Will General Bipin Rawat go down as one of the greatest generals of Indian Army?

[captscooby81]

FM K M Cariappa was the first Field Marshal of Indian Army ..

FM Sam Maneckshaw
Gen. Kariappa

Lt. Gen. Kaul will go down as the worst.

 

[indiatester]

Yes, you are correct. Gen. Jacob should be in that list.

There is another person who acted even before Gen. Jacob. Gen. Jacob acted after getting approval. Brigadier Sant Singh acted before getting approval. He violated a few basic principles that he was taught in the military and came out with flying colours.

I think you missed out a big one. Gen. Sundarji.

 

[aliyah]

He was a political appointee promoted out of turn. He presided over India's 1962 defeat. To his credit, he did go to the NEFA front to share the miseries of the troops and ended up in the hospital.

Military historian and filmmaker Shiv Kunal Verma has the military all around him, Verma's book is one of the few comprehensive accounts pieced together to give the total picture—not only of the battlescape, but also the political space. The book opens with the infamous run-ins between the Jawaharlal Nehru-Krishna Menon political leadership and the K.S. Thimayya-led military on the other, but quickly moves on to be with the officers and men on the ground. It presents the story of how they fought the Chinese and among themselves and against the ferocious forces of weather against which they had no defence.

Excerpts from the book

Nehru was waiting for Thimayya and for the first time, the normally reticent Timmy exchanged angry words with the prime minister. He told Nehru that his arbitrary decision of making NEFA [North-East Frontier Agency] the responsibility of the army, made public in Parliament, was preposterous and completely against Indian interests. Thimayya felt that Nehru had completely compromised the army.

Without providing the additional resources required, handing over the borders to the army was a meaningless gesture; this would allow the Chinese the opportunity to claim that the Indians were the aggressors, for they always went to great pains to describe their own troops as border guards. Thimayya asked Nehru to find a way out of the mess in the next couple of weeks, after which he departed. Immediately after Thimayya’s departure, the shaken prime minister summoned Krishna Menon to Teen Murti.

Nehru and Krishna Menon knew that the prime minister was in serious trouble. He had got away with the admission in Parliament earlier in the day only because the triple whammy—ongoing clashes on the border, the construction of National Highway G219 across the Aksai Chin and the Khenzemane and Longju incidents—had come as a shock to the members of the House. At any rate, it was unlikely that any of the parliamentarians knew the terrain or understood matters pertaining to the military to raise any meaningful questions. Thimayya wanted Nehru to undo the mistake; but should the prime minister formally withdraw his statement about deploying the army and revert to the previous arrangement, he would be committing political hara-kiri. The threat of Thimayya taking over the reins of government, at least in Nehru’s mind, was very real.

Politics is full of subterfuge, and survival, when the chips are down, is perhaps the biggest challenge. Not only did the Nehru-Menon team now have to survive, they had to neutralize Thimayya. Three days later, Krishna Menon sent for Thimayya in ‘a highly excited state of mind’ and vented his anger at the chief for having approached the prime minister directly, suggesting instead that the matter should have been resolved at his level. Threatening Thimayya of ‘possible political repercussions if the matter became public’ Krishna Menon ended the meeting. A seething Thimayya returned to his office, and after a brief conversation with his wife, Neena, promptly sent in his resignation letter.

The letter, which was received by Teen Murti on the afternoon of 31 August, was put up to Nehru who promptly sent for Thimayya in the afternoon. By now Nehru was far more assured in his manner, using his authority and personal charm to good effect. After a long conversation in which the prime minister persuaded the army chief to withdraw his resignation letter in the larger interest of the nation, especially since the problem with the Chinese had flared up, the matter of the resignation was deemed closed.

However, after Thimayya’s departure, news of his resignation was deliberately leaked to the media while the subsequent rescinding of the letter was held back. Quite expectedly, the Thimayya resignation made banner headlines the next morning. Through the day, there was no formal reaction from the government, as the prime minister was preoccupied with General Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, who was in transit through New Delhi. By the evening the Press Trust of India had announced that Krishna Menon had also resigned, only to withdraw its report a short while later.

On 2 September 1959, the prime minister once again rose in Parliament to make a statement. He told the Lok Sabha that he had persuaded the chief to withdraw his resignation. He then went on to speak about the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military and then, had surprisingly, proceeded to castigate Thimayya, saying the issues that led to his resignation were ‘rather trivial and of no consequence’, and that they arose ‘from temperamental differences’. He then chided the chief and reproached him for ‘wanting to quit in the midst of the Sino-Indian border crisis’.

Even today, the contents of Thimayya’s resignation letter remain a highly guarded secret. Instead, vague stories about Thimayya’s resignation were routinely floated where it was said that Timmy had resigned out of pique because of the manner in which Krishna Menon treated him. On careful scrutiny, that doesn’t hold water.

The much adored prime minister, who could do no wrong in the eyes of the public, had betrayed General Thimayya. Trapped in this bad situation, the chief had no option but to quietly endure the humiliation and get on with the job of trying to prepare the army to face the Chinese when the need arose.

The prime minister’s attitude towards Thimayya was damaging to the chief as well as the army. A whispering campaign started that speculated on the ‘rather trivial’ reasons for Thimayya’s resignation. That the chief was unhappy with the defence minister’s insistence on promoting certain officers was a well-known fact and pre-dated the Longju incident. It was hinted that the ‘temperamental differences’ were a direct result of this difference of opinion. General Thimayya was, by all accounts, a seasoned, disciplined soldier who would hardly have made issues over trifles. Only overriding national interests could have provoked him to take this step. Further, as a disciplined soldier he had accepted his prime minister’s assurance and withdrawn his resignation. From the day he had taken charge, Thimayya had been focused on redressing the various problems that faced the Indian Army, especially the evolving civil-military equation where the army seemed quite removed from the decision-making process on matters relating to defence. However, he found himself up against a wall in the form of the Ministry of Defence, which was either indifferent or hostile to his moves. After the resignation drama Thimayya was seen as an alarmist and a defeatist. Having thus weakened the office of the army chief, the prime minister now placed his hope in the man he believed had all the answers. In the corridors of power in New Delhi, it was Lieutenant General B. M. ‘Bijji’ Kaul whose star was on the rise.

The Chinese had the first laugh, as the Indians had so far played the game just as they would have wished them to. Even according to Chinese records, at no stage had there been any action that pitted more than an Indian infantry company against at least four to five times the number of Chinese troops. The Chinese officially admit to 2,419 casualties (722 dead and 1,697 wounded). The figure is quite stunning, given the situation in which each Indian position was asked to fight.

From all accounts, Bogey Sen’s presence in Tawang between 22 and 23 October only added to the confusion. Before landing at Tawang, the army commander had flown towards Zimithang to get an idea of the terrain which he was not familiar with at all. Once in Tawang, as we have seen, Sen did nothing to bolster the confidence of the garrison. The meeting with [Lt Gen Niranjan] Prasad later in the evening focused on two issues: the Nam Ka Chu rout of 7 Brigade and the immediate withdrawal from Tawang. Bogey Sen opposing a withdrawal only amounted to theatrics, for had he wished, as the army commander, he had the authority to overrule Prasad.

Both officers at the time were unaware that Army HQ, now represented by Monty Palit, was pushing for the same decision. There was a critical difference though—Prasad was planning on falling back on Bomdila with Se-la only playing the part of a delaying obstacle. Palit, on the other hand, based on the one incomplete reconnaissance made almost two years ago, had made up his mind to dig in at Se-la. [Army chief Pran Nath] Thapar having gone along with his DMO, who now had the tacit approval of Nehru, was relegated to the role of a spectator. The Thorat Plan, even though it hadn’t been implemented, at least had had some discussions around it and plans had been drawn up. Just as Tawang was abandoned on a whim, Se-la was seemingly chosen arbitrarily by Monty Palit who played the ‘cleared by the cabinet’ card to ride roughshod over any opposition.

In the coming days, the Indian military high command would take decisions that lacked even the most basic common sense. Even as Palit was coming out of the defence minister’s room with Nehru’s ‘the military must decide where to fight’ mandate, Bogey Sen had decided to sack Niranjan Prasad as GOC 4 Division. Less than three hours previously, as he was leaving Tawang, Sen had eventually endorsed Prasad’s decision to pull back from Bum-la and evacuate Tawang. Surely, having seen for himself the effect of the headlong retreat from Zimithang on Prasad and other senior officers, Sen was experienced enough to know that to pull back any further would result in losing not just all the supplies and material that had so painstakingly been put together, but a withdrawal without a fight would further sap the morale of the men and officers. So far, after the first couple of hours of fighting on the Nam Ka Chu, Tsangdhar, Khenzemane, and Bum-la, all Indian units that had come into contact with the Chinese were only fighting in penny packets or withdrawing. Had it been decided that Tawang was to be held at all costs, it would have made perfect sense to replace Prasad as the GOC since the army commander felt he had lost the will to fight. But to institute this change after the withdrawal order was given was to add considerably to the existing chaos.
On the evening of 23 October neither Delhi, Lucknow nor Tezpur had any idea where the next defensive line was supposed to be; the only orders given until then were to abandon Tawang and Bum-la and fall back on Jang. When Palit took the draft of the order to hold Se-la to the chief, it was decided that Thapar, Palit and the IB chief, [B.N.] Mullik, would fly immediately to Tezpur and discuss the matter with Bogey Sen in person. From all indications,Thapar was still not fully convinced about the decision to hold Se-la. On his own initiative, Palit put into place steps for the stocking of supplies for Se-la, working on the assumption that five battalions would be required to hold the feature.
...........................................................................................................
Its small extract from book just to understand then situation.
Question again why only Lt.gen kaul?????

 

[Spectribution]

If Gen Bipin Rawat keeps kicking ass of Pakis and Chinks and get fresh arty to IA then he will be go down as one of the greatest generals ever.

If he goes SJW and follow's "women empowerment' model of UK,US in allowing WiC then he will be laughed at in all DSOIs around the country for time eternal.

 

[mayfair]

Later during surrender, one Paki soldier remarked to Gen.Jacob that if Paki soldiers ever had a competent leadership like that of IA generals, no force could defeat them.

Napakis will always find excuses for their defeat.

This is an entity that has not won a single war in its entire history and they talk of being unbeatable, but for the lack of leadership?

 

[mayfair]

Gen VK Singh will be up there, not for his military victories (no major skirmishes during his time), but for the long term institutional reforms he initiated (@Kunal Biswas @hammer head @Mikesingh can confirm), some of which were sadly scuttled (TSD).

I suppose, his political rehabilitation was one of the ways to acknowledge his contributions.

 

[Mikesingh]

Its small extract from book just to understand then situation.
Question again why only Lt.gen kaul?????

1962 was a disaster of galactic proportions where there were too many incompetent cooks that spoiled the broth. Before that there were no plans, no strategy, no wargaming no nothing. The Chinese were taken for granted. And so were the Pakis. Nehru even went to the extent of saying that an Army was not needed as the police were competent enough to defend the country! So why waste resources on them?

The junior leaders and troops acquitted themselves well in spite of the the enormous disadvantages but the higher direction of war stuffed with pussies, let them down with their incompetence and utter confusion.

 

[Dark Sorrow]

Gen. K. S. Thimayya
FM Sam Maneckshaw
Gen. Kariappa
Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh
Gen. J. N. Chowdhury
Lt. Gen. J. S. Arora
Gen. V. P. Malik
Maj. Gen. Candeth

I will add the person who ordered the troops in Ladakh correctly anticipating a PLA offensive thus giving enough time to the troops to acclimatize. I do not recall his name.

These are the persons (not in any particular order) who, IMHO, will go down as the greatest generals in the history of independent India. The current general's achievements are insignificant compared to these predecessors before.

Lt. Gen. Kaul will go down as the worst.

You missed out General Jacob who was instrumental in breaking Pakistan in 2 parts.
Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh should be in the first place. He led our forces at the darkest time in independent India.

 

[pmaitra]

You missed out General Jacob who was instrumental in breaking Pakistan in 2 parts.
Lt. Gen. Harbaksh Singh should be in the first place. He led our forces at the darkest time in independent India.

I agree. Someone already pointed that out.

 

[12arya]

I think the COAS is rattling too many cages and pissing all the libs off!

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com...ss-border-army-chief/articleshow/62477439.cms
Will call Pakistan’s nuke bluff if tasked to cross border: Army chief

A Soldier Speaks: Major Gaurav Arya’s Befitting Reply For Defaming Army Chief

(I'm new here and I don't if I can post these here. if not do let me know)

 

[ezsasa]

i think so.. he comes off as a no-nonsense badass that will take terroristan to its logical conclusion. not only that, he is in no mood to give the militants in North-east any respite. Yes he has political backing from the Modi government but I think he was handpicked and superceded two competent generals (Lt.Gen Bakshi and Lt.Gen Hariz) for this reason . In my opinion, he deserves his own thread. Pahari making India proud

Only wartime chiefs get to be the greatest generals, Titles such as "Greatest general" are given public not by fanboys..

But yes, any chief who captures POK and creates land route between India and Afghanistan will get that title and his name will live on for centuries..

 

[12arya]

https://swarajyamag.com/magazine/ra...ading-the-armys-campaign-in-jammu-and-kashmir

Rawat’s Robust Response: How The Chief Is Leading The Army’s Campaign In Jammu And Kashmir
Syed Ata Hasnain

General Bipin Rawat


Snapshot

• A lasting solution to the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir has to come from the political community and the administrative machinery.
  
  Before any of that, though, it falls on the army to create a stable security situation.

This must start on a personal note because the current Indian Army Chief, General Bipin Rawat, is a former colleague and subordinate. He relieved me in the Military Secretary’s branch as the Colonel in charge of policy and management of the officer cadre. While I commanded Indian Army’s Dagger Division in Baramula, he commanded the Rashtriya Rifles 5 Sector (brigade) in the nearby volatile town of Sopore. Later, as I commanded the Chinar Corps, I also had the opportunity of asking for him by name, to command the Dagger Division, my old formation. He later dealt with the North East as a senior staff officer and commanded Indian Army’s largest formation, 3 Corps, which oversees a major part of anti-insurgency operations and the Line of Actual Control.

On 1 January 2017, when General Rawat was appointed Chief of the Indian Army, he brought to his appointment a wealth of experience of having dealt with hybrid conflict conditions in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the North East. He inherited a situation in J&K which was tenuous. Six months post the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani which had triggered unending turbulence on the streets; the army faced three major challenges. First, the Line of Control (LoC) was getting much more active with nearly everyday ceasefire violations by the Pakistan Army. The Hindu areas in the vicinity of the Jammu international boundary were under intense fire, which created communal tension with potential for more negative fallout; that was Pakistan’s intent.

The infiltration of foreign terrorists, although under a fair degree of control, had witnessed attempts at targeting the army’s installations closer to the LoC. This was against the usual trends of deeper movement to safe houses and strikes in the hinterland. The suicide attack on the headquarters of the Uri Brigade on 18 September 2016 was part of this trend. Earlier, the army posts in the Jhelum Valley had also been subjected to such attempts and the brigade headquarters at Poonch and Tangdhar had successfully neutralised terrorist efforts to target them. Related to the LoC was also the fact that on 28 September 2016, the much-hyped surgical strikes had been launched against terrorist launchpads across the border. Although casualties inflicted were unconfirmed, the campaign itself became a celebrated event in India, leading to the expectation of such retribution in future too.

The second challenge was the continuing trend of terrorist strikes in the hinterland. From the high of 2011-12, when the army had established complete domination by effectively choking infiltration, the low was the proliferating local militancy, which required no foreign terrorists, to flourish. South Kashmir found its own moorings through the movement led by Burhan Wani, who succeeded in inspiring a segment of the youth through his image management on social media and networks spread by word of mouth. The surge in violence in 2016 was primarily in the southern districts of Anantnag, Pulwama, Kulgam and Shopian, sometimes moving up to Bandipora. The disturbing trend of flash mobs at encounter sites interfering in operations conducted by the security forces (SF) was leading to severe challenges for the SF, resulting in both SF and civilian casualties. The civilian casualties always triggered further disturbances and the potential of a cyclic chain of negative events always remained high.

The third challenge was a flow out of the second and not restricted to any single aspect. The political environment was vitiated and the local political class was being shunned. It did not have the ability of even visiting the rural areas to which the movement had shifted. The alienation against India and everything Indian was massive and no military civic action programmes such as ‘Sadbhavana’ could hope to overcome this. The new generation of Kashmiris, born after 1989, had only witnessed violence in everyday life and knew little about the happiness of a stress-free environment. It had produced a brooding and vengeful youth veering towards suicidal tendencies.

All the challenges which stood evident in early 2017 continued at different levels through the 18 months that General Rawat has been in office, underlining the fact that hybrid conflicts are long-drawn affairs. However, simultaneously, they were addressed with a new understanding of the ground.

General Rawat’s term as Army Chief, mid-way through his tenure, has been characterised by a robust response at the LoC without any horizontal proliferation. There was a choice to proliferate response to the LoC of the Kashmir sector and even to Kargil. This advice has been eschewed in favour of a stronger response in the areas where Pakistan attempted to escalate, with greater flexibility vested in frontline commanders. This was sane because LoC exchanges in the Kashmir Valley segment helps Pakistan divert the attention of our troops from the counter infiltration grid. The Neelam Valley domination that the Indian Army enjoys is a measure of last resort and must never be encashed too early. The subsidiary prong of this strategy has been the continuously strengthening counter infiltration grid. More prioritisation to sub-sectors and induction of additional units from the Pir Panjal South has afforded this.

It was done with an element of risk incurred both in the Jammu and Valley regions. In the Jammu region, militancy and terror have been largely wiped out, but the potential for resurgence always exists. Moving Rashtriya Rifles units from the grid there did weaken it to an extent. Communal violence and other political factors in Pir Panjal South can always contribute towards destabilisation and possible exploitation by Pakistan. Disturbing an existing but stabilising grid is never a good strategy, but the risk has been worth it because it energised the counter infiltration measures along the LoC in the Kashmir segment.

General Rawat’s knowledge of the ground in the Uri and Lipa sectors did ensure the practical deployment of additional troops. There have been strikes by border action teams of the Pakistan Army, but the demand for crossing the LoC has been silenced through effective neutralisation from our side, except in one case in the Poonch sector late in December 2017, when our troops had to do a shallow trans LoC operation.

Before venturing into reinvigorating the counter-terror operations, General Rawat drew the ire of a part of Indian intelligentsia by using some strong language against those who attempted to come in the way of the army’s operations at encounter sites. He termed them virtually as over-ground workers (OGWs) and promised action against them as anti-national elements, just the way other OGWs are dealt with. It was a strong message to the troops that they need not feel cowed down by the attempts to cause hindrance to their operations.

Operation ‘All Out’ was the generic name given for all counter-terror operations as the SF prepared for the 2017 summer campaign season. While cooperation between the SF constituents has always been good, the need for further refinement of cooperation was a necessity due to the changing nature of conflict. The necessity of being on the same page was never felt more as vigilante flash mobs attempted to intervene and prevent the effectiveness of execution of operations. A couple of decisions added weight to the effectiveness. First among them was on reintroduction of cordon and search operations (CASO). Generic CASO is executed when intelligence is not specific but exists in bits and pieces. It involves a larger number of troops and creates alienation among the populace, which has to suffer the ignominy of search of houses over a longer duration. This was the challenge in South Kashmir and the return to CASO ensured better domination, and in some cases, actual contact with terrorists. CASO was progressively reduced through later months of 2017 as greater domination was achieved.

Operation ‘All Out’ remained dynamic in concept as it switched to focus on terrorist leaders, who through social media were attempting to create personality cults and larger-than-life images of themselves. This strategy, which the army adopted to curb terrorist initiatives and break their command, control and planning, again proved invaluable as close to 20 militants were eliminated. The infamous photograph of the team of young terrorists with Burhan Wani saw all the members on display being neutralised. Hard operations convey the right message that life as a terrorist may not exceed more than three months.

It is in the third domain, the socio political one that the SF initiatives have yet to bear fruit to the degree desired. This is work in progress. It needs to be appreciated that soft power initiatives to take effect require the rebuilding of trust and creation of hope through restoration of the dignity and self-esteem of the people, and 2018 is the right year for that. To its credit, the army continued with almost all its soft power measures, but the ability to dilute alienation could enhance only marginally because of powerful narratives, which the separatists had been able to ingrain once again in the minds. General Rawat made it clear in a recent media interaction that the contribution, which infiltration made towards sustenance of levels of violence, has been curbed and controlled.

However, the terrorist strength today is being maintained through the phenomenon of local recruitment of youth driven by the passion generated on the streets and funerals of young terrorists, who were many cases their friends. This means that a virtually interminable chain of induction and availability of local terrorists will make the attainment of peace a non-starter. For this, the assistance of the political community, clergy and academics, and of parents, is a must. They have to be empowered to speak, travel and address through multiple means of communication. The army is never afraid to extend a helping hand well beyond its responsibilities as the attainment of peace remains its ultimate aim. If by its own presence or redeployment, it can assist in this effort, it will ensure that, and even provide necessary feedback for the efforts. The political community has to be urged to engage with the people but shorn of political rhetoric. This assurance has been given time and again by the Chief.

The political and social outreach is enabled by the domination achieved in the security situation. The continuity of that domination is as essential, because such strategies cannot work in fits and starts or remain driven by personalities. They have to be institutionalised. The army under its current Chief understands this better than almost all, and has, therefore, worked towards putting together its best practices for continuity. A major achievement in the internal dynamics of the army has been the careful succession procedure to ensure optimum talent in the field is maintained without trying to question the validity of specialisation needed for India’s most enduring military challenge.

Anyone who knows the profession of soldiering would appreciate that the most important battle-winning factor for warriors remains the entire notion of trust. What the current leadership like many of those in the past has achieved is to maintain and build on the concept of trust. Commanders down the chain have been empowered and backed up many times even in the event of mistakes, which in such conditions will occur. It is important to allow the army to do its work and back it with equal degree of trust from the political leadership. The situation in J&K is as worrisome or stable as one may wish to read it. The most important thing is to back the political community and the administrative machinery and encourage them to provide quality governance and positive narratives even as the army holds the periphery and prevents any breach

 

[HariPrasad-1]

He is a very good general like other generals of Indian army. However, to fall in the category of SAM or Krishna swamy sunder ji, one need a chance from time to show their own stuff. If any conflict happens, we will be able to see his stuff or after his retirements and passage of time, some of his work shall come in public domain which shall give us an opportunity know more about him. I am sure that many of the work done by him is under wrap.

 

[vampyrbladez]

Everything is good about this guy except if he has any women in combat BS.That is a deal breaker for a rationalist-militarist-nationalist like me. Sir, if you can find this message, DON'T DO IT!

 

[mayfair]

Hardly rationalist you are................................

 

[12arya]

this guy is pure fun......

 

[Adioz]

What do you guys make of this?
Some fair points made IMHO.

End of the two-front war chimera
The Army added 3 lakh troops while selling the dream of a two-front war. If India instead had a joint land doctrine for peace-time deterrence, it would not have been militarily coerced in Doklam.

THE proposed restructuring of the Indian Army is a one-man show, meant to deflect political pressure to reduce the army through perception management. The Army chief General Bipin Rawat’s suggestions are not reforms, but quick-fixes through borrowed ideas.

The key idea of joint-ness at the top (Army Headquarters and field formations) by cutting down directorates and headquarters is straight from China’s People Liberation Army’s 2015 military reforms book. Instead of suggestions from field commanders on how to reduce troops without compromising operational efficiency, Gen. Rawat has put the deliberative process on its head by announcing his verdict to his commanders. Moreover, he has rushed to disclose the convening order of the three committees (the preliminary stage) to the media as fait accompli well ahead of the final acceptance within the service.

Yet, Gen. Rawat cannot get the right balance between the army’s revenue (for troops’ pay and allowances) and capital allocations (for acquisitions) for desired modernisation without some deep thinking and cutbacks. Since the year 2000, the army has added one command headquarters, three corps headquarters, five divisions (56, 57, 59, 71 and 72 mountain divisions) and six brigades. This is in addition to the 80,000 strong Rashtriya Rifles which does counter-terrorism operations. All these add up to about three lakh troops.
Most of these mindless accretions have happened since 2009 after the army successfully sold the idea of preparing for the two-front war to the government. Now, unless these nearly three lakh troops are slashed after deliberations, readjustments and restructurings, the army would not be able to do its desired modernisation in order to remain operationally relevant to the new warfare. Remember, the PLA took three years of deliberations (from November 2012 to March 2015) before its reforms were announced, and hopes to accomplish them by 2020.

What we need are reforms for the military and not the Army alone in order to acquire conventional war deterrence. Since the warfare has altered drastically with the induction of stand-off, precision, stealth, unmanned, and deniable weapon platforms across all war domains (to ensure minimal casualties and greater speed) of land, air, space, sea, cyber and electronic, the old reforms suggested by various earlier military reform committees are no longer relevant.
Given this, the starting point for new reforms should be the lessons of the 2017 Doklam crisis between India and China. For example, the unrealisable two-front war thinking failed the Doklam test. Since India was not prepared for even peace-time escalation beyond the tactical face-off, Prime Minister Narendra Modi sought peace with President Xi Jinping at Wuhan in April 2018. Considering that most of the army’s new formations including 17 corps have been raised consequent to the acceptance of two-front war formulation, did these raisings make any difference to the Doklam outcome? Clearly not; worse, a newly-raised division of 17 corps meant for China was actually on deployment against Pakistan during the crisis. The Indian Army is simply unable to get over its Pakistan fixation.

While abandoning the two-front war thinking, the Indian military should seek acquisitions based upon defined threats and stop open-ended capability-building. The latter is done by major powers which have global geopolitical interests, vibrant defence-industrial complexes and excellent warfare and defence centres. India has none of these.

The other lesson of Doklam is that the future of warfare is not war, but successful military coercion. I have often heard senior military officers say that China will not go to war with India. Of course, China will not go to war with India because it is able to accomplish its objectives by military coercion. Two examples of successful military coercion by China would help make this point — the South China Sea against the US, and Doklam against India. When Indian generals say that there will be no repeat of the 1962 war, China tells India to forget 1962. China is right. Repeat of 1962 will not happen for two reasons: PLA’s focus is on military coercion in peace-time, and non-contact war, if needed.

The key to beat military coercion is by developing credible peace-time deterrence. In this, the Army, through its border management, would play a critical role. However, the air force should be in the doctrinal loop since it would be the lead service in actual land warfare. This was the mistake made by India during the Doklam crisis. The Air Headquarters was brought into the picture well after the Army had entered into the face-off with the Chinese troops. If India had a joint land doctrine for peace-time deterrence and war-fighting for continental defence, it might not have started the Doklam crisis by blocking the Chinese road construction party.

Thus, the requirement for joint doctrine in peace and war cannot be over-emphasised. As part of the 2015 military reforms, all PLA think-tanks have been bought under the Academy of Military Sciences. These include those devoted to the science and art of warfare and futuristic warfare where Artificial Intelligence (robotics, autonomy and human-machine interface) is set to play a significant role in addition to simulations. The Academy’s strength has risen from 1,000 to more than 10,000 officers. Technology can only be exploited optimally in warfare with joint doctrines for peace and war.

This is how reforms happen, through deliberation and consultation over a period of time; not by cherry-picking ideas from all over the world and superimposing them on existing structures.

 

[mayfair]

For example, the unrealisable two-front war thinking failed the Doklam test.

How did it fail the Doklam test??

Two examples of successful military coercion by China would help make this point — the South China Sea against the US, and Doklam against India.

How was Doklam a "successful military coercion by China"?

But then this is Pravin Sawhney, so what to expect.

 

[Adioz]

How did it fail the Doklam test??



How was Doklam a "successful military coercion by China"?

But then this is Pravin Sawhney, so what to expect.

Put aside the Doklam bashing and his comments on "no deliberations are made before announcing these reforms" part. His statements on joint reforms is what caught my eye. And he is not wrong in pointing out the lack of jointness in our response to China at Doklam. The obvious answer is CDS and Theater commands. Waiting for the day we will get to see those actually implemented.

BTW, was 17 Corps really on deployment against Pakistan? Anybody know?
But its a bit stupid of Pravin for dragging the Mountain Strike Corps into this. I mean, the Corps is not fully ready yet, with the M777s, Chinooks, etc. yet to come.

 

[mayfair]

CDS and theater commands have been pricky issues for us for a while. Especially with the other forces not willing to reinforce IA dominance.

But in the past during wartimes IA cheif has acted as de facto CDS. For instance, FM Maneckshaw was effectively the CDS in 1971 war, with the supreme overall authority. I believe Gen. Malik enjoyed a similar position during Kargil, even as IN was involved in cowing down Napakis in the Arabain sea, far away from Kargil.

That said, the debate on instituting these reforms has been raging for a while. In fact as far back as Kargil when KR commission suggested a slew of defence reforms. It's just that much has not been open to public.

Here is Gen Malik with his views on the matter