What if we had to choose between MBT's.

bengalraider

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ofcourse T-90s is not the future tank ,leo2 or challenger or M1A1 is also not the future tank . evry tank keep on getting better
the difference is that in the case of Abrams and Leo the home military , the U.S army and the budeswehr found enough of an improvement from the predecessor (M60 & Leo1)that they were both inducted in large numbers, contrast that with the reluctance among the Russian general staff to induct the T-90 in large numbers , this has stated that the T-90 is a stopgap the T-95 is going to be the game changer that shall match the Leo or the Abrams.
from the Moscow defense brief
Efforts to create an advanced Russian tank have also been drawn out for a long time. The first official mention of this tank, which the media have dubbed the T-95, was made by Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev in March 2000. According to published sources, work on “Item 195” began at the UVZ design bureau in the early 1990s. The tank is presumably a significant departure from the Soviet-era tanks currently in service. In particular, it is expected to have a new hydropneumatic suspension with adaptive features, and the entire crew will be placed in a sealed compartment inside the hull, isolated from other tank components. The tank will presumably be armed with a new main gun with a caliber of up to 152mm with a new multi-channel fire control system that works in optical, thermal, near IR, and radar spectrums, and is built on the principle of identical capabilities for both gunner and commander and fully supports the hunter-killer mode of operation, a unified command information system and tactical level automatic management system, and advanced active and passive defensive aids to protect the tank from various modern and future types of threat.
In spite of all the work that went into this tank, it would appear that its development is not yet complete; in part, because of the workload imposed by the T-90 export contracts on UVZ and the design bureau. Apparently, during negotiations over the first contract for deliveries of T-90S tanks to India, Indian experts expressed a strong interest in the future Russian tank that was already at a high level of preparedness at that time. If this is true, then considering the extremely positive influence that cooperation with India has had on the success of T-90 production in Russia, it is a pity that no agreement for joint work on “Item 195” was reached. This would surely have assisted the design bureau to develop a genuinely modern Russian tank, and provided it with an assured market.
In the end, all resources were concentrated in the production of the T-90; a tank that, in spite of its strong qualities, is burdened by design flaws typical of the Soviet tank and thus represents something of a dead end for Russian tank building. The production of an advanced Russian tank remains a project for the future, and whether Russia’s defense industry is capable after fifteen years of near-paralysis of providing the Russian army with a high-technology product in the quantities it needs is an open question.
and by the way is your entire family in the military?you keep attributing your views to some uncle or the other.
 

AJSINGH

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the difference is that in the case of Abrams and Leo the home military , the U.S army and the budeswehr found enough of an improvement from the predecessor (M60 & Leo1)that they were both inducted in large numbers, contrast that with the reluctance among the Russian general staff to induct the T-90 in large numbers , this has stated that the T-90 is a stopgap the T-95 is going to be the game changer that shall match the Leo or the Abrams.
from the Moscow defense brief


and by the way is your entire family in the military?you keep attributing your views to some uncle or the other.
yes my father is also in the IA, my grandfather has also is IA ,my father has 3 brother , 2 in IA , one in IN
 

sandeepdg

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Well, according to our needs and resources, i would say that the T-90 is best suited for our current needs..... although we need to take part in the development of the T-95 FMBT with Russia for our future needs........
Given a choice other than the T-90, I would definitely vote for the Leopard 2A6/2E for IA.... it is as of now arguably the best MBT in the world, the only MBT that is operated and favored by the armed forces of 17 countries...
 

Srinivas_K

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T-90 suits the dessert terrain in Rajastan well as it has less weight compared to the other tanks.
 

K Factor

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IDF lost 56 tanks, 18 of them Mk IV... tank corps deaths were made up 33% by Mk IV. Out of the tanks knocked out of action, 32% were Mk IV. Their best tank had a death rate 1% higher than their older tanks. Explain to me how that is a life saver?

T series in Gulf War has nothing to do with nothing. Russian tank casualties in Georgia =ZERO. The last time Russian tanks came under heavy fire was Kadori Gorge 2000, a T-90 took seven RPG hits and kept on rolling without a care in the world.

Russian Anti-Armour Weapons and Israeli Tanks in Lebanon

Mikhail Barabanov

The military conflict that unfolded from 12 July – 14 August, 2006 between Israel and the Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite Islamist Resistance group, marked the first time in several years that the Israeli army has confronted a well equipped opponent in a large-scale confrontation. Military observers paid particular attention to the use of Israeli armour and the outcome of battles between Israeli main battle tanks and Hezbollah’s anti-tank weaponry.
All in all, four division headquarters and 17 Israeli Army brigades (six armoured, seven infantry and four airborne) took part in battle, though not all were up to full combat strength. Over 30,000 Israeli servicemen and up to 400 main battle tanks were directly engaged in battle on Lebanese soil, and the tanks were all Merkava models made in Israel. Of the six armoured brigades, two brigades (7th and 847th) were equipped with the Merkava Mk 2 model, three brigades (188th, 434th and 673rd) with the Merkava Mk 3 model, and one brigade (401st) with the most advanced Merkava Mk 4 model. Of the seven infantry brigades, two (1st and 609th) were equipped with Achzarit heavy armoured personnel carriers, converted from Soviet T-55 tanks seized from Arab forces in the wars of 1967 and 1973.
Since 2000, Hezbollah has turned the expanse between the Israeli border and the Litani river into a heavily fortified line of defence, known as “Nasser.” Practically every settlement was equipped with temporary or permanent fortifications (including concrete bunkers, steel doors, etc), a large number of underground tunnels and heavy camouflage. However, although Hezbollah fighters made use of these fortifications, they did not engage in positional warfare, but mounted mobile military operations. Fighters were mobilized in groups of no more than 20 people (often just five or six), based, as a rule, on detachments of anti-tank missile systems. It appears their strategy was to expose the advancing Israeli units, and tank units in particular, to guided anti-tank missiles fired at a fairly long range, often changing their positions, using a network of tunnels and bunkers.
Hezbollah deployed up to 2500 fighters, of which a core of a thousand “regular” troops were well trained and equipped to the best western standards. These zealous, professional fighters were well supplied with arms, and strictly followed orders. One could not say that Israel was fighting with “partisan” formations in the conventional sense of the term, but in reality with a well equipped and organized regular army, even if it displayed some peculiar methods of warfare.
Hezbollah made a special effort to confront Israeli armour with a huge number of anti-tank weapons, including the Soviet Malyutka anti-tank guided—missile complex (NATO code AT-3) with 9M14 series guided—missiles (including licensed Yugoslav versions and the Iranian Raad and Raad—2T tandem warhead “clones,” the Fagot (AT-5), Konkurs (AT-5, including the licensed Iranian Towsan-1 version), the French MILAN, the American TOW (including its Iranian Toophan and tandem warhead Toophan-2 copy), recoilless guns and several versions of the Soviet RPG-7 hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher. Iran and Syria were the main suppliers of these weapons, with some western systems apparently reaching the Shiites from the arsenal of the Lebanese Army.
Aside from that, Hezbollah used a small number of modern 9K115—2 Metis-M (AT-13) and 9K129 Kornet-E (AT-14) portable anti-tank guided—missile systems, and RPG-29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launchers, delivered by Russia to Syria in 1998—1999. These three new systems penetrated armour exceptionally well thanks to their tandem High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads. The close-range Metis-M system have a range of up to 1500 meters and are armed with 9M131 guided—missiles weighing 13.8 kg with wire-guidance. The heavier Kornet-E fires 9M133 laser-guided missiles weighing 29 kg up to 5500 meters. Both systems are made by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau and were equipped with 1PN86V1 Mulat thermal sights. The hand-held RPG‑29 Vampir anti-tank rocket launcher is one of the latest products of Moscow-based Basalt. Weighing 11.5 kg, it fires rocket-propelled grenades that weigh 6.2 kg up to 500 metres from a telescopic pipe.
Hezbollah’s defences were structured around these anti-tank weapons, which were used in great numbers. According to Israeli estimates, the fighters launched over 500 anti-tank guided—missiles in July alone, and about 1000 through the course of the conflict. Moreover, the anti-tank guided—missiles were used not only against armoured objects, but also against Israeli infantry. The fighters sought generally to employ the weapons from the maximum possible range.
On the whole, both the scale of Hezbollah’s use of anti-tank systems, as well as their possession of modern systems with superior armour penetration capability, came as a surprise to the Israeli command. Nevertheless, measures to reduce losses of armour were taken from the very beginning. It is indicative that on Lebanese territory the Israelis used only their heavily protected APCs on main battle tank chassis: the Achazarit (on the T‑55 chassis), the Nagmahon, a few of Nemerah prototypes(on the Merkava chassis), the Puma combat engineering vehicle and the Nakpadon, all based on the old British Centurion tank chassis, while the standard M113 APCs, even those modernized with a great deal of extra protection, where hardly used at all, and then only as engineering, support and convoy vehicles.
According to various Israeli and Western sources, during the course of battle in Lebanon, between 46 and 50 Merkava main battle tanks (of the 400 deployed) and 14 APCs were hit by anti-tank weapons, including 22 incidents where tank armour and 5 cases where APC armour was penetrated. Another six tanks and at least one APC were blown up by mines and IDEs.
Of those tanks hit by anti-tank weapons, 18 were the newest Merkava Mk 4 version (from the 401st armoured brigade), and six of these had their armour penetrated. Twenty-three tank and five APC crew members were killed. A large number of anti-tank guide-missiles and RPG grenades hit the tanks, but in most cases these did little damage. It was reported that one of the Merkava Mk 4 tanks survived 23 hits from anti-tank guided—missiles before it was finally disabled and its armour penetrated. All penetrations of Merkava armour, according to Israeli statements, were achieved by the Konkurs, Metis-M and Kornet-E anti-tank guided—missiles, and the RPG-29 rocket-propelled grenades. If one considers that 22 of 50 tanks had their armour penetrated, that gives a penetration rate of 44% (and only 33% for the Merkava Mk 4). According to Israeli Army statistics, the penetration rate for tanks during the 1982 Lebanon War was 47%, and 60% during the 1973 War. The crew casualties rate was also much higher in 2006 at 0.5 crew member for each damaged tank, while the rate per disabled tank in 1973 War is one full crew member.
The number of irrecoverable tank losses among those damaged, according to recent Israeli publications, was five altogether, of which two (a Merkava Mk 2 and Mk 4) were destroyed by IDEs and three tanks were completely burned out after hits by guided anti-tank guided—missiles. This attests to the high degree of protection afforded by the most modern Merkava Mk 4 tanks, which could be damaged only by the most modern anti-tank weapons with powerful tandem HEAT warheads hitting, it would seem, weakened armoured zones.
The extremely low percentage of missile hits and the low percentage of armour penetration clearly shows that the vast majority of anti-tank guided—missiles were of the old type, most likely the completely obsolete Malyutka (and its many copies), with clumsy guidance systems (manual, on the oldest models), with no modern sights and a relatively small warhead, by modern standards.
It appears that non-modernized second generation anti-tank guided—missiles produced in the 1970s (Fagot, Konkurs, MILAN, TOW) were used in battle. The Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, with their much higher level of effectiveness, were clearly present in very small numbers, but accounted for the majority of Israeli losses. This allows one to conclude that Israel made an issue of the possession of these new systems by Hezbollah mostly for political, rather than strictly military, reasons. On the other hand, if Hezbollah had a large number of Kornet-E and Metis-M systems, the Israeli tank attack in Lebanon could have been completely repelled. Modern Russian weapons proved to be quite effective against the newest Western equipment.
The old types of anti-tank guided—missile systems have shown themselves to be extremely ineffective. And since the majority of anti-tank forces in the world are equipped with precisely this old generation of missile systems, the results of recent warfare in Lebanon should sound an alarm, and provoke considered reflection regarding the purchase of modern anti-tank weapons, such as the Kornet-E.
Nevertheless, from their experience in Lebanon the Israelis themselves concluded that armour itself cannot in principle provide full protection from anti-tank guided—missile systems, and that all of their tanks would be equipped with active protection systems such as the Rafael Trophy and the IMI Iron Fist systems.
They decided in early 2007 to equip the entire fleet of Merkava tanks and the Nemerah APCs yet to be built with Trophy active protection systems by the end of 2008. Passive electronic countermeasures are also now held in high regard. Apparently, none of the four tanks equipped with experimental electronic countermeasures system was hit by even a single anti-tank guided—missile.
However, the importance of heavy “conventional” armour (including explosive reactive armour suites) was also proven on the battlefield, and the Israelis decided to continue the production of Merkava Mk 4 main battle tanks, and to launch the serial production of heavily armoured Nemerah APCs on the chassis of these tanks. Two hundred such vehicles have been ordered.
Thus, the war in Lebanon has proven the Soviet and Russian approach to the development of protection for main battle tanks, as established in the 1970s, to be very well. In the 1980s the USSR created the first comprehensive passive (Shtora) and active (Drozd, Arena) protection systems, which are still being developed today. Israel and the West are only now catching up to Russia. Meanwhile, we can see that the newest Western tanks (included the well-protected Merkava) burn up when hit by modern anti-tank weapons in just the same way as the old Soviet T-72 tanks deployed in Chechnya and Iraq.
Russia avoided the Western fashion of dismissing heavy armour and explosive reactive armour as “unnecessary” and continued to develop a balanced configuration of armour, including detachable and built-in protection, and in this turned out to be justified. The Lebanese conflict of 2006 and the war in Iraq have once again proven allegations of the obsolescence of the main battle tank to be absurd. The modern MBT with its powerful heavy armour and large combat weight will continue for some time as the core of the land forces.
As for the tactical application of armour troops, it is clear that the Israelis used their tanks in small groups almost exclusively for immediate support of line infantry. It was precisely this well equipped and trained infantry that played the decisive role in battle. Attempts to use armour troops to achieve a breakthrough without infantry support and reconnaissance inevitably led to senseless losses, as befell the forces of the 401st Israeli armoured brigade at Vadi Saluki on 9 August.
The tank battalion of this brigade, pushing forward with no infantry, fell into a fire trap of anti-tank guided—missile systems (mostly Kornet-E, according to Israeli sources), losing eleven Mk 4 Merkava tanks damaged and eight crew killed, including the battalion commander. The Israeli armour troops were clearly not well prepared for action against modern anti-tank weapons.
On the Israeli side, it is also clear that the armoured reserve units were insufficiently prepared, especially in the use of countermeasures (smoke screens, advancing fire to disturb aiming, reverse gear withdrawal, etc).
As such, the quality of the training of the armour troops and the ability of the commanders to effectively combine tanks and other forces remain the key elements for the successful use of main battle tanks on the field.



http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/2-2007/item2/item1/
Tank casualties in Lebanon 2006 were not due to superior ATGMs or inferior tanks, but due to the way tanks were used and the overconfident mind-set of IDF.
Any tank in the world used in the same way would have met the same fate.


Vladimir, hope you find this article and the figures given in it interesting. :wink:


Another very good post by Brig.Ray about this topic.
http://www.defenceforum.in/forum/63707-post19.html
 

Vladimir79

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Tank casualties in Lebanon 2006 were not due to superior ATGMs or inferior tanks, but due to the way tanks were used and the overconfident mind-set of IDF.
Any tank in the world used in the same way would have met the same fate.


Vladimir, hope you find this article and the figures given in it interesting. :wink:
The penetration rate was marginally less, yet deaths in the Mk IV were higher. The application of their tanks has nothing to do with how they performed when hit. Considering both statistics, the Mk IVs protection rate seems a bit overhyped. Certainly not the performance upgrade one would expect from a fourth generation tank compared to second and third.
 

K Factor

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T-90 suits the dessert terrain in Rajastan well as it has less weight compared to the other tanks.
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Specifications AbramsM1A2 Leopard 2 Leclerc T-90SBhishma Arjun[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Crew 4 4 3 3 4[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Combat weight 69.54 tons 60.79 tons 54.5 tons 46.5 tons 58.5 tons[/FONT]
[FONT=Arial, sans-serif]Ground Pressure 15.4 PSI 11.8 PSI 13.5 PSI 12.5 PSI 11.9 PSI[/FONT]

http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/1796701917IPCS-Special-Report-23.pdf

What matters in soft desert soil is the ground pressure per unit area of the tank, and as you can see from the above detail, Arjun is better.
 

Vladimir79

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What matters in soft desert soil is the ground pressure per unit area of the tank, and as you can see from the above detail, Arjun is better.
What matters is transporting your tanks to the battlefield. That increased width and weight make rail and highway travel near impossible. What good is a tank you can't get to where it is needed most?
 

K Factor

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What matters is transporting your tanks to the battlefield. That increased width and weight make rail and highway travel near impossible. What good is a tank you can't get to where it is needed most?
We were talking about performance in the desert, not how to get the tanks into the desert. I don't want to get into the logistics issue, as it has been discussed on forums all over the world countless number of times, why the Arjun should or should not be selected.
All I am saying is that once the Arjun is in the desert, I doubt it will not be able to out-perform T90S.
 

bengalraider

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What matters is transporting your tanks to the battlefield. That increased width and weight make rail and highway travel near impossible. What good is a tank you can't get to where it is needed most?
We have some of the best CV & rail carriage makers in the world i'm pretty sure they can (if asked to)build trucks to transport the arjun anywhere we want it.
 

Vladimir79

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We were talking about performance in the desert, not how to get the tanks into the desert. I don't want to get into the logistics issue, as it has been discussed on forums all over the world countless number of times, why the Arjun should or should not be selected.
All I am saying is that once the Arjun is in the desert, I doubt it will not be able to out-perform T90S.
So where are the trials you guys promised? I guess Arjun still has some "tweaking" to do. T-90 is ready baby --- bring it on!
 

AJSINGH

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We were talking about performance in the desert, not how to get the tanks into the desert. I don't want to get into the logistics issue, as it has been discussed on forums all over the world countless number of times, why the Arjun should or should not be selected.
All I am saying is that once the Arjun is in the desert, I doubt it will not be able to out-perform T90S.
arjun power pack has failed number of times ,that is why IA is not buying anymore ARJUN
 

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