Could India have forced Pakistan after 71 war on the Kasmir issue?

Discussion in 'Defence & Strategic Issues' started by Yusuf, Nov 4, 2009.

  1. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    There was a discussion on shout about indo pak war of 71. We had a member say India lost a crucial leverage by not forcing the issue on Kashmir in return for the land India had captured.
    My view and some of the other members was that India was in no position to force the issue as the US was breathing down indias throat. Thr Nixon admin was anti India and had sent the seventh fleet to the Bay of Bengal. The US might have attacked India if India has forced the issue on Kashmir was the view.

    The US was late in doing anything about India successfully liberating Bangladesh but would have not let India dictate terms on Kashmir.

    What is members take on this?
     
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  3. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    by land means bangladesh, then i don't think it was possible. max india could have added to its geography.
    on the other hand if india had forced on the issue of POWs(90000 odd) it would have fructified.

    they avoided SOVIET UNION breathing down their necks. india had a security pact with SU. they would have done nothing except watch in silence.

    if india was not in pact with SU it would have been a possibilty.
     
  4. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    India had captured 13000 sq km of pakistani territory in the western sector.
     
  5. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    my bad. in that case then i agree with that member you quoted. 13000sq.km and 90000 POWs would have easily forced pakistan to accept on kashmir.
     
  6. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    yes india could have soled the kashmir situation in 1947-48 then in 1965 then in 1971 but for the glittering gold of nobel peace prize was more for indian pms to lose those leverages at crucial junctures like wat Man mohan singh did in Sharm-e-sheikh declaration.As general patton said in 1945 these politicians always leave war incomplete to be fought by armies in futures.same thing indian pms have done.repeated same mistake over and over and over again.
     
  7. Sabir

    Sabir DFI TEAM Senior Member

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    Thanks Yousuf for posting the thread. Of course it provides better space here to discuss than in shout box.

    I am completely agreed with you and I must add that GOI did the prudent thing by not dragging it to the extent where whole situation could take a U-turn. The Nixon administration was not clearly in our side. They not only send their carrier fleet towards Indian Ocean but requested China to move troops to border to scare India. But damage was done before they could do anything. (I don’t know whether the story of Soviet submarine following US carrier fleet is true or not) Perhaps they could not imagine Pak Army would surrender so early. One thing we must remember India had moral support for Muktibahini in east-Pakistan but India declared war only when Pakistan attacked in the Western front. So there was no point to carry on the issue even after defeating Pakistan when there was all possibility that mighty US and China were not liking that. It is debatable whether US would really attack India or not but after starting barraging if we had to step back empty handed facing threat from US and China (which was highly possible than actual war), our victory would have turned in to a bitter humiliation. Practically speaking Pakistan was important for US and they needed to alleviate their (Pakistan) wounds as a moral booster even if it was little late. So US threat could not be taken lightly. US could easily declare a deadline for us…. “Leave their territory within..…else…” Retreating after such threat would be of more humiliating. Don’t forget there were other means to create pressure on India other than militarily.

    And I don’t think once Pakistan was assured of Chinese and US support they would have bothered about POW or territory captured by India. So, in my opinion Indira Gandi and her Generals not only lead India to a victory against Pakistan but also took prudent decision about where to end it.
     
  8. Sabir

    Sabir DFI TEAM Senior Member

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    “Indira’s mistakes…not bargaining Kashmir over captured territory…….”- all these are propagated by some political parties in India. Some of them were in power together for a full term when Pakistani intruders invaded kargil, Lashkar’s men reached the door of Parliament and Masud Azhar got released and danced his way to Pakistan. What was done? Troops were sent across the border and then called back. (Don’t know whether they saw red eyes of Uncle Sam)
     
  9. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    there is no question of dragging. we are talking of post war scenario.

    it can be psy-ops too to scare india. americans are masters of psy ops.

    then how do you beleive US carrier fleet?
    india was in security pact with SU. so it is perfectly possible.

    1971 was a master stroke both militarily and politically. maneckshaw and indira gandhi take all the credit respectively. indira also made sure US will not get aggressive on india by going to SU well before 1971.

    india- SU pact put all that to rest. USA or China could not have faced upto SU.

    same as above.

    the point does not arise 'cos pakistan surrenedered. what you are saying is at best an assumption which never happened and indira had already accounted that for.

    great victory yes. prudent i doubt.
    one always negotiates from a position of strength and forces the adversary to toe his line in post war scenario. india never had such a position of strength in its history. 13000 sq km and 90000 POWs was a huge advantage. it would have made history. we lost it.
    btw if you think it was prudent to end the way it ended why are we still struggling with kashmir problem? why terrorists keep coming and have field day?
    point we won the war but lost a huge opportunity.
     
  10. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    it is a natural charge. there is value in that considering we never had a bargaining advantage as we had in 1971.

    it was a major intel flop. can't really compare a disadvantage(kargil) vs advantage(1971). in kargil we were only trying to recover our own territory. in 1971 we had enemy territory in our hands.

    even present home minister PC has said it is a difficult decision to make. don't think of only the release of the terrorists. what about 170 odd hostages in the plane in kandhahar? you want them to die? no govt could have done that.
    now let me also say i am no BJP supporter.

    it had its own positives.
    please go thro' this-
    BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR: Volume 5(5) March-April 2003
     
  11. thakur_ritesh

    thakur_ritesh Administrator Administrator

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    Interesting question raised and a question that has bogged my mind for way too long, good at last we are having a discussion on the issue, and I am sure we could all have a better understanding on the issue at the end of it.

    PoK has very serious strategic implications to our security, and economic activity. If we have this piece of land back few of our concerns do get addressed.

    If ever we had an opportunity to wrest this place back to our fold, well there never was an opportunity better than 71. when you are sitting on 13,000sq kms in then west pakistan, with an opposing army having had surrendered with over 90,000 POWs, with a completely demoralized army, well it to me looks like a case of missed opportunity.

    Can we even imagine what a massive psychological pressure is around when 90,000 families ask their government to negotiate the release of their loved ones, with a completely demoralized army and more so at a time when their land was massively occupied by us.

    That said the fear of the us getting involved looked imminent, but the question is when it was certain India was going to get involved in the liberation of Bangladesh then why did the us wait so long to send across their aircraft carrier. Were they depending too much on Chinese support which did not come by? Fact of the matter is if they wanted to halt us, they would have never ever allowed the liberation of Bangladesh to happen in the first place, so one does question the very notion of us getting involved in the future as well, especially when there were SU submarines headed their way to the Indian ocean something I am sure the us must have been well aware of.

    Chinese would have never ever got involved, if required they would have given material support to the Pakistan army but nothing beyond.

    I will still like to believe 71 was a case of half baked measures, a golden opportunity missed!

    Will certainly look forward to Ray Sir’s post, I am sure he will clear a lot of ground realities as they stood then, and what would have been the best outcome, or were we in fact with the best result.
     
  12. Vladimir79

    Vladimir79 Defence Professionals Defence Professionals

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    Why not? You had already defeated Pakistan in the East, taken 13,000sqkm in the West. Pakistan was so demoralised you could have marched straight to Islamabad.

    US has never been on your side when it comes to Pakistan, and they never will.

    FYI, there were always Soviet subs trailing carrier task forces. That is what they were maid for. US wouldn't have done anything to risk nuklear war. especially not for Pakistan. You think the Amerikan public cared? They had just had their peace marches to get out of Vietnam. A US carrier fleet in 1971 was not invincible either, before the advent of AEGIS, a 50 plane strike package could have sent that fleet to the bottom.

    Other means? US had already sanctioned India in 1971, if they weren't going to risk losing a carrier there was little more they could do. India wasn't exactly tied into the world economy in 1971, especially not like it is today. China was the big threat India faced here, but then CCCP had amassed nearly 2 million troops along their nothern border so you know they weren't going to do anything stupid after India signed a military pact with us. US couldn't have gotten Amerikan public support for another Asian war while they still had troops in Vietnam. India should have taken the whole bag of wax. We had their back.

    That is one way to look at it, or you could say Gandi didn't have the guts to end the scourge of terror Pakistan has become which could have lead to an era of peace on the subcontinent. Think about what would have happened with Pak wiped out back then. No more terrorists, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would have been assured. China wouldn't have had the ballz to attack Vietnam without Pakistan as a destabliser. They wouldn't have the guts to support Maoist rebels either. No 9-11 and no War on Terror--- it would have been near peace on earth!
     
  13. AkhandBharat

    AkhandBharat Regular Member

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    Pppj, Great minds do think alike if I must say so myself. You have listed out the same arguments I had with Yusuf last night!

    The member rests his case.:thank_you2:
     
  14. Sabir

    Sabir DFI TEAM Senior Member

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    Guys do you really believe even if we had forced Pakistan to sign some papers, it would made the sub-continent a peaceful place. They are fighting a proxy war because they cant withstand a real one. They would continue their policy of cutting India with thousand wounds what they are following till date. Our leaders that time were in better position to take dicision than we do today after so many years. I dont think Indira took decision without discussing the Soviet.
     
  15. Sabir

    Sabir DFI TEAM Senior Member

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    Vladimir Sir,

    Was it the fact that Americans alone were afraid of Soviet nuke-but not Soviet about American nukes???? Within a decade it was proved West-US-Pak axis was more powerful than the Soviet and exhausted Soviet Army were called back from Afganistan. More hostality in the sub-continent, involvment of great powers in it is something that we cant bet on the possible outcome. Can you gurantee it would not bring collapse of Soviet Union much earlier?
     
  16. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    sabir, your point is valid. proxy war would not have stopped but atleast kashmir issue would have been out of the way.

    she unfortunately beleived on the private word of ZA bhutto- that he will have to build up consensus in pakistan but will eventually agree on the loc being permanent. he reneged his word. we lost the best opportunity we may never have.
     
  17. Sabir

    Sabir DFI TEAM Senior Member

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    Kashmir Issue is always out of the way. It belongs to India doesnt matter whether Pakistan put stamp on it or not. And why we need it to be verified by Pakistan if it is our territory. Democratic Butto Gvt was formed after Pakistan's defeat when their people came on street against the incapability and deceptive information about imaginary victory by the military Gvt. May be that made India to take softer stance. Unfortunately Bhutto was hanged later and Pak military took control of Pakistan again.
     
  18. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    then why are we discussing j&k as one of the issues in the composite dialogue? pakistan says it is the core issue. pakistan sends terrorists in the name j&k saying they are freedom fighters!!
    the fact of the matter of the issue is we could have permanently settled the core issue but we did not.
    but i agree with your sentiment.

    possibly one of the factors. i think indira trusted bhutto but he did not live upto it.

    PA has always ruled pakistan irrespective of whether there was a democratic govt or not.
     
  19. Vladimir79

    Vladimir79 Defence Professionals Defence Professionals

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    I think you overestimate the importance of the invasion of Afghanistan. We never had more than 104,000 troops in country during the whole campaign. All we wanted was a puppet government to stop US influence from gaining in Central Asia and to encircle China. We spent about $5 billion a year on average which was nothing to total Soviet GDP. Most of our casualties were due to illness. Red Army never lost a battle The Afghan Army we established did most of the fighting and dying so it was their war to lose when we withdrew. They outlasted the CCCP by two years and could have held longer if they hadn't betrayed themselves to the Mujihadeen. The thought that it brought about the collapse of CCCP is laughable, $5 billion a year is only twice what it cost to keep those troops on active duty anyway. Our total GDP by the end of the conflict was $1.5 trillion so $5 billion was nothing.

    What killed the CCCP:

    1) Grain shortage
    2) Depressed oil prices
    3) Peristroika
    4) Glasnost
    5) Excessive military spending
     
  20. ppgj

    ppgj Senior Member Senior Member

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    a fine article, a bit old but must read.

    Paper no. 2061/14.12.2006

    INDIA’S FINEST HOUR – DECEMBER 16 1971: LESSONS FOR INDIA’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

    By Dr. Subhash Kapila

    Introduction – Pakistan’s “Unconditional Surrender” at Dhaka

    In India’s post-Independence political and military history, December 16, 1971 was India’s finest hour. In a swift fourteen day military offensive against East Pakistan, the Indian Armed forces forced an “unconditional surrender” of the 93,000 strong Pakistan Army garrison in East Pakistan.

    This total military victory of the Indian Army over the Pakistan Army was made possible by a direct synergy between India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Army Chief, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, Air Chief Marshal PC Lal and the Naval Chief.

    The strategic aim and military requirements of the Indian Army were allowed to prevail by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi over political preferences. This enabled the Indian Armed Forces to execute operations with boldness and audacity. The result was a spectacular success.

    The Indian Armed Forces drew many lessons from this military campaign and revised their strategic doctrines.

    However, on the 25th Anniversary of this historic event, what is worrisome is that certain weaknesses in India’s political leadership have kept surfacing as a persistent trend since 1947. India’s political leadership, irrespective of their political hues has yet to ignite a strategic mindset in their approaches to national security management.

    India’s security environment is as troubled, if not more as it was in 1971. As in 1971, the United States and China are not inclined to restrain Pakistan for their respective strategic ends. Likewise, despite all the rhetoric of the Pakistani President, an emboldened Pakistan persists in its proxy war against India.

    Against such a backdrop, this paper has selected to highlight the following issues which India’s political leadership must pay heed to:

    * National Security Challenges to India’s Security Need to be Met Squarely and Boldly.
    * India’s War Preparedness as a Strategic Imperative is a Constant Irrespective of the Regional Political Climate.
    * India’s Political Leaders Must Develop Strong Reflexes and Audacity in Handling National Security Challenges
    * India Must Resist Major Powers Pressures on National Security Issues
    * India’s Fruits of Hard Won Military Victories Must Not be Frittered Away by India’s Political Leadership on the Negotiating Table or for Political Reasons
    * India’s Political Leadership Must Recognize that India Has to “Stand Alone” to Protect Her National Security Interests.

    National Security Challenges to India’s Security Need to be Met Squarely and Boldly

    In 1971, India tried its utmost to find political and diplomatic solutions to the challenges posed by Pakistan. Pakistan was militarily emboldened by the support it got from the United States and China.

    After Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went around the world capitals and particularly USA, she realized that no support was forthcoming for India from any quarter. It was then she realized that India was left with no other option than the military option. The Indian Armed forces were given the freedom of military action by her without any caveats attached. The results are there for all to see. The Indian Armed Forces delivered on the political faith and implicit trust reposed in them.

    Today India faces similar problems from Pakistan and the scenarios are similar. Yet India’s political leadership dithers in meeting Pakistan’s provocative proxy war headlong. Every Pakistan based terrorist bombing is met with the standard feeble response of Manmohan Singh Government that terrorist bombings will not be allowed to derail the peace process with Pakistan.

    Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister never advanced such feeble responses. In response to repeated provocations by Pakistan she gave the Indian Armed Forces full freedom of military action including permitting the Indian Army to enlarge the strategic aim of capturing the whole of Bangladesh as opposed to her initial political aim of capturing only Khulna and Chittagong to facilitate establishment of a Bangladesh Government- in- exile on Bangla soil.

    It must also be remembered that India’s military offensive to liberate Bangladesh was mounted in defiance of United States and China’s direct military and political pressures.

    India’s War Preparedness as a Strategic Imperative is a Constant Irrespective of the Regional Political Climate

    India paid a heavy price when a military debacle was imposed on the Indian Armed Forces in the 1962 Sino-Indian War due to neglect of national security and war preparedness for long years by Prime Minister Nehru. It was based on a gross misreading by Nehru of the regional political climate and China’s intentions.

    In March 1971, if the Indian Army had given in to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s initial pressures for early military operations, the results would have been a fiasco as the war preparedness of the Indian Armed Forces had gone down in the preceding period due to paucity of defence allocations.

    The Army insisted on a six months time span to build up their military inventories to sustain their planned military operations. The results were stupendous.

    The Kargil War 1999 with Pakistan highlights the imperatives of constant war preparedness as in today’s security environment, wars can occur without much warning and with short or no preparation times.

    When Kargil War broke out, the inventories of the Indian Army were once again very low as in the 1990s during Dr. Manmohan Singh’s tenures as Finance Minister, the annual Defence Budget allocations stood constantly limited. But for the magnificent help of Israel which airlifted India’s military requirements as the War broke out, India would have not achieved success. Further, if the war had enlarged to a modern conventional war across the International Border, India’s military operations would have stood curtailed.

    It is imperative that India’s political leadership at the highest levels ensures that military inventories are always to the full strength and India’s strategic reserves in terms of ammunition, petrol, diesel and spare parts are not depleted.

    In 2006, the picture of indifference to this vital aspect of India’s war preparedness persists. Today India is not short of financial resources for her war preparedness or in terms of defence acquisition options. Yet the Indian Air Force today is short of 146 combat fighter planes seriously affecting the operational effectiveness of India's air power. The Indian Air Force Chief has cautioned the Government on many occasions.

    The laxity lies in the politicization of India’s major defence equipment acquisitions ignoring the imperatives of national security. In war preparedness time is not a luxury which can be afforded.

    India’s Political Leaders Must Develop Strong Reflexes and Audacity in Handling National Security Challenges

    The Bangladesh War in 1971 was a classic example where the political leadership of the day was not found wanting in matching the boldness and audacity of the Indian Armed Forces. Earlier in 1965, it was Prime Minister Shastri who displayed political boldness in acceding to the Army’s request to cross the International Border for military operations against Pakistan.

    Today the biggest challenge to India’s national security is the unrestrained Pakistan’s war of terrorism and the subversion of the fringe elements of the Indian Muslim community for their cause.

    India’s counter-terrorism responses are feeble, infirm and apologetic. This arises from India’s political leadership lacking strong reflexes and audacity to meet headlong this challenge. This in turn arises not only from a lack of strategic culture in the political class but also because the counter-terrorism war is being determined by minority vote bank considerations rather than national security considerations.

    If India aspires to be a global power, it cannot do so until its political leadership is ready for pre-emptive strikes, military interventions in the region where its security interests are threatened and a “political will” to use the tremendous power of the Indian Armed Forces.

    India Must Resist Major Powers Pressures on National Security Issues

    Following December 16, 1971, the Indian Army moved its 2 Corps and other formations to the Western Sector against Pakistan, Militarily; it was an opportune moment for India to carry the 1971 War to its logical conclusion, namely the destruction of the Pakistani military machine in West Pakistan.

    Alarmed by the above, the United States put up unbearable pressure on Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to desist from any Indian military offensive against West Pakistan. India gave in to the pressures.

    In the Kargil War, India again gave in to United States pressure to order a three-day ceasefire to enable to Pakistan Army to withdraw to the LAC. In the process the Pakistan Army mined these routes which India had to traverse at grave personnel costs to reach her positions on the LAC.

    During OP PRAKARM, similar United States pressures prevented India from carrying its coercive war to its logical conclusion.

    Presently, India’s strong counter-terrorism responses against Pakistan are being limited by extreme US pressures on the Manmohan Singh Government not to endanger General Musharraf’s rule in Pakistan.

    India in this regard must learn lesions from the Chinese leaders. China in 1950 when it still had to consolidate the Communist regime, militarily challenged the United States in the Korean Peninsula. It needs to be noted that the United States was the sole nuclear weapons power when China challenged it.

    India’s Fruits of Hard-Won Military Victories Must Not be Frittered Away on the Negotiating Table or for Political Reasons

    India’s political leadership ever since 1947 has persistently exhibited this disturbing trend as the record below would show:

    In 1947 Kashmir War when the Indian Army was within striking distance of Muzaffarbad (now capital of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir) it was stopped in its winning momentum by Prime Minister Nehru for political reasons. Capture of Muzaffarbad would have ensured Indian control of the entire J & K State, prevented the strategic nexus between Pakistan and China and there would have been no Karakoram Highway.

    In the 1965 War with Pakistan, the Indian Army captured the strategic Haji Pir – Poonch Bulge and the Kargil Heights. Prime Minister Shastri agreed to return these territories to Pakistan at the Tashkent Conference under Russian pressure.

    In 1971 War after the historic “unconditional surrender” of 93,000 Pakistan Army troops, Indira Gandhi “unconditionally” agreed to return them to Pakistan. The 93,000 Pakistan Army prisoners held for over a year were a tremendous leverage that was available to India to extract a full settlement on Kashmir from Pakistan on India’s terms. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi frittered away the golden opportunity made possible by the Indian Army. This was in marked contrast to her boldness during the War. The difference seemingly being that at Simla in 1972 there was no strategic advice available to her as she was now surrounded by political advisers.

    Today when Pakistan persists in her terrorism and proxy war against India, the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh seems inclined to gift away to Pakistan, India’s hard-won victories in Siachen and the Saltoro Ridge especially which dominates Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and also Kashmir territory ceded by Pakistan illegally to China. This is despite strong strategic advice from the Indian Army and the Indian strategic community.

    Once again the reasons for a possible sell out on Siachen are political and not strategic. The political reasons being pressure from USA to give some concessions to General Musharraf to shore up his regime and that the Indian Prime Minister is keen to carry some accord with him to make his visit to Pakistan a success.

    Once again this highlights Indian political leaders’ proclivity to barter away hard-won military gains for political reasons.

    India’s Political Leadership Must Recognize That India Has To “Stand Alone” To Protect Her National Security Interests

    The 1971 India-Pakistan War leading to liberation of Bangladesh was conducted in the face of stiff opposition from the United States and China. Even Russian attitudes were lukewarm initially. They became permissive of India’s military offensive only when they got firm indication of a US-China quasi-strategic nexus emerging as a result of Henry Kissinger’s famous trip to China.

    In the run up to this War, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi scurried around world capitals to enlist political support against Pakistan’s genocide and its resultant affects of millions of refugees streaming into India. No country came forward to restrain Pakistan.

    The Indian Armed Forces snatched a spectacular military victory against such strong opposition from the United States and China, It was made possible by a strong, bold and audacious Indian military leadership conscious that the political leadership of the day had given them the autonomy and flexibility to execute their strategic end-objective without one hand tied politically.

    As India today tries to establish strategic partnerships with the United States and China, one thing that needs to be factored into India’s strategic thinking, formulations and plans is that despite such strategic partnerships, when the chips are down in the future between India and Pakistan, both USA and China would side with Pakistan.

    India’s trajectory towards a global power status would generate in its wake uncertainties in India’s strategic intentions and the consequent development of counter-pressure points against India by her partners. India has to develop a “GO ALONE” political and military strategy of a strong and self valiant military and strategic capability backed by a strong and resolute political leadership with a strategically ignited mind-set.

    It is important that India while establishing strategic partnerships keeps the above in mind as part of its contingency planning.

    Concluding Observations

    India’s remarkable sustained economic growth can make her an economic superpower one day, like Japan and Germany. But economic strength alone cannot make India a global power whose strategic interests and sensitivity to them would be counted in world capitals.

    To become a global power commensurate with her growing economic strength India’s political leaders would have to fortify themselves with resolute will, a strategic culture and a strategic mindset to play the global power games.

    The global arena and its power games are filled with imponderables that are the stuff of history. If India’s political leadership wants to equip themselves adequately to be competent to lead India toward a global power status, they must patiently study Indian History and India’s Military History in post-Independence India and devote time to grasp the essentials of war, strategy, national power and national security.

    The world respects power and India’s political leadership has yet to exhibit that they have grasped the essentials of power, as this paper’s contents would indicate.

    (The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:[email protected])

    INDIA’S FINEST HOUR – DECEMBER 16 1971: LESSONS FOR INDIA’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
     
  21. Yusuf

    Yusuf GUARDIAN Administrator

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    There is no denying the fact that the 71 gains was a great opportunity for India to drive a bargain. That it was not done is whats baffling. It cannot be we were stupid to hand them back everything though that is how it appears. Im sure FM Manecksaw wouldnt have allowed IG to go ahead and withdraw without having sound reasons for it. Remember IG listened to the FM and thats why were were so successful in the war.

    All that forced me to consider other circumstances that might have acted on India to do what it did.

    Pakistan surrendered, but if India had imposed conditions on it regarding Kashmir, would it have agreed? If not, then would India have kept the land which was occupied inspite of world pressure? Remember Indias diplomacy ensured the Europeans backed us on the Bangladesh issue, but would they have backed us on keeping Lahore? I dont think so.

    Would India have started another campaign against Pakistan? This time US would have been ready to attack India in support to Pakistan.
    I cant believe India was that silly to hand back everything on a platter though it appears that way.
     

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