Mao tse-tung on legalism and lord shang

[Ray]

MAO TSE-TUNG ON LEGALISM AND LORD SHANG

HOW CHINA'S ANCIENT PAST INFLUENCED ITS FUTURE



This, Mao's earliest known writing, is an essay he wrote in June 1912 when, after leaving the army, he had enrolled as a first-year student at the middle school in Changsha. His teacher thought so highly of this effort that he marked it for circulation among all members of the class; he also singled out many passages with circles, indicating approval of Mao's style, and dots, registering appreciation of the content.

The essay reveals an early admiration on Mao's part for the harsh ruling system of Chinese Legalism, a system Mao seems to have drawn inspiration from in developing his own political philosophy.

"HOW SHANG YANG ESTABLISHED CONFIDENCE BY THE MOVING OF A POLE"[1]

(June 1912)

When I read the Shi ji about the incident of how Shang Yang established confidence by the moving of a pole, I lament the foolishness of the people of our country, I lament the wasted efforts of the rules of our country, and I lament the fact that for several thousand years the wisdom of the people has not been developed and the country has been teetering on the brink of a grievous disaster. If you don't believe me, please hear out what I have to say.


Laws and regulations are instruments for procuring happiness. If the laws and regulations are good, the happiness of our people will certainly be great. Our people fear only that the laws and regulations will not be promulgated, or that, if promulgated, they will not be effective. It is essential that every effort be devoted to the task of guaranteeing and upholding such laws, never ceasing until the objective of perfection is obtained. The government and the people are mutually dependent ans interconnected, so how can there be any reason for distrust? On the other hand, if the laws and regulations are not good, then not only will there be no happiness to speak of, but there will also be a threat of harm, and our people should exert their utmost efforts to obstruct such laws and regulations. Even though you want us to have confidence, why should we have confidence? But how can one explain the fact that Shang Yang encountered the opposition of so large a proportion of the people of Qin?

Shang Yang's laws were good laws. If you look today at the four thousand-odd years for which our country's history has been recorded, and the great political leaders who have pursued the welfare of the country and the happiness of the people, is not Shang Yang one of the very first on the list? During the reign of Duke Xiao, the Central Plain was in great turmoil, with wars being constantly waged and the entire country was exhausted beyond description. Therefore, Shang Yang sought to achieve victory over all the other states and unify the Central Plain, a difficult enterprise indeed. Then he published his reforming decrees, promulgating laws to punish the wicked and rebellious, in order to preserve the rights of the people. He stressed agriculture and weaving, in order to increase the wealth of the people, and forcefully pursued military success, in order to increase the prestige of the state. He made slaves of the indigent and idle, in order to put an end to waste. This amounted to a great policy such as our country had never had before. How could the people not fear and trust him, so that he had to use the scheme of setting up the pole to establish confidence? From this we realize the wasted efforts of those who wield power. From this, we can see the stupidity of the people of our country. From this we can understand the origins of our people's ignorance and darkness during the past several millennia, a tragedy that has brought our country to the brink of destruction.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of anything out of the ordinary, the mass of the people always dislike it. The people being like this, and the law being like that (i.e., the people clinging to their old ways, and the law being directed toward radical change), what is there to marvel about? I particularly fear, however, that if this story of establishing confidence by moving the pole should come to the attention of the various civilized people of the East and the West, they will laugh uncontrollably so that they have to hold their stomachs, and make a derisive noise with their tongues. Alas, I had best say no more.

Source: Introductory note and text translation from Stuart R. Schram, ed., Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings, 1912-1949, vol. 1. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 5-6.

[1] The tale to which the title of Mao's essay refers is the following:

"After the decree [incorporating his whole set of sweeping reforms] was drawn up Shang Yang did not at once publish it, fearing that the people did not have confidence in him. He therefore had a pole thirty feet long placed near the south gate of the capital. Assembling the people, he said that he would give ten measures of gold to anyone who could move it to the north gate. The people marveled at this, but no one ventured to move it. Shang Yang then said, 'I will give fifty measures of gold to anyone who can move it.' One man then moved it, and Shang Yang immediately gave him fifty measures of gold, to demonstrate that he did not practice deception."

This translation, cited by Schram, is from H.G. Creel, Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1954), pp. 153-54.

To read the ancient Legalist texts and history to which Mao refers see the WFF's collection of Chinese Legalist Philosophy Texts (in English and Chinese)

Mao on Legalism and Lord Shang

This is what Mao felt and how foolish he felt that the Chinese people were!

 

[Ray]

One of the first writers to articulate an explanation for the rapid decline of the Qin was the young genius Jia Yi (201-169 BCE).... The final sentence of Jia Yi's essay is an effective summary of his argument: " . . . it failed to rule with humanity and righteousness and to realize that the power to attack and the power to retain what one has thereby won are not the same."

Chinese 305 (Prof. Durrant)

 

[Ray]

But, on the whole, I'm a gullible sort and accept that, like their peace-loving agrarian reformer ancestors of 1948, the present PRC folks are peace-loving cultural reformers in the mold of Zheng He.

How do I know that to be true ? The People's Daily, Zheng He: Master explorer (April 6, 2011), tells me so:

China's motives were not conquest but expanding influence and knowledge of its culture. China had been richer and more cosmopolitan than any country in Europe for thousands of years. Already in the 1400's China and India represented more than half of the world's GDP together. A paragon of fair trade practices with conflicts internal rather than international. Then, like now, China supported stability over change domestically and abroad.

Zheng He's China wanted global prominence and respect matching its superiority. His mission: a charm offensive without historical precedent. He was the face of expansionist friendly China. People's Daily described him as an "Ambassador of Peace." For the most part he was, unless provoked to defend national interests for which he is credited with masterful genius. Not until World War I would the world see the naval might Zheng He mobilized for his journeys as he single-handedly revolutionized navigation.

China was ahead of the world in most areas of development. He's fleet was larger than anything the world had known, with expeditions of up to 317 ships and around 28,000 men aboard — experts calculate 20,000 of them were military men. Crews with interpreters of many languages, astrologers, astronomers, doctors, pharmacists, entertainers, diplomatic and protocol experts to coordinate official receptions with dignitaries in the more than 35 countries visited.

The intent of the voyages was to create a showcase of the splendor and strength of the Ming dynasty not trade, conquer or as a crusade to promote China's religions.

Quote:
"These were friendly diplomatic activities. During the overall course of the seven voyages to the Western Ocean, Zheng He did not occupy a single piece of land, establish any fortress or seize any wealth from other countries. In the commercial and trade activities, he adopted the practice of giving more than he received, and thus he was welcomed and lauded by the people of the various countries along his routes,"
stated Xu Zu-yuan, PRC Vice Minister of Communications, on July 2004.

A goal was to bring foreign VIPs to China's imperial court. It was a Noah's ark gathering of top diplomats to introduce them to its sphere of influence. It was not hard to convince key foreign figures to accompany Zheng He in an all-expense-paid trip to China's to meet the emperor.

China's Emergence as a Superpower - Page 21 - Small Wars Council

 

[Ray]

Power grew out of Zheng He's gunboats

Admiral Zheng He's armadas sailed from Nanjing to as far as East Africa over eight voyages between 1405-1433. Most Chinese lionize the Muslim eunuch as a peace loving ambassador of peace and friendship. But Australian historian Geoffrey Wade tells Victor Fic the admiral was a Ming military commander pursuing gunboat diplomacy, and indicts the commodore for war crimes.

A senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, based in Singapore, Wade's interests include Sino-Southeast Asian historical interactions and related issues such as Chinese expansions and early Islam in Southeast Asia. Wade's work includes an online database [1] that provides English translations of over 3,000 references to Southeast Asia



extracted from the Ming imperial annals. In 2009, Wade's China and Southeast Asia was published, a six-volume survey of seminal works on Southeast Asia-China interactions.

Victor Fic: Geoff, how did you become fascinated with Zheng He?

Geoffrey Wade: I have long been interested in how China and Southeast Asia interacted and did my PhD on Southeast Asia as represented in the Ming reign annals. A key element was the Ming maritime missions to Southeast Asia. China's commemorations of Zheng He in 2005 further piqued my interest.

VF: Summarize the orthodox Chinese claim that he was a peaceful seafarer.

GW: Within Chinese societies, one finds "popular" perceptions of Zheng He. One tribute translates as:

From the age of Zheng He until the new period of socialist construction, the achievements of Zheng He during his voyages to the Western Ocean have been excellent materials for conducting patriotic education for the Chinese nation.

This is taken from Huang Hui-zhen and Xue Jin-du's book Eighty Years of Researching Zheng He. These two PRC [People's Republic of China] academics surveyed most of the studies of Zheng He to the present.

A second translates as:

These were thus friendly diplomatic activities. During the overall course of the seven voyages to the Western Ocean, Zheng He did not occupy a single piece of land, establish any fortress or seize any wealth from other countries. In the commercial and trade activities, he adopted the practice of giving more than he received, and thus he was welcomed and lauded by the people of the various countries along his routes.

The speaker here is Xu Zu-yuan, then PRC vice minister of communications, in July 2004. This official was responsible for the Zheng He 600th anniversary celebrations in 2005.

VF: Did you initially believe these glowing tributes?

GW: No, I first came to Zheng He through a critical reading of the Ming annals and thereby was cognizant of his role in Ming China's military exploits.

VF: You amass evidence that Zheng He was "proto-colonialistic" and his treasure fleet was a gunboat armada. Where is the proof?

GW: The primary source material for Zheng He is in the Ming imperial annals. That text plus those written by persons like Ma Huan, a Muslim interpreter who accompanied him, provides all the evidence to validate the accusation.

VF: You focus on the admiral's massive fleet and crew - why are the numbers indicative?

GW: The various missions comprised between 50 and 250 ships, huge armadas, abroad for several years. The sources differ on the number of personnel, but figures between 27,000 and 30,000 are cited for the largest missions. A typical mission comprised, in the senior ranks, almost 100 envoys of various grades, 93 military captains, 104 lieutenants, 103 sub-lieutenants plus associated medical and astrological staff members. In one example, 26,800 out of 27,400 on board were the rank and file, the irregular and crack troops, plus sailors and clerks. Each mission likely carried over 20,000 military men.

In a Ming annals reference of 1427, it notes "10,000 crack troops formerly sent to the Western Ocean," also suggesting a large force of military men.

VF: You also note the armada was heavily armed.

GW: Like the Ming forces sent to Yunnan in South China and Dai Viet or today's Vietnam, they carried the most advanced firearms available in the world such as cannons, rockets and firelances. I underline they were military missions with strategic aims because much current scholarship, both Chinese and non-Chinese, stresses they were "voyages of friendship".

VF: You note that Zheng He engaged in violence in Sumatra. What were his ends and means?

GW: Clearly, this force's major threatening role - "to shock and awe" - encouraged foreign rulers to come to the Ming court to "pay tribute". Also, sometimes Zheng He's voyages brimmed with violence to implement the Ming emperor's demands. The cardinal engagements included his attack on the Old Port at Palembang in Sumatra in 1407 during his first major mission abroad. He returned with a "pirate" named Chen Zu-yi captured for reportedly having "feigned surrender but secretly plotting to attack the Imperial army".

VF: What were the casualties?

GW: The Ming fleet reported 5,000 persons killed, 10 ships burnt and 7 captured. Later that year, the Ming recognized the polity of Old Port. But because of the ex-military Guangdong and Fujian Chinese who lived there, the Ming deemed it not a separate country, but a "pacification superintendency", a common term for polities ruled by non-Chinese on the Chinese borders. The appointed superintendent, Shi Jin-qing, was recognized by Zheng He as the local ruler. References to this polity end in 1430, implying its fortunes were tied to the Ming presence in Southeast Asia and that the rulers were indeed Ming state agents.

VF: You advance evidence that also at Sumatra, the admiral stepped into a civil war.

GW: In 1415, Su-gan-la, the reported leader of the Samuderan "bandits", as the Ming annals called them, was captured and taken to China from Sumatra by Zheng He. Contradictory sources obscure the events of 1414 and 1415, and some of Ma Huan's account is obviously drawn from local folkore. But Zheng He appears to have intervened in a civil war in northern Sumatra and supported the side not hostile to the Ming. Again, the expedition was mainly a military force imposing a "pax Ming" on what became Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.

Asia Times Online :: Power grew out of Zheng He's gunboats

 

[Ray]

Asia belongs to China if not the whole world!

 

[no smoking]

I don't follow you here. Where is the point putting Mao and Zheng together?

 

[redragon]

he lost it