Was there an Indian plot to break up Pakistan in 1971?

ALBY

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The sweeping victory of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman's Awami League in the 1970 Pakistani elections was warmly received in India. The Bengalis of East Pakistan had always favoured a more cooperative approach in relations with India. New Delhi hoped for a progressive improvement in bilateral relations with a new democratic Pakistan, in which the eastern wing had its rightful representation. However, some observers questioned the possibility of bridging the vast political divide between the two wings of Pakistan. They felt that the eastern wing was likely to secede.
[h=3]SECESSION, OBJECTIVES[/h]
In December, High Commissioner B.K. Acharya expressed a view that was widely accepted in New Delhi. He recognised the possibility of secession but argued that majority control of the Central Pakistan Government by the East Pakistanis offered the only hope of achieving India's policy objectives towards Pakistan and overcoming the stonewall resistance of West Pakistan against better ties. Moreover, a secessionist East Bengal might demand integration with West Bengal and a United Bengal and might pass under the control of pro-Chinese Marxists. Such developments would further complicate India's defence and strategic problems. Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul agreed that India should do nothing to encourage the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan but he added that it did not lie in India's hands to stop it. Much would depend on the rulers of Pakistan and the realisation by West Pakistan of the need to come to an equitable arrangement with East Pakistan.Indian officials reviewed the situation in early January. MEA Secretary S.K. Banerjee and Acharya observed that the question of a secessionist movement would arise only if the eastern wing failed to secure its six-point autonomy demand through constitutional means. Acharya observed that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan Peoples' Party, might accept the autonomy demand if he himself could be all-powerful in the western wing, or if each wing was allowed to go its own way. However, a basic point of disagreement was in regard to powers of taxation. The army would not accept an arrangement under which it would have to depend upon subventions from the provinces for its funding.R.N. Kao, the head of India's Research & Analysis Wing (RAW), said that he had received information that Mujib himself considered secession to be a definite possibility and was preparing for such an eventuality. Kao's assessment was that Mujib's hands were tied. He would either have to adopt an unyielding stand on the six-point demand or be swept aside by popular opinion. He would go through the motions of seeking implementation of the demand through constitutional means but a secessionist movement was a definite possibility. In this case, India could expect appeals for assistance in a variety of fields, including arms, money and military training. He urged that India should position itself to offer the assistance that might be requested.
[h=3]WHAT THE RECORDS SHOW[/h]
The records show that New Delhi had no prior intention of dismembering Pakistan. However, events moved rapidly in East Pakistan. At the end of January 1971, RAW confirmed that the Awami League leadership was not very optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations on a new constitution and was preparing to launch a mass movement for an independent Bangladesh if the talks proved abortive. In early March, Tajuddin Ahmad met secretly with Deputy High Commissioner K.C. Sen Gupta, on Mujib's instructions, to explore whether India would provide political asylum and other assistance in the event of a liberation war. After consulting Delhi, Sen Gupta gave a response that was insufficiently specific to satisfy Sheikh Mujib. In mid-March, the latter repeated his appeal for assistance at this critical hour for his country, which was left with no alternative but to fight for independence.India was not taken by surprise by the Pakistani crackdown on the Bengalis on March 25. She was not prepared, however, for the savagery of the onslaught. This drew impassioned condemnation from all sections of the Indian public. It also resulted in a refugee influx on a totally unexpected and unprecedented scale.Though border inhabitants offered unstinting hospitality to the victims of the barbaric crackdown, it became evident that economic and political stability in the border provinces would be in danger unless conditions were created for the return of the millions of refugees to their homeland.
[h=3]THE PLAN[/h]
By the beginning of April, India's political aims had crystallised. New Delhi entertained deep apprehensions concerning a long-drawn guerrilla war in East Pakistan. It feared that a freedom struggle initially led by the moderate Awami League might eventually be taken over by pro-Chinese extremists if it dragged on for years. Thus the freedom fighters had to be assisted to bring the hostilities to the earliest possible conclusion and open military intervention might be required in the final stage.Second, conditions had to be created to enable the return of the refugees to their homes as early as possible. In the absence of a political settlement between the Awami League leadership and Islamabad, the refugees would return only to an independent Bangladesh.These cerebral reasons were powerfully reinforced by the moral outrage caused by Pakistan army atrocities and the strong public support for intervention on behalf of the victims. After March 25, Indian public opinion was unanimous in demanding that the government should extend full assistance to the Bangladesh freedom struggle.At the beginning of the year, India had hoped for a united Pakistan in which the eastern wing exercised a degree of influence proportionate to its population. The prospect of secession was viewed with some misgiving. It soon became evident, however, that secession was a very real possibility as the dominant forces in Pakistan were not prepared to accept the six-point programme. The brutal crackdown of March 25 sealed the fate of a united Pakistan. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh was inevitable after the massacre. Public sympathy for the people of Bangladesh and India's national interests demanded that full cooperation be extended to the freedom struggle in order to ensure its speedy success.(The writer is a retired diplomat and author of War and Diplomacy in Kashmir, 1947-48.)

The Hindu : Opinion / Op-Ed : Was there an Indian plot to break up Pakistan in 1971?
 

lemontree

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There was no plot to even reach Dacca. We at best wanted to capture only Chittagong and Khulna, and force the Pakistanis to free Mujib and hand over power to the Bengalis. It was Lt. Gen. JFR Jacob who disagreed and favored taking control of all of East Pakistan and capturing Dacca.
 

Ray

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The events overtook the plans.
 

Ray

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Maybe of interest.

The 1971 Indo-Pak war: Missed opportunities

.......What we gained

We, as a nation, got praised the world over for our strength, power and will to defeat any oppression, particularly to wash away the ugly memories of 1962 debacle. We also got Pakistan to come to terms with the Shimla Pact, and we created a new country that would be friendly to us in future and we hoped our all problems in the east were resolved.

What we missed/could have done

1. On Western Front: It is a common knowledge that we went deep into the Pak territory - in Punjab as well as in Sindh. This writer was just a newbie in the Indian Army in the 1971 war (lieutenant) and was posted at the western front (Punjab) and in January 1972, after the ceasefire, have been to what is the now (Pakistan) Police Academy in Lahore as well as a place very near Sialkot where we had advanced and had taken control of the areas. And we all used to discuss the penetration of Indian forces deep in Punjab and Sindh. So, we had a real bargaining upper hand over Pakistan. Lot of us feel that we lost this once a lifetime opportunity- and rightly. I have read Bhutto's memoirs and biography where he says about the Shimla Pact: "We had nothing to gain. Yet I managed to get back our territory, our people (the prisoners of war) and the dignity of Pakistan and what we gave was a promise to resolve the issue peacefully." We could have pressurised Pakistan to resolve a number of issues including the Indus river water dispute, power projects in J&K, border issues in Runn of Kuchh and so on.

It is now established history, we - our leaders did not think of these while
signing the Shimla Pact. What a great vision!

2. The Eastern front - A New Country born - We the youngsters, as the young officers are called, used to hear from our seniors and discuss a lot of issues which were in air. Let me summarise them - but before that - a brief of Chittgong Hill Tract – an autonomous area - the eastern most part of then East Pakistan.

Chittagong Hill Tract

The early history of the Chittagong Hill Tracts is a record of constantly recurring raids on the part of the eastern hill tribes, and of the operations undertaken to repress them. At the time of partition Chittagong Hill Tracts had a majority non-Muslim population of 97% (most of them Buddhists), but was given to Pakistan. The Chittagong Hill Tracts People's Association (CHTPA) petitioned the Bengal Boundary Commission that, since the CHTs were inhabited largely by non-Muslims, they should remain within India. Since they had no official representation, there was no official discussion on the matter, and many on the Indian side assumed the CHT would be awarded to India.

On August 15, 1947, many of the tribes did not know to which side of the border they belonged. On August 17, the publication of the Radcliffe Award put the CHTs in Pakistan. The rationale was that CHTs were inaccessible to India and to provide some
buffer area to Chittagong (now in Bangladesh), a major city and port; it was also argued that its only approach was through Chittagong.

Two days later, the CHTPA resolved not to abide by the award and hoisted the Indian flag. The Pakistani army dealt with the protest but the problem has not yet been solved.

The last viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, who considered the grant of independence to India as his act of crowning glory, was ambitious to achieve this "superhuman" task in record time. He said that before accepting the post of viceroy he had told King George VI, who was his cousin: "I am prepared to accept the job only on one condition. India must be granted independence by July 1948 and I will not stay there a day longer." Mountbatten came to India in March 1947 and this left him just about 16 months to complete such a gigantic task. In reality, he achieved it in five months, on August 15, 1947 for which he was given so much credit.

Originally, the award of the Boundary Commission was to be made public on August 13. But Mountbatten was reluctant to make this public. According to Philip Ziegler, the author of Mountbatten's official biography, the case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts was uppermost in Mountbatten's mind. "He (Mountbatten) foresaw an Independence Day marred by rancour, Nehru boycotting the ceremonies, India born in an atmosphere not of euphoria but of angry resentment. So Mountbatten decided to announce the award only on 16 August when the celebrations were over." As Zeigler writes, "India's indignation at the award of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to Pakistan may have been a factor in making up Mountbatten's mind to keep the reports to himself till after independence".

Mountbatten was himself surprised by the ferocity of Sardar Patel's reaction to the issue. Leonard Mosley in his book The Last Days of the British Raj says, "This is a matter for Mountbatten's conscience."

The Port of Chittagong

The Port of Chittagong is the largest seaport in Bangladesh, located by the estuary of the Karnaphuli river in Patenga, near the city of Chittagong. It is a deepwater seaport dominated by trade in containerized manufactured goods and products. It is one of the two main sea port of Bangladesh - most of the export and import of the country are handled via this port (almost 90%). Compared to Haldia port, this is rated better being
all weather port which gets tides lower and is also a deep sea port - so is capable of handling bigger freight / cargo boats and ships and therefore bigger loads.

NOW THE ISSUE
We used to hear in informal conversations about our chief, Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, expressing the advantageous situation we were in and the bargaining power we had. Few important issues we heard and discussed about were:

(a) Doing something about the very narrow Neck near Naxalbari and barter of land (These type of arrangements have precedence world over) - Nepal to Bangladesh is just a few kilometres here, we could have widened this gallery by bartering some land elsewhere with the newborn country. Imagine the strategical importance of this narrow passage - It has two lifeline railway links, national highway linking the northeast with the rest of India, a state highway, co-axial and microwave highways of DOT, an important oil pipeline to Barauni - all condensed within a few kilometres. And one can enter from Nepal - a very porous and practically unchecked boarder - and escape to Bangladesh
after inflicting damage to any or more of these lifelines.

But our leadership did not think of any of this.

(b) Calcatta (Now Kolkata) -Dhaka - Agartalla train link - with permission to run military special trains also: imagine, we would have dominated the new country in all aspects unlike the situation today where BDR fires and kills at will and we do nothing except protests.

(c) Using of Chittagong Port for Indian Defence Forces: it may be of interest to all to note that Kolkata - Chittagong is just over 8 to 10 hours by a ship and Chittagong - Agartalla is less than 150 km, so just about 4 to 5 hours if a good road is planned. This means our forces/troops and essential supplies for all - as Kolkata-Agartalla could be covered in less than 16 to 18 hours as against 6 to 7 days presently. The northeast would not have been that far (including in our minds) our people there would have felt not neglected as they feel now.

(d) We also heard talks of the Army wanting this area to be an independent nation, a correction of the mistake of 1947, a buffer and another India sympathetic people enveloping the newborn country.

(e) Resolving of Farakka, Teesta and Brahmaputra water disputes, proposed Inland waterways from Kolkata to Patna and Guwahati, a number of hydro-electric projects and what all then or immediately after the independence of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, none of these was thought of and addressed to when we had 100% sure chances in our favour.

Wish our leaders had some far vision, or at least listened to those who had (our great chief Sam Bahadur), we would have got something much better than the Shimla Pact and also the eastern neighbour not so unfriendly. It is up to us to praise our leaders of a particular family for all the follies and the subsequent damage to the country.
GovernanceNow.com | The 1971 Indo-Pak war: Missed opportunities
 

Iamanidiot

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@Brigadier
I have read that GenJacob is the individual who is most responsible for the creation of bangladesh.The GoI only intended to cease the hostilities
 

anoop_mig25

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(b) Calcatta (Now Kolkata) -Dhaka - Agartalla train link - with permission to run military special trains also: imagine, we would have dominated the new country in all aspects unlike the situation today where BDR fires and kills at will and we do nothing except protests.

(c) Using of Chittagong Port for Indian Defence Forces: it may be of interest to all to note that Kolkata - Chittagong is just over 8 to 10 hours by a ship and Chittagong - Agartalla is less than 150 km, so just about 4 to 5 hours if a good road is planned. This means our forces/troops and essential supplies for all - as Kolkata-Agartalla could be covered in less than 16 to 18 hours as against 6 to 7 days presently. The northeast would not have been that far (including in our minds) our people there would have felt not neglected as they feel now.

(d) We also heard talks of the Army wanting this area to be an independent nation, a correction of the mistake of 1947, a buffer and another India sympathetic people enveloping the newborn country.

(e) Resolving of Farakka, Teesta and Brahmaputra water disputes, proposed Inland waterways from Kolkata to Patna and Guwahati, a number of hydro-electric projects and what all then or immediately after the independence of Bangladesh. Unfortunately, none of these was thought of and addressed to when we had 100% sure chances in our favour.

Wish our leaders had some far vision, or at least listened to those who had (our great chief Sam Bahadur), we would have got something much better than the Shimla Pact and also the eastern neighbour not so unfriendly. It is up to us to praise our leaders of a particular family for all the follies and the subsequent damage to the country.
such stupid thinks happens when we donot have members from that field al we have is babus and netas whose only concern is to loot and show themself as messiah to world and public

i would have been better if we would have american type of system where x,y,z is made incharge of department where unless he/she has expertise in that department
 

Param

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If not for the Americans pressure, we would have succeeded in breaking up West-pakistan also.
When they send a nuclear powered Aircraft carrier with a task force to drive home their point it's much more then 'pressure'.
 

Tshering22

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When they send a nuclear powered Aircraft carrier with a task force to drive home their point it's much more then 'pressure'.
There was no freaking pressure. It was only hyped by this government who probably secured millions in personal wealth. Nuclear carrier that was thwarted by Soviet nuclear submarines patrolling the BOB during the hostilities. Americans were NOT going to fight us and start a world war 3. Pakistan was very well within our reach.

AT THE LEAST we could have taken back POK in exchange for 93,000 POWs. That would have been enough. But Indira thought it is best to send Army's efforts down the drain.
 

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