Unconventional Warfare

Discussion in 'Defence & Strategic Issues' started by sorcerer, Nov 1, 2014.

  1. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    The idea of this topic is to discuss about the more deadly form of warfare, the unconventional warfare. Today, the world nations are posturing aggressively, not with weapons but with ideas on how to bleed the opponents slowly to death. Here we can discuss, the various UW measures and counter measures taken by nations across the world.

    “A single assassin can achieve, with weapons, fire or poison, more than a fully mobilized army" -Kautilya


    Unconventional Warfare: A Historical Perspective

    1.
    Preface
    By definition, a war is fought between sovereign states, and this has become anormative concept when we talk about war. There was a historical background for this. It was the brainchild of political and intellectual leaders of the 17th and 18th centuries who sought to settle differences among people in a civilized manner, and other forms of armed conflict were severely restricted. As the years rolled on into the 20th century, however, unusual armed conflicts have steadily increased. Notwithstanding the paradigm of war between sovereign states has not yet lost its relevance. Meanwhile, the acts of terrorism committed in the United States on September 11 shook the world. Words such as “new war” and “asymmetric war” have since gained currency and have come to be used in various contexts. With these in mind, this paper will survey the history of wars between states and examine in light of these developments the significance that unconventional warfare takes on in armed conflict as a whole.


    2.
    What is Unconventional Warfare?
    To start with, it is necessary to define the concept “unconventional warfare,” the subject of this paper, to clarify the points of argument contained herein. The antonym of unconventional warfare is conventional warfare, which means a battle between states’ regular armed forces. Therefore, unconventional warfare is a generic term that covers all military and quasi-military operations other than conventional warfare. More specifically, one dictionary lists under the heading “unconventional warfare” revolutionary wars and its constituents, subversion and guerrilla; command raids and other and special operations; terrorism and counter-terrorism. But nuclear war, and warfare in which biological and chemical weapons are used, are not included in the concept of unconventional warfare . This definition of unconventional warfare makes no reference to the type of subject waging unconventional warfare. This means that unconventional war is conducted sometimes between private armies, sometimes between national armed forces and guerrilla, and sometimes even among national armed forces. The term “unconventional warfare” used in this paper is based on such a definition.


    3.
    War between Sovereign States — Sealing Original Sin of Mankind

    Given that an antonym of unconventional warfare is conventional warfare fought between states’ regular armed forces, the term of reference applicable to discuss unconventional warfare is war between sovereign states. In that context, war between states is treated as a normative concept. Therefore, unconventional warfare cannot be meaningfully discussed without referring to past wars fought between states.

    Typical wars between states as we know them are sovereign’s wars fought in the 17th and 18th centuries and national wars that started from the Napoleonic Wars and were ended with World War I. As is well known, mankind had overcome the ghastly religious wars by virtue of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, and this paved the way for the advent of sovereign states. According to the oft-quoted definition of Max Weber, one of the essential characteristics of the state is that it upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force over a prescribed territory. Means of physical force that had proliferated in society prior to the advent of sovereign states were concentrated in state, and its use was monopolized by state.

    Agents of exerting force on behalf of state were its police and armed forces. The term “armed forces” refers to a state’s regular forces. By defining the state’s armed forces as the sole legitimate agent for carrying out war, armed conflict that might be called the original sin of mankind was enclosed. In reality, it required a slow-paced historical process for a state to complete the monopolization of physical violence and empower only the state’s armed forces to use it. For all that, however, the state’s armed forces have become an organ for employment of physical violence with the highest legitimacy so far
     
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  3. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    War in the Age of Dynasties

    Relations among states in the age of dynasties had a strong coloring of personal relationships among sovereigns and wars between them had the appearance of a game between sovereigns. The issues which principally gave rise to war were mainly royal succession, and sovereigns, the parties to the war, did not harbor strong hatred or enmity against each other. They weighed the importance of the object of war — the succession to the throne or territory — against the cost of continuing the war, and made peace with one another at an appropriate time . In reality, however, dynasties in those days did not have sufficient wherewithal to finance a war. In the 18th century, absolute monarchy appeared, but to view absolute monarch of those days as that who had absolute power as we perceive it today is misreading the reality. In those days, the power of a state did not permeate as far as the bottom of the social scale as it does today, and monarchical governments could not mobilize all the resources of the country.

    This is simply because the people in those days did not have the consciousness as a nation. Therefore, they viewed war as a struggle between sovereigns, remained indifferent to it and did not deliver of their own volition resources needed to execute the war . There were substantial constraints on military strength. Not to speak of military technological limitations, sovereigns had to contend with strong socio-political constraints more than anything else.

    Needless to say, monarchical governments had no way to conscript people into armed forces, and the standing army they maintained was largely composed of hired professionals, not native citizen-soldiers. Early in the 17th century, a professional standing army came into being in the Netherlands, and the country could create it with the wherewithal it had obtained through maritime trade.

    With sufficient funding, the Netherlands was able to maintain the standing army by regularly paying to its soldiers throughout the year. King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and then France created standing armies modeled on that of the Netherlands, and professional standing armies paid for out of treasury funds were established directly under the command of the sovereign. Those standing armies were structured in a state’s bureaucratic system, and were subject to strict discipline.

    As the professional standing army was made up of paid professional soldiers, its maintenance entailed large costs, necessarily making sovereigns hesitant to start a war rashly. Moreover, one should not overlook the fact that the international system then in existence had conditions restraining sovereigns from plunging into a fierce war. In the course of the disintegration of respublica christiana, a number of states emerged, creating an appearance of an anarchical international system. In reality, however, it was anything but anarchy. In those days, the French language was used widely at royal courts, and a cosmopolitan society of European aristocrats sharing common values, language, lifestyle and blood relationships existed. Within the framework of such a common world, a balance of power developed. During war, the distinction between the realm of public and that of private was honored, and there was an unwritten rule that war should not disturb civil society, a private domain that started to take shape in those days. As a result, commerce, travel and cultural and scholarly exchanges even with an enemy country continued almost unimpeded. In those days, there were no passports and visas, and citizens of all countries were allowed to cross national boundaries. With the advent of nations, the situation changed.
     
  4. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    National War

    National war began in the French Revolution that started toward the end of the 18th century and ended early in the 19th century. Relations among states up to that time had been governed by diplomatic customs, and wars were conducted by professional standing armies commanded by aristocrats hired from various countries. However, when political society changed, the nature of war had necessarily to change with it. As a king was dethroned and the people became the supreme ruler, “nation, ” the situation changed drastically. The state has become the instrument that serves some sort of abstract cause such as equality, freedom, revolution or nationalism. The state of France is a classic example of this. When the people can find a value in the state that is worthy of their sacrifice to defend it, they voluntarily offer human and material resources to prosecute a war. In the 19th century, issues for which states frequently went to war were territorial claims and the enlargement of the sphere of influence, and they were closely linked to rising nationalism. Underlying such developments was the fact that national war had necessarily to become furious, and that war between sovereigns had become to appear stupid looking and anachronistic. In fact, national war was so fierce that it moved Karl von Clausewitz, the author of On War (vom Kriege), to conceive the idea of “Absolute War” as an ideal type. The advent of nation-states led him to establish a prescribed doctrine of the trinity of government, state’s armed forces and nation. In fact, what prompted him to write On War was the great shock he got from the French military of those days. It appeared to him that the French military was a giant body of partisan armed forces that did not observe the traditional customs of war. Clausewitz — and for that matter, some members of military officer corps of Prussia — perceived that the secret of the strength of the French military of those days could not be explained merely by military technique (organization of divisions, etc.). In other words, he saw the emergence of armed forces made up of native citizens, not professional soldiers who were merely hired for payment, and realized that to counter the French Army, Prussia must build a national army composed of native people . Although the efforts of some of its officers did not immediately come to fruition on account of the arrival of the Restoration after the settlement of Vienna in 1815, the door to the era of national army, once opened, was not closed entirely. Nationalist movements gathered strength throughout the 19th century, and one continental country after another introduced a short-term conscription system in earnest in the second half of the century with the result that mass armies emerged. And this movement coincided with the entrance of the populace on the political stage. In this mass movement age, nationalism gathered strength sharply, and when a mass army joins forces with such hyper- nationalism, war necessarily becomes fiercer. As war thus became a people-to- people war, not one between sovereigns as it had been, dialectical mechanism of power worked: state’s power infiltrated into the deep bottom of the civil society, and the people also cooperated with the state from the bottom, enabling the state to mobilize the nation’s resources almost without limits. Citizens of an enemy became enemy aliens, no longer partners in trade or cultural exchange. A case in point is the World War I, which was escalated to a total war that made no distinction between the front line and the home front.

    So far, we have surveyed wars in the age of sovereigns that typified war between states and national wars of the 19th century. While these two types of war differed widely depending on whether they had the backing of nationalism. On the other hand, they had some essential points in common in that they abided by the principle — that only the armed forces of a state recognized as a member of the international community by other countries can engage in a war. It was in the 20th century after World War I that many incidents of unconventional warfare erupted.
     
  5. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Armed Conflicts in the 20th Century

    (1) Struggle Centering around Ideology and Political System

    When viewed from a historical standpoint, the 19th century ended and the 20th century started with World War I. As dramatized by the fall of illustrious dynasties of Europe such as the house of Hohenzollern, the house of Hapsbburg, and the house of Romanov brought about by the shock of an all- out war, and by the intervention of an outsider, i.e. the United State which brought the war to a conclusion , the era of Europe came to an end. The world also witnessed the emergence of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. From our perspective, we Japanese really feel that many wars were fought between the regular armed forces of states until World War II, but the feeling about war varies from country to country. As the Bolshevik Revolution, which occurred toward the end of World War I, dramatically illustrates, the 20th century was an era of ideology, and when viewed in terms of a normative concept implied in the concept of conventional war, it was an unusual century littered with highly partisan armed conflicts. The anomaly can also be seen in the fact that the Red Army of the Soviet Union was the armed forces not of the state but of the Communist Party. Although Nazi Germany, a major belligerent in World War II, had taken the form of a state, it was, in political reality, nothing more than a state “hijacked” by a peculiar political party called “the Nazis.” The peculiarity of the Nazis is obvious from the fact that it possessed private armies the brown- shirterd Sturmabteilung (SA) and the black-shirted Schutzstaffel (SS meaning bodyguards). Armed conflicts that were of strongly partisan- oriented nature increased sharply during the Cold War era. Characteristic of armed conflicts in the 20th century was that they were strongly partisan-oriented and points of contention that led to armed conflict often had to do with struggles for ideology and political systems. Those that led to armed conflicts such as territorial disputes and the enlargement of spheres of influence that had occurred frequently in the 17th century through the 19th century decreased. The struggle for enlargement of spheres of influence, if anything, was synonymous with a geopolitical enlargement of ideologies . As Carl Schmitt, a German legal scholar, for one, predicted an increase in partisan war, it was natural that the instances of unconventional warfare as typified by revolutionary wars should have increased in such an era.


    (2) Unconventional Warfare in the Cold War Era — Revolutionary War

    Guerrillas and commandos raids into a hostile country, constituents of unconventional warfare, had occurred from olden times. The word “guerrilla” derived its origin from a Spanish word “guerrilleros,” which means a small war, and the first guerrilla war occurred on the Iberian Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars early in the 19th century
    . Special operations such as commandos raids were conducted in rear areas of enemy lines during World War II.

    However, they differed from the unconventional warfare under discussion. The guerrilla war waged against foreign troops (the French Army) on the Iberian Peninsula had a strong tinge of spontaneous insurrection rooted in the popular antagonism of the local people against the invader. The special operations conducted during World War II had, no matter how highly they were praised for their heroism, the subsidiary character of supporting the regular forces’ operation within the framework of a war between belligerent states.

    On the other hand, many of unconventional warfare during the Cold War era were carried out in the context of a revolutionary war that was accompanied by an extremely fierce partisan rivalry for a political system in a developing country. As the word “revolutionary war” clearly implies, it is a civil war and differs from a war conducted by the regular armed forces of states.

    In the case of many developing countries, unlike Western countries where states had evolved without external intervention in the course of their long history since the 17th century, a Western-style state was grafted onto their indigenous political soils that had formed in a long history different from that of the Western. Therefore, it is only natural that the grafted state should be fragile. Civil wars erupted frequently there while nation- building dragged on.

    Such fragility of government caused political turmoil and, if aggravated, armed conflicts that took the form of unconventional warfare. The U.S. armed forces intervened in the Vietnam War in support of South Vietnam. While the U.S. armed forces were a state’s egular armed forces, their adversary, the Viet Cong, which slipped into the general population and carried out subversion, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, was not the regular armed forces of the state, and did not observe the rules of state-to-state war. Although North Vietnam, the real enemy, did not apparently go to war with the United States, it in effect entered the Vietnam War through infiltration. External powers such as China and the Soviet Union lent support to North Vietnam but did not at all enter the war officially. North Vietnam and the external powers supporting it carried out a revolutionary war by creating an ambiguous and uncertain situation in South Vietnam where there was no distinction between peace and war.

    As revolutionary wars are conducted in an extremely politicized environment, officers of the state’s regular armed forces who have become accustomed to conventional missions that are clearly set apart from political and social factors, especially those of the U.S. armed forces who value the tradition of military professionalism, found unconventional warfare beyond their capacity and were averse to it.

    During the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union had sought to build deterrence by producing a large number of nuclear arsenals, and their leaders strained every nerve not to cross the threshold of nuclear deterrence. They conceived the idea of, and have carefully made preparations for, conventional war to the extent not exceeding the threshold of nuclear deterrence. Such conventional war was dubbed as “a limited war. ”

    The conventional war many U.S. armed forces officers thought about and made preparations for was mainly one that might have been fought in Europe. It may be said that unconventional warfare was carefully carried out in a space where peace and war were not distinguishable below the threshold of conventional warfare . There was no nuclear war during the Cold War era in the end.

    Conventional wars did occur in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan, but the United States and the Soviet Union have never fought directly each other. On the other hand, unconventional war was actual warfare that directly involved the United States and other advanced countries of Western Europe. It may be said that unconventional war was an anathema to the armed forces of Western countries. How officers of a state’s armed forces, especially those of the United States, were averse to unconventional warfare was evident in their attitude toward the Special Operations Forces (SOF). To deal with unconventional warfare, it is necessary to create SOF and run them under an integrated command. In reality, however, the United States had started making preparations for them in earnest as late as in the 1980s, and it was in 1987 that it created the post of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Susan L. Marquis, the author of a book that traced the history of the SOF and USSOCOM, said, the so-called mainstream officers of the three services of the U.S. armed forces had little understanding about, nor sympathy for, their SOF. On the contrary, as the organizational culture of the SOF was so apart from that of the mainstream organization, they considered the SOF as a heresy and it was not so easy to create a central command for the SOF in such a climate11 . Be that as it may, the Cold War ended shortly after the USSOCOM was created, and the world has entered the post-Cold War era.
     
  6. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Armed Conflicts in the 20th Century

    (1) Struggle Centering around Ideology and Political System

    When viewed from a historical standpoint, the 19th century ended and the 20th century started with World War I. As dramatized by the fall of illustrious dynasties of Europe such as the house of Hohenzollern, the house of Hapsbburg, and the house of Romanov brought about by the shock of an all- out war, and by the intervention of an outsider, i.e. the United State which brought the war to a conclusion , the era of Europe came to an end. The world also witnessed the emergence of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution. From our perspective, we Japanese really feel that many wars were fought between the regular armed forces of states until World War II, but the feeling about war varies from country to country. As the Bolshevik Revolution, which occurred toward the end of World War I, dramatically illustrates, the 20th century was an era of ideology, and when viewed in terms of a normative concept implied in the concept of conventional war, it was an unusual century littered with highly partisan armed conflicts. The anomaly can also be seen in the fact that the Red Army of the Soviet Union was the armed forces not of the state but of the Communist Party. Although Nazi Germany, a major belligerent in World War II, had taken the form of a state, it was, in political reality, nothing more than a state “hijacked” by a peculiar political party called “the Nazis.” The peculiarity of the Nazis is obvious from the fact that it possessed private armies the brown- shirterd Sturmabteilung (SA) and the black-shirted Schutzstaffel (SS meaning bodyguards). Armed conflicts that were of strongly partisan- oriented nature increased sharply during the Cold War era. Characteristic of armed conflicts in the 20th century was that they were strongly partisan-oriented and points of contention that led to armed conflict often had to do with struggles for ideology and political systems. Those that led to armed conflicts such as territorial disputes and the enlargement of spheres of influence that had occurred frequently in the 17th century through the 19th century decreased. The struggle for enlargement of spheres of influence, if anything, was synonymous with a geopolitical enlargement of ideologies . As Carl Schmitt, a German legal scholar, for one, predicted an increase in partisan war, it was natural that the instances of unconventional warfare as typified by revolutionary wars should have increased in such an era.


    (2) Unconventional Warfare in the Cold War Era — Revolutionary War

    Guerrillas and commandos raids into a hostile country, constituents of unconventional warfare, had occurred from olden times. The word “guerrilla” derived its origin from a Spanish word “guerrilleros,” which means a small war, and the first guerrilla war occurred on the Iberian Peninsula during the Napoleonic Wars early in the 19th century
    . Special operations such as commandos raids were conducted in rear areas of enemy lines during World War II.

    However, they differed from the unconventional warfare under discussion. The guerrilla war waged against foreign troops (the French Army) on the Iberian Peninsula had a strong tinge of spontaneous insurrection rooted in the popular antagonism of the local people against the invader. The special operations conducted during World War II had, no matter how highly they were praised for their heroism, the subsidiary character of supporting the regular forces’ operation within the framework of a war between belligerent states.

    On the other hand, many of unconventional warfare during the Cold War era were carried out in the context of a revolutionary war that was accompanied by an extremely fierce partisan rivalry for a political system in a developing country. As the word “revolutionary war” clearly implies, it is a civil war and differs from a war conducted by the regular armed forces of states.

    In the case of many developing countries, unlike Western countries where states had evolved without external intervention in the course of their long history since the 17th century, a Western-style state was grafted onto their indigenous political soils that had formed in a long history different from that of the Western. Therefore, it is only natural that the grafted state should be fragile. Civil wars erupted frequently there while nation- building dragged on.

    Such fragility of government caused political turmoil and, if aggravated, armed conflicts that took the form of unconventional warfare. The U.S. armed forces intervened in the Vietnam War in support of South Vietnam. While the U.S. armed forces were a state’s egular armed forces, their adversary, the Viet Cong, which slipped into the general population and carried out subversion, terrorism and guerrilla warfare, was not the regular armed forces of the state, and did not observe the rules of state-to-state war. Although North Vietnam, the real enemy, did not apparently go to war with the United States, it in effect entered the Vietnam War through infiltration. External powers such as China and the Soviet Union lent support to North Vietnam but did not at all enter the war officially. North Vietnam and the external powers supporting it carried out a revolutionary war by creating an ambiguous and uncertain situation in South Vietnam where there was no distinction between peace and war.

    As revolutionary wars are conducted in an extremely politicized environment, officers of the state’s regular armed forces who have become accustomed to conventional missions that are clearly set apart from political and social factors, especially those of the U.S. armed forces who value the tradition of military professionalism, found unconventional warfare beyond their capacity and were averse to it.

    During the Cold War era, the United States and the Soviet Union had sought to build deterrence by producing a large number of nuclear arsenals, and their leaders strained every nerve not to cross the threshold of nuclear deterrence. They conceived the idea of, and have carefully made preparations for, conventional war to the extent not exceeding the threshold of nuclear deterrence. Such conventional war was dubbed as “a limited war. ”

    The conventional war many U.S. armed forces officers thought about and made preparations for was mainly one that might have been fought in Europe. It may be said that unconventional warfare was carefully carried out in a space where peace and war were not distinguishable below the threshold of conventional warfare . There was no nuclear war during the Cold War era in the end.

    Conventional wars did occur in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan, but the United States and the Soviet Union have never fought directly each other. On the other hand, unconventional war was actual warfare that directly involved the United States and other advanced countries of Western Europe. It may be said that unconventional war was an anathema to the armed forces of Western countries. How officers of a state’s armed forces, especially those of the United States, were averse to unconventional warfare was evident in their attitude toward the Special Operations Forces (SOF).

    To deal with unconventional warfare, it is necessary to create SOF and run them under an integrated command. In reality, however, the United States had started making preparations for them in earnest as late as in the 1980s, and it was in 1987 that it created the post of assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity conflict and the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Susan L. Marquis, the author of a book that traced the history of the SOF and USSOCOM, said, the so-called mainstream officers of the three services of the U.S. armed forces had little understanding about, nor sympathy for, their SOF. On the contrary, as the organizational culture of the SOF was so apart from that of the mainstream organization, they considered the SOF as a heresy and it was not so easy to create a central command for the SOF in such a climate . Be that as it may, the Cold War ended shortly after the USSOCOM was created, and the world has entered the post-Cold War era.
     
  7. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    5.
    The Significance of Unconventional Warfare in Post-Cold War Era


    Many of armed conflicts that stood out after the end of the Cold War were ethnic conflicts in so-called “failed states.” The form they took was far apart from the war between a state’s regular forces that we consider a standard form since the formation of modern states. In those conflicts, the trinity of government, a state’s armed forces and the nation formalized by Clausewitz did not exist. There is no longer an effective government that centrally governed the country, and there were mere armed groups, not state’s armed forces. There was no nation as a political concept, and there were only people driven by passion andhatred. As was shown in the case of the Kosovo conflict, armed forces of advanced countries had no choice but to intervene in such an ethnic conflict.

    Other situations in which the armed forces of advanced countries are called into action include countermeasures against international drug trafficking or piracy. Then came the shocking terrorism on September 11, and the U.S. armed forces and those of its allies have mounted an attack on the Taliban. All of the cases mentioned above are situations where unconventional wars were fought. True, conventional weapons, such as cruise missiles, bombers and aircraft carriers, were mobilized for the onslaught on the Taliban, giving the appearance similar to conventional warfare. On the other hand, operations aimed at chasing or hunting down Osama bin Laden on a personal basis, the moving spirit of the recent terrorism reminiscent of the Middle Ages were executed by the special operations forces. We saw a number of unconventional wars during the Cold War, but those after the Cold War are different from those in the Cold War era.

    Unconventional wars of the Cold War era were fought in the context of confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet camps, and this means that they were after all instruments for struggle between states. On the other hand, many of the unconventional wars we have seen in recent years have been fought not in the context of struggles between states but as a form of asymmetric war between astate and a non-state actor.


    Will the number of unconventional wars increase in coming years? How should we define the position of unconventional wars among armed conflicts? These are the questions we must answer. To answer these questions, it is necessary to review what the international order should basically be. The international order as we know it is one that was built on basic units of sovereign states that have developed since the 17th century. More recently, various arguments have been brought forward about future of states, the basic units of international order. Some went so far as to expound that states were bound to decline and become extinct . This argument is interesting and appealing, but it will have a merit in an extra-long time span of several centuries. To be sure, in this globalization age, the state’s power to effectively ensure security on its own account, not to speak of management of economy and finance, has declined. This is why international security cooperation is necessary, and the international community can cope with the situation through cooperation. To this writer, states, especially, nation states, seem to have strong life force. This is evident from the way ethnic conflicts have been brought to an end in all parts of the world. Even when the existing states failed, or when a civil war broke out, new states emerged in their place. After Yugoslavia was dismembered, new states such as Croatia and Bosnia were separated and became independent. East Timor is seeking independence from Indonesia. This may be viewed as an attempt to reorganize a state by redrawing a line separating a “failed state” into new states. As long as human beings want to lead a peaceful and orderly life, someone has to govern them and assure their security. Sovereign state has emerged and developed as a governing institution since the 17th century. However, the present state system should not be viewed as the inevitable outcome of historical development since the decline of feudalism. According to recent studies of history, other types of governing institution, such as the Hanseatic League and Ialian city-states, emerged and coexisted with sovereign states and they rivale done another for hegemony. In the process, the Hanseatic League and Italian city-states lost out, and sovereign state became a dominant form of governing institution in the end.

    Then a mutual recognition system (the Westphalia system), under which a state could exist as a sovereign state only when it was recognized by other sovereign states, came into being . The governing institution called “state” that originated in Europe has spread across the globe, and there exist about 200 states today. In this sense, the inter-state system is a mere four centuries old. For nation state, the system of nation state is only 200 years old.

    Do we have an alternative to state? In reality, the governing institution called “state” is required to exist in every corner of the earth under the current system of mutual recognition of states. Wherever human beings may live, we require a state to exist there. This is our civilization. Under this civilization, the state is a legitimate monopolizer of the means of physical violence, and the state’s armed forces and the police are the only armedgroups enjoying legitimacy. When viewed from this perspective, one perceives the significance unconventional warfare will have in coming decades. When a state fails and ethnic conflict erupts, armed forces of other states whose national interests are affected or threatened intervene. Such intervention is designed to settle conflicts in such “failed states” and bring about a state effectively capable of governing the country, and unconventional warfare may be conducted depending on the situation.

    Armed piracy is just a crime, and in the sense that a means of physical violence which must be legitimately monopolized by the statehas fallen into the hands of a non-state actor, it constitutes a challenge to the international community built on units of states. As the terrorist campaign conducted by Osama bin Laden is only aimed at destruction without any constructive alternative, it truly amounts to a challenge to the current civilization. Therefore, the armed forces of the United States and other states had to mount all-out anti-terrorist operations with world-wide supports. In other words, an idea of forming a coalition of armed forces of states affected by terrorism conceivable as a collective response to meet a challenge to the inter-state systemposed by various non-state entities.

    Here state’s armed forces will carry out unconventional warfare. Whether it is the police or the state’s armed forces that deal with such a situation is immaterial. The real issue is the mobilization of the means of physical violence monopolized by the state. The question of deciding whether the police or the state’s armed forces should be used is merely a matter of convenience.Generally, in a situation where a state has collapsed creating anarchy in its wake, armed forces of other states happen to be an appropriate agency to deal with such a situation.

    Such being the reality, it would be wrong to think that the armed forces of a state should be prepared to deal only with unconventional warfare from now on. Rivalry among states will continue in coming years.This is evident from the fact that the geopolitical designs of the countries involved in Afghanistan’s future got entangled in a whirlpool of competition for influence. As the inter- state system based on units of states will remain unchanged as an international order in coming decades, rivalry among the states will continue as before. On the other hand, when a “failed state” emerges in a region where people are in the midst of a struggle to build their own states or large-scale terrorism erupts, and when they pose a challenge to the inter-state system, other states will try to meet such a challenge in unison. A new role of armed forces to deal with such challenge s is in the offing. One of the notable characteristics of the current international military situations is the growing cases of cooperation among armed forces of states in order to deal with non-state actors. Allied attack on the Taliban and the subsequent counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations in so-called “failed states” are cases in point. We may see a new age of “Internationalization in Military Affairs” coming around the world, in which unconventional warfare will take on a growing importance. Such a prospect has an important practical significance. When viewed from the standpoint of building of defense capability, states will be required to strengthen their unconventional war capability by creating and improving special operations forces along with the traditional conventional war capability to dealwith inter-state conflict.
     
  8. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    In a tough neighbourhood

    We need to develop a deterrent to irregular warfare since conventional response and diplomatic manoeuvering by itself aren't enough as conflict situations in recent years have clearly shown, says PC Katoch

    The massive institutionalised radicalisation in urban centres of Pakistan - described in 'Dainik Times' of Karachi as a "monstrous experiment in brainwashing on par with, if not worse than, Nazi Germany's eugenics" - bodes ill for us, what with heightened cross-border terrorism and irregular war through armed modules planted in India since 1992-1993
    . In addition to this will be the internal challenges in coping with insurgencies as we manage social change while headed to becoming the most populous country in the world. It would be naive to think the 27-odd terrorist outfits operating in India, including the Maoists, will not be exploited by China and Pakistan. The Maoist insurgency itself spans 16 states, its northern tip touching Maoists in Nepal and southern tip resting on a fast radicalising Kerala.

    Post Geronimo, when Shuja Pasha (DG-ISI ) talked of targets in India having been identified, reconnoitered and rehearsed, he was obviously referring to the ground work done by the likes of David Headley and Tahawwur Rana. The LeT has expanded into an international organisation, and its footprints in the Maldives and in Kerala will pose a far greater danger to south India in future. Sooner or later, the al-Qaida and LeT will also exploit the Somali piracy infrastructure, which is getting more organised.

    China's tacit support to the jihadi strategy of Pakistan (shielding, for instance, people like Hafiz Saeed at the UN), its strategic inroads in POK, the PLA (People's Liberation Army) presence in the 'string of pearls' surrounding India under the garb of development projects, its protêgês in Nepalese Maoists, the claim to Arunachal Pradesh and Doklam Plateau in Bhutan, desire to dominate IOR, support to insurgents in our north-east and recent aggressiveness does not auger well too. Chinese nationals with fake Indian PAN cards on missions to meet Naga and Ulfa insurgents indicate that China has no compunctions in fomenting trouble in India. The present Opposition in Bangladesh is known for its links with anti-India terrorist organisations, and a change of guard in Dhaka could increase our problems. Killing Osama bin Laden does not change the terror threat for India. It may actually escalate with the US's withdrawal from the Af-Pak region. And compounding all this is the Pakistani obsession to install a favourable regime in Afghanistan that will kick Indians out, its expanding nuclear arsenal and the ISI-military stranglehold in every sector of government. The focus of terrorist organisations in the Af-Pak belt may actually shift to India. Today, the world worries about Pakistani nukes falling into radical hands, but the pace of radicalisation in Pakistan is affecting the army - keepers of the nukes - itself. The 'thousand cuts' policy of Pakistan can actually be expected to multiply. Asymmetric /irregular and fourth-generation wars are and will continue to be the order of the day with diminishing chances of a conventional war. A failing and radicalised country like Pakistan will continue to use non-state irregular forces against India. China, on the other hand, can be expected to use Pakistan as proxy as it fits into Beijing's own strategic plans to keep India under check.


    We need to develop a deterrent to irregular warfare since conventional response and diplomatic manoeuvering by itself are not enough. Conflict situations in recent years show clear trends that irregular and asymmetric forces have emerged with greater strategic value over conventional and even nuclear forces. We need to build overt, publicised capabilities and deniable covert capabilities as deterrent to these kinds of wars. Such a deterrent will require to be selectively demonstrated in order to establish its credibility. Our Special Forces should be employed pro-actively for covert and deniable operations to build such a deterrent rather than merely using them within our borders for tactical tasks. We must have the capability to 'control fault lines' of our adversaries rather than submitting to them exploiting our fault lines. We should understand that Special Forces do not create resistance movements but advise, train and assist resistance movements already in existence. They should be central to asymmetric response - and that does not equate automatically to physical attack. The US Special Forces (USSF) conducts proactive, sustained man-hunting and disruption operations;they employ unconventional warfare against state-sponsored terrorism and trans-national terrorist groups globally. They also generate persistent ground, air and maritime surveillance in areas of interest. We should do what Chanakya had said: "Do not be very upright in your dealings, for you would see by going to the forest that straight trees are cut down while crooked ones are left standing".

    Special Forces can provide us the tools to address non-traditional challenges by providing a silent and effective medium to achieve security objectives. They must be used to continuously 'shape the battlefield' for sub-conventional and irregular war. In a 21st century setting, major employment of Special Forces will be in the sub-conventional. Their strategic tasking should be in concert with national security objectives, which requires control and coordination at the highest level. They can produce high results with no or very low signatures and can be used as a controlled response along the escalatory ladder in the emerging strategic environment. We need to define a National Strategy for Employment of Special Forces and integrate and consolidate our Special Forces. Success and effectiveness of Special Forces can be multiplied manifold by formulation of a well-worked-out strategy for their employment. Establishment of a streamlined command and control structure, streamlining the lines of authority, secure and seamless communication links, enhanced inter-agency coordination for intelligence gathering and sharing and establishment of a national inter-agency database for intelligence are some of the steps which will assist rapid decisionmaking and coherent response.

    In this context, establishment of an Integrated Special Forces Command (ISFC) should be a national imperative. In the absence of a Chief of Defence Staff, the model we should adopt is to create an ISFC under the NSA, parallel to the Strategic Forces Command, with a Strategic Special Forces Cell (SSFC) in the PMO. The ISFC should continue to also meet strategic Special Forces requirements of the Services. Collectively, our national Special Forces assets (of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Special Action Groups of the NSG and Special Groups of the SFF) equal the USSF in numbers. They should be integrated into the ISFC with dedicated air and intelligence effort, added support elements and the like.

    Operation Geronimo highlights the advantages of joint training/joint operations of our Special Forces with counterparts like the USSF. This needs national-level coordination.

    Establishment of an SSFC in the PMO should be the very first step of such an initiative. Our Special Forces must be deployed incognito for continued surveillance in areas of India's strategic interest rather than sending whole Special Forces units and sub-units on UN missions, which no other country does. Expansion of Marine Commandos of the Navy also merits examination as also creation of expeditionary strategic forces, including a separate Marine Corps.

    In a tough neighbourhood | Cover Story | Times Crest
     
  9. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    NATO’s Unconventional War Against Russia

    NATO Suspends Cooperation with Russia over Ukraine and Crimea. The New NATO Doctrine: Conventional Strategic Pressure as Cover for Unconventional War.

    Christof Lehmann (nsnbc) : NATO foreign ministers on Tuesday, agreed to suspend coöperation between Russia and NATO, and agreed on their commitment to enhance the Alliance’s collective defense. NATO denounced as illegal, Crimea’s accession into the Russian Federation and denounced Russia for an “illegal military intervention in Ukraine”. Measures NATO is taking also include enhanced cooperation with Sweden, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries.Russia maintains that the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation was consistent with international law and denounces NATO for an aggressive military expansion that poses a direct threat against Russia.


    On Tuesday, April 1, 2013, NATO’s foreign ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the Alliance’s collective defense and agreed to further support Ukraine while suspending NATO’s cooperation with Russia. NATO Secretary General warned Russia “not to make a mistake”, saying:

    “NATO’s greatest responsibility is to protect and defend our territory and our people. And make no mistake about it, that is what we will do”.

    Rasmussen stressed that the ministers had directed Allied military authorities to develop additional measures to strengthen collective defense and deterrence against any threat of aggression against the alliance, and added:

    “We will make sure we have updated military plans, enhanced exercises and appropriate deployments”.

    NATO has already upgraded its presence in Poland, Romania and the Baltic States, including extra surveillance patrols over Poland and Romania and increased number of fighter aircraft allocated to NATO air policing in the Baltic States. It is noteworthy that one of the stipulations of the agreement for the reunification of Germany was that NATO would not deploy any troops to any of the former Soviet Republics and Warshaw Pact member states.

    The NATO foreign ministers issued a joint press release, denouncing Russia for an alleged, “illegal military intervention in Ukraine” and for the “violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. The NATO foreign ministers stressed that NATO does not recognize Crimea’s accession into the Russian Federation and denounced Russia for “Russia’s illegal and illegitimate attempt to annex Crimea”, adding that NATO urges Russia to “take immediate steps, to return to compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities”.

    Russia for its part, maintains that both the referendum in Crimea, the declaration of independence of Crimea, and the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation are in full accordance with international law. The Russian expert in international law and governance, Alexander Mezyaev explained the Russian position and the comparison with Kosovo:
    The United Nations International Court of Justice handed down an advisory opinion in 2010 saying unambiguously that the unilateral declaration of independence is in accordance with the international law.A referendum based decision is not a «unilateral declaration of independence». The Court’s ruling was related to the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegitimate government of Kosovo and Metohija. In the case of Crimea the government is democratically elected and legitimate. There are no international norms to be violated; such norms simply do not exist.


    With regards to NATO’s claims that the referendum and the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation violated the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Mezyaev stressed that the claim sounds solid at first glance, but that the claim has no legal basis.

    To define what is meant with “the principle of territorial integrity” stated Mezyaev, one should refer to the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the resolution 2625 (XXV) of the United Nations General Assembly on October 24 1970. Mezyaev also elaborates on the principle of non-inteference into internal affairs as well as on the principle of self-determination. About the latter Mezyaev concludes:

    Finally, the very same Declaration contains the principle of self-determination of peoples. It reads,
    «By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter».



    Russian Measures to Deescalate Tensions.

    Russia maintains that the coup d’État by the new Kiev government was a criminal act and that the post-coup government therefore is an illegal government. Russia’s President, Vladmimir Putin has in that regard repeatedly stressed that Russia wants to have good relations with Ukraine, but that he, as a president, currently does not have a counterpart in Kiev.

    Russia has, however, taken steps to de-escalate the situation by authorizing military overflights over the Russian – Ukrainian border with Ukrainian surveillance planes,
    to defuse false claims about a Russian military buildup along the Ukrainian border. While Kiev has not made use of that trust-building measure, both Kiev’s and NATO member State’s state and corporate controlled mainstream media and governments continued a hard-line denunciation policy backed by false claims about a Russian military escalation. Although Russia maintains its position about the illegality of the government in Kiev, Moscow has offered Kiev talks about all matters and concerns which could contribute to a de-escalation and to trust-building between Kiev and Moscow.

    Legality versus Legitimacy.
    NATO and its constituent governments, for their part, carefully avoid the use of the terms legal and legality when it comes to the situation in Ukraine and the post-coup government in Kiev. Rather than constructing arguments which are based in international law, stressed Mezyaev, NATO member States attempt to divert attention from international law by using vague, and legally invalid terms like legitimate, illegitimate or legitimacy which are purely theoretical legal terms. Mezyaev stressed:

    It is defined by law scholars and has no commonly accepted or even legally binding criterion. Now why is everybody keeping on, talking over and over again, about the «legitimacy» of power, while fully ignoring the term «legality»? These are the words by the US State Department spokesman:

    «We are in the same place we have been in, which is that we don’t – we believe that Yanukovych has lost his legitimacy as he abdicated his responsibilities. As you know, he left Ukraine – or left Kyiv, and he has left a vacuum of leadership. So we continue to believe that he’s lost legitimacy and our focus remains on the path forward».


    Claims about a Russian Aggression.
    In the press release, the NATO foreign ministers denounce Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. The first to introduce allegations about a Russian aggression was Ukraine, on February 28 and the UN Security Council Sessions on March 1 and 3. Mezyaev wrote about the allegations:

    On March 3 the United Nations Security Council’s deliberations were focused on two aspects of international law.

    First, the Ukraine reported that Russia rejected its request to launch immediate consultations in accordance with article 7 of the 1997 a bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership.

    Second, it affirmed that «The Russian Federation has brutally violated the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations, obliging all Member States, inter alia, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State».

    Both of the arguments put forward by the so-called representative of the Ukraine have weak points. The matter is, that from a legal point of view, there has been no request made, asking Russia to hold any consultations. This affirmation is obvious because there is no legal entity in existence to do so.


    Maintaining the illegality of the post-coup government, Mezyaev stressed that the ousted President, Victor Yanukovich, who had to flee the country after being fired at, had authorized Russia to assure the security of Ukraine, and that NATO’s claims about any Russian aggression therefore are baseless and have no hold in international law or Ukrainian law. Mezyaev wrote:

    On March 3 the Russian Permanent Representative showed to the UN Security Council members a letter signed by President Yanukovych asking for military involvement. It said,

    «As the legitimately elected President of Ukraine, I wish to inform you that events in my country and capital have placed Ukraine on the brink of civil war. Chaos and anarchy reign throughout the country. The lives, security and rights of the people, particularly in the south-east and in Crimea, are under threat. Open acts of terror and violence are being committed under the influence of Western countries. People are being persecuted on the basis of their language and political beliefs. I therefore call on President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin of Russia to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to establish legitimacy, peace, law and order and stability in defence of the people of Ukraine».


    NATO: Don’t bother US with the Facts. Don’t bother US with Law. Russian Complaints rejected saying “It’s none of your Business”.
    Regardless of NATO’s failure to base its arguments and condemnation of Russia in international or in Ukrainian law, the NATO foreign ministers imply that Russia had challenged peace, political independence and the territorial integrity of the Euro-Atlantic region as a whole.

    Neglecting the post coup-Kiev government’s threats to abolish Russian as a second official language, pogroms against the Jewish community, and wide-spread violence by ultra-nationalists, overtly neo-Nazi parties and fascist organizations, the NATO foreign ministers press release claims that NATO advocates an independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine firmly committed to democracy and respect for human rights, minorities, and the rule of law as a key to Euro-Atlantic security. To demonstrate NATO’s commitment to Ukraine, wrote the foreign ministers:
    “we will intensify our cooperation in the framework of our Distinctive Partnership. Today, NATO and Ukraine have agreed, as set out in the statement by the NATO-Ukraine Commission, to implement immediate and longer-term measures in order to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to provide for its own security. … We have also today agreed a package of measures aimed at deepening our cooperation with other NATO partners in Eastern Europe, in consultation with them and within our existing bilateral programmes.

    The NATO foreign ministers added, that NATO, over the past twenty years has consistently worked for closer cooperation and trust with Russia, adding:

    “However, Russia has violated international law and has acted in contradiction with the principles and commitments in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Basic Document, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Rome Declaration. It has gravely breached the trust upon which our cooperation must be based”.


    The press release continues, stressing that NATO has decided to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation between NATO and Russia. Political dialog, in the NATO – Russia Council, however, could continue as necessary, at the Ambassadorial level and above, to allow us to exchange views, first and foremost on this crisis. The suspension would be reviewed in June.

    The announcement is a stark reminder about the fact that NATO grossly overstepped the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) on Libya which authorized the implementation of a no-fly-zone. NATO abused the resolution to bring about regime change with the aid of the bombardment of the country’s military as well as the destruction of the country’s infrastructure, and with the support of al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood brigades which were armed and funded by GCC and core NATO member states.

    The statement is also a stark reminder of NATO’s illegal war on Yugoslavia, the illegal war on Afghanistan, the illegal war on Iraq, and the state-sponsorship of internationally banned terrorist organizations in Syria, which, currently, are are involved in the ethnic cleansing of Christian Armenian Syrians in Syria’s Lattakia province.

    Russia’s President Vladimir Putin stressed NATO’s illegality and disregard for international law when he delivered the speech for the accession of Crimea into the Russian Federation on March 18. Putin denounced NATO and its members for breaching all and every agreement with Russia, adding that when Russia complains, it is condescendingly told, that

    “It’s none of your business”. He added, “can you imagine greeting NATO soldiers in the streets of Sevastopol? I mean, not on a visit, but stationed there?”

    NATO’s response to Russian concerns, however, it not a mere “It’s none of your business”. Without saying it explicitly, what NATO’s foreign ministers stressed, is that the Alliance’s push toward the East and the strategic encirclement of Russia would be boosted in response to the Russian position with regard to Ukraine and Crimea.

    The immediate “initiatives” from NATO’s side include increased cooperation with Gulf-Arab nations, increased military cooperation with Georgia, and increased cooperation with the Swedish Air Force. All of the above measures were announced within 24 hours after NATO suspended its cooperation with Russia.

    NATO Upgrades Cooperation with Gulf-Arab Nations.

    NATO Foreign Ministers met with their counterparts from the Istanbul Cooperation Imitative (ICI): Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. NATO announced that this was the first meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers with the ICI countries, since the official launch of this initiative at the NATO Summit in Istanbul in June 2004. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said about the initiative:

    “The launch of our initiative 10 years ago was a clear signal. That the security and stability of the Gulf region is of strategic interest to NATO. Just as the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area matters to the Gulf region. … We need to protect our sea lanes, energy supply routes, and cyber-networks. We face complex and interconnected security challenges, such as terrorism, piracy and proliferation. They are challenges that we need to tackle together”.



    Rasmussen failed to mention the Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, alongside core NATO members USA, UK, and France, are the main sponsors of terrorism in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as in the Russian Republic of Chechnya and Russia’s other Caucasian Republics. Rasmussen did, however, indicate the nature of the more covert part of “the initiative” when he said:

    “Over the past decade, our dialogue and cooperation have steadily intensified. From Bosnia to Kosovo, and from Afghanistan to Libya, our Gulf partners have made valuable contributions to NATO-led operations. … As we look to the Wales Summit this September, we will work on ways to deepen our political dialogue and practical cooperation. And we will discuss how we can tailor our cooperation so that it fits our Gulf partners’ specific security needs”.


    It is worth mentioning that core NATO-member USA was the de-facto creator of Al-Qaeda, and that NATO-backed Al-Qaeda fighters committed some of the worst atrocities and massacres against Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. In 2012, the then NATO commander James G.Stavridis described the NATO operation in Libya as a “teachable moment and a model for future interventions”.

    More “Security” at NATO’s North-Eastern Flank.
    NATO – Sweden increase Cooperation. On Tuesday, two US fighter jets under NATO command were scrambled from the Siauliai air base in Lithuania Tuesday, reports NATO. The US jets under NATO command were scrambled to exercise with two Swedish Gripen fighter aircraft over the Baltic Sea, in a training event designed to improve coordination and emergency procedures.

    The Baltic Regional Training event is conducted several times a year. The exercises bring fighter jets from NATO countries together with the air forces of Sweden and Finland, which are longstanding partners of the Alliance. What NATO again, fails to report is that the agreement on the reunification of Germany prohibited the deployment of NATO troops to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Again, both NATO’s military and its PR doctrine appear to be based on the principle:

    “Don’t bother us with facts. Don’t bother us with law. It’s none of your business, Russia”.

    NATO reports that Search & Rescue and air combat training are included in the two-day event. The training aims at enhancing effective cooperation between NATO and its parter Sweden. Addressing the situation in Ukraine and tensions between Russia and NATO, the alliance stressed that:

    NATO normally has four to six fighter jets deployed for the air-policing rotations. In light of the current crisis in Ukraine, the United States has reinforced the air-policing mission with additional aircraft. Many European Allies have also offered additional planes to the mission.


    NATO increases ”Support” of Georgia.

    NATO Foreign Ministers also met with their Georgian counterpart Dr. Maia Panjikidze in the NATO-Georgia Commission on Wednesday, reports NATO.

    The Alliance states that the meeting took place for “an exchange of views on Georgia’s progress in implementing reforms and on developments in Georgia and in the region”. NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen spoke about NATO’s cooperation with Georgia, saying:

    “As a country aspiring to join our Alliance, Georgia is a special partner for NATO. And we very much value our political dialogue and practical cooperation. … At this time, it is more important than ever to stress that the breach of territorial integrity and sovereignty is unacceptable. That nations have the right to make their own free choices. And that those choices should be respected by all”.

    NATO’s foreign ministers reportedly also expressed their recognition for Georgia’s outstanding contribution to NATO operations and to Euro-Atlantic security. Fogh Rasmussen said in that regard:

    “You are the largest non-NATO troop contributor to our mission in Afghanistan. You have committed to contribute to our planned Resolute Support Mission. And we welcome your decision to take part in the NATO Response Force. … You have made remarkable progress with ambitious democratic and defence reforms. Further progress will require continued constructive cooperation between the government and the opposition. Following the presidential elections last year, the upcoming local elections in June will be another important milestone for Georgia’s

    It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian ultra-nationalist liberation army UNA-UNSO, which cooperated with German SS and military troops during the second world war, has played a not insignificant role in Georgia’s war against Russia.

    UNA-UNSO is known for having close ties to NATO’s Gladio network. Moreover, even though both Ukrainian European and US-American politicians denounce the Ukraine’s Pravy Sector as responsible for the sniper killings of 90 and the injuring of more than 500 in Kiev, the day before the armed coup, most analysts who who are read into NATO’s Gladio network agree that it is overwhelmingly probable that it was not Pravy Sector but UNA-UNSO snipers who were hired to carry out the mass murder.

    Unconventional Warfare the New NATO Doctrine – Also against Russia.
    NATO’s new military doctrine is based on unconventional warfare. As former NATO Admiral James G. Stavridis stressed during a 2013 Forestal Lecture, the developments in military technology have made a war of walls, which ended with the end of the cold war impossible. New warfare, stressed Stavridis, is based on asymmetric warfare.

    Moreover, a classified training circular for US Special Forces, titled “Special Forces Unconventional Warfare”, TC 18-01, stresses that the United States, for the foreseeable future, will be predominantly involved in unconventional warfare. James G. Stavridis also stressed, as already mentioned, that NATO considers its regime change in Libya as a teachable moment and model for future interventions.

    Knowing that NATO planners are aware that a conventional, full-scale military confrontation with Russia, let alone a nuclear confrontation would not only be counter-productive but non-survivable; aware of the fact that the strategic balance would not afford either side the possible to emerge as a victor of a full scale confrontation; there is a pressing need to answer the question what function NATO’s continued encirclement of Russia and posturing could have.

    NATO advances one step at the time, maintaining and increasing the military pressure against Russia, knowing that Russia is as unlikely to mount a large scale military campaign as NATO. The purpose is to maintain pressure on Russia, economically, strategically, and to deny Russia an effective military counter-move while stressing its geopolitic sphere of interest, and increasingly also Russian republics with unconventional war.

    Saudi Arabia’s support of Chechen and Caucasian terrorist organizations in Chechnya and the Caucasus play an important role in NATO’s war on Russia. Saudi, Qatari, Turkish, US, UK and French-backed mercenaries in Syria are playing an important role in NATO’s war against Russia. The UNA-UNSO has been playing an important role in the Ukraine and in Georgia’s war on Russia.

    The order of the day for NATO is plausible deniablity as “the Alliance” while core NATO member states are directly or indirectly involved in that unconventional, fourth-generation war on Russia. One example for NATO denial of involvement is the answer the author received after asking NATO’s press office about the use of a NATO member’s military bases in Turkey which are used by Turkish and US troops as well as “rebels” who participate in the war on Syria. A NATO official replied, stressing that:

    “There are no NATO bases in Turkey from where incursions into Syria are launched. In fact, NATO is not engaged in any military actions in or against Syria. … NATO’s only military activity in the region is our defensive Patriot deployment which protects Turkey against the threat of Syrian ballistic missiles. These Patriots batteries have been based in Turkey since early 2013. With regard to the conflict in Syria, the Secretary General has made very clear that negotiations towards a political solution are the best chance for peace. There is no military solution to the conflict and NATO fully support the efforts of the international community to find a peaceful solution”.


    March 21, 2014, NATO member Turkey provided artillery, tank and missile fire support, targeting Syrian army positions, while thousands of “rebels” fighting under the banners of Jabhat al-Nusrah crossed the Turkish – Syrian border and launched a large-scale campaign in Syria’s Lattakia province.

    The complete ethnic cleansing of Christian Armenian Syrians from the city of Kessab was one of the first objectives that was reached.

    The United States provides advances anti-aircraft missiles and anti-tank missiles for the insurgents. Meanwhile, NATO suspends Russia’s “partnership for peace” and claims that NATO is not involved in Syria – at all – with the exception of “defensive” Patriot missile systems.

    It is this fourth-generation warfare that is being waged against Russia. It is a warfare that is as relentless as rust. It never sleeps.

    It will be wide awake and eye its next objectives when the time has come that NATO finds it more useful to let the dust of Ukraine and Crimea settle and to offer Russia to become a “partner for peace” – again.

    source:NATO's Unconventional War Against Russia | nsnbc international
     
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  10. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Special Forces Unconventional Warfare

    DOCUMENT:
    TC 18-01
    United States Special Forces- Unconventional Warfare
    Training Circular (TC) 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare , defines the current United States (U.S.) Army Special Forces (SF) concept of planning and conducting conventional warfare (UW) operations. For the foreseeable future, U.S. for ces will predominantly engage in irregular warfare (IW) operations.

    Source : http://nsnbc.me/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/special-forces-uw-tc-18-01.pdf
     
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  11. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    UW Terminologies
    [​IMG]
     
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  12. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Kautilya and Asymmetric Warfare

    Introduction:

    Asymmetric warfare has been a topical and an important subject since the attacks on 9/11. However, the concept of asymmetric warfare is not as new as it is sometimes made out to be. Perhaps it is the first time that asymmetric warfare has captured the attention of the American public, the media, and the administration. It is now understood that security sector reforms are needed to tackle asymmetric warfare. This paper claims that it is extremely important for big powers to not only understand asymmetric warfare, but to master the art and science of it. In discussing this hypothesis, the paper will try to answer the question; why have states failed to adapt to asymmetric warfare in the modern age and?

    This paper will consider the issue of asymmetric warfare and try to understand the problems states face in dealing with it. The paper will also suggest some viable options that the states could consider to effectively fight asymmetric wars. In doing so, the paper will consider the U.S. war in Afghanistan and the Punjab insurgency movement in India during the 1980s and 1990s as illustrations. The objective of using illustrations will be to understand as to why it is extremely important for big powers to devote more resources towards understanding and to master the art of asymmetric warfare. The paper will look at the seminal text, the Arthashastra, by Kautilya which was written in the third century BCE to understand the importance of understanding non – traditional methods of warfare like asymmetric warfare and why he considers tools of guerrilla warfare and other methods of sabotage and subversion to be a quintessential tool of statecraft.

    The paper comes to the conclusion that states could learn some valuable lessons from the strategists of the past regarding the underlying principle behind asymmetric warfare. This paper claims that while there has been an evolution in guerrilla warfare over time, the basic philosophy that drives a weaker actor to fight asymmetric or guerrilla warfare is still the same as it was twenty three hundred years ago, hence making the philosophy and ideas of Kautilya valuable and perennial. The paper also outlines the importance of formulating a holistic strategy to combat asymmetric warfare which includes cultural, political, social and military aspects. Finally the paper concludes that the biggest challenge for the U.S. and other big powers is to change its mind set if it wants to tackle asymmetric warfare effectively.

    Philosophy of ‘Asymmetric’/Guerrilla warfare: Past and Present

    Dr. Rod Thornton, a lecturer at King’s College’s War Studies departments states that “asymmetric warfare is violent action undertaken by the ‘have – nots’ against the ‘haves’ whereby the have – nots, be it state or sub – state actors, seek to generate profound effects – at all levels of warfare (however defined), from the tactical to the strategic – by employing their own specific relative advantages against the vulnerabilities of a much stronger opponents.” Thus asymmetric warfare is defined rather broadly that can include different methods as long as the principle of asymmetry and lop – sidedness in resources between two actors holds true.

    Kautilya in his work, the Arthashastra states that “a single assassin can achieve, with weapons, fire or poison, more than a fully mobilized army.” While Kautilya’s tactics of subversion is certainly different from modern day asymmetric warfare, the idea and philosophy of asymmetry behind the use of assassins and guerrillas in past and the present is the same. In both cases the ‘have – nots’, be it states or non state actors can have profound effects by employing asymmetric tactics irrespective of their strengths and weaknesses. Conversely, through asymmetric tactics, even strong states can achieve their goals by spending an insignificant amount of resources. In the words of Colonel Clinton J. Ancker, “asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways and means.” This shows that the ways adopted by Kautilya can give us insights into an earlier form of asymmetric warfare.

    In his philosophy of ‘concealed war’ and ‘silent war’ he discusses the use of guerrilla warfare, assassination, use of prostitutes as assassins and informers, and contrived conflicts to win battles against an adversary king. However, the interesting aspect of ‘concealed war’ and ‘silent war’ is that he advises both the powerful kings and the weak kings to use ‘concealed war’ and ‘silent war’ as a way to keep the enemy kings in check. He also states that weaker states will always resort to the use of silent war as defeating a bigger and stronger state in the battlefield is impossible for them. Thus he believes that the biggest threat that a ‘super power’ state (in his time, the Mauryan Empire) is not on the battlefield, but is from silent and proxy war that invariably involve asymmetric warfare tactics. Similarly the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu stated that an army should avoid strength [of the enemy] and strike at weakness. The reason why Kautilya is being cited as an example here is because he, being the Prime Minister of the strongest empire in South Asia, and perhaps in Asia at that time, understood the relative importance of and the threat from non – traditional methods of warfare to his empire, which included the use of assassins and guerrilla warfare, which could not be tackled just by the traditional army, irrespective of its size and power. Non – traditional methods were used to spread a sense of chaos to unnerve the big power and drive it towards making unwise decisions which in turn would eventually lead to its downfall.

    It sounds logical to think that a weaker power or entity would never challenge a powerful country through traditional means. Therefore, it leads us to ask another, perhaps a rhetorical question, as to why big states, like the U.S. have failed to understand the incapability and irrelevance of traditional military tactics to tackle asymmetric warfare? Interestingly, many of the tactics that are used by militant/terrorist organizations to recruit people into their outfits are similar, if not identical to the tactics that Kautilya used to sow the seeds of discord in the kingdom of the adversary king.
    Many of the extremist outfits tend to recruit people who are alienated or feel a sense of alienation and dissatisfaction. Kautilya in the Arthashastra states that “miraculous results can be achieved by practicing the methods of subversion.” Kautilya was aware of the deadly effect that non – traditional methods of warfare.

    Kautilya uses methods of ‘silent warfare’ to establish contacts with people who are willing to work against the enemy king. Kautilya approaches those individuals who are dissatisfied with the enemy. He approaches those who are “angry at the enemy and want to see him out of power; those who are frightened by the enemy; those who are insulted by the enemy, those disappointed in their expectation from the enemy, those who are impoverished or suffering from adversity, those denied their rewards for meritorious service and those whose loyalties had been secretly tested.”In other words, Kautilya systematically tries to gathers people who are dissatisfied and frustrated with the enemy or have grievances (legitimate or illegitimate) that have not been addressed by the enemy king. Similar tactics are used by terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda.



    Recruiting the Dissatisfied:

    While the process of recruitment for terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda has evolved over time, the basic principle even today is to attract those who may be alienated or dissatisfied in their societies for various reasons. The process of recruitment of terrorists is rather systematic and a certain section of the population that may be socially or economically vulnerable is targeted.
    Many of the recruits seem to have come from the lower strata of the economic ladder. Various terrorist organizations tend to guarantee a compensation for the family of the militants. However, in addition to this, terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda have also started the use of technological tools like the internet to attract the youth from the middle class and upper classes in the Muslim world.

    Other systems of recruitment like ‘the funnel’ are also used whereby a potential member is transformed over the training period and those who do not go through the transformation exit the recruitment process. Both these methods are geared towards recruiting people outside the circle of people and communities that have traditionally supported al – Qaeda.

    It has been said that poverty alone does not explain the existence of terrorism and the link if any is indirect and weak. It has therefore been argued that ‘terrorism is a result of political frustrations and indignation (imagined or real) and not poverty. Martha Crenshaw, a political scientist at Stanford University, states that “It is a strategy rooted in political discontent, used in the service of many different beliefs and doctrines that help legitimize and sustain violence. Ideologies associated with nationalism, revolution, religion, and defense of the status quo have all inspired terrorism.”Her views also resonate with those of kautilya who exploits the discontent and dissatisfaction in the people and uses it to his own advantage.

    One of the main events that Crenshaw believes has shaped modern day ‘terrorism’ is globalization. While globalization is not considered as a direct cause of terrorism, it is considered as a facilitator. In other words, globalization is the catalyst that gives stimulus to social, economic, nationalist, religious or cultural variables which in turn affect the way terrorism evolves under certain circumstance. This means that the causes for terrorism in different areas of the world are exclusive to that area as different sets of variables may be predominant in different areas and in different times.Therefore, terrorism is the response of a section of the population which feels vulnerable, alienated and threatened because of globalization. In other words, terrorism in modern times is predominantly the response of the weak (with the exception of state – sponsored terrorism).

    How states respond: Exploring alternative responses

    Unfortunately, states in most cases have failed to understand the importance of understanding and preparing for counter – terrorism or asymmetric warfare. States continue to use outdated techniques that were never meant to be used to combat asymmetric warfare. This also includes the way a state negotiates. For instance, during the Punjab insurgency, the Indian government strictly followed the model of “tactical concession of political power at the state level as quid pro quo for deflection, diffusion and de – emphasis on ethnic demands.”

    The negotiation process led to the Rajiv – Longowal Accord in 1985 that guaranteed compensation for the innocent victims of the insurgency and guaranteed justice for them. However, this turned out to be a symbolic agreement and was never really implemented. The inability to implement the Rajiv – Longowal Accords coupled with the hawkish negotiation tactics of the Indian government gave a picture of an uncaring and arrogant regime, further justifying the cause of Khalistan for many Punjabis. Furthermore, Punjab under President’s rule from 1987 to 1993 was under a virtual ‘police raj’ which led to some of the worst human rights violations. However, the police officials have time and again stated that while the police may be partially guilty, a certain degree of human rights violations are inevitable while fighting insurgency. The fact that the situation in Punjab has returned to normalcy has led many to believe that the government’s strategy of “bullet for a bullet” has worked. K.P.S. Gill, the former chief of police ruthlessly prosecuted the anti – insurgency campaign. During his time as the chief of police, while many insurgents were caught or killed, a number of innocents were also killed. Till today there are pending cases of human rights violation against police officers who were in charge of the anti – insurgency campaign.

    However, some have given an alternative explanation for why terrorism ended in Punjab. Many believe that the militants were defeated not just because of the anti – terrorist policies of the government, but more so because of the rural society, where the militants were primarily located. “Militants in their daily operations became ensnared in existing social networks, including local feuds and factional enmities, kinship retribution, and the social underworld of criminality as well as in the private accumulation of wealth and personal aggrandizement.” Therefore, the movement died because of factors endogenous to it rather than external forces, like the police or the army. Furthemore, because of the criminalization of the movement, it lost a significant amount of support from the Punjabi population. This some believe was the final blow to the Khalistan movement. Thus, it is said that K.P.S. Gill and his police department killed a ‘dead tiger.’

    The point being made here is that the lack of societal support led to the end of the insurgency and militancy in Punjab. States need to break out of their traditional methods of dealing with insurgency. States must stop dealing with insurgency like a war and consider other methods. If the Indian government had spent a little more time and attention on understanding the significance and the relevance of Punjab rural society it could have crafted a much more effective anti – terrorist policy which would not have led to so much blood shed, violence and human rights violations. Antulio Echevarria, who is the director of research at Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, states that one of the ways to tackle asymmetric adversaries, or any adversary for that matter, is by “looking for connections among the various parts of an adversary, or adversaries, in order to determine what holds them together.” By identifying the fault lines in the enemy camp one can defeat the enemy or enemies even without engaging them on the battlefield.

    The idea is primarily to separate out the radicals from the moderate which would give a more lucid picture of the situation. John Jandora, an analyst at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, states that while the tendency is generally to club all the “Jihadists” into one group. However, “one finds evidence of doctrinal discord” between different Jihadi groups like the Mujahedeen and al Qaeda. Unfortunately, we see that states tend to rely solely on force which tends to backfire because, if a state itself legitimizes the use of force, how can it expect other militants to give up arms? Thus, the state must not resort to the use of force every time there is an emerging crisis and must give dialogue and diplomacy a chance.

    However, the modern face of terrorism does differ from the kinds of terrorist and militant activities witnessed in the past. Rod Thornton states that terrorist organizations in the past like the ETA, IRA and the Red Army Faction conducted “small – scale propagandistic attacks against symbols of state – such as its security forces. If innocent bystanders were killed, it was usually unintentional.” He goes on to say that the “Islamist terrorists have modified Sun Tzu’s edict from “kill one person, frighten a thousand” to “kill a thousand, frighten a million.”” Thornton believes that the modern terrorists have given up making the distinction between state and its citizenry thereby including the ‘whole enemy society’. This has certainly contributed to an increased awareness about terrorism among the public. Furthermore, Thornton states that the characteristics that define the new breed of ‘terrorists’ are “1) increased degree of fervor. 2) their increased ability to implement attacks and 3) their increased ability to cause mass destruction.”

    While Islam does not support or advocate terrorism, there are a few misguided Muslims who misquote the Quran and misrepresent Islam for their own vested interests, or sometimes out of sheer ignorance. The idea behind the use of religion in recruiting militants is convoluted and unfortunate. It can be argued that the twisted use of religion tends to justify the killing of innocent people for the militant. Furthermore, the promise of going to paradise upon death tends to make the prospect of death less scary and depressing, if not desirable, given the poor living conditions many of the militants come from. Simply put, while religion does not support terrorism and may not be the driving force behind it, it is the ‘opium of the masses’ that mobilizes people.

    Other factors that lead to an increase in extremism and fervor in ‘terrorists’ are occupation of the holy land by American troops, a sense of disrespect of Islam (imagined and real) by the West and intractable issues like the Israeli – Palestinian conflict where the U.S. has consistently shown partiality towards Israel. The lack of even handedness in the U.S. in dealing with the Israeli – Palestinian conflict has enraged many Muslims around the world, enabling some leaders to use this rage to incite hatred and recruit militants.

    For various reasons, many of these ‘terrorist’ organizations that engage in asymmetric warfare have also attracted many educated people who come from middle class backgrounds. This has among other things made technology more accessible to ‘terrorist’ organizations. For instance, one of the prime accused in the recent Ahmedabad bomb blasts was a software engineer who worked for one of the leading software companies in India. Even Mohamed Atta who was one of the hijackers on 9/11 was a student at the Technical University of Hamburg. Therefore, with the increase in fervor, recruitment of technically educated militants and the availability of information on building explosives on the internet and books, ‘terrorist’ organizations have increased their ability to cause mass destruction.

    Recent reports have been suggesting that the U.S. forces have been finding it difficult to tackle asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan. After fighting a technology driven war in Afghanistan where air strikes were extensively used to defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda, people in the U.S. defense establishment have started understanding the futility of the use of air power and excessive reliance on technology. It is now thought that conventional military force does not prove to be effective against irregular/asymmetric warfare. This is because asymmetric warfare not only defies the traditional rules of engagement and “calls for cultural, political and military qualities that are not the traditional strengths of Americans.” Standard tools of warfare do not prove to be adequate in meeting the new challenges that have been posed by asymmetric or irregular warfare. While the use of air power, which is very important for the U.S. may have been successful in killing a few militants in Afghanistan, the majority of the victims of air raids have been civilians. At the same time militants have tended to take shelter in heavily populated areas which cause more civilian causalities. Such events have led to a backlash against the Afghan government and the international forces

    In the case of the U.S. the biggest hurdle in adapting to asymmetric warfare seems to be changing the existing mind set. America’s excessive reliance on technology while may be a great advantage when fighting a state, it does not prove to be helpful in fighting an asymmetric war like the one in Afghanistan. Thornton states that “in the American case there has always a great deal of technological help available, and the temptation is to let that deal with the problem. This thinking is flawed in that it can lead to the exclusion of better alternatives.” In cases of asymmetric warfare, nothing can ever replace human intelligence. However, the use of human intelligence can prove to be tricky because it can potentially lead to an increase in the risk to the lives of agents and the troops. Technology and air power tend to be destructive and reduce the risk to the lives of the troops on the ground.

    However, given the technological disparity between the Taliban and the U.S. troops, and the landscape of Afghanistan, technology may not prove to be as effective. It will be important for the U.S. to switch to using human intelligence and rely more on people who know the terrain of Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan very well. That having been said, the involvement of technology in the fighting ‘terrorism’ is necessary to a certain extent. Many militants have started using cell phones as a way of communication. The availability of such technology at a low cost has certainly given a boost to the ‘terrorist’ networks.

    Understanding culture and social structure of the opponent also provides valuable information on how these militants think, behave and what their worldview is. As seen in the Punjab case, the government of India underestimated the influence that the rural social structure had on the militants. In the case of Afghanistan, understanding the tribal culture and code can help the U.S. troops a lot to not only understand the opponent, but respecting the tribal culture will also earn them a lot of goodwill.

    Another very important aspect that needs to be understood by the U.S. is the importance of using the appropriate amount of force. During the Grenada war a Cuban officer in Grenada stated that the American “reaction was to destroy everything with their planes and artillery fire and see what’s left.” Similarly the UN official, Carl Bildt stated that there was “little between doing nothing and a massive use of military force” for the American troops. Therefore, finding the middle ground with respect to the use of force is very important for the Americans, if they want to have a successful strategy against ‘terrorism’ and insurgency. This is because; finding militants in a region is equivalent to trying to find a needle in a haystack. The militants tend to blend themselves into the local population which makes it difficult to distinguish them from the civilian population. The use of planes and artillery make it very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between the militants and the civilian population. At the same time, one must understand the fact that given the terrain of the region in Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan, it is very difficult to mobilize tanks and artillery in such mountainous regions.

    Discretion shown in the use of military force will be a lot more helpful in winning the ‘hearts and minds of the people’ as it is the civilian population that suffers the most because of military force. Even if we look back in time, the British government in its campaign against the Communist ‘terrorists’ undertook a “campaign of public information, civic action, and other persuasive measures by which the government won the crucially important support of the populace.” Even Kautilya states that the biggest power of a king is the goodwill of the populace inside and even outside his kingdom. This shows that it is just not enough if there is a moderation in the use of military force. It is also important for the U.S. government to involve the local populace in defeating extremism and ‘terrorism’ in Afghanistan or in Iraq. Involving the populace in the ‘war on terrorism’ will automatically alienate the militants who tend to rely on public support. In fact the Taliban has been losing members because members have been returning to their tribal obligations and primal allegiance.A Similar pattern was seen during the Punjab insurgency in the late 1980s when many militants were not able to completely isolate themselves from their society which led to the extinction of the insurgency movement. This further proves the influence and strength that social rules and obligations tend to have on even rebellious militants and insurgency movements.


    Conclusion:

    In sum, the basic point this paper makes is that the basic philosophy that drives asymmetric warfare is not necessarily a new phenomenon as history does have some valuable lessons that modern strategists could learn. Furthermore, this paper tries to make the point that it is important for big powers to understand and master the art and science of asymmetric warfare. Kautilya in the third century BCE stated that “a single assassin can achieve, with weapons, fire or poison, more than a fully mobilized army.” Thus Kautilya understood the effectiveness and the importance of non – traditional methods of warfare and expected the strong king to understand and master the art of such non – traditional methods of warfare.

    He advised the strong kings not only to keep a close eye on his associates and allies, but to surround the enemy kings and the weak kings with his agents so that no one could use subversive and guerrilla tactics to either assassinate the strong king or create disruptions within his empire. Similarly the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu stated that an army should avoid strength [of the enemy] and strike at weakness. That said, the modern concept of asymmetric warfare and ‘terrorism’ has evolved over time and have characteristics of their own given the circumstances. However, they are similar to ‘silent war’ because both fall under the category of non – traditional warfare, for their time periods.

    Furthermore, the problem seems to be that governments tend to have a set model on how to deal with insurgencies. We have seen how both the Indian government and the U.S. government have used standard methods, like the use of military force to try and resolve issues of insurgencies. It is now believed that asymmetric warfare and counter – terrorism is so complex that standard responses are not only ineffective, but tend to be counterproductive. Tactics employed against asymmetric warfare must be flexible and there cannot be a checklist for a set of tactics that ensure success. This is because each case of counter – insurgency and asymmetric warfare is different and thus tactics and strategies need to be flexible and adjustable.

    In the case of the U.S. Dr. Rod Thornton states that it is the “U.S. armed forces, more than all others, that need to think most about how to counter asymmetric adversaries,” His views seem to be in agreement with even ancient strategists like Kautilya who states that big states need to be prepared to fight ‘silent wars’ and not just conventional wars, as other states would tend to choose subversive ways to attack and defeat the major power than choose to challenge it on the battlefield. Given the threats faced by the U.S, it must not rely heavily on technology and must understand the importance and value of human intelligence. Human intelligence will prove to be more effective because unlike technological intelligence, human intelligence can predict the motives, present and future intentions and the state of mind of the enemy.

    The U.S. will now have to get used to a new kind of warfare that will tend to prolonged, highly variable in form and complex. The U.S. army cannot have the luxury of planning every move out and expect the plans to materialize. Given the amorphous form of asymmetric warfare, there will be a greater need to adopt a more flexible doctrine to combat asymmetric warfare. This also means that there has to be a greater degree of moderation shown in the use of military force. The culture of a Manichean or dualistic strategy of either using no force or excessive military force has to give way to a more multi layered approach with each layer representing a gradual increase in the use of military force.

    Another aspect that needs to be addressed by the U.S. military establishment is the need to factor in culture in fighting asymmetric warfare. For instance, in Afghanistan, it would be very beneficial to the U.S. army if it spent some time and effort understanding the tribal culture and codes of conduct. This will certainly give a context to the fight against ‘terrorism’ in Afghanistan and will also help differentiate between the extremists and the moderates in the society. It has been illustrated earlier that even though insurgents tend to operate outside the societal norms, these insurgents have tended to get involved in their society. This has been true in Punjab during the 1980s and in Afghanistan today. Thus cultural and social norms could be used to reintegrate many of the insurgents into their tribe or society which would weaken terrorist organizations like al – Qaeda and the Taliban. However, to do so, the U.S. military must earn the goodwill of the people of Afghanistan and Iraq. By understanding and respecting the cultures and practices of the Afghan and Iraqi societies, the U.S. would not only be able to earn the goodwill of the general populace, but will show the world that the U.S. does respect Islam, thus giving one less tool to the extremists to indoctrinate the youth against the West.

    Most importantly, the U.S. government must reform its mind set if it has to be able to fight asymmetric warfare. At present the problem seems to be that the U.S. prefers traditional wars because it is the best at it. Furthermore, as Dr. Thornton puts it, fighting traditional wars gives the U.S. a chance to display its technological prowess. Asymmetric warfare tends to neither give the U.S. the opportunity to display its technological prowess nor the opportunity to end the war quickly and secure a decisive victory. Thus the need of the hour is to rethink American military strategy with respect to asymmetric warfare and nurture a military culture that is not only discreet in its use of military force, but also uses military force smartly.

    Kautilya and Asymmetric Warfare
     
  13. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Kautilya’s Philosophy on SMART Power in National Security

    Abstract

    The Arthashastra is a treatise of political advice to the king, written by the Indian philosopher, Kautilya, in the 4th century B.C.E. Kautilya’s pragmatism is reflected in policy advice on how to conduct war and diplomacy by both honest and dishonest means toward the goal of increasing the power,wealth, and security of the state. Kautilya advocates “SMART”1 power--the interface of warfighting capabilities combined with diplomacy, opportunism, and guile. His ideas for competitive advantage, resonate today. Kautilya’s ideas center around the concept of his “Raj Mandala”--a model upon which the king could decide on collusion, cooperation, alliance, acquisition or destruction in dealings with other nations. Through all of this he set forth a scheme of covert dealings, misinformation, spies, planned assassinations and poisonings. Kautilya can be seen as “predecessor” of Machiavelli, and like him is viewed as both a sinner and a saint on management principles and practices.

    PROLOGUE:

    Public bureaucracies, such as the military confront quandaries of ethical choice. Such dilemmas are often of an ends/means nature, or the greatest good for the greatest number, and Machiavelli’s proposition, “when the act accuses, the result excuses.” When is a lie “noble” or “royal”?--in Platonic terms we sometimes suggest that the people may be deceived for their own good, and when is it not? What about the “dirty hands dilemmas” often encountered when public officials such as military commanders commit acts that from everyday reality are considered evil, but deemed necessary to maintain the national interest. In modern day cases like Abu Gharib, Guanatnamo Bay interrogations, the Iran-Contra affair and in a myriad of other nstances our military leaders face conflicts of values, dilemmas of the “lesser of evils, “ or the quandary of “viable alternatives.”
    From the year 2010, let us backtrack quickly to the year 352 BCE when a man named Kautilya served as the advisor to a powerful King, Chandragupta Maurya, in the Mauyran dynasty. Kautilya, generally felt no such conflicts. As the ultimate pragmatist he wasted no rhetorical statements to dilute his harsh management philosophies. Like Hoederer in Satre’s play, he might well have stated: “I have dirty hands right up to the elbows. I have plunged them in filth and blood. Do you think you can govern innocently?” This case study bring to light a number of questions, is the public servant who commits bad deeds for the public good, an evil person, a pragmatist, or a tragic hero like Weber’s “suffering servant” (1919, 1946, 1978) who in doing his duty has ultimately lost his soul?

    I. KAUTILYA’S PRAGMATISM:

    The treatise, known as the Arthasastra, was written by Kautilya around 321 B.C.E. He was the Prime Minister of the Mauyran Empire in the service of Chandragupta Maurya, its powerful king. This was one of the greatest books on war, leadership, management, and political economy of the ancient world. It presented strategic advice for decision-makers to maximize a state’s resources and its national security. It advocated rational self-interest in decision-making, yet at the same time it also argued for principles of a welfare state, in which enlightened self-interest would prevail. However, enlightened self-interest was promoted by Kautilya for pragmatic reasons and not for ethical ones, per se. Its precepts embody patterns of thinking on leadership and management applicable to modern corporations and military bureaucracies. On reading the Arthasashtra, one is struck by the political astuteness of its writer, Kautilya, who can be termed one of the shrewdest policy wonks the world has ever known. The purpose of the Arthasashtra was to be a comprehensive guide for government in the Mauryan Empire, and to aid its ruler to increase the wealth, power and security of the kingdom. To do this, Kautilya, much like his modern counterparts appears to have had an on-going love affair with growth and business enhancement, albeit in a cunning, ends-based philosophy that echoed Machiavelli’s famous dictum, “when the act accuses, the result excuses” (The Prince, 1532).

    The word, artha, itself, translates to “material well-being”-- in effect, it is the study of economics. The work is, thus, sometimes referred to as “the Science of Material Gain” (Kosambi, 1994). Indeed as Tisdell has argued there was no parallel in economic philosophy to the Arthasashtra until Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations (Tisdell, 2006). It has also been translated as the “Scripture of Wealth.” Because of its focus on power, accrued via the sharp instruments of politics, public policy analysis, and administration, the Arthashastra, is also sometimes known as “The Science of Polity,” “Treatise on Polity,” and the “Science of Political Economy (Singh, 1993; Kosambi, 1964; Boesche 2002 and Boesche, 2003). To these definitions of what the Arthasashtra represents, this analysis adds that it is also the Science of SMART Power, using regular and irregular means to do so. Kautilya’s realism is reflected in the often brutal and gory details of what the king must do to seize and to retain power. Thus, Kautilya, much like any modern CEO, kept a vigilant and analytical eye on the internal strengths and weaknesses, and external opportunities and threats of the nation, as they impacted state security and welfare.

    Kautilya’s analysis of wealth and power has four characteristics—reality, usability, transferability and consumption power (Raja, 2005, pg. 51). To him, the satisfaction of the need for wealth and power, at any cost, would naturally create positive externalities for the state to maximize overall satisfaction--a concept which was later associated with Jeremy Bentham’s philosophy: “the greatest good for the greatest number” (1789).

    Who would be the leaders of this state? Here Kautilya, the Professor from Taxila University, just like for Plato before him, was an elitist when it came to governance. He believed in oligarchic government, whose leadership, he argued, should be made up of learned elites. Upon the shoulders of these learned officials would fall the responsibility to discern the methodologies for the satisfaction of preferences that provided the greatest value to the state. Like Plato, he believed in the policy of the “noble lie” –i.e., lying for the public good. Similar to Plato, he was in favor of a strong military elite, whose generals would be in key advisory roles to the Commander-in-Chief (Chandragupta Maurya). Because the leaders were given the leeway of extreme utilitarian goals (later associated with the Machiavellian aphorism: “the ends justify the means”) the Arthasashtra approved of the breaking of compacts, loose-promise-keeping, and treachery. Thus, in modern moral terms, such incentives could be seen as flawed policies, in that they were strongly-coupled to economic outcomes, while paying scant attention to the ethics of the means and ends.

    The Arthasashtra was an interesting document in its emphasis on materialism at a time when India was concerned with issues of spirituality and a focus on moksha—the liberation of the soul from the bonds of karma. In the Hindu philosophy then as now, the ultimate end is an end to rebirth and a conjoining of the individual soul with the divine. Thus Kautilya’s often sadistic means of reaching the end state of wealth and power, would only be a way of creating karma that binds a soul to the material universe. It has been theorized that it is because of the brutality of some of the means used to get to the ends, that Chandragupta’s grandson, the great Mauryan Emperor, Asoka, turned away from violence and embraced non-violent Buddhist ethics.

    It is impossible to read the Arthasashtra without being struck by its pessimistic and cynical view of human nature. Being the ultimate pragmatist Kautilya, dispensed general advice to those who lead governments: “a person should not be too honest. Just as straight trees are chopped down first, honest people are taken advantage of first” (Arthasashtra, 350 BCE). This, “no-nonsense” treatise has been described as a book of “political realism,” by Boesche (2003)--because it does not advocate what “ought” to be done, rather what “must” be done in a world of imperfect human beings. His statement that “the intrinsically pure man is rare” resonates with another practical strategist, Sun Tzu, who lamented: “hardly ten men of true integrity and good faith can be found today…” (Sihag, 2009; Rasmussen 1994) The dicta in the Arthasashtra show clear, if cynical, observations of hypocrisy, and; how human beings will generally put their preferences and interests first, will lie and cheat--even while simultaneously giving lip service to lofty ideals. Kautilya notes: “It is possible to know even the path of birds flying in the sky, but not the ways of government servants who hide their income” (Arthasashtra).

    If Kautilya’s advice to the ruler appears to resemble Machiavelli’s counsel to the prince, this is a fact that has not escaped notice. Kautilya preceded Machiavelli by many hundreds of years, thus Kautilya could be said to be Machiavelli’s intellectual ancestor. In his work, “Politics as a Vocation,” Max Weber found the advice of Kautilya to be so calculating, wily and ruthless as to render Machiavellian thought “harmless”1 (Runcimann, translated by Matthews, 1978).

    Kautilya like Machiavelli looked at the dark side of human nature as the baseline from which leaders must strategize.
    Machiavelli observed: “ It is necessary for him who lays out a state and arranges laws for it to presuppose that all men are evil and that they are always going to act according to the wickedness of their spirits whenever they have free scope.” (The Prince, 1532). Kautilya’s advice to the King was similar to the thinking of a Theory X manager (MacGregor, 1960, i.e., the nature of the governed was: weak, opportunistic, greedy, and self-serving). These were people to be controlled by a powerful bureaucracy led by the King by selected punishments and rewards. Both philosophers preferred utility to morality and both men have views on perfidy that are audacious by today’s accepted moral standards.

    How well did Prime Minister Kautilya succeed in his efforts in using “the means justify the ends” utilities, as a SMART tool in nation-building? History records that Chandragupta Maurya (under Kautilya’s tutelage) succeeded in bringing together almost all of the fiefdoms in India, making him the unifier of all India, its first Emperor while he was still in his early twenties. Because his achievements ranged from destroying the Nanda Empire, and conquering the Alexander the Greek’s Macedonian provinces in India and eventually establishing centralized rule throughout South Asia, some scholars refer to him as cakravartin, or world conqueror (Bhargava, 1996, Kohli, 1995, Spellman, 1964). The Mauryan Empire was larger than the British Empire in India, and spanned the Indian Ocean in the South and East, to the Himalayas in the North, to Iran in the West. Kautilya’s precepts foreshadowed current management philosophy on internal strengths of the organization for competitive advantage. Building VRIO—valuable, rare, inimitable, and organizationally-integrated organizations (Barney and Hesterly, 2005) are implicit in the Arthasashtra.
    An important question remains, however, as to whether the economic guidance came at the price of subordination of ethics to terms of economics. In terms of modern management, how can Kautilyan dicta be viewed?
     
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  14. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    II. KAUTILYA’S SUCCESSFUL USE OF SMART POWER FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPREMECY:

    Kautilya was a complex individual and his policies for international relations are sophisticated, multifaceted, and byzantine in structure. He developed complex constructions on how war and international relations were to be conducted. Within each conceptualization were many substructures designed to meet any contingency. Many of the concepts had two faces—an overt one, for example, showing the face of friendship, and a covert one, undermining the friend by secret methods and then reaping the benefits. Again, all of these actions were advocated not for Kautilya’s personal benefit, but were pragmatic aims for the power and glory of the Mauryan Empire. In dealing with other states, Kautilya advocated the use of soft and hard power-- a modern concept, now known as “smart” power (Nye, 2003) which is discussed next.

    [​IMG]

    2.1.: Smart Power:

    According to Professor Joseph Nye, a former Clinton administration official in the Department of Defense, who coined the phrase, “smart power” this is a combination of hard and soft power--i.e., the employment of both military and diplomacy tools. Nye’s philosophy of soft power is getting what is wanted through attraction and collaboration versus confrontation and coercion.

    In her confirmation speech as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton called for the use of “smart” power, saying: “We must use what has been called smart power, the full range of tools at our disposal — diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal and cultural — picking the right tool or combination of tools for each situation” (Clinton, 2009). Returning to the Arthasashtra, one sees the concept of “SMART” Power in Kautilya’s “Mandala Theory” of international relationships.

    How successful was the Mandala concept? Alexander’s defeat in India is credited to the philosophy of international relations, war, politics, and military matters that were existent in ancient India and at Taxila University, where Kautilya was a professor, and which later found their way into written form in the Arthashastra. The famed Indian Rajput warrior, Shivaji based his campaigns to defeat the Mughal Emperors on interpretations of the text. More recently a military leader like Bismarck, might have thought in Kautilyan style, in his attempts to expand the wealth and power of Prussia. Even while he did not always advocate conflict to increase the power and wealth of the state, to Bismarck the soft side of national power was ultimately and always a temporary phenomenon. Like a modern CEO Kautilya never lost cognizance of the fact that allies could easily become enemies depending on the dictates of the environment. Thus even while he argued for cooperation, collaboration, collusion with allies—much like a modern captain of industry or military leader 1, as will be described later, he was not above using corporate Feints and underhand Gambits in order to create advantage for his side.

    2.2. Soft Power--The Raj Mandala Model of Diplomacy:

    The essence of Kautilya’s utilitarian and practical advice is to prevent a balanced equation of power to remain between states, particularly between his own state and another. He believed that the ruler must always seek to tip the balance of power in his favor. Kautilya the realist understood the relationship between power and maximization of wealth. He sought to provide the means by which the balance of power would shift in favor of “the-king-who-wants-to-conquer,” whom he called the “vijigishu”. The vijigishu, of course, describes a ruler with the mindset of his own king--Chandragupta Maurya. He therefore argued for an energetic and dynamic foreign policy:

    “The welfare of a state depends on an active foreign policy,” (Arthashastra 6.2.1.). The power equation is important in deciding what foreign policy needed to be pursued. He envisioned his state as being surrounded by concentric circles—hence the term “mandala.1”

    For each of the concentric circles he designed policy blueprints for action:
    1) Immediate Neighbors Should be Suspect at All Times: neighboring states were to be looked at as potential enemies, even if friendly relations prevailed in the immediate present.

    2) Maintain Neighbors of Immediate Neighbors As Allies: The state that borders the neighbor on the other side of the vijigishu’s kingdom should be courted and viewed as a potential ally-- particularly if the vijigishu’s immediate neighboring state was stronger or equally strong.
    This power and policy was not to be extended merely bilaterally or even linearly in geographic terms, but rather to be pursued in a geopolitical centrifugal concept, with the vijigishu’s state at the center of the hub.

    This was the “Raj Mandala” theory of balance of power as expounded by Kautilya. This formation of allies around the perimeter of neighboring states provided protective value, in case cordial neighboring relationships failed. Even if cordial relations did not fail, he envisioned taking neighboring states, usually in underhand ways, if he had created a strong ally on the other side of the “enemy’s” kingdom: “The enemy, however strong he may be, becomes vulnerable to harassment and destruction when he is squeezed between the conqueror and his allies” (6,2,40). While the Mandala generally describes a series of concentric circles, the boundaries of these circles appear to move in and out of each there in various formations, from sharper incursions to more subtle ones. They are wholly contained shapes in the designated regions in the mandala depict infiltrators in those regions—possibly spies, envoys, dissenters, or secret agents. The Mandala is an apt depiction of complexity of stakeholders in international relations today.
    [​IMG]



    Kautilya advocated six types of foreign policy: Sandhi, Vigraha, Asana, Dvaidhibhava, Samsarya, and Yana.
    1) Sandhi: This is the principle of cooperation and accommodation, but as always, on a temporary and “wait-and-see” basis. Sandhi itself is a complex construct within which lie five discernable types, shown in Figure 2.1, (or Table 2.1) each of which is present in contemporary international relations.

    [table="width: 500"]
    [tr]
    [td] Sandi[/td]
    [td]Meaning [/td]

    [/tr]
    [tr]
    [td]Karmasandhi[/td]
    [td]Cooperation and Exchange in areas of military products and knowledge[/td]
    [/tr]
    [tr]
    [td]Bhoomisandhi[/td]
    [td]Transfers and Exchanges of land, use of certain natural resources like water.[/td]
    [/tr]
    [tr]
    [td]Hiranyasandhi[/td]
    [td]Wealth transfer of tangible and intangible wealth[/td]
    [/tr]
    [tr]
    [td]Anayasitsandhi[/td]
    [td]Agreement and Cooperation to colonize others, economically or politically[/td]
    [/tr]
    [tr]
    [td]Mitrasandhi[/td]
    [td]Cooperation without any expectation of reciprocation except, perhaps, goodwill. (Mitra=friend).[/td]
    [/tr]
    [/table]
    We see Mitrasandhi or friendship (mitra=friend) in our relations with certain countries, in particular with great Britain.

    In corporate America we see this Another type of foreign policy was Vigara, a hostile policy toward another state—culminating in conflict or war. It was particularly toward the states that were either subordinate in power or equal in power that the Arthasashtra advocates the vigara policy.

    Yana is the policy of direct attack on another state. If the state is deemed to be weak, has valuable resources, or is in a favorable location, aggression would be considered.

    Dvaidhibhava was a policy of non-alignment with states that are greater powers. For example, India pursued a policy of non-alignment for several decades in which both the United States and the USSR—both superior powers, were cultivated. Dvaidhibhava also meant double-dealing when necessary—i.e., dealing with one superior power overtly to maintain friendships, and dealing with another covertly to destroy the first

    Asana was a foreign policy of indifference toward certain states for various expedient reasons.

    Samsarya was a policy of protection given to a weaker state. With samsarya, the protector gains an ally and a staging platform for future conflict with another state.
    [​IMG]
     
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  15. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    2.3. Hard Power—The Use of Force:

    Kautilya strongly advocated that the ruler must always be prepared for war (yuddha), and should actively seek to conduct war at all times in the pursuit of power and wealth. In contrast to Carl von Clausewitz who said that war is an extension of domestic politics ( 1976), Kautilya argued that that diplomacy is just a subtle act of war. This resonates with Max Weber’s later dictum that there is no morality in international relations and that states must accept the reality of perpetual conflict (1919, 1978).

    He claimed that a nation’s foreign policy should always consist of preliminary movements toward war. His focus was economics and not ethics and morality.
    In viewing the opportunities and threats in the external environment Kautilya saw the following possibilities for national advantage, which can be translated to predatory or hostile attack strategy for corporations seeking competitive advantage:

    1) Strong states are potential FOES—strong competitive corporations are FOES

    2) States that have calamities (famine, floods etc) or are in trouble with bad economies
    are VULNERABLE, and should be immediately ATTACKED—
    ATTACK
    quickly and seek advantage when rival companies become weakened.


    3) States that are weak with no popular support it should be EXTERMINATED—some
    corporations must be ELIMINATED when they add no value to customers, with little
    to no negative fallouts to oneself.

    4) If a state has a tyrannical king, there is advantage to be gained from ATTACK, as
    inside support can be counted upon—plan to UNDERMINE unpopular corporate
    CEOs from the inside.

    5) If a state is relatively strong, it can be HARASSED silently and weakened over time—
    continuous CHALLENGES to rivals comes about through continuous improvement on
    one’s own products and services.

    For Kautilya there were to be three kinds of warfare on-going at all times:

    1) Kautilya’s Prakasayuddha, Overt, Conventional and Traditional War—such as the World Wars I and II. In business this attack is known as “thrust” and it is the classic frontal attack with brute force, for example, Advanced Micro Devices attack on Intel’s Pentium chip, that temporarily cut into its market. The success of such an attack, Kautilya knew depended on relative strengths of the two forces, and the importance of the coveted areas. In this case the attacker needs to have strong strengths—at least a three-to-one advantage to overcome a well-defended territory.

    2) Kautilya’s Kutayuddha or Covert War, which we now term as asymmetrical or irregular warfare. This is similar to the wars being waged against the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. This form of warfare is also similar to two philosophies from business, the tactic of the “Feint” and the tactic of the “Gambit”. As an example of a feint, Kautilya would not be above using deception by attacking a rival’s less prosperous area, with an eye to a more prosperous area. When the rival’s resources would be diverted to the secondary area, then the real target could be attacked. Kautilya’s “gambit” was much like a game of chess when a lesser piece of territory is sacrificed to gain a higher-value territory—and is used today in corporate strategies.

    3) Kautilya’s Gudayuddha, or Clandestine and Silent War1, which is an extension of the covert war, but in which spies and infiltrators, disinformation and treachery, within a targeted state is carried on, under the radar. This is similar to a hostile surreptitious corporate takeover. Awareness is generally considered a prerequisite for any defense. One might look to the known example of Honda’s successful attack on Harley Davidson’s large, powerful, motorcycle empire with its small 50cc, $250 motorbike that looked more like a bicycle than a motorcycle. If an attack is so subtle that rivals are not aware of it, then the attacker’s objectives are likely to be attained and systems will be in place to secure those objectives well before the target recognizes the attack. The military strategist Sun Tzu argued that “the expert general approaches his object indirectly” (Sawyer, 1994). Kautilya, wasted no time wondering about the ethics of the strategies he advocated. This is reminiscent of Max Weber’s view, expressed in the 19th century, that morality plays very little part in international politics (Weber, 1919, 1946, 1978).
    [​IMG]


    Kautilya, advocated the use of all three forms of warfare individually and even simultaneously. In the final analysis of Kautilya’s international relations policy, he loudly articulates what today is only covertly advocated, i.e., that any state after some time uses up its resources and new sources need to be acquired either through alliances, pseudo-alliances or direct force. In corporate terms, a company that has exhausted the resources in a single product or geographic market, must diversify in order to continue to advance it underlying profit-maximizing goals.
     
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  16. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    III. KAUTILYAN “MORALITY”:


    The three important internal issues for the ruler to attend to are:
    Raksha—or protection of life and liberty within the state;
    Palana or law and justice; and,
    Yogakshema or welfare of the people.

    These three characteristics are also to be seen to be subsumed in the constitutions of all modern states as--preservation of Life, Liberty, Justice, Equality and Property.

    It is mainly in Kautilya’s Yogakshma domestic policies that scholars see a “value-based” philosophy (Kumar and Rao 1996; (Chunder, 1970). Therefore, has Kautilya been misunderstood as a ruthless and brutal Prime Minister? Is he in fact a principled leader whose ideals centered around yoga-kshema? Given that one of Kautilya’s famous pieces of advice in the Arthasashtra runs as follows: “a person should not be too honest. Just as straight trees are chopped down first, honest people are taken advantage of first,” this would indeed be a curious interpretation of Kautilyan ideology. Thucydides, in the Melian Dialog, argues Boesche, “has an objective standard of justice a moral yardstick by which to measure human actions.” However, Boesche goes on to state that “Kautilya has no moral standard” (italics added) other than good or bad ends that accrue to states as consequences of their actions1. In effect, Kautilya is a consequentialist and an utilitarian. Within this structure he is also clearly a rule utilitarian, who defines general principles in the Arthasashtra that will increase value to the state, even if some bad deed is done to achieve it—such as lying, stealing, poisoning, and killing, i.e., the “ends justify the means” policy.
    Perhaps if we look at Kautilya’s ethics as compartmentalized, then one can find some resemblance of a “values-based” leadership within the domestic policies he advocates. However, these values-based principles, such as: piety, purity, truthfulness, avoiding injury to others work towards the material and spiritual wellbeing of subjects 1and avoid profits that bring injury to the people, must be analyzed in light of his ends-justify-the means” philosophy.

    When he argued that the leader should undertake good deeds for his people, it was only for expediency to keep the populace happy so that they would not revolt, and less so for concern for human rights and social justice. He also displayed surprisingly gentle ideas of how to incorporate prisoners of war into the nation and use their labor to create value. What meaning can be drawn about such benevolence and protection of human rights from one who advocated the use of torture as a illegtimate means to get information, spies, poisons, and treachery to acquire other nations?

    Was Kautilya the ultimate hypocrite? To answer this, one must look to the core characteristic of Kautilya—his pragmatism. It was not so much that he advocated benevolence as an intrinsic virtue, but as a pragmatic tool to serve the ends of the state, to ensure the goodwill and labor of the populace, and to prevent challenges to the ruler. He set up the bureaucracy to pull out the essential value from human endeavor through a series of economic and social incentives.

    Kautilyan incentives can be seen not only as instruments of power and control over the bureaucracy, but also as insurance risk (Sihag, 2009). This system of rewards and incentives in management are remarkably similar to our own management philosophies of pay-for-performance systems, stock options, bonuses, and other incentive payouts for employees. He thus created, what might be the earliest governmental system of pay-for-performance, and management by objectives for the bureaucracy, and divided these performance systems based on the kind of work that was done for the state from the senior executive service, middle managers to lower functionaries.

    Boesche’s argument that the Kautilyan welfare state was paternalistic cannot be disputed. It had elaborate rules, designed to keep the goodwill of subjects, and also to keep them submissive (Boesche, 2002). The Arthasashtra was dictatorial in nature, giving detailed prescriptions on minute details of citizens’ daily lives—such as how to wash clothes, keep clean, when to cover windows at night, and how many times to bathe horses. In this, Kautilya’s precepts foreshadowed by many centuries, the work of Frederick Winslow Taylor, and scientific management. Like Machiavelli, Kautilya’s final goal was wealth maximization. At best, his “valued-based” management principles were limited to domestic policies within the state; at worst one may see his ideas about governmental ethics to be amoral, at times immoral, and certainly contradictory.

    Kautilyan Concepts & Their Meaning

    [​IMG]
     
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  17. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    IV. KAUTILYA IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

    How have Kautilya’s ideas been implemented and modified through the years? What other theorists and practitioners have contributed to the evolution of SMART power? What are the modern applications of this concept? This paper’s scope does not allow for comprehensive answers to these questions, but it is useful to examine how threads of Kautilyan thought have been weaved through the fabric of history. Figure 4.1 illustrates historical figures close to Kautilya’s time as well as influential theorists over 1,000 years later.

    [​IMG]

    The writings of two figures from the same historical era as Kautilya have greatly influenced modern strategic thought regarding how nations interact, and many of their themes are in concert with one another. Some argue that Sun Tzu (circa 544-496 BCE) “has become the intellectual father of a school of warfare that advocates winning by maneuver or by psychologically dislocating the opponent.” (Bartholomees, 2009) Also, he advocated use of deception, surprise, and intelligence akin to Kautilya’s Gudayuddha to attempt victory without overt combat. A continent away and about a century later, Thucydides penned the epic history of the Peloponnesian War. In it, he analyzed the role of power in international relations including diplomatic interactions leading up to and accompanying war as well as the domestic and cultural aspects influencing them. His chronicle of states’ quests for power to survival and grow may have provided a theoretical foundation for the evolution of the modern international system where “on the level of grand strategy all instruments of national power must be leveraged in conjunction with military means in pursuit of national goals.” (Nation, 2009) Thucydides’ account addresses several ethical and moral issues related to the use of power that readers of Kautilya should note. This includes the bluntly pragmatic “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” logic of the Melian dialogue, although the resulting strategic consequences of Athen’s harsh treatment of Melia may have contributed to their own eventual downfall. Applying Kautilya’s direct warfare of Yana and Prakasayuddha against weak opponents may risk similar long-term faults.


    Skipping ahead by a millennium, one can see the evolution leading to the modern Westphalian state system through the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, an advisor in the Florentine Republic, one of the five major Italian stato in the 15th century. Often characterized as ruthlessly pragmatic, Machiavelli’s emphasis on the survival of the state as paramount resonates with Kautilya’s primary goal. This ends of the state—the raison d’état—are justified by any means necessary for success, although arguably his power policies follow a more amoral, vice immoral, approach. That is, although the state (embodied by The Prince in Machiavelli’s case) should not set out to do immoral acts, they may be necessary for survival. As such, every tool available should be applied to increase the state’s power, including violence, deceit, treachery, and dissimulation. Echoing the philosophy espoused by Kautilya, Machiavelli notes that rulers are “judged by their success in defending and advocating the interests of the state, not by any other standards, moral or political.” (Nigro, 2009) Almost 200 years after the formal treaty of Westphalia, the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz wrote his observations and philosophies regarding the nature of war during the 19th century. The concepts in his work strongly influenced the development and application of U.S. land power during most of the 20th century. He recognized the strong connection between politics and war, highlighted by his “paradoxical trinity” composed of violence, subordination, and chance represented by the people (internal politics), the government (policy), and the military. His work concentrates on the more conventional aspects of war—the Prakasayuddh of Kautilya—with insights on such themes as seeking battle, determining an enemy’s center of gravity, and reaching the culminating point of attack. The main thrust of his work focuses on the use of physical force—hard power—as a necessary component (the means) to imposing the state’s will on the enemy (the ends).


    In the contemporary context, one might say that the U.S. Army has come “full circle” with regard to the balanced use of soft and hard power. In the latest version of its primary field manual on Operations, the Army acknowledges the current U.S. security environment as “a complex period of prolonged conflicts and opportunities” which requires “the protracted application of all instruments of national power.” The emphasis is no longer simply “to fight and win,” but rather, “to create conditions that advance U.S. goals” across a spectrum of conflict spanning stable peace through insurgency to general war. In fact, Department of Defense policy directs that stability operations, the lowest end of the spectrum, “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.” This more holistic approach mirrors those of Kautilya and Sun Tzu, with the crucial difference of the U.S. applying measures to ensure consistency with its enduring moral and ethical values. These include specific laws of war to safeguard fundamental human rights as well as to make the transition to peace easier. Also, rules of engagement (ROE) are directives provided to guide the use of force in a delicate balance to pursue tactical victory without causing strategic failure. (U.S. Army, 2008) Ideally, the application of laws of war and ROE will allow operations at the most violent end of the conflict spectrum to avoid the myopic and counterproductive shortfalls of Kautilya’s brutal wielding of national power. To be effective, the U.S. must also be on guard to ensure that enemies whose activities follow the immoral aspects of Kautilyan philosophy do not undermine the commitment to fundamental values for expediency.

    V. CONCLUSION:

    Kautilya’s ideas on wealth maximization did not come to scholarly interest until the early 21st century, when this ancient treatise was translated into English and Hindi from its original Sanskrit in 1915 (Choudhary, 1971). Thus, scholars are only now beginning to place this work into a contemporary context. In his work, “The Six Principles of Political Realism,” Hans Morgenthau has argued that, “…the fact that a theory of politics that was developed hundreds or even thousands of years ago….does not create a presumption that it must be outmoded and obsolete.” He goes on to say that “To dispose of such a theory as a ‘fashion’ or ‘fad’ is tantamount to assuming that in matters political we can have opinions but no truths” (1973).

    In terms of what we know about ambition and pursuit of wealth and power from Kautilya’s Arthasashtra, one can indeed describe it as a “Science of Acquisition.” To this some cautionary words to today’s state and corporate leaders would be to temper a lust for acquisition of wealth with a sense of global economic justice. From the propensity of leader pathology in private and public corporations in modernity (Coates, 2004, 2007) it is clearly evident that the leaders in debacles of Enron, Tyco, Worldcom, General Motors, Bank of America, AIG, and others, pursued strategies of wealth maximization without concern for ethical codes of conduct. We did see that the fundamental attribution error and the self-interested bias prevailed in these cases—but corporate America is not alone. Lying, cheating and stealing are pervasive in Washington’s public sector network of public conglomerates. However, if there is any thin silver lining of a lesson to be learned from the recent stories of Bernie Madoff and the philosophy of greed epitomized by the fictional Gordon Gekko, is that immorality, conscious or unconscious at the top is bad for business. The Exxon Valdez, Johnson and Johnson, and Tylenol cases showed that market value decreased by 8% after these catastrophes, whereas after ten weeks following these disasters the stock of firms with ethical values increased by 5%, and unethical firms dropped by 15% (Fombrun, 2005). For utilitarian reasons, therefore, corporate leaders need to be the leading champions of the organization’s espoused values (Coates, 2009). The military recognizes this value and has articulated it in doctrine--U.S. Army expects every leader to be a “Values Champion”2 and to do his/her duty (USAWC, Primer, FM22-100).
    Michael Walzer has another perspective. He suggested that the populace must reconcile to living under the rule of bureaucrats “who have lost their souls” (1973). From the Arthasashtra, one might speculate that despite harsh dictates in pursuit of “good” ends, Kautilya may have looked at the leader, not so much as a wealth mazimizing warrior, but more as a tragic hero who had to do evil to reap good. Max Weber offered a similar concept of the leader, as one who suffered, and “lets himself in for the diabolic forces lurking in violence” (Gerth & Mills, 1946).

    Although written hundreds of years ago, Books Seven, Eleven and Twelve of the Arthasashtra provide us practical guidance for use by the modern corporations. The discussions about human nature and its motivations and behaviors remain current across the centuries and so too do ontology, epistemology and methodology of nation-building and interstate relations. Distrust, self-interest and the on-going quest to secure scarce resources just as a part of modern nations as these were in Kautilya’s time. The “dirty-hands dilemma”3 continues to challenge some modern leaders. For others, like Kautilya, the dirty-hands quandary is no dilemma at all, as he and they enthusiastically advocates policies that bring about private and personal gain. Not to do so, is an act that Kautilya may have seen as spinelessness and many modern leaders see as cowardice in the seemingly macho management milieu of the 21st century.

    In the end, Kautilya, the man, remains an enigma. On the one hand he dispensed soft justice in his Yogakshema concept of welfare. On the other hand he dispensed harsh justice, and was opportunistic to the point of brutality. Looking at the personality of Kautilya is much like peeling an onion. His is a layered and complex personality that will continue to fascinate scholars in its contradictions and brilliance for years to come and his pragmatism mixed with cynicism is relevant for in understanding the complexities, opportunities and threats to modern nation-states and business corporations.

    Source: www.isme.tamu.edu/ISME10/Coates-Caton10.doc
     
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  18. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    The Napoleonic Wars and Guerrilla Tactics

    During the Napoleonic Wars, Napoleon's occupation of the Iberian Peninsula prompted one of the greatest outbreaks of unconventional warfare in military history.

    [​IMG]

    In July 1807, Napoleon invaded the Iberian Peninsula. Napoleon calculated that such a military operation would be be relatively easy due to perceived Spanish weakness and inept leadership. If successful, Napoleon could exploit Spain's resources and expand his Continental System, denying the British another important trading partner.

    Napoleon did not anticipate the will of the people to resist a foreign invader. Shortly after his successful invasion and defeat of conventional forces, guerrilla warfare ensued. In response to the demands of unconventional warfare, Napoleon's initial invasion force of 50,000 swelled to 80,000 by 1808. Guerrilla tactics employed by ordinary peasants resulted in French forces precariously controlling only the ground they physically occupied.

    Peasants and Guerrilla Warfare During the Napoleonic Wars

    Shortly after Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, organized, regional guerrilla bands emerged. In an effort to quell resistance, the French intensified their efforts at retaliation. Such efforts resulted in guerrilla bands gaining fresh recruits and increased support from the population. One observer remarked, "...the priest girded up his black robe, and stuck a pistol in his belt; the student threw aside his books, and grasped the sword; the shepherd forsook his flock; the husbandman his home."


    Guerrilla fighters varied in their composition and motivation. Mountaineers, who held suspicion and hate of anyone from outside the mountain areas, made up some guerrilla unites. The French brutality motivated many peasants throughout the countryside to join guerrilla units. French occupation of cities resulted in urban populations of varying social status to provide aid and recruits for guerrilla fighters.

    For others, unconventional warfare provided opportunity. Bandits throughout the peninsula seized opportunities to raid French supply lines in the hopes of gaining valuable war material and food supplies. Former officers of the defeated Spanish army no longer had their regular unites to command. To make up for the lack of regular forces, many took command of guerrilla units. Others formed guerrilla units of their own.
    Guerrilla Tactics Used Against Napoleon's Army

    The employment of unconventional warfare by the people of the Iberian Peninsula allowed them to take and hold the initiative. Guerrilla tactics included operating in small, local bands. Spanish guerrillas chose when and where to attack the French. They also had the advantage of not having to engage French forces in open combat. Rather, Spanish guerrillas attacked targets of opportunity with great effect.

    In the early stages of guerrilla warfare in Spain, guerrilla units focused most of their attacks on French communications. Before long, the continued success of guerrilla attacks on French communications forced the French to provide military escorts up to 300 strong for each courier.

    Such successes emboldened guerrilla bands to increase the intensity of their attacks and importance of their targets. Guerrillas began attacking French convoys, seizing weapons and food. The guerrillas constantly harassed and attacked targets of opportunity whenever they could.


    Effects of Unconventional Warfare During the Napoleonic Wars

    Like most wars, guerrilla warfare did not result in the wholesale destruction of French power in the Iberian Peninsula. Nor could local, scattered guerrilla bands realistically hope to achieve a decisive victory against the highly organized and well supplied professional French army.

    Viewing the Napoleonic Wars as a whole however, the unconventional warfare waged by the people of the Iberian Peninsula did have an important material and psychological impact on the French. Guerrilla warfare in Spain forced Napoleon to increase his forces in the region to over 80,000 at any given time during the occupation. In spite of their efforts, for most of the occupation period the French merely controlled the ground they stood on, alone and isolated in a hostile, foreign land.

    With escalating conflict on the European continent, Great Britain remaining dominant on the seas, and limiting French capacity to make war, Napoleon could ill afford grinding unconventional warfare on the Iberian Peninsula. Approximately 50,000 Spanish guerrilla fighters accounted for approximately 145,000 French dead, or roughly ten percent of the French army per year of occupation. To put the numbers in perspective, more Frenchmen died in the Iberian Peninsula fighting guerrillas than Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. The French experience in the Iberian Peninsula or the "Spanish Ulcer" as Napoleon called it, serves as poignant reminder that fighting an unconventional war often results in a commitment disproportionately higher than commanders of professional armies can predict or expect.

    Source:https://suite.io/matthew-ferraton/2y192fv
     
  19. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Unconventional Warfare during the Civil War-John S. Mosby's campaign for the Shenandoah
    by Kryn Miner

    Since man picked up a weapon against his fellow being, he has always looked for a way to defeat his opponent in a more efficient and lethal way. It is our nature to seek out and exploit the weaknesses of our opponent thus maximizing our gain verses our risk
    . It's this thinking that brought about the evolution of unconventional warfare, or "Special Operations," and the men that mastered its effective use. From Roman generals like Tacitus to Men like Maj. Robert Rogers and Sir Thomas Gage history has provided us examples of this. These visionary men, who possessed the innate ability to see "outside" the realm of conventional thinking and tactics, developed exceptional solutions to the unique problems of asymmetric warfare they faced. Challenges such as inferior numbers, limited logistical systems, constrained conventional wisdom, and entrenched military dogma all plagued these men as they propagated their respective fights. Through the use of surprise, speed, audacity, and moral courage they were able to overcome substantial disparities and claim victory time and again from the hands of traditionally "superior" forces. During the years of 1862 through 1865 another such visionary man made his mark on the annals of the distinguished list of "Special Operators". John S. Mosby, or the Gray Ghost as he had come to be known, nearly turned the tide of the Civil War in the Shenandoah Valley and in turn the battle torn state of Virginia.

    To truly appreciate the deeds of Mosby we need to understand what made him and his band of Partisans effective... Home field advantage! Mosby was born in Edgemont, Virginia on December 6th 1833. He was the child of a well to do farm owner, Alfred D. Mosby. At the age of six his parents moved the family from his maternal grandfather's home to the family farm in Charlottesville, VA. As a child, Mosby led a somewhat privileged life and, as a youth attended school regularly. As a young man he also attended college at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville and excelled in the staples of a classic education, eventually going on to practice law. As with many men who aspire to greatness, one single event had a lasting impact on the man he was to become. In March of 1853 he shot and nearly killed a man named George Turpin for an alleged slanderous comment apparently made about the 19 year old Mosby. Although he was initially found guilty, he was eventually freed for the offense after serving a short sentence. The act was to have a lasting effect on Mosby. He saw it as a moral obligation to answer for the unjust attack on his good name. Later on he would feel the same way towards the Union, and it's aggression towards his way of life and beloved Shenandoah Valley. Having had the benefit of growing up in the place he would later conduct operations, Mosby had the distinct advantage over any adversary. His in-depth knowledge and working social ties within the community were keys to his success. This is one of the guidelines used today whenever building an effective guerrilla force. He knew the terrain and the people. This allowed him to continually maneuver in and around the occupying intruders at will. It also gave him a network of intelligence gatherers, and passive supporters to assist in his operations.

    At the onset of the war Mosby had enlisted into the 1st Virginia Cavalry. This unit was led by a then Col. JEB Stuart. Although Mosby was opposed to the dissolution of the union he felt a moral obligation to stand and defend his native home of Virginia. Although only a private upon his enlistment Mosby quickly became a shining star in the unit and quickly drew notice of its commander. This relationship would eventually blossom into one of unwavering trust and commitment, on both parties. This again is a major factor in the application of Mosby's type of unconventional campaign, "undying loyalty to your mission, your commander and his intent."

    By June of 1862 Mosby was a full Lieutenant operating on Stewart's staff as his adjutant. He was continually selected to conduct various scouting parties and reconnaissance missions for Stewart. One such mission was across federal lines and proved to be the capstone to Mosby's burgeoning career. He had discovered a hole in McClellan's line that allowed Stewart to ride 1200 cavalry in behind the union army's line. This action forced McClellan to retreat back along the VA Peninsula and secured Mosby's reputation as a trustworthy officer. Shortly after this action Mosby was captured by union troops and then paroled. This was a grievous mistake the Union would regret for the next three and a half years. He felt that the biggest vulnerability of the Union was its underbelly. The Union combat and field trains were ripe targets that begged to be attacked. He said, of the Union supply system, "A small force moving with celerity and threatening many points on a line can neutralize a hundred times its own number." In this statement he had, in essence, stated a focal point of the theory of "Relative Superiority." This theory states that; a small force given proper mission parameters and using speed, surprise and violence of action can defeat a larger, numerically superior force within a given span of time. Eventually Mosby's ability to conduct small scouting parties and raids with resounding success earned him the opportunity of his career.

    On January 1st 1863, then Lieutenant, John S. Mosby along with nine confederate Cavalry troopers from the 1st Virginia set out on a mission to reconnoiter the upper Fauquier county region and, when feasible, attack pickets and supply trains in the area. By this time he was sending his intelligence reports directly to Gen. Stewart's HQ. His actions were an immediate success. As he had suggested, the attacks were instrumental in containing the Union's progression through the upper Shenandoah Valley. The war of Mosby's Confederacy had begun. Over the next twenty eight months Mosby conducted various raids on wagon trains of supplies and suttlers, encamped Union forces, and various key strategic targets and personnel located in the area. Each time he would attack and simply fade into the wilderness. It was this hit and run tactic that earned him the name "Gray Ghost" among the Union forces that faced him. He had been successful in killing or capturing over a hundred Union pickets, soldiers and sympathizers. He also had a knack for penetrating deep into Union lines and capturing high ranking officers while they slept. This skill was one of his most potent and useful weapons, Psychological Warfare. It can be safely assumed that not a single Union officer with any significant importance slept well when in "Mosby's Confederacy" for fear of being awakened by the barrel of a colt revolver wielded by Mosby himself. One of the most notable of these kidnappings was the Fairfax Courthouse Raid on March 9th, 1863 when Mosby captured fifty eight horses and thirty three Union soldiers, among them Brigadier General Edwin Stoughton. Lincoln himself commented on the raid, saying "I'm sorry… For I can make brigadier generals but I can't make horses" in an attempt to lighten the situation. The raid earned Mosby his Captain's Bars and the gratitude and acknowledge of General Lee himself. No other Confederate officer during the war is mentioned more in Lee's papers then John S. Mosby. Mosby's plan to disrupt the Union Operation at its most vulnerable point was having some good successes. But, he knew it was time to escalate the campaign and move towards dealing more crippling blows to the Union.

    With the approval of Lee, in 1864 Mosby renewed his campaign after a short lull during the dead of winter. This time he set his sights on not only the supply trains of the encroaching Union army but it's supply life line, the network of railroads they controlled that connected the Army in the west to the Army of the Potomac and Washington D.C. itself. He attacked rail stations and trains near Duffield Station, WV; Martinsburg and Winchester; Manassas Gap near Piedmont, between the Plains and Rectortown; Fauquier; and other key locations. He continually harassed and forced the Union to commit more troops to the region with the usual raids on supply trains and outposts. Once again he focused on a key target within the realm of SOLIC, or Special Operations / Low intensity Conflict, the systematic targeting of PKI or Public key Infrastructure. The Union needed these railroads to operate in the region, and more so to supply Union forces in the west. The simple act of attacking them forced the Union command to address the issue with an infusion of combat forces to protect the vulnerable rail system. Mosby did not need to be overly successful, and in fact was not much of the time, with his raids. He only needed to force his opponent to react to his actions, with an escalation of critical manpower and resources. This was the single biggest impact he had on the war's outcome. Had the Confederate command embraced this and implemented it on a larger scale across the campaign they could have drastically increased their chances of a favorable outcome. Although the concept was not new, Lee and Davis did not realize, or rather accept, the concept of asymmetrical warfare. Lee's traditional "set piece battle" mindset was not conducive to winning a war of attrition, which was what essentially the war evolved into. Although he appreciated Mosby and his efforts, he didn't fully see the potential in them. This can be noted in his order that all partisan units be disbanded and assimilated into the regular Confederate forces. Modern historians, such as Robert L. Kirby, have realized the impact such Irregular efforts could have had on the war, and have posed the question of why Lee didn't realize the potential.

    In growing response to the Mosby threat Union commanders sought to deploy several tactics to level the field. Although none were overly effective, the only one that had any impact on the Gray Ghost's operations was the deployment of large groups of Union cavalry. In the latter part of 1864 several units of Union horse were operating in the region. They were assigned the mission of destroying Mosby and his Rangers. Elements of the 2nd US Cav, New York's 13th Cav and elements of the Illinois 8th Cav were actively conducting patrols through the valley. One such unit was under the command of the infamous Col. George A. Custer, who only a year before had made his mark on the war with his daring Cavalry ride at Gettysburg against the confederate Stewart. Mosby wrongfully held Custer accountable for the execution of several Rangers and when engaged by him, held a firm "no parlay" policy towards the Union troopers.

    All in all, the Union campaign to rid the Shenandoah of Mosby and his Rangers was largely futile. Although they were able to capture or kill Mosby's men in small numbers, Mosby's command had grown in size and now was comprised of some 779+ men. The Union had unknowingly assisted Mosby by violating a key tenant of fighting an insurgency. They had alienated the local population and did nothing to win support within the public opinion for their cause. For every one Ranger they captured or killed, they inadvertently caused the enlistment of two more, only fortifying Mosby's influence over the region. Frustrated, Union commanders began to order the burning of farms and internment of "service" aged males. All of these responses and their piece meal application did nothing to garner support for their cause. By mid 1864 Mosby and his men had forestalled any real measure of response to his campaign. Mosby's biggest enemy was his own convoluted chain of command that did not realize his potential at the operational command levels. Although Mosby had by this time, made regular reports to both Stewart and General Lee himself, he was regarded, by mid level commanders, as a sideline attraction within the bigger context of the war. A new Union commander had assumed command of the Army of the Union and was marching towards the Fledgling nation's capital, Richmond and that was where the Confederate focus lay. By late November General Sheridan, Union commander in the region, had come to realize that Mosby was doing more to thwart Union efforts, with his second and third order effects, than anyone of the traditional Confederates he currently faced. He is quoted as saying "I will soon commence work on Mosby… Heretofore I have made no attempt to break him up… as I would have employed ten men to his one, and for the reason that I have made a scapegoat of him for the destruction of private rights. Now there is going to be an intense hatred of him in that portion of this valley which is nearly a desert. I will soon commence on Loudon County, and let them know there is a God in Israel." With that statement General Sheridan began to conduct what was to become the "Burning Raid" in which the Union systematically destroyed any and every farm, homestead, and potential support asset of Mosby in the valley. In all more than 2000 families were left homeless and without food. The destruction was said to be on a biblical scale as observed by Ranger J. Marshal Crawford. In this slash and burn campaign Sheridan had finally dealt a substantial blow to Mosby and his Rangers. His response was a key component in defeating an insurgency. He broke the will of the indigenous people's will to fight and/or support the insurgent forces. He denied Mosby the one critical advantage he had over the Union forces time and again, the land itself and the people who lived there. This effort was bolstered by an influx of Union forces that occupied, in force, all of the critical assets that could support Mosby. In this he denied him his intelligence network, logistical support, and the support of the indigenous community, three critical elements required in conducting an insurgency such as his. This finally brought about the second and third order effects Sheridan sought. Mosby was more of a liability than an asset to the people.

    As the war came to a close Mosby had become more of a curse then a blessing to the people of the Shenandoah Valley. They knew all too well that it was because of him that Sheridan unleashed his hell on earth and a great deal of animosity was held on his behalf. The people of the Valley simply wanted their lives to return to normal and the war to end. Long gone were the sentiments of Confederate solidarity and independence. To that end, and under the direction of Robert E. Lee himself, who had just six days earlier surrendered at Appomattox, Col. John S. Mosby quietly agreed to a suspension of hostilities to confirm Lee's surrender. In a letter to General Morgan he stated:

    "I am ready to agree to a suspension of hostilities for a short time in order to enable me to communicate with my own authorities or until I can obtain sufficient intelligence to determine my future action"


    He eventually confirmed the report and agreed to surrender the command of his partisan rangers to Col. James Kidd at 11:30 am on the steps of Millwood. The two then went inside and ate dinner together. Two days later on April 18th, 1865 another meeting was convened to further discuss the surrender. Unlike the first meeting this one was far less civil and ended in a stalemate of sorts, with Mosby and his detachment walking away from the "Mexican standoff" that the meeting caused. Announcement of Union cavalry in the woods caused the meeting to end abruptly under the threat of a gunfight. On the 21st of April Col. Mosby ordered a meeting of his men to bid them farewell. He gave a speech in which he commended them on their service to Virginia and him. After this, the men signed paroles and officially disbanded the 43rd Bn of Virginia Cav. Mosby himself spent several weeks eluding capture by Union forces and was finally paroled by U.S. Grant himself in mid June.

    A lot can be said about the 128 pound man that became the "Gray Ghost". Historians have written volumes regarding the man, his accomplishments, and the way he went about it. As an amateur historian, I am intrigued as to how this man, with no formal military education, specialized training, or experience conducted such a successful long term campaign. Our military spends years training our junior and senior officers to conduct this type of warfare, and still only a few are able to grasp its fundamentals, much less it's subtle nuances that make it effective. We have a saying in the Special Operations community, "some men pick the job and then some jobs pick the man."I think in this case, it can safely be said it's both. Mosby proved that, unlike much of the techniques and tactics of warfare which are trendy and time specific to an era, the application of unconventional warfare is timeless.

    Source:Military History Online - Unconventional Warfare during the Civil War - John S. Mosby's campaign for the Shenandoah
     
  20. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Another Way To Fight: Unconventional Warfare from Rome to Iran

    On 20 October 2011, Mahmoud Jibril, the interim Prime Minister of the Libyan National Transitional Council, publicly announced the death of former Libyan dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi. Qaddafi’s overthrow was the culmination of months of intense effort from Libyan revolutionary militias, the United States, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The victory was also a bright spot in the tumultuous Arab Spring that continues to engulf the region.

    Most aspects of the military operation in Libya were largely familiar to the general public. First, NATO established a naval blockade along Libya’s 1,100-mile coastline, cutting Qaddafi off from external supplies. Second, the United States used its superior air power to strike enemy targets and control the skies. Less familiar was the third prong of the strategy: the foreign military advisors who worked beside Libyan fighters to help equip, train, and direct them in combat. When this advising role came to light, major publications like the London Telegraph heralded it as a “new way of waging war.”

    Combining air and sea power with operations in support of rebel forces was definitive in the overthrow of Qaddafi. However, the manner in which the coalition supported the rebel forces on the ground was nothing new. In Libya, NATO and its Arab allies conducted an unconventional warfare (UW) campaign, defined by U.S. Special Operations Command as:

    Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area. (Emphasis added.)



    UW has been an inseparable component of armed conflict since the inception of warfare, but as an officer with seven years of experience in Special Forces, I have seen its specific role often overlooked and misunderstood. In fact, many of the activities that characterize the Libyan conflict are present throughout military history. This misunderstanding leads policy experts to miss opportunities to study cases that can guide, inform, or offer solutions to today’s conflicts. This article analyzes the use of UW during three different historical periods, ranging from ancient Rome to modern-day Iran, and concludes that a failure to understand UW represents a failure to understand a major strategy used by our adversaries.

    Ancient Rome: Quiet Envoys, Mass Defections

    In the third century BCE, Rome and Carthage were the preeminent superpowers of a region that spanned from Western Europe and the Mediterranean to North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. The battle for primacy between these two empires lasted more than a century. After a series of grievous defeats to Carthage at the outset of the Second Punic War, Rome decided to try a new approach.

    In 213 BCE, the Roman Senate dispatched a military envoy to meet with Prince Syphax, ruler of the Numidian territories in North Africa. Numidia was aligned under Carthage and provided its leader Hannibal with his best cavalry units. The envoy consisted of three Roman centurions who beseeched Syphax to turn against Carthage. In return, Rome would repay Syphax, with interest, following the successful conclusion of the war. The prince agreed, but his one condition was that a centurion remain “with him as instructor in the art of war.”The centurion Quintus Statorius agreed to stay behind and began the task of arming, equipping, and training the Numidian tribes. Syphax kept his promise and immediately sent messengers to the Numidian fighters in the Carthaginian army to persuade them to leave. Carthage then witnessed a portion of their military forces abandoning them and an uprising on the home continent.

    The challenges that Statorius faced more then a millennia ago were very similar to those that coalition advisors encountered on the ground in Libya in 2011. Statorius had to instruct a society accustomed to fighting on horseback and open plains on the finer points of fighting in a tightly packed phalanx (the military innovation of its day). Similarly, the soldiers deployed by countries such as the United Kingdom, France, and Qatar had to train new Libyan volunteers in hit-and-run tactics so that they could stand up to Qaddafi’s well-equipped military. Both tasks required special skills such as diplomacy and an understanding of how to develop capability with limited external support. Most importantly, both Numidia and Libya highlight the inordinate impact that a handful of well-trained soldiers can have in a quiet advisory role.

    The American Revolution: France’s Gamble

    Today, the United States commands the most capable armed forces in the world. But, as is easy to forget, during its fight for independence, the U.S. military began as a ragged mix of militia very similar to Libya’s 2011 revolutionaries. Both the United States and Libya would not exist in their present form had a foreign power not intervened with UW.

    In 1775, France was approaching financial insolvency, smarting from the loss of its colonies in North America, and stifled by England’s encroaching power. Across the Atlantic, as the Continental Congress prepared to declare independence from England, Louis XVI saw an opportunity to reverse France’s misfortune by stoking the conflict between King George III and his subjects in America.

    France initially provided the American insurgency with money, gunpowder, and expertise from military advisors such as Polish engineer Colonel Thaddeus Kosciuszko and France’s Major General Marquis De Lafayette. Publicly, Paris gave London assurances that France had no desire to capitalize on the war,[v] but secretly, French ministers used fictitious shell companies to continue supplying the revolutionaries with material and ammunition.[vi] U.S. General George Washington was appreciative yet cautious about France’s offers of assistance. Like smart bombs and laser-guided munitions today, cannon and military engineering were the advanced technologies that America needed to defeat the British. He even made the energetic Lafayette his aide-de-camp—to the delight of the French court. However, Washington was aware that France’s efforts were not wholly altruistic. “I am heartily disposed to entertain the most favorable sentiments of our new ally and to cherish them in others to a reasonable degree,” he said, “but it is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest.”[vii]

    By October 1781, the condition on the ground was strikingly similar to that in Libya in 2011. The American revolutionaries had won a share of symbolic victories. The fledgling government enjoyed diplomatic relations with countries like France, Spain, and the Dutch Republic. In the south, the Continental Army—led by Lafayette and reinforced by the French Navy on the Chesapeake—trapped British forces at Yorktown. The Southern British Army’s ultimate surrender in Virginia forced Britain to the negotiating table and signaled the end of the war.

    During both the American and Libyan revolutions, foreign governments shaped the outcome of events against regimes that they did not favor by using UW. It provided France, and later the United States, with the capability to influence these conflicts quietly, without involving large numbers of their own troops. When the timing was right, France and the United States used their conventional military power (i.e., naval blockade, air force) to support the unconventional fighting on the ground. Moreover, although both the Americans and Libyans received substantial foreign assistance, both still felt in control of their own revolutions. Had Libya or the American colonies won their independence without a distinct sense of ownership, the victory would fail to unite the citizenry or garner acknowledgement from the international community.

    Iran Today: UW Comes First

    As the dust settles in Libya, one of the biggest mistakes U.S. leadership can make is to assume that other countries are not conducting their own UW campaigns. Among the most notable that I observed firsthand is that of Iran.

    Iran looks to UW as its almost exclusive means of projecting military power. Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Iran sent approximately twenty-four members of its Revolutionary Guard Corps to Beirut to support Hezbollah.[viii] In the eighteen years that followed, the number of agents in the country rose as high as five hundred. When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, the Ayatollah Khomeini addressed the Iranian National Security Council to comment on “Iran’s greatest foreign policy success. We will repeat it across the Islamic world until all of Islam is liberated.”[i
    x] Iran considers the Israeli withdrawal the first decisive defeat of a Western power in postmodern times.[x]

    Unlike NATO’s efforts in Libya, Iran’s UW efforts are not limited to a singular country or region. Where Iran can find a group with whom it shares a common enemy, it will build relationships. Iran’s recruiting pool of insurgents comes from the geographical swath of land known as the “Shia crescent”: Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Bahrain. According to intelligence reports, all have sizable Shia populations that Iran can use as a sectarian baseline to build surrogate forces. Further afield in South America, Iran has a presence in the Tri-Border region of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. Hezbollah affiliates provide funding for their military wing in Lebanon, and Iran builds contacts inside the drug trade.[xi] In my experience, even if Iran falls short of supplanting a hostile regime and installing a friendly one, these surrogates provide a capacity to retaliate when Tehran feels threatened. In Iraq, for example, I was aware that the Revolutionary Guard supplied illegal Shia militias with munitions that could penetrate the armor on U.S. vehicles. When the United States convinced China and Russia to agree to tighter United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iran on 18 May 2010, I believe that Tehran gave the order to attack U.S. forces.[xii] Two days later, I saw car bombings on American patrols in the Diyala Province, an area previously characterized by relative calm.[xiii]

    Conversely, Iran uses unconventional strategies to protect regimes fighting their own insurgencies. In Syria, there have been reports of Iranian Revolutionary Guard members advising Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s military officers.[xiv] Iranian operatives wear Syrian uniforms, speak the local Arabic dialect, and provide tactical assistance in combating the Free Syrian Army. Though not playing the role of the insurgent, these agents are performing much the same function: quietly supporting foreign forces to fight a common enemy.

    One of the biggest differences between Iran and the West is how Iran prioritizes its UW capability above that of its conventional military.
    Consider that for any NATO member, the most senior leaders are overwhelmingly conventional military officers. Their backgrounds are in the infantry, on naval ships or in jet fighter squadrons. This experience influences their planning, which consequently does not factor in UW. Iran is the opposite; the Revolutionary Guard is the closest to the Ayatollah’s ear while the conventional military sits further down the table. I can attest that when the United States feels threatened, we reach for our tanks and our cruise missiles. When Iran feels threatened, it reaches for UW.

    Conclusion

    UW will only play an increasing role in today’s state of affairs. As the United States wrestles with intervention in Syria, how to deal with Taliban bases in Pakistan, and the right response for Al Qaeda in Yemen, UW will be an appealing choice—especially to an American public fatigued by a decade of war. UW can be cost-effective and minimally visible; it can legitimize local authorities and make conventional military options more effective. However, UW also carries real risks. In Libya, the world is still coming to terms with those recalcitrant fighters who have yet to align with the central government. What share of responsibility does the international community bear for the resulting instability, given that they armed them?

    It is vital that the dialogue over UW begins now. Special Operations, the proponent of UW, has grown immensely over the last twelve years. However, there has not been a corresponding growth in the understanding of UW within the Defense Department and its various agencies. The military is eager to return to its traditional mission and redevelop its conventional warfighting skills. But if there is no corresponding push to educate senior leaders and policy makers on this subject, the United States may lose a potential edge in future conflicts. Our adversaries are learning and with each passing year the United States’ technological superiority is lessened. Like Rome in 213 BCE, it is time for a different approach.



    Dave Coughran is a 2014 Master in Public Policy candidate at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, currently studying diplomacy and international affairs. Coughran completed two tours to Iraq as a Green Beret in the Special Forces. He speaks Arabic and has served in numerous advisory posts to militaries and governments from the Middle East.


    Source:Another Way To Fight: Unconventional Warfare from Rome to Iran | Kennedy School Review
     
  21. sorcerer

    sorcerer Senior Member Senior Member

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    Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan: A Case Study of the Taliban as an Unconventional Warfare Proxy Force

    Douglas A. Livermore

    As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan transitions full responsibility for operations to local forces and prepares to withdrawal the bulk of its forces by the end of 2014, it is important to look to the future of the conflict. The Taliban is far from defeated, and they will definitely remain a formidable foe to the Afghan government in 2015 and beyond. The world will witness a protracted and extremely violent struggle for dominance between the legitimate Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the fundamentalist Taliban insurgency vying to reinstitute the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which was overthrown by the US-led effort in late 2001. On one side, the Afghan government will do everything in its power to remain firmly entrenched as the central national authority governing from Kabul, the capital city. Opposing them, the Taliban will continue to strike out from safe havens in Western and Southern Pakistan, attempting to undermine the Afghan government and reemerge as the dominant power in Afghanistan. The Taliban seeks to reclaim the central national authority currently held by the Afghan government and once again exercise near-complete political and spiritual control over the entire population of Afghanistan.
    [​IMG]

    What is not entirely clear to casual outside observers is the “hidden hand” that directs and ultimately benefits from the Taliban’s efforts to destabilize Afghanistan. Pakistan, and specifically its Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), has been engaged in an incredibly long-term unconventional warfare campaign that provides an illuminating view into how such a strategy can be used to indirectly achieve a state’s national objectives.
    By employing the Taliban as a proxy force, Pakistan has achieved key regional objectives without the bulk of its conventional forces becoming decisively engaged in Afghanistan.

    While the ISI originally launched an Unconventional Warfare (UW) campaign to destabilize Afghanistan at the direction and with the full backing of then-President Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq after he took power in a bloody coup in 1979, it is unclear if that support continues today under the democratically elected President Asif Ali Zadari.
    Regardless, evidence that the ISI continues to support and direct the Taliban is voluminous, indicating a continuation of the UW campaign, with or without the direct permission of Pakistan’s elected leaders. When viewed with a critical eye, the Pakistani UW campaign against Afghanistan, with the Taliban acting as an indigenous proxy force, exhibits all of the characteristics and phases codified in the UW model used by the United States Government (USG). By analyzing the campaign through this lens, one can better understand the situation on the ground today as well as predict future Pakistani and Taliban strategies designed to undermine and potentially overthrow the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Perhaps the most important question that should be asked is this: Why would Pakistan want to conduct UW against Afghanistan?

    “Pashtunistan.” This word has struck fear into the hearts of Pakistani leaders for generations. Meaning “Land of the Pashtuns”,
    it is a concept deeply rooted in the psyche of the Pashtun tribes which straddle the Afghan-Pakistani border and poses a potential existential threat to modern-day Pakistan. The modern border, known as the “Durand Line”, is poorly defined and regularly contested. In 1893, the British, represented by Mortimer Durand, forced the Afghan Emir Abdur Rahman Khan to accept a dictated boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan (then “British India”). This border was intentionally designed by the British to divide the Pashtuns, thereby keeping Afghanistan weak and a perfect “buffer zone” between the encroaching Russian Empire and British India (on which the Russians had designs).[1] Afghan rulers since Abdur Rahman have almost universally rejected the “Durand Line” and the current government of President Hamid Karzai, himself a Pashtun, refuses to recognize this border as legitimate.[2] There are regular skirmishes between Afghan and Pakistani troops all along their shared border as each side jockeys for every slight advantage. The most recent major flare-up occurred in September of 2011, when Pakistan launched more than 340 artillery rockets into Afghanistan, damaging several towns and forcing the evacuation of thousands of terrified Afghans. [3]

    Generally speaking, there is little common understanding among the population of Afghanistan who exactly qualifies as an “Afghan”. In antiquity, the ethnic term “Afghan” was accepted as synonymous with only the Pashtuns.[4] Against this historic framework, and with few exceptions, loyalty in Afghanistan rarely extends beyond the tribal or ethnic level, as Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan cautiously eye the Pashtun majority. Given their druthers, the Pashtun majority of Afghanistan would undoubtedly seek reunification with the Pashtun tribes in Western Pakistan under the banner of a “Greater Afghanistan”. Doing so would strip nearly half of Pakistan’s land area as well as its vital Indian Ocean ports of Jiwani, Gwadar, and Pasni. These ports give Pakistan access to the mouth of the Arabian/Persian Gulf and provide further strategic strength. Obviously, the loss of Pashtun lands is unacceptable to Islamabad, which is why the Pakistanis have consistently sought to undermine Afghan unity and maintain a weakened Afghanistan in order to secure their northwest border.

    Despite its concern about Afghanistan, it is India, not Afghanistan, which Pakistan sees as the greatest regional threat. India and Pakistan have officially fought wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999, in addition to numerous undeclared skirmishes along their shared borders, particularly near the contested Kashmir province.[5] Because of this constant threat, Pakistan maintains the vast majority of its conventional forces along the Kashmir and Indian borders, poised to blunt Indian aggression or to potentially take advantage of any real or perceived vulnerabilities in India’s defenses.

    Aside from the direct threat posed by the emergence of “Pashtunistan”, the Karzai administration has also greatly improved relations with India, much to the discomfort of Pakistan. Immediately after the fall of the Taliban and the installation of Hamid Karzai as president of Afghanistan, India, which previously supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and Pakistan, opened consulates in Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, and Mazar-e-Sharif.[6] Both Iran and India have become heavily invested in both the Afghan private and government sectors, thereby raising for the Pakistanis the specter of regional envelopment by hostile powers.[7] As a result, Pakistan chose to employ the Taliban and other insurgent groups as proxies against Afghanistan as an “economy of force” effort. Without having to commit the bulk of its conventional force to dealing with Afghanistan, which would have left the Kashmiri and shared borders with India weakened, the Pakistanis instead “outsourced” the bulk of its efforts vis-à-vis Afghanistan to the Taliban. The Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch reported in 2000:

    “Of all the foreign powers involved in efforts to sustain and manipulate the ongoing fighting [in Afghanistan], Pakistan is distinguished both by the sweep of its objectives and the scale of its efforts, which include soliciting funding for the Taliban, bankrolling Taliban operations, providing diplomatic support as the Taliban's virtual emissaries abroad, arranging training for Taliban fighters, recruiting skilled and unskilled manpower to serve in Taliban armies, planning and directing offensives, providing and facilitating shipments of ammunition and fuel, and ... directly providing combat support.”


    In the course of this case study, it will become evident that the ISI has conducted and continues to wage unconventional warfare (UW)—defined by USG as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”[9] —against Afghanistan in order to achieve its own national objectives. This UW campaign, employing the Taliban and other insurgent entities, has alternately been designed to “coerce, disrupt, and overthrow” first the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and now the GIRoA.

    Beginning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the ISI has manipulated and used various insurgent factions in Afghanistan to ensure instability and pursue Pakistan’s own regional ambitions. These efforts came to a head in the post-Soviet era, when the ISI expedited the formation of the Taliban and provided equipment, training, and direction aimed to overthrow the fledgling “Islamic State of Afghanistan” created after the ouster of the Soviet puppet government of Mohammed Najibullah. The Taliban, with considerable Pakistani support, successfully conquered most of Afghanistan by 1996, claiming Kabul and driving the remaining elements of the transitional government, then called “The Northern Alliance” into the far northeastern corner of the country. Al-Qaeda (“The Base”), a terrorist group that also traced its origins to the anti-Soviet mujahedeen movement and which received safe haven under Taliban protection in Afghanistan, conducted a series of coordinated attack on the US in September of 2001. This action nearly undid all of Pakistan’s efforts when the US-led assault quickly overthrew the Taliban and forced the majority of its leadership to take refuge in their original safe havens in Pakistan. For the last eleven years, the Taliban and its associated insurgent groups have waged guerrilla warfare from these Pakistani safe havens, supported by the ISI.

    Careful analysis of the Pakistani UW campaign, using the Taliban as an indigenous proxy force, readily reveals the organizational elements and phasing outlined in USG UW doctrine. The definitive work on this subject is Training Circular 18-01 “Special Forces Unconventional Warfare”, published by Headquarters, Department of the Army. This document outlines seven distinct phases within the USG model for UW, though it goes to great lengths to point out that not all phases are necessary or must proceed in a linear fashion to ensure success in UW. Given specific conditions, successful UW can be waged without conducting all phases. The USG doctrinal phases of UW consist of:



    • Psychological Preparation –The aggressor state conducts assessments of and employs information operations (formerly psychological/propaganda operations) designed to influence the population of a target country. These steps are necessary to determine the suitability for and set the initial conditions to initiate an insurgency.
    • Initial Contact – Intelligence agents or special operations forces from the aggressor state meet with key leaders of the insurgency to begin cooperation and arrange for follow-on support from the aggressor state to the insurgents.
    • Infiltration – Agents of the aggressor state and/or indigenous insurgent forces enter, either covertly or clandestinely, into the operational area in order to begin efforts to undermine, coerce, or overthrow the established authority (either a government or occupying power).
    • Organization – Agents from the aggressor state assess the composition and capabilities of the insurgency and then advise the insurgent leadership on changes designed to maximize effectiveness of the insurgency. Organizational design is intended to achieve optimal balance between leadership (underground), support personnel (auxiliary), and fighters (guerrillas).
    • Buildup – Agents train and advise insurgents while generally avoiding contact with forces from the targeted authority (government or occupying power). This phase is designed to develop insurgent forces and increase the capabilities of the insurgency before undertaking full-scale combat operations. Some limited guerrilla operations can be conducted against lightly-defended targets (“confidence targets”) to build the morale of the guerrilla force and validate training previously given by the agents to the guerrillas.
    • Combat Utilization – Insurgent forces conduct guerrilla warfare under the advisement of aggressor state agents. The goal is to gradually increase the frequency and intensity of guerrilla attacks in order to achieve operational objectives while preventing a massive retaliation from the targeted authorities (government or occupying power). These guerrilla operations are designed to achieve insurgent objectives but can also be coordinated with objectives of the aggressor state. Guerrilla operations can facilitate the introduction of conventional forces from the aggressor state or continue without assistance to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow the government or occupying power.
    • Transition/Demobilization – Upon the achievement of the aggressor state’s national objectives, the indigenous insurgent forces can either be transformed into the new legitimate authority (in the event of an overthrow of the previous regime) or demobilized (as might be the case if the objective was simply to coerce or disrupt a targeted regime or occupying power). Members of the insurgency can transition into legitimate government, military, or law enforcement entities thereby ensuring the continuation of control within the targeted country.

    The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, normally referred to as simply the ISI, is an entirely separate entity of the Pakistani government, independent from the Pakistani military and any meaningful civilian oversight. However, the ISI does draw the bulk of its force from the military, estimated by some experts to be around 10,000 personnel.[10] Within the ISI, there exists a “Covert Action Division” (CAD), very much akin in design and purpose to the US Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) “Special Activities Division” (SAD). The CAD/ISI conducts paramilitary and other covert special operations in support of Pakistani national interests, responsibilities into which UW fits perfectly. Within both the CAD/ISI and SAD/CIA reside the expertise and authorities to execute UW campaigns using indigenous forces to pursue objectives of national importance. Previously, the CAD/ISI received training from and cooperated with the SAD/CIA, most visibly during their joint UW campaign, Operation CYCLONE, against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.[11] SAD/CIA and CAD/ISI worked together to train, equip, and direct Afghan resistance forces, known colloquially as the “mujahedeen” (“those who pursue jihad [holy war]”), to undermine and ultimately overthrow the communist, pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and expel the Soviet invaders. The CIA and ISI celebrated the latter outcome when the last Soviet forces withdrew across the so-called “Friendship Bridge” in Balkh Province, Afghanistan in February of 1989.[12] After the Soviets withdrew, the UW campaign against Afghanistan became a purely Pakistani/mujahedeen affair, as the CIA withdrew the vast majority of its support. The fall of the DRA, took a bit longer, finally succumbing to the mujahedeen in 1992. Despite past cooperation with the CIA, the years since 1989 have seen a rapid emergence of radical Islamist sympathies within the ISI, suggesting that, if ISI support of the Taliban is unsanctioned at the Pakistani parliamentary level, it is clearly tolerated within the ranks of the secretive ISI given the ethnic and ideological ties shared between its members and the Taliban.[13] Since the fall of Pakistan’s strongman dictator-turned-president, Pervez Musharraf, the civilian government’s efforts to exert increased control and oversight of the ISI, such as the abortive July 2008 attempt to legislatively place the ISI under the supervision of the interior ministry, have proved futile.[14]

    Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, the Pakistanis found themselves in a unique position to influence events in Afghanistan in a manner that would ensure continued instability. By providing safe haven for and a conduit for US/CIA aid to the Afghan resistance, the Pakistanis, specifically the ISI, were placed perfectly to control the “endgame” in Afghanistan. During the Soviet occupation, the ISI carefully managed the relationships between the major mujahedeen groups and funneled CIA aid in order to ensure Afghan disunity in perpetuity. While the Soviet’s occupied Afghanistan, the ISI held a legitimate fear that more drastic efforts, such as direct military intervention, would incite a massive Soviet retaliation against Pakistan.[15] At the same time, the ISI was engaged in Phase 1 (Psychological Preparation) of UW, an intense effort to shape Afghan perceptions and set the conditions for the post-Soviet insurgency planned to install an Afghan government amenable to Pakistani interests. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and with the CIA no longer providing or directing the disposition of aid, the ISI shifted the preponderance of military support to the hardline Islamist mujahedeen, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, in an effort to keep Afghanistan in an extended state of civil war and ensure the emergence of a mujahedeen faction leader loyal to Pakistan. Hekmatyar, as the head of Hezb-e-Islami, was a Pashtun warlord, fully committed to the pursuit of personal power. So ambitious was Hekmatyar, that he was often accused of spending "more time fighting other Mujahideen than killing Soviets".[16] For his part, Haqqani spent part of the war against the Soviets as a member of Hezb-e-Islami before breaking away to form his own network. During this period, the CIA used Haqqani’s network as an “independent asset” in Afghanistan and US congressman Charlie Wilson, made famous for his own instrumental advocacy of US support to the mujahedeen, referred to Haqqani as “goodness personified”.[17] Conversely, the chief of staff for the Pakistani army reportedly called Haqqani and his network, “a strategic asset”.[18] While Haqqani was always considered a hardline Islamic radical, he fortuitously switched his allegiance to the Taliban just before their eventual victory in 1996. Despite the rise of the Taliban in 1992, Hezb-e-Islami and the Haqqani Network have remained largely independent from the larger group, though they often cooperate on specific goals and the ISI has maintained very active relations with each group for the purposes of waging its UW campaign in Afghanistan.

    As the civil war ground on, living conditions for the average Afghan continued to deteriorate as the warlords squabbled bloodily amongst each other. Basic necessities became increasingly scarce as inflation soared. Those who could not flee to Pakistan fell deeper and deeper into squalor. Particularly in the south, amongst the civilian populace around Kandahar, there was a groundswell of demand for stability and an end to the seemingly ceaseless violence. Most importantly, the Pakistani Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (“Assembly of Islamic Clergy”), a religiously conservative political group that advocated for imposition of Sharia law in Pakistan, established schools in the Afghan refugee camps that dotted southern and western Pakistan. These schools, or madrassas, were largely funded by the ISI beginning in the early 1980s, using both Pakistani funds and those provided from private donors in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Middle Eastern states friendly to the cause of radical Islam. In these schools, radical clerics preached the virtues of jihad and the establishment of a Sharia-based Caliphate. The first seeds were sown from which the core of the Taliban would eventually spring. UW Phase 1 (Psychological Preparation) was intensified through the radicalization of Afghan refugee youth in the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam madrassas, and the Afghan general population’s desperation caused by the Pakistani-sustained civil war, ensuring that Afghanistan would be ripe for the taking in Pakistan’s larger UW campaign. By 1991, an initial cadre of Taliban, led by a charismatic radical cleric, Mullah Mohammed Omar, moved out of southern Pakistan to set up operations around Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Omar was a veteran of the mujahedeen campaign against the Soviets, having received considerable training directly from the ISI on multiple occasions during the 1980s.[19] Not even the emergence of a weak transitional government in Kabul, called the Islamic State of Afghanistan, in April of 1992 was enough to dissuade the ISI from its intentions to set loose the Taliban in Afghanistan. The psychological conditions were set for the birth of an insurgency that would, however briefly, achieve Pakistan’s regional goals.

    While the Taliban continued to percolate in southern Pakistan and Afghanistan, the ISI amplified its effort to overthrow the newly-formed Islamic State under interim-President Burhanuddin Rabbani through use of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s hardline Islamist militia, Hezb-e-Islami (“Islamic Party”), by providing massive amounts of military aid and other assistance.[20] Amin Saikal, an expert on Afghan affairs, wrote of these efforts:

    “Islamabad [Pakistan] could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders [the Afghan transitional government]... to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. Had it not been for the ISI's logistic support and supply of a large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul.”


    Hekmatyar was the clear favorite of the Pakistanis to fulfill its purposes as a puppet leader for the Afghans, but his forces proved unable to capture Kabul and were repeatedly defeated by the other warlords now serving the Islamic State, notably Ahmad Shah Massoud. Known as the “Lion of Panjshir” for his defeat of nine separate Soviet assaults into the Panjshir Valley, Massoud was a legendary figure who served as the Minister of Defense for the Islamic State before and during the Taliban/Pakistani invasion.[22] Specifically, Massoud expertly led a counterattack that broke and routed Hekmatyar’s forces besieging Kabul. Massoud, gracious in victory and desiring to end the civil war that ravaged Afghanistan, asked Hekmatyar to accept the post of minister of the interior for the Islamic State, place aside personal ambitions of total power, and bring his Hezb-e-Islami militia into the fold. Blinded by ambition, Hekmatyar vehemently refused and began rebuilding his forces in preparation for another attempt at overthrowing the Islamic State.

    Meanwhile to the dismay of Pakistan, the new Afghan government was receiving military and economic backing from both Iran and India, two of Pakistan’s greatest regional rivals.[23] Every day that the government of the Islamic State remained in power was another day with which it could solidify its hold on power. With frustration mounting, the ISI decided in 1992 to change course and withdrew much of its support of Hekmatyar redirecting it to the Taliban[24] Fearing that a unified and powerful Afghanistan would eventually seek resolution of the Pashtunistan “question” through force of arms, the ISI provided funding and training to create the first Taliban formations in late 1992 to serve as a proxy force for the destabilization and conquest of Afghanistan. Consistent with Phase 2 (Initial Contact) of the doctrinal UW model, the ISI approached Mullah Omar sometime in 1991 or early 1992 to offer its services for the achievement of the Taliban’s goals in Afghanistan. Making initial contact with the Taliban was easy for the CAD/ISI, since thousands of adherents remained in Pakistan around Quetta where they continued to receive radical Islamist instruction at the ISI-funded Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam madrassas. Mullah Omar maintained his rear headquarters in Quetta from which he regularly traveled back and forth to Kandahar and where he allegedly met with the ISI several times.[25] As the Taliban was essentially a CAD/ISI creation, it did not take long to coordinate agreements between the ISI and the Taliban to achieve the Pakistani objective of toppling the troublesome Afghan transitional government through a UW campaign using the Taliban as a proxy force. The ISI offered the Taliban the training and equipment it desperately needed to achieve its goal of establishing an Islamist Caliphate in Afghanistan, and all that the ISI asked in return were friendly relations and support of Pakistani regional objectives once the Taliban was in power. UW Phase 2 (Initial Contact) was essentially a foregone conclusion given the extremely close relationship that the ISI had with the Taliban throughout its formative years.

    Given the lawless nature of southern Afghanistan between 1992 and 1994, Taliban and CAD/ISI forces were able to freely move between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Because of this, Phase 3 (Infiltration) of the UW model was similarly easy for the ISI to accomplish. The porous border has historically been incredibly difficult to control, as numerous unmapped paths crisscross the mountainous regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. During the mujahedeen conflict against the Soviets, the ISI had used these trails to push tens of thousands of fighters across the very same routes that it would now use to infiltrate Taliban proxy forces as well as their CAD/ISI advisors. Previously, hardened DRA and Soviet troops had been unable to stem the flow of fighters coming out of Pakistan, even with full control of Kandahar and all of the major routes throughout the country. Now, in 1992, with Kandahar Province in the throes of a local power struggle between competing warlords, the resulting anarchy allowed the Taliban to come and go as they pleased. Though starting with very small numbers, the ISI would eventually direct the infiltration of massive formations of Taliban fighters directly into Kandahar Province after which they spread throughout Afghanistan.

    As the ISI had been intimately involved in the initial stages of the Taliban’s formation within the madrassas, the Taliban was easily reorganized from a simple student religious group to a functional military formation, ready to conduct guerrilla operations to undermine and ultimately supplant the Rabbanni government of the Islamic State. Phase 4 (Organization) of the doctrinal UW model, as it was executed by the Pakistani ISI, went through several revisions over the course of the UW campaign. Often, the religious leader, or mullah, of each madrassa would serve as the military commander for the students under his care, a system that lent itself well to paramilitary organization necessary for training/equipping and guerrilla operations. The ISI simply adopted and adapted this organizational structure, providing as much training as possible to overcome the lack of military experience from which many of the mullahs suffered. Of course, in some cases, such as that of Omar, these mullahs were also experienced veterans of the previous insurgency against the Soviets. As part of this phase, the ISI established routes by which it would be able to sustain the Taliban after infiltration during the UW campaign against the Islamic State government. Of particular utility were the opium smuggling routes operated by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islam faction, over which Hekmatyar had transported hundreds of thousands of tons of opium by 1992.[26] The ISI made use of these historic smuggling routes through the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border, the same ones used during the Soviet occupation to provide military aid to the mujahedeen. These paths offered ready-made resupply routes over which the Pakistanis would push massive amounts of critical supplies into Afghanistan in order to sustain the Taliban insurgency.

    Starting in 1992, the ISI began an intensive training regimen for the Taliban in Pakistani camps designed to build up and prepare them for battle against the Afghan transitional government, a clear indication of the ISI engagement in UW Phase 5 (Build-Up).
    Using recruits from the massive Afghan refugee populations amassed in Pakistan as a result of the Soviet invasion and subsequent Afghan civil war, the ISI established recruitment and training camps while continuing to cultivate leadership elements of the Taliban around the town of Quetta, which today remains the spiritual root of the Taliban. The masses of young, idealistic students in the madrassas, their heads previously filled by radical clerics with utopian visions of jihad, received practical training in the employment of deadly weapons, small unit tactics, and other necessary skills to create an effective guerrilla. In camps scattered throughout southern and western Pakistan, specifically in Quetta and the Federally Administered Tribal Area, Pakistani Army and CAD/ISI forces trained and equipped Taliban units for deployment to Kandahar. The Taliban conducted its first “confidence target” operation in the spring of 1994, in the village of Sangesar, located near Kandahar. Taliban fighters, led by Mullah Omar in a daring raid, captured a local governor whom villagers accused of kidnapping and raping two young girls. Without trial, the Mullah Omar ordered the governor hung from the barrel of a tank. [27] Mullah Omar initially had only about 50 Taliban adherents in the Kandahar area, but reinforcements would soon arrive. Each raid or ambush on Afghan government troops or other militias built up the Taliban’s confidence in and the ISIs validation of the training completed, while also attracting additional recruits to the cause. With Phase 5 (Build-Up) complete, the ISI was ready to release the Taliban wholesale into Afghanistan for the purposes of achieving Pakistan’s national objectives during Phase 6 (Combat Employment).

    When Mullah Omar ordered the Taliban to undertake large-scale offensive operations against the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in the spring of 1994, it did not take long to swell his ranks with recent Taliban graduates from the Pakistani training camps. The ISI rapidly pushed large numbers of Taliban across the border and into Kandahar to reinforce Omar, thereby indicating a distinct shift into Phase 6 (Combat Employment) of the UW campaign construct. By the summer, Mullah Omar could count at least 15,000 fighters within his ranks, making him a serious contender to the Afghan transitional government, which was still struggling to form functional ministries and fend off Hekmatyar’s offenses that were again threatening Kabul.[28] Taliban formations advanced northward toward Kandahar City from their intermediate staging bases in Maiwand District, Kandahar Province. Many victories brought additional fighters and heavy weapons into the Taliban fold as the majority of local warlords, with their much smaller militias, chose to join the Taliban rather than futilely resist them.[29] One province after another fell to the Taliban, with many of their inhabitants welcoming them as liberators and hoping for the stability promised by the Taliban’s Sharia law as an alternative to the horrific chaos of the last fifteen years. The psychological preparation that the Pakistanis had established as part of their Afghan conflict-extending measures clearly smoothed the way for their Taliban proxies to conquer large swaths of the countryside. However, there were major setbacks, and the Taliban suffered a number of significant defeats in late 1994 and early 1995. The Taliban attempt to capture Herat in southwestern Afghanistan was thwarted by government forces and the Taliban suffered extremely heavy casualties. By late September of 1995, the Taliban had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul, besieging the city and showering rockets onto military and civilian targets, alike. Once again, Massoud sallied forth leading the armed forces of the transitional government and achieved a miraculous victory over the Taliban, routing them. Ahmed Rashid, a noted Afghanistan scholar, wrote about the impact of these Taliban defeats:

    "The Taliban had now been decisively pushed back on two fronts by the government and their political and military leadership was in disarray. Their image as potential peacemakers was badly dented, for in the eyes of many Afghans they had become nothing more than just another warlord party."


    Fearing a possible failure of the mission, the ISI pulled the Taliban forces back and undertook a massive effort to reinforce and reequip them. Reinforcements came in the form of a massive new “batch” of Taliban recruits from Pakistan, nearly 25,000, as well as several units from the Pakistani Army intended to steel the resolve of the Taliban.[31] Much of the funding for the new equipment and training came from Saudi Arabia, and the commitment of Pakistani military units signaled the importance which the ISI placed on Taliban success. In 1996, the Taliban went back on the offensive. The US Defense Intelligence Agency reported in 1996 that:

    "These Frontier Corps elements [of the Pakistani Army] are utilized in command and control; training; and when necessary - combat. Elements of Pakistan's regular army force are not used because the army is predominantly Punjabi, who have different features as compared to the Pashtun and other Afghan tribes."


    The Taliban, now aided directly by Pakistani CAD/ISI and military forces, captured Herat in a surprise attack in September 1995. The siege of Kabul was renewed that same month, though Massoud continued to hold out and was even able to continue the consolidation of power under the transitional government. In addition to Taliban rockets, the Pakistanis added indiscriminate artillery bombardment and even used its ground attack aircraft to pound Kabul and its outskirts. Massoud’s effort to negotiate an inclusive government with Taliban participation was rejected outright. Regardless, Massoud held out for a year before finally withdrawing his forces from the city, still in good order, to prevent more needless death and destruction.[33] The Taliban entered Kabul on 26 September 1996, having successfully overthrown Rabbani and seized power. The capture of Kabul marked the end of Phase 6 (Combat Employment) as the ISI UW campaign entered into the last and possibly most critical phase, Phase 7 (Transition). The remnants of the transitional forces, led by Massoud, conducted a fighting withdrawal to the north after rebranding themselves the “United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan”. This group was factional, at best, with ethnic groups operating under their own commanders but owing some grudging allegiance to Massoud. Massoud’s forces, more commonly known to the West as the “Northern Alliance”, managed to hold onto a small number of Northern provinces despite the best efforts of the Taliban and Pakistanis to crush them. India and Iran provided massive amounts of aid to the Northern Alliance in order to resist the Taliban and their Pakistani masters, estimated at approximately $70 million (and at least five Mi-17 helicopters) between 1996 and 2001.[34] Conservative estimates place the total number of Pakistani military troops who served in Afghanistan between 1994 and 1999, fighting alongside the Taliban at between 80,000 and 100,000.[35] Human Rights Watch reported, "Pakistani aircraft assisted with troop rotations of Taliban forces during combat operations in late 2000 and... senior members of Pakistan's intelligence agency and army were involved in planning military operations.”[36] Clearly, Afghanistan, as a whole, served as an extended proxy battlefield between the major regional powers, much to the detriment of the average Afghan civilian and regional stability.

    The Taliban and Pakistanis moved swiftly to consolidate the transition of power during Phase 7 (Transition) at the successful conclusion of the UW campaign. Pakistan, followed only by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, quickly recognized the Taliban movement, their own creation and UW proxy force, as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.[37] Ultimately, the Taliban would extend its influence deep into the lives of nearly every Afghan, banning smoking, dancing, music, alcohol, and a whole litany of other “vices”. Women and girls were banned from working or attending school, and required to wear the traditional “burqa” full-body dress.[38] To enforce these rules, the Taliban established “religious police” who employed draconian measures to punish perceived offenses. Sharia law replaced the existing justice system and Afghanistan witnessed a complete reversal of the democratic processes started under President Rabbanni.

    Once in power, the Taliban executed a number of moves intended to solidify their power and support Pakistan’s regional interests. For instance, in 1998, an Iranian consulate in a Northern Alliance area was seized by the Taliban and the Iranian diplomats murdered. Though the Taliban claimed the murders were the work of “rogue elements”.[39] Iran alleges to this day that it collected radio intercepts during the attack proving that Mullah Omar personally approved the execution of its diplomats.[40] Regardless, the attack weakened Iran’s influence and ability to aid the Northern Alliance, benefitting both the Taliban and Pakistan’s efforts in Afghanistan. Despite such “gains”, the Taliban’s success in Afghanistan was ultimately undone because of its relationship with a small but deadly terrorist faction, al-Qaeda. The founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin-Laden, had been a low-level financier and facilitator for a small group of Arab mujahedeen during the 1980s. During that time he formed important and lasting relationships, in particular with the head of the Pakistani ISI, Hamid Gul.[41] After the Soviet withdrawal, bin-Laden had returned to Saudi Arabia, only to be infuriated by the US presence in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War against Iraq. Al-Qaeda evolved slowly, but its headquarters moved repeatedly during the 1990s, being expelled from Sudan before finally finding a home in Afghanistan under the Taliban.[42] Assassins from al-Qaeda, posing as a media crew, detonated explosives hidden in a camera during an interview and killed Massoud at his Northern Alliance headquarters just two days before al-Qaeda’s brazen series of coordinated attacks on the US on 11 September 2011.[43] In response, the US demanded that the Taliban surrender bin-Laden and the leadership of al-Qaeda. The Taliban refused, instead offering to hand al-Qaeda over to a “neutral” third party, such as Pakistan, for trial and eventual punishment. Unsatisfied, the US led an invasion, itself a UW campaign, spearheaded by special operations forces and paramilitary operatives from the CIA who, together with the Northern Alliance, succeeded in toppling the Taliban by November.

    Pakistan claims that it severed all ties of support with the Taliban after the September 2001 attacks, though that has not prevented the Taliban from reoccupying the safe havens in Western Pakistan from which it originally sprang in 1992. Taliban and al-Qaeda forces fleeing Afghanistan in November of 2001 allegedly received assistance from ISI, and some were even evacuated on Pakistani Air Force cargo aircraft out of Kunduz to refuge in Pakistan.[44] In 2006, the chief of staff for UK forces in southern Afghanistan, Colonel Chris Vernon, stated, "The thinking piece of the Taliban is out of Quetta in Pakistan. It's the major headquarters."[45] This headquarters, known as the “Quetta Shura”, is located in southern Pakistan while sizeable formations of Taliban train and launch operations into Afghanistan from Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan. Islamabad granted Waziristan virtual autonomy and has exercised very limited control in the FATA since 2006, allowing the Taliban near-immunity to impose Sharia law and regroup for their continuing operations to undermine the legitimate government of Afghanistan.[46]

    The Taliban, allegedly acting on intelligence and with support provided by the ISI, have repeatedly attacked Indian targets in Afghanistan.[47] The Indian Embassy in Kabul was attacked by suicide bombers in July 2008, killing 58 and wounding 141, and again in October 2009, this time killing 40 and injuring more than 100. In both cases, the Afghans, Indians, and US either insinuated or outright accused the ISI of being behind the attacks, though the Taliban claimed responsibility. The US president, George W. Bush, presented evidence of ISI involvement in the 2008 attack to the Pakistani Prime Minister and threatened “serious action”.[48] The Indian national security advisor was much more direct, stating, "We have no doubt that the ISI is behind this [referring to the 2008 suicide bombing]."[49] Rather than refrain from attacking diplomatic targets, the ISI allegedly employed the Taliban to attack the US embassy in Kabul in September of 2011, killing at least seven people and wounding another 19.[50] In response, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullins, stated before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that:

    The fact remains that the Quetta Shura [Taliban] and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. [They are] Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan [that] are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as US soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network, which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.


    Most recently, the Taliban launched a massive assault on the Indian consulate in Jalalabad, Afghanistan on 3 August 2013.
    The attack resulted in several deaths and injuries, though the majority occurred at nearby mosque damaged by a suicide truck bomb.[52] Attacks of this nature are well within the modus operandi of the ISI, as demonstrated by the alleged involvement of the ISI in directing and supporting members of the Pakistani hardline Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (“Army of the Righteous”) during the bloody coordinated attacks in Mumbai, India, in November of 2008. Lashkar-e-Taiba conducts operations from bases in the Pakistani-Kashmir region and has sought since 1990 to achieve the “liberation” of Muslims in Indian-Kashmir by way of violence. While Pakistan officially declared Lashkar-e-Taiba a terrorist organization, a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 2011 found significant evidence that the ISI employs the group to conduct terrorist attacks in Kashmir and India as part of a larger UW campaign to weaken India’s hold on the contested area.[53] In the 2008 Mumbai attack, Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists conducted numerous small-arms and bomb attacks against a number of popular Mumbai hotels and shopping centers, killed 166 people and injured at least 308. One of the terrorists was captured alive by Indian security forces and later admitted to receiving direction and support from the ISI.[54] Repeatedly, the ISI employs proxy forces to conduct long-term, low-cost UW against Pakistan’s regional rivals because this strategy presents an irresistible “win-win” outcome. At worst, the Pakistanis can support an indefinite UW campaign that keeps its neighbors destabilized, which in the case of Afghanistan renders it unable to pursue its intentions with regard to Pashtunistan or closer Indian relations. At best, with ISI support the Taliban might regain control in Kabul and be repositioned as a puppet government malleable to Pakistani interests. This outcome would provide Pakistan considerable “strategic depth” on its Western flank, allowing them to focus all of their attention on India without fear of “Pashtunistan”.

    The Taliban conquest of Afghanistan provides a fascinating and complete doctrinal example of modern unconventional warfare. The Pakistanis employed a predominantly indigenous force, the Taliban, to overthrow the legitimate transitional government and install a pro-Pakistani regime. Armed with Pakistani weapons, trained by Pakistani advisers, sympathetic to Pakistani interests, and eventually with Pakistani soldiers fighting directly alongside them, the Taliban conquered Afghanistan.[55] Today, with more than thirty years of investment in the destabilization of Afghanistan, it is improbable that Pakistan will abandon these efforts and risk the emergence of a strong, independent Afghan government pursuing reunification with the Pashtun tribes of Western Pakistan. Pakistan’s efforts to undermine Afghanistan and prevent any pursuit of a “Greater Pashtunistan” state by means of a UW campaign is consistent with their world view, in which they are beset on all sides by neighbors laying claim to significant chunks of Pakistan’s sovereign territory. Once Pakistani interests are understood, their continued support to the Taliban becomes understandable, if not acceptable to the international pursuit of regional stability.

    Source:Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan | Small Wars Journal
     
    Last edited: Nov 2, 2014

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