those indians include undivided india means pakistanis and bangladeshis
churchill killed 5 million indians in feminie in bengal and is hated most because of shubhash chandra bose and INA and never wanted india to be free, though jinnah used to lick his boot and was his biggest bootlicker
http://historydetox.com/10-3-partition-and-conspiracy-part-3/
Some of this covers similar ground to Prakash Almeida, as shown above, although Das disagrees over the indispensability of Jinnah. But Das’ main focus is Churchill, and he makes some shrewd and pithy observations. ‘Churchill loved his Indian empire, but not India’ (p. 58), and he follows with another neat line: ‘He loved the British rule, but not the Indian subjects’. Quite so. But then we move into more speculative regions. After the war, Churchill’s ‘one consolation’ was ‘that an independent India would also be a divided India – divided into Hindustan, Pakistan and ‘Princestan’, with the latter two still remaining strong bastions of British power’ (p. 62). Such an India was indeed the general thrust of British policy, but if we just call it ‘a federated Indian Union’ it does not sound so sinister. And as for the consolation Churchill is supposed to have drawn from it, this is just the first of many misconceptions Professor Das seems to have managed to accumulate about Churchill and British political circles in general.
Churchill would indeed have drawn some comfort from the creation of an Indian Union
containing some sort of ‘Pakistan’, but then so would the entire British establishment. The formula ‘Hindustan, Pakistan and Princestan’ could cover anything envisaged by the original Cripps Mission of 1942, or the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946. The British wanted to oversee the creation of some sort of unitary Indian state, and were very keen that it should be kept within the Commonwealth. The idea that Churchill would have enjoyed seeing the creation of a divided India flies in the face all the documentary evidence we have, and runs counter to
everything Churchill ever believed about India and the British Empire in general. Nor, to return to Das’ original comment above, is it at all certain, or even likely, that any ‘Pakistan’ would have been a bastion of British anything.
One of the problems of talking about Churchill and Pakistan is that Churchill was long out of office by the time Jinnah ever satisfactorily outlined what he actually meant by Pakistan. It was not until early 1946 that Jinnah, in private, began to make concrete proposals to British emissaries. It was many more months before it became clear that he could not be satisfied within some federal system of regions and provinces. So, any talk of what Churchill did and did not think about ‘Pakistan’ after the war needs to be specific to avoid being either anachronistic or wildly speculative. It is also irrelevant within the wider historical context, because Churchill was by then out of government.