A Response to Enemies of Topol
In generalizing the negative statements with respect to the Topol (Topol-M) complex, it is advisable to dwell on the following ones:
a. The complex has poor concealment, in connection with which it is detected by space assets with high reliability and can be destroyed at the desired moment using conventional or nuclear weapons.
Counterargument. The level of survivability of the mobile land-based missile complex depends to a determining extent, as we know, on the following two factors: reliability of identification (and not simply detection) in alert duty areas, and the number of square kilometers of area (with specific properties) per launcher.
Poor reliability of identification of the mobile land- based missile complex (i.e., reliability based on which it is inadvisable to make a decision to deliver strikes against presumed points where launchers are located) has been confirmed in several stages:
by experimental studies using mockups of terrain and hardware of the complexes;
by many years of full-scale experiments using full- scale equipment and aviation and space reconnaissance assets (research topic "Mishen" [Target], fulfilled in the 1970's and 1980's);
in a combat situation (in 1991 during the war in Iraq the Americans had an accuracy of the reconnaissance field which seemingly left no chance for the mobile Scud complexes supplied to Iraq at one time by the Soviet Union.
As is well known, however, the Iraqis were launching the missiles right up to the very armistice, and arguments go on to this day about the number of complexes destroyed on the ground).
Creation of such a reconnaissance field density over the territory of Russia (if of course it is not reduced through efforts of well-wishers to the territory of the Moscow-Suzdal Principality) is a fantastic task. And here is the very time to recall requirements imposed by the Americans with respect to a ban on the Temp-2S complex, the ban on means of reloading launchers, and the ban on basing combat subunits (in so-called peacetime) in an area with a radius of more than 10 km--eloquent requirements, the meaning of which showed up well based on results of the Iraqi campaign!
Our faultfinders' assertions about limited capabilities for basing the mobile land-based missile complexes and for their road movement are unfounded. At one time the USSR Ministry of Defense together with industrial organizations analyzed and selected position areas on the country's territory capable of holding hundreds of mobile launchers, should it be required, without detriment to national economic activity. The capability for movement of the hardware of a complex over roads of various categories and off the roads has been confirmed by performance tests extending for many thousands of kilometers. The service life of the multiple-axle chassis supports the necessary frequency of position change during the time set for the operating life of the complex. The launcher's independence has been taken to such a level where it is capable of performing a combat mission independently, and not as part of that "herd" of vehicles which was required 30 years ago. Based on decisions of the military-industrial complex, work was done simultaneously to work out the methods and means of increasing the nonidentifiableness of complexes at field positions (dummy activity, camouflage nets) and to ensure necessary levels of resistance of systems and hardware to the damage-producing elements of a nuclear burst.
Finally, Chief Designer documentation provides for quite specific regimes of operation of the complex ensuring its concealment. A violation of documentation requirements (for example, constantly being in bases in light shelters) already is in the area of the Law of Criminal Procedure. So reliable destruction of Topol complexes is possible only on condition of the entire expanse of position areas being covered with a specific overpressure. But this requires detonating such a number of nuclear weapons that the act becomes senseless for the attacking side--the consequences of radioactive contamination will be global.
b. Mobile land-based complexes are highly vulnerable to actions of saboteurs.
Counterargument. A single act of sabotage is absurd in its essence from a state standpoint (that of a potential enemy). The following is interesting with respect to large- scale sabotage (on a national scale) coordinated in time: sabotage teams (obviously, disguised as mushroom hunters, surveyors, hunters, foresters and so on) constantly must seek and accompany the launchers, and on bicycles or motorized sledges as a minimum, otherwise you won't keep up. They naturally have to live under field conditions--in the rain, intense heat, severe cold. Of course, this theme could be continued in the presence of a situation of total muddle in our counterintelligence structures, but to no avail. The potential enemy isn't up to organizing such an operation, which that very same experience of the war with Iraq again showed clearly.
c. Mobile land-based missile complexes are predisposed to accidents and so carry a threat to the environment, especially in connection with the presence of solid propellant in missile engines.
Counterargument. No more than a dozen overturns of launchers and transporter-reloader units with missiles occurred over many years of operating the Pioner and Topol complexes, and all instances were in the first years of mastering the new equipment. No explosion of solid- propellant charges occurred in a single one of the accidents. Moreover, all missiles (or their engines) were used successfully for experimental purposes after a preventive maintenance inspection.
In addition, those familiar with properties of fuel components of liquid-propellant combat missiles from more than hearsay do not have to be told what will happen if, for example, a mobile launcher with such a missile falls from a bridge into a river or even a stream.
d. Mobile land-based missile complexes have the highest cost of deployment and upkeep.
Counterargument. Comparative assessments of cost indicators of missile complexes with different forms of basing, made regularly within the scope of integrated research (for example, Vekha, Vekha-2, Perspektiva-2010), indicate that this is not so. It was research that showed that the cost of a round as part of a grouping of complexes of a specific type and the cost of this grouping's performance of a conditional combat mission in a retaliatory strike are the most objective indicators in comparing the tactical-technical-economic effectiveness of different strategic missile complexes. This approach means in particular that the cost of the infrastructure which services combat missile complexes (and only them) also must pertain to the cost of a round, i.e., for example, if there needs to be a system of air defense of basing facilities to ensure survivability of missile-armed naval ships in those facilities, then its cost must be included in the cost of a round as part of the grouping of naval nuclear forces, exactly as this indicator also must include the cost of tunnels [shtolnya] on shore filled with a so-called second salvo (even if everyone understands that a second salvo is a chimera).
Sometimes one may run across speculative assessments where expenditures as part of the grouping [gruppirovka] pertain to one warhead. The incorrectness is that the grouping [kuchnost] of warheads (of each one separately) may differ greatly for different missiles. And if particular specific characteristics are used, then in a number of cases it would be correct to relate expenditures to the unit area destroyed (with a certain overpressure) in a retaliatory strike. With respect to the Topol type of mobile land-based missile complex, this incorrectness also lies in the fact, for example, that in the opinion of some specialists the Topol-M missile can be fitted with several warheads if necessary. One also should not forget that a new intermediate-range complex with a wide gamut of combat outfitting can be created quickly (again if necessary) based on the Topol (Topol-M) complex with relatively small expenditures.
e. Topol missile complexes have lower effectiveness not only compared with naval, but also with silo complexes.
Counterargument. That this is not so generally already follows from what was said earlier. We will note only the following.
With respect to silo complexes, the assertion of their higher effectiveness is most likely the product of hallucinations or of some kind of special kind of thinking, since it is enough to constantly remember the television broadcast from aboard an American precision cruise missile flying down the ventilation shaft of a superhardened underground shelter in Baghdad. Everything is said with this graphic aid, and no theoretical logomachy is necessary.
With respect to domestic sea-based complexes, it must be borne in mind that despite many flaws of their basing system, they are a necessary component of the grouping of strategic nuclear forces as a whole. In 1970 the U.S. Congress held thorough hearings on the subject of why America needs a strategic nuclear triad. As a result it was admitted that this is necessary inasmuch as if one has only one component, the enemy will get an opportunity to concentrate his resources on countering it. Probably for the foreseeable future it is possible to agree with the conclusion of the Americans (at the very least with respect to a diad--ground and naval components of the strategic nuclear forces), who even now are in no hurry to reject a triad.
The U.S. position with respect to its own land-based mobile complexes is explained simply. First of all, America is foreordained by geography itself (natural conditions above all) to have a strategic sea-based missile system. At the very least they do not have to boast that they are able to break open the ice in order to fire (an activity, by the way, accompanied by very strong acoustic noise). Secondly, their powerful naval component essentially is not threatened by anything now and for long years ahead. New capital expenditures simply would be foolish in that situation. And thirdly and finally, there is a reason about which they prefer not to speak loudly. Studies of 20 and 30 years ago showed that the deployment of mobile land-based complexes on U.S. territory is fraught with considerable organizational/legal and financial problems dictated by the large-scale privately owned land and transportation infrastructure.
We will encounter these problems immediately as soon as we transfer land and roads to the hands of private capital on a mass basis.
In conclusion, attention must be directed to two points.
First. The extremely serious discussion (wherever it occurs) of questions of future organizational development of the country's strategic nuclear forces should not be carried out without the involvement of professionals from organizations that developed the missile complexes.
Second. It would be exceptionally advisable to delve more attentively into restrictions imposed by the Americans with respect to our land-based mobile missile complexes and weigh once again the need to retain these restrictions, bearing in mind that the strategic nuclear forces will remain the only persuasive means of ensuring the country's military security for a long time yet.
