The first 7 hours of cold start

[JayATL]

An awesome post I picked from another poster in another forum

THE FIRST 7 HOURS

Let's assume following situation of cold start doctrine...
Time line January 2016

the build up:

There is a massive terror attack on Indian soil by non state actors originating from pakistan. there is troop buildup similar to 26/11 and then in couple of months everything calms down in the media.

Cold start

Day 1:

22.30 - Brahmos / Nirbhay Missile strikes on forward radar installations, and forward aribases in eastern sector of pakistan.

22.45 hrs:

12 strike packages , each strike package consisting of 4 M2k , 2 MKI flying Air Interdicition config, 3 Mig29SMT and 4 Rafale's flying Air superiority hit target the following targets

1. PAF Mianwali
2. PAF Sargodha
3. Paf jacobabad
4. PAf mushaf
5. 6th Armoured Division headquartered at Gujranwala
6. 1st Armoured Division headquartered at Multan
7. 12th Infantry Division headquartered at Murree
8. 26th Mechanised Division headquartered at Bahawalpur
9. 22nd Division headquartered at Sargodha

(render them temporarily non operational) (assume 80% objectives achieved according to plan )

4 IAF strike packages same configuration as above strike Pakistan navy preceded with missile attacks from forward deployed INS Delhi, INS Trishul and INS trikand.

4 Naval strike packages attack PN assets in sea in hunter killer formation, composed of 6 Mig 29 each

Indian navy begins forward deployment for its CBG

23.30 hrs:


First wave begins.

IBG combination (assume) Fast attack Light IBG
25 t90, 10 Arjun MBT, 15 IFV, 12 Support vehicle, 3 LCH/ALH/MI 35 forward control, 6 Pinaka batteries. 2 mig 29 cover for each light IBG. 1 battalion of infantry

18 light IBG squads break loc at rajasthan and punjab and gujrat sectors,


00.00 hrs Heavy Air interdiction mission
strike package combination : 4 jaguar 4 M2k bomber missions, 4 Su30 Multirole configuration, 3 Mig 29's flying air superiority mission.
16 strike packages clear ground resistance for light IBG's

00.30 heavy shelling across all available assets

01.15 hrs

Heavy IBG Configuration
35 T90/T72, 15 ArjunMBT, 30 IFV, 4 batteries of SA8, 8 tunguska, 3 LCH/ALH/Mi 35 Forward air control configuration, 10 Pinaka mlrs, (4 Mig 27 close air support and 4 Su 30 MKI dedicated air support for group of 4 heavy IBGS)

16 Heavy IBG's and another 8 light IBG's break LOC in punjab and rajhastan and gujrat sector, Heavy IBG's aim for control of forward PA targets, Light IBG's reinforce the first wave,

01.45 Hrs. Fire missions for Artillery and cruise missiles directed by forward IbG's at resistance.

02.00 First wave IBG"s hold ground with air cover.

02.30 hrs :

Second Strike mission begins after damage estimation of first IAF strike.
20 strike packages (strike package consisting of 4 M2k , 2 MKI flying Air Interdicition config, 3 Mig29SMT and 2 MKI flying Air superiority) forward air installation and armored divisions targeted.

03.10[/U] 8 Light IBG from second wave trailing first wave by 2 hrs reinforce 8 light IBG's in Punjab sector. In rajhasthan sector and gujrat sectors 8 IBGS of first wave join into 4 IBGS .

04.00 hrs

12 dual Light IBG's and 16 Heavy IBG's are in pakistani territory engaged with PA in 3 sectors at 28 different locations. 14 locations face very stiff resistance, 6 locations see lighter resistance and IA IBG's break through at 8 locations.

4.30

2 Armored divisions break through into pakitan in 8 groups, and 411 (Independent) Parachute Field Company (Bombay Sappers), 622 Parachute Composite Company ASC are air dropped into forward engagement areas.


5.00

3 Infantry divisions and 2 mountain division mount attack on kashmir sector.

5.30

Air interdiction Missions, Strike package, 4 mig 27 & 4 jaguar strike configuration, 2 rafale flying air superiority, 8 mig 21 air patrol.

6.00
Air Interdiction mission, Strike package, 3 m2k, 5 MKI strike configuration 6 rafale air superiority configuration, 3 Mig 29 SMT air patrol, 2 MKI dedicated electronic warfare configuration.



Assume such are the initial 7 hrs of cold start? what comes next?Original Post By sandy_3126

 

[pankaj nema]

Mate these scenarios are all lifted from Bharat rakshak

BR is the bible for all jingoes

 

[JayATL]

Mate these scenarios are all lifted from Bharat rakshak

BR is the bible for all jingoes

well - is it a well thought out plan?

 

[pmaitra]

Perhaps we could consider how Pakistan would react, how our plans can get thwarted and what contingency plans we have in place.

I like this thread BTW, whether lifted from BR or wherever.

 

[sayareakd]

@JAYATL they forget to add part where Prithvi missiles fired with runway denial bomb, just as the first wave of fighter taken to sky and attack on oil storage facilities next to airports.

 

[utubekhiladi]

Day 1:

22.30 - Brahmos / Nirbhay Missile strikes on forward radar installations, and forward aribases in eastern sector of pakistan.

this plan is total failure..:bs: this kind of plans do look good on papers but practically impossible to execute. now Imagine that after our initial missile strike, Pakistan decided to return the favor by launching their missiles. ??? our forward bases will have no-where to hide.

this plan is only possible when/if we have solid missile defense and our enemies don't.

the funny thing is, the master brain behind failed plan forgot that there is a thing called 'AWECS' on both side and both sides will use it.

 

[sayareakd]

UK where do you expect their AWAC to fly if its range is 400km. ???

 

[utubekhiladi]

UK where do you expect their AWAC to fly if its range is 400km. ???

don't let those range numbers betray you saya,

I am not saying that awecs are game changers but what i am trying to say is, this plan is total failure

 

[sayareakd]

UK if you do it properly it will not but as you said expect counter from their side therefore to have max effect you should have element of surprise and network centric operation is must where all the three services are working as one unit. If we attack at right time and prepare for counter from enemy, yeah they can be defeated, Still cold start has one point (liab) which says only to point where Pak dont use nukes. Therefore dont expect too much out of cold start if enemy knows where to stop and how to stop us.

 

[utubekhiladi]

....prepare for counter from enemy...

right, thats why i said, we need to have strong missile shield. their missiles are the only thing that can harm us.

 

[Galaxy]

right, thats why i said, we need to have strong missile shield. their missiles are the only thing that can harm us.

By 2016,

We will have AAD/PDV (500-1500 km) as ABM.

Also, many SAM's like S-300, Barak-8, SpyDer, Akash MK1,2, Maitri will be deployed - These can destroy Aircraft, UAV, Cruise Missiles. S-300 can kill BM too.

Also, Novator K-100 equipped with MKI will be operational soon which is "AWACS KILLER". Add, MKI with Brahmos.

Also, By 2016 - We will be operating quite large no. of Shaurya, Prahar and Brahmos - These 3 will be unstoppable :thumb:

Concern : Nasr But Advantage is most of our important bases and important assets are more than 100 Km away from border. Still, BM is concern overall inspite of ABM.

 

[WongHoongHooi]

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A PURE "AIR" & A MIXED AIR+GROUND OPTION ?

I'm not Indian but I've long read about the arguments of some quarters that India should strike back conventionally in response to another - say - Mumbai.

"What does it seek to achieve ?" is a question that will likely draw the answer of "To teach the other side a lesson". But what would your readers say is the difference (in terms of objectives) between a pure (limited) air strike response and an option that includes ground operations ?.

 

[JBH22]

Plan looks good but the author failed to notice some points:
1-cold start requires mechanised infantry our troops still ride into battle with what outdated BMP-2 or in trucks.
2-what about Self Propelled artillery that's supposed to move with tanks and punch enemy strong points.
3-where are the helicopter numbers to airlift brigade size troops??
4-What about air support are we still going to send these poor pilots in the Mig-27
5-Sending jawans without decent gear to death and bring sorrows to their families who'll come later mourn their dead sons on TV
6- Nirbhay missile is not operational and brahmos still in induction.


We are bitting more than we can chew our capabilities are not there........................

 

[pmaitra]

5-Sending jawans without decent gear to death and bring sorrows to their families who'll come later mourn their dead sons on TV

I agree with the rest, but this one was plain and simple emotional and pessimistic. Why do you think the soldiers will die? Some will, but aren't soldiers meant to fight wars? Indian Army is voluntary, so what is the problem? Also, is it only the soldiers dying? So many civilians get killed. Are the civilians not giving their lives too? If you don't send one soldier to fight, then can you guarantee that that soldier's friends and families will not be blown up by a bomb planted by terrorists?

What if there is another Mumbai style attack? Are we going to wait or are we going to strike back? Opinions may vary, but I would strike back, soon enough. Yes, we may not have the proper equipment, but our present equipment is not so bad either. Indian Army has never been a rag tag army.

One Russian woman once told me that Putin should not be sending the Russian men to fight in Chechnya because so many of them are getting killed. I told her that if you don't send them to fight in Chechnya, those terrorists will come to your city and kill you. Better send them. Even if they die, at least they will manage to kill some enemies in the process.

 

[JBH22]

I agree with the rest, but this one was plain and simple emotional and pessimistic. Why do you think the soldiers will die? Some will, but aren't soldiers meant to fight wars? Indian Army is voluntary, so what is the problem? Also, is it only the soldiers dying? So many civilians get killed. Are the civilians not giving their lives too? If you don't send one soldier to fight, then can you guarantee that that soldier's friends and families will not be blown up by a bomb planted by terrorists?

What if there is another Mumbai style attack? Are we going to wait or are we going to strike back? Opinions may vary, but I would strike back, soon enough. Yes, we may not have the proper equipment, but our present equipment is not so bad either. Indian Army has never been a rag tag army.

One Russian woman once told me that Putin should not be sending the Russian men to fight in Chechnya because so many of them are getting killed. I told her that if you don't send them to fight in Chechnya, those terrorists will come to your city and kill you. Better send them. Even if they die, at least they will manage to kill some enemies in the process.

Point was that sending them with better gear gives them an edge rather than sending them to fight with third rated gear so that afterwards their family come and mourn on TV.

 

[sandeepdg]

By 2016,

We will have AAD/PDV (500-1500 km) as ABM.

Also, many SAM's like S-300, Barak-8, SpyDer, Akash MK1,2, Maitri will be deployed - These can destroy Aircraft, UAV, Cruise Missiles. S-300 can kill BM too.

Also, Novator K-100 equipped with MKI will be operational soon which is "AWACS KILLER". Add, MKI with Brahmos.

Also, By 2016 - We will be operating quite large no. of Shaurya, Prahar and Brahmos - These 3 will be unstoppable :thumb:

Concern : Nasr But Advantage is most of our important bases and important assets are more than 100 Km away from border. Still, BM is concern overall inspite of ABM.

Trouble with Cold Start is that the moment Pakistan realizes that an Indian attack is underway, they will launch a barrage of ballistic missiles. AAD may be active but the first such cover will go to the main cities like Mumbai and Delhi. Other than S-300 nothing can hit a BM. So the only way to deny Pakistan any advantage is suppress their BM forces in eastern Pakistan firstly, and then the others.

Nasr is a battlefield range BM, not for firing against bases in India. Its sole use is cut down an India armored assault within Pakistan itself. We have the Prahaar for the same pupose, which will probably replace the 300 mm Smerch in the future. But then again we may save bases back home using our ABM shields, but we won't be able to save the armored brigades that are already inside Pakistan from Nasr strikes. We can also make multiple Prahaar strikes but then again the losses on our side will also be heavy.

 

[Agustya]

The first priority is to take out their delivery systems (missiles, jets, etc) , N-weapons and deny runway access. India knows where up to 70% of the warheads are located. Strike that first. That can be achieved with cruise missiles. Prevent the N-strike from their side. Thats the whole point of the cold start right? 7 hours is too much of a window. It won't take more than 1/2 hour for them to respond. Prevent that response. Overwhelm them to the point where they will lose the will to fight within the first 1/2 hour.

 

[shuvo@y2k10]

special forces raid to secure loose nukes in pakistan followed by multiple bombing raids on the hardened and secure nukes before the first tank column of the army moving into pakistan.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

MIT CIS: precis Spring 2012

The air balance between India and Pakistan is also thought to heavily favor the larger and more technologically sophisticated Indian Air Force. While India has a qualitative and quantitative advantage, the air capabilities gap narrowed rather than widened in the last decade. The Pakistan Air Force has undergone substantial modernization since 2001, when Pakistan exited from a decade of US-imposed sanctions. With purchases from US, European, and Chinese vendors, Pakistan has both dramatically increased the number of modern fighter aircraft with beyond-visual-range capability as well as new airborne early warning and control aircraft. Meanwhile, India's fighter modernization effort has been languid over the last decade. India's largest fighter procurement effort—the purchase of 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft—began in 2001 and has been slowed considerably by cumbersome defense procurement rules designed to avoid the appearance of corruption. While over the course of a prolonged conflict, there is little doubt that the Indian Air Force would win an air superiority battle, that battle would be hard fought and take time. The longer the fight for air supremacy, the longer it is before the Indian Air Force can focus on supporting ground forces in the event of substantial army-to-army clashes. More limited air strikes against "terrorist training camps" might be attractive to decision-makers in Delhi, but they are poor targets as the camps are likely to be empty following any large-scale terrorist attack on India. Further, such air strikes create the risk of tit-for-tat dynamics where Pakistan feels compelled to give back in kind to demonstrate an ability to protect its territory from India. If the Pakistan Air Force perceives that it cannot successfully use airpower in a reprisal raid following an Indian air strike, Pakistan may use conventionally armed cruise and ballistic missiles. India's air and missile defenses would not be able to stop a missile attack and might not be able to prevent a Pakistani air strike—thus, breaking an escalatory spiral of dueling air or missile strikes would prove daunting.


The ground forces balance has received the most attention from outside observers, in large part because the Indian Army has publicized its efforts at doctrinal innovation, most often referred to under the "Cold Start" moniker. However, India's ground superiority is unlikely to be sufficient to achieve a quick victory. After the December 13, 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian Army was embarrassed by political criticisms that the mobilization to the Indo-Pakistani border took too long to complete. The army worked to speed up mobilization timelines and allow for Indian Army actions against Pakistan prior to a cumbersome full-scale mobilization. The principal difficulty with limited ground options is that they prevent India from taking advantage of its main advantage: its larger ground forces. Simply put, if India chooses to employ only a portion of its army, Pakistan would choose to employ a larger portion of its own forces to stop the attack and perhaps open up other fronts on terrain favorable to Pakistan. Relatedly, because Pakistan's population centers are close the border, it is easier for the Pakistan Army to maintain most of its land forces near the border than it is for India to do likewise. The net result of both factors is that India may have difficulty mobilizing more quickly than Pakistan. Therefore, even a limited ground attack could quickly escalate to being a full-scale clash between armies, with all the incumbent risks.


The net result of this analysis is to conclude that India's limited military options against Pakistan are risky and uncertain. Pakistan has options to respond to limited Indian moves, making counter-escalation likely. At least in the near-term, Pakistan appears to have configured its forces in such a way as to deny India "victory on the cheap." Therefore, India might well have to fight a full-scale war that could destroy large segments of Pakistan's army to achieve its political aims, which would approach Pakistan's stated nuclear redlines. Such a conclusion should induce caution among Indian political elites who are considering military options to punish or coerce Pakistan in a future crisis. In the event of a future terrorist attack in India blamed on Pakistan, Indian leaders are likely to have few good options and outside observers should remain intensely concerned of the dangers of escalation between these two nuclear-armed states.

 

[W.G.Ewald]

Bill the Butcher: Armageddon: the India-Pakistan War of 2019

India-Pakistan Nuclear War Would Kill 2 Billion People, End Civilization: Report

Why India can’t go to war with Pakistan | Firstpost