeping the identity of its
    men secret, and pretending not to be involved? Why did
    the Pakistani military not plan a counter-offensive to
    blunt or stop India from relentlessly clearing the
    heights as it did?
    The logic defies explanation, and some of the
    explanations are ludicrous enough to be unbelievable. It
    has been said that after Pakistan's nuclear tests in
    1998, Pakistani military leaders believed India to be
    very afraid of Pakistan. Furthermore, it was believed
    that the morale of the Indian armed forces was at
    breaking point and that Indian soldiers would be ready to
    run away from battle at the slightest threat. In the 1965
    war, India had taken Pakistani pressure off Kashmir by
    opening a second front in Punjab. It appears that
    Pakistani generals believed that India would be afraid to
    repeat that in 1999 because they feared nuclear
    retaliation from Pakistan. And within Kashmir it was
    129
    expected that the Indian army would capitulate and run
    away.
    In February 1999, at about the time when Pakistani army
    men were secretly taking up their positions in the
    mountains near Kargil, senior Pakistani General Javid
    Nasir wrote in the prestigious Pakistani Defence Journal
    (116):
    I say with all the authority and professionalism that
    'The Indian army is incapable of undertaking any
    conventional operations at present what to talk of
    enlarging conventional conflict'
    It is inconceivable that a professional Pakistani soldier
    and senior officer should deliberately and publicly
    choose to underestimate an adversary without paying the
    slightest heed to the possibility that the assessment may
    be wrong, or that there may be alternate, less reassuring
    assessments.
    This statement by a senior Pakistani army general eerily
    echoes the assessment made by Pakistani dictator Ayub
    Khan 34 years earlier when he stated that Indian morale
    would break after a couple of hard blows. As indicated in
    the description of the Pakistani mind in chapter 5, such
    assessments are more indicative of the psychological
    state of the Pakistani army officer, with a self-image
    amounting to delusions of grandeur rather than objective
    and rational military judgment. It is interesting to note
    that the large and powerful army of Pakistan has
    cultivated a leadership that somehow believes that the
    Indian military will be a pushover in battle. Such an
    attitude can be termed as nothing short of suicidal, as
    events have shown.
    After the Kargil conflict, Gen. Ved Prakash Malik, the
    130
    Indian Chief of Army Staff who oversaw the defeat of
    Pakistani forces in the Kargil conflict wrote about Gen
    Javid Nasir's article and misperception within the
    Pakistani army's high command that led them to attempt
    the Kargil misadventure (117):
    This was not only a gross underestimation of a possible
    adversary but also a poor assessment and misperception.
    Some other assumptions and misperceptions which led to
    the Pakistani offensive operation in Kargil were:
    1.Nuclear umbrella allows offensive action without risk.
    2.International community would intervene or stop the war
    at an early stage.
    3.The coalition government in India, weak and indecisive,
    will either over-react or under-react.
    4.India is militarily weak and unprepared.
    5.Indian frustration will lead to escalation, putting the
    onus of escalation on India.
    6.Military operation under the garb of Mujahideen would
    focus attention on Kashmir and Pakistan would be able to
    claim this as a victory.
    Assumptions regarding enemy weakness and fear can only be
    termed as high hopes unless they are balanced out by
    other, less rosy scenarios. But it does not appear that
    the Pakistani army had planned for anything but easy and
    cheap victory in Kargil. That is a disquieting thought.
    If Pakistani Generals persist in thinking of war and easy
    victories against India, the chance of Pakistan viewing
    India with any sanity or objectivity can also be
    dismissed as high hopes.
    131
    Chapter 12
    PROVINCES AND ASSORTED FRAGMENTS
    The word “provinces” calls to the mind the idea of a
    nation that has been divided into smaller blocks for
    administrative reasons. Each province is one part that
    contributes to the whole.
    In the case of Pakistan this idea is misleading –
    Pakistan’s provinces belong to the Pakistani state in
    name only, with vast swathes of Pakistan falling outside
    the bounds of any control. Indeed more than half the land
    area of Pakistan is outside the control of the Pakistan
    government. Much of this area is sparsely populated, but
    the peoples in such areas have either declared
    independence, or are seeking separation from Pakistan.
    The state of Pakistan can be compared to a shattered
    cookie within an intact wrapper – each fragment is
    separate, but held together forcibly by the wrapper. The
    “wrapper” that holds the Pakistan state together is the
    Pakistan army, which has regularly massacred people
    within those provinces in an effort to maintain control.
    In 2006 Amnesty International published a report (159)
    about human rights violations in the tribal areas of
    Pakistan. An excerpt from the report says:
    “..In the "war on terror", Pakistan has violated a wide
    array of human rights, including the right to life, to
    the security of the person, to freedom from arbitrary
    arrest and detention, to freedom from torture, other illtreatment
    and enforced disappearance, and to legal
    remedies and reparations.”
    Pakistan has four provinces, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan
    and the Northwest Frontier Province. The map below
    132
    depicts the provinces of Pakistan.
    Punjab, Sindh and the Northwest frontier provinces
    (N.W.F.P.) form the “core provinces” of Pakistan. These
    were the provinces that voted to be part of Pakistan from
    the outset. These provinces form less than half the land
    area of Pakistan, but are home to over 80% of Pakistan’s
    population, which, in the absence of any reliable recent
    census is estimated to be between 160 and 170 million in
    2006.
    Punjab is by far the dominant province, with Punjabis
    comprising over 50% of Pakistan’s total population, and
    contributing over 60% of the personnel in the Pakistan
    armed forces. The fact that most of the population and
    economic activity of Pakistan occurs in these three
    provinces can be seen in the photograph below, which
    shows a map of Pakistan super-imposed on a satellite
    133
    photograph of the Indian subcontinent at night. Almost
    all of Pakistan is dark, except for a strip close to the
    Indian border representing the provinces of Punjab, Sindh
    and N.W.F.P., which show lights and population activity.
    BALOCHISTAN: Balochistan is the largest province of
    Pakistan, comprising 42% of the land area, but it has a
    population of only about 7 million – or just over 4% of
    Pakistan’s population. Balochistan became part of
    Pakistan after it was forcibly annexed by the Pakistani
    army after Pakistan was created in 1947.
    Balochistan is rich in natural resources, including
    natural gas and minerals. The people of Balochistan have
    long fought for independence of their land from Pakistani
    rule, and more recently for a fair share of the proceeds
    from the natural resources being exploited in
    Baluchistan.
    In return, the Pakistan army and successive governments
    have shown that they want the natural resources more than
    134
    they want the people of Balochistan. Despite a long
    struggle the sparse population of Balochistan cannot
    match the firepower of the Pakstani army. A series of
    massacres of Balochi tribals have occurred with the use
    of deadly force, including helicopter gun ships. This has
    resulted in the death in 2006 of a prominent and
    respected Balochi leader and a fierce opponent of
    Pakistani occupation, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.
    F.A.T.A. The F.A.T.A. – or Federally Administered Tribal
    Areas is a euphemism for a completely lawless area that
    does not come under Pakistani control at all. It is a
    strip of land on the Northwest border of Pakistan with
    Afghanistan populated by tribes, of whom less than 2%
    live in urban areas. They do not recognize Pakistan’s
    border with Afghanistan and the area is home to a
    thriving arms industry in which clones of almost any type
    of small arms are made in small workshops (139).
    The Pakistan army actually entered the F.A.T.A. for the
    first time in its history in 2002 on the pretext of
    helping the US in its war on terror. In 2006 the same
    army made an ignominious retreat from the area after
    suffering hundreds of casualties, signing a peace deal
    with the Taliban who control an area of the F.A.T.A.
    called Waziristan (see map on page 136). The “peace deal”
    (160) made by the Pakistani Army with people who are
    supposed to be Pakistani citizens guarantees that the
    Pakistani army will never return to Waziristan and a
    return of confiscated weapons, as well as the payment of
    reparations for damage. This has been described as a defacto
    acceptance of an independent “Islamic Emirate of
    Waziristan” – ruled by the Taliban, in an area that
    serves as a safe harbor for the Al Qaeda and other
    assorted Islamist militia personnel.
    135
    Chapter 13
    PAKISTAN, JIHAD AND TERRORISM
    When it was declared by the US Treasury department that
    two thirds of all terrorist groups had a link with
    Pakistan, the statement came as sweet music to the ears
    Indians who have been fighting terrorism from Pakistan
    for over a decade (118).
    About two-thirds of all designated terrorist groups in
    the world have a Pakistani connection, according to the
    U.S. Treasury Department.
    The statement was a vindication of long-standing Indian
    concerns. Since 1989, India had been ploughing a lonely
    furrow in the diplomatic capitals of the world calling
    attention to Pakistan's role in terrorism. The terrorist
    attacks of September 11th 2001 in the US, in which
    aircraft were hijacked and crashed into the twin towers
    of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in
    Washington were a wake-up call to the somnolent and
    blinkered intelligence communities of the West about the
    deep changes taking place in Pakistan.
    A charming tale for children is told in an animated film
    called “The Sorcerer's Apprentice” featuring Walt
    Disney's cartoon character Mickey Mouse. The sorcerer
    (magician) is Mickey himself and has the task of drawing
    water from a well to fill a tub. Being too lazy to do the
    job himself, the sorcerer uses his magic powers to make a
    broom grow hands and legs to draw water to fill the tub.
    As Mickey relaxes and falls asleep the Sorcerer's
    Apprentice, the magic broom, working tirelessly,
    transfers enough water to cause a flood and does not
    stop. A panicky Mickey wakes up and chops the magic broom
    into small pieces but each piece then becomes a new
    apprentice that carries water and the flooding starts to
    136
    get out of control.
    Pakistan and jihad are like the story of the Sorcerer's
    Apprentice. The Pakistani army tried to use jihad to do
    it's work but jihad, and terrorism associated with jihad
    now has a life of its own and may be getting out of
    control of the Pakistani army.
    Jessica Stern, an expert on terrorism wrote (119):
    Pakistani militant groups are killing civilians and
    engaging in terrorism in Indian-held Kashmir under the
    guise of holy war. The government in Islamabad supports
    these militants and their religious schools as cheap ways
    to fight India and educate Pakistan's youth. But this
    policy is creating a culture of violence that exacerbates
    internal sectarianism and destabilizes the region.
    Without change, this monster threatens to devour
    Pakistani society.
    Islamic scholars, especially from Pakistan, have
    repeatedly tried to point out that jihad is not
    terrorism. It is stated that jihad is an internal
    struggle and not external violence. But this assertion
    goes against the facts on the ground. Terrorism and
    senseless violence are being routinely committed in the
    name of jihad. In the Pakistani context, terrorism and
    jihad are one and the same. In his study of jihadi groups
    in Pakistan, Ehsan Ansari says of jihad (120):
    various Islamic groups have been interpreting it to mean
    'holy war' against everything the perceive as being 'non
    Islamic'
    An interview with a leading Pakistani expert on jihad,
    Arif Jamal, was published by the Asia Times online. Jamal
    has this to say about jihad (121):
    137
    The main objective of jihad even today is to defeat the
    infidels and establish Islamic states all over the world.
    One of the ideological founding fathers of Pakistan,
    Maulana Maududi, placed a great emphasis on jihad, (120)
    so Pakistanis are not strangers to the concept of jihad.
    And with jihad being defined as holy war to defeat
    infidels, acts of terrorism are considered normal and par
    for the course by a large number of Pakistanis. The
    extent to which the system to promote violent jihad
    against non-Muslims has spread in Pakistan may be gauged
    from the following reports:
    Terrorism expert Jessica Stern writes (119):
    Only about 4,350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000
    madrasahs in Pakistan have registered with the
    government... Madrasahs are the supply line for jihad...
    A report from the US council of Foreign Relations said:
    According to The Washington Post, some 7,000 madrasas
    currently operate in Pakistan, with enrollment at more
    than 650,000 students. Pakistani officials estimate that
    10 to 15 percent of the madrasas in Pakistan promote
    extremist ideologies.
    The New York Times reported on May 27, 2002:
    there are as many as 500,000 members of jihadi - Muslim
    holy war organizations - in Pakistan, including many
    thousands committed to the cause of forcing India out of
    the sector of Kashmir that it controls.
    Jihad became a driving force in Pakistan under General
    Zia ul Haq in the 1980s.
    138
    Quoting Jessica Stern (119):
    Pakistani dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted
    the madrasahs as a way to garner the religious parties'
    support for his rule and to recruit troops for the anti-
    Soviet war in Afghanistan.
    This is supported by a report in the Asia Times (122):
    The jihadi outfits were in fact a part of the ISI's
    operations and the brainchild of late dictator General
    Zia ul-Haq and General Akhtar Abdul Rehman. The purpose
    was to develop a para-military force that would assist
    the Pakistan army in the event of war.
    Jihad in Pakistan received a lot of funding from the US
    and Saudi Arabia. Stern reports that Pakistan received US
    $ 3.5 billion from these countries in the 1985 to 1989
    period. Jihad became an important business in Pakistan,
    with funds coming in from diverse sources such as Libya,
    Iraq, Iran and other Gulf states. Along with the money
    came guns and drugs, mainly heroin, to fund the US backed
    war against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. With US arms,
    Saudi funds and Jihad recruits from Pakistan, the Soviet
    Union was put under sufficient military pressure to
    withdraw from Afghanistan, paving the way for the
    Pakistan sponsored Taliban to form a government in
    Afghanistan.
    Tariq Ali wrote in The Independent of the UK (123):
    religious fundamentalism is the legacy of a previous
    military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq...During his rule
    (1977-89), a network of madrassahs (religious boarding
    schools), funded by the Saudi regime, were created...The
    2,500 madrassahs produced a crop of 225,000 fanatics
    139
    ready to kill and die for their faith when asked to do so
    by their religious leaders. Dispatched across the border
    by the Pakistan Army, they were hurled into battle...The
    Taliban creed is an ultra-sectarian strain, inspired by
    the Wahhabi sect that rules Saudi Arabia...The Taliban
    could not, however, have captured Kabul on their own
    ..They were armed and commanded by "volunteers" from the
    Pakistan Army
    For the Pakistani army, control of Afghanistan with its
    puppet, the Taliban government was a double blessing. The
    forces of jihad provided a huge supply of trained and
    experienced soldiers to fight India in a low cost war.
    The Pakistani army could describe the jihadi-terrorists
    as freedom fighters and deny any link with them, while
    Pakistan claimed to provide only moral and diplomatic
    support to them.
    Meanwhile Afghanistan itself was seen by Pakistan as
    strategic depth - that is, if India ever attacked
    Pakistan, Pakistani forces and leaders could withdraw
    into Afghanistan and continue to fight. Afghanistan also
    served as a safe place to continue to train jihadis to
    fight Pakistan's war against India.
    RAND, a US based non-profit organization that helps
    policy and decision making, carried the following passage
    in a commentary (124):
    Sponsoring militancy in Kashmir is regarded as a
    relatively cheap and effective way of offsetting existing
    power symmetries (essentially through the philosophy of a
    'war of a thousand cuts') while simultaneously ...
    ensuring that Pakistan has sufficient strategic depth to
    undertake a protracted conventional war on the subcontinent,
    should this ever become necessary.
    140
    A report in the New York Times (27th May 2002) describes
    how the jihadis from Afghanistan were applied against
    India:
    drawing on the 80,000 fighters whom Pakistan had trained
    and armed to fight the Soviet forces in
    Afghanistan...Pakistan's military and intelligence
    services struck upon the idea of employing jihadis to
    wrest control of the Kashmir from India. "We have fought
    three wars with India and have not won even one of them,"
    said an expert on the country's jihad movements. "The
    success of the jihadi strategy in Afghanistan compelled
    the generals to try it on India, too. The Kashmir jihadis
    are our cannon fodder because they are willing to die for
    their cause in a way that no paid soldiers would."
    And even today as Pakistani jihadis continue to be used
    as cannon fodder against India, the recruitment has to go
    on. Jihad is advertised in Pakistan as a career path to
    follow. Shahid Nadeem wrote in the Daily Times of
    Pakistan (125):
    The moment we left Fortress Abbottabad, it was jehadi
    territory. Wall chalking after wall chalking advertised
    jehadi outfits and announced recruitment for jehadi
    fighters. Just a few kilometers from the Havelian
    cantonment, there are slogans such as Jehad is the
    shortest route to Paradise and Contact us for commando
    Jehadi training. Walls between Havelian and Haripur are
    full of jehadi slogans and adverts
    Pervez Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani scientist and columnist
    wrote(126):
    Islam, Pakistan, Jihad became emblazoned on banners at
    Pakistani army recruitment centers, ... A new ethos was
    created; this was to be an army not just for Pakistan,
    141
    but for the greater glory of Islam.
    Jihad has been made attractive and financially rewarding.
    The rewards of waging jihad include the following, among
    more worldly rewards (127):
    The mujahideen were assured of entering Paradise before
    the first drop of their blood fell to earth. The Holy
    Scriptures of Islam also say that houris [beautiful
    virgins of the Koranic Paradise] come down to Earth to
    take the spirit of the mujahid who is about to die before
    the first drop of his blood falls to earth. The martyrs
    are promised 72 houris in Paradise. These houris are more
    beautiful than all the beauties of the world combined.
    There are salary and pension rules in place as well. A
    RAND report quotes Indian Intelligence estimates of the
    budget of the Pakistani agency responsible for training
    and coordinating jihad-terrorist action in India the so
    called Inter Services Intelligence or I.S.I. (124):
    annual ISI expenditure to the main militant organisations
    runs to between US$125 and $250 million a year. These
    funds are used to cover salaries for fighters (which run
    from 5,000 to 10,000 rupees a month), support to next of
    kin, cash incentives for high-risk operations and
    retainers for guides, porters and informers.
    Appendix 4 reproduces an article carried in the online
    paper Mid-Day listing details of incentives and salaries
    offered to terrorists from Pakistan. The article is
    revealing in the extent to which Pakistan has been
    organizing and funding terrorists who have long been said
    to receive only moral and diplomatic support from
    Pakistan.
    With jihad and terrorism being Pakistan's main industry,
    142
    the effect on India has been murderous.
    A paper published by the South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG)
    carries examples of newspaper headlines resulting from
    terrorist acts sponsored by Pakistan in India(128). A few
    samples are quoted below:
    • "Suspected Islamic militants axed to death six
    members of a shepherd's family overnight. The attackers
    killed four women and two children, the officer said."
    • "Militants slit the throats of two women, shot
    dead another person and set off two explosions damaging a
    bridge "
    • "Terrorists have slit the throats of two of the
    four policemen abducted after the attack on a police post
    in Udhampur on Sunday.
    Statistics of deaths of Indians in Kashmir show that over
    17,000 civilians have been killed by Pakistani trained
    terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir from 1990 to 2003.
    Over the same period Indian security forces have
    intercepted and killed 17,000 terrorists who were found
    committing acts of terrorism or infiltrating into India
    from Pakistan, along with the staggering recovery of over
    27,000 assault rifles and machine guns, and over 59,000
    hand grenades, 6 million rounds of ammunition and 34,000
    kilograms of explosives (129).
    The US army discovered in Vietnam that groups of armed
    men carrying machine guns and explosives, hiding in
    jungles in mountainous regions cannot be fought with
    tanks and attack aircraft. Men have to be met by men in
    deadly face to face encounters at the end of long vigils
    or cordon and search operations. The US in Vietnam had
    the luxury of being able to withdraw from Vietnam, but
    Indians do not have the option of withdrawing from their
    143
    own land. Terrorism, with hundreds of thousands of
    jihadis entering from Pakistan required a robust
    response, and India met the threat by building a powerful
    counter-insurgency apparatus, and by starting to fence
    the India-Pakistan boundary where possible.
    As the Indian strategy proved effective, jihadis started
    getting eliminated in increasing numbers, and the average
    life-span of a jihadi-terrorist entering India from
    Pakistan was reduced to weeks or months rather than years
    (130). One Indian army major is quoted in an interview as
    saying (131):
    Once somebody picks up the gun then his family knows that
    it is only a matter of days before they hear that he has
    been killed in an encounter. We put the average lifespan
    of a terrorist at two-and-half years. Within this period
    we are bound to eliminate him.
    This seems to have had a significant effect on the morale
    of Pakistan's army backed jihadi-terrorist apparatus,
    because the Pakistani government started protesting
    against the presence of large numbers of Indian counterinsurgency
    personnel within India, and diplomatic
    protests grew shriller as Indian security forces chalked
    up success after success.
    In many areas, terrorists from Pakistan were unable to
    enter India at all or were able to infiltrate through in
    the smallest numbers. A backlog of violent, trained and
    indoctrinated terrorists built up in Pakistan, and
    gradually, these terrorists began to target other nations
    of the world.
    Once again, the only country that tried to alert the
    world about the global terrorist threat emanating from
    Pakistan's jihad factory was India, but Indian
    144
    information fell on deaf ears, until the September 11th
    2001 terrorist attacks on the US. That woke up the
    intelligence communities of the world with a jolt. Since
    then terrorist links leading back to Pakistan have been
    found in countries like Burma, Nepal, Chechnya,
    Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, Kuwait,
    Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Turkey, Latvia,
    Australia, UK, Canada, Indonesia and the Philippines.
    (119,132). A detailed study exists in an online portal of
    the evidence of Pakistani links to terrorism against the
    US, including links to the September 11th attacks (133).
    Pakistan has now become the home base of global
    terrorism. Terrorism Central would not be an
    inappropriate name for Pakistan, and it is by no means
    certain that anybody in Pakistan can control the forces
    that have been unleashed. The Sorcerer's Apprentice is
    out of control. The entire world, and Pakistan itself is
    being targeted by the Islamist groups spawned and
    nurtured by the Pakistani army and its intelligence cell,
    the I.S.I.
    In an article on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the
    magazine India Today, referring to the L-e-T (Lashkar-e-
    Tayeba), a powerful and deadly Pakistan based jihad
    group, had this to say in its December 2003 edition
    (132):
    There is a terrible price to pay for this facilitation
    because the same forces that drive jehad in Jammu and
    Kashmir drive it in other lands too...Indian authorities
    reckon that groups like the LeT could, in time, become
    more dangerous. Not only would they become too large for
    the ISI to manage but also their strong links with the
    underworld would create a sort of double whammy.
    This view is echoed by one of India's premier anti145
    terrorism experts, K.P.S. Gill, who warned (134):
    There is now mounting evidence of a loss of control as
    these autonomous religious groups challenge, not only
    their Army and ISI handlers, but the Government itself.
    In an indication of increasing international
    understanding of how jihad threatens to eat up Pakistan,
    a report carried by RAND said (124):
    it is no longer apparent that the army or ISI exercise
    complete control over the proxies they have helped to
    create, some of which are now openly talking about
    fomenting a fundamentalist revolution in Pakistan itself.
    In Decemeber 2003, General Pervez Musharraf, President of
    Pakistan survived two attempts to assassinate him that
    occurred within days of each other (135, 136). The fact
    that the route of the motorcade he was travelling in was
    known to the people who wanted to kill him suggests that
    someone close to General Musharraf was involved in these
    attempts. In an interview quoted in the BBC (137),
    Musharraf blamed the Al Quaeda for attempting to
    assassinate him. Other reports too have pointed to
    Islamist forces within Pakistan as being responsible for
    wanting to replace General Musharraf. Although the first
    of the two assassination attempts was thought to have
    been stage managed by Musharraf's supporters to win
    greater sympathy for him (138), the second one, a suicide
    bombing involving multiple bomb laden trucks was a very
    real indicator of the sort of forces that exist in
    Pakistan today.
    These forces will not be easy to eliminate. Apart from
    multiple Islamist groups, Pakistan is awash with weapons.
    There are an estimated 18 million illegal firearms in
    Pakistan, in addition to 2 million registered ones (139).
    146
    Pakistan is home to a Kalashnikov culture with hundreds
    of firearm manufacturing workshops making weapons,
    including inexpensive clones of the Kalashnikov AK-47
    assault rifle, a reliable weapon of choice for
    terrorists, being able to spray a high volume of fire at
    targets. In a coherently functioning nation-state, the
    government retains coercive power. That means that the
    government, (the army, in Pakistan's case) retains the
    armed power to suppress and control all other groups. But
    that monopoly over coercive power may have slipped out of
    the hands of the Pakistani army, into the hands of
    Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan.
    147
    Chapter 14
    THE GOVERNMENT AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
    There is probably no government in the world which does
    not have one or more people in power who are either
    themselves criminals or have links to criminals. However,
    successive Pakistani governments and the army have been
    unique in actively supporting and participating in
    international criminal activity as an integral component
    of the Pakistani economy and foreign policy.
    Heroin smuggling and Narco terrorism:
    Heroin is a drug that is a derivative of the medically
    used pain-killer morphine. It is obtained from the Opium
    Poppy plant. Although heroin itself has medicinal value
    as a potent pain-killer, it is extremely addictive when
    administered to normal people. People are said to crave
    for the drug after experiencing its effects just once. In
    most countries of the world, heroin is illegal to
    manufacture or possess because of its dangerous potential
    to cause addiction. Heroin addicts become so physically
    dependent on the drug, and crave the drug so much that
    they are willing to pay very high prices to obtain it,
    making heroin the star compound of the illegal drug
    trade.
    In October 1994, US Senator Frank Pallone brought to the
    attention of the US house of representatives a news
    report in the Washington Post (140):
    Mr Pallone said:
    Mr. Speaker, I rise to bring to the attention of my
    colleagues a report that appeared in the Washington Post
    of September 12, 1994, which describes a disturbing link
    between narcotics and terrorism. The report from Karachi,
    Pakistan, headlined `Heroin Plan by Top Pakistanis
    148
    Alleged' quotes Pakistan's former Prime Minister Nawaz
    Sharif saying that `drug deals were to pay for covert
    operations' brings to mind other reports not so long ago
    of Pakistani involvement in using the Bank of Credit and
    Commerce International [BCCI] to launder drug money that
    was eventually believed to have been used in financing
    terrorist groups involved in the New York World Trade
    Center bombing. The report cites Pakistan's army chief
    and head of intelligence agency proposing to then-Prime
    Minister Sharif `a detailed blueprint for selling heroin
    to pay for the country's covert military operations in
    early 1991.
    The news report said that three months after Nawaz Sharif
    became Prime Minister of Pakistan he was approached by
    the Pakistan army chief of staff, Gen. Aslam Beg and Gen.
    Asad Durrani, the head of the Inter-Services Intelligence
    (ISI) with the blueprint for a plan to export heroin to
    raise money for the Pakistan army's covert foreign
    operations a euphemism for Pakistan sponsored terrorism
    in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
    Indian analyst, B. Raman writes (141) that money earned
    through Pakistan's heroin trade was used to fund
    Pakistan's arms purchases, including missiles from North
    Korea, submarines from France and components for
    Pakistan's covert nuclear program. During the late years
    of Gen. Zia ul Haq's rule and in the early years of
    Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a special cell
    was set up by Pakistan's ISI for the use of heroin for
    covert action, under one Brigadier Imtiaz.
    Raman writes:
    Pakistan's illegal heroin economy has kept its legitimate
    State economy sustained since 1990 and prevented its
    collapse. It has also enabled it to maintain a high
    149
    level of arms purchases from abroad and to finance its
    proxy war against India through the jehadi organisations.
    The Indian army's 15th Corps, which is in the thick of
    action against terrorists from Pakistan has this to say
    in an article on Narco-Terrorism on its website (142):
    Both the Pakistan Army and the Inter Services
    Intelligence (ISI) agency are known to be extensively
    involved in narcotics trade. The primary reason for
    indulging in narcotics trade by these two premier
    institutions of Pakistan is the need for money to finance
    covert foreign operations, which the otherwise cash
    strapped economy of Pak could ill afford to pay for. The
    nexus between Pak ISI and Pak Army with the drug mafia is
    a well documented and established fact. Pak trucks are
    used by the drug mafia for narcotics smuggling. Even
    during the Afghan crisis Pak trucks and National
    Logistic Cell (NLC) vehicles transporting arms to Afghan
    Mujahideen were used for shipping large consignments of
    drugs from the drug producing areas to Karachi,
    Islamabad, Rawalpindi and other such city centres, where
    the drugs were processed, packaged and despatched towards
    their destination.
    In a one and a half year period from January 1997 to May
    1998, the Indian army captured from Pakistani
    infiltrators about 19 Kilograms of Heroin with a street
    value of US $ 5 million. Also recovered was 60 Kilograms
    of Charas - a drug derived from Cannabis (Ganja).
    Nuclear Proliferation:
    Nuclear weapons, also known as atomic bombs are extremely
    destructive. They have been used only twice in August
    1945 when the Unites States dropped a bomb on each of the
    Japanese cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. A single bomb
    150
    reduced each city to rubble, killing hundreds of
    thousands of people, causing Japan to surrender within
    days. That brought the second World War to an end. The
    destructive potential of nuclear weapons made them
    attractive to nations as a deterrent - a weapon of
    terrifying power to scare a potential attacker from
    waging war for fear of being hit by nuclear weapons. And
    because of their destructive potential, the technology
    for manufacturing nuclear weapons remained a closely
    guarded secret, available to only a handful of nations in
    the world.
    As described in chapter 4, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a
    Pakistani metallurgist stole the blueprints for making
    Uranium enrichment centrifuges from a Dutch concern
    called URENCO that he worked for. Enrichment of Uranium
    is one of the first steps in making one type of nuclear
    bomb. Upon his return to Pakistan, Khan was encouraged
    and funded by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the time,
    Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to set up facilities to enrich
    Uranium manufacture nuclear bombs. Abdul Qadeer Khan
    became a hero and achieved cult status in Pakistan as the
    father of Pakistan's Islamic bomb
    In late 2003 and early 2004, it became clear that
    Pakistani nuclear technology to enrich Uranium had been
    supplied to North Korea, Libya and Iran, along with
    actual blueprints of nuclear bomb designs in order to
    help these nations manufacture atomic bombs. Centrifuges
    made from the very designs Qadeer Khan had stolen from
    URENCO were found in Iran, and these centrifuges had
    radioactive contaminants that unmistakably bore the
    signature of a Pakistani source. Shipments of centrifuge
    components to North Korea and Libya were intercepted.
    Pakistan had obtained funds from Libya in exchange for
    this technology and North Korea paid for the technology
    by supplying Pakistan with ballistic missiles capable of
    151
    carrying nuclear weapons (143).
    In early 2004 the world was witness to an incredible
    drama on Pakistan television in which Abdul Qadeer Khan
    made a public confession of having sold nuclear weapons
    technology to other nations entirely on his own, with no
    knowledge of the Pakistani army or government. This
    confession was followed by a prompt presidential pardon
    for Dr. Khan by President and army chief Gen. Musharraf.
    It would be naive to imagine that successive Pakistani
    governments and the military were unaware of Khan's
    activities.
    An article in the online edition of the L.A. Times said
    (143):
    U.S. officials, nuclear experts and a former prime
    minister of Pakistan expressed doubts Monday about how
    Khan and a handful of associates could have circumvented
    the extraordinary controls on the country's nuclear
    technology without the military's blessings.
    Benazir Bhutto, who served twice as prime minister before
    going into exile in the face of corruption charges, said
    she doubted that the transfers could have taken place
    without the knowledge of senior military officials.
    "It is difficult to accept that the scientists could have
    violated government policy on their own," she told the
    Los Angeles Times. "Those who violated the policy are now
    hiding behind the scientists."
    On February 4th 2004, the New York Times reported (144):
    experts inside and outside the government say it is
    difficult to believe that Pakistan's nuclear secrets
    could have been exported without the knowledge of some in
    152
    the military and the Pakistani Inter-Services
    Intelligence agency, especially since some shipments were
    made on Pakistani military aircraft.
    Four days later, the New York Times carried a report in
    which it was said (145):
    Few of Mr. Bush's aides believe Pakistan's story that Dr.
    Khan operated alone. He has the deepest ties to the
    military, which oversaw the Khan Research Laboratories,
    and supplied it with a cargo fleet. Pakistan got missiles
    from North Korea, investigators believe, in return for
    uranium enrichment technology. Clearly, the Pakistani
    government must have known something about how its new
    missile fleet materialized.
    It is virtually certain that the televised drama of
    Qadeer Khan absolving the army of all responsibility for
    proliferation while taking all the blame, only to be
    pardoned by the army is in keeping with the Pakistan
    army's time honoured tradition of protecting its self
    interest and attempting to appear farcically squeakyclean
    in the face of contrary evidence.
    Airliner hijacking:
    The most blatant case of an airliner hijacked with
    Pakistani army and government complicity is the shameful
    episode of Indian Airlines Flight number IC 814 that was
    hijacked in December 2000 by five Pakistani nationals who
    boarded the flight in Kathmandu in Nepal. If it had not
    been for the murder that the hijackers committed and
    their success in achieving their aim of securing the
    release of jailed terrorists in India terrorists who were
    later to enter Pakistan and mastermind further murders
    and play a role in the suicide attacks of September 11th
    2001 in New York, this whole hijacking story could have
    153
    come out of a B-grade semi-comic motion picture.
    The five hijackers actually received their weapons in a
    diplomatic bag checked in by Pakistani First Secretary in
    Nepal, Mohammad Arshad Cheema (146). The hijacked
    aircraft was flown to the UAE, Amritsar and Lahore, and
    the newlywed husband of a honeymooning couple was
    murdered by slashing his throat, and his body thrown out
    of the aircraft while his wife remained on board for the
    rest of the duration of the hijack. The plane was then
    flown to Kandahar in Afghanistan, where it came under
    control of Pakistan's puppet Taliban government. In a
    surreal turn of events, the hijackers were provided with
    new weapons in Kandahar, as reported by a French tourist
    hostage who survived the ordeal (147).
    Indian intelligence agencies who monitored and recorded
    the communications of the hijackers on the aircraft in
    Kandahar found them receiving instructions from Lt. Gen.
    Mohammad Aziz, a Pakistani Corps commander (148). On
    Aziz's instructions the hijackers demanded a ransom of
    nearly one million US dollars, which was to be delivered
    in cash. When that was decided to be impracticable, the
    money was deposited in the account of a Pakistani
    diplomat in Delhi. The hijackers also secured the release
    of three dangerous Pakistani terrorists in prison in
    India, including Maulana Masood Azhar the founder of the
    Pakistan based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Omar
    Shaikh. The released terrorists disappeared from Kandahar
    and resurfaced in Pakistan. Omar Shaikh was later
    implicated in helping to fund the attacks on the World
    Trade center in New York, and was finally arrested for
    the murder of the Jewish-American reporter Daniel Pearl.
    Pakistan's record with reference to Indian airliners
    hijacked to Pakistan has been condemnable. After a 1971
    hijack the hijackers were granted asylum in Pakistan, and
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    the aircraft blown up on the ground. After a 1976 hijack,
    the hijackers were imprisoned for a token one month in
    Pakistan for entering Pakistan without due documents. In
    two instances of hijacking in 1981 and 1984, the
    hijackers were given refuge in Pakistan. And in an
    unbelievable second hijacking event in 1984, the
    hijackers received a weapon along with snacks in Lahore
    (149).
    Refuge for Criminals:
    Pakistan has positioned itself as an ideal place for any
    criminal from India to seek, and obtain refuge. India
    has a list of 20 most wanted criminals who are living in
    Pakistan.
    The following is a list of names of the twenty, and a
    brief description of their activities (150):
    1. Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of Jaish-i-Mohammad, man
    behind the attack on India's parliament on December 13,
    2001. He is also wanted for an attack on the J&K Assembly
    on Oct 1, 2001 in which 38 people were killed. He
    currently lives in and operates from Bahawalpur,
    Pakistan.
    2. Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, co-founder of Lashkar-e-Toiba,
    also blamed for the attack on parliament in New Delhi. He
    operates from Muridke town, near Lahore in Pakistan.
    3. Dawood Ibrahim, an Indian underworld don, man behind
    the planning and financing of 13 explosions in Mumbai in
    1993 in which almost 300 people died. Ibrahim is wanted
    in connection with cases of arms supply, counterfeiting,
    drugs trade, funding alleged criminals, murder and
    smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi,
    Pakistan.
    155
    4. Chhota Shakeel, a key associate of Dawood Ibrahim.
    Wanted for murder, extortion, kidnapping, blackmail of
    businessmen and film stars in India. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    5."Tiger" Ibrahim Memon, accused of executing the 1993
    Mumbai blasts. He is wanted in cases of murder,
    extortion, kidnapping, terrorism and smuggling arms and
    explosives in India. He is currently living in Pakistan.
    6. Ayub Memon, accused of executing the 1993 Mumbai
    blasts. He is alleged to have helped his brother Ibrahim
    Memon carry out the blasts. He is wanted in cases of
    terrorism and smuggling. He lives in and operates from
    Karachi, Pakistan.
    7. Abdul Razzak, accused of involvement in the Mumbai
    blasts. He is wanted in cases of terrorism and arms
    smuggling. He lives in and operates from Karachi,
    Pakistan.
    8. Syed Salahuddin, head of Hizbul Mujahideen, which has
    claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on Indian
    forces in Kashmir, India. He currently lives in and
    operates from Muzaffarabad, Pakistan.
    9. Ibrahim Athar, an associate of Maulana Azhar Masood
    and was one of the hijackers of Indian Airlines flight
    IC-814 from Kathmandu to Delhi in 1999. He is a member of
    Jaish-i-Mohammad and is wanted for hijacking, kidnapping
    and murder. He currently lives in and operates from
    Bahawalpur, Pakistan.
    10. Zahoor Ibrahim Mistri, a member of Harkat-ul-Ansar,
    which later changed its name to Harkat-ul-Mujahideen. He
    is wanted in connection with the hijacking of IC-814 and
    156
    in cases of kidnapping and murder. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    11. Shahid Akhtar Sayed, is wanted for the IC-814
    hijacking and for kidnapping and murder. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    12. Azhar Yusuf, wanted in the IC-814 hijacking case and
    in cases of kidnapping and murder. He lives in and
    operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    13. Abdul Karim, a Kashmiri terrorist blamed for more
    than 30 bomb blasts in Delhi and parts of northern India
    in 1996-97. He lives in and operates from Lahore,
    Pakistan.
    14. Ishaq Atta Hussain, an associate of Dawood Ibrahim,
    is wanted in connection with a conspiracy to kill Indian
    Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister L.K. Advani. He
    lives in and operates from Karachi, Pakistan.
    15. Sagir Sabir Ali Shaikh, an associate of Dawood
    Ibrahim, is also wanted in connection with the conspiracy
    to kill Advani. He lives in and operates from Karachi,
    Pakistan.
    16. Wadhawan Singh Babbar, chief of Sikh group Babbar
    Khalsa International, which was involved in an insurgency
    in East Punjab during the 1980s. He is wanted in over a
    dozen cases of sedition, murder and in connection with
    the assassination of East Punjab's then chief minister
    Beant Singh. He lives in and operates from Lahore,
    Pakistan.
    17. Ranjit Singh Neeta, chief of Khalistan Zindabad
    Force. He is wanted in cases of murder, bomb blasts and
    smuggling of arms in India. He lives in and operates from
    157
    Lahore, Pakistan.
    18. Paramjit Singh Panjwar, leader of the Khalistan
    Commando Force. He is accused of trying to revive the
    Sikh insurgency in East Punjab and is wanted in more than
    a dozen cases of murder, treason, conspiracy and arms
    smuggling. He lives in and operates from Lahore,
    Pakistan.
    19. Lakhbir Singh Rode, leader of the International Sikh
    Youth Federation, is wanted in cases of arms smuggling,
    conspiracy to attack government leaders in Delhi and
    inciting religious hatred in East Punjab. He lives in and
    operates from Lahore, Pakistan.
    20 .Gajinder Singh, leader of Sikh group Dal Khalsa, is
    accused of hijacking an Indian Airlines plane from
    Srinagar to Delhi in 1981. He was arrested by Pakistan
    after he hijacked the plane to Lahore and tried. He lives
    in and operates from Lahore, Pakistan.
    Pakistan admitted the presence of the third man on the
    list, Dawood Ibrahim in Pakistan in September 2003 after
    news of a bomb blast in Karachi. Rediff reported (151):
    Pakistan has admitted gangster Dawood Ibrahim's presence
    in the country, according to a report. The admission came
    after a bomb blast at a Karachi business centre, the
    Kawish Crown Plaza, which the inspector general of Sindh
    police said was "ostensibly owned by Ahmed Jamal but
    actually belonged to Dawood Ibrahim", Pakistani journal
    The Herald said.
    Dawood Ibrahim was subsequently designated a global
    terrorist by the US for his links with Al Quaeda and the
    Lashkar-e-Tayeba, the Islamist extremist group that was
    founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, the first man on India's
    158
    Most wanted list, one of the prisoners released by India
    after the 1999 hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft
    to Kandahar in Afghanistan.
    Printing and circulation of counterfeit currency:
    In January 2000, a staffer from the visa section of the
    Pakistan embassy in Nepal was arrested in Kathmandu
    (Nepal) after passing counterfeit Indian currency to
    Nepalese police in a sting operation. The Pakistani
    ambassador tried to stop the arrest claiming diplomatic
    immunity for the staffer but it turned out that he did
    not have diplomatic immunity.
    The Indian Express reported (152):
    Officials said the quality of fake notes was "such that
    it could only be printed in security presses", in an
    apparent hint that Pakistan was indulging in massive
    printing of fake notes to abet its terrorist activities
    against India.
    With Indian currency being valid in Nepal, that country
    was a natural choice for anti-India activities from
    Pakistan, which apparently intended to destabilize the
    Indian economy by flooding India with fake currency. One
    report (153) quoted the street value of the Pakistan made
    counterfeit currency in India:
    The prevailing price for counterfeit currency in Punjab
    is Rs 40-60 (83 US cents-$1.25) in exchange for every
    Pakistani-made Rs 100 note - the range depending on the
    buyers' bargaining skills and the volume required. The
    right contacts can ensure that Pakistani counterfeit
    159
    currency is available even cheaper..
    Another report of the arrest of a man carrying
    counterfeit currency said (154):
    The racket was being remote controlled by Aftab Butki
    from Dubai in United Arab Emirates (UAE). Butki is a
    front man of notorious mafia don Dawood Ibrahim and
    controls the gang for pumping fake currency into India
    through the porous Indo-Nepal border. Inter Services
    Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan has been providing
    logistical support to the underworld dons for flooding
    the Indian market with counterfeit currency with the sole
    aim of creating panic in the Indian market. Joint
    Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, U K Katna said,
    "The counterfeit currency notes were sent for damaging
    the Indian economy.
    The high quality of the counterfeit notes and official
    sponsorship of this and other criminal activities by
    Pakistani governmental agencies is a frightening
    indicator of the chaotic state that Pakistan is in with
    no expense being spared to prepare for war or jihad
    against India and very little being spent on development
    and education within Pakistan.
    160
    Chapter 15
    PAKISTAN FAILED STATE
    The credit for coining the name Pakistan probably goes to
    one Choudhry Rehmat Ali who is said to have thought of
    the name in 1933 as an acronym containing letters from
    the names of all the areas which this man thought were
    representative of the ancestry of his people. Another
    theory is that the acronym was composed by a group of
    students in Cambridge in England. It is not clear if
    Rehmat Ali was one of these students. A passage
    attributed to him says (155):
    "Pakistan" is both a Persian and an Urdu word. It is
    composed of letters taken from the names of all our
    homelands - "Indian" and "Asian". That is, Punjab,
    Afghania (North West Frontier Province), Kashmir, Iran,
    Sindh (including Karachi and Kathiawar), Tukharistan,
    Afghanistan, and Baluchistan. It means the land of the
    Paks-the spiritually pure and clean. It symbolizes the
    religions, beliefs and the ethnical stocks of our people;
    and it stands for all the territorial constituents of our
    original Fatherland.
    The theory that Pakistan is an acronym does not stand up
    to scrutiny. In the first place, the Pakistan described
    by the acronym includes Iran and Central Asia
    (Tukharistan) as part of Pakistan and makes no mention of
    East Bengal, which was part of Pakistan until it seceded
    with the creation of Bangladesh. A second curious anomaly
    is that the name of this nation that is claimed to be
    derived from Urdu and Persian is composed of letters in
    the English alphabet with the English letters forming
    the acronym. Such an acronym is non-existent when the
    name is written in Urdu. It seems more likely that the
    acronym theory of the name is a confabulation, a
    plausible but imagined memory that fills in gaps in what
    161
    is remembered as to how Pakistan got its name.
    Ultimately, the stress on pure Islam and a nation purely
    for Muslims, that has Urdu as its official language
    suggests that the real origin of the name Pakistan
    derives from the Urdu word Paki. The dictionary of Urdu,
    Classical Hindi and English defines Paki as Purity - with
    stan meaning country (156).
    That stress on purity - or purity with a narrow
    definition has certainly played a role in Pakistan's
    undoing. Purity is a subjective concept, and can only be
    grasped in relation to something else that is impure. To
    define purity, one must simultaneously define what is
    impure, and Pakistanis have spent the years since 1947
    years struggling to weed out anything that they consider
    impure, rather than concentrate on nation building.
    India, and Indians were impure and were rejected.
    Minorities and religious groups in Pakistan were impure
    Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Ahmediyas and later even Shia
    Muslims in Pakistan were not pure enough for Pakistan.
    Further purity was required by fighting wars and making
    sacrifices. Social imbalance, corruption, poverty and
    greed were all minor blips in the route to Pakistan's
    mythical purity.
    Conditions of life for a Pakistani depend on what class
    of society one belongs to and whether one lives in a
    rural or urban area. As noted in chapter 2, there are
    only two main classes of society in Pakistan, the very
    rich and the very poor and these classes comprise 90% of
    Pakistan's population.
    There is a very small, very rich class of Pakistani. They
    are the Rich Anglophone Pakistani Elite, sometimes
    facetiously referred to by the acronym of that name. The
    acronym R.A.P.E. is perhaps an apt description of what
    162
    this class have been doing to Pakistan. They are the
    feudal lords, who may own thousands of acres of land.
    They might be rich industrialists and businessmen, or
    they might be serving or retired army officers.
    The lifestyles of these people can be compared to that of
    the rich and famous anywhere. They live in fabulous
    mansions, maintained and supported by armies of servants.
    These are the beautiful people, the handsome men clad in
    lounge suits or traditional sherwanis, the mascara and
    lipstick adorned women in designer dresses. No burkha
    (veil) for these women.
    The elite are educated, often in the best schools and
    universities of the world. They travel, and are familiar
    with all the major cities that a man of this world should
    know about New York, London, Paris, Rome, Geneva. They
    are seen in parties and receptions attended by friends
    and diplomats, actors and society people. Their
    photographs appear in glossy magazines and on the
    Internet. These charmed people are the Pakistanis that we
    see and hear.
    Irfan Husain wrote in the Dawn:
    An old friend was recently invited to a serving general's
    official residence for a small dinner party, and came
    away hugely impressed by the acres of immaculate lawns,
    the discreet lighting, the tasteful furnishings and the
    overall level of luxury...The food and refreshments were
    of the highest quality, and the army staff who served the
    small gathering had apparently been trained at a fivestar
    hotel...
    But 90 percent of Pakistanis are rarely seen or heard
    outside Pakistan. They are the servants, the sweepers,
    the waiters, the casual laborers and sharecroppers, the
    163
    goatherds and the cleaners with their wives and their
    children. They can be seen on Pakistani streets and in
    the villages. The men wear crumpled and seemingly
    unwashed salwar suits. The women, if seen at all, are
    covered in burqas as expected of women in Islamic
    Pakistan. The women do not work outside the home and may
    have four or more children to bring up. More than half
    these people do not earn enough money for a decent life.
    Most earn less than the equivalent of US $1 per day. Even
    those who earn more than that often sink below poverty
    level at certain times of the year, or in times of
    illness or drought.
    Malnutrition is rampant, as is lack of education. Any
    education that can be gained, can be gained only from
    madrassas that often provide food and shelter for its
    students. That is a welcome source of relief for a very
    poor family with many children to care for. But girls are
    not allowed, and girls are not sent to schools either, in
    the few places where schools exist.
    Life is harsh, and many try to find work in the Middle
    East to earn a living as menial laborers. Others try to
    migrate to Europe and beyond. The hard life, hunger,
    poverty and destitution are accepted by some people as
    the will of Allah that cannot be questioned or mitigated.
    Others are angry and frustrated at their lot and these
    people are told by their elite masters that poverty and
    hardship are because of Indian aggression or some other
    extraneous factor. Pakistani leaders, being Islamic and
    who appear forever busy to defend Pakistan, are above
    blame.
    And that has been an integral part of Pakistan's problem.
    For more than five decades since independence, Pakistani
    leaders have sacrificed enormous and fruitless amounts of
    money, time, human life and effort to somehow equal,
    164
    match or defeat India. The build up of Pakistani armed
    forces into a formidable war machine was initially to
    defeat India and take Kashmir, and later to defend
    against an India that had no intention of attacking
    Pakistan. Money and effort that should have gone into
    building schools, roads and hospitals in Pakistan was
    spent on building a war machine that could never
    overwhelm an India that was just too big. Pakistan was
    halved when Bangladesh seceded, but even then the
    wasteful expenditure did not stop. The bloated ranks of
    army retirees had to be accommodated, and businesses were
    custom made for employing them, and development of the
    poor was bypassed as usual. Money from any source was
    poured developing nuclear weapons to deter India. Money
    was diverted to training Islamist operatives for covert
    operations against India, and a system of salaries and
    pensions had to be set up for them, while the stoic
    Pakistani public, with women and children at the bottom
    of the pile received little. Even criminal activity aimed
    against India, gun running or currency counterfeiting
    swallowed funds that should have gone into schools and
    healthcare in Pakistan.
    In the midst of this, the poor of Pakistan are left with
    the only succour they can get - Islam. And even that is
    used against Pakistan's arch enemy, India. Popular
    devotion to Islam is channelled to provide an endless
    supply of men for jihad. Anger is carefully re-directed
    away from the ruling elite, to be directed at India,
    Israel, the US or other Western nations, or is
    internalised as people not being "Islamic" enough. The
    anger is compounded by what is taught in schools and
    madrassas following curricula that actively teach hatred
    and discrimination to impressionable children.
    The madrassa is the place where students' physical hunger
    is assuaged, but their emotional hunger for explanations
    165
    about the miserable existence of their families is often
    met by a call for violent jihad against forces that are
    blamed for hunger and misery. Every son sent to a
    madrassa is one mouth less to feed for a poor family, and
    sending one son to die for jihad brings honour and
    financial reward to the family.
    Girls grow up uneducated, live at home until they come of
    age, marry and produce children. Boys are preferred in
    all ways in this male-dominated society. The girl child
    gets less food and is more likely to die of malnutrition
    and disease. The ratio of men to women in Pakistan is
    grossly skewed with many more men than women.
    But women hold the key to family honour. A woman's place
    is in the home - she is not supposed to be seen outside,
    either alone, or in the company of a man who is not her
    husband or father. A woman who breaks rules by exposing
    herself or by being seen with a non-approved male
    companion, or a woman who marries against the wishes of
    her family is considered to be committing a crime by
    bringing dishonour on the family - an act that is
    punishable by death.
    Pakistani society has both extremes. On the one hand the
    society has a small minority of wealthy and emancipated
    people among whom women can get educated and work. The
    other extreme is the harsh life of a woman living under
    the burden of strict discriminatory rules. Between these
    two extremes are a vast mass of Pakistanis who are more
    or less generally poor; they are generally uneducated,
    and the level of education for women is invariably less
    than that of men.
    The people are docile, as the British had found them.
    They do not easily rise up in revolt against tyranny or
    injustice, but individuals in such a society grow up in
    166
    conditions that make their minds receptive to
    indoctrination into a life of terrorism and jihad.
    The people need clean drinking water, roads, schools,
    health care, and access to family planning so that births
    can be spaced out, giving a mother time to recover and
    nurse an earlier child before bearing another child. But
    the money, people and will to provide these things never
    reach the population. All the money in Pakistan, be it
    government funds, aid money or export profits is split up
    and shared by a small percentage of wealthy people at the
    top. The Army gets money; the army businesses do well;
    the businessmen and feudal lords get money, and very
    little reaches the Pakistani on the ground. The only
    funding that reaches this level comes from unaccounted
    and unaccountable sources funding the madrassas that
    preach an agenda of hatred and jihad.
    Pakistan is controlled by an oligarchy of a thousand
    individuals or so (157) in a few dozen families. This
    ruling elite is composed of senior army officers,
    business magnates controlling key businesses such as
    transport, fuel oil and cement, as well as feudal
    landowners. For the survival of corrupt business
    interests in Pakistan the elite must remain in power and
    not be bothered by rebellion or the uncertainties of
    democracy. The 140 million mostly poor people of Pakistan
    are kept in check with the excuse that their faith,
    Islam, is under threat from India, and other nations.
    Pakistanis have been told that the army and the ruling
    elite have protected Pakistan and Islam from these
    external threats. For aid givers like the US and rich
    Western nations, the ruling elite of Pakistan behave like
    moderate, secular and well-intentioned democrats who are
    keeping Islamic fundamentalism at bay.
    Time and again Pakistani leaders change masks depending
    167
    on whom they are addressing. They appear in Western suits
    or crisp army uniforms, speaking in English to aid givers
    and donors. To their deprived population, they appear in
    traditional Pakistani salwar suits, and speak in Urdu.
    Western aid givers are told what they want to hear; that
    the ruling elite are fighting to hold fundamentalist
    forces at bay and that more aid and lifting of sanctions
    are essential for the prevention of a Islamic
    fundamentalist takeover of Pakistan.
    In the meantime the ruling clique in Pakistan ensures its
    own survival. Each member of this elite community knows
    that too much action in curbing or controlling the vast
    business empires of their rivals will upset one's own
    business interests. Opponents are rarely killed, punished
    severely or publicly humiliated. They are gently
    sidelined, along with sops to keep them happy. This
    mechanism was clearly illustrated after the father of
    Pakistan's nuclear bomb Abdul Qadeer Khan made a public
    confession that he was responsible for the proliferation
    of nuclear technology (chapter 13). Within a day, he was
    publicly pardoned by Pakistani President General
    Musharraf, and allowed to keep all the wealth that he had
    earned from nuclear proliferation activities. The ruling
    clique of Pakistan stands to gain from this form of loose
    cooperation in which all the business interests survive
    at the expense of the constitution and law, while people
    are constantly fed with the anti-Muslim India threat.
    The threat that is held up is that if the ruling clique
    goes, Pakistan will sink into an uncontrollable morass of
    160 million hankering for an Islamic state. Whether this
    is likely or not, the US administration and some US think
    tanks seem to believe this providing the ideal setting
    for Pakistani rulers to play a double game of pretending
    to be devoutly Islamic for their people, while appearing
    moderate to aid givers.
    168
    When Pakistani President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf
    was given an ultimatum by the US government in September
    2001 that he could be With the US or against the US in
    its war on terror, he made his decision to support the US
    in a speech (56) that used the time tested Pakistani
    mask-changing routine to address different groups of
    people. He spoke in English initially, knowing that this
    would be understood by viewers in the US, saying words of
    support to please the US. But in the course of the same
    speech, he addressed Pakistanis in Urdu and, using
    Islamic examples, told them that his alliance with the US
    was akin to a temporary alliance with the devil to deter
    an immediate threat. This ploy is a fail safe formula
    that has allowed the survival of the Pakistani oligarchy
    so far, even as the human condition of the people in
    Pakistan has gradually deteriorated.
    The average poor Pakistani is taught that his misery is
    because of Indian aggression, or more recently, because
    of the US' war on terror. External anti-Islamic forces
    are always to blame. The powerful and wealthy groups of
    Pakistan stand to lose their money and lifestyles if
    funds are diverted to education, health care and
    development of the poor. As long as the poor can be left
    to vent their anger against some external foe by joining
    jihad or accepting their misery as Allah's will the rich
    army, elite and feudal leadership of Pakistan will be
    under no pressure to change.
    No power on earth can coax this small group of rich and
    powerful Pakistanis that wealth in a nation has to be
    shared and spread around for development of society and
    the nation as a whole. The rich get richer and the poor
    get poorer, and the population of the poor is rising
    rapidly, and their level of education is falling. These
    people will form a huge mass of uneducated and unemployed
    169
    people in a few years' time.
    The ruling elite of Pakistan are engaged in a strange
    experiment in which they seem out of touch with reality.
    They exist on a different plane from the poor and they do
    not seem to understand that the burgeoning population of
    the poor, and the anger that is now being channeled
    against India or the West can turn inwards. The poor are
    over 100 million strong now but will be twice that number
    in a single generation, and they will be jobless, hungry
    and angry.
    Nations like India, China, Russia and Western countries,
    who have all had to face the violent consequences of
    trained jihadi fighters from Pakistan are vigorously
    resisting and neutralizing them. The forces of jihad are
    unlikely to receive sanctuary or be allowed to survive in
    these nations in the current geo-political scenario.
    Faced with such pressure outside Pakistan, thousands of
    indoctrinated, armed and dangerous young men could well
    turn inwards at Pakistani rulers, blaming them for their
    inability to help in the victory of jihad over
    unbelievers. If Pakistani leaders can show constant
    military victories, it is likely that their population
    will at least temporarily continue to be happy at the
    successes. But when low-tech irregular Islamic militias
    spawned by the Pakistani army and governments are unable
    to achieve victories despite tremendous losses, they are
    increasingly likely to ask the leaders of Pakistan, the
    army and the elite why they are being defeated.
    From the beginning Pakistanis, rich or poor have had no
    sense of nationhood, no sense of whom and what they are
    other than being a group of Muslims who have escaped from
    India. Every effort at development and good governance
    has been destroyed by a vested interest, always living in
    the vain hope that some Western nation, or rich Islamic
    170
    nation will bail the country out. Democracy was first
    derailed by the migrant bureaucracy who had moved to
    Pakistan from India. Later it was the army that stood to
    lose from democracy. Political parties have been
    disempowered, and the judiciary lives under the shadow of
    the army.
    The only forces that are gaining strength are those of
    fundamentalist Islam, the forces that seek to fight India
    or the US, or even Shias within Pakistan. The two most
    powerful groups in Pakistan today are the army and
    Islamic groups, Pakistan is getting to the stage when the
    Islamic groups have infiltrated into the ranks of the
    army and appear set to take control of Pakistan. The
    Islamic groups themselves are divided, and their unity
    may only last as long as it takes for them to gain
    control of Pakistan.
    None of these powerful groups seems to be interested in
    development or progress. No group seems set to allow
    modern education, peace with India, women's rights or
    birth control in Pakistan, all essential for progress.
    The political parties and democratic forces did not do
    this. The army did not do it and the Islamic groups do
    not show any intent of fostering a progressive Pakistan.
    Predictably, they too are careening down the path of more
    and purer Islam as the answer to Pakistan's problems. And
    worse for Pakistan, Islamist groups, with trans-national
    loyalties, cannot be guaranteed to be interested in the
    territorial integrity and borders of Pakistan as they
    exist. And so the disease eating Pakistan from the inside
    continues.
    Jessica Stern wrote (119):
    Pakistan is a weak state, and government policies are
    making it weaker still. Its disastrous economy,
    171
    exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders, is at the
    root of many of its problems. Yet despite its poverty,
    Pakistan is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on
    weapons instead of schools and public health. Ironically,
    the government's "cost-saving" measures are even more
    troubling. In trying to save money in the short run by
    using irregulars in Kashmir and relying on madrasahs to
    educate its youth, Pakistan is pursuing a path that is
    likely to be disastrous in the long run, allowing a
    culture of violence to take root.
    Pakistan is in an unstable state and there appears to be
    no leader who can show Pakistan a way out. Too many
    Pakistanis have been taught that they exist only for
    Islam and for jihad and these people are now caught
    between the twin pincers of the global war on terror
    being conducted by many nations on the one hand, and by
    the rich and corrupt Pakistani rulers on the other. The
    long term outlook for Pakistan does not appear
    encouraging.
    In a paper on Pakistan, Stephen Cohen wrote (158):
    When security, human services, justice, and basic
    necessities are not provided, states fail.
    Pakistan can be compared to a broken biscuit whose pieces
    are held together by some wrapping paper. The area
    labelled as Pakistan on maps is called Pakistan, but that
    area is not wholly under the control of any single
    government or leadership, as one would expect of a
    normally functioning nation-state. The first fragment of
    the biscuit that broke off was Bangladesh, in 1971. There
    is no guarantee that the other fragments of this
    dysfunctional state will hold together.
    Pakistan is already a nation that is only partially under
    control of its government which is basically the army.
    172
    Only 5% of Baluchistan, Pakistan's largest province, is
    under Pakistani control. Tribal law rules the sparsely
    populated land. The Pakistani government has little or no
    control over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas the
    so called FATA. Areas of Pakistan's first city, Karachi,
    are outside government control.
    Gaining control of Pakistan is easier said than done. As
    indicated in Chapter 12, Pakistan is awash with illegal
    weapons. The FATA areas are home to hundreds of small
    arms factories and shops that sell them (151). With 18
    million illegal firearms, Pakistanis outside the military
    and government have enough weapons to equip several
    armies, and anyone trying to bring heavily armed private
    militias under control will have to contend with a lot of
    firepower.
    But as the history of nations shows, if the Pakistan
    government is unable to control its own territory,
    someone else is likely to step in to fill the vacuum
    sooner or later. Therein lies the real significance of
    having large areas in a country that are out of
    governmental control. The fact that a government can only
    govern areas that it controls means that areas beyond
    government rule are ripe for control by some other force
    or alternate government. These schisms are begging to be
    exploited. The United States already has a powerful
    military presence in Pakistan, and perhaps that is an
    eerie harbinger of yet another civilization set to rule
    this lawless land.
    Pakistan is perhaps fortunate that the nation state of
    India is not yet as adept and conscious of international
    hegemonic games and how India can interfere to bring law
    and order to the fraying edges of Pakistan. But that may
    be changing as the lawlessness of Pakistan continues to
    spill into an increasingly powerful India as terrorism,
    173
    forcing India to become conscious of its role and
    responsibility in the region.
    174
    APPENDIX 1
    http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/Maharaja_letter.html
    Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh
    to Lord Mountbatten
    on the eve of Pak invasion on J&K in 1947
    My dear Lord Mountbatten,
    I have to inform Your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in
    my State and request the immediate assistance of your Government. As
    Your Excellency is aware,the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not
    acceded to either the Dominion of India or Pakistan. Geographically
    my State is contiguous wit h both of them. Besides, my State has a
    common boundary with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and with
    China. In their external relations the Dominion of India and Pakistan
    cannot ignore this fact. I wanted to take time to decide to which
    Dominion I should accede or whether it is not in the best interests
    of both the Dominions and of my State to stand independent, of course
    with friendly and cordial relations with both. I accordingly
    approached the Dominions of India and Pakistan to enter into
    standstill agreement with my State. The Pakistan Government accepted
    this arrangement. The Dominion of India desired further discussion
    with representatives of my Government. I could not arrange this in
    view of the developments indicated below. ln fact the Pakistan
    Goernment under the standstill agreement is operating the post and
    telegraph system inside the State. Though we have got a standstill
    agreement with the Pakistan Government, lhe Govemment permitted a
    steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and
    petrol to my State.
    Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes wnh modern
    weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State, at first in
    the Poonch area, then from Sia1kot and finally in a mass in the area
    adjoining-Hazara district on the Ramkote side. The result has been
    that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to
    175
    be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at several points
    simultaneously, so that it has become difficult to stop the wanton
    destruction of life ad property and the looting of the Mahura power
    house, which supplies electric current to the whole of Srinagar and
    which has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnpped and
    raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the
    State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer
    capital of my government, as a first step to overrunning the whole
    State.The mass infiltration of tribesman drawn from distant areas of
    the North-West Frontier Province, coming regularly in motortrucks,
    using the Manwehra-Mazaffarabad road and fully armed with up-to-date
    weapons, cannot possibly be done without the knowledge of the
    Provincial Govemment of the North-West Frontier Province and the
    Government of Pakistan. Inspite of repeated appeals made by my
    Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or to stop
    them from coming into my State. In fact, both radio and the Press of
    Pakistan have reported these occurences. The Pakistan radio even put
    out the story that a provisional government has been set up in
    Kashmir. The people of my State, both Muslims and non-Muslims,
    generally have taken no part at all.
    With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great
    emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask
    for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the
    help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of
    India. I have accordingly decided to do so, and I attach the
    instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government. The other
    alternative is to leave my state and people to free booters. On this
    basis no civilised government can exist or be maintained.
    This alternative I will never allow to happen so long as I am the
    ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country. I may also
    inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once
    to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry
    the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
    If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at
    Srinagar. Mr. V.P. Menon is fully aware of the gravity of the
    situation and will explain it to you, if further explanation is
    needed.
    176
    In haste and with kindest regards,
    Yours sincerely,
    Hari Singh
    October 26, 1947
    177
    APPENDIX 2
    http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kashun80.htm
    Resolution 80 (1950)
    Concerning the India-Pakistan question, submitted by the
    Representatives of Cuba, Norway, United Kingdom and United States and
    adopted by the Security Council on March 14, 1950.
    (Document No. S/1469), dated the 14th March, 1950).
    THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
    Having received and noted the reports of the United Nations
    Commission for India and Pakistan establishing its resolutions 39
    (1948) of 20 January and 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948.
    Having also received and noted the report of General A. G. L.
    McNaughton on the outcome of his discussions with the representatives
    of India and Pakistan which were initiated in pursuance of the
    decision taken by the Security Council on December 17, 1949,
    Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesman
    like action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations
    Commission's resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949 for a
    cease-fire, for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and
    Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in
    accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method
    of a free and impartial plebiscite, and commending the parties in
    particular for
    their action in partially implementing these Resolutions by
    (1) The cessation of hostilities effected January 1, 1949,
    (2) The establishment of a cease-fire line on July 27, 1949, and
    (3) The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be
    Plebiscite Administrator,
    Considering that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties
    should be based upon the substantial measure of agreement of
    fundamental principles already reached, and that steps should be
    taken forthwith for the demilitarisation of the State and for the
    expeditious determination of its future in accordance with the freely
    expressed will of the inhabitants,
    178
    1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to make
    immediate arrangements, without prejudice to their rights or claims
    and with due regard to the requirements of law and order, to prepare
    and execute within a period of five months from the date of this
    resolution a programme of demilitarisation on the basis of the
    principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton proposal or of such
    modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed;
    2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the
    following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions
    in such place or places as he may deem appropriate;
    (a) to assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation
    of the programme of demilitarisation referred to above and' to
    interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarisation;
    (b) to place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India
    and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security
    Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to
    contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute
    which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State
    of Jammu and Kashmir; to exercise all of the powers and
    responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission for
    India and Pakistan by reason of existing resolutions of the Security
    Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the
    Resolutions of the United Nations Commission of August 13, 1948 and
    January 5, 1949; to arrange at the appropriate stage of
    demilitarisation for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator
    of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between
    the parties; to report to the Security Council as he may consider
    necessary, submitting his conclusions and any recommendations which
    he may desire to make;
    3. Requests the two Governments to take all necessary precautions to
    ensure that (heir agreements regarding the cease-fire shall continue
    to be faithfully observed, and "calls upon them to take all
    possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of 'in
    atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations;
    4. Extends its best thanks to the members of the United Nations
    Commission for India and Pakistan and to General A. G. L. McNaughton
    for their arduous and fruitful labours;
    5. Agrees that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
    179
    shall be (terminated, and decides that this shall take place one
    month after both parties have informed the United Nations
    Representative of their acceptance of the transfer to him the powers
    and responsibilities of the United Nations Commission referred to in
    paragraph 2 (c) above.
    The Security Council voted on this Resolution on 14-3-50 with the
    following result:
    In favour: China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Norway, U.K. and
    U.S.A.
    Against: None
    Abstaining: India and Yugoslavia
    Absent : USSR
    180
    APPENDIX 3
    http://www.indianembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/Tashkent_Declaration_January_
    10_1966.html
    Tashkent Declaration
    January 10, 1966
    The 1965 armed conflict between India and Pakistan was formally
    brought to an end by signing this declaration at Tashkent, the
    capital of the Republic of Uzbekistan in the Soviet Union. Prime
    Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan signed it on
    behalf of their respective countries in the presence of the Soviet
    Premier Alexi Kosygin who mediated between them.
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, having met
    at Tashkent and having discussed the existing relations between India
    and Pakistan, hereby declare their firm resolve to restore normal and
    peaceful relations between their countries and to promote
    understanding and friendly relations between their peoples. They
    consider the attainment of these objectives of vital importance for
    the welfare of the 600 million people of India and Pakistan.
    I
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that
    both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighborly relations
    between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations
    Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have
    recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful
    means. They considered that the interests of peace in their region
    and particularly in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent and, indeed, the
    interests of the people so India and Pakistan were not served by the
    continuance of tension between the two countries. It was against this
    background that Jammu and Kashmir was discussed, and each of the
    sides set forth its respective position.
    II
    181
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not
    later than 24 February, 1966, to the positions they held prior to 5
    August, 1965, and both sides all observe the cease-fire terms on the
    cease-fire line.
    III
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that relations between India and Pakistan shall be based on the
    principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
    IV
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that both sides will discourage any propaganda directed against the
    other country, and will encourage propaganda which promotes the
    development of friendly relations between the two countries.
    V
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that the High Commissioner of India to Pakistan and the High
    Commissioner of Pakistan to India will return to their posts and that
    the normal functioning of diplomatic missions of both countries will
    be restored. Both Government shall observe the Vienna Convention of
    1961 on Diplomatic Intercourse.
    VI
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    to consider measures towards the restoration of economic and trade
    relations, communications, as well as cultural exchanges between
    India and Pakistan, and to take measures to implement the existing
    agreements between India and Pakistan.
    182
    VII
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that they will give instructions to their respective authorities to
    carry out the repatriation of the prisoners of war.
    VIII
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that the two sides will continue the discussion of questions relating
    to the problems of refugees and eviction/illegal immigrations. They
    also agreed that both sides will create conditions which will prevent
    the exodus of people. They further agreed to discuss the return of
    the property and assets taken over by either side in connection with
    the conflict.
    IX
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have agreed
    that the two sides will continue meetings both at the highest and at
    other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries. Both
    sides have recognized the need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani
    bodies which will report to their Governments in order to decide what
    further steps should be taken.
    The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan recorded
    their feelings of deep appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of
    the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and personally to the
    Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. for their
    constructive, friendly and noble part in bringing about the present
    meeting which has resulted in mutually satisfactory results. They
    also express to the Government and friendly people of Uzbekistan
    their sincere thankfulness for their overwhelming reception and
    generous hospitality.
    They invite the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to
    183
    witness this declaration.
    APPENDIX 4
    http://web.mid-day.com/news/nation/2003/november/67781.htm
    Terrorists earn a peon's wage By: M K Tayal November 2, 2003
    What motivates a young man to take up terrorism, enrol himself at a
    training camp in Pakistan, infiltrate India, fire at the Army and
    possibly never return home?
    It is a small pay package that equals the wage of a peon or driver.
    The lure of a mere Rs 3,000 per month ensures that the Inter-Services
    Intelligence (ISI) meets its manpower requirements.
    However, not every terrorist gets Rs 3,000. Payments relate directly
    to performance, area of operation, number of casualties the terrorist
    has inflicted upon Indian security forces, motivation level and other
    HR criterion.
    In short, the ISI maintains dossiers and gives annual marks to its
    cadres very much like the Pakistan Army does for its regular
    employees.
    The pay scale is not rigid as it varies depending on the risks one is
    willing to take and his commitment to the cause. Some of the more
    'enthusiastic' Kashmiri youth get around Rs 5,000. With the number of
    years one puts in, the annual increment increases.
    A Kashmiri company or battalion gets from Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000. A
    district commander gets around Rs 20,000.
    Nevertheless, one thing is clear that Kashmiri youth get a raw deal
    compared to the Pakistani or foreign counterpart. The Kashmiri
    mujahideen is paid less by the ISI than a Pakistani terrorist.
    The rank and file from Pakistan or Afghanistan or any other country
    gets a starting salary of Rs 5,000 that can go up to Rs 7,000.
    Commanders get much more. A commander starts at anything above Rs
    25,000. The higher they go, the heftier the pay package and the more
    discreet it becomes.
    Lashkar-e-Taiba's (LeT) Doda district commander Mohd Shahzad, a
    184
    Pakistani national, captured by the Army after a fierce encounter in
    September 2003, said he came to Jammu & Kashmir to be a jehadi and
    was paid nearly Rs 20,000 per month but that limit was waived off as
    a special case.
    "Money didn't matter. I could get as much as I wanted," Shahzad had
    said. However, he remained silent when asked what was the amount his
    parents were getting in Pakistan.
    But it is sure that the money Shahzad got was for operations in his
    area and his logistical support. His monthly emoluments were being
    directly sent to his home in Pakistan.
    The main attraction in joining the ISI is the initial offer. A
    Kashmiri gets Rs two lakh as one-time payment to join. There is a
    catch. One must go over to Pakistan to get the complete four to five
    month training and then work his way back into India from the 120
    launch pads.
    The basic training at the 85 training camps is the same and involves
    handling small arms (AK-47) and explosives, small unit tactics of
    raid and ambush and radio communication. The second term involves
    training of special
    operations-explosives.
    The fidayeens (soldiers on a suicide mission) get highly
    sophisticated training but their emoluments remain a mystery, since
    naturally none survive to tell their tale.
    "Poor economic conditions in the Valley force some to cross over to
    Pakistan for their training. The amount is too tempting for anyone to
    say 'no'," explains an official.
    There are other factors too at work. Competition and style for
    instance drive most youth into the realm of the AK-47. "It has become
    a style. If you don't have a gun you don't get good girlfriends and
    nobody respects you," a militant said to an army officer serving in
    the Valley.
    Sources also point to the presence of foreign militants who come to
    the Valley after sessions of intense motivation and psychological
    drills. LeT's Shahzad said he came to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) to fight
    jehadis as he was told harrowing stories of atrocities being
    committed on the Muslims in the Valley.
    185
    I felt I had to take revenge but now after fighting the army for more
    than three years I realise the futility of this 'freedom' movement,"
    he said in a heart-to-heart talk.
    However, the ISI makes sure that those who help recruit while on the
    job are not neglected. It rewards handsomely. "If a militant
    motivates and enrols another youth, he can make upto Rs 1.5 lakh,"
    explained a source.
    However, initially the ISI made sure the money was delivered to the
    militant's parents but as the numbers started dwindling, so did it
    the commitment.
    Though no one complains publicly, there have been reports of parents
    of the deceased militant not getting a single penny. Realising this,
    Kashmiri youths are now averse to taking up the gun while recruitment
    from Pakistan remains high.
    186
    SOURCES AND REFERENCE MATERIAL
    1.Indian Muslims and Pakistan, Vir Sanghvi, Counterpoint,
    Sunday 7th March 2004
    http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_602882,00300001.ht
    m
    2. The eight conflicts that the Indian armed forces have
    been involved in since 1947 are the four conflicts with
    Pakistan described in Chapter 11, the long running lowgrade
    war of cross border terrorism from Pakistan
    described in Chapter 12; Operation Vijay against the
    Portuguese occupation of Goa in 1961, the India-China war
    of 1962, and Operation Pawan, the Indian peacekeeping
    operations in Northern Sri Lanka in the late 1980s.
    3. Pak population will swell to 349m by 2050, Syed Asif
    Ali and Muddassir Rizvi KARACHI/ISLAMABAD: The Daily
    Jang, Pakistan, September 28th 2003, online edition,
    http://jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2003-daily/26-09-
    2003/main/main7.htm
    4. Who Owns Pakistan? Website by Shahid-ur-Rehman
    http://members.tripod.com/richpaki/whoowns.htm
    5. Human conditions not improving in Pakistan: report,
    By Nadeem Malik, The Daily Jang, Pakistan, December 5th
    2003, online edition, http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-
    daily/05-12-2003/main/main5.htm
    6. National stock-taking, M B Naqvi, The Daily Jang,
    Pakistan,August 14th 2002, online edition,
    187
    http://jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2002-daily/14-08-
    2002/oped/o5.htm
    7. Op-ed: Our missing middle, by Ravian, The Daily Times,
    Pakistan, August 1st 2003, online edition,
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_1-8-
    2003_pg3_3
    8. Television sets per 1000 people - Pakistan has 22 TV
    sets per 1000 population
    http://www.alsagerschool.co.uk/subjects/sub_content/geogr
    aphy/Gpop/HTMLENH/stats/tvs.htm
    9. Pakistan, The Press for Change, Kavita Menon, Special
    Report According to London's Financial Times, the
    combined circulation of Pakistan's entire Englishlanguage
    press is no more than 150,000 in a population of
    134 million.
    http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2000/Pakistan_feb00/Pakistan
    07feb00Br.html
    10. Reforming Pakistan's madrassas, Musharraf determined
    to change Muslim schools' 'indoctrination', By Tom Brokaw
    Anchor, NBC News
    http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4264215/
    11. Donors want poverty trends reversed, By Ihtashamul
    Haque, The Dawn, Pakistan, November 6th 2003, online
    edition,
    http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/06/op.htm
    12.
    http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/publications/pocket_b
    ook2003/chapter02.pdf - a document published by the
    statistics division, Government of Pakistan, page 2.
    188
    13. Deplorable schools angering Pakistanis
    Issue at the top of voters' agenda Juliette Terzieff,
    Chronicle Foreign Service, Thursday, October 10, 2002,
    The San Francisco Chronicle, online edition,
    http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/
    article.cgi?f=/chronicle/a/2002/10/10/MN155006.DT
    14. What and wherefore of Madaris, A. B. S. Jafri, The
    Dawn, Pakistan, 20th January 2003, online edition,
    http://www.dawn.com/2003/01/20/fea.htm1
    15. Medievalism and Pakistan's madrassas, Nadeem Iqbal,
    The Asia Times online edition, 29 Aug 02
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DH29Df05.html
    16. The madrassas and the have-nots, Dr Tariq Rahman,
    Professor of Linguistics and South Asian Studies, Quaidi-
    Azam University, Islamabad, The News - Jang :
    Opinion, Saturday September 08, 2001 - "At the time of
    the partition there were 137 madrassas.In 1950 there were
    210 of them while in 1971 they increased to 563. Nowadays
    there are at least 7000 of hem. Out of the registered
    ones - and most are still unregistered - the Barelvis
    have 1400; the Deobandis 550 and the Ahl-e-Hadith 347.
    These are the Sunni madrassas"
    http://light.afgha.com/article.php?sid=7657
    17. The Pakistani Time Bomb, Alexei Alexiev, Center for
    Security Policy
    http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=
    static&page=alexievpakistan
    18. Pamela Constable, The Washington Post, September 19th
    2001, online edition,
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp189
    dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A59220-
    2001Sep19&notFound=true
    19. Madrassas: A make-believe world. By Aijazz Ahmed
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EA14Df01.html
    20. "The Subtle Subversion - The State of Curricula and
    Textbooks in Pakistan", A.H. Nayyar and Ahmed Salim,
    http://www.sdpi.org/archive/nayyar_report.htm
    21. Conflict and Violence in the Educational Process,
    Khurshid Hasanain and A. H. Nayyar,
    http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/chapter_8.html
    22. Others, as we know them, Kamila Hyat, The Daily Jang,
    Pakistan, August 10th 2003, online edition
    http://jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2003-weekly/nos-10-08-
    2003/enc.htm#1
    23.THE MENACE OF EDUCATION What Are They Teaching In
    Pakistani Schools Today? by Pervez Hoodbhoy,
    http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2000-
    09/14hoodbhoy.htm
    24. Zobaida says anti-India material from curricula to be
    deleted, Monday March 08, 2004 (1520 PST)
    http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=57435
    25. A not-so-subtle subversion, Shireen M Mazari,
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2004-daily/10-03-
    2004/oped/o3.htm
    26.Pakistan's Economic Dilemma, Sreedhar, Sr. Fellow,
    IDSA, June 18, 1998,
    http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/southasia/06181998sreedhar1
    190
    .html
    27. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non
    Proliferation Project: Countries Possessing Ballistic
    Missiles
    http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/BallisticMissileCh
    art.asp?p=8
    28. Missile Overview, Gaurav Kampani, Nuclear Threat
    Initiative, April 2004
    http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/i
    ndex_3066.html
    29.http://www.stuff.co.nz/stuff/0,2106,2741933a12,00.html
    30. K. Subrahmanyam, The Pretence is Over - Pak Link with
    Nuclear Black Market, Editorial, The Times of India, Feb
    1st 2004
    31. China Nuclear Milestones, The Risk Report
    Volume 6 Number 6 (November-December 2000),
    http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/china/nukemiles.
    htm : U.S. intelligence discovers China gave
    Pakistan a tested nuclear bomb design.
    32. Strategic Affairs Analysis, No 003/Issue Aug 16
    http://www.stratmag.com/issueAug-15/page06.htm
    "According to a report leaked out of the Los Alamos
    Nuclear Laboratory, in the autumn of 1998, the air
    samples acquired over Chagai by US intelligence agencies,
    contained traces of plutonium. Pakistan, around the
    period of the tests, had not had time to develop a
    warhead from the minimal quantities of plutonium
    191
    generated by the research reactor at PINSTECH. Therefore,
    there is evidence that the devices tested were either
    plutonium supplied by non-Pakistani sources, or the
    device itself was not a Pakistani warhead but that of
    another nuclear weapons state which needed to validate a
    modernized warhead, given the moratorium on nuclear
    testing"
    33. HOW POOR ARE THE POOR, By KHURRAM FAHEEM, Feb 03 -
    09, 2003,
    http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/page/c-issue/etc4.htm)
    34.Jobs or jihad, thats the question, Shalini Chawla, Fri
    19 July 2002,
    http://www.indianexpress.
    com/full_story.php?content_id=6224.
    35. Truth about Zia's 'status quo' era, By Special
    Correspondent,
    http://www.dawn.com/2002/09/02/ebr7.htm
    36. Kidnapped Nation, Richard Behar, FORTUNE, Monday,
    April 29, 2002,
    http://meadev.nic.in/ind-ter/for-med/fortune-
    29apr2002.htm
    37. When will Pakistan get an apology?, Shaheen Sehbai, 6
    Aug 2002
    http://www.satribune.com/archives/aug03_09_02/opinion_edi
    torsdesk.htm
    38. The confusion in our minds, By Zubeida Mustafa,
    http://www.dawn.com/2002/08/05/op.htm
    39. John Lancaster, Washington Post Foreign Service
    Tuesday, April 8, 2003; Page A29
    192
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52556-
    2003Apr7.html
    40. Musharraf and the Jihad industry, Pervez hoodbhoy
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-8-
    2002_pg3_5
    41. Cross-Cultural Face-Negotiation: An Analytical
    Overview" by Professor Stella Ting-Toomey,
    http://www.cic.sfu.ca/forum/ting-too.html
    42. "The Arab Mind", Raphael Patai
    43. Testimony of Professor Stephen P. Cohen, Senate
    Committee on Foreign Relations, January 28th 2004, India
    and Pakistan: Steps towards Rapproachement.
    44. India-Pakistan in War & Peace, by J N Dixit, review
    in the Asia Times
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    45. Islam and Secularization,
    http://www.secularislam.org/separation/secularization.htm
    46. http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo/wwwhse1421.html
    47. No intention to enter into nuclear race: Musharraf,
    http://www.nci.org/02/03f/14-06.htm
    48."The Encyclopedia of Land Warfare in the 20th
    Century", Part 5, Asian Wars of Imperial Succession,
    Brigadier Shelford Bidwell, Pages 164-173, Leisure Books,
    Salamander Books Ltd 1977, 27 Old Gloucester St, London
    WC1N 3AF, UK
    49. We must hang together, I M Mohsin, http://www.jang193
    group.com/thenews/jul2002-daily/11-07-2002/oped/o4.htm
    50. Prospects for social cohesion,
    http://www.1upinfo.com/country-guidestudy/
    pakistan/pakistan45.html
    51: Fall of Dhaka-the true face, Brig (r) A Q Anjum
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/16-12-
    2003/oped/o5.htm
    52. Fall of Dhaka: the true face-2, Brig (r) A Q Anjum
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/17-12-
    2003/oped/o6.htm
    53. Pakistan:Transition to Democracy?" 3rd Oct 2002,
    report from the International Crisis Group,
    http://www.ecoi.net/pub/nz194_00900pak.pdf
    54. Speech Archive, History Channel
    http://www.historychannel.com/speeches/archive/speech_19.
    html On December 17, 1971, 90,000 West Pakistani troops
    surrendered to Indian forces in Bangladesh and the war
    came to an end.
    55. The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2001.
    India-Pakistan Wars
    http://www.bartleby.com/65/in/IndiaPak.html
    Pakistan lost its eastern half, an army of 100,000
    soldiers,
    56. Text of speech by General Pervez Musharraf,
    http://www.laclave.net/docs/documentos/pakistan.doc
    57. DEFENCE NOTES, The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971,
    Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN,
    http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/pak-army.htm
    194
    58. Martial Mind - Pakistan Officer Corps thought-process
    about Defence, Columnist Hamid Hussain explores the
    Pakistan military mind-set.
    http://www.defencejournal.com/2002/july/martial.htm
    59. How poor are the poor, Khurram Faheem
    http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/page/c-issue/etc4.htm
    60."TO BE A WOMAN IN PAKISTAN IS TO ASK FOR A LIFE OF
    SUBSERVIENCE" By Ameera Javeria,
    http://www.mjfellows.org/journal/winter01/javeria.html
    61. International Perspective on Family Violence in
    Pakistani Society, Zafar Abbas, Social Work Group, Pains
    Welfare Trust International, Karachi, Pakistan
    http://wcfv.confex.com/wcfv/2003/preliminaryprogram/abstr
    act_2380.htm
    62.
    http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/3251/spri
    ng99/pakistan.html
    63 Islamic Pakistan illusions and reality, Abdus
    Sattar Ghazali,
    http://ghazali.net/book1/body_chapter_1.htm
    64. Ethnic Cleansing in Pakistan during Partition: A
    Preliminary Statistical Analysis, Sridhar N.,
    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE6-
    2/sridhar.html
    65. Pak army siphoning off US aid in Swiss accounts,
    Times of India, online edition, SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2002
    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/html/uncomp/ar
    195
    ticleshow?artid=27859526
    66. Some obstacles in normalization, M. H. Askari
    http://www.dawn.com/2003/12/12/op.htm#2
    67. Jihad and the United States, By M. Asghar Khan,
    http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/15/fea.htm#1
    68. Massacres of shias in Iraq & Pakistan - the
    background, by B.Raman, Paper no. 941, 03. 03. 2004
    http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper941.html
    69. Pakistan's Taliban Problem, By Reuel Gerecht, Monday,
    October 29, 2001, The Weekly Standard,
    http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.13288/news_detail.asp
    70.http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/jan2003-daily/22-01-
    2003/oped/o5.htm
    71.The Friday Times online, 28th March 2003 28 March 2003
    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/
    72.http://www.tolueislam.com/Bazm/misc/pkk_04.htm
    73.http://www.witnesspioneer.
    org/vil/Articles/politics/mawdudi2.html
    74 The Root of India-Pakistan Conflicts, Rajiv
    Malhotra, Monday, February 11, 2002,
    http://www.sulekha.com/expressions/column.asp?cid=170243
    75. Among the Believers, V.S. Naipaul, Picador, 1981,
    page 87, page 102, page 112, page 116, page 159
    76. Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan, Sharif al Mujahid
    http://members.tripod.com/~no_nukes_sa/chapter_5.html
    196
    77. P.H. Reddy, Demographer, The Times of India, 8th
    April 2003.
    78. Explore Pakistani culture,
    http://ny.essortment.com/pakistanicultur_rrme.htm
    "Pakistani culture can be called as "Mixed Culture".
    Although the majority of people in Pakistan are Muslims
    by birth and faith, there is a strong influence of Hindu
    culture on the present Pakistani culture. The shadows of
    this influence are quite visible on the marriage
    ceremonies and festivals like "Basant"
    79. Islamic Revolution: the only possible future for
    Pakistan, Dr Kalim Siddiqui, Crescent International,
    Sunday August 5, 2001
    80. Military in the Power structure of Pakistan, Mohammad
    Waseem:
    81. Social forces and ideology in the making of
    Pakistan, By Hamza Alavi, Prof Karrar Hussain Memorial
    Lecture Nov 2, 2002, The Friday Times, Dec 6-12, 2002
    82. Understanding Political Islam, M.A.Hussain, Wed Jun
    25 '03
    http://jakarta.indymedia.org/front.php3?article_id=1642&g
    roup=webcast
    83. The reality of an Islamic state, Asad Latif JAN 21,
    2002
    http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/usattack/story/0,1870,98
    039,00.html
    84 Political Authority in Classical Islamic
    Thought, Tamara Sonn
    197
    http://www.islamonline.net/iol-english/qadaya/islamic-
    3/islamic3.asp
    85. An Advanced History of India, Vol 1, (Lahore, 1980),
    p 391), Majumdar, Raychaudhuri and Datta,
    86."Pakistan Papers", Mani Shankar Aiyer, UBSPD, 1994,
    page 10.
    87. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL 'DEVELOPMENT'
    OF PAKISTAN AND ITS RATIONALE, Brig. S.K Raychaudhuri VSM
    (Retd), ARTRAC [Army Training Command] magazine, PINNACLE
    Vol 2 No 2 October 2003.
    88. Know thy enemy!, Masud Akhtar Shaikh,
    http://jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2003-daily/19-12-
    2003/oped/o4.htm
    89.Change the Rupee into Riyal or Dinar, Ahmed Quraishi
    http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Dec-2003/19/EDITOR/op5.asp
    90. Soldiers in business, "Power, Perks, Prestige and
    Privileges: Military's economic activities in Pakistan -
    Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
    91. Pakistanis Question Perks of Power, By John Lancaster
    Washington Post Foreign Service, Friday, November 22,
    2002; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/
    articles/A23614-2002Nov21.html
    92. Robert Fisk: Farewell to democracy in Pakistan, 26
    October 2001
    http://www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp?story=101459
    93. Whose land is it anyway? Irfan Husain,
    198
    http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/mazdak.htm
    94. Rightsizing of the Armed Forces
    http://www.pakistanweekly.com/Opinion.htm
    95. The Weekly Independent, Issue #48, May 23-29, 2002
    96. Military Inc. Dominates Life in Pakistan, PAUL
    WATSON, TIMES STAFF WRITER
    http://www.satribune.com/archives/oct7_13_02/LATIMES_stor
    y.htm
    97. Oped by Dr. Farrukh Saleem
    http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/may2003-daily/25-05-
    2003/oped/o5.htm
    98 Official Web Page of the National Logistic Cell
    of Pakistan, http://www.nlc.com.pk/
    99. A first hand list of Army land lords, Special SAT
    Report
    http://www.satribune.com/archives/Aug17_23_02/P1_landgrab
    bing.htm
    100. Pakistan struggles with poverty reduction, Nadeem
    Iqbal
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DL12Df01.html In
    its "World Development Indicators-2002", the World Bank
    says that 31 percent of Pakistan's population lives off
    $1 a day, while the percentage of people living below $2
    a day is a staggering 84.7 percent.
    101. Era of mullah coddling is over, Najam Sethi, The
    Friday Times, Pakistan
    http://www.thefridaytimes.com/front.shtml
    199
    102. The Pakistan army and Islamic radicals, By Amos
    Perlmutter, The Washington Times, November 17, 1999,
    reproduced on the website of the Indian Embassy
    http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/Terrorism/news_us/pak
    _army_radicals%20_nov_17_99.htm
    103. Pakistan-India: Same game, new rules, Syed Saleem
    Shahzad
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK27Df03.html
    104. B.Raman, quoted in the online portal Rediff:
    http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/oct/01arvind.htm
    105. Interview with Nawaz Sharif, Weekly Independent, Vol
    1, No 7, March 7-13, 2002
    106. Pakistan's privileged army Quest for hegemony at
    home, abroad, G. Parthasarathy
    http://www.hinduonnet.com/bline/stories/2003081400020800.
    htm
    107. The rogue army of Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy,
    Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications
    Thursday, Jan 02, 2003
    http://www.blonnet.com/stories/2003010200060800.htm
    108. What if Pervez Musharraf is killed, Pramit Pal
    Chaudhuri
    http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_510850,0008.htm
    109.Indian Army History, http://www.bharatrakshak.
    com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Link3.html
    110. Indian Navy History, http://www.bharatrakshak.
    com/NAVY/Link3.html
    200
    111. Indian Air Force History, http://www.bharatrakshak.
    com/IAF/History/Link-Hist.html
    112. KASHMIR AND PARTITION OF INDIA (Part II)
    by Prof. Ram Krishen K. Bhatt, http://www.kashmirinformation.
    com/Miscellaneous/Bhatt2.html
    113. Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten
    on the eve of Pak invasion on J&K in 1947.
    http://www.kashmirinformation.
    com/LegalDocs/Maharaja_letter.html
    114. Virtual Bangladesh : History : Eyewitness accounts,
    Rafiqul Islam, Professsor Rafiqul Islam
    http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/rafiqul_islam.html
    115. Case Study: Genocide in Bangladesh, 1971
    http://www.gendercide.org/case_bangladesh.html
    116. Calling the Indian Army Chief's Bluff, Lt Gen (Retd)
    JAVED NASIR http://www.defencejournal.com/febmar99/
    chief-bluff.htm
    117. Lessons from Kargil, Gen VP Malik PVSM, AVSM (Retd)
    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE4-
    6/malik.html
    118. Terrorists plan to pose as disabled travelers
    Pakistani nationals behind U.S. plot, warns new Homeland
    Security memo, Paul Sperry
    http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=3633
    4
    119. Pakistan's Jihad Culture, Jessica Stern, Foreign
    Affairs, November/December 2000
    http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20001101faessay940/jessica201
    stern/pakistan-s-jihad-culture.html
    120. Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great
    Game, M. Ehsan Ansari, published by the Strategic Studies
    Institute, page 5
    121. THE ROVING EYE Jihad: 'The ultimate thermonuclear
    bomb', Pepe Escobar http://www.atimes.com/indpak/
    CJ10Df01.html
    122.Pakistan-India: Same game, new rules, Syed Saleem
    Shahzad, Asia Times Online, Nov 27th 2003
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EK27Df03.html
    123. The Taliban's Pakistan connection, Excerpts from a
    Sept. 15 article by Tariq Ali, in The Independent (UK)
    http://www.tao.ca/~mayworks/911/1/pakistan.shtml
    124. Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency, Peter
    Chalk
    http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/090101JIR.html
    125. The spirit of Gandhar, Shahid Nadeem
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-8-
    2002_pg3_7
    126. Musharraf and the Jihad industry, Pervez hoodbhoy
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_17-8-
    2002_pg3_5
    127. Jihad: 'The ultimate thermonuclear bomb', Pepe
    Escobar.
    http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/CJ10Df01.html
    128. Indo-Pakistan Talks Myths, Delusions and Fantasies!!
    Guest Column: Arindam Banerji, South Asia Analysis Group,
    202
    Paper no. 710, 09. 06. 2003
    http://www.saag.org/papers8/paper710.html
    129. The Truth About Kashmir, a website maintained by the
    Indian Army's 15th Corps. http://www.armyinkashmir.org/
    130.PROFILE OF A MILITANT: Based on the statistics
    available the average life span of a militant / mercenary
    does not exceed 20 months from the time he returns to J&K
    to participate in the so called Jihad. A period in which
    he is a fugitive, moving from one hide to another, trying
    to avoid contact with the security forces
    http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/profile.html
    131. Harvest of Terror, By Ghazala Wahab,
    http://www.forceindia.net/harvest.asp
    132. Beyond Control, Indrani Bagchi with Anil
    Padmanabhan. India Today, December 8th 2003
    133. Pakistani Role in Terrorism Against the U.S.A,
    Narayanan Komerath, BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR - Volume 5(2)
    September-October 2002
    http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-
    2/narayanan.html
    134.The Politics of Islam in Pakistan, K.P.S. Gill, The
    Pioneer, March 2, 2001
    135. Musharraf eludes assassination bid - Dec 14th 2003,
    http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/12/14/bl
    ast.musharraf/
    136. Musharraf escapes second assassination attempt,
    http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/dec26/i1.asp
    203
    137. Musharraf admission on secrets, BBC News online,
    Friday, 23 January, 2004, 18:30 GMT
    http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3424007.stm
    138. Assassination 'windfall' for Musharraf, Syed Saleem
    Shahzad
    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/EL19Df05.html
    139. Pakistan has 18 million illegal firearms-report,
    quoting Reuters Alertnet
    http://www.pakistanfacts.
    com/article.php/20030115094510198
    About 18 million firearms are held illegally in Pakistan
    in addition to the two million weapons that are legally
    registered.. The main concentrations of illegal arms in
    Pakistan are in semi-autonomous tribal regions bordering
    Afghanistan. Many of the weapons have been imported from
    Afghanistan, awash with arms after more than 23 years of
    war. Guns are also produced locally, notably in the
    tribal town of Darra Adamkhel, which is famous for
    imitation weapons from all over the world. The Dawn
    report said Darra Adamkhel still had around 900 arms
    factories, all of them illegal and about 150 shops
    selling arms and ammunition
    140. Hon. Frank Pallone, JR. in the House of
    Representatives, Monday, October 3, 1994
    http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1994_cr/h941003-terrorpak.
    htm
    204
    141. Heroin, Taliban & Pakistan, by B.Raman,
    http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper288.html
    142. NARCO TERRORISM IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND PAKISTAN'S
    ROLE, http://www.armyinkashmir.org/articles/narco.html
    143. Pakistan Caught in Web of Evidence, By Douglas
    Frantz, Paul Watson and Mubashir Zaidi,
    http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgpaknukes3feb03,1,1265066.
    story?coll=la-home-headlines
    144. Warhead Blueprints Link Libya Project to Pakistan
    Figure By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER,
    Published: February 4, 2004,
    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/04/politics/04NUKE.html
    145. Confronting the Nuclear Threat America Didn't Want
    to Be True, By DAVID E. SANGER, Published: February 8,
    2004
    http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/08/weekinreview/08sang.htm
    l?hp
    146. IC 814 Hijack,
    http://users.senet.com.au/~wingman/hijack.html
    147. Plane hijackers received new weapons in Afghanistan:
    French hostages, Agence France-Presse, Sunday, January 2,
    2000, http://pak-terror.freeservers.com/webarticle50.htm
    148. Aziz hand seen in Kandahar hijacking, Public Affairs
    Magazine, newsnight.net,
    http://www.indiareacts.com/archivefeatures/nat2.asp?recno
    =23&ctg=community
    149. Pakistan's role in hijacking, By Samuel Baid
    http://meadev.nic.in/OPn/2000jan/11ht.htm
    205
    150. 20 Most Wanted Terrorists that India has demanded
    Pakistan to extradite back to India, Kashmir Herald on
    the Web, Volume 3, No. 6 - November 2003
    http://www.kashmirherald.com/nov03/top20.html
    151.Dawood in Karachi, admits Pakistan, September 21,
    2003 15:13 IST,
    http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/sep/21dawood.htm
    152. Pak embassy official in Nepal held selling fake
    Indian currency, PRESS TRUST OF INDIA,
    http://www.indianexpress.com/ie/daily/20000104/ifr04015.h
    tml
    153. Rahul Bedi, April 4, 2002 from the Asia Times:
    http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/2002/0404ramp
    ant.htm
    154. International currency racket busted, Extracted from
    'The Pioneer', New Delhi, Dated 24th September 2002
    http://www.alphalasertek.com/programs/news4.asp
    155. How did the word "Pakistan" come into existence?
    http://www28.brinkster.com/pakistan4ever/wordpakistan.htm
    l
    156. "A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English"
    Author: John T. Platts, ISBN: 81-215-0098-2, Publisher:
    (Indian Edition) Mushiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.
    Page: 218.
    157. Stepehen Cohen, Financial Times (London,England)
    January 16, 2004, Friday Europe Edition 1#
    158. The Nation and State of Pakistan, Stephen Cohen
    http://www.twq.com/02summer/cohen.pdf
    206
    159. Pakistan Human Rights ignored in the ‘War on
    Terror’, Executive summary,
    http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa330352006
    160. Pakistan Surrenders The Taliban control the border
    with Afghanistan, by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Bill
    Roggio ,10/02/2006, Volume 012, Issue
    03http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/0
    00/000/012/738ijawx.asp
     

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