Indian BMD and Pakistan

Discussion in 'Strategic Forces' started by LETHALFORCE, Apr 24, 2010.

  1. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://cominganarchy.com/2009/03/10/indian-bmd-and-pakistan/

    Indian BMD and Pakistan



    While the US missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic have consistently made the news, few realize that other countries are equally interested in ballistic missile defense (BMD). Unsurprisingly, those are Japan, Israel and India (Russia to some extent).

    And while Russia has the experience, expertise and technology to build some countermeasures, others do not. Therefore, when I read about Indian BMD, I wonder how Islamabad will react as they have a far smaller capacity to do so with most of their technology being Chinese or North Korean.

    Buoyed by the successful testing of its fledgling ballistic missile defence, India is pushing ahead with an ambitious version of the star wars project capable of shooting down incoming ICBMs in the 5,000 km range. The phase-II of the BMD systems, likely to be deployed by 2014, will be an important part of India’s defence as both China and Pakistan possess nuclear capable missiles. Once the BMD is in place it will place India in a fairly exclusive club alongside US, Russia and Israel.

    Even the possibility of effective BMD presents a major threat to Pakistan’s strategic weapons. Given that their warheads will be delivered by a combination of missiles and F16s, and that the Indian Air Force would likely intercept at least some of those planes, what are Pakistan’s options for countering India’s BMD program? They have neither the money or indigenous capabilities to develop their own, nor are they likely to find a country willing to sell them the technology. Even a partially successful Indian BMD program could have a major destabilizing effect on relations with Pakistan at a time when Pakistan is fighting for its very existence from internal threats.
     
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  3. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/...issile-defence-shield/articleshow/4247009.cms

    India kicks off work on advanced missile defence shield


    NEW DELHI: Buoyed by the successful testing
    of its fledgling ballistic missile defence, India is pushing ahead with an ambitious version of the star wars project capable of shooting down incoming ICBMs in the 5,000 km range.

    The phase-II of the BMD systems, likely to be deployed by 2014, will be an important part of India's defence as both China and Pakistan possess nuclear capable missiles. Once the BMD is in place it will place India in a fairly exclusive club alongside US, Russia and Israel.

    India will be playing catch up with China which stunned the world by shooting down a weather satellite with a missile in January 2007. Putting in place a system capable of intercepting inter-continental ballistic missiles would enhance India's strategic prowess.

    While a BMD system can be overwhelmed by a flurry of missiles or a low-flying cruise, it would be a important part of India's defence against the danger of ballistic missiles.

    If the ongoing Phase-I BMD system is geared to tackling enemy missiles with a 2,000-km range, Phase-II is enhance capacities significantly. Plans are also afoot to have space-based surveillance systems to ensure a hostile threat can be detected even earlier than the present long-range tracking radars (LRTRs) used in the BMD system, which track the `enemy' missile as well as guide the `interceptor' missile in destroying it.

    Sources said DRDO has told the government that while the Phase-I systems can be deployed from 2012 onwards, the Phase-II systems will come into operational play only from 2014 onwards at the earliest.

    There will be another interesting spin-off from the indigenous two-tier BMD system, capable of tracking and destroying hostile missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) the earth's atmosphere. It will give India a potent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon since technology required for "neutralisation'' of a ballistic missile or a satellite is somewhat similar.

    India, of course, has received presentations from the three countries which have operational BMD or anti-ballistic missile systems -- US (Patriot Advanced Capability-3), Russia (S-300V) and Israel (Arrow-2) -- as of now.

    Though all three are hawking their systems to India, New Delhi has decided to go in for its own "home-grown'' BMD system specifically designed to meet its security needs. Moreover, there are financial and feasibility concerns about importing foreign systems.

    "We are cooperating with countries to bridge our technology gaps. US, for instance, has a different threat profile. Its systems will not be suitable for us. Our system has to cater for our own threat profile,'' DRDO chief controller for missiles, Dr V K Saraswat, said on Monday.

    Dismissing PAC-3 as "an outdated system'', the scientist said India's BMD system was "20-30% more capable'' than it. He, however, acknowledged the BMD system had received some help from countries like Israel (LRTRs), France (fire-control radars) and Russia (seekers).

    DRDO, of course, often promises more than it can deliver. This time, however, it sounds quite confident, especially after the third test of the Phase-I BMD system on March 6, when a two-stage exo-atmospheric interceptor missile intercepted an `enemy' missile at an 80-km altitude.

    In the earlier tests, in November 2006 and December 2007, the enemy missiles had been "killed'' at altitudes of 48-km and 15-km respectively. The next test, with both exo and endo interceptor missiles in an integrated mode, is slated for September.

    "We will complete all our tests for Phase-I by 2010-2011. All BMD building blocks like long-range radars, communication network, mission control centre and launch control centre are in place,'' said Saraswat.

    "What we are now perfecting are Phase-I interceptor missiles, which fly at 4.5 Mach high-supersonic speeds. We are already working on Phase-II interceptors, which will have hypersonic speeds of 6-7 Mach,'' he added.
     
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  4. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_2/comment/2c.htm

    BMD and its Impact on Pakistan

    The Bush Administration has shown its commitment to the development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and has begun an aggressive diplomatic sell of this globally. BMD has two components: National Missile Defence (NMD) based in the US and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). While the NMD is a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defence system with a space-based detection system – the envisaged TMD focuses on rapid deployment and with an element of high manoeuvrability. And, unlike the NMD, the TMD comprises a number of subsystems.

    The NMD is primarily a programme designed for the security of the continental US and the present scheme, with missile-tracking radar and the initial launch site’s location in Alaska, is clearly targeted for China and its very limited Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force. The so-called “rogue states” of West Asia are certainly not the targets. In any case, the issue of “rogue” states does not really wash because only the US imagination could think of a missile attack on the US mainland from a state like Iran or even North Korea!

    BMD also impacts upon the NATO deterrent shield over allies like Canada, Japan and Europe. This may be weakened now since they can become more accessible targets for anti-West forces than the US – once the NMD is deployed. Which is why the US is now talking of a wider notion of “Missile Defence”, which would eventually cover the European allies, to stem the opposition to BMD from these allies.

    The TMD systems, which will be stationed across the globe, including on allied territories, will impact China again (through Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) as well as countries like Pakistan and Iran (through India, Israel etc). In addition, the US Seventh Fleet’s presence in the Asia-Pacific region will also bolster the TMD further. All the countries chosen to be part of the TMD will be given the relevant missile systems and technology, which would lead to the US thus unilaterally contravening the (Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and other nonproliferation agreements.

    So, at the very least, China will have to seek an expansion of its ICBM force including more multiple warheads. It may also choose to develop ICBMs that can escape sensor detection and it may also opt for mobile warheads based in submarines – with a more expansive deployment, perhaps even in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

    How will the BMD impact the global arms control agenda in general, and Pakistan’s strategic deterrence in particular?

    To begin with, the ABM Treaty will stand totally violated. It seems that President Bush regards it as a redundant leftover from the days of the bipolar world and is inclined to violate it unilaterally, should Russia not agree with its complete revision. So far Russia has shown its unwillingness to tamper with the ABM Treaty, but it may be bribed into doing so. In any case, the ABM Treaty has an “extraordinary” cancellation clause, which allows either side to give six months’ notice of withdrawal for reasons vital to national security.

    More dangerous is the new US line of treating international agreements as “leftovers” of the bipolar era. After all, almost all the arms control measures can be placed in this “leftover” category, including the NPT with its legitimation of only five nuclear weapon states.

    BMD will also violate many existing international arms control arrangements beyond the bilateral ABM Treaty. At the multilateral level, the BMD plan directly contravenes the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, especially with the US plans to use Tactical High Energy Laser, developed in cooperation with Israel, as one of the anti-missile systems, which will be deployed in space. The NPT itself will be undermined, especially Article VI. Even the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties will be undermined by the TMD. Worse still, the US will become a major missile proliferator when it seeks to deploy TMD on allied territories and, therefore, transfers sensitive missiles and missile technology. This would directly contravene the MTCR regime.

    The BMD factor will also impact on the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty), making such a treaty more of an improbability. The Chinese stance, that the FMCT must be linked with deweaponisation of space, will now be further hardened. So all in all, the BMD will undermine the global arms control and disarmament agenda. Of course, the US will declare its intent of unilateral reduction in warheads along with BMD deployment – but other states will not follow suit unless they too would have acquired a BMD capability. If anything, other nuclear weapon states may have to add to their missile arsenals and to the varied mix of these arsenals.

    Apart from weakening the arms control framework, the BMD also threatens the stability of deterrence that has been built over decades. This is because the whole presumption against nuclear weapons’ usage has so far been premised on mutual vulnerability. The BMD plan totally destroys this and in so doing, destroys the carefully constructed stability of traditional nuclear deterrence.

    As for Pakistan, the BMD with its TMD component will be a source of strategic threats in the future. Already, India has acquired components of the TMD from the Soviet Union and now it is in the process of acquiring the Phalcon radar. This acquisition means that Pakistan’s limited missile force and deployments would be completely vulnerable, and therefore, its deterrence weakened, since it would now not be premised on mutual vulnerability in relation to India. Pakistan will have to place its missiles on mobile launchers in Balochistan – until hardened silos can be perfected for deployments in other more forward locations. This, in turn, would put stress on command, control and communications. Also, political stability of the province becomes a vital factor in terms of the safety of such deployed weapons.

    In fact, Pakistan may be compelled into going for some triad arrangement of nuclear forces – as well as seeking defence agreements within West Asia and the Gulf region, to make up for its lack of spatial depth. India’s missile ranges, as well as its intent of deploying missile defence, means that the distinction between South and West Asia and the Gulf has been eliminated in the military context.

    Along with this, with China being compelled to increase its warheads and ICBMs, India is bound to use that as a pretext to amass further missiles and so there is a danger of a missile race in this region. But there is also the opportunity for closer military cooperation with China. After all, in the face of its being targeted twice – through NMD and TMD – China, as stated above, will need to expand its naval military presence to the Indian Ocean. In this regard, Pakistan can offer base facilities along its coastline. There is more of a need now for a formal defence cooperation agreement between China and Pakistan, with a strong focus on some sort of a defensive belt from the Gulf to Myanmar. In such a scheme, Bangladesh may also come in to protect itself from India’s growing militaristic policies.

    Such cooperation also has an economic side in that it would help secure energy supply sources and routes. It is clear that BMD will lead to a more direct linkage between security and economic issues – with a major focus on maintaining secure sources and routes of oil and gas. India has already been talking of energy security and making strategic inroads in the Gulf region as well as investing in the energy sector in the Central Asian states. The politics of pipelines is going to be a major factor in the strategic relations of this region stretching from the Gulf to Central and South Asia. Pakistan and China cannot afford the luxury of ignoring these developments now that the US has gone overt with its intent of developing and deploying BMD.

    Also, given the new likely technological cooperative links in the military field – based on BMD assessments, between the US, Israel, Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, etc, – there is a need for Pakistan to expand its military-technological cooperation, not only with China but also with the states of West Asia and the Middle East. How South Africa reacts to BMD would also define the future of Africa in terms of regional nonproliferation and military capabilities and alliances.

    Finally, a country like Pakistan will find its political options constrained in the wake of the BMD plan and the evolving Indo-US-Israel nexus in this regard. Those who looked to reestablishing a close strategic alliance for Pakistan with the US need to realise that the US-centric option is simply not there anymore and alternative options must be taken advantage of. These include looking closer within the region for new multiple level alliances with the strategic factor as the core.

    Pakistan also needs to put its fears regarding BMD on the top of its dialogue agenda with the US, as a major perceived threat for this country. In other words, for Pakistan this must be pursued as a priority agenda item in any future dialogue with the US.

    Also, Pakistan now has to view all its arms control commitments within the context of the threat BMD poses to it – including adopting closer links with China on FMCT negotiations. On the FMCT, Pakistan needs to support the Chinese position that the FMCT must be part of a wider non-proliferation agreement that includes a commitment to deweaponise space. With the US committed to the use of High Energy Lasers, schemes and plans for the deweaponisation of space are not going to be possible in the coming future. Thus, there will be little scope for an FMCT to come into being any time soon, unless China and its allies on this count forego the linkages they are presently seeking. In other words, the global non-proliferation agenda is now going to be more directly linked to an overall scheme with the BMD being a central issue.

    As for regional options of non-proliferation – they cannot now be dealt with in isolation from the global situation, given the direct linkages established between the two by the components of BMD. Thus, the viability of nuclear weapon free zones will be called more and more into question with space-based weapon systems and TMD deployed across the globe. In a world which threatens to become a free-for-all in terms of weapons systems, BMD will make the unthinkable thinkable – that is, a nuclear war.
     
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  5. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/missile-defense-india

    Missile defense in India

    A few weeks ago, Indian officials held preliminary talks with the United States about purchasing a missile defense shield from it. "India is a partner of ours, and we want to provide it with whatever it needs to protect itself," a U.S. official told the Financial Times. Already, Indian officials and scientists have witnessed some simulations of the U.S. missile defense system, along with a couple of live tests. Washington even has offered to sell the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 system to India.

    India's interest in strategic missile defense dates back to 1983 when New Delhi initiated an "Integrated Missile Development Program." The program included not only offensive missiles such as the nuclear-capable Prithvi and Agni, but also the Akash, a surface-to-air missile that had the potential to provide India with theater missile defense capabilities. Later in the 1990s, India's Defence Research & Development Organization and the country's military discussed initiating conceptual missile defense studies. Around the same time, the Indian military had a few conversations with Israel and Russia about how they could help New Delhi advance its air defense systems. Although such talk clearly demonstrated an Indian interest in missile defense, it was confined to professional military officers and low-level bureaucrats.

    The interest of India's elected leadership intensified a few years later, their support growing for a variety of reasons. First, 9/11 and the subsequent war in Afghanistan turned Pakistan into a U.S. ally, triggering speculation that the Pakistani government might be overturned by anti-American Islamic fundamentalists who would then control Islamabad's nuclear arsenal. And if Pakistani nuclear weapons fell into such hands, India feared it might be the first target.

    Secondly, some in India believe that a domestic missile defense capability might be able to check Pakistan more generally. Ever since Islamabad obtained nuclear weapons, it has emboldened its strategy of supporting insurgencies within India to settle outstanding political differences--i.e., Kashmir. Missile defense, the argument goes, would prove instrumental in providing New Delhi reassurance and protection since Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be countered both offensively and defensively.

    Finally, few countries in the world face the missile threats that India does. Of course, there's Pakistan and its Ghauri and Shaheen missile series--both of which possess ranges longer than 1,000 kilometers. But there's also nearby China, a fellow nuclear-armed state equipped with DF-21 missiles that can travel more than 2,000 kilometers. So it's no surprise that the upper-echelons of the Indian government have begun to show significant interest in defense technologies that can, at least theoretically, combat such threats.

    A ballistic missile flight from Sargodha, Pakistan, could reach New Delhi in about 5-7 minutes. As such, Indian missile defense proponents envision the system working as follows: A technically complex and vast constellation of early warning sensors would detect the missile immediately after it is launched. This part of the system is already more or less in place; the Green Pine radar, which India purchased from Israel around 2002 and is situated about 200 kilometers north of New Delhi, can detect a missile 90 seconds after it has been launched--at least on a preliminary basis. The next step is to determine whether the signal picked up by the radar is that of an incoming missile or a false alarm.

    Complicating matters is that India and Pakistan share a border, making for shorter ballistic missile flights. For example, the estimated total missile flight times are 8-13 minutes for ranges of 600-2,000 kilometers. The flight times can be even less if the missile is flown in a depressed trajectory.

    Such a short time period places stringent conditions on procedures for evaluating and verifying warnings. There would be no time to consult or deliberate after receiving this warning. In other words, any response would have to be predetermined, presenting a significant likelihood of accidental nuclear war from false alarms.

    Oddly, despite such potentially catastrophic consequences, in India the debate about missile defense has become a debate about India's burgeoning ties with Washington as a part of New Delhi's "Next Steps in Security Partnership"--a 2002 diplomatic initiative between the United States and India to expand their cooperation in civilian nuclear activities and civilian space programs, along with broadening their dialogue on missile defense to promote nonproliferation and to ease the transfer of advanced technologies to India.

    For the United States, missile defense initially was only one aspect of its budding bilateral relationship with New Delhi. But over time missile defense has come to represent something larger in the relationship. Quite simply, it represents Washington's implicit support for India against Pakistan, without, of course, supporting an explicit Indian recourse to offensive military strategies. Along these lines, there's every reason to expect the United States to continue to be supportive of India's emergence as a counterweight to China.

    Ultimately, technology will decide the operational capability of missile defense in India. But for the time being, it can be assumed that New Delhi's decisions with regard to missile defense are strongly linked to the changing tenor of U.S.-Indian relations.
     
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  6. LETHALFORCE

    LETHALFORCE Moderator Moderator

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    CROSS POSTED

    http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-Land-Based-Air-Defence/PAD-AAD-India.html

    PAD/AAD (India), Self-propelled surface-to-air missiles


    Type
    Self-propelled static surface-to-air missile system

    Development
    India is developing a complete suite of air defence missiles that are both endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric that will employ Network Centric technology and will be able to engage all types of targets including:Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM)Air breathing targets such as aircraftCruise missilesThe system is expected to be deployed in a mix and match group to counter short reaction threats. Details of at least two missiles have been released, the PAD and AAD. There has however been some discussion as to whether an air-to-air missile currently in development - the Astra - has already been involved in user firing trials in a surface-to-air role. This may well be used as a means of either point defence, or at the very least in defence of the two primary missile systems against SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) attacks. A further missile development that will increase the range and capability of the system is know as the PDV, this is also due for firing trials sometime early in the FY2010. With this capability, India will have protection cover in the western region and the northeastern region against those targets that are launched from 2,500 km. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has developed technologies including Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS), Nano materials and Nano sensors to enable it to enter this particular area for missile defence and has laid down a solid foundation for the indigenous missile defence of India from its local adversaries such as Pakistan and
     
  7. kseeker

    kseeker Retired

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    Defence News - India's hostile BMD Program and Pakistan's Security Option

    [​IMG]

    India’s BMD capability has evolved after many years of clandestine research and development. Since July 1983, Indian scientists have been engaged in fusing the foreign and domestic research and components for the development of the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).

    India’s other preference for augmenting its TMD potential is to buy these missiles from the friendly states. The Russian Federation and Israel have signed agreements with India, under which India has been receiving TMD components and technology from these states. The U.S has been forging a new strategic partnership with India, in order to contain its future adversaries in Asia. Therefore, instead of opposing India’s missile build-up, the U.S is supporting it.

    Earlier this year, The Hindu reported V.K. Saraswat claiming that incoming ballistic missiles with a range of 2000km could be destroyed with the shield and this capability would be enhanced to meet missiles with a range of 5000km by 2016.

    The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is developing a two-tier Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system that provides a multi-layered shield against ballistic missile attacks. The BMD system consists of a Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) missile and an Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception. The PAD intercepts missiles at altitudes between 50km-80km and the AAD missile destroys them at altitudes of 15km-30km.

    India has also shown interest in the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile defence system. Indo-Israeli relations improved considerably in the 1990s. Israel assumed the role of becoming the second biggest seller of weapons to India after Russia. However, India has acquired a number of weapons systems from Israel.

    The Arrow missile system was jointly developed by Israel and the US. Arrow 2, an advanced version of Arrow, is designed to intercept short and medium-range ballistic missiles, and can detect and track up to 14 missiles simultaneously at distances as far a 500 km away.
    With an Indian BMD system, Pakistan would be forced to respond in some way in order to ensure the integrity of its nuclear deterrent. Although it is difficult to gauge Pakistan’s response, it would depend on the type, size and shape of an Indian BMD.

    There are a number of options that Pakistan could possibly pursue. Pakistan could either go for its own defence systems or build up its offensive forces to overwhelm India’s defences.

    Pakistan’s ability to produce its own missile defence systems is extremely limited both from technological point of view as well as from an economic one. A less costly and more effective option for Pakistan could be a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy.

    The simplest solution for Pakistan would be to go for a larger number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles. This would entail an increase in the number of missiles both Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV-ed) and single warheads. Pakistan would also have to increase its fissile material production in order to have more warheads.

    The purpose of the numbers approach would be to saturate Indian defences. This would mean, for example, if India has the capability to intercept twenty-five missiles, Pakistan should have thirty.

    Another option for Pakistan could be deployment. This could entail maintaining assembled form of missiles to reduce the reaction time. This could be taken a step further to the level of actually deploying the assembled missiles tipped with nuclear warheads. Pakistan can also go for a triad of nuclear forces. At present, Pakistan has land- and air-based nuclear forces but no sea-based one.

    In the short term, a mix of qualitative and quantitative improvements in Pakistan’s offensive capabilities might be a more viable solution for Pakistan.

    In the long term, Pakistan needs to acquire advance technologies, like perfecting cruise missile technology, reducing the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan, to neutralise the effects of Indian missile defence systems. Moreover, Pakistan can also pursue a diplomatic course by suggesting an ABM treaty between India and Pakistan, or by negotiating a zero missile regime between the two countries.
     

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