Full Article by Shri Vijay Gokhle
What a gem of an ARTICLE!!!
All those who are interested in geopolitics,
kindly bookmark this Article. This is "Future engraved in stone".
https://stratnewsglobal.com/indias-response-to-covid-19-will-define-its-future-global-role/
India’s Response To COVID-19 Will Define Its Future Global Role
Vijay Gokhale
8-10 minutes
PUNE: Time will tell if COVID-19 defines the remainder of the 21st century. History may not hold the answers because disruption on a global scale has not been witnessed before, not even during the two world wars of the 20th century. COVID-19 transcends all barriers, geographical, physical, social and cultural. It has become personal to every individual on this planet.
How and why it began will engage scientific and medical professionals for years. Each government and society will need to “feel’’ their way to finding a solution that fits. There are examples, good and bad — China, Italy, Singapore and South Korea. But India is none of these countries.
WHO executive director Michael J. Ryan has said that the future of COVID-19 to a greater extent, will be determined by what happens in densely populated large countries. But it is more than just that. How India tackles this public health crisis will not just determine the future of COVID-19, it will reshape our world.
In the past 30 years and more and especially after 1992, China’s spectacular rise has shaped our world more than any other development. Its technocrat-governed, state-owned enterprises driven, export-oriented manufacturing model powered by a disciplined workforce, has been the world’s envy.
As it created wealth, it also spun myths about the superiority of its governance model, mainly to convince its own population why the communist model is better than other political systems, and later to the rest of the world. It came to be labelled as the ‘BEIJING CONSENSUS’.
To be fair, others added and admitted in propagating the superiority of the Chinese system. Those who prospered from China’s rise, extolled the virtues of clear policy making, workforce efficiency and ease of doing business.
They were unmindful, some wilfully that China’s labour laws, banking systems, property rights and legal means were non-democratic, even draconian and illegal in their own countries. These businesses preached the virtues of the China system to their governments. The Tiananmen incident of 1989 became a footnote in world history, and human rights, simply an occasional point to be made by western leaders to their own population, as a token gesture of moral superiority.
The guardians of democracy — the world’s media — also played their part well. To be posted as a correspondent in China in the 1990s and 2000s was tantamount to a one-way ticket to success and glory. To be sure, there were some who wrote about the problems too but until a couple of years ago,
it was well known in media circles in China that it was preferable to cohabit with the foreign ministry. To be invited to tea by the Chinese official spokesperson was as avoidable as COVID-19.
COVID-19 has dispelled the myths around the Beijing consensus. Try as the Chinese authorities might to showcase their system as having efficiently tackled a national emergency, even the remotest nation on earth has learned about their failure. This time it will not be so simple to white wash. After all it has adversely impacted the last person on earth.
Where does India come into this play? And why should it matter to the rest of the world? The easy answer is that we are one-sixth of humanity and our inability to prevail over COVID-19 would have global implications. But beyond this easy answer, is there a deeper meaning in the current global state-of-play? COVID-19 is not merely a medical war; it is a conflict of ideas.
We are a democracy. Every five years we elect our leaders. National policy is made in Parliament after open debate. It can be freely criticised and also legally challenged. And for years on end, it has been regarded as an imperfect system when juxtaposed with China’s. It has suited the Chinese. It becomes easier for them to explain to their people when a neighbour as big, as populous, as underdeveloped as them, is unable to match China’s economic progress; that choosing one’s leaders may not be a better option.
The Chinese public, from time to time, disparages or mocks our democracy. When they do so, it is from fear. The fear that if democratic India can deliver, the rule of the Communist Party can be challenged. India, not western democracies, is the real existential ideological threat. How we handle this crisis will determine our place in the world of the future.
The government response has been comprehensive and leader-driven. A central task force has been set up and COVID-19 has been declared a notified disaster in order to help states get access to funds. Travel advisories are in force; all movement domestically is being constrained. The prime minister’s call for a “Janata curfew” saw a national response. In our fight against COVID-19, all institutions of the state have begun working in tandem and it is being done in the full glare of our media and our citizens. Far from hiding the enormity of the challenge, we are open. Even as we prepare to fully engage, discussion is being encouraged on how we should deal with the economic consequences of COVID-19. Media is in the frontline of this battle, not as “embedded correspondents’’, but as full partners in a democracy in reporting facts and in counselling the people.
We have a long and painful battle ahead. It calls for sustained leadership (through persuasion and not coercion) but equally it calls upon all citizens to follow. It is for this reason that all citizens must heed the advice of the government and join the fight unconditionally. For what is at stake is not merely our own health and economic well-being, but the very future of India in the world.
If we prevail in this fight, we will show to the rest of the world, that imperfect as it may be, democracy is the better method of delivering results in the face of an international crisis. And that it works with all its faults and imperfections. And that it can thrive even in countries where there are large and poor populations, as much as it does in the richer and less populated parts of the world.
When 1.3 billion Indians can prove this by our deeds and actions, we will gain the world’s respect and we will emerge as a global leader. We could put to rest those who say democracy is a luxury for the richer part of the world.
We can become a democratic model that is different from the western model, but as efficient and we can face the other 1.3 billion and say that this is an alternative available to them.
After COVID-19 is over and done with, the world may yet go back to doing business with China albeit differently, because its global manufacturing capacity will be needed for recovery and growth, but the world will have learned a lesson. Bold decisions on attracting foreign companies to India as well as a rethink of our stand on multilateral trading arrangements may be one way to bring back our economy and convince the world of our centrality in not only fighting the crisis but also rebuilding post-crisis.
China will put on its humanitarian face using its business icons and its markets to repair the damage in the West,
while reaching deep into its pockets to buy support in Africa, Asia and elsewhere. Those who call them out may be pressured and possibly punished. They expect this from the West.
But if we speak out it will be different. For that reason alone, our voice will be important. Chinese reactions will be predictable, talk of third world and Asian solidarity will be mixed with hints, and even some action that they have the capacity to disrupt our economic recovery. They will act against us in multilateral bodies and activate the expected pressure points in the region. We have been down this road in recent times and faced their ire. We may have to do so again, but we will earn the world’s respect and demonstrate that we are ready for global leadership.
(The author retired recently as India’s Foreign Secretary. Views are personal)
And here is Chinese perspective. How they pursue India.
For China India is non existent entity, No more then an irritant. But still some how they are fearful about India.
Kindly note they consider MODI AS BIGGER THREAT THEN, INDIA AS A WHOLE.
These Bastards see India is perspective only when they factor India in Alliance with USA, otherwise India stands NOWHERE.
Wakeup call all Indians, India's enemy is China, in every possible way.
If anybody has
DREAMS THAT INDIA CAN EVER BE FRIEND WITH CHINA, PLEASE CLEAR COBWEBS FROM THEIR EYES.
https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-india/
warontherocks.com
China’s Strategic Assessment of India - War on the Rocks
Yun Sun
17-22 minutes
This year marks the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India. Ties between Beijing and New Delhi have been fraught throughout those decades, including a
border war in 1962,
the Sikkim skirmishes in 1967,
the Sumdorong Chu Valley skirmish in 1987, and
the Doklam standoff in 2017. The two countries continue to harbor disagreements over their shared border, the
issue of Dalai Lama, China’s security
cooperation with Pakistan,
trade, and the geopolitics of South Asia and Asia as a whole.
China’s policy toward India in the past two to three years has shifted. It now actively promotes closer ties.
The reason for this move was the drastic rupture from the Doklam standoff between China and India in 2017, in which Chinese and Indian troops faced off along part of their disputed border. In addition,
Beijing fears an emerging India-U.S. alliance as part of Washington’s
Indo-Pacific Strategy. In fact, China and India have announced 70 events throughout the year to celebrate the 70th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. The official rapprochement between these two global giants represents a case of major realignment — a rare case for the Chinese playbook.
Despite high-profile visits by senior leaders, China remains profoundly suspicious of India’s strategic ambition and intentions. Such duality — formal rapprochement on the surface versus distrust and hedging in private — will continue into the foreseeable future with major implications for the region’s peace and stability.
The Trajectory of Bilateral Ties
China believes in power politics and its own natural superiority.
Beijing’s vision for Asia is strictly hierarchical — with China at the top — and does not consider India an equal. Recognizing India’s historical influence in South Asia, its capability as a regional power, and its global potential, China’s policy toward India has largely followed a pattern of balancing India in South Asia by propping up Pakistan and developing ties with small countries in the region. In addition, China has sought to prevent an India-U.S. alignment in Asia. When possible, Beijing has tried to build a “coalition” with India on the global level as members of the “Global South.” Disputes and disagreements existed but were managed as neither side was willing to change the status quo in a radical manner.
Xi and Modi becoming the leaders of China and India, respectively, significantly elevated the stress on bilateral relations. Both leaders are ambitious and keen on expanding their countries’ influence while bolstering their vitality:
Xi through the Belt and Road Initiative and Modi through the Modi Doctrine. On the bilateral level, China believes Modi is trying to force China’s hand on border disputes, India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group membership, Masood Azhar’s terrorist designation, and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor projects in Kashmir. Convinced of its superiority, Beijing did not believe it needed to cater to India — although it does now — and rejected Modi’s demands on all fronts.
China’s condescension and India’s frustration culminated in the Doklam standoff in the summer of 2017, in which Chinese and Indian troops staged a confrontation for more than two months over China’s road construction in the trijunction area between China, India, and Bhutan. This standoff was a watershed event in China’s policy toward India during recent decades. Although both countries refrained from the use of force,
India’s assertiveness forced China to reassess India’s strategic capability and resolve. This reassessment challenged much of the previous longstanding bias that colored China’s judgment, including the simplistic and static view of India’s inferior status in the regional power hierarchy.
The Asymmetry of Threat Perceptions
For China, the Doklam standoff raised fundamental questions regarding the nature of India’s threat.
Despite the asymmetry of their national power — India’s GDP is 20 percent that of China’s — China is disadvantaged by the asymmetry of threat perceptions.
Simply put, India sees China as its primary threat while China sees India as a secondary challenge. Beijing’s national security priorities unequivocally lie in the western Pacific. Such asymmetry of security priorities means that India may not yet rival China in national power or in a conventional or nuclear arms race, but its resolve and focus on China are significantly stronger than those of China.
Because India is not China’s primary threat and South Asia is not China’s primary theater, China would prefer to save on costs and minimize military and strategic resources on India.
In the event that a conflict is unavoidable, China could mobilize to an overwhelming capacity to achieve a decisive victory on the battlefield — which is why the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 was constantly mentioned during the Doklam standoff. (WHAT THESE CHINESE BASTARD THINKS OF INDIA & MODI? WHAT INDIA IS, IS IT INDIA OF 1962 OF NEHRU???)
However, China doesn’t want to have a conflict with India. over either the border or the status of Kashmir. Even if China could defeat and contain India through a war, the payoff for China would remain minimal because it wouldn’t address China’s key external security challenges in the Pacific.
Instead, a breakdown in ties with New Delhi would only further expose Beijing in its primary theater vis-à-vis the United States.
China’s strategic goal is to stabilize relations with India in order to avoid a two-front war with the United States and India — all while minimizing distractions. But the challenge of this goal lies in how it can be achieved.
For China, the Chinese and Indian demands are different and asymmetrical by nature. Key concessions that India demands from China — such as the border settlement and U.N. terrorist designations for anti-India militant groups based in Pakistan — are hard commitments that cannot be reversed. What China needs from India — such as neutrality and political alignment — is ephemeral and easily adjustable. (JUST SEE AT THE AUDACITY OF "MIDDLE KINGDOM" SYNDROME.) While New Delhi sees addressing these issues as the prerequisite for India to trust China, Beijing doesn’t believe that relinquishing its leverage will in any way stop India from conducting hostile actions down the road — especially given their clashing regional visions.
As such, China’s policy towards India is pulled in two opposite directions — between a perhaps genuine desire for friendly ties with India so it can focus on the United States and the Pacific, and an equally genuine hostility due to conflicting agendas in Asia. The former points to a positive trajectory with reduced distrust and enhanced ties. The latter explains the lack of substantive progress in achieving such results.
China’s Debate on India-U.S. Ties
China’s distrust of New Delhi is greater as the result of burgeoning India-U.S. ties. Washington’s
Indo-Pacific Strategy, released three months after the Doklam standoff, seeks to anchor India in its larger Asia posture. The role, assistance, alignment, and power status the United States have offered India contributed to China’s speedy rapprochement with India and its deepening suspicion of India at the same time.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy has sent China into a frenzy of damage control in order to prevent the emergence of an India-U.S. alliance. When China was more or less reassured by Modi’s reiteration of “strategic autonomy” and reluctance to embrace the Indo-Pacific concept in public, China elevated the status of Sino-Indian relations to an unprecedented level, resulting in a rather abrupt positive shift after the Doklam crisis.
Since then, the U.S. factor has become the most important consideration in China’s policy toward India. For China, the prospect of facing the American military at sea and the Indian military along its southern border and in the Indian Ocean becomes much more real and dangerous with defense cooperation between the United States and India. Such cooperation will not only damage the security and stability of China’s western borderland while undermining China’s strategic influence in South Asia; it will also hinder China’s power projection capability in the Indian Ocean with the potential to threaten China’s energy supply from the Middle East. Regionally and globally, the U.S. endorsement of India’s leadership status dilutes and diminishes China’s soft power, and encourages other countries like Japan and Australia to follow suit in seeking closer ties with New Delhi.(THIS IS WHAT CHINA IS MOST WORRIED ABOUT "THE QUAD ALLIANCE".
China’s elevation of relations with India reveals an inconvenient truth: exogenous factors primarily drive China’s rapprochement with India.
Had Washington not adopted the Indo-Pacific Strategy and pursued alignment with India, the trajectory of China’s policy toward India would have looked very different. Before and after the Doklam standoff, nothing endogenous in Sino-Indian relations fundamentally changed, including the unresolved border disputes, the competition between China and India for influence in South Asia, the longstanding Tibet issue, the growing trade imbalance, the Pakistan factor, and the two countries’ vastly different visions for the regional order. China might have concluded that improved ties with India were in its interests,
but the decision to reach out to New Delhi occurred when it did because Beijing saw the United States swaying India’s preference.
While India has no place in China’s vision for the regional order, the United States offers India a significant position in the Indo-Pacific Strategy. U.S. President Donald Trump’s India policy is the biggest factor that has altered China’s calculation about India’s strategic importance and pushed Beijing to appease New Delhi.
But, if the assessment is that India has accepted a de facto alliance with United States, China will have to prepare for a very different approach toward India.
The Chinese South Asia policy community is currently debating the nature of the India-U.S. alignment and the malleability of India’s preferences.
The consensus in China seems to be that India wants and needs to rely on the United States to balance China’s growing regional dominance. The disagreement lies in the extent to which India will align and cooperate with Washington for this shared agenda.
Chinese civilian observers and diplomats — former and current — have rather low expectations about India-U.S. cooperation. For them, India and the United States appear to be innately incompatible. In terms of strategic culture, India follows a non-alignment tradition while U.S. global strategy is based on alliances. In terms of strategic goals, India does not seek a total confrontation with China though a confrontation appears to be America’s aim. In terms of partners, India seeks diverse partnerships, including with Russia, a U.S. adversary.
In terms of technical compatibility, India has no intention to completely abandon Russian weapons systems, which makes America’s proposed interoperability a challenge in the least. For these Chinese experts, the India-U.S. alignment is tactical — out of expediency — and lacks systematic commitment and binding arrangements. When conflicting calculations arise — and they will arise — the India-U.S. alignment will fall apart.
Unlike their counterparts who are more focused on diplomacy and foreign policy,
Chinese defense strategists and security experts are concerned about the substance of the growing India-U.S. ties. In their view, Washington is making India offers that India cannot refuse, including but not limited to defense industry cooperation, arms sales, and information and intelligence sharing. Even if India thinks it is maintaining its autonomy, Chinese strategists see India enticed, entangled, and potentially enmeshed in institutionalized cooperative frameworks that it later cannot reject despite its aspiration for autonomy.
For hardliners in Beijing,
the benefits that the United States has offered in material and diplomatic terms have already emboldened New Delhi to pursue risky policies vis-à-vis Pakistan in addition to a more assertive negotiating posture towards China. Within the region, China has grown increasingly wary of the destabilizing effect of Modi’s foreign policy. From Beijing’s perspective, the Modi Doctrine is heavily imbued with his Hindu nationalism and was recently strengthened by his victories on Article 370, changing the legal status of Kashmir, and a controversial citizenship law. Moreover, the Modi Doctrine directly reflects what the Chinese see as a risk-seeking or, at a minimum, a risk-neutral policy toward Pakistan. The Chinese are innately distrusting of any country’s foreign policy that is linked to radical domestic politics — a bitter lesson China learned from itself during the Cultural Revolution. In the case of India, China is also worried that its domestic ethno-religious conflicts could potentially spill over across the border.(CHINESE BASTARDS CONVENIENTLY FORGOT WHAT THEY ARE DOING IN XINGIANG) .
The Implication for South Asia Crisis Management
The changing power equilibrium and alignment among the United States, China, India, and Pakistan have a critical impact on the crisis dynamics of South Asia. Despite the warming of ties on the surface, the suspicion and embedded hostility between China and India have in fact deepened since the introduction of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. Regional dynamics have shifted, leaving the United States and India on one side with China and Pakistan on the other.
These changing dynamics will have important implications for U.S. policy toward South Asia and crisis management down the road.
The prospect of China playing a helpful and constructive role in a future India-Pakistan crisis is inevitably dampened. In the 2019 Pulwama crisis, China publicly called for de-escalation and restraint as usual, but some have raised questions regarding the information Beijing shared with Pakistan. China may increasingly view South Asia as a zero-sum game — any perceived win for India will register as a loss for Beijing, and vice versa.(THESE CHINESE BASTARDS THINK THEY CAN MEDDLE IN AFFAIRS CONCERNING INDIA), (NO MATTER WHAT THEY WILL NEVER LET PAKISTAN FAIL, PAKISTAN IS THEIR KEY TO INDIA) As a result, China will be more inclined to manipulate the game to improve its strategic payoff vis-à-vis the United States and India. In that case, the best that the United States can hope for might be for China to not become a spoiler.
In the past, the United States enlisted Chinese constructive support in crisis management between India and Pakistan. Such a role was conditioned upon a perceived relative balance of power between India and Pakistan.
However, as Beijing has keenly observed, that delicate balance of power between India and Pakistan increasingly favors New Delhi. If Pakistan is no longer able to act as China’s balancer of India in South Asia, China’s most direct remedy is the strengthening of Pakistan’s power by way of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, (AND THIS IS WHAT CHINA-PAKISTAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR IS ALL ABOUT). a massive infusion of funding and infrastructure projects to revive Pakistan’s economy. However,
if that strategy is not successful in the near future, China could step in with more direct involvement in the form of further security assistance (WATCH OUT FOR STEALTH AIRCRAFT & NUCLEAR SUBMARINE FOR PAKISTAN IN NEAR FUTURE).
As the competition deepens between China on the one hand and the United States and India on the other, China will have less incentive to “deliver” Pakistan in a crisis scenario.
A widely shared perception in China is that India’s appetite only grows when China makes concessions and forces Pakistan’s hand. From the perspective of Beijing, India’s new-found alignment with the United States has emboldened Modi’s adventurism. For example, India revoked Article 370 five months after its brinkmanship in Pulwama, which directly challenged China’s territorial claims in Ladakh. For China, whatever it delivers on Pakistan will not be seen as China’s good will but a concession extracted due to India’s strength. Following that logic, India will make even more demands if China delivers anything.
The subtle changes to China’s calculations regarding crisis management in South Asia do not mean that Beijing will actively facilitate or expedite a crisis in South Asia. Given China’s reactive strategic culture and the fact that its strategic priority lies in the West Pacific, it is almost inconceivable that China would deliberately prompt a confrontation to change the status quo in South Asia. China has traditionally resorted to diplomatic mediation to defuse crises between India and Pakistan. However, in the midst of a changing power equilibrium and external alignment in South Asia, a China that feels defensive and vulnerable is unlikely to be as helpful as the United States would like to see.
However,
China could be more helpful under one scenario: when Washington treats crisis management in South Asia as its overwhelming priority and China’s cooperation as an indispensable component.(BILLI KE KHWAB AUR USKE SAPNE ME CHICHDE- "MEAT LOAFS IN DREAMS OF A CAT") Since its ties with Washington have plummeted in recent years, China has been desperately seeking issues that could still merit cooperation with the United States to prove that Sino-U.S. relations are not yet damaged beyond repair.
If Washington pursues Beijing to jointly manage a crisis in South Asia, China would be willing to cooperate. However, in that case, it is also foreseeable that China will be unlikely to facilitate a long-term solution so that it can continue capitalizing on the U.S. need for Chinese cooperation — just like what it has done with North Korea.(CHINA IS USING PAKISTAN AS NORTH KOREA) In light of the prevailing great-power competition between Beijing and Washington, however, crisis management in South Asia is probably another case of collateral damage.
Conclusion
Despite China’s public embrace of India and the official elevation of Sino-Indian relations to an unprecedented level, Beijing’s distrust and hostility toward India run deep, and vice versa. While the two countries have incompatible interests on a range of key issues, there’s little chance of reconciling those differences any time soon. In the meantime, China is trying to both stabilize ties with India and prepare for future disruptions.
China and India are both powers with regional hegemonic ambition and potential. Their structural conflict is irreconcilable until the two countries find a mutually agreeable compromise in their regional arrangements. Efforts to address the endogenous frictions — such as the border dispute and trade imbalance — could foreseeably help to facilitate that compromise. However, in the era of great-power rivalry and domestic populism, such efforts would be exceedingly difficult.
Yun Sun is the director of the China program and co-director of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center.
- enjoy the many "But V Gib Bajillions of AID waaaaa" ass burns
