Kargil was a total failure. ABV wanted to win Nobel Peace prize and he almost pulled this off over the dead bodies of more than 500 Indian soldiers. I will choose real victory over "moral victory" on any given day.
BTW, brace for the "Kadi Neenda" from our brave RW government, coming through.
Perhaps you should re-visit Kargil Ops. If ABV were after nobel prize (I do not say it was not his motivation but to blame him for the deaths of 547 of our brave jawaan and soldiers is incredulous and callous to say the least), we
1. Would not have involved the airforce from the word go. It was.
2. Would Not have deployed our nuke-tipped missiles, ready to launch at a minutes notice. But we did.
3. Paras and SFs WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN given a free hand for cross LoC ops. But they were. There were several successful and not so successful ops. All this is well documented by Gaurav Sawant and even Praveen "My garnny crossed the LoC" Swamy.
The armed forces were woefully under prepared after years of "soft" defense budgets under PVN/MMS combine followed by Gowda/Gujral. Our intelligence capabilities had been famously sacrificed by Gujral only a year earlier. We had no idea about TSP plans, their nuke arsenal and deployment. It's only much much later that we came to know that they were
nook nood.
Kargil WAS a real victory. Bakis can never ever use that route again and they curse their jarnails for it day and night.
Getting back to these ops..some tough questions need to be asked.
1. Gen Hasnain claims that there were specific intelligence inputs. Why did the piglets still manage to enter the area? Did they use the same ingress routes as the last attack on Uri? If yes, then how and why was this allowed?
2. What were the cause of such high casualties? It seems that most were due to burning tents. After the previous incident in Uri where we lost most of our jawans not to terrorists but to fire in their bunkers started by kerosene lamps, why were we not prepared to avoid such incidents wherever they could happen?
3. What was the role of QRT in this incident? If we follow the timeline carefully, the piglets entered around 5:15 A.M. and were neutralised not very long after. This implies that much of our casualties happened during the critical period between detection and engagement. Just like the previous attacks in Uri and Pathankot. What lessons were learned then and what have we learned now?
4. What casualties did we suffer that could have been prevented but for the lack of better equipment? Who is responsible for this clusterf**k? Identify and punish the politicos, MoD babus and army personnel responsible.
5. What options do we have for retaliation?
