Pakistan, Caste and dilemma of quislings

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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Journey of a Dalit corpse

Written by Ganpat Rai Bheel
Published on 29 November 2017

exhuming_bheel_boy.png

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The exhumed body of Bhooro Bheel. The incident occurred on October, 7, 2013 in village\town Pingrio in Badin district of Sindh. The dead body of a Dalit, Bhooro Bheel was exhumed on the pretext that he was a profane Hindu untouchable and could not be buried in a Muslim graveyard [2]. "Shouting "Allahu Akbar", or "God is greatest", the crowd dug out the body and dragged it through the streets of the southern town of Pangrio in a dispute over the location of the grave" reported a newspaper. [2]
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In district Badin, a corpse of a young Bheel was exhumed out of the grave and thrown in the open. Sahib-i-Iman (true believers of Islam) performed that inhuman act with the religious fervor of utmost sanctity. On the pages of daily Sindh Express, that photo and report were published with some detail. It can be said that this picture truly depicts the existing status of 'secular and Sufi' Sindh, and warrants a Dalit a 'death certificate' too.

This is the status of Adivasi folks of Sindh who are not only living stranded nomadic existence for centuries but they are living that life in the grave as well. This land of Sindh is no more of the land of those Dravidian, of Dalits, whose dead bodies it throws out of its embrace. The invaders, the outsiders spiritually rule over Sindh, and the elegant tombs are raised in their honor, whereas the indigenous owners of that land, are disgraced all their lives, and when they die, they are not even given space in their own land. This incidence was not the act of any lone maniac, but it was the reflection of the whole society, its attitude towards Dalits. This is the bitter truth that when the Dalit of Dravidian origin is ostracized and humiliated all his life and is not even allowed to rest in peace after death.

The saying 'kith's enmity does not last long, she\he repents, returns and repays', is utterly nonsensical. Adivasis of the subcontinent are not by any means considered as kith and kin of the rest of the folks. These Sindhi folks that descended from Kurds, and came from the valleys of Dajla and Farat (Euphrates and Tigris), they sing the greatness of the Indus valley civilization of the Dravidians, and complain of later invasions of their ancestors, and do not tolerate the existence of those that in fact were the ultimate victims of such intrusions and invasions.

This apathy and antipathy is not uncommon, and not a novel or a new phenomenon. Each instance of Adivasi life is no less tortuous than death itself. This is as if it is a given condition of existence. And when they actually die off physically, they are not considered worthy to become dust with dust. Jogi community usually faces that issue more often than any other Adivasi communities. When any family member of Jogi nomads dies, they cover up the body with rilli (Sindhi traditional quilt). Jogi women, instead of crying or lamenting, observe painful silence. Little children also remain mum out of uncanny terror. When any child unable to control their sorrow, weeps, parents fold the weeping child into their arms so that its voice would not go outside the Jogi settlement.

At that very instant, this world ceases to be the place where humans could live. It is nothing but the jungle ruled by savages, by wolves and ferocious beasts. Men wait for the night to fall. And when the time comes, they secretly begin to dig the grave. The dead body is secretly buried down before the dawn arrives. The raised soil above the grave (that they called 'udharimitti', i.e., the borrowed soil') is flattened after grabbing a handful of it in trembling hands. Having so ensured that it does not show any signs of the burial place, they take their digging stuff, they touch the burial place the last time, say some final prayers in their heterodox manner (My daughter\son\ mother\ father\ pray for our souls!!! ). Soon after the burial, they embark upon their journey to find the other place. Domesticated dogs and donkeys that accompany them are witness to that whole doleful and extremely painful episode and must be feeling proud and grateful not to be one of the human folk. Their pride is by no means unjustifiable. Living a life worse than animals has no other meaning for Dalits than the unending journey of living and dead corpses.

The whole society, the state, casteism, racism, and extremist tendencies, the anti-human values that we harbor are responsible for such a state of Dalits. Dalits too, are responsible for their own humiliation, because instead of reacting against such inhuman attitudes and oppression they accept it as their existential given, and tolerate it.

Dalits have to unite for their human rights, social justice, and equality. Only through their own efforts, Dalits have succeeded, wherever in the subcontinent, they have launched social and political movements. Their own character, unity, and assertion have played the pivotal and decisive role in their struggles. Because, no other Mahtama, or emancipator, will descend to change their lot, neither did it come in the past, nor it will ever come in the future. NGOs, so-called civil society, paper-lion human rights commissions, National or governmental human rights organizations are probably more oppressed than Dalits. Great and grand revolutionaries, popular leaders, nationalists have done nothing except paying lip service to Dalits' cause. In such a scenario, Dalits or Adivasi folks have no other option except to return to themselves and echo what the poet of resistance from Maharashtra, Namdeo Dhasal said:

Socialism of this world
Communism of this world
And all its renditions
We have tried them all
And reached the conclusion that
Only our own shadow can cover our feet.

This article was originally published in October 2013 in the daily SindhExpress.
Translated by: Sufi Ghulam Hussain

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LordOfTheUnderworlds

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scroll.in/article/859841/the-pakistan-protest-that-brought-the-government-to-its-knees-and-the-changing-face-of-sufi-culture

The Barelvis, the force behind the party and the protest, are deeply imbued in the Sufi shrine culture of South Asia. With the rise of puritanical Islam in the last couple of decades in the country, many commentators have looked towards other traditions within Islam that were seen as inclusive and tolerant. The Barelvi movement, the most popular one within the Islamic tradition in South Asia, was seen as the perfect response, an interpretation of Islam rooted in South Asian culture, a depiction of Sufi Islam.


However, such assumptions are based on a quite simplistic understanding of Sufism. There is no one uniform interpretation of the term. Sufism means different things to different people. Even within the Sufi tradition, there is a range of ideas, some of which sometimes directly contradict each other................. Rest blah blah blah....
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Why are Barelvis wielding new political influence in Pakistan?

The last three weeks have laid bare Pakistan’s claims of countering extremist ideology, both militarily and ideologically. The state shut down social media websites and TV channels in order to counter protesting supporters of the newly-formed religious party, Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool-ullah around Islamabad, and ordered the deployment of troops to restore order. But as a clear sign of insubordination, the military instead objected to the way the protest was handled.

It is important to explore the genesis of TLYP – a group of Barelvi religious organizations behind these protests. For decades, the Deobandi-Salafist groups championed the cause of violent jihad in Pakistan, while the Barelvi groups mostly remained apolitical and non-violent. However, unlike the common belief that only Deobandi-Salafist groups apostatize other sects, Barelvi literature is also rich with fatwas against the followers of other Islamic sects. One reason why Barelvi groups weren’t radicalized during the Afghan jihad is because the Saudi funding to fight the Soviet Union was directed towards Deobandi and Salafist groups due to their ideological affinity. However, over the past few years, Barelvi groups have gained significant political influence and street power.

It all started with the Salman Taseer blasphemy row. Then Governor of Punjab province, Taseer raised concerns about the way a blasphemy-accused Christian woman Asia Bibi’s case was treated. He visited her in the jail, and promised to appeal to then President Asif Ali Zardari to grant her clemency, while criticizing the controversial blasphemy laws. His statements drew the ire of several religious groups, especially the Barelvi organizations, which accused him of committing blasphemy.


One Barelvi cleric, the Rawalpindi-based Hanif Qureshi incited his followers to murder Governor Taseer. Among his listeners was an elite force soldier, Mumtaz Qadri, who was assigned with Salman Taseer’s security detail a few days later. Qadri murdered Salman Taseer at an Islamabad market, and handed himself in afterwards.

Since then, Qadri, a Barelvi himself, became the poster boy for Barelvi religious groups. They now champion the ishq-i-rasool (love for the prophet), and remain at the forefront of anti-blasphemy campaigning in Pakistan. The much-needed catalyst to bring their followers on the streets was the hanging of Mumtaz Qadri to death. TLYP was born out of the protests against Qadri’s death. The current leader Khadim Hussain Rizvi gained fame through his fiery speeches against the government.

Unlike the several militant outfits which turned on the military after Pakistan decided to aid the United States’ war on terror in Afghanistan, TLYP focuses its criticism on the civilian government, and not the military. Unlike the Deobandis and Salafis, experts say, Barelvi leaders pose as pro-army and pro-state, who want themselves affiliated with the army, thus giving an impression that everything they are doing is lawful.

This stands true in the current fiasco as well, when General Qamar Bajwa reportedly refused to deploy the military to disperse the protestors, saying “they are our people”. Now that a deal has been struck between the government and the protestors with the arbitration of an ISI Major General, and Law minister Zahid Hamid has resigned, several questions arise: why did an ISI General act as an arbitrator between the government and protestors? If the government was willing to accept the protestors’ demand, why wait for three weeks? Perhaps, the military pressurized the government to accept the protestors’ demands.

The deal itself has been subject to severe criticism by various quarters, with leading commentators describing it as “surrender”. Unfortunately, such deals were struck with the likes of TTP leaders Mullah Fazlullah in Swat and Nek Muhammad in Waziristan, but ultimately, the state had to launch military operations against them.

If one was to learn from those experiences, accepting the demands of an outlawed group is acknowledging them as stakeholders, which only worsens the situation. With this deal as well, the government conformed to the outrageous demands of a small group of protestors – setting another very bad precedent.

Now that someone’s faith is subject to suspicion by a mob, it is clear the mob won’t stop with Zahid Hamid. According to some reports, Punjab Law minister Rana Sanaullah needs to testify his belief in the finality of Prophethood in front of some clerics. If this continues, no one even with a slightly dissenting opinion will be able to live peacefully in Pakistan.

However, there is another important factor to be considered. The military in Pakistan has a history of using religious groups to further their agenda. Currently, the establishment is working hard to destroy the PML(N) votebank ahead of the 2018 general elections. What better way to do so but pitting Barelvism – a large part of the Pakistani population adheres to this school of thought – against the PML(N) ?

The signs have been there. In the recent by-elections for the National Assembly seat vacated by the disqualified former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, TLYP received more than 7,000 votes, while the Milli Muslim League – a political front of the banned LeT (or JuD) – received more than 5,500 votes. Both parties built their campaigns based solely on anti-PML(N) rhetoric.

One reason the military establishment is now relying on Barelvi groups is because the previous “assets” have now become a liability. Pakistan faces continuous pressure from the international community for not acting against terror groups like Hafiz Saeed’s Jamaat-ud-Dawa, or its previous incarnation, the Lashkar-e-Toiba. By using the Barelvi groups, over an issue as sensitive as blasphemy, the military establishment might be preparing alternative assets to be deployed against their political rivals in Pakistan. The public perception after the government crackdown against protestors is overwhelmingly anti-PML(N), while the Pakistan military has gained more sympathy for refusing the act against them. Pakistan’s ultra-conservative population believe they were fighting for a noble cause.

The stage has now been set for the PML(N) exit in the elections next year, but at a hefty cost. A dangerous precedent has been set, and the majority Muslim sect has been weaponized. History is repeating itself in Pakistan.

Umer Ali is an award-winning Pakistani journalist who has reported extensively on terrorism, blasphemy, and human rights. He tweets @iamumer1
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Barelvis and the Pakistan movement
Dr Ishtiaq Ahmed
NOVEMBER 30, 2017
In light of the recent commotion created by some Barelvi clerics, which the federal government bungled up with its characteristic incompetence, it is time that someone speaks out the truth about the Pakistan movement and its ideology. Let me say without mincing words: Pakistan was created in negation of principles of secular democracy.

Barelvi clerics had spearheaded the All India Muslim League’s campaign for Pakistan ahead of the 1945-46 general elections. A handful of Deobandis led by the followers of Ashraf Ali Thanvi (who died in 1943) including Shabbir Ahmed Usmani also supported the demand for a separate state for Indian Muslims. However, the main Deobandi party, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, led by Hussain Ahmed Madani advocated a vision of wataniyat or nationalism that was fore grounded in territory, rather than religious identity.

Madani warned that even if the Muslim League manage to win a separate state, it will inevitably be a state dominated by some sect of Islam — there could be no such thing as a Muslim or Islamic state of all Indian Muslims because the latter were notoriously divided into sects and sub-sects. Another prominent religious scholar, Abdul Kalam Azad also shared similar sentiments. His speeches are available on YouTube on the question of Muslims’ in a post-British India.

In my opinion, those who say that Pakistan, as it exists today, is not Jinnah’s Pakistan, are missing the point. Jinnah may not have anticipated that his two-nation theory would lay the foundation of a state in which the organic relationship between Islam and the state would result in the rule of the ulema. However, he could not have been unaware of the fact that the religious establishment, including Barelvi clerics, saw the state he demanded and won as having been established in the name of Islam.

Jinnah gave a free hand to the Barelvi clerics and mashaikh (heads of Sufi shrines) to mobilise Muslim support by promising the resuscitation of the ideal Islamic state founded in the 7th century.

Let me quote then Punjab Governor Sir Bertrand Glancy’s observations in his fortnightly reports about the 1945-46 election campaign in the Punjab from my book, The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed (Oxford University Press).

In the report of September 13, Glancy described the Muslim League campaign in the following words: “Muslim Leaguers are doing what they can in the way of propaganda conducted on fanatical lines; religious leaders and religious buildings are being used freely in several places for advocating Pakistan and vilifying any who hold opposite views.”

In the report of December 27, Glancy noted: “Among Muslims, the Leaguers are increasing their efforts to appeal to the bigotry of the electors. Pirs and Maulvis have been enlisted in large numbers to tour the Province and denounce all who oppose the League as infidels. Copies of the Holy Quran are carried around as an emblem peculiar to the Muslim League. Firoz (Sir Firoz Khan Noon) and others openly preach that every vote given to the League is a vote cast in favour of the Holy Prophet.” In the report of February 2, 1946, Glancy wrote to Viceroy Wavell:

“The ML (Muslim League) orators are becoming increasingly fanatical in their speeches. Maulvis and Pirs and students travel all around the Province and preach that those who fail to vote for the League candidates will cease to be Muslims; their marriages will no longer be valid and they will be entirely excommunicated.”

In Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Pir Sahib Manki Sharif led the election campaign and described it as a jihad. The same is true for Sindh and even Rajasthan and elsewhere. The barelvi ulema and pirs were at the forefront of the election campaign.

One of the slogans raised in those days, ‘Pakistan ka Na’ara Kya? La Illaha Il-lilah’ (What is the slogan of Pakistan? It is that there is no god but Allah), was coined by Asghar Sodai, a poet and academic from Sialkot in the Punjab. In the 1970s, it was revived but with a slightly different wording, ‘Pakistan ka Matlab Kya? La Illaha Il-lilah (What is the meaning of Pakistan? It is that there is no god but Allah).’

Interestingly, such campaign slogans did not figure officially in the Muslim League resolutions and documents, but so what? From a political science point of view, when you solicit the support of people for a political objective and achieve it, it becomes a social contract and both sides are bound by it.

Jinnah famously said on August 11, 1947, that in Pakistan, ‘Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is a matter of private belief but as citizens of the state’. But after more than a million Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs had been killed mainly in gruesome communal attacks following Partition and 14-15 million uprooted from their homes, there was no chance in a million that Pakistan could ever be a secular state.

Slowly but surely the theological, ideological and political initiative in defining what is Pakistan has moved into the hands of the Barelvi clerics. The heyday of deobandis and ahl-e-hadith militancy which emerged as a great factor in Pakistani politics in the wake of Afghan jihad now seemsto be over.

The major challenge for the state is going to be the protection of rights of the Ahmadia community. The truth is that from 1944 onwards the Ahmadia community too supported the demand for Pakistan. So, they too have a right to exist as a community and live in security and peace even if the Muslim majority considers them to be non-Muslims.

The Indian National Congress had pleaded with Jinnah and the Muslim League to join it in the creation of a secular and democratic state following British withdrawal, but that plea was rejected on grounds that Muslims and Islam would be in danger in a united India. Well, now we have Pakistan which is solidly and overwhelmingly Muslim, but we have minorities in Pakistan including Ahmadis. Can someone propound an Islamic law which ensures that all Pakistanis are entitled to basic security of life and their communal identity?
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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The truth about forced conversions in Thar
NAZIHA SYED ALI
Updated Aug 17, 2017 04:46pm

Illustrations by Reem Khurshid.
UMERKOT: “When a girl is brought before a qazi for conversion to Islam, the qazi must comply immediately. If he delays the conversion even to say his prayers, he himself becomes kafir,” said Pir Waliullah Sarhandi, a younger brother of Pir Mohammed Ayub Jan Sarhandi. The latter, who is gaddi nashin of the Sarhandi shrine in Samaro tehsil of Umerkot district, claims to have converted thousands of Hindu girls and young women to Islam, mostly those belonging to the scheduled castes — Bheel, Meghwar and Kohli. Allegedly, this includes forced conversions, as well as conversions of underage girls eloping with Muslim men.

The most recent case to have caused a stir is that of Ravita Meghwar: her parents claim their 16-year-old daughter was abducted by men from an influential Muslim community living near their village in Tharparkar district, forcibly converted by Pir Ayub Jan in Samaro and married off to one of her kidnappers. When Ravita appeared in court in response to her parents’ petition she refuted their account, maintaining that she had gone willingly and that she wished to stay with her husband, Nawaz Ali Shah.

It is a story that is playing on repeat in Tharparkar and Umerkot, districts that are home to large communities of Hindus — Tharparkar’s Hindu population is in fact around 50 per cent — and it threatens to wreck centuries of inter-communal harmony in the area. This is a part of the country where religion has traditionally been worn lightly. Instead, cultural commonalities bind the communities. At one time there was even social acceptance of Muslim men marrying Hindu women: former Sindh chief minister Arbab Rahim’s maternal cousin is one-time MPA Ram Singh Sodho, whose mother converted to Islam after marriage. Now locals profess increasing concern that Thar too like the rest of the country is becoming polarised along religious lines.

After the hue and cry over forced conversions in Umerkot and Tharparkar districts, the Sindh Assembly passed a bill against the practice in November 2016. But before the governor could sign it into law, some religious organisations threatened widespread agitation if the government did not withdraw it. Their main objection was to the provision stipulating that the conversion of underage individuals would not be formally recognised until they reached the age of majority. The attempted legislation was mothballed. Now however, the government has announced it will review the bill again. To what end, it is difficult to predict.

A little before sunset on an overcast day, Gulzar-i-Khalil, Pir Ayub Jan’s madressah in Samaro, looks drab and uninviting. Its dun-coloured façade with its peeling paint and barren surroundings has an air of neglect, and facilities for the students appear to be extremely basic — as if the owners have far more important things to attend to. In the grounds, groups of boys mill about, enjoying the weather during a break in their religious instruction. Two men are stooped over a griddle on a wood fire nearby, making chapattis for the evening meal at the madressah.


Students at Pir Ayub Jan Sarhadi's madressah in Samaro with the seminary's caretaker. ─ White Star


The pir’s brother, voluble and expansive, clearly takes pride in the institution’s reputation as a one-stop shop for no-questions-asked conversions. “We’ve converted untold numbers of Hindus to Islam,” he said, declaring himself unable to give a precise figure. “No one is forced to become a Muslim, there’s not even one instance of that,” he insisted. Pir Ayub Jan himself is in Karachi to gather support for putting pressure on Sindh’s legislators to withdraw the bill.

Similar to Bharchundi Sharif in Mirpurkhas district further north, the Sarhandi shrine is synonymous with religious conversions, but most of the conversions taking place at the latter are of Hindus living in lower Sindh. Even going by the estimates of those engaged in the conversion of non-Muslims in Tharparkar and Umerkot districts, the annual rate is at least in the several hundreds, possibly more.




“At least 25 conversions of young Hindu girls and women take place every month in Umerkot’s Kunri and Samaro talukas alone,” said an activist from a local human rights organisation. “This area is so deprived and the people, most of whom belong to the scheduled castes, are so powerless that the families know there’s no use in them reporting forced conversions to the police, let alone raising a hue and cry.” That is why only a miniscule number of alleged forced conversion cases make it into the media. According to a list compiled from news reports by the organisation mentioned above, in 2015 and 2016, only 13 Hindus in the Samaro and Kunri talukas converted to Islam.

However, a curious disparity is evident even in the few cases that have been reported. The list of 13 only includes two males. One of them is Dilip Kumar, an adult, and the other is Ramesh Bheel, a young boy who converted along with his mother Devi Bheel. Human rights activists in Umerkot and Mithi, Tharparkar’s largest town, ask in exasperation: “Why only young girls and women of marriageable age? Why don’t mature women convert? Why is the story always the same — a girl runs away with a Muslim man, converts to Islam and refuses to have anything more to do with her family, who have little choice but to stay quiet?”

Daughters gone forever
Shiv Dhan and Mani, however, did not stay quiet when their two daughters, Sonari and Samjoo, were abducted from home in the middle of the night on Jan 15, 2016 by a group of intruders armed with guns and axes. Among them was the son of a landlord who owned acres of land on the other side of the main road running alongside their village and who subsequently married Sonari. At his modest home, Shiv Dhan, who along with his wife works on a local landlord’s farm, reached into a crevice in the mudbrick wall and carefully pulled out a bundle of folded newspapers. The yellowing pages were a testament to the couple’s desperate struggle to get their daughters back. “Along with some members of our family, we occupied the road there and remained there for several days in protest,” he said. “We filed a case but they never let us meet her or talk to her alone.” Sonari maintained in court that she had converted to Islam and married of her own will.


Shiv Dhan and Mani, the parents of Sonari who have never seen their daughter. She was kidnapped and forcibly converted last year. ─ White Star


Their sole comfort is that their younger daughter was returned in a few days: they have never met, or even seen 16-year-old Sonari since. Tellingly, when asked how many children he has, Shiv Dhan said he has one daughter and two sons. Whether he has become resigned to never setting eyes on Sonari again, or whether she is now dead to him after having changed her religion, it is difficult to tell.

Instances of Hindu men wanting to convert for the sake of marrying Muslim girls are virtually unheard of. One that did occur two years ago is illustrative of the power imbalance in the area’s social dynamics. A young Hindu man from Umerkot city was working in Karachi when he fell in love with a Pakhtun girl. He brought her to his native town, became a Muslim and married her. It was not long before the men from her family descended on his house, and not finding the couple there, abducted some women of his family. Although police rescued them before the men could go very far, the boy’s family returned the girl. “Do you ever hear of Hindu girls’ families being able to do something like this? They can’t because the police and agencies are all on the side of the Muslims,” said Ramesh Kumar*, a rights activist in Umerkot.

A demographic breakdown of the Hindu population in Sindh offers an interesting perspective on the travails of the community in Pakistan. According to Krishan Sharma, a Mithi-based human rights activist, northern and central Sindh are home to upper caste, well-to-do Hindu business families, who live in prime locations coveted by politicians and tribal sardars who want to invest in land, or set up petrol pumps, factories, etc. Often the long-term Hindu residents do not wish to sell their property, so “a situation is created to drive them out”. That can include kidnapping for ransom as well as forced conversion of their daughters.




“Contrary to perceptions, most of those in this category don’t migrate to India. They are shifting from Ghotki, Khairpur, Umerkot, etc to Karachi where they can be found in large numbers dominating the rice, pulses and cotton markets,” said Mr Sharma. “Ironically, Hindus feel safest in the country’s most lawless city.”

The highest number of Hindus in Pakistan, however, live in southern Sindh where most of them work as agro-based bonded labour. “They have no access to education, health or basic amenities. Their women and children work in the open all day, they’re visible, everyone can see them. They’re easy targets for the waderas’ sons and their henchmen.” (The daughters of Muslim hariselsewhere in the country are often no safer at the hands of waderas.) That is also why the highest number of forced conversions of Hindu girls and young women take place in the green belt of Umerkot district — rather than the arid Tharparkar district — where Muslims zamindars have vast landholdings and most of the haris are Hindu.




(Local Hindus are at pains to point out that it is only the wealthy Muslim zamindars that prey on their girls and women. Other Muslims in Thari society, they say, have always accorded them dignity and respect.)

According to human rights campaigners, older men lure and entice young and naive Hindu girls by promises of marriage that seem like a stepping stone to a far better life than they could ever dream of. “But even if no force is involved, this is not informed consent,” maintained one of these activists. “In the case of minors, it should not be deemed consent at all, but compulsion.”


Some of the largesse bestowed on new converts: free medicine, sewing machines, dowries for their daughters and brick and mortar living homes. The pictures are taken from the New Muslim Welfare Association booklet.


Dr Ramesh Vankwani, MNA and patron-in-chief of the Pakistan Hindu Council, said, “There is not even one case in which anyone has willingly converted. These men, who are often already married, kidnap the girls, keep them in their custody for 15 days, rape them, and through threats and intimidation, make the girls say they converted willingly”.

When a young girl finds herself in such a situation, she is left with few options. Returning home can mean putting herself and her family at risk of retaliation by her abductors. At the same time, and this is particularly in the case of older girls, she is also afraid the community may shun her because they see her as defiled. “For her to remain with the man can appear to be the lesser evil,” said Fatima Halepoto, a human rights lawyer. “What adds to the tragedy is that these girls, or even the children they bear, are never fully accepted into the man’s family either. I know of cases in which they are made to live in a room separate from the main house.”

Charity, but only for 'New Muslims'
However, it is not only the powerlessness of haris in the social hierarchy that gives license to wealthy waderas to take advantage of them. After all, Hindus have lived here since centuries; it is only in recent years that forced conversions have become such a burning issue. An increasing wave of fundamentalism in the area is also contributing to an indirect sanction of the practice. Moreover, this growing religiosity has given rise to another aspect of religious conversion, one that directly exploits the haris’ extreme poverty.


Certificate of conversion awarded by the JUI-F madressah.


About 20 kilometres north of Umerkot, near the garrison town of Chhor, lies the settlement of New Islamabad. Fresh converts are schooled for four months here in the basics of Islam after they recite the kalima at the imposing Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl) madressah complex in Chhor. The new Muslims receive a ‘sanad’ (certificate) upon completing their course.

The head of the madressah complex, an affable man by the name of Mohammed Yaqoob who is also the general secretary of JUI-F Umerkot district and the head of the Wafaqul Madaris Al-Arabia in Umerkot and Tharparkar districts, said: “We accept only families for conversion. New Islamabad can accommodate 40 families at a time. Twenty-three families have recently left and another 35 are due to arrive soon.” With a sheepish smile, Maulvi Yaqoob said he did not wish to speak ill of Pir Ayub Jan Sarhandi and agreed that Maulana Fazlur Rehman would not approve of the kind of conversions that took place in Samaro. He maintained that he refused to carry out conversions of Hindu girls accompanied by Muslim men wanting to marry them. “There is less Islam here and instead more of other things.”

At the same time, the madressah makes an exception for young Hindu men and women who cannot marry each other because of the many prohibited degrees of relationship in their culture. For them, changing their religion seems the only recourse.

Maulvi Yaqoob estimates that around 9,000 conversions have taken place at the madressah during the last 15 years. More recently though they have started maintaining a record, and he can confirm that last year, around 850 Hindus underwent conversion here.

In earlier years, he said, his compatriots had to often venture far afield in the area to preach, “but now 99.9 per cent of people who come to us for conversion come as a result of tableegh by the earlier converts”.

Another reason for impoverished lower caste Hindus to approach Maulvi Yaqoob for conversion may also be the largesse they receive upon entering the fold of Islam. The madressah’s New Muslim Welfare Association provides converts with brick and mortar homes to live in, ghee, flour, sewing machines, dowries for their daughters, etc. The ‘new’ Muslims are given the facility of cultivating crops on the surrounding land where a concrete-lined canal, supplying water to the Cantonment from Nara Canal in the east, provides water all year round. It is a vastly different scenario from the parched expanses where they wait anxiously for rains every year.


Maulvi Yaqoob outside his madressah in Chhor. ─ White Star


For progressives and rights activists in Thar, the rapidly expanding settlement of New Islamabad is further evidence that the secular nature of their society is being changed. “Where does the JUI get such lavish funding for all this construction and for maintaining the place?” said Akbar Soomro*, a development sector employee. Another social worker puts it bluntly: “The reason for what is happening is India’s close proximity to this part of Pakistan. Hindus, however loyal to this country, will always be suspect in the eyes of the establishment.”

According to MNA Ramesh Vankwani, “The forced conversions have set a precedent, that converting Hindus to Islam is sawab ka kaam. No one is protecting us, not even the state”.

Mr Sharma, the human rights worker based in Mithi, narrated a chilling incident. At a wedding function a few years ago, he found himself in conversation with a senior law-enforcement official.

“At one point he told me, ‘The state is not comfortable with you people’”, recalled Mr Sharma. “I asked if he was referring to Hindus. He said ‘No, everyone. In other border areas we get support and facilitation from people about the enemy, but we get no information from people in Tharparkar, from either Muslims or Hindus. There’s no support from the security perspective to the state.’ When I responded, ‘Should we Hindus leave?’ he said, ‘No we’re not asking for that. We simply want Muslims here to be better Muslims’.

Some time later, when I saw a vehicle belonging to the FIF [the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation, the charity wing of the Jamaatud Dawa], I realised this wasn’t an individual’s statement.”

From the point of the security forces, Thar’s geographical contiguity with India makes it a particularly sensitive area where cross-border infiltration makes it necessary to exercise more-than-usual vigilance over the local population, regardless of religious affiliation.

Salafi Islam comes to Thar
Nevertheless, say locals, while the state has little money for health, education or development in the area, there seems to be plenty of funding for new madressahs that have mushroomed since the early 2000s. It is not as though ultra conservative Islam has never existed here. Many decades ago, Badiuddun Shah Al-Rashdi, a cousin of Pir Pagara, brought the Salafi Ahle Hadith movement to Thar from Badin with funding from Kuwait.




However, in a society that valued its pluralism, the influence of its political arm, the Jamiat Ahle Hadith, remained confined to a few pockets, such as between Diplo — a town in Tharparkar — and Badin district. Until about 15 years ago, that is, when a hardline version of Islam began to spread throughout Thar. It found a natural ally in members of the Jamiat Ahle Hadith. These now form the bulk of the JuD presence here. According to locals, they seem to have unlimited funding at their disposal to build madressahs; they even purchase mosques to disseminate Salafi Islam.

Although most madressahs in Umerkot and Tharparkar districts belong to JUI-F, JuD’s presence in Thar is steadily increasing. (A few madressahs belong to the Jamaat-i-Islami as well.) This is despite the fact that JUD is on the Interior Ministry watchlist under Schedule II of the Anti Terrorism Act, which denotes that the government has reason to believe it may be involved in terrorism.

An enormous JuD centre is under construction just outside Mithi at the Nagarparkar road junction. Several people told Dawn that locals driving trucks with construction material for the building have to disembark outside the gate. The madressah’s own people take the vehicles inside, unload the contents, and bring the trucks back. Meanwhile in Mithi itself, the FIF has forcibly occupied a college property as its base.

In response to the contention that madressahs are increasing all over the country, rights activists in Thar say that the existence of a huge, largely destitute and marginalised Hindu population in the area means that the issue of conversions is far more complex than its proponents make it out to be. It also carries a high risk of violent social conflict.

Two years ago, in the run-up to Eidul Azha, JuD declared they would sacrifice cows in Mithi’s main Kashmir chowk that Eid. (Because so many Hindus live in Tharparkar, there is no cow slaughter in Mithi, while only one shop in Umerkot town sells beef.) But the residents, both Hindu and Muslim alike, went to the maulvi and asked him not to create fasaadbetween the communities. Thus far, according to locals, JuD is not involved in conversions of Hindus. “They’re concentrating on making better Muslims of the Muslims for now,” said a Hindu social worker.

Most intriguing though, given the animosity in Pakistan towards proselytising by any religious community other than Muslims, is the space allowed to Christians, mainly Irish Catholic, and Ahmadis to operate their centres in Thar — some in close proximity to madressahs. (Ahmadis in particular have to contend with institutionalised discrimination and persecution in the rest of the country.) The Christian and Ahmadi missionaries offer impoverished Hindus schools, health clinics etc as an inducement — in fact, it is not unknown for the converts to revert to their old faith if the projects fail to materialise or come to an end. “If a Hindu becomes a Christian here, or even an Ahmedi, it's not a problem just as long as he ceases to be Hindu,” said Mr Soomro, the human rights activist.

Thar has long been known for communal harmony, negligible incidence of crime and a benign social ethos. If, as the locals fear, things proceed along the same trajectory, the part of Pakistan they call home may become engulfed in the kind of turmoil that has proven such a formidable challenge to the state elsewhere in the country.

*Some names have been changed to protect privacy.
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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Jamiat’s Stranglehold

Irfan AslamUpdated April 09, 2017


The contradiction could not have been starker: if the urbane, sophisticated side of the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba is represented by former stalwarts such as Hafiz Salman Butt or Javed Hashmi, its violent, uncouth ways are manifested in the ugly events that transpired on March 21, 2017.

On the day, two days before Pakistan Day, Pakhtun and Baloch students of the Punjab University (PU) were celebrating Pakhtun Cultural Day on the new campus of the university under the auspices of the Pakhtun Students Union (PSU). Pashto songs were being played and male Pakhtun students, donning their traditional dress, were doing the Attan dance. No women were dancing, however, as they watched the Attan from the sidelines.

Out of nowhere, club-wielding activists from the IJT suddenly appeared at the event and started uprooting the tents erected and throwing chairs around. Pakhtun students started running helter-skelter as the attackers chased them out of the venue. After some time, they regrouped and retaliated, forcing the attackers to run away. Till then, the lawns around the venue of the event had turned into a battlefield with both parties pelting stones at each other.


The clash left at least 10 students injured; Asfand Khan, vice chairman of the PSU, claims that 21 of their fellows, including 17 boys and four girls, were injured in the clash. “Fourteen of the injured students remained hospitalized for days. Some of them who had fractures or head injuries have not yet fully recovered.”

The PSU’s retaliation to IJT’s antics elevates it into a unique position: it is perhaps the only student organisation in Punjab that has stood up to the might of the Jamiat in PU in the recent past. Even Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan was manhandled in 2007 in the throes of the lawyers’ movement when he had attempted to enter the university to help build an anti-government student’s resistance. The IJT not only roughed up the PTI chief but also handed him over to the police, who Imran Khan was evading at the time.

“This is not the first time that the IJT had attacked us,” claims
Asfand Khan. “On February 9, some Pakhtun students were busy in group study. But just because there were girls in the group, the IJT boys tortured the Pakhtun boys.”

Matters went to a boil the next day as the IJT again beat up 12 Pakhtun students. This led to a clash between both groups outside Hostel No 1 of the university. “IJT members called up these Pakhtun boys’ homes and issued death threats to their parents,” alleges Asfand. “An inquiry was launched into the incident by the PU administration but no details of the investigation were ever revealed.”

The IJT, according to PSU officials, cadres, and members of other student groups, is a sacred cow that is left untouched by the administration. “Even right now, there is an element of fear among Pakhtun students,” narrates Asfand. “What’s worse is that neither the police nor the PU administration took any action against those behind the March 21 attack. The main culprits were identified but they move around on their motorcycles with impunity. The administration asks only us to remain restrained.”

This theory is given credence by a rally organised inside the university by the IJT on March 31 after Friday prayers to show its power. Although some PU teachers deny reports and claim that the rally never took place, Asfand says that letting the IJT stage the rally and then not owning up to it points at the lenient approach of the administration towards the Jamiat.

In the aftermath of the March 21 violence, PU banned all students organisation rather than just the ones causing trouble. In other words, both the victim and the attacker roles in the violence were painted in the same light.

What gives the IJT such power on campuses?

GENESIS AND GROWTH

In his book Vanguard of Islamic Revolution: Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, Iranian-American scholar Vali Nasr traces the origin of the IJT to December 23, 1947 in Lahore when 25 students, most of them sons of Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) leaders, officially formed the IJT. Its first meeting was held later the same year and was addressed by JI chief Maulana Abul A’la Maududi. Although IJT cells were formed in other cities of Punjab, the organisation was headquartered in Karachi.

The IJT was conceived as a missionary (daw’ah) movement. “Its utility lay in the influence it could have on the education of future leaders of Pakistan which would help Mawdudi’s ‘revolution from above’,” argues Nasr in his book. But the IJT got involved in politics more than religious training — this was an attempt to counter the rising influence of the left-wing Democratic Students Federation (DSF) and National Students Federation (NSF), both of whom were associated with mainstream progressive politics.

A battle of ideologies often spilled over to the street, violently in certain cases, as in 1952 and 1953 when Jamiat clashed with DSF and NSF. It was in the same era that the JI shifted the centre of IJT to Lahore, with the idea being that its proximity with the party leadership could allow it to be controlled more effectively.

The IJT remained active at campus level and on the streets, be it for the anti-Ahmadiyya protests and violence in the 1950s or the enforcement of sharia law campaign in 1975. Its role was also crucial to the politics of the Pakistan’ National Alliance (PNA) — a coalition of nine parties that was formed against Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as well as the General Ziaul Haq-supported Nizam-i-Mustafa Movement in 1977. Nasr points out that the IJT was also involved in violence that led to the fall of Dhaka in 1971 as its Nazim-i-Aala, Matiur Rahman Nizami, had formed the al-Badr and al-Shams militias at the Dhaka University to spread terror among Bengali citizens. It is no surprise that when Bangladeshi courts sentenced JI-Bangladesh’s leaders to death for their war crimes, Jamiat and JI activists in Pakistan took to the street in protest.

From 1977 till 1984, the IJT was patronised and promoted by the Zia regime which wanted to counter the pro-Bhutto Peoples Student Federation (PSF). General Zia’s slogan of Islamisation was best suited to the JI whose main force among the youth was the IJT. Teachers at the University of Karachi (KU) allege that the culture of guns on campus was introduced by the IJT during this time. This state of affairs continued until General Zia discarded the JI as an ally since he had no more use for them. Before the divorce, however, the IJT was ruling over at least 20 universities across the country including PU.

EMPOWERING THE DISEMPOWERED?

Despite its antics, the IJT is undoubtedly a force that draws great support from towns and villages across Punjab. Part of the reason is its name: the ‘Islami’ creates a facade of it being the most pious or religious — a factor that holds great significance to the many entering the university from conservative backgrounds.

Most PU students — both women and men — hail from rural areas,” explains Dr Rana Ejaz, assistant professor at the PU Department of Political Science. “Many of them have a repressed upbringing and no say in the family. When such students are provided with a support system and given importance by the IJT, they get megalomaniac and get involved in excesses, especially when the administration and teachers also feel helpless before them.”

This modus operandi helps the IJT achieve greater penetration on campus. According to Dr Ejaz, the disempowered are often handed important positions in the IJT, such as that of hostel nazims where they have total freedom and control over others.

Students describe that as newcomers arrive to the university, IJT members often intercept them and take them to their camp to have them registered with Jamiat. Sometimes they are also coaxed to join by taking them on a round of the hostels. The benefits of them joining the IJT are portrayed to be manifold: power on campus and inside hostels, connections inside the administration and faculty, good grades, Islamic co-curricular activities, and even protection from other groups.

In practice, however, male anxieties about powerlessness are exploited by the Jamiat to reinforce their vision of the world and recreate it on campus. The IJT’s politics on campus are not a far stretch from the everyday caste politics and violence in rural Punjab — only this time, the power lies with the disempowered men, irrespective of whether it comes through the barrel of a gun or the swing of a baton.........

..............................


...................... PSU’s Asfand Khan, for example, does not rule out the element of racism behind the whole episode played out on campus on March 21. The IJT narrative on social media in the aftermath of the violence castigated the Pakhtun students as ethno-nationalists, whose activities were not Pakistani enough for the IJT two days before Pakistan Day.

“There was a Baloch event some days ago but members of the IJT members themselves participated in it and danced to the music too,” narrates Asfand. “They did not attack the Baloch students’ event but they attacked Pakhtun celebrations..............

.......... There was a time when student unions were the nursery of mainstream politics. This era was marked by ideological politics: left versus right, communism versus capitalism, public versus private. Leaders were trained at the grassroots, educated in ideology, and sent among the masses with populist agendas.

As the era of ideology exited during the 1980s, it was replaced by ethnicity: the Pakhtun, Baloch, Sindhis, Mohajirs, even Seraikis and Hazarewal all congregated around parties and groups that safeguarded their ethnic identity and rights. Among those arguing for religious politics and Pakistani nationalism were the IJT and the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) of the Muslim League, both of which remained largely Punjabi phenomena.

But while the era of ideology saw ideological wars and debates, the era of ethnicity witnessed a surge in violence. In fact, more than argumentation, violence became the primary modus operandi of those in the political sphere. Student unions weren’t spared of this phenomenon either — armed skirmishes at the University of Karachi, for example, between Jamiat and the All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organisation (APMSO) became routine. All this while the parent parties of both student groups engaged in battle on the street............
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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A Pakistani's interpretation of Bhakti movement and Sikhism etc. Don't know about historical accuracy.

From Kabir to Nanak

Raza Naeem
TFT Issue: 22 Sep 2017

Raza Naeem on the Bhakti movement and the rise of Guru Nanak, whose message was one of reconciliation, syncretism and communal harmony

Namdev (1270 – 1350) was the son of a tailor. He was born in Sattara division (Mumbai) and his mother tongue was Marathi. He got into bad habits in his youth and began to rob and steal. One day he was standing outside a temple and a lower-caste woman carrying her child arrived and sat down on the floor. The child was constantly crying. The mother tried her best to entertain the child but he did not cease crying, upon which she began to beat him. Namdev felt great pity for the child and approaching the woman, scolded her. The woman said that the child is hungry since the last two days, and was now insisting that she go to the temple and get God’s food from there. Namdev inquired about her husband’s profession. She replied, “My husband was a horse-rider but he was murdered by a dacoit Namdev. Now I only have this skeleton of bones. Do you want me to give the same skeleton to the child to chew on?”

Namdev was so affected by this incident that he abandoned the life of a dacoit (brigand) and became a bairagi. Wherever he went, he would teach people about prem bhakti. While roaming around, he appeared in Punjab at the age of 55 and began to live in a hut that he constructed on the edge of a pond in Bhatiwal, a village of Gurdaspur. One day a storm came and swept away his hut. Then Namdev constructed a second hut on the edge of a jungle. These ashloks were probably recited by Namdev after this incident. He has likened God to a carpenter in them:

“A neighbour asked Namdev

Who built your hut

If you tell the carpenter’s name

I will pay him double his salary

My sister! You cannot find my carpenter

My carpenter is the pillar of the spirit

If anyone wants to have a hut built

The carpenter will have to be paid in love

When purush (Man) breaks ties with his family and friends

Then the carpenter himself goes to him

I cannot describe his appearance

He is present in everything and everywhere

A mute who has tasted ambrosia

How will he tell about its tastiness?”

Gradually the number of Namdev’s disciples began to grow and a settlement flourished near the jungle which became known as Ghumman afterwards. Namdev’s Samadhi is located there and every year Namdev’s festival is celebrated there on the 13th of January.

Bhagat Namdev’s mother tongue was Marathi but the shabds attributed to him in Guru Granth Sahib are in the Prakrit language of northern India. This Prakrit contains a multitude of Farsi and Arabic words; although the pronunciation of these words is Hindavi. If the shabds of bhagat Namdev are really his own work, they tell us that the language which was prevalent in the Sutlej and Ravi Doab at the end of the 13th century was not very different from the language of Amir Khusrau.

“God! Only you are the support of this blind man

I am poor, miserable, merely Your Name is everything for me

O Karim, O Rahim, O Allah you are Ghani

You are the only One present and I am standing in Your Presence

You are a river of benevolence, You are very Rich

You are Wise, You are All-Seeing, what can miserable me do?

And Namdev’s Swami, You are Forgiving, You are Hari”

To present an image of God by joining the Islamic terminologies of Divine attributes with the terminologies of the Hindu religion is a distinct feature of the Bhakti Movement. In another shabd, Bhagat Namdev says:

“O my friend, o my friend, listen to good news

May I sacrifice myself for you, may I sacrifice myself for you

A kind deed is your forced labour, your name is high

Wherefrom have you come, where were you and where are you going now?

This is the city of Dwarka, speak the truth

Your turban is very nice, and your words are sweet

But what is the use of Dwarka city for a Mongol?

You alone are the Khan (Mongol) amongst thousands

You are like the wheat-complexioned king (Krishan bhagwan)

You are the master of horse, master of elephants and lord of men

You are Namdev’s swami, and the messiah for all”

Sadhana was born in Sehwan (Sindh) and a qasai (butcher) by caste. There are cloaks of obscurity over the circumstances of his life. Just this much can be said with certainty: that he was a contemporary of Namdev. He was drawn away from his profession by sitting in the company of sadhus and sants; and he began preaching prem in Sindh by becoming a bhagat.

The founders of the Bhakti Movement had preached prem with God and man with great devotion, but their movement could never become so powerful in the Ganges-Yamuna valley that it could change the structure of political and social life of the country with its influence. Kabir, Rai Das, Dhanna, Saeen, Dadu and other bhagats were undoubtedly desirous of social reform with a true heart. But in their opinion the differences of zaatpaat, chhootchaat, pujapaat and class hierarchy are artifices of pandits and maulvis. If people become the devotees of prem and abandon ostentatious rituals, the veils between God and man would be lifted; walls of hatred would fall; Hindus and Muslims, Brahmins and untouchables, rulers and ruled, great and small, everybody will become like brothers; and all the problems of society will be thus dealt with. Obviously these well-intentioned bhakts did not have a detailed consciousness of the economic nature of the differences of caste and the great and the small (maybe it was not even possible); and neither was bringing about social revolution by means of class struggle (social revolution was not possible because revolutionary conditions were not even present).They were not even in favour of fighting the ruler of the day and the upper classes for social reforms, but they were certain that the hearts of opponents could be changed through prem bhakti – a message of love.

But many upper-caste people were not prepared to try this prescription of bhakti because it would deal a blow to their social rights and privileges. Consequently, the upper and middle classes of the Ganges-Yamuna valley collectively remained aloof from the Bhakti Movement. In fact, the movement did not become very popular even amongst the ordinary cultivators. Neither the Hindus nor Muslims were willing to transcend religious divides; although relations of compromise were strengthened between both.

But this plant of Bhakti took the shape of an energetic popular movement upon reaching the land of Punjab, and its roots spread far and wide amongst the agricultural settlements. After some time, the political conditions of the country took such a turn that people affiliated with this movement became a unique Sikh nation. The founder of this movement was Guru Nanak.

Guru Nanak was born in 1469 in village Talvandi (Nankana Sahib) of Gujranwala. In those days, Sultan Bahlul Lodhi was the king in Delhi. Nanak’s father Kalu Chand was a khatri by caste and the munim of the Rajput sardar of the village. The jotshi (astrologer) named the child Nanak which like the name of Kabir was prevalent among both Hindus and Muslims. Nanak’s early education was conducted in a paathshaala. At the age of nine or ten, he was admitted to the madrassah of Mullah Qutbuddin; but Nanak’s heart was not drawn towards education. So initially his father entrusted the work of cultivation to him, then shop-keeping, but the result was not successful. Then Nanak was sent to live with his sister who was married to the divan of Nawab Daulat Khan Lodhi. This is the same Daulat Khan Lodhi who had invited Babar to invade India after bcoming upset with the attitude of his relative Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi. He was the subedar of Lahore and Multan. Nanak found a job in the charity house of the nawab and he began to live in comfort. During this time, he married a girl named Sulakhan and had two sons named Sri Chand and Lachmi Das.

But it was a time of great unrest and anarchy. The invasion of Timur (1398) had broken the back of the sultanate. Delhi had become desolate. The subedars of Bengal, Deccan, Sindh, Malwa, Gujarat, Khandesh, Mewar and Kashmir had become independent in their own right. There were frequent rebellions in the remaining regions. Today this nawab refused to obey; tomorrow that raja became insurgent. The sultan’s forces remained busy in subduing the rebellions and the blood of the sinners flowed along with that of the sinless. The disputes between the Turk and Afghan emirs had separately destroyed the administration of the country. Sultan Bahlul Lodhi tried a great deal to prop up the falling wall of the sultanate, but no Balban or Alla-ud-din Khilji was born amongst his successors, who could strengthen the foundations of the sultanate. Hence every person was harassed; there was uncertainty everywhere; and people’s morals were descending daily.

Nanak’s heart used to wrench at this decline. He was born in a Hindu household but he was not interested in the Hindu religion. His entire youth was spent amongst Muslims and he used to respect Islamic teachings a great deal; but was greatly saddened by witnessing that the Muslims were as worldly – worshippers of status and just selfish as the Hindus. He felt the maulvi is also as uninterested in the reform and progress of the people as the pundit. Nanak’s heart drew away from the world. He left his job and adopted asceticism, leaving behind his household. A Muslim mirasi of Talvandi Mardana and brother Bala supported him and Nanak set out to search for truth. He would sit in the company of sadhus, sants, pirs and fakirs and learn matters of understanding from them. He became familiar with the Bhakti Movement during this journey. He also benefitted for a long period of time from the company of Sufi Sheikh Sharaf of Panipat; Sheikh Ibrahim, the khalifa of Baba Farid Shakarganj in Pakpattan; and the pirs of Multan. It is said that he had also travelled to the holy places of Iran, Iraq and Arabia. After his return from the journey, he began to teach his creed in the villages of Punjab.

Because Muslims had established their rule here for 500-600 years, and there was hardly a settlement where 3 or 4 houses did not belong to Muslims, so Hindu ears had also become accustomed to the important points of Islam. Therefore Guru Nanak mostly used Islamic terminology whilst inviting people towards his new creed. He was himself greatly influenced by Islam, especially the philosophy of the unity of God; and accepted Muhammad (PBUH) as an ideal personality. Therefore he adopted the Holy Prophet (PBUH) as a model for himself, rather than Kabir and Namdev (Dr Tara Chand, pp. 169)

Guru Nanak firmly believed that the reform of society cannot happen without ending religious disputes. In his opinion both the followers of Hinduism and Islam in the Indian Subcontinent had so far failed to establish anything close to harmony.

Guru Nanak’s instructions included the following:

“Establish the religion of truth. Remove evil. And whoever of the two approaches you, accept it. Refrain from killing the living. Protect the poor. Remember that God’s person is living in 84 lakh of the created.”

He worked to spread a message of intermingling, peace and amity – winning the love and respect of both Hindus and Muslims, and influencing both with his teachings. When he passed away at the age of 70 (in 1539), it is said that that the same dispute arose over his corpse which had happened over the corpse of Kabir. Muslims wanted to bury him according to Islamic rituals and Hindus insisted on cremating him but when the corpse was uncovered there was nothing there except a few flowers. Hindus built the Samadhi of Guru Nanak there and the Muslims built a Mazar but the flood of the river Ravi swept both away.
 
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LordOfTheUnderworlds

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The story of Piro and the Gulabdasis

Piro Preman
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piro_Preman
edit1.jpg

Little is known about Piro's life. She is believed to have been sold into prostitution in Heera Mandi, the red-light district of Lahore. She escaped Heera Mandi and went on to become a devotee of Gulab Das at the Gulabdasi Dera in Chathian Wala (in present-day Pakistan). Das was a Sikh Jat who founded the Gulabdasi sect. The sect was based on HinduSikh asceticism, but considered themselves to be neither Hindu nor Sikh.[3][4]

Most of the information about Piro comes from her own autobiographical verses, the Ik Sau Sath Kafian or the "One Hundred and Sixty Kafis (160 Kafis)", written in the mid-nineteenth century. In 160 Kafis, Piro describes a series of events in her life after she began living with Gulab Das in Chathian Wala. Piro refers to herself as a prostitute, and also a Muslim. Following her arrival in Chathian Wala, Piro writes that her "professional wardens" from Heera Mandi followed her and persuaded Gulab Das to send her back to Lahore. She ultimately agreed to return to Lahore, where she describes a confrontation with mullahs and qazis who assume that she has not only become an apostate, but also converted to the religion of her guru, thus becoming a kafir. Piro does not deny apostasy or conversion, but refuses to convert back to Islam. She abuses the mullahs and Islam, and praises the spirituality of her guru. According to historian Anshu Malhotra, "The unabashed use of language that might be considered vulgar among the respectable today, adds a colourful dimension to Piro’s speech."[3]

Piro writes that her actions result in her being abducted, and forcibly transported from Lahore to Wazirabad. She is incarcerated at Wazirabad by a woman named Mehrunissa. Piro describes that she was able to befriend two women, Janu and Rehmati, and utilize their help to send a message to Gulab Das. The guru sends two of his disciples, Gulab Singh and Chatar Singh, to Wazirabad. With the help of sympathizers, the disciples are able to rescue Piro and bring her back to Gulab Das' establishment in Chathian Wala.[3]

Piro and Gulab Das shared an intimate relationship despite social and religious pressures.[5] The two were interred together at a tomb in Chathian Wala.[6] Although the Gulabdasis were neither Hindu nor Sikh, following the Partition of India, they were expelled from Chathian Wala by the now Muslim-majority populace in Pakistan. The sect subsequently fled to India where they settled in Haryana.[7]
(Should be the next film by Sanjay Leela Bhansali? o_O)
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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First amongst unequals

Brian Cloughley
TFT Issue: 01 Dec 2017
Brian Cloughley reflects on Pakistan’s past leaders and the appalling educational gap in the country



In 1958 Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Britain visited India and Pakistan, in that order. His description of his travels is illuminating as well as being somewhat depressing, and among other personal impressions he considered his opposite number in India, Prime Minister Nehru (an Allahabadi Aristocrat), to be “undoubtedly arrogant and very fixed in his ideas… Nevertheless, he is able, full of charm, cultivated, and ruthless, all great qualities in a leader.” (Which was a case of the pot calling the kettle black without a trace of irony!)

In Karachi he enjoyed meeting “Iskander Mirza, the robust President… and his wife” whom he judged to be “grands seigneurs — very charming hosts, not too intellectual, and good food and wine. (Nehru’s food was uneatable. It was European but like a bad boarding house.)”

His view of Mirza was echoed by the British High Commissioner, the brilliant Sir Morrice James, who observed that “As well as brains and personality, Mirza possessed an impressive physique. As his second wife he had recently taken the beautiful divorced spouse of the Iranian Military Attaché in Karachi. The two of them made a magnificent couple as they stood, radiant and dignified, at the head of the grand staircase at the President’s House as the Pakistan National Anthem was played; when it was over they walked down to join their guests between the two files of Lancers of the Presidential Bodyguard.”

Then Macmillan reflected on Pakistan itself, which he found “poor; politically unstable; in a state of religious turmoil (the mullahs have large though rather uncertain power); without a political class — without so large an Indian Civil Service tradition as India, and practicing corruption on a grand scale.” This was regrettable, but in Macmillan’s eyes there was a redeeming feature, in that “the one stable element in this situation is the Army” with the other armed services being “also reliable.”

Have there been many changes in Pakistan since, almost sixty years ago, the charming (and ruthless) Macmillan observed that the army was the “one stable element” in the country?

To be sure, there has not been another “magnificent couple… radiant and dignified” in the President’s residence since Mirza’s time. But, as I have written elsewhere, “Mirza did not relish democracy. His instincts were far from egalitarian, and he had no sympathy for the politicians and their business associates who managed their unsavoury affairs by flattery and bribery, which was becoming an open scandal. He had been unanimously elected president under the new constitution and could have exercised enormous influence for good. Advice and persuasion — even coercion — could have been his tools to steer the politicians towards better paths, but he took the easy way out by joining the game of placement, favouritism, and double-dealing, and the country suffered accordingly.”


Iskander and Nahid Mirza

Sixty years later, the country continues to suffer from precisely the same afflictions.

Successive prime ministers and presidents have been diverse in every way, there having been figures of well-meaning ineffectiveness, such as Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry, via authoritarian (and well-meaning, but regrettably unskilled) military martinets, to the capable but imperious and uncongenial bureaucrat Ghulam Ishaq Khan; then the honourable, upright but ineffectual Farooq Leghari; and down, down, down to the corrupt, cynical and incompetent yet curiously influential Asif Zardari.

In periods from the glittering yet shabbily amoral Mirza years to the most recent Nawaz Sharif restoration, the Bhutto dynasty threw sunshine and cast dark shadows in varied measure, with the opening light being Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s 1971 accession speech in which he declared that “I have been summoned by the nation as the authentic voice of the people of Pakistan … We have to rebuild democratic institutions… we have to rebuild a situation in which the common man, the poor man in the street, can tell me to go to hell.”

Of course Bhutto had no intention of permitting the man in the street to tell him anything, and he was no more interested in democracy than his equally aristocratic predecessor, the gilded Mirza. Indeed he had no intention of allowing anyone at all to tell him anything he didn’t want to know. This was his downfall, as it was of his daughter, whose undoubted skills were eclipsed by her blinkered refusal to engage with the world outside her tight circle of close associates — regarded by not a few observers as obsequious sycophants.


Harold Mcmillan

It is fascinating to examine the catalogue of Pakistan’s leaders since the time of the dedicated and essentially secular Mr Jinnah who declared in 1947 that there should be “No distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.”

His political emulator, Prime Minister Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, of another noble family, and a most effective leader (in my opinion the best prime minister that Pakistan has ever had), was similarly inclined. On the other hand, ZA Bhutto hypocritically instituted prohibition of alcohol and fostered the influence of mullahs, both of which concepts were embraced with enthusiasm by his immediate successor. On the night of Bhutto’s announcement of Prohibition, he and an old friend of mine “cracked a bottle of Scotch together.”

So what link, what commonality, what possession of mutual origin, interest, or ambition could there possibly be between such disparate personalities as these mentioned above?

Here is the link: it’s about where so many of Pakistan’s presidents and prime ministers went to school.


Mirza attended Elphinstone College in Bombay, then went to Britain’s Royal Military Academy. Z.A. Bhutto was at Cathedral and John Connon School, Bombay (as was Jinnah), and sent his daughter to Jesus and Mary Convent, Murree. Zia-ul-Haq went to the Government High School in Simla and Shaukat Aziz to St Patrick’s High School.

Farooq Leghari was at Aitchison and Forman Christian College – the latter also attended by Pervez Musharraf after his time at St Patrick’s. Yousaf Gillani was another Forman student, and Asif Zardari yet another St Patrick’s boy. Lastly, Nawaz Sharif went to St Anthony’s, and is described on his website as having “got his early education from prestigious schools.”


But there is a recent report by a UN agency about education in Pakistan in which the bright picture of schools such as St Patrick’s and Aitchison is dimmed a bit.

The UN’s dispassionate and depressing account includes the story of eleven-year-old Jamila in Karachi who “works as a domestic servant. At first her job was only to look after the baby, but as she grew older the other servant in charge of housecleaning and cooking was dismissed and Jamila was asked to do all the work. She said ‘I want to go to school like other children, but my parents can’t afford it. So I have to work and help support my family’.” The mind reels. In her abysmal enslavement she watches the children of her employers and their friends going happily to school every day and wonders in her sadness why she must be excluded.

The UN records that in Pakistan “While over 70 percent of the richest young men and women have completed lower secondary school, only 16 percent of the poorest young men and fewer than 5 percent of the poorest young women have done so,” and the Council on Foreign Relations reports that the education system “suffers from inadequate government investment, corruption, lack of institutional capacity, and a poor curriculum that often incites intolerance.” (And don’t forget the madrassas.)

The message is there: loud, clear and exceptionally important. If Pakistan is to achieve its proper place in the world there must be immediate emphasis — and vastly increased expenditure — on education. Pakistan’s prime ministers and presidents and all the high and mighty of the country rose to eminence because they received an early education (should have written, they received good education because they came from high and mighty class) , to which all children are entitled, and which most are now denied.

To quote the Quaid-e-Azam, he of the Cathedral School, Bombay, “Without education it is complete darkness and with education it is light. Education is a matter of life and death to our nation.” His words were wise and apposite.
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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Iskander Mirza


first president of Pakistan
great grandson of Mir Jafar
The choice of wife of this Shia Nawabzada from Bengal is also interesting:

2nd wife: some divorced wife of an Iranian Military attache in Pakistan. She was from and aristocratic family. After clicking wikipedia links for few times, her claimed lineage goes back to Nader Shah and Timur!

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So this Shia Nawabzada and first president of Pakistan was responsible for bringing first martial law in Pakistan.

But the Janissary Pakistani Army kicked him out and he died in london (where else?) , allegedly living with financial difficulties. And....

It was reported widely by Pakistani media that despite hailing from a wealthy Nawab and aristocrat family, Mirza lived in poverty in England and his regular income was based on retired pension of £3,000 as a former military officer and president. Foreign dignitaries such as Ardeshir Zahedi, Shah of Iran, Lord Inchcape, Lord Hume, and Pakistani billionaires in London had made his life in exile tolerable.[47]

At the London hospital where he died, he once said to his wife, Nahid: "We cannot afford medical treatment, so just let me die."
He died of a heart attack on 13 November 1969 and President Yahya Khandenied him a burial in Pakistan. The ShahMohammad Reza Pahlavi sent his personal plane to London to bring President Mirza's body to Tehran, where he was given a state funeral. Hundreds of Iranians, including Prime Minister Abbas Hoveyda, and Pakistani expatriates in Iran bade farewell and offered their prayers.
In October 1954, while in West Pakistan, Mirza's second marriage took place in Karachi after he fell in love with an Iranian aristocrat, Naheed Amirteymour, daughter of Amirteymour Kalali. She was a close friend of Begum Nusrat Bhutto. It was this friendship that brought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto into the political arena of Pakistan.....
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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http://thelondonpost.net/iranian-intelligence-honey-trapped-pakistani-president/
Iranian intelligence ‘Honey Trapped’ Pakistani President
By
The London Post
-
6th January 2016

It seems Pakistani intelligence completely failed when Iranian intelligence launched their ‘honey trapping’ operation against Pakistan’s Defense Secretary Colonel Iskander Mirza by Iranian intelligence agent Nahid Afghamy who was stationed in Pakistan as wife of Colonel Afghamy Military Attaché’ at the Iranian Embassy in Pakistan – Karachi.


Her country woman and relative Nusrat Isphani was already married to Zulifqar Ali Bhutto the future prime minister of Pakistan. It was both Mirza and Bhutto’s second marriage with younger women from Iran...
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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So this Iskandar Mirza was supposedly great grandson of Mir Jafar.

Mir Jafar was Nawab of Bengal.
But not original mughal installed Nawab. He became Nawab after replacing previous Nawab with help of British east India company. Thus beginning the formal rule of the company in India.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mir_Jafar
 

indus

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A Paki realising the truth of Pak society.

The events at Faizabad have made me realise that I'm now a minority in Pakistan

Muhammad Azfar NisarDecember 01, 2017

Pakistanis love myths. Whether it the myth of the Islamic Bomb or the myth of Pakistan as the saviour of the entire Ummah, we love to feel good about ourselves.

These myths allow us to live in a fantasy world, to ignore the true horror of our times.
One such myth is that of the silent majority. The myth goes something like this:

The violence and intolerance in Pakistan is the undertaking of an organised minority and that most Pakistanis are, in fact, tolerant.

Whether it is a terrorist attack or a case of honour killing, it is the go-to myth for Pakistanis.

All of us feel satisfied in the belief that the silent majority abhors such practices. Yet, nothing ever changes in Pakistan. This silent majority never makes its presence known.

Like all of you, I have also waited, all my life, for this silent majority to finally stand up and put a stop to all the nonsense that is going on in the country.

You can’t blame me for believing in this myth either. My family, friends, and teachers all believed in it as I was growing up.

When I told my wiser colleagues that, after all these years, my trust in this silent majority was wavering, I was advised to keep believing.

I was told that the problem was that the silent majority was, well, silent. The task of activists and well-wishers of Pakistan was, then, to help the silent majority became vocal about the need to resolve the many contradictions of our society.

So, I continued to believe. I witnessed a generation of young activists emerge, all of whom were given the same advice. They all tried to make the silent majority speak against the deeply unjust socio-economic system of our country.

Some activists were killed, some were forced to leave the country, and others disappeared. But as a group, they still persisted.

The silent majority, however, was nowhere to be seen. Apparently, the silent majority was in deep slumber.

This week, the nation surrendered at Faizabad. I watched the revolution live on television but it wasn’t the kind of change I had been waiting for. This was not the coming of the silent majority that had been foretold.

I went back to my wiser colleagues and asked them to enlighten me as to what exactly happened at Faizabad. I was told that I was panicking for no reason and that this was only a minority that had laid siege onto the federal capital.

This week was a painful one for me, for I finally learned that I had been living a fantasy all my life. There was no silent majority in Pakistan that some mysterious event was finally going to jolt them out of their sleep.


I used to laugh at children for believing in unicorns and fairies. This week, it occurred to me that I was no different. I was living in cloud cuckoo land as well.

This week it dawned on me that it was this fabled silent majority all along that had transformed the society into what it is today. The majority of this country is intolerant, and this is why they have remained silent in face of mounting social and cultural crisis. Their silence was tacit approval of the ugliness around us.

I feel sorry for the activists and the intellectuals who have spent their lives believing they could succeed in waking the silent majority up. The silent majority was always awake and had been laughing at those trying to summon a mythical group.

This week, I understood that I am actually a minority in Pakistan. The critical task for us now is to embrace this status and work to convince the intolerant majority to let us live in peace in their country.
 

mayfair

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The Napaki is talking nonsense. When it is about the supremacy of Islam over Kaafir, especially when it comes to India vs Shitistan, this Napaki is shoulder to shoulder with the mullah-army brigade as well as the unwashed Abdul (In shitistan Ayeshas do not count).

Now some unwashed Abduls had the temerity to enter his upscale Isloo neighbourhood and make him sweat, he is throwing a hissy fit.

He like all the other RAPEs in Shitistan, wants the unwashed fata Abdul to confine his jihad to India, leaving the likes of Nisar to enjoy swirling scotch on their patio overlooking large farms inherited from their feudal ancestors, who themselves looted them from the displaced Hindus and Sikhs, party late into the night, own multiple passports, spend summer vacations in Londonistan and then don a starched white shalwaar kameez in Ramzan, repeatedly say Astaghfirullah and back to regular programming.

The problem is that the Abdul led by the Abdullahs are no longer willing to fight the Kaafir alone, since unlike what their overlords told them, kaafirs refused to oblige and roll over. Kaafir are dispatching the unwashed to Jahannum faster than they can say AoA. So the Abduls want the RAPEs to join their "cause" (which they know RAPEs cannot and will not), failing which, they should compensate.
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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Free-will marriage
Hajrah MumtazDecember 04, 2017

.... murder of a couple in Karachi that had contracted a ‘free-will’ marriage. In other words, a woman and a man had exercised their right to choose their own partner. Aparently, their fate was ordered by a jirga — tribal forums for ‘justice’ that have been declared against the law for over a decade (more about that later). The couple was strangled to death, their bodies stuffed in gunny bags, and delivered to the earth silently. They belonged originally to the Kohistan district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa........

.......... Scores of such cases come to light every year, the problem of ‘honour’ killing not seeming to abate despite the state having passed legislation regarding various such and related crimes in this context including swara — the practice of giving a woman as a ‘gift’ to an aggrieved family or tribe to settle a dispute,.........
........
While on the subject of legislation, the state is not innocent of ambivalence either: while well-meaning legislation has been passed, it is also a reality that the state has at various times bowed before its own inability to mend a broken formal justice system.

Most recently, for example, the National Assembly passed in February the Alternate Dispute Resolution Bill, 2016, which would allow informal but traditional ‘courts’ to settle 23 types of civil and criminal disputes. And for the record — or irony — it was in October 2016 that a joint session of parliament unanimously approved anti-honour killing and rape bills.....

......
— the fact is that this dire reality cannot be pinned on any one or two ethnicities alone.

Sindh has been notorious for such killings, to the extent that several years ago, ‘free-will’ couples started putting in advertisements in Sindhi-language newspapers in connection with their predicament. Today, they are common: a young woman puts on public record that she has married someone because she wanted to, so that if something happens to her or her husband, the blame can be squarely implicated.
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Fact-finding mission report in Sharifa Bibi case
.... The mission was conducted in Garrah Matt, D I Khan on November 11, 2017.
On October 27, 2017, a teenage girl, Sharifa Bibi, was forcibly stripped, paraded naked and assaulted on the pretext of the restoration of honor. According to the fact finding report, Sharifa was stopped by the culprits from Kombh and Sehar caste group on her way back to home after fetching water from a nearby pond. She was dragged, her clothes were torn by using scissors and knives on gun points and she was paraded naked in the streets before being confined for 5-6 hours.
After locking Sharifa Bibi at one of the accuser’s house, the Kombh family men went to nearby Chaudhwan Police Station and lodged a fake FIR against men of Sharifa Bibi’s family for kidnapping a woman, Mattu Mai from Kombh family. Later FIR was lodged by Sharifa’s family under Sections 354-A, 342, 148, 149.
It is also learnt that the SHO collaborated with the Kombh family and was reluctant to lodge an FIR when Sharifa Bibi arrived at the police station after getting released from forced custody of the culprits. The same SHO tried to twist the facts reported by Sharifa Bibi and was later on dismissed for doing the same as a result of the pressure from civil society and media.
He report says that Maulvi Rab Nawaz from the accused family instigated the crime by providing the culprits with the justification from religion “haath k badly haath” and advised them to take revenge by dishonouring a woman from Sajjad’s family which led to the violence against Sharifa Bibi. It has been learnt that Sharifa Bibi’s brother, Sajjad, was involved in a relationship with the girl of Kombh family three years ago. The village council fined Sajjad’s family Rs105,000 to resolve the matter. But somehow payment of the fine did not resolve the issue and men of Kombh family held a grudge against Sajjad and decided to “punish” his sister instead......
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https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/12/03/mai-says-education-is-now-her-first-mission/
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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Awadh
500px-India_Awadh_locator_map.svg.png


Awadh pronunciation , known in British historical texts as Audh or Oude, is a region in the modern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh(before Indian independence, it was known as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh) and a small area of Nepal'sProvince No. 5.
It was established as one of the twelve original subahs (top-level imperial provinces) under 16th-century Mughal emperor Akbar and became a hereditary tributary polity around 1722 AD, with Faizabad as its initial capital and Saadat Ali Khan as its first Subadar Nawab and progenitor of a dynasty of Nawabs of Awadh (often styled Nawab Wazir al-Mamalik). The traditional capital of Awadh was Faizabad, but the capital was later moved to Lucknow,
http://www.anwarscoincollection.com/2011/12/03/the-durranis-the-sikhs-awadh/



https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawab_of_Awadh
Nawab of Awadh

The Nawab of Awadh or the Nawab of Oudh/ˈaʊd/ was the title of the rulers who governed the state of Awadh (anglicised as Oudh) in north India during the 18th and 19th centuries. The Nawabs of Awadh belonged to a dynasty of Turkish origin from Nishapur, Iran.[1][2][3]
As the Mughal Empire declined, the emperors lost their power and became puppets and prisoners of their new overlords, the Marathas. Awadh thus grew stronger and more independent. The capital city at the time was Faizabad.
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Shi‘i State Formation in Awadh and the Ulama

The Emergence of Successor States to the Mughals

The Rise of the Awadh Successor State
In the period 1722-75 three nawabs reigned through several phases of state formation in Awadh. The. state has been described as "a distinct realm of structured political relations that is defined by contention along its boundaries and among politicians and bureaucrats who, in competing for office and influence, rework social and economic conflict into political terms," and emphasis has shifted in the scholarly study of state making from static institutions to the "structured relations between the state and other spheres of society."[9] The question arises of what social forces influenced the rise of the nawabs to regional autonomy in Awadh. As Iranian Shi‘is, the nawabs, originally temporary Mughal appointees, seem at first glance an elite group unlikely to assert strong authority over the Hindu peasants and Sunni townsmen of Awadh. How they made Shi‘i rule at all palatable to Awadh's population must occupy us as a central question. Moreover, it might be asked if there arc any parallels between the rise of Shi‘i rule in Awadh and that of the Safavids earlier in Iran.

The emergence of the province of Awadh as a Shi‘i-ruled state depended in part on developments at the Timurid court, where the Mughal administrative elite allowed Iranian Shi‘i immigrants to rise as provincial governors. On the one hand, pohtical instability in Iran encouraged large numbers of Iranian notables to go to India; on the other, the mood at court after the passing of Awrangzib (d. 1707) grew decidedly more tolerant of Shi‘ism. Awrangzib's successor, Bahadur Shah (d. 1712), leaned heavily toward Shi‘i Islam.[10]The Shi‘i Barhah Sayyids, mere Delhi courtiers, made and unmade Mughal emperors, further demonstrating growing Shi‘i power. Greater tolerance at court allowed more elite recruitment of avowed Shi‘is to high office,

The Iranians made an impact, not only on the Delhi court, but on North India as a whole. Mir Muhammad Amin Nishapuri (d. 1739), the first nawab of Awadh, began a dynasty that ruled for 136 years. Nishapuri. known as Burhanu'l-Mulk, derived from a family of Islamic judges (qazis ) in Khurasan, whom Shah Ismacil Safavi of Iran transplanted there from Najaf as part of his campaign to make Iran Shi‘i.[11]Nishapuri came to India in 1708, where he worked himself up the bureaucratic ladder to emerge as a power broker in Delhi. He helped free the Mughal emperor, Muhammad

― 41 ―
Shah, of the political control of the Barhah Sayyids in 1720, receiving as a reward the governorship of Agra.[12]

In 1722, after Burhanu'l-Mulk failed to subdue peasant uprisings, the emperor demoted him to the less remunerative governorship of Awadh. There he overcame and co-opted the Sunni Shaykhzadah landholders based in the strategic town of Lucknow, who then collaborated in the emergent Awadh state. Awadh never achieved a high degree of governmental centralization, making the cooperation of such local elites essential to political stability. Burhanu'l-Mulk then brought within his orbit the Hindu Rajput Mohan Singh of Tiloi, who dominated the southern part of Rai Bareli. The Nishapuri satrap spent the next decade and a half establishing stronger central rule in Awadh, greatly increasing its revenue. In something of a declaration of independence, he resisted the Mughal emperor's one attempt to transfer him to the governorship of another province, Malwa.[13]

In January of 1739 Nadir Shah of Iran took Lahore, invading through Afghanistan. Burhanu'l-Mulk brought his forces into the fray on the side of the Mughal emperor, but was defeated and captured. The nawab, after negotiating an Iranian withdrawal, felt disappointed by the Mughal emperor's subsequent political appointments and treasonably suggested to Nadir Shah that it would be quite Facile and highly rewarding to take Delhi. The Iranian conqueror, delighted to take up the suggestion, victoriously marched into the city, the savage looting of the capital later perpetrated by his troops constituting one of the century's great disasters. Nadir reduced the Mughal emperor to a vassal of Iran, making Burhanu'l-Mulk imperial regent..... Blah..... Blah..... Blah...
images.png
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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https://m.rediff.com/news/column/marathas-wanted-to-liberate-hindu-holy-sites/20171204.htm

................. e of the 18th century, the Marathas had consolidated their hold over Central India, the Malwa plateau. The Marathas wished to test the waters as well as establish the rights of all Hindus to go on pilgrimages.

In a planned move Bajirao's mother Radhabai went on a year-long visit to Hindu holy sites in the north in February 1735. Such was the awe Bajirao commanded that the Mughal emperor not only welcomed her visit but also deputed a guard of 1,000 soldiers to accompany her throughout her stay.

Radhbai returned to Pune in June 1736 after a prolonged stay at Kashi.

In 1737 Bajirao made a successful dash to Delhi and defeated the Mughal army. As Nizam Ul Mulk tried to come to the emperor's rescue, Bajirao moved against him and defeated him in the battle of Sironj in January 1738.

The Mughals ceded the province of Malwa to the Marathas. Bajirao in turn appointed the Shindes (now the Scindias) to look after Gwalior and the Holkars to take charge in Indore. Once the base in Malwa was secure, the Marathas began forays into the Indo-Gangetic plains.

On June 27, 1742, Malhar Rao Holkar, the Maratha general, with a cavalry force of over 20,000 soldiers reached the vicinity of Kashi.

Holkar planned to pull down the Gyanvapi mosque that was constructed at the site of the Kashi Vishwanath temple by Aurangzeb and rebuild the temple.

The people of Kashi were alarmed and sent a delegation requesting Holkar not to do so. The delegation argued that the Mughals were too strong in Kashi and the residents would be killed once the Marathas left.

Holkar acceded to their request and left without restoring the Kashi temple.

By 1750, after Nadir Shah's devastating raid in 1739 and the plunder of Delhi (during which he carried away the famous Peacock throne and Kohinoor diamond), the Mughal emperor was reduced to a puppet in the hands of various nobles and the Marathas. The latter had become virtual kingmakers in Delhi.

In 1752, the Mughal wazir (prime minister) Safdar Jung sought Maratha help. They agreed, but demanded more provinces and the liberation of Hindu holy places.

Safdar Jung agreed to the first condition but made various excuses to deny the Hindu holy places to the Marathas.

One of the akhbars (news reports) mentions that the general opinion among Muslims was against the move as the control over Kashi, Mathura and Ayodhya was seen by them as symbols of conquest of Islam over Hinduism.

At that time as well as in the 21st century, Shia Muslims were more accommodative than Sunnis.

Nadir Shah's invasion and Ahmed Shah Abdali's invasion in 1759 forced the Marathas to change their policy of basing only small forces in the north.

On April 14, 1760, a large force under Sadashiv Bhau marched from Pune to deal with the threat of an Afghan invasion.

Bhau was instructed to first defeat Abdali at Delhi and then turn east and liberate Hindu holy sites.

He was to further proceed to Bengal to drive away the English who had begun to pose a serious threat to Maratha domains in the north and the south.

The aim to liberate holy places had one rather unfortunate effect. Attracted by the opportunity to conduct a pilgrimage to the holy places, a large number of non-combatants joined the Maratha force.

This was contrary to Bajirao's practice of maintaining a nimble-footed army that had so successfully conquered Malwa. This was to prove a great hindrance when the Marathas faced Abdali at Panipat on January 14, 1761.

In a closely fought battle the Marathas suffered a major defeat. The Afghan losses were also considerable and Abdali returned to Afghanistan soon thereafter.

The resultant power vacuum was soon filled by the English who advanced from Bengal and established their sway over most of Doab (the Ganga-Yamuna valley).

The Marathas under the able General Mahadji Shinde re-established themselves in Delhi by 1765. However, they could never again muster sufficient strength to conquer the rest of north India.

In the second Anglo-Maratha war fought in 1803, the English defeated the Marathas in the battles of Delhi, Aligarh, Lassawari and Assye.

The English did not tinker with the ownership of Hindu holy places and the status quoestablished by Mughal emperors Babar and Aurangzeb continued under their rule till 1947.
Excerpted from Mighty Marathas: The Last Indian Empire by Colonel Anil A Athale (retd)
 

LordOfTheUnderworlds

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Barelvi

Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi

Barelvi (Urdu: بَریلوِی‎‎, Barēlwī, Urdu pronunciation: [bəreːlʋi]) is a term used for the movement following the SunniHanafi school of jurisprudence, originating in Bareilly
... in British India.....
The name derives from the north Indian town of Bareilly, the hometown of its founder and main leader Ahmed Raza Khan (1856–1921).[2][3][4][5][6] Although Barelvi is the commonly used term in the media and academia, the followers of the movement often prefer to be known by the title of Ahle Sunnat wa Jama'at, (Urdu: اہل سنت وجماعت‎‎) or as Sunnis, a reference to their perception as forming an international majority movement.[7]
The movement emphasizes personal devotion to the Islamic prophet Muhammad and a synthesis of Sharia with Sufi practices such as veneration of saints.[8][9] Because of this, they are often called Sufi, although they have little in common with the Sufism of classical Islamic mystics.
Ahmed Raza Khan Barelvi belonged to the Barech tribe of Pushtuns.[7] The Barech formed a tribal grouping among the RohillaPushtuns of North India who founded the state of Rohilkhand.
Unlike other Muslim leaders in the region at the time, Khan and his movement opposed the Indian independence movement..................... Khan declared that India was Dar al-Islam and that Muslims enjoyed religious freedom there......................... , he opposed labeling British India to be Dar al-Harb ("land of war"),
 
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LordOfTheUnderworlds

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West Pak refugees bear brunt of BJP infighting
Posted at: Dec 1, 2017, 1:12 AM




Dinesh Manhotra

Tribune News Service

Jammu, November 30

West Pakistani refugees have been bearing the brunt of the infighting in the state unit of the BJP as a group within the party is apathetic towards the problems of the ‘state-less’ lot.

As nearly 1.5 lakh West Pakistani refugees, living in different parts of the Jammu region, are being deprived of participating in the panchayat, local urban bodies and Assembly elections, a group within the BJP was of the opinion that there was no reason to take a tough stand for these ‘non-voters’.

Highly placed sources said during the coalition coordination committee meeting on November 21, the issue of denying subsidised ration to these refugees were taken by the BJP representatives, but no other issues pertaining to them was taken.

“For West Pakistan refugees, BJP ministers are not going to confront with the PDP because they (ministers) are well aware that these displaced persons are eligible only for casting votes in the Lok Sabha elections,” a source said, adding, “Two Lok Sabha members of the BJP from the Jammu region are particular about solving the issues of these refugees, but they are not getting the required response from the state unit.”

For BJP’s Lok Sabha members, one-time solution of the problems of the West Pakistan refugees is must as this chunk is the ‘deciding factor’ in both Jammu-Poonch and Udhampur-Doda Lok Sabha constituencies.

In the Agenda of Alliance — the document for running government in J&K, both the PDP and the BJP had promised to “take measures for sustenance and livelihood of the West Pakistan refugees”, but nothing has been improved to date. Conditions of these refugees are same as were three years ago before the formation of this regime.

“Our patience is running out. The Centre is serious about solving our issues once for all, but those at the helm of affairs in the state are adopting a casual approach towards our issues,” regretted Labha Ram Gandhi, a leader of the West Pakistan refugees.

It is also widely alleged that the BJP leadership in J&K is dominated by the “upper caste” and a majority of these refugees are Dalits and OBCs, so caste prejudice is another factor of the apathetic approach of solving their problems.
 

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