The Chinese theory of Legalism, which is the bedrock of Chinese mindset and Han culture, does not encourage democracy and so to expect Chinese would embrace democracy would mean a total change of mindset.
Legalism
For something quite different from both Daoism and Confucianism, we now turn to a third classical Chinese social and political philosophy: *Legalism* (fajia 法家) Of the three, Legalism is usually the easiest for students from the United States to comprehend. As you will probably see in the following pages, the Legalist view of the world has much in common with contemporary U.S. society. There are also some major differences (e.g., Legalism's view of human nature versus the contemporary tendency to assume people are basically good), of course, but on the whole, the basic tenets of Legalism should be fairly easy to comprehend.
Human Nature & Psychology
Legalism starts with the premise that human nature is evil. More specifically, "evil" means that humans are by nature selfish and antisocial. They will always do what is best for themselves in the short term. Individuals will behave in a way that benefits the larger society only if they can be shown that such behavior is also in their own personal self interest. By fully understanding and using this fact, a ruler can build a powerful state. The ruler has in his hands--or should have in his hands--the full coercive force of the state. He also controls substantial wealth. He uses this coercive force and this wealth to manipulate the population of his state through positive and negative reinforcement (to use contemporary terminology). Reward behavior that benefits the state (and therefore the ruler); punish that which does not. Han Feizi, (#fuzzy image#) the great theoretician of Legalism, called punishment and reward the *two handles.* The ruler uses these two handles to control the behavior of his ministers and subjects. Han Feizi explained:
The enlightened ruler controls his ministers by means of the two handles alone. The two handles are punishment and favor. What do I mean by punishment and favor? To inflict mutilation and death on people is called punishment; to bestow honor and reward is called favor. Those who act as ministers fear the penalties and hope to profit by the rewards. Hence, if the ruler wields his punishments and favors, the ministers will fear his sternness and flock to receive his benefits.1
Today's readers of Han Feizi are often struck by certain resemblances between his ideas and those of the early sixteenth-century Italian political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli (1569-1627) or (to a lesser extent) the American behavioral psychologist B. F. Skinner (1904-1990).2 Han Feizi's understanding of human nature also bears some resemblance to the theories of behavioral psychologists.
In their youth, both Han Feizi and the Legalist Prime Minister Li Si studied under a prominent Confucian scholar. As you might have guessed, this scholar was Xunzi, the Confucian who argued that human nature is evil. Han Feizi and Li Si fully accepted this part of Xunzi's teachings. There was, however, a major difference in their views of human nature. Xunzi said that a person's original nature is evil and so it must be modified through strict training. Han Feizi and the other Legalists did not think this evil original nature could ever be trained or modified. Humans were self-serving and anti-social from the time they were born until the time they died, and any attempt to change this basic nature was futile and misguided. Instead, rulers should accept that human nature is permanently evil, embrace this fact, and use it to their advantage.
Indeed, according to Legalist theory, humans could be made to do anything at all should there be sufficient incentive. For example, according to Han Feizi:
Because the king of Yue admired valor, many of his subjects defied death; because King Ling of Qu liked slim waists, his state was full of half-starved people on diets. Because Duke Huan of Qi was jealous and loved his ladies in waiting, Shudiao castrated himself in order to be put in charge of the harem; because the duke was fond of unusual food, Yiya steamed his son's head and offered it to the duke.3
In these cases, the bizarre behavior was the result of underlings trying to impress a ruler or play up to his desires. Such examples, if they really happened, suggest that not only will people do nearly anything if there is sufficient incentive, but also that the ruler should keep his likes and dislikes a secret from his subordinates. Notice that in any case, Han Feizi's human beings are motivated by selfish desires for personal gain--"evil" in classical Chinese thinking.
Law & Government
Law (fa 法) was the mechanism by which rulers should employ the two handles to their advantage. The people exist to serve and strengthen the state, thought the Legalists. Rulers, therefore, should create a comprehensive system of laws that rewards all behavior of benefit to the state and severely punishes behavior that weakens the state. The ruler should carefully construct the laws in a way that people, particularly government ministers, have incentives to spy on their peers and associates. Furthermore, government must enforce laws with 100% certainty and no exceptions. Law and the power to enforce it, not authoritative humanity, moral authority and the like, was the key to a harmonious society and a strong state. Being only a single person, a ruler cannot personally watch over all the many affairs of state. The system of laws therefore serves to extend his own power and authority. Han Feizi explained:
Stretch the plumb line, and crooked wood can be planed straight; apply the level, and bumps and hollows can be shaved away; balance the scales, and heavy and light can be adjusted; get out the measuring jars, and discrepancies of quantity can be corrected. In the same way one should use laws to govern the state, disposing of all matters on their basis alone.4
Once established, law must be enforced without any favoritism or exceptions. There must be no consideration of extenuating circumstances. The law takes on a life of its own and its integrity takes precedence over any individual (except the ruler, the only one above the law):
The law no more makes exceptions for men of high station than the plumb line bends to accommodate a crooked place in the wood. What the law has decreed the wise men cannot dispute nor the brave man venture to contest. When faults are to be punished, the highest minister cannot escape; when good is to be rewarded, the lowest peasant must not be passed over. Hence, for correcting the faults of superiors, chastising the misdeeds of subordinates, restoring order, exposing error, checking excess, remedying evil, and unifying the standards of the people, nothing can compare to law. For putting fear into the officials, awing the people, wiping out wantonness and sloth, and preventing lies and deception, nothing can compare to penalties. If penalties are heavy, men dare not use high position to abuse the humble; if laws are clearly defined, superiors will be honored and their rights will not be invaded. If they are honored and their rights are inviolable, then the ruler will be strong and hold fast to what is essential.5
The world Han Feizi envisioned, and which the Qin dynasty attempted to put into place, was a far cry from the aristocratic culture of the early Zhou dynasty. It was also at odds with what the Confucians would have wanted. Recall that Confucius specifically opposed penalties and laws as the primary means of rectifying society. Notice that this passage suggests that personal security ("rights" in the passage above) would be one major benefit from a system of rigidly-enforced, harsh laws.
(Interestingly, similar appeals to personal security can be heard in some of the "law and order" rhetoric of contemporary politicians--both conservative and liberal. The extent to which people are willing to accept a police state in return for security against crime, terrorism, and even economic misery, is a major issue in the contemporary U.S.--albeit one that is rarely cast explicitly in these terms.)
Legalists advocated severe penalties for relatively minor offenses. The idea was that if minor offenses result in stiff punishment, people will not dare commit major ones (#interesting Chinese example# from the 1920s). Of course, the opposite can take place in real life. The laws should be clear so all can understand them. Duties and expectations (i.e., job descriptions) for government ministers should be clearly defined. Those who do not measure up to these expectations must be punished, as must those who exceed the bounds of their assigned duties:
Once in the past Marquis Zhao of Han got drunk and fell asleep. The keeper of the royal hat, seeing that the marquis was cold, laid a robe over him. When the marquis awoke, he was pleased and asked his attendants, 'Who covered me with a robe?' 'The keeper of the hat,' they replied. The marquis thereupon punished both the keeper of the royal hat and the keeper of the royal robe. He punished the keeper of the robe for failing to do his duty, and the keeper of the hat for overstepping his office. It was not that he did not dislike the cold, but he considered the trespass of one official upon the duties of another to be a greater danger than cold.6
Ministers and commoners alike should do precisely what the laws and regulations require of them, no more and no less. Each member of society must work like a cog in a giant machine. To do otherwise would be to endanger the great machine of state.
Although Legalism may sound plausible in theory, in practice, even a society like ancient China was too complex for the laws to handle. It is nearly impossible to make laws to cover all circumstances and possibilities. Legalism engenders extreme distrust and suspicion, as people are encouraged to spy on those around them. Informants would receive generous rewards. Those who know of an offense but fail to report it would be liable for severe punishment. The mistrust and suspicion thus caused can work to the ruler's advantage if he is skilled at manipulating it. In the long run, however, it tends to create divisions in society that are detrimental to the state.
Brief Excursion into Modern China: Mao & Jiang as 20th-Century Legalists
One Chinese ruler who was extremely skilled at manipulating suspicion and distrust among his subordinates, and society at large, was #Mao Zedong,# who was in power from 1949 until his death in 1976. He was an admirer of the "First Emperor" of the Qin dynasty, whom Mao regarded as a great progressive state-builder. In similar fashion, Mao, too, was the "first emperor" of a new Communist China. Consciously or otherwise, he employed many classic Legalist techniques in governing, and he was particularly adept at keeping the preponderance of power in his own hands. Even now, history books from China usually praise the ideas of Han Feizi and the accomplishments of the first Qin emperor: "Han Fei[zi]'s opposition to conservatism was clear-cut and his advocacy of reform positive. Representing the interests of the feudal landlord class, he was laying the ideological foundation for the advent of feudal aristocracy."7 As you may know, basic Marxist historiography holds that human societies go through four inevitable states: 1) slave-owning society; 2) feudal society; 3) capitalist society; 4) socialist society. The author of this passage regards Han Feizi and the Legalists as aiding progress by helping move from the first to the second stage. Were he brought back to life, Han Feizi might be surprised to see his ideas poured into a Marxist mold.
Praise for the Legalists helped Mao justify his own heavy reliance on coercive power to transform society. For example, part of a 1949 address, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," reads:
'Don't you want to abolish state power?' Yes, we do, but not right now; we cannot do it yet. Why? Because imperialism still exists, because domestic reaction still exists, because classes still exist in our country. Our present task is to strengthen the people's state apparatus--mainly the people's army, the people's police and the people's courts--in order to consolidate national defense and protect the people's interests.8
And the "people's" army, police and courts are still as busy as ever keeping order in China. Theoretical Marxist fantasies to the contrary notwithstanding, the state is not about to wither any time soon, in China or anywhere else. To be sure, there were major differences between the theory and practice of government in Mao's China and in the Legalist statecraft of ancient China. Still, one cannot fully understand twentieth-century China without some understanding of the Legalist legacy that continues to exert a strong influence.
In Taiwan, official propaganda frequently points out that in contrast to Mao's following the Legalist path, #Jiang Jieshi# 蔣介石 (better known in the U.S. as Chang Kai-shek), who ruled Taiwan from 1949 until his death in 1975, followed the way of Confucius. Such statements are basically correct regarding Mao, but they are not accurate regarding Jiang. It is true that unlike Mao, Jiang, an admirer of Hitler in the 1930s, did not go out of his way to praise the Legalists. And he also paid lip service to the Confucian tradition when he thought that doing so would enhance his image. But, in practice, Jiang's rule was based solely on *coercive force,* the preponderance of which he kept in his own hands.
Although enemies, Jiang and Mao were alike in that both gave the highest priority to their personal quest for power, regardless of how many millions of innocent people perished in the process. Jiang's regime on the mainland (late 1920s-1949) was corrupt and brutal, and often resembling an #organized crime syndicate# more than a government in the usual sense of the term. If Jiang could be called a follower of the "Confucian Way," so too could virtually anyone. Jiang was a Legalist who gave unconvincing lip service to China's Confucian legacy; Mao was a Legalist who frankly acknowledged his admiration for Han Feizi and the First Qin Emperor.
There is a broader point here beyond examining the ruling styles of Jiang and Mao. Notice how useful the ancient past can be for *political manipulation in the present.* Praising or criticizing Confucius, or the First Emperor, was not a purely scholarly act without political content in the China or Taiwan of recent decades (including the present day). And this point applies to most other countries as well. In the modern world, debates over "correct" interpretations of history have significance that goes well beyond the academic disputes of scholars.
Chapter Five: Legalism
!first go an establish some rudiment democratic rights in chin and then come and critize about our democratic system!and who told you that India doesn't have money,ohh wait it must be the great 
hu jintao himself!we are a 2 trillion dollar democracy and our economy will son get doubled by 2020!you chinis are becoming so arrogant because your country suddenly has become rich that you don't mind insulting other countries just for fun!but don't forget that the wheel of economy is very uncertain,today you have become the 2nd largest economy and we are at no.7 but who can tell that we won't become the 2nd largest economy in the next 15 years!so it's very dangerous to take pride on your economic status and insulting the weaker ones as we all know that your bad karmawill eventually haunt you down asthey say that karma is a bi**ch:taunt1:!
