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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EGYPT'S MILITARY BUILDUP
Jeffrey Azarva*
Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Egyptian government has undertaken extraordinary efforts to modernize its military with Western arms and weapon systems. By bolstering its armored corps, air force, and naval fleet with an array of U.S. military platforms, the Egyptian armed forces have emerged as one the region's most formidable forces. But as the post-Husni Mubarak era looms, questions abound. Who, precisely, is Egypt arming against, and why? Has Egypt attained operational parity with Israel? How will the military be affected by a succession crisis? Could Cairo's weapons arsenal fall into the hands of Islamists? This essay will address these and other questions by analyzing the regime's procurement of arms, its military doctrine, President Mubarak's potential heirs, and the Islamist threat.
INTRODUCTION
In March 1999, then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen embarked on a nine-nation tour of the Middle East to finalize arms agreements worth over $5 billion with regional governments. No state received more military hardware than Egypt. Totaling $3.2 billion, Egypt's arms package consisted of 24 F-16D fighter planes, 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks, and 32 Patriot-3 missiles.[1] Five months later, Cairo inked a $764 million deal for more sophisticated U.S. weaponry. Few in Egypt and the United States batted an eye.
For the government of Husni Mubarak, exorbitant military expenditures have always been the rule, not the exception. In the 29 years since the Camp David Accords, successive U.S. administrations have provided Egypt with roughly $60 billion in military and economic aid subsidies to reinforce its adherence to peace.[2] Under U.S. auspices, the Mubarak regime has utilized $1.3 billion in annual military aid to transform its armed forces from an unwieldy Soviet-based fighting force to a modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military.
Outfitted with some of the most sophisticated U.S. weapons technology, Egypt's arsenal has been significantly improved--qualitatively as well as quantitatively--in nearly every military branch. While assimilating state-of-the-art weaponry into its order of battle, the Egyptian military has also decommissioned Soviet equipment or upgraded outdated ordnance. This unprecedented military buildup, however, extends beyond the mere procurement and renovation of Western armaments; Egypt has been the beneficiary of joint military exercises and training programs with the United States dating back to 1983.
However, while the Egyptian leadership has professed its desire for peace and emphasized the deterrent nature of the buildup, its stockpiling of arms should arouse some concern. Already the most advanced army on the African continent, the Egyptian military faces no appreciable threat on its Libyan or Sudanese borders. Thus, some analysts believe it has been reconstituted with one purpose in mind: to achieve military parity with its neighbor across the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula--Israel.
Many Israeli policymakers, though, see Egypt's conventional military buildup in a different light. In their analysis, Egypt's self-perception as a regional power broker necessitates the creation of a potent military. While Egypt remains a hotbed of anti-Semitism nearly three decades after peace, for them, such rhetoric is intended only for domestic consumption. The mainstream Israeli defense establishment, by and large, shares this assessment, citing the Egyptian military's doctrinal flaws and questionable combat readiness as an impediment to renewed conflict.
Yet while battle plans are not being drawn up in Cairo, Egypt's muscle-flexing does raise an eyebrow when other factors are considered. As the Husni Mubarak era enters its twilight years, no real decision has been made concerning his successor, though his son certainly appears the frontrunner. While Egypt's Islamists are unlikely to usurp power anytime soon, a drastic change in leadership could spawn greater instability in the Egyptian-Israeli arena. Likewise, Egypt's failure to curtail endemic weapons smuggling on the Egypt-Gaza border--arms which are funneled to Palestinian terrorists--has fueled speculation among Israeli hardliners that Cairo may be girding for war.
The truth, of course, likely lies somewhere between these divergent viewpoints.
ARMING TO THE TEETH
In a November 1995 speech, President Husni Mubarak encapsulated the mission statement of the Egyptian military, declaring, "...The level of our armed forces is a source of pride for us all, and [they] are capable of deterring any danger threatening our national security."[3] Senior officials and generals in the Egyptian armed forces, such as Minister of Defense and War Production Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, have echoed similar sentiments that, while stressing the doctrine of deterrence, have explicitly stressed the importance of offensive capabilities. While not discounting the probability of armed conflict with Israel, Egyptian officials view such offensive-orientated capabilities as a means of enhancing Egyptian diplomacy, allowing it to operate from a position of strength. The Mubarak government sees this posture as a prerequisite for regional stability, inextricably linked to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, diplomatic leverage alone cannot explain Egypt's buildup. As the main bastion of regime support, the military's strength serves Mubarak's interest in stability. Given the paranoia that pervades much of the ruling elite in Egypt and other Arab mukhabarat states, it is understandable that the Egyptian leadership views a strong military as its greatest asset. In this sense, Egypt's bloated defense budget represents a quid pro quo of sorts. Mubarak furnishes his military brass with weapons and pensions; in return, they refrain from dabbling in politics and pledge to safeguard his regime from external threats. Perhaps one can also frame the buildup in terms of domestic prestige. Owen L. Sirs writes that during the height of the 1960s, the government's military parades "...served as a sort of symbolic dialogue between the Egyptian regime and its people."[4] While today's demonstrations may lack the pomp and grandeur reminiscent of the Nasser era, they still serve to showcase the country's modernization and progress.
Other motives drive Egypt's strategic objectives as well. Ostracized by its neighbors in the 1980s for blazing a trail to peace, Egyptian leadership found vindication in the peace process of the 1990s. Yet with this historic opportunity came two distinct choices. As Robert Satloff notes, Egypt could either "...expand the circle of peace via widening Arab normalization with Israel or [choose] to follow a different path, one that views Israel as a fundamental challenge to Egypt's self-perception as a regional power... and makes anti-normalization a fixture of Egyptian policy."[5] Perhaps threatened by the Jewish state's regional assimilation and military prowess, Egypt has opted for the latter. Thus, it has embarked on a sustained campaign to contain Israel and alter the Middle East's balance of power.
Flush with billions in U.S. military aid since the 1980s, the Egyptian government has significantly revamped its conventional forces, paying particular heed to its armored corps, air, and naval forces. Today, Egypt, no longer a beneficiary of its erstwhile Soviet patron, can boast of a Western-style fighting force--comprised of 450,000 regular servicemen--that approaches the quantitative and qualitative levels of the Israeli military in certain sectors. Israel is, of course, more concerned with preserving its edge in the latter. That is, given the sheer size of Israel's Arab neighbors, it is imperative that the Jewish state compensate for its inevitable quantitative weakness by maintaining its advantage in weapons systems, training, and technological know-how.
Still, the qualitative gap has shrunk as Egypt catapulted itself into the upper echelon of Middle Eastern arms importers during the past decade. From 2001 to 2004 alone, Egypt paid $6.5 billion in arms transfer agreements, $5.7 billion of which was used to purchase U.S. weaponry.[6] During this period, Egypt supplanted Saudi Arabia as the primary recipient of U.S.-manufactured arms in the Middle East.[7]
Among Egypt's most noteworthy acquisitions has been its procurement of American-made M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, whose components are partly assembled on Egyptian production lines. When the U.S. Department of Defense first licensed production of the M1A1 tank (commensurate with the Israeli Merkava tank) in Egypt in 1988, the decision raised alarm in some U.S. and Israeli policy circles, given the sensitive transfer of technology involved, the method of co-production, and the fiscal constraints it would place on an already burdened Egyptian economy. Yezid Sayigh notes that this industrial strategy of in-country assemblage, prevalent in the Middle East, enables the arms importer to "...acquire the necessary production skills and military technology gradually, with the eventual aim of producing indigenous systems."[8] Israeli analysts believe that by the time the current contract is completed in 2008, Egypt's armored corps will have amassed 880 M1A1s.[9]
In 1999, Israeli defense officials became concerned when Egypt acquired 10,800 rounds of 120mm KEW-A1 ammunition for its Abrams battle tanks.[10] Composed of depleted uranium, this armor-piercing ammunition--long possessed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--was used by U.S. Abrams crews to decimate 4,000 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles during Operation Desert Storm and is said to be able to neutralize any armor system in existence.[11] None of this is to mention Egypt's 835 upgraded and U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks that also saw action in the 1991 Gulf crisis.[12]
The influx of sophisticated, Western weapons into Egypt is not limited to the renovation of its armored corps. This buildup also extends to the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), which now sports roughly 220 F-16 fighter planes, in comparison with the approximately 240 F-16s in the Israeli arsenal.[13] Israeli strategic analysts, such as Ret. Brigadier General Shlomo Brom, are quick to point that while this margin has narrowed substantially since the 1980s, the status of the Israeli Air Force's qualitative edge should not be confused with quantitative parity in military platforms. "We say they aren't the same planes. The level of the pilots and the quality of the weapons systems are not identical," Brom stated.[14] There are also reports that Israel will be the first Middle Eastern state equipped with the F-22 and F-35, the F-16's successors.
Still, other IDF officials disagree with Brom's assessment and believe that the EAF's growth has forced Israel to alter its air combat techniques. Those critics point to the EAF's recent integration of 36 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters, each capable of carrying 16 laser-guided, anti-tank, Hellfire missiles.[15] It is worth noting, though, that while permitted to upgrade the Apaches to their more advanced prototype (the AH-64D), Egypt has been prevented from acquiring the helicopter's most coveted feature--the Longbow radar--which has first-rate target identification capabilities.[16] Nonetheless, the Israeli Air Force maintains only a handful more of Apaches than its Egyptian counterpart.
While apprehensive about the buildup of the Egyptian ground and air forces, some Israeli officials, especially Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz and former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Navy, Major General Yedidia Ya'ari, consider the overhaul of the Egyptian navy to be the most significant aspect of the military's modernization program. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' 2003-2004 Middle East Strategic Balance report notes that Egypt acquired two Knox class frigates and four Oliver Hazard Perry frigates from the United States in the 1990s.[17] Obtained as excess defense articles from the Pentagon, the Perry-class frigates are "capable of over-the-horizon combat and anti-submarine warfare."[18]
However, it was the November 2001 Bush Administration decision to sell Egypt 53 satellite-guided Harpoon Block II missiles, which can exploit Israel's lack of strategic depth by evading its current air defense systems, that has truly caused consternation in Jerusalem.[19] This purchase could signal a strategic shift in Egypt's naval doctrine--one that would allow it to project its open-sea capabilities even further in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and place a stranglehold on Israel's most important maritime lifelines. Though the U.S. State Department downplayed the missiles' offensive nature, one must remember that Egypt's geographic position gives its fleet--which maintains principal naval bases at Ras al-Tin on the Mediterranean and at Safajeh and Hurghada on the Red Sea--the capability to blockade both of Israel's sea links with the outside world.
The United States will likely continue to refrain from selling the Egyptian government advanced weapon systems that would allow the EAF, or any other branch of the Egyptian armed forces, to enjoy operational parity with their Israeli counterparts. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said as much during his visit to the region in 1999, when he reassured then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States remained committed to "...Israel's qualitative edge and military capability to protect its own people."[20]
In the past, though, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to export some of its most sensitive military technologies to regional governments, as evidenced by the Clinton Administration's sale of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range-Air-to-Air-Missile (AMRAAM) to the United Arab Emirates in 1998.[21] Prior to this transfer, only Israel had been cleared to purchase the AMRAAM among Middle Eastern states.[22] However, contracts were soon inked in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, with the United States selling Cairo a lesser ground-launched version of the missile in 2000 only because of vociferous Israeli objections.[23] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's blasé reaction to these and other related developments belied Israel's true concern. In 2004, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom vehemently opposed--and ultimately won restrictions on--a U.S.-AMRAAM sale to Jordan based on fears that the technology would eventually be sold to Egypt.[24] Though purchasing the AMRAAM system had once been the sole prerogative of NATO member states (and Israel), the flurry of U.S. sales to non-NATO Arab governments, including Egypt, signaled that U.S. arms transfer sales could indeed trump strategic promises.
[....]
Jeffrey Azarva*
Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Egyptian government has undertaken extraordinary efforts to modernize its military with Western arms and weapon systems. By bolstering its armored corps, air force, and naval fleet with an array of U.S. military platforms, the Egyptian armed forces have emerged as one the region's most formidable forces. But as the post-Husni Mubarak era looms, questions abound. Who, precisely, is Egypt arming against, and why? Has Egypt attained operational parity with Israel? How will the military be affected by a succession crisis? Could Cairo's weapons arsenal fall into the hands of Islamists? This essay will address these and other questions by analyzing the regime's procurement of arms, its military doctrine, President Mubarak's potential heirs, and the Islamist threat.
INTRODUCTION
In March 1999, then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen embarked on a nine-nation tour of the Middle East to finalize arms agreements worth over $5 billion with regional governments. No state received more military hardware than Egypt. Totaling $3.2 billion, Egypt's arms package consisted of 24 F-16D fighter planes, 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks, and 32 Patriot-3 missiles.[1] Five months later, Cairo inked a $764 million deal for more sophisticated U.S. weaponry. Few in Egypt and the United States batted an eye.
For the government of Husni Mubarak, exorbitant military expenditures have always been the rule, not the exception. In the 29 years since the Camp David Accords, successive U.S. administrations have provided Egypt with roughly $60 billion in military and economic aid subsidies to reinforce its adherence to peace.[2] Under U.S. auspices, the Mubarak regime has utilized $1.3 billion in annual military aid to transform its armed forces from an unwieldy Soviet-based fighting force to a modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military.
Outfitted with some of the most sophisticated U.S. weapons technology, Egypt's arsenal has been significantly improved--qualitatively as well as quantitatively--in nearly every military branch. While assimilating state-of-the-art weaponry into its order of battle, the Egyptian military has also decommissioned Soviet equipment or upgraded outdated ordnance. This unprecedented military buildup, however, extends beyond the mere procurement and renovation of Western armaments; Egypt has been the beneficiary of joint military exercises and training programs with the United States dating back to 1983.
However, while the Egyptian leadership has professed its desire for peace and emphasized the deterrent nature of the buildup, its stockpiling of arms should arouse some concern. Already the most advanced army on the African continent, the Egyptian military faces no appreciable threat on its Libyan or Sudanese borders. Thus, some analysts believe it has been reconstituted with one purpose in mind: to achieve military parity with its neighbor across the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula--Israel.
Many Israeli policymakers, though, see Egypt's conventional military buildup in a different light. In their analysis, Egypt's self-perception as a regional power broker necessitates the creation of a potent military. While Egypt remains a hotbed of anti-Semitism nearly three decades after peace, for them, such rhetoric is intended only for domestic consumption. The mainstream Israeli defense establishment, by and large, shares this assessment, citing the Egyptian military's doctrinal flaws and questionable combat readiness as an impediment to renewed conflict.
Yet while battle plans are not being drawn up in Cairo, Egypt's muscle-flexing does raise an eyebrow when other factors are considered. As the Husni Mubarak era enters its twilight years, no real decision has been made concerning his successor, though his son certainly appears the frontrunner. While Egypt's Islamists are unlikely to usurp power anytime soon, a drastic change in leadership could spawn greater instability in the Egyptian-Israeli arena. Likewise, Egypt's failure to curtail endemic weapons smuggling on the Egypt-Gaza border--arms which are funneled to Palestinian terrorists--has fueled speculation among Israeli hardliners that Cairo may be girding for war.
The truth, of course, likely lies somewhere between these divergent viewpoints.
ARMING TO THE TEETH
In a November 1995 speech, President Husni Mubarak encapsulated the mission statement of the Egyptian military, declaring, "...The level of our armed forces is a source of pride for us all, and [they] are capable of deterring any danger threatening our national security."[3] Senior officials and generals in the Egyptian armed forces, such as Minister of Defense and War Production Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, have echoed similar sentiments that, while stressing the doctrine of deterrence, have explicitly stressed the importance of offensive capabilities. While not discounting the probability of armed conflict with Israel, Egyptian officials view such offensive-orientated capabilities as a means of enhancing Egyptian diplomacy, allowing it to operate from a position of strength. The Mubarak government sees this posture as a prerequisite for regional stability, inextricably linked to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, diplomatic leverage alone cannot explain Egypt's buildup. As the main bastion of regime support, the military's strength serves Mubarak's interest in stability. Given the paranoia that pervades much of the ruling elite in Egypt and other Arab mukhabarat states, it is understandable that the Egyptian leadership views a strong military as its greatest asset. In this sense, Egypt's bloated defense budget represents a quid pro quo of sorts. Mubarak furnishes his military brass with weapons and pensions; in return, they refrain from dabbling in politics and pledge to safeguard his regime from external threats. Perhaps one can also frame the buildup in terms of domestic prestige. Owen L. Sirs writes that during the height of the 1960s, the government's military parades "...served as a sort of symbolic dialogue between the Egyptian regime and its people."[4] While today's demonstrations may lack the pomp and grandeur reminiscent of the Nasser era, they still serve to showcase the country's modernization and progress.
Other motives drive Egypt's strategic objectives as well. Ostracized by its neighbors in the 1980s for blazing a trail to peace, Egyptian leadership found vindication in the peace process of the 1990s. Yet with this historic opportunity came two distinct choices. As Robert Satloff notes, Egypt could either "...expand the circle of peace via widening Arab normalization with Israel or [choose] to follow a different path, one that views Israel as a fundamental challenge to Egypt's self-perception as a regional power... and makes anti-normalization a fixture of Egyptian policy."[5] Perhaps threatened by the Jewish state's regional assimilation and military prowess, Egypt has opted for the latter. Thus, it has embarked on a sustained campaign to contain Israel and alter the Middle East's balance of power.
Flush with billions in U.S. military aid since the 1980s, the Egyptian government has significantly revamped its conventional forces, paying particular heed to its armored corps, air, and naval forces. Today, Egypt, no longer a beneficiary of its erstwhile Soviet patron, can boast of a Western-style fighting force--comprised of 450,000 regular servicemen--that approaches the quantitative and qualitative levels of the Israeli military in certain sectors. Israel is, of course, more concerned with preserving its edge in the latter. That is, given the sheer size of Israel's Arab neighbors, it is imperative that the Jewish state compensate for its inevitable quantitative weakness by maintaining its advantage in weapons systems, training, and technological know-how.
Still, the qualitative gap has shrunk as Egypt catapulted itself into the upper echelon of Middle Eastern arms importers during the past decade. From 2001 to 2004 alone, Egypt paid $6.5 billion in arms transfer agreements, $5.7 billion of which was used to purchase U.S. weaponry.[6] During this period, Egypt supplanted Saudi Arabia as the primary recipient of U.S.-manufactured arms in the Middle East.[7]
Among Egypt's most noteworthy acquisitions has been its procurement of American-made M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, whose components are partly assembled on Egyptian production lines. When the U.S. Department of Defense first licensed production of the M1A1 tank (commensurate with the Israeli Merkava tank) in Egypt in 1988, the decision raised alarm in some U.S. and Israeli policy circles, given the sensitive transfer of technology involved, the method of co-production, and the fiscal constraints it would place on an already burdened Egyptian economy. Yezid Sayigh notes that this industrial strategy of in-country assemblage, prevalent in the Middle East, enables the arms importer to "...acquire the necessary production skills and military technology gradually, with the eventual aim of producing indigenous systems."[8] Israeli analysts believe that by the time the current contract is completed in 2008, Egypt's armored corps will have amassed 880 M1A1s.[9]
In 1999, Israeli defense officials became concerned when Egypt acquired 10,800 rounds of 120mm KEW-A1 ammunition for its Abrams battle tanks.[10] Composed of depleted uranium, this armor-piercing ammunition--long possessed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--was used by U.S. Abrams crews to decimate 4,000 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles during Operation Desert Storm and is said to be able to neutralize any armor system in existence.[11] None of this is to mention Egypt's 835 upgraded and U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks that also saw action in the 1991 Gulf crisis.[12]
The influx of sophisticated, Western weapons into Egypt is not limited to the renovation of its armored corps. This buildup also extends to the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), which now sports roughly 220 F-16 fighter planes, in comparison with the approximately 240 F-16s in the Israeli arsenal.[13] Israeli strategic analysts, such as Ret. Brigadier General Shlomo Brom, are quick to point that while this margin has narrowed substantially since the 1980s, the status of the Israeli Air Force's qualitative edge should not be confused with quantitative parity in military platforms. "We say they aren't the same planes. The level of the pilots and the quality of the weapons systems are not identical," Brom stated.[14] There are also reports that Israel will be the first Middle Eastern state equipped with the F-22 and F-35, the F-16's successors.
Still, other IDF officials disagree with Brom's assessment and believe that the EAF's growth has forced Israel to alter its air combat techniques. Those critics point to the EAF's recent integration of 36 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters, each capable of carrying 16 laser-guided, anti-tank, Hellfire missiles.[15] It is worth noting, though, that while permitted to upgrade the Apaches to their more advanced prototype (the AH-64D), Egypt has been prevented from acquiring the helicopter's most coveted feature--the Longbow radar--which has first-rate target identification capabilities.[16] Nonetheless, the Israeli Air Force maintains only a handful more of Apaches than its Egyptian counterpart.
While apprehensive about the buildup of the Egyptian ground and air forces, some Israeli officials, especially Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz and former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Navy, Major General Yedidia Ya'ari, consider the overhaul of the Egyptian navy to be the most significant aspect of the military's modernization program. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' 2003-2004 Middle East Strategic Balance report notes that Egypt acquired two Knox class frigates and four Oliver Hazard Perry frigates from the United States in the 1990s.[17] Obtained as excess defense articles from the Pentagon, the Perry-class frigates are "capable of over-the-horizon combat and anti-submarine warfare."[18]
However, it was the November 2001 Bush Administration decision to sell Egypt 53 satellite-guided Harpoon Block II missiles, which can exploit Israel's lack of strategic depth by evading its current air defense systems, that has truly caused consternation in Jerusalem.[19] This purchase could signal a strategic shift in Egypt's naval doctrine--one that would allow it to project its open-sea capabilities even further in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and place a stranglehold on Israel's most important maritime lifelines. Though the U.S. State Department downplayed the missiles' offensive nature, one must remember that Egypt's geographic position gives its fleet--which maintains principal naval bases at Ras al-Tin on the Mediterranean and at Safajeh and Hurghada on the Red Sea--the capability to blockade both of Israel's sea links with the outside world.
The United States will likely continue to refrain from selling the Egyptian government advanced weapon systems that would allow the EAF, or any other branch of the Egyptian armed forces, to enjoy operational parity with their Israeli counterparts. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said as much during his visit to the region in 1999, when he reassured then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States remained committed to "...Israel's qualitative edge and military capability to protect its own people."[20]
In the past, though, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to export some of its most sensitive military technologies to regional governments, as evidenced by the Clinton Administration's sale of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range-Air-to-Air-Missile (AMRAAM) to the United Arab Emirates in 1998.[21] Prior to this transfer, only Israel had been cleared to purchase the AMRAAM among Middle Eastern states.[22] However, contracts were soon inked in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, with the United States selling Cairo a lesser ground-launched version of the missile in 2000 only because of vociferous Israeli objections.[23] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's blasé reaction to these and other related developments belied Israel's true concern. In 2004, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom vehemently opposed--and ultimately won restrictions on--a U.S.-AMRAAM sale to Jordan based on fears that the technology would eventually be sold to Egypt.[24] Though purchasing the AMRAAM system had once been the sole prerogative of NATO member states (and Israel), the flurry of U.S. sales to non-NATO Arab governments, including Egypt, signaled that U.S. arms transfer sales could indeed trump strategic promises.
[....]