Discussion in 'Military History' started by Kunal Biswas, Aug 12, 2013.
Originally Posted by Twinblade.
Nothing change much..
Everybody knows there were tactical blunders, everyone knows there were strategic blunders, everyone knows there were diplomatic blunders. But then, why analyse them when praising the ill equiped, ill trained, ill acclamatised braveheart who jumped into the embrace of death solves everything.
Generals happy, Bureacracy happy, Politicians happy and the public screaming victory on the streets. Why analyse the problem at all? Why flog the dead horse?
Everyone knows the refusal of the senior commanders ( right upto the Chief of Staff) to take cognizance of the actual scale of the enemy operation. Of course they corrected, after the blind patrol parties began returning in coffins.
Everyone knows just how the command resisted the idea of inducting Heavy artillery to support the initial attempts. But hey, they had a change of heart after battalions after battalions were sent back licking their wounds.
Everyone knows that besides a very few field commanders on a few select occasions, all the others made centre play, walking their assaults right infront of the enemy MG nests. Every commander played it by the book, when out of the box thinking would have saved countless lives.
It is to the credit of our bravehearts that brought us victory after victory, casualties notwithstanding. We won the war despite the commanders and the politicians, not beacuse of them. The victory belongs to the NCOs and the JCOs who commanded their men to victory or death, and at times, both. It is not the commanders sitting in SriNagar or Delhi who won us this war.
Our pride in our armed forces often blinds us to the tactical errors that they made, and still make. The pride is on the jawan, the NCO, the JCO. The higher ranking comanders must be held to a much higher standard. They cannot be by the book commanders. Ask any NATO commander the most important aspect of leading, and innovation comes right after discipline.
I'd add the young officers along with those NCO's and JCO's. Just like the US counter-terrorism machine was caught napping on 9/11, Kargil was the same for us. The use of SF as super-infantry,the no-no when it came to going behind enemy lines and cutting paki supply lines etc.
After reading your post I thought if sending recon parties early on to estimate enemy strength might have saved Capt. Kalia, not because its of no use to go through the what-if's but if something like this happens again then better the situation is solved with a lesser body count on our side.
Your last paragraph is something very true. The recent loc incident has shown that the infantry is still neglected, the arty boys have got their toys,air defence,IAF but the foot soldier is neglected, thankfully the SF are getting what the want.
Its about all those men who were on the field, Includes who lead the men, there is no distinction in battle field, they are all the same looking each other back ..
@Ray Sir ..
There was this excellent essay written by Major Divik Kandpal about the need to revamp the training structure of young Officers in the Indian army. Coming from a Major, who himself went through this process should be proof enough that the officers are no more at par with their job requirements.
The following are excerpts from the essay....Please note that they may not be consequtive paragraphs.
Unfortunately, as we come close to the end of the first ten years of the service of the first batch of YOâ€™s commissioned in the 21st Century, the environment can easily discern that slowly somehow the above training continuum is getting disrupted. The results of this trend may not be visible in a flash. Nevertheless, the slowly declining sheen of the officer corps can be attributed to â€˜erosion of values amid their quest for easy successâ€™.
After a few months in his parent unit, he goes for his first structured career course â€“ the YOs course. It is followed by Commandosâ€™ and Weaponsâ€™ courses. During the service bracket of five to eight years, he is detailed for Junior Command (JC) course. Interspersed between these courses are Part B and D Promotion examinations and a string of miscellaneous courses like Regimental Signal Officers (RSO), Mechanical Transport Officers (MTO), Quarter Master (QM), Military Law, Mountain / Jungle Warfare, Computer and Information Technology (IT) courses, to name a few.
These are generally vacancy based. Unfortunately, due to a variety of internal and environmental factors the above mentioned continuum of educating and grooming YOs stands disrupted and has led to a â€˜start-stopâ€™ necessity based approach.
The â€˜shortage of officersâ€™ is the single biggest reason for the above problem .The inadequacy of officers at the unit level leads to lack of mentoring at all levels. Add to it, the ever â€˜increasing commitmentsâ€™ which take away from them the traditional growing up period. They are pushed into operations straightway after commissioning. This at times leads to picking up wrong practices and values, which at later stages, become difficult to rectify.
The present day training curricula, right from the OTA / IMA upto JC course is sufficiently covering the â€˜tacticalâ€™ aspects of conventional environment. However, the challenges that the Country faces in the form of Asymmetric Warfare (AW) requires review of the basics of our training, especially at the YOâ€™s level. Add to it, the quantum leap in technology that our Army is making to prepare itself for Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and the demands of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
Thus, the environment expects our YOs to be â€˜technocrat wizardsâ€™, with requisite adaptability to imbibe and implement rapidly changing technological concepts that are getting introduced endlessly, and also â€˜intellectual understandingâ€™ to comprehend the subtleties of humanities oriented subjects like Perception Management, Human Rights, Media Management, International Relations and Diplomacy.
On top of all this is the challenge of â€˜leadingâ€™ and â€˜managingâ€™ an increasingly awakened and educated PBOR, who most often would not question your decisions and actions but would also not submit meekly â€˜alwaysâ€™ without expressing reasonable doubts or seeking premature exit from Military service.
This is just a small set of extracts from the essay. But it clearly defines where the IA as an institution are going wrong. A good number of new intakes are not adequate to the task.
And if one reads the last 2 paragraphs keenly, he clearly mentions out that the officers may be out of sync with his subordinates. Bear in mind this article was written in 2009, and we have already seen the brawl in Ladakh between army jawans and officers.
I'm linking the whole essay here. Its a must read for those who wish to understand why there exists so many tactical errors in SOPs...
USI of India | An article by USI
**Major Divik Kandpal-was commissioned into Corps of the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers on 11 Dec 1999 and did his initial attachment with 14 Battalion, the Maratha Light Infantry. He is presently posted in 636 EME Battalion.
@Kunal, @Ray, @sayareakd, @Yusuf, @arnabmit
I agree there is lot need to be done at level of YO`s, There is also need for adjustment in recruitment also..
But i also should mention about ' sync ', Its not the same with every unit, Yes there are cases but not on majority but its a real thread..
@Kunal Exactly what are the tactical blunders made?
Imho the lack of equipment that IA had are as follows;
1- Anti material sniper rifle and HMG like Kord to engage enemy bunkers.
2- GPMG for platoon to lay suppressive fire.
Please add more, afaik the BM-30 Smerch was purchased to nullify the "low" firepower of BM-21 Grad, iirc in one article I read one officer saying " If we had the BM-30 during kargil we would have flatten Tiger Hill"
That would be true.
Maybe there would be those who believe otherwise because they have never seen it all!
That is why i posted those vids on first place, Please watch them, It includes English also at some places..
The discussion is about tactical blunders includes of tactics..
If you looking for equipment, I can give you a endless list as IA infantry is still in late 80s,
And that too equipment from Indian design and made for our needs, Imports are not IA solutions..
i nominate the above as post of the year
btw we used to have a member of the month competition and it has been ended but now instead would we consider having a post of the month nomination ?
Gen VP Malik's role in Kargil was also under criticism, but i'm not able to find a source........Guru's pls help
To be frank, was there a lack of equipment?
Ideally, there should have been the moon, if you understand what I mean.
However, one must realise that Rumsfeld was not wrong when he said - "You go to war with the army you have---not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time."
What do you all feel that the Army did not have that was on the inventory?
The biggest blunder was not allowing troops to cross LoC.
Could you explain what that would have achieved?
Taken the war directly to pakis for starters. Given army alternate routes to retake posts, im sure some routes would have been better than the ones which were taken.
yeah, he right, at tactical level this was better..........Ray Sir knows abt Brig. Aul who did jus' that for Pt.5535..........he crossed LOC and captured 2 Paki peaks, which were then exchanged back with them by an "agreement".
Just becos sumthing went wrong in 5535 story, doesnt mean the tactic wasnt sound, and lives of jawans were saved, bloodshed was avoided, etc.
Sir, Yes there was deficiency from Clothes to the fire arm, We lack precision munition for infantry motars and night vision so does Gunships to provide fire support and UAV / Drones to monitor enemy activity ..
Don't get me wrong Sir, We have equipment but not suitable to fight much better arm enemies, Our equipments need to be upgraded, Just the existing once will do ..
Are we prepared atleast now? did IA get the NVD's or are they still lacking them.......?
For regulars, Thermal on Insas is the first and last night vision equipment ..
Can we hope anything better coming their way in the near future?
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