Mr. Singh's Leap of Faith (on talks with Pakistan)

Discussion in 'Foreign Relations' started by ejazr, Feb 17, 2011.

  1. ejazr

    ejazr Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703373404576147770085095438.html

    It makes no sense for India now to return to the table with Pakistan, especially without preconditions.

    Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has long wanted to leave his stamp on foreign policy by achieving a lasting peace between India and Pakistan. Since he came to power in 2004, he has resolutely carried forward the process of bilateral dialogue that was initiated by Atal Behari Vajpayee, his predecessor. He was compelled to suspend those talks in November 2008 after Pakistani terrorists carried out an attack on Mumbai. Now, more than two years later, the memory of those attacks has faded sufficiently for him to resume that process. The two countries agreed to a new timetable for the dialogue last week.

    However, returning to the diplomatic table with Pakistan is a mistake. Increasingly compelling evidence has emerged that the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, carried out the Mumbai attacks with the connivance of the Pakistani military establishment. Despite being confronted with evidence by both India and the United States, Islamabad is playing a delaying game to avoid having to take any action against militant groups.

    Mr. Singh does not appear to see dialogue as an instrument to achieve desired outcomes. The earlier joint mechanism he and Mr. Musharraf initiated in 2006 to investigate and counter cross-border terrorism failed to prevent a string of attacks across Indian cities, not least the one on Mumbai.

    The Indian prime minister pressed on nevertheless, yielding to demands made by Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani at successive summits. At a July 2009 summit at Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, Mr. Singh allowed Mr. Gilani to phrase the joint statement in a manner that suggested Indian involvement in the insurgency in Pakistan's western Baluchistan province. The Pakistani media consequently portrayed this as an admission of guilt on India's part.

    Mr. Singh also effectively dropped India's insistence that talks could only resume after Pakistan acted against the terrorists accused of the Mumbai attacks, even reaffirming this position at a summit in Bhutan last April. All this, in spite of considerable political costs to himself and his political party.

    The Indian government's fecklessness is clear from whom it chooses to diplomatically engage with. Mr. Singh doesn't care that Pakistan's post-Musharraf civilian leaders are powerless to deliver on anything substantial. And that it is the military that matters

    Here, General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, is pursuing an anti-India agenda. Under his leadership, the Pakistani military has distanced itself from the overtures made by his predecessor, Mr. Musharraf. A former Afghan official has stated publicly that the 2008 bombing of India's embassy in Kabul was perpetrated by Lashkar-e-Taiba with cooperation from Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence (ISI) agency at a time when Gen. Kayani, as army leader, had ultimate responsibility for the ISI. During his tenure, there has been a resurgence of terrorists infiltrating into the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir; both Mr. Musharraf and Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari have admitted that the ISI has been broadly responsible for these infiltrations in the past.

    A WikiLeaks cable, part of last year's dump, shows that even the U.S. has started to question Mr. Kayani's role. One diplomat wrote in 2009 that "the Pakistani establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see as . . . an important counterweight" to India. Mr. Kayani is seen to be against a pro-Indian government in Kabul.

    As long as India officially remains the chief threat to Pakistan, the military establishment can reorder Islamabad's resources whichever way it wants; this power vanishes if India is no longer deemed that kind of threat. Perhaps that's why even Mr. Musharraf couldn't persuade his military colleagues on the merits of settling with India. If a military dictator couldn't deliver on a deal at the height of his power, agreements with Pakistan's civilians are unlikely to be worth the paper they are printed on. Yet Mr. Singh soldiers on.

    Talks might even have worked if New Delhi had ratcheted up the engagement step by step, in response to small, tangible acts of good faith by Islamabad. Now, though, India's decision will be interpreted as a victory by the Pakistani military-jihadi complex. Much like the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea, Pakistan's military leaders reckon they can use their possession of nuclear weapons to get away with acts of aggression against their neighbor. This lets them use provocative attacks as a low-cost option to achieve their geopolitical objectives. Rewarding aggression with unconditional talks only encourages an encore.

    Mr. Singh and others in India's foreign policy establishment say they have no alternative. They point to the lack of credible military options—because these options carry the risk of nuclear escalation. But talks with Pakistan versus punitive military strikes is a false dichotomy. There are other solutions within the sphere of diplomacy.

    These solutions involve understanding what truly enables the military-jihadi complex. The principal reason this complex can afford to export terrorism to India, Afghanistan and elsewhere is because, at a fundamental level, it is bankrolled and bailed out by the United States, China and Saudi Arabia.

    These powers support a state that has been on the brink perhaps since the 1950s—so long that its elites have mastered the art of playing from that position. The Americans are desperate to extricate themselves from Afghanistan, the Chinese wish to tie down the U.S. and contain India, and the Saudis are interested in using Pakistan to hedge against a nuclear Iran.

    India has not yet attempted to use its own burgeoning relationships with these states to shape the behavior of various state and non-state actors that operate from within Pakistan. The real talks New Delhi should be pursuing are with Washington, Beijing and Riyadh.

    Mr. Pai is founder of the Takshashila Institution and editor of Pragati—The Indian National Interest Review.
     
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  3. KS

    KS Bye bye DFI Veteran Member

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    Hope this Leap of Faith is not a Blind Leap into the Valley.
     
  4. amitkriit

    amitkriit Senior Member Senior Member

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    India has proved once again that Pakistan can kill Indians with impunity without fearing any reprisal.
     
  5. Ray

    Ray The Chairman Defence Professionals Moderator

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    It is time to put Pakistan in its place while dialogueing.

    This much and no more or take a running jump!
     
  6. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    Letting Pakistan off the hook


    February 17, 2011 12:08:00 AM

    G Parthasarathy

    By agreeing to resume dialogue with Islamabad, New Delhi has allowed those behind the 26/11 carnage to walk free. Will Manmohan Singh now hand over Siachen?

    New Delhi appears to have lost its sense of direction in dealing with Islamabad. Mr Manmohan Singh came close to fashioning an agreement with General Pervez Musharraf on Jammu & Kashmir, which recognised that “while borders cannot be redrawn, we can work towards making them irrelevant — towards making them just lines on a map”. But Mr Singh’s belief that terrorism should not be allowed to undermine the ‘composite dialogue process’ with Pakistan has cost us dearly both before and after the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. At least 184 people, including nationals of countries ranging from the US and the UK to Israel and Singapore, perished in the ruthless terrorist carnage unleashed by the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba in Mumbai on November 26, 2008. There is no dearth of evidence about the involvement of the ISI in this carnage. This was not the first attack by the ISI on Mumbai. Dawood Ibrahim, the mastermind of the 1993 carnage, still lives comfortably in Karachi.



    Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to resume the ‘composite dialogue process’ in January 2004 following an assurance from Gen Musharraf that territory under Pakistan’s control would not be used for terrorism against India. India and Pakistan announced the resumption of what was the ‘composite dialogue process’ in all but name on February 10 this year. Worse still, the Mumbai carnage was reduced to a virtual footnote — just another terrorist incident — in the announcement. India has received unprecedented international support to deal with the perpetrators of 26/11. The Israelis have filed a highly publicised law suit in a New York court against LeT chief Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and ISI boss Lt General Shuja Pasha for their role in the Mumbai attack. We have, however, shot ourselves in the foot, thanks to some divisive and irresponsible statements by certain politicians, voicing concern about ‘Hindu terrorism’ in India.




    The damage caused by these irresponsible statements became evident when I recently met a group of distinguished Pakistanis who averred that India had no right to insist on action against the perpetrators of the 26/11 terrorist attack as it had taken no action against the ‘Hindu terrorists’ responsible for the deaths of Pakistani nationals in the Samjhauta Express bomb blasts. Pakistan’s official spokesman has accused India of lacking the resolve to act against ‘Hindu terrorists’. Pakistan has also launched a campaign claiming that the Indian Army is full of ‘Hindu terrorists’ like Lt Colonel Srikant Purohit, now under arrest for his alleged involvement in the Malegaon blasts. The issue of ‘Hindu terrorism’ was raised when Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao met her Pakistani counterpart Salman Bashir in Thimphu. Irresponsible statements have resulted in India paying a high price internationally.

    India’s response to the Pakistani propaganda machinery has been weak and incoherent. Instead of asserting that terrorist acts, allegedly executed by Indians (from SIMI and Abhinav Bharat), were exclusively in their own country and cannot be equated with the 26/11 attack, which was carried out by Pakistanis crossing illegally into India, our Government has appeared defensive and confused in handling the issue. This, in turn, has led to India getting itself cornered and unable to maintain continuing pressure to force Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the 26/11 attack to book. India's astute Foreign Secretary, who has handled past negotiations with Pakistan with commendable skill, has urged people not to “lend any credence” to what Hafiz Mohamed Saeed says. But is it prudent to forget that after vowing to raise the “green flag of Islam” on the ramparts of the Red Fort, Hafiz Saeed masterminded terrorist strikes on the Red Fort in Delhi in January 2001 and on Mumbai in December 2008?

    Having been put on the defensive on Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the Government of India has only further weakened our position by agreeing to what in effect is resumption of the ‘composite dialogue’ with Pakistan. The result of this is going to be that Pakistan will divert attention from terrorism it sponsors to its ‘grievances’ on issues like river waters, Siachen, Sir Creek and Jammu & Kashmir. While continuing engagement with a neighbour is imperative even in times of conflict as during Gen Musharraf’s Kargil misadventure, what we are now finding is that even the terms of the dialogue, which effectively sideline the salience of terrorism Islamabad sponsors, have been set by Pakistan.

    Given the growing violence and religious extremism within Pakistan, it should be obvious that the weak civilian Government headed by President Asif Ali Zardari lacks the authority to take any bold measures on issues like terrorism, given the ‘India-centric’ obsession of its Army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani. It is, therefore, astonishing that our Government is prepared to resume dialogue with Pakistan on Siachen. Only a few years ago, the Prime Minister appeared agreeable to withdrawing forces from Siachen until he was forced to backtrack because of political and public opposition. Mr Singh’s readiness to consider troop withdrawal from Siachen was not only opposed by the Army but also reportedly by his colleagues in the Government and the Congress. Given Gen Kayani’s track record, it would be a perilous mistake to withdraw from Siachen in the belief that the Pakistani Army will keep its word and not move into areas vacated by us as it did earlier in Kargil. Our Army has made it clear that if the Pakistanis were to walk into vacated positions we now occupy in Siachen, we would not be able to retake those positions which we have held sacrificing the lives of scores of our officers and men. Do the sacrifices of our men in uniform count for nothing?

    India has already lost its trump card in dealing with Pakistan-sponsored terrorism because of political leaders giving divisive, religious colours to terrorism and due to its diplomatic naiveté. Under the directions of Gen Kayani, the Pakistani Government has returned to sterile rhetoric about Jammu & Kashmir and disowned the framework for a solution devised earlier with Gen Musharraf which was based on territorial status quo. Does our Government seriously believe that talks between Foreign Secretaries will lead to Gen Kayani having a change of heart or restraining Gen Pasha from planning attacks on Indian Territory and on Indian interests in Afghanistan? Any pullout from Siachen has to be linked to a final settlement of the Kashmir issue and India should neither forget not forgive the perpetrators and masterminds of the 26/11 attack.
     
  7. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    A different dialog this time around




    Shyam Saran: A different dialogue this time round?

    India must take the post-nuclear reality into account and devise an effective counter-strategy

    Shyam Saran / February 16, 2011, 0:40 IST



    India and Pakistan agreed to resume comprehensive bilateral dialogue at their foreign secretaries’ meeting in Thimphu recently on February 6, 2011. This event has proved that we continue to be locked into a predictable pattern of “dialogue- disruption- dialogue”, which has characterised India-Pakistan relations for the past two decades and more. Every time the threads of engagement are picked up and advanced, there is a major terrorist attack on Indian targets traced back to Pakistan or a Kargil-type provocation. India responds by suspending bilateral dialogue. After a certain time interval and with Pakistan making familiar declarations of good intentions, dialogue is resumed until the next round in the same chain. Will this time be different? It may be worthwhile to examine the above pattern and relate it to other significant factors influencing India-Pakistan relations.

    One, the overt declaration by India and Pakistan of their nuclear weapon status in 1998 was a key development whose significance for India-Pakistan relations has not been fully analysed and understood. An important determinant of Pakistani behaviour post-1998 was the test case of Kargil in 1999. In similar Pakistan incursions in 1965 and 1971 in Kashmir, India responded by enlarging military operations to other sectors of the India-Pakistan frontier. The prevailing doctrine was that if Pakistan meddled in Kashmir, India reserved the right to retaliate at any theatre of its choosing. This is what happened in 1965 and 1971. However, in response to Kargil, India limited its retaliatory operations to the Kashmir theatre, its political leadership even declaring publicly that we would not expand the area of conflict.


    This display of restraint may have won kudos from the international community, but the conclusion Pakistan drew was that nuclear deterrence had worked to its advantage in preventing India from escalating armed conflict with Pakistan beyond the threshold set by Pakistan. Pakistan also believes, with good reason, that the US and China would act to reinforce Indian restraint.

    Two, with this perception taking shape, Pakistan began to escalate the frequency and scale of cross-border terrorist attacks against Indian targets. In 2001, there was the horrific attack against Parliament which led to the “Parakrama” mobilisation of the Indian Army along the India-Pakistan border. This could have been the occasion to dispel the notion that India would not launch a ground attack across the border in response to a patent act of aggression against it. However, Parakrama never went beyond “coercive diplomacy” and it served to strengthen Pakistani belief that its nuclear assets had been successful in deterring India from any significant retaliation against Pakistani provocation.

    Three, the next major escalation in Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism against India came with the 26/11 attack on Mumbai in 2008. Despite the scale and brazenness of the attack, India did not retaliate with military measures against Pakistan. In fact, even the gesture of “coercive diplomacy” resorted to earlier when the Indian Parliament was attacked, was missing from India’s quiver.

    The uncomfortable truth is that nuclear deterrence, which is, at the end of the day, a state of mind rather than an operational reality, has been worked to its full advantage by Pakistan, while reducing our own space for manoeuvre against it. Pakistan has displayed strategic boldness in doing so. We have, by contrast, been on the defensive.

    It is this perception that is also leading Pakistan’s strategic planners to work feverishly to augment and upgrade the country’s nuclear arsenal and its delivery capability. The objective appears to be to achieve a significant nuclear edge over India rather than maintain a rough parity. Pakistan may well believe that such numerical and qualitative edge over India will further reduce India’s willingness to risk a potentially escalatory encounter with Pakistan. Recent reports indicate that Pakistan has now more nuclear weapons than the UK and its new Khushab reactors will provide even more significant quantities of fissile material for a significantly expanded and growing nuclear arsenal. It is now clear why Pakistan has single-handedly held up multilateral negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT ), which India supports, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, citing reasons of vital national interests.

    It is a matter of argument whether India should have behaved differently than it did in the instances referred to. Every political leader has to weigh the pros and cons before taking decisions on war and peace and such decisions ought not be taken in haste or in a fit of impulsive anger. What is clear, however, is that we have not fully understood why we have been led into a defensive posture even though the distance between India and Pakistan, in terms of overall power, has been increasing. The answer lies in the fact that we have allowed a situation to develop where the choice to our political leadership is either to risk a war escalating to the nuclear threshold or to continue with the “dialogue-disruption-dialogue” approach with virtually nothing in-between. This inhibits us from addressing the strategic reality we are confronted with. We must have a more varied tool-kit to manage India-Pakistan relations than be left with only a binary choice.

    India must take this post-nuclear reality into account and devise an effective counter-strategy, otherwise we risk the “dialogue-disruption-dialogue” pattern becoming further established but at progressively higher levels of escalation in cross-border terrorism or in conventional-type military provocations, but below the threshold of all-out armed attack across the border. An entire array of positive and negative levers, which have been talked about often but never seriously pursued, need to be put in place to influence and shape Pakistan behaviour, if we wish to see a departure from the current, uncomfortable reality. If the current dialogue is used as a platform to initiate this more nuanced approach to our relations, then things may be different this time round.

    The author is a former foreign secretary and currently senior fellow at the Centre for Policy Research
     
  8. ajtr

    ajtr Veteran Member Veteran Member

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    Scoring self-goals with Pakistan

    Kanwal Sibal
    We have decided to resume the so-called composite dialogue with Pakistan, without admitting as much. Why not be frank about the change in our position? Why resort to word play to obfuscate? If we are going to discuss counter-terrorism, peace and security, Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul navigation project, people-to-people exchanges, trade, how does this agenda differ from that of the composite dialogue?

    Why are we not able to adhere firmly to our position? The other side can, so why do we waver? Pakistan has been adamant that a renewed dialogue should discuss Kashmir as a priority issue and has batted for the composite dialogue format. It has steadily chipped away with success at our resolve to emphasise terrorism, progress on bringing to justice the perpetrators of Mumbai, etc, as a priority, before moving step-by-step to other issues, without being straitjacketed by the composite dialogue arrangement.

    Our position that we first need to remove the trust deficit, deal with what is doable before moving on to more difficult issues, has been effectively jettisoned. We still mention sequencing and step-by-step progress, but we also say that all outstanding issues will be discussed, and we list them too, and that includes all the items on the agenda of the composite dialogue. There is an obvious incompatibility in the two positions. We also say that we are not agreeable to timelines for discussions on subjects like Kashmir, Siachen etc that Pakistan emphasises, yet we have agreed that discussions on all the listed issues will take place by July when the Pakistan foreign minister will be visiting India. In the coming four months or so we are ourselves visualising a lot of diplomatic activity. In this compressed timeframe is there much scope for ‘sequencing’? That would suppose that Pakistan will move forward concretely very quickly on trying those responsible for the Mumbai carnage and on the issue of terrorism, for us then to be ready to discuss Kashmir, etc, and complete the agenda ‘sequentially’ in four months. One assumes there was clarity of understanding between the two sides at Thimphu on this point, as otherwise the fiasco at Islamabad last year could be repeated.

    This broadening of the bilateral dialogue on Pakistan’s terms would suggest that either the trust deficit has been reduced in the last few months or that we now judge that by yielding to Pakistan’s rigid position we can hope to achieve better results than by holding fast to our own. At least in the public domain there is no evidence that Pakistan is more pliable than before on issues of core interest to us. On the contrary, the signals from Pakistan, even on the eve of the recent Thimphu meeting, have been negative. The Pakistani spokesman attacked us aggressively on the Samjhauta Express issue, questioning our sincerity in unearthing the military links of the Hindu terrorist groups. Hafiz Saeed once again ranted against India on Kashmir, this time advocating nuclear war to wrest the province from us. Pakistani political leaders made predictable statements on the Kashmir Solidarity Day about the right of Kashmiris to self-determination, and their participation as a third party in India-Pakistan parleys on Kashmir. Pakistan believes it has enough diplomatic room to vitiate the atmosphere every time India-Pakistan talks begin, without any diplomatic cost to it as it believes India would swallow its provocations for lack of other options. The recent vituperations of its permanent representative in Geneva against us were also a reminder of Pakistan’s unchanged thinking toward us.

    We have agreed at Thimphu that terrorism, as was the case in the past, will be discussed by the home secretaries, with the foreign secretaries discussing Kashmir and peace and security. After 26/11 such reversion to the previous format is difficult to justify. What this means is that terrorism — the priority issue for India — will be dealt with at the “concerned ministry” level, while the principals — the foreign secretaries — will discuss Pakistan’s priority issue of Kashmir. This arrangement also effectively dilutes the centrality of terrorism from the Kashmir issue, besides suggesting that more than terrorism cross LoC movement and trade and such CBMs require special attention, whereas terrorism should remain for us a fundamental political and foreign policy issue determinant for bilateral ties. Inevitably, at the home secretaries level, the terrorism issue will get reduced to transmission of information, legal procedures, document sharing, technical counter-terrorism matters etc, losing the political link with Kashmir, as that specific dimension will be outside the remit of these secretaries. One can only hope that the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism will not get revived, to suit Pakistan’s strategy of projecting itself as a partner in fighting the shared threat of terrorism, rather than an official supporter of terrorism directed at India.

    Pakistan has also used successfully the timetable of Pakistan foreign minister’s visit to India as a diplomatic weapon against us. With the confidence that India needs resumption of the dialogue more than Pakistan does, the minister has been playing hard to get, laying down conditions, demeaning us by convoking us to show meaningful and concrete progress in talks, as if we are the recalcitrants whereas Pakistan genuinely and sincerely wants to move forward. He has been getting away with his arrogant posture because we have been entreating him to come. Implicit in our appeals is the message that we are ready to move forward ‘meaningfully’, whatever that means. Why do we put ourselves in a position where we become equally if not more responsible than Pakistan to move the dialogue forward? Initially the minister (it won’t be the pompous Qureshi now) was to come in January or February this year; the visit then got shifted to April, and now it is slated for July. Pakistan has got its way. We have been given time until July to prove our sincerity to Pakistan, and the reward for us would be its foreign minister’s visit to India. The US believes that the visit of its president to a country is a form of political reward. We have, unfortunately, let Pakistan adopt this kind of a patronising posture toward us.

    The timing of our initiative to resume the full-spectrum dialogue is also not promising. The public reaction in Pakistan to Salmaan Taseer’s assassination, with lawyers showering the murderer with rose petals, indicates a mood that gives less hope than before of serious action by the government on the Mumbai issue and jihadi terrorism. The current governmental crisis in Pakistan handicaps our peace parleys. President Asif Ali Zardari is more feeble than before, and General Ashfaq Kayani stronger. Just when the US is finding it increasingly problematic to deal with Pakistan, we are signalling that we can do business with it. We make Pakistan look more open and politically credible, more capable of delivery, by expressing our willingness to talk to it even about Afghanistan.

    If we do not want to play hard ball with Pakistan, like Pakistan does with us, why do we play soft ball with it? Self-goals will not help us achieve the goal we chase of peace with Pakistan.
     
  9. ejazr

    ejazr Stars and Ambassadors Stars and Ambassadors

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    Nirupama Rao clarifies on twitter on Nitin Pai's article

    Saw Nitin Pai's article in WSJ. Dialogue with Pak is not pursued in vacuum. Our terrorism-related concerns r not sacrificed by any measure.

    Furthermore, our ties with Beijing, Riyadh and Washington r utilized to relay our concerns clearly.
     
  10. Singh

    Singh Phat Cat Administrator

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    A very pithy rebuttal.
     
  11. anoop_mig25

    anoop_mig25 Senior Member Senior Member

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    why does indian every other(tom harry)indian leadership wants to go down in histroy as leader who sucessfullied solved relations between india-pakistan and to please pak (inturn their army generals) ready to Sacrifice indian strategic inresets

    bloody hell even an iota of such effort had been made towards making indian developed/self-reliant country that person`s named would had been written in histroy book with golden ink
     

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