Discussion in 'Pakistan' started by nrupatunga, Feb 17, 2014.
Pakistan Taliban Has 500 Feamle Suicide Bombers, Cleric Says
These two points concerned me in this article.
A slightly dated article on TTP
How the Pakistani Taliban Became a Deadly Force
Pakistan: Why war with the Taliban is now the only option
Fazlullah removes Sajna as TTP chief of South Waziristan
But with yesterday's airstrike, talks are not on table for atleast some time now.
DFI Thread - Major Faction Splits From Pakistani Taliban
Pakistan Taliban Fractures Over 'Un-Islamic' Kidnapping and Killing
TTPâ€™s suicide hit kills 5 people including two colonels
Pak Taliban splits over leadersâ€™ â€˜narrow objectivesâ€™
Pakistan's bewildering array of militants
In essence Pokingsatan has all the flavours of terrorists..
PESHAWAR, Pakistanâ€”Six leading figures of the Pakistani Taliban pledged allegiance to the terror group ISIS, one of them claimed in an audio message released Tuesday. Shahidullah Shahidm announced the leaders' loyalty to ISIS, which declared the creation of an Islamic State.
Six Pakistan Taliban Leaders Swear Allegiance to ISIS: Spokesman - NBC News
Just wait&watch IS will enter Pork!stan then we will see real CIVIL WAR (oops Shia GENOCIDE) and shia's are 20% and they already armed.If u watch paki news for every 2 shia's',shiite retaliate 1 sunni.So time
Pak army is fighting a successful war against Taliban in Tribal areas of Pakistan.
Islamic State Defections Fracture Pakistan Taliban
In an audio statement released last week, the former Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman Shahidullah Shahid announced that he and five other commanders from the terror group have given the bayâ€™ah (oath of allegiance) to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-styled â€œcaliphâ€ of the group that describes itself as the Islamic State (IS), and is also known as ISIS and ISIL. This is the first public defection of commanders from the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups to IS.
Their defection portends further divisions within Pakistanâ€™s jihadist community, which has rapidly splintered since the killing of the TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud last fall in a U.S. drone strike. These divisions could result in heightened violence between anti-state jihadist groups in Pakistan. But Pakistan is also likely to see a rise in both sectarian and overall violence. Down the road, there is a risk that Pakistanâ€™s disparate jihadist groups could consolidate into a united front, even if the probability of such a scenario is low at present.
None of the TTP commanders who have defected to IS are major figures. They do not command sizable forces. But their standing within the region could be enhanced as a result of their association with IS. Some Pakistani observers claim that the IS brand is increasingly popular with younger, rank-and-file jihadists. Indeed, the al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban brands are two decades old. Shahid and his allies could see a surge in their ranks as a result of their association with IS.
While Shahid has given the oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi, itâ€™s unclear whether he has been accepted as a member of IS. In his audio statement, Shahid said that he had given the oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi on three previous occasions via a number of emissaries, but still awaits a response. Evidently, al-Baghdadi has yet to respond affirmatively to Shahidâ€™s overtures, though the reasons for his silence are unclear. It may be that IS has yet to develop an actual strategy for South Asia, though another South Asian jihadist group, Ansar al-Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind defected from the al-Qaeda orbit into the IS world, but it is India and Afghanistan-centric.
Meanwhile, the core leadership of the two major Pakistani Taliban factions, the TTP and its Jamaatul Ahrar splinter group (TTP-JA) are currently hedging between supporting al-Qaeda and IS â€“ the two major transnational jihadist fronts. Both groups have issued statements calling on al-Qaedaâ€™s affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, and IS to reconcile. They will likely continue to issue statements of support for IS that fall short of making an oath of allegiance to the group.
Both regional and sectarian dynamics tie the TTP and TTP-JA to the Afghan Taliban. The Afghan Taliban, TTP, TTP-JA, and most other Pakistani jihadist groups come from the Sunni subsect known as the Deobandis. And a common attribute of Deobandi militant groups is their nominal allegiance to Mullah Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, who holds the title of amir-ul-mumineen (commander of the faithful). Mullah Omar has a quasi-caliph status, and were the TTP and TTP-JA to declare allegiance to al-Baghdadi, this would likely nullify their allegiance to Mullah Omar.
IS is ascendant in the Middle East and al-Qaeda has been weakened in South Asia. But the Afghan Taliban finds itself in a favorable position as the United States completes the withdrawal of its combat forces this year. It has a decent chance of seizing significant portions of southern and eastern Afghanistan from the Kabul government in the coming years. And so the TTP and TTP-JA cannot afford a hostile relationship with the Afghan Taliban, which could very well be in control of their backyard.
Major commanders associated with the TTP and the TTP-JA are certainly discomfited by the defection of mid-level commanders to IS, which poses a potential threat to their hold over their respective fiefdoms inside Pakistan. They will have to take active measures to contain these new competitors. This containment strategy could involve direct violence against pro-IS commanders, as well as seeking to outdo them in attacks against the Pakistani state and religious minorities. The prime leadership of the TTP and TTP-JA has avoided public criticism of IS. Similarly, they may be reluctant to attack outfits that have moved into ISâ€™s orbit. While this is a battle they may hope not to fight, it may also be one they cannot avoid.
The six TTP commanders who have moved into ISâ€™s orbit come from the central region of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. This region, in particular the Kurram Agency, was hit by a full-scale sectarian war from 2007-11. While violence there has been reduced significantly, the major militant commanders in this region remain at-large. Undoubtedly, they will work to prevent encroachment by IS-aligned forces in their areas. At the same time, though, given ISâ€™s extreme anti-Shia focus, both the TTP and IS-aligned militants could once again renew sectarian violence in central-FATA and KP.
While the threat of Sunni-Shia sectarian violence elevates, so too does the potential for intra-Sunni sectarian tensions. Curiously, Shahidâ€™s audio statement suggested that he is now styling himself as a Salafi, the puritanical sect to which al-Baghdadi belongs. Shahidâ€™s statement was released by a media outlet called al-Muwahideen (The Monotheists), a terminology that is particularly indicative of a Salafi bent, given its fervent opposition to all sorts of shirk (polytheism or association of partners with God).
While al-Qaeda is also a Salafi jihadist group, it has had an alliance of convenience with militant organizations from the Deobandi subsect. Indeed, the amir of its new South Asia affiliate is a Deobandi cleric. And Shahidâ€™s apparent transition to Salafism may indicate that a sectarian conversion is perhaps a prerequisite for Pakistani jihadist groups to associate themselves with IS. The Deobandis as well as the many Deobandi militant clerics and seminaries will not find this congenial.
The Salafi factor raises the issue of Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT), which perpetrated the 2008 Mumbai attacks. LeT comes from the Ahl-e Hadis sect, which is effectively the South Asian equivalent of the Salafis. And so while the LeT prime organization is likely to remain aligned with the Pakistani security apparatus, there is potential for low-to-mid-level fighters from LeT to defect and join IS, moving from one Salafi jihadist group to another, seeing IS as a more authentic jihadist force â€“ one that is not â€œpollutedâ€ by a partnership with a â€œsecularâ€ state like Pakistan.
Jihadist groups in South Asia are in the midst of a major transitional phase that is taking place against a backdrop of a global jihad that itself is in a state of flux. Old alliances and relationships will be tested. Still, senior commanders with the TTP and TTP-JA are likely to publicly maintain a polite disposition toward IS while affirming their loyalty to the Afghan Taliban. Maulvi Fazlullah, the amir of the weakened TTP, issued an audio statement this weekend in which he renewed his allegiance to Mullah Omar. The TTP-JA is more likely than the TTP to ally with IS, but its spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan will probably continue to tease the media and other observers with statements that adulate IS but baulk at formally associating with the group. For the TTP-JA, its primary goal is to supplant the TTP as the major umbrella organization for anti-state jihadists in Pakistan. And so it will seek to maintain good ties with all regional and transnational jihadist outfits as long as possible. But if the impact of this small group of IS defectors is a wave rather than a ripple, then the TTP-JA, in particular, may have to abandon its diplomatic balancing act and choose a side.
Arif Rafiq (@arifcrafiq) is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute and president of Vizier Consulting, LLC, which provides strategic guidance on Middle East and South Asian political and security issues.
Islamic State Defections Fracture Pakistan Taliban | The Diplomat
Was about to post on this topic here on this thread. But then noticed that there's already a thread.
Taliban attack Army School in Peshawar - DFI Thread
. Who are the Pakistani Taliban?
A. The Pakistani Taliban, formally known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, is a loose and increasingly divided umbrella organization that once represented roughly 30 groups of militants. The group was officially founded in 2007 by a prominent jihadi commander, Baitullah Mehsud, and for years it and allied groups like Al Qaeda have been based in the Pashtun tribal areas in northwestern Pakistan, particularly in North and South Waziristan.
Many Pakistani Taliban commanders fought in Afghanistan as part of the movement that swept to power in Kabul. When American forces ousted that movement in 2001, many of its leaders fled across the border into Pakistan. The Pakistanis among them played host to their Afghan counterparts â€” as well as hundreds of fighters from Al Qaeda â€” providing them with shelter, logistical support and recruits.
One of the 132 students who were killed at a school in Peshawar as nine gunmen wreaked havoc with grenades and suicide vests.
A 2008 photo showed Hakimullah Mehsud, center, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, who was said to have been killed.
Under pressure by the United States, the Pakistani Army made tentative efforts to dismantle those sanctuaries in 2003 and 2004, but it was too late. The tribal militiamen, enriched and radicalized by their Qaeda guests, chafed under the armyâ€™s attempts to impose control.
Baitullah Mehsud, right, in 2004 in South Waziristan. Credit A. Majeed/A.F.P. â€” Getty Images
They sometimes cooperated in cease-fire agreements with the Pakistani military, only to renege months later. Under Mr. Mehsud, the Taliban started to attack the Pakistani security forces and government, even within the countryâ€™s major cities. Soon, they openly declared their goal of imposing their will across pakistan.
The United States designated the Pakistani Taliban a terrorist organization in September 2010.
Q. What relationship do the Pakistani Taliban have to the Afghan Taliban?
A. The group owes allegiance to the Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, and cooperates closely with the Afghan movement in its insurgency in Afghanistan, providing men, logistics and rear bases for the Afghan Taliban. It has trained and dispatched hundreds of suicide bombers from Pakistanâ€™s tribal areas.
A truck bomb explosion left the the six-story Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in flames in September 2008. Credit Farooq Naeem/Agence France-Presse â€” Getty Images
The movement shares a close relationship with the Haqqani Network, the most hard-core affiliate of the Afghan Taliban, which has been behind repeated suicide attacks in and around Kabul and eastern Afghanistan. The groups also cooperate and provide haven for Qaeda operatives, including Al Qaedaâ€™s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The wide extent of militant cooperation in the tribal areas has complicated matters for the Pakistani military intelligence agency, which has long provided support for the Afghan-focused Taliban, even while trying to fight the Pakistani Taliban in recent years.
Q. What are the most significant attacks claimed by the Pakistani Taliban?
A. The Pakistani Taliban and affiliated militant groups have mounted a long series of devastating attacks in Pakistanâ€™s cities over the years.
Pakistani soldiers moved Malala Yousafzai to an army hospital in Peshawar after Pakistani Taliban militants attacked her in the Swat Valley last year. Credit Agence France-Presse â€” Getty Images
One of their most significant attacks in 2014 was an audacious siege of the Karachi international airport in June. The attack, in which a group of 10 attackers fought security forces for hours and killed 13 people, represented the final straw for Pakistanâ€™s military. Within days, an extensive military air and ground assault began against Taliban leaders headquartered in North Waziristan. It is that offensive that a Taliban spokesman said led to the retaliatory militant attack in Peshawar on Dec. 16 that killed dozens of Pakistani schoolchildren and teachers.
In September 2013, the Pakistani Taliban unleashed one of their deadliest attacks ever, sending suicide bombers to the historic All Saints Church in Peshawar, a symbol of cooperation between Muslims and Christians. All told, at least 120 people died in the attack and its aftermath, which refocused attention on the Talibanâ€™s persecution of religious minorities. The attack was ordered even as the Pakistani government and Taliban leaders were exploring peace talks.
In 2012, the Pakistani Taliban shot Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani schoolgirl in the Swat Valley, for advocating the education of girls. Ms. Yousafzai went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 and has become a worldwide symbol of the groupâ€™s indiscriminate violence and subjugation of women and girls. She and her family live in England, in part because the Pakistani Taliban have vowed to attack her again.
Through the years, the militants have also hit Pakistani military and intelligence targets, including a suicide bombing in the canteen of Pakistanâ€™s elite special forces commandos, the Special Services Groups, and a hostage-taking inside the armyâ€™s General Staff Headquarters in Rawalpindi. The Pakistani Taliban were also behind fatal bomb blasts on softer targets like the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September 2008 and the Pearl Continental Hotel in Peshawar in 2009.
Baitullah Mehsud is also thought to have been behind the suicide bombing that killed former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007.
Under Hakimullah Mehsud, the group demonstrated a close alliance with Al Qaeda. He claimed a role in the suicide bombing by a Jordanian double agent that killed seven C.I.A. officials and a Jordanian intelligence official at Camp Chapman in eastern Afghanistan in December 2009, mounted in revenge for the killing of Baitullah Mehsud. The Taliban disseminated video footage showing Mr. Mehsud beside the bomber before the attack.
Mr. Mehsud later trained Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-American who tried to set off a car bomb in Times Square in New York City in 2010.
Q. What is the state of the Talibanâ€™s leadership?
A. The Pakistani Taliban group is now nominally led by Maulana Fazlullah, a jihadi leader thought to be in hiding on the Afghan side of the border. But the organization has been under pressure from a military offensive in North Waziristan since June 2014, and the main group has suffered at least two major schisms and several bouts of deadly infighting, as rival leadership factions have differed over the groupâ€™s direction.
Yet Mullah Fazulullah was seen as a possible peacemaker within Pakistanâ€™s militant firmament when he was chosen to lead the Taliban after the previous leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, was killed in an American airstrike in November 2013.
Mr. Mehsud was the Talibanâ€™s most flamboyant leader. He was a close aide and deputy to the Pakistani Talibanâ€™s founder, Baitullah Mehsud, coming to prominence through a series of daring attacks. He rose to supreme leadership after an American drone strike killed Baitullah Mehsud in August 2009.
Really ! I heard your crazy General Musharraf following dictats from wash DC wants to still, retain Taliban as "strategic assets" to trouble India and Afghanistan. CNN and many zion outlets are still trying to prop him up so that the old game of using good terrorists to achieve strategic aims remain intact.
US+Saudi+Paki Mily Axis of /// and their favorite proxy warriors...so called "good Taliban"
This guy is bonkers lol. Adnan Rasheed (guy in the video) was supposedly killed in an airstrike, so not sure if that was not killed, or if this is an old video that is being released now.
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