The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
The Final Settlement

The International Herald Tribune calls it 'Kashmir's real story!" The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations is an honest, thought-provoking analysis of the psychology and ground realities of the two countries based on the comprehensive understanding of developments taking place over the last three decades. The conflict between India and Pakistan currently extends to the entire South Asian region, from Afghanistan to Bangladesh. Of this widespread conflict, the Jammu & Kashmir component is known internationally.

The Jammu & Kashmir issue itself has several dimensions. To India, it is a test of secularism. To Pakistan, it is a source of strategically important rivers. To the people of Jammu & Kashmir, it is a matter of living in peace with dignity. Therefore, in all its complexity, the search of a final settlement between the two must be based on an analysis of the three essential elements in the bilateral relationship – fire, water and earth. In this report, SFG states that a final settlement between the two will have to be based on realistic analysis of the water situation in the entire Indus River Basin – an element, hitherto unknown.

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Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Executive Summary

Since January 2004, India and Pakistan have initiated a cautious peace process. The year 2004 witnessed substantial
improvement in the contact between the two societies, including unprecedented visits of media persons to Jammu &
Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control. Also, unusual was the experience of bilateral cricket matches where the
spectators of both the countries cheered both the teams. There is already an agreement on a tentative schedule of official
meetings until September 2005. However, it is important to note that despite the peace process arms race has increased at
a hectic pace. In the last 15-16 months, India and Pakistan have conducted 20 missile tests. Pakistani military leadership
has been shopping for arms all around the world including new sources such as Sweden. Moreover, there are indications
that a meeting of Corps Commanders held on January 6, 2005 has authorised ISI to work out a strategy with extremist
groups to launch a fresh series of attack, on a limited basis, in the Indian territory beginning in March 2005.
The two countries are committed to reach a final settlement as per the Simla Agreement of 1972. At Simla, the final
settlement was envisaged in the narrow context of the cartography of Jammu & Kashmir. The developments of the last
30 years compel the final settlement to be comprehensive if it really has to be final and enduring.
The crafting of the final settlement requires honest, though bitter analysis of the psychology and ground realities of the
two countries. The conflict between India and Pakistan currently extends to the entire South Asian region, from
Afghanistan to Bangladesh. It also engages sections of population in far-flung parts of the two countries. It is reflected in
the strife in India's north-east and Pakistan's Balochistan. India accuses Pakistan of using Bangladesh as a platform to
destabilize India's eastern sector. Pakistan accuses India of using Afghanistan as a platform to subvert Pakistan's western
half. Of this wide spread conflict, the Jammu & Kashmir component is known internationally. The Jammu & Kashmir
issue itself has several dimensions. To India, it is a test of secularism. To Pakistan, it is a source of strategically important
rivers. To the people of Jammu & Kashmir, it is a matter of living in peace with dignity.
The search for final settlement therefore must be predicated on the analysis of the three essential elements in the bilateral
relationship fire, water and earth. The final settlement must also be a basis for restructuring relations between the two
countries, since a settlement will not be final, unless it paves the way for a new and healthy relationship between the two
countries in the place of current hostility.

The primary requirement of the final settlement is to accept the entirety of the India- Pakistan rivalry and to deal with it.
At the deepest level, this confrontation can be traced to the identity crisis. India traces its origin to a civilization of 4,000-
5,000 years ago. Pakistan traces its nationhood either to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, or to the conquest of Sindh by
Mohammad bin Qasim in 712 AD. If the Lahore Resolution is the basis of Pakistan's identity, the State of Pakistan is a
protest against Indian dominance of the region. If Mohammad bin Qasim's conquest is the basis, the State of Pakistan is a
representation of foreign conquest. The final settlement requires first and foremost, that Pakistan perceives itself not in
terms of protest or conquest, but simply as a normal and progressive state. The people of Pakistan deserve that their
leaders treat their state as Pakistan, and not as "non-India".
The final settlement also needs recognition of the factual reality that there is no psychological divide on the basis of
religion in the South Asian region, though there are cultural differences. More than two thirds of the Muslims in the
subcontinent have chosen to live on the basis of coexistence or ethno-linguistic nationalism. Less than one third of the
region's Muslims live in Pakistan, the state created on the basis of theological identity. Even among them, it is still
uncertain if some will choose ethno-linguistic nationalism.
While India has a clear identity as a nation, it is striving to define its role in the world. While India aspires to play a
global role, it often thinks and behaves as a power seeking regional dominance. The final settlement will require a
mind-set change, whereby India defines a global role for itself in a way that carries Pakistan and other neighbours
with it, as partners in progress, the way the United States is able to carry Canada, or France and Germany are able to
carry Benelux. In other words, both India and Pakistan will need to redefine their identity on a much higher plane
than their current obsessions indicate.
The redefinition of Indian and Pakistani identity calls for the curbing of extremism. It is necessary to do so for internal
restructuring of the two nations, which is essential for the restructuring of relations between them into a positive and
peaceful mould. It is a tough call for Pakistan, which has been using terrorist groups as tools of state policy. Pakistan has
shown its ability to reverse this policy to serve American interests. It needs to extend its commitment to deconstructing
terror by ending the use of terror as a state policy in toto. Once it is determined to travel on this path, it will have to take
tough action against a large number of terrorist organisations involved in violence and unlawful activities. Many of them
aspire to Islamise Pakistan, dismantle India, capture assets of the two states and then conquer the world. Except for a few
groups, which are focused on Kashmir, the others have much wider objectives extending to the entire subcontinent and
eventually the world. They will not be satisfied with the resolution of the Jammu & Kashmir issue. The only way to curb
their activities would be for the Pakistani government to arrest top leaders of all such organisations, and freeze their
assets, ensuring that these measures apply to any new organisations with which any of the individuals associated with
earlier banned organisations, might be associated. Pakistan also needs to ban schools associated with Jama'at-ud-Dawa,
ensure that the madrassa education system is not misused by vested interests to recruit students for training in violence,
and to protect government and private schools from encroachment by militant organisations for recruitment and
indoctrination. The final settlement will depend on Pakistan ensuring that it destroys all groups that aspire for the
destruction of Pakistan itself in its present form, and also India.
There is a growing Jhang-Peshawar Consensus among sections of the army, political parties and jihadi groups to convert
Pakistan into a hard-line Sunni Muslim state, annihilating Shi'a professionals and maintaining hostility against India to
fuel the internal power game. At the same time, a growing section of the middle class is seeking reconciliation with India
and alignment with the West. Pakistan is thus seized by a contest between the forces of socio-economic modernisation
and religious orthodoxy. General Pervez Musharraf and his corps commanders are on both sides of the contest. In their
personal belief and public relations, they prefer modernism. In their operational strategies, they have no hesitation to use
orthodox extremism. The final settlement between India and Pakistan will depend on the final settlement of balance of
power in favour of progress and modernism within Pakistan.
India also needs to contain extremism in the country, even though no extremist group in India advocates the dismantling
of Pakistan. However, there are groups that support arms race and hostility towards Pakistan. It is essential to ensure that
such groups are not allowed to vitiate the atmosphere when the government is trying to restructure relations with the
Besides redefining identity and containing extremism, the final settlement will also depend on India and Pakistan
developing a shared vision of the South Asian region. Both the countries are vulnerable to external subversion due to
flaws in their internal governance processes. Several groups in Sindh and Balochistan have launched separatist
agitations from time to time, particularly since the beginning of 2004. Similarly, there are many groups in India's northeast
that demand varying degrees of autonomy, including complete secession. India and Pakistan accuse each other of
using neighbouring countries as platforms to assist secessionist movements in India's north-east and Pakistan's western
and southern provinces. The final settlement will require an agreement to refrain from such subversive tactics and joint
efforts to help stabilise the weak neighbouring countries, particularly Afghanistan and Bangladesh.
The partition of 1947 and 1971 are fait accompli, since it is not possible to roll back history. However, partition and
division cannot be the model for future political arrangements. Partition often serves to satiate the greed of powerful men
in the name of accommodating distinct identities of people. There is no end to the process of division and sub-division in
as much as there is no limit to the greed of powerful men. The final settlement must be one based on principles of cultural
and social identities, and political unity. It must be a settlement that allows cohabitation of different ethos, creating a
large ethos of peace in the region.

If India and Pakistan take a political decision to restructure their relations, they will have to ensure that water serves as a
flow to bring them together, rather than taking them further on the course of conflict. Since 1999, every proposal made
by Pakistan through track two diplomacy, either directly or indirectly, refers to water as a core issue.
The statements made by Pakistan's military officials, Kashmiri leaders and newspaper editorials describe Jammu &
Kashmir as a supplier of crucial rivers, and project the bloodshed there as the sacrifice made by Kashmiri youth to ensure
Pakistan's water security.
Pakistan's per capita water availability has declined from 5,600 cubic metres at the time of independence to 1,200 cubic
metres in 2005. It is expected to reach the threshold level of 1,000 cubic metres before 2010, or perhaps even 2007.
Groundwater table is depleting in 26 of 45 canal commands. Due to heavy silt load carried by the Indus, Pakistan's water
storage capacity is declining. About 50 per cent of it is expected to be lost by 2010, making it difficult to support cotton
sowing and wheat maturing. While all provinces are suffering from water shortages, there is a tendency to force Sindh to
bear a disproportionately higher share of burden than Punjab. The army leadership is keen on ensuring water supply to
Punjab at the cost of Sindh. Senior officers, including General Pervez Musharraf, have purchased land in Punjab.
The diversion of water upstream has resulted in the decline of water downstream. As a result, the discharge of seawater
into the sea is going down and the intrusion of seawater into the mainland is going up. Sea intrusion has destroyed 1.5
million acres of farmland, resulting in the evacuation of three commercial towns, extinction of certain species of fish,
and the loss of revenue to large numbers of farmers and fishermen. About 75 per cent of Sindh's ground water resources
are brackish. About 88 per cent of agricultural land is affected by salinity and water logging. Moreover, during 2000-
2005, Sindh's share in irrigation water was cut by 25-40 per cent. As a result of water shortage, industries are shifting
from Sindh to Punjab and NWFP. Sindh's position as an industrial centre is in peril. The people of Sindh fear that the
plans to construct the Kalabagh dam and Thal Canal will further aggravate their problems. Sindh has launched massive
agitation against Kalabagh and Thal, threatening secession. In 2004, demonstrations were held in the province almost
daily, where speaker after speaker compared the present situation in Sindh to the one in East Pakistan in 1971.
Pakistan needs fresh sources of water in areas where dams can be constructed. As a result, Pakistan has been proposing,
through track-two diplomacy, that it should be given parts of the Kashmir valley and Jammu, so that it can have physical
control on the Chenab basin. India cannot oblige Pakistan since water availability in India's northern provinces has been
declining, leading to conflict between Punjab and Haryana.
The final settlement will have to be based on realistic analysis of the water situation in the entire Indus River Basin. The
construction of Mangla dam has led to resentment in the Mirpur area of Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the Line of
Control. There is also resentment in the Kashmir valley on the Indian side of the Line of Control, because the Indus
Waters Treaty undermines the potential to develop hydroelectricity and irrigation projects. There is a direct conflict
between Pakistan and the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan wants the Kashmir valley and parts of Jammu to be able
to build dams to divert rivers for Punjab's benefit at the cost of the Kashmiris. On the other hand, Jammu & Kashmir
needs to come out of the Indus Waters Treaty to improve its own irrigation, hydroelectricity and employment prospects.
Pakistan is not interested in the full accession of Kashmir, if it involves giving equal rights to Kashmir along with other
provinces. Pakistan's interest is in having Kashmir as a semi-autonomous state, which cannot demand equal rights with
other provinces, but which allows the federal government to exercise political control on its resources.
There is a general misunderstanding that Pakistan wants to annex the Kashmir valley for political reasons. This option
would mean major disaster for Pakistan, as it will lose Chenab resulting in up to 17 per cent reduction in water flows.
Also, the Indus Waters Treaty may stand dissolved. Punjab will not be affected much as it will continue to draw water
from Jhelum. As the flow of Indus will decline, Sindh will be compelled to start a civil war.
Therefore, Pakistan is not interested in Kashmir alone. Pakistan wants Kashmir plus those districts of Jammu that form
the catchment area of the Chenab. The physical control over the Chenab valley would provide Pakistan an opportunity to
build dams upstream and regulate river flows to Punjab and Sindh. Currently, India has identified nine sites on Chenab
for hydroelectricity development. The river has the potential for building dams, which could be bigger or comparable to
Tarbela and Mangla dams in Pakistan. India, under the Indus Waters Treaty, can only build run-of-the-river
hydroelectric stations. However, if Pakistan takes control of the area, it will have no such restrictions. It will be able to
take more advantage of the high speed and momentum of upstream Chenab. It would also provide strategic depth for the
Mangla dam and the important Pothohar region, from where more than half of the army personnel are recruited.
However, India would lose the strategically vital Akhnoor area in Jammu and also access to Ladakh. India may then
Therefore, the Chenab formula should be rejected at this stage of discussion in the interest of peace and stability in South
Unilateral abrogation of the Indus Waters Treaty should not be considered by either party. For more than 40 years, the
Indus Waters Treaty has proved to be an outstanding example of conflict resolution. It is based on the division of the
Indus River Basin with Pakistan having effective control of the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) and
India having an effective control on the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas). Due to increase in the water stress in
the two countries since the early 1990s, the treaty has come under strain. It may find it difficult to survive the next 10
years, even though there is no exit clause. It is imperative for both India and Pakistan, to envisage comprehensive
development and planning of the Indus River Basin. A holistic approach to water resources recognizing the linkages
between water, land, users, environment and infrastructure is necessary to evade the crisis of water scarcity in the
Water needs to be managed as a commodity. It is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives from both
countries, whose functions would entail identifying short term and long term supply capacity of the basin and its
integrated development, setting up of infrastructure and coordinating activities of the different technical agencies. The
development of such a plan would require large financial and technical resources. It should be possible to mobilise such
resources from around the world, perhaps with the World Bank agencies playing a lead role.
The integrated development approach may be Utopian, but all the other options will lead to destruction sooner or later. It
is only possible with a paradigm shift in the mindset. It will require a complete end to hostilities, both physical and
psychological, from both sides. It will have to be a part of the final settlement in letter and spirit.

The debate on Jammu & Kashmir has so far avoided public focus on water, concentrating on the political status of the
area. The UN resolutions call for Pakistan to vacate the Jammu & Kashmir territory. In the modern context, it must not
only involve the withdrawal of military forces but also the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure. The second part of the
UN resolutions calls for a plebiscite to determine accession to India or Pakistan. There is no provision for complete
The public opinion in Jammu & Kashmir is divided. Some groups, notably Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front and All
Parties National Alliance, want complete independence. Some groups, such as National Conference and People's
Democratic Party, want to be with India. Some groups, such as Muslim Conference, want to be with Pakistan. Some
groups functioning on the Indian side, such as components of the Hurriyat, seek integration with Pakistan. Some groups
functioning on the Pakistan side, such as Balawaristan National Front, seek integration with India. With such plurality of
opinions, it is unfair to consider any proposal that explores accession of the full state to either India or Pakistan.
Those seeking complete independence seem unsure about the idea of independence. At the superficial level, this
appears to be a desire for freedom. However, a closer look suggests that all the votaries of independence actually
want political independence but with full economic integration with India, as well as Pakistan. They want free
movement of factors of production, as well as goods and commodities. This is like Poland or Hungary wanting to
join the European Union for economic benefits, without their accepting the political objectives and commitment to
democracy and plurality. Pakistan and India are both opposed to this option. Moreover, an independent and
landlocked Jammu & Kashmir will only mean continuation of India-Pakistan rivalry in another form. It will merely
change the nature of the conflict, not end it.
Some scholars propose conversion of the Line of Control into an international border. Most Kashmiri leaders
oppose such a division of state. Pakistan's rulers describe this as an Indian strategy to freeze the status quo, while
the Indian government is bound by a parliamentary claim to Kashmir on the other side of the LoC. The people of
India are bound to disallow their government to consider this option when they come to know about the plight of the
people in Gilgit-Baltistan and the strong desire among people there to be relieved from the control of Pakistan. Also,
people of Pakistan do not want to let India have the Kashmir valley, and more importantly, Jammu, because of
rivers, as discussed earlier.
As accession, independence and the conversion of Line of Control into the international border are not viable, the search
for unconventional options has seized the minds of scholars and practitioners. Some aim at decimating the Kashmiri
identity into narrow cleavages in the fashion of post-Yugoslavia formation of the Balkans. The latest such proposal was
floated by General Musharraf, towards the end of 2004.
An alternative proposal could be based on gradual unity of the people of Jammu & Kashmir and gradual amity between
the people of India and Pakistan. Thus, the Line of Control should be transformed into a Line of Cooperation. On either
side of the Line of Cooperation, considering the polarity of preferences that range from complete independence to
preference for the same side to accession to the other side, the only reasonable via media would be autonomy and
devolution. It will be up to multiple interest negotiating bodies from the Pakistani side of Kashmir, including Gilgit-
Baltistan to work out the details of autonomy with Islamabad. Similarly, it will be for a multiple interest forum on the
Indian side to negotiate the details with New Delhi. Nevertheless, at the minimum level, the Indian central government
must restrict the powers of the Governor and repeal the laws that may be considered draconian by the Jammu & Kashmir
Bar Association. Similarly, on the Pakistani side, Gilgit-Baltistan must be integrated with Kashmir. In the interim
period, it must have an elected chief minister. The President of Kashmir, including Gilgit-Baltistan, must be a
ceremonial one like a provincial governor. Gilgit-Baltistan needs the withdrawal of the Frontier Crime Regulations
laws, as also an independent judiciary in the interim period.
It must be emphasised that autonomy is not proposed here as a political arrangement for power sharing or cooption of
locally important voices in power structures. Rather, it is meant to be the foundation of a new society. Therefore, a
package of reconciliation and reconstruction measures would be essential.
Once New Delhi, Islamabad and the groups in Jammu & Kashmir accept the framework of devolution, reconciliation
and reconstruction, a set of new institutions will be required, such as:
a. A permanent body with the task of monitoring the efficient functioning of the autonomy. Teams negotiating
the autonomy issue could form this body.
b. Committees appointed by the assemblies of both sides of Kashmir should meet biannually to discuss various
issues including economic, social and cultural.
c. The governments of India and Pakistan should hold official meetings on a regular basis, specifically on
Most important, it will be necessary to establish Joint Economic Development Council of Jammu & Kashmir to promote
trade, investment and joint ventures. The Council should also undertake the task of joint development of the Indus Water
Basin, treating water as a commodity. The Council must set rules for a fast track visa process for all Kashmiris, who have
bona fide business or family interest. Visa windows can be established in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad for this purpose.
This fast track visa process can slowly move towards the free flow of people once:
a. Terrorism subsides, as borders cannot be opened up if the violence persists.
b. A similar arrangement for the free flow of all the citizens of India and Pakistan is reached, as it will not be
feasible to open up the borders for the Kashmiri people and then prevent them from entering into the other
parts of either India or Pakistan.
It is necessary to have joint patrolling of the Line of Cooperation by Indian and Pakistani troops to stop flow of
criminals, drug dealers and terrorists who will be tempted to take advantage of the privileges offered under fast
track visa system and the Joint Economic Development Council.

The agenda for containing fires spreading far and wide across the South Asian region, introducing joint water
development, and converting the Line of Control into a Line of Cooperation is ambitious. It is impossible to implement
such an agenda if the final settlement is perceived as a result of secret negotiations between ambitious men. It is not
feasible to restructure relations between India and Pakistan if secret talks take place on the one hand and missile tests,
terrorist training camps, and strategically planned dams and canals become the order of the day on the other. The final
settlement is about tremendous forces of fire, water and earth. Above all, the final settlement is about our identity, about
us, about redefining the kind of people we want to be!


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009

The Simla Agreement of 1971 commits India and Pakistan to a final settlement between the two countries. A narrow
interpretation of the Simla Agreement would mean a final settlement on the political status of Jammu & Kashmir. While
this is essential, it is inadequate for a final settlement between India and Pakistan. The scope of conflict between the two
countries has now expanded to cover several parts of their own territories, as well as other countries in the South Asian
The process of composite dialogue and confidence-building measures, initiated in January 2004, continued in
September 2004 and planned until September 2005, offers hope. It is necessary to build on the optimism it has generated.
At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that superficial euphoria does not ignore subsurface realities. The period of
peace process January 2004-March 2005 has so far witnessed about 20 missile tests by India and Pakistan. This period
has also seen an expensive shopping spree by the defence ministries of the two countries. Thus, the current peace process
is more about talks and less about action. Nevertheless, it has generated hope, which can be a catalyst for a real change.
Hope can drive results; not substitute them.
The most difficult challenge is in defining the conflict itself. It can be witnessed in the form of brutality at the partition of
1947, the strife in Jammu & Kashmir in 1948-49, the wars of 1965 and 1971, the Kargil war of 1999, low intensity
violence in Punjab in the 1980s, in Jammu & Kashmir since the late 1980s and in the Indian north-east since the 1990s.
At the beginning of 2005, the theatre of conflict stands expanded to Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. The conflict
extends beyond its violent expression. It is reflected in the opportunity lost in business, education, culture and
comprehensive regional cooperation. It is mirrored in the loss of innocence of the youth and bitter memories of the old.
The Pakistani elite considers self-determination of the Kashmiris as the core issue of the conflict. The Indian public
opinion considers terrorism as the core issue. The Pakistani argument focused on Jammu & Kashmir fails to explain why
Bangladesh and Balochistan, as well as Punjab and Nepal, should be victims of violence. The Indian thesis
concentrating on terrorism ignores the fact that three India-Pakistan wars took place prior to 1989, before terrorism was
introduced in the Jammu & Kashmir valley.
Whether we like it or not, the core issue between India and Pakistan is a pathological deficit of trust. It surfaced in the
form of disputes over Rann of Kutch in the 1960s, Bangladesh in 1971, Punjab in the 1980s, Jammu & Kashmir in the
1990s, and perhaps Assam and Balochistan around 2005 and probably Indus River waters around 2010. So long as the
deficit is not covered by trust and mutual conviction in bilateral relations, there will be myriad excuses to light the fires.
Whatever the excuse, the primary reason for the most serious violence in the history of the subcontinent will be control
over water resources in the second half of the decade. Ironically, this may happen when India and Pakistan should be
celebrating the golden jubilee of the Indus Water Treaty signed in 1960. So far the treaty has endured the wars of 1965,
1971 and 1999. Unfortunately, India and Pakistan are heading towards the worst war ever despite the treaty.
And, of course, there is the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. It is more significant than others because it has persisted ever
since Independence while each of the other issues lasted for a decade or less. It is also easier to resolve if India and
Pakistan decide that they do not need an issue to carry on with confrontation to justify the need of nationhood in one case
and secular character of the society in the other to define their respective identities.
The search for the final settlement between India and Pakistan must therefore begin with their respective identity crisis.
The conflict will go on if the two countries look back at the events of the eighth, eleventh, sixteenth and twentieth
centuries to seek their origins. They will be able to arrive at the final settlement if the two states, and all of us, over 1.2
billion people of the two countries, commit to redefine ourselves in terms of the twenty-first century.


Tihar Jail
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Part 1: FIRE
Chapter 1: Identity

The conflict between India and Pakistan is ultimately about identity. It is about who we are and who we want to be as
people. On the surface it appears to be a conflict about what we want to have - water, or land or whatever else. The
reason why we are not able to reach a negotiated agreement on sharing what we want is because we confuse what we
want to have with what we want to be.
There are conflicts in our mind about where we come from, what we form as respective societies and where we want to
reach. India and Pakistan in their present forms are post-colonial states. Nevertheless, to most Indians, India is not a
state, but a civilization one that predates the arrival of not only the British and the Mughals, but also the Aryans. The
Indians trace the birth of civilization to approx 2500 BC, when King Bharat reigned; even though there is a dispute about
prehistoric dates. Some Pakistanis trace the birth of their nation not only to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, but also to
the landing of Muhammad Bin Qasim in Sindh and Multan in 712 AD.

Pakistan's Problems
If Pakistan is to be defined as a concept that was born with Muhammad Bin Qasim's conquest of Sindh, it is then
intrinsically associated with foreign forces. On the other hand, if Pakistan is to be defined as a product of the Lahore
Resolution and the partition of 1947, it is then associated with indigenous protest. The difficulties of the Pakistani mind
to harmonize with India reflect the psychological tussle between a concept associated with foreign conquest and a
concept demonstrating local protest. Therefore, the Pakistani mind is constantly trying to conquer and protest. The
final settlement for the Pakistani elite is the victory of Pakistan over the entire land mass and population that Indians
claim to form the Indian civilization. Until such a conquest is realized, a struggle is deemed to be essential to actualise
the concept of protest.
Thus the conflict with India is a testament to existential crises. It is about continued existence of Pakistan as a notion, as
an idea, as an identity of people who want to protest against the local culture. It is not about land, water, trade routes,
finance and such material elements. It is also not about religion or majority-minority relations in the subcontinent. It is
about power and resistance to power.
Pakistan was created in the name of Islam. However, the support for the Pakistan movement was confined to parts of
Punjab, Bengal and United Provinces. There was no enthusiasm for the concept of a religion-based state in Sindh,
Balochistan, NWFP, and Southern India. Presently, there are more Muslims living in India than in Pakistan.
The conquest of Mohammed Bin Qasim, and other Muslim rulers, particularly the Mughal dynasties, made it possible
for the Muslim elite to rule the subcontinent. The creation of Pakistan made it possible for a conglomeration of Muslim
landlords to rule a part of the subcontinent, though 300 million Muslims have chosen to not belong to the Pakistani state.
About half of them chose to live in India. Another 150 million Muslims broke away from Pakistan to live in Bangladesh,
which is a state formed on the basis of linguistic nationalism and not religion. About 150 million Muslims of the
subcontinent currently live in Pakistan, though it may be speculated that some of them may prefer linguistic or ethnic
nationalism as the basis for formation of new states in the decades to come.
The choice made by two thirds of the subcontinent's Muslims in support of coexistence or linguistic or ethnic
nationalism, proves that there is no great psychological divide on the basis of religion. There are undoubtedly cultural
and economic differences between different religious communities. There is enough historical evidence to prove that
vested interests manipulate these differences to produce communal tension. The coexistence of differences with a
desire for peaceful cohabitation challenges the concept of a state based on religious ideology. Therefore, the Pakistani
elite constantly needs to justify the need for their state in the form of protests against the Indian civilization, currently
represented by the Indian state. To them there will be no final settlement until they conquer or until they realize that
Pakistan as a state can thrive as a vehicle for progress and not protest.
Should the Pakistani elite determine to perceive its state as a vehicle of progress for all its people, a final settlement with
India will not only be feasible, but also beneficial. In 1995, J.N. Dixit, who as the former Foreign Secretary represented
the quintessential Indian establishment, announced on the platform of International Centre for Peace Initiatives (ICPI),
that the Indian elite had accepted the consolidation of Pakistan as a modern state in its own right and respected its
evolution over five decades. In 1999, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, leader of the Hindu nationalist political forces, visited
Pakistan as the head of the Indian government. He paid tributes at Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore to symbolize the respect
accorded by the Indian people to the concept of the Pakistani State. Gone are the days when a segment of Indian political
thought questioned the partition. The dramatic proclamation by late Mr. J.N. Dixit in Mumbai in 1995, Prime Minister
Vajpayee's visit to Minar-e-Pakistan in 1999 and several other gestures demonstrate that India treats Pakistan as any
other sovereign state. As pointed out elsewhere, even extremist Hindu leaders respect the sovereignty of Pakistan,
though they accuse it of using terrorism to undermine the sovereignty of India. There is a fringe element among Hindu
nationalist groups that propagate the concept of 'Akhanda Bharat'. Many Pakistanis construe this as a desire of Indian
extremists to colonise Pakistan. In reality, the advocates of this theory espouse democratic confederation, not
colonisation. In any case, they include a confused bunch of individuals ranging from romantics to armchair theorists.
There is a growing tendency in Pakistan itself to try to seek a self-generated identity and not as a protest movement
against India. An increasing number of young people want Pakistan to be integrated in the world economy. Some
would like to see Pakistan as part of the global Islamic community. A few have tried to define Pakistan as a part of
greater Central Asia. In the 1950s, the Pakistani elite made a serious effort to form a confederation with Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, Pakistan has not given up its obsession with India. If India claims permanent membership of the UN
Security Council, Pakistan objects. If India seeks a role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Pakistan protests. It
often appears that Pakistan is more interested in India's loss than its own gains. This is a psychological problem that
needs to be diagnosed and cured in terms of human psychology, and not in terms of any piece of territory.
Pakistan's identity crisis poses the greatest stumbling block to the final settlement between Pakistan and India. It has
become complex in the last 20 years because of a new yearning to define the national identity in a religious framework.
There is growing contest between the forces of social modernism and religious orthodoxy. The ruling establishment has
been playing with rival tendencies to entrench itself in the power structure. In the process the State has been going
through transformation. In the 1950s it was a bureaucratic state. From the 1960s to the 1990s, it was a military
dominated state. Since the 1990s, the military and the mullahs have been competing and collaborating with each other
to determine the shape of the state. As of 2005, the military has an upper hand over the jihadi groups. If present trends
continue, it is quite possible that religious orthodoxy will become a dominant force with the military playing a secondary
role, unless the forces of social modernism manage to prevail.
In the dynamics of simultaneous competition and collaboration between the military and the mullahs, an uneasy
relationship with India is essential. If there is peace with India, it is not possible to use the enemy card to galvanise the
military or the mullahs. If there is total confrontation with India, it is not possible to use normalization process as a tool
in the internal power game. The final settlement and the final confrontation are equally inconvenient. So long as
Pakistan is engaged in a struggle to define its identity, it would be extremely handy to have India as an enemy.

Indian Identity
India does not have existential problems. India is clear that it wants to be a plural and secular democracy. It has had a
stable constitution since its independence. Many of the constitutional changes, such as the Panchayat Bill have resulted
in the deepening of democracy. Over the last 55 years, the electoral process has led to the sharing of power with
backward castes and minority communities. India has problems of corruption, crime and conflict. There are groups that
reject the social and political ethos of the country. Nevertheless, there is sufficient consensus on the plural, secular and
democratic character of the country.
While India has a clear identity as a nation, it is striving to define its role in the world. On the one hand, India aspires a
global role. On the other, India often thinks and behaves as a power concerned with regional dominance. It appears that
India is simultaneously trying to be a frog in the pond and the lion of its national emblem. India's conflict with Pakistan
is, to a certain extent, a product of India's struggle to find space in the world from two opposite directions. If India is
serious about a place at the high table, Pakistan should not be an issue. It should be possible for India to carry Pakistan
and other neighbouring countries in South Asia along as its closest allies. For instance, India should have been able to
establish a relationship with Pakistan such as the one that the US has with Canada, Britain with Ireland or France and
Germany with Benelux. Such an equation would mean generosity on the part of India but without equal reciprocation.
From time to time, India has been able to have dependable partnerships with Nepal and Sri Lanka, and even Bangladesh.
It should have been possible to forge close economic and cultural linkages with Pakistan as well, since the 1950s by
offering huge concessions. These could in turn have paved the way for strategic understanding. At least the Simla
Agreement of 1972 could have been used to foster real friendship. The history of India-Pakistan relations is a case of
missed opportunities.
If India is serious about being a lion with four heads that looks around in all directions with supreme confidence, it
should be aspiring to negotiate the formulation of global political and economic structures. It should be engaged with
G8 and P5 in efforts to determine rules of the game for the conduct of international relations. Instead, Indian leaders
have approached great powers to protest against Pakistan sponsored acts of terror. On many occasions, India's
discussions with the US, EU and Japan have been dominated by the concerns of others about India-Pakistan
confrontation rather than India's concerns about global political and economic imbalances.
India's difficulties with Pakistan are the result of a failure to define a clear strategic vision and pursue it vigorously. If
indeed this vision were to be global, India would need to expand its asset base. The primary component of such an asset
base has to be a thriving economy and advancing technology. The secondary component has to be a genuinely cordial
relationship with all the neighbouring countries. If India has an economic union with Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Bangladesh, it would be a strong force by virtue of control over energy routes and proximity to China and Russia. Every
great power in the world would want to deal with a country whose political orbit extends from the Caspian to the Asean.
Instead of thinking in these terms, India has wasted far too much of its energy in managing an adversarial relationship
with Pakistan. If India wants to make a U-turn now, it will only be possible with a new mindset and a new vision.

Conceptual Confusion
The problems of identity are not confined to the national level. Some Kashmiris agitate in the name of Kashmiriyat.
Some project Kashmiriyat subservient to a militant religious identity. The Balochis have sought independence in the
name of Balochi identity. Myriad groups from Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan and North-east India struggle to establish
tribal identities. Across South Asia, at least ten major religions and sects are practised and over 200 languages spoken. If
local administrative units are created in federal political structures, they can facilitate cultural expression and
governance. However, if every entity is to be granted independent statehood, South Asia will become home to 200 states,
equivalent to the current membership of the United Nations.
More important, a state based on religious or ethnic identity begs a moral question. On the surface, such a state is meant
to accommodate a distinct identity. Beneath the surface, the demand for an independent state represents a combination
of grievances and greed. Mohammed Ali Jinnah demanded Pakistan only when he realised that he could not head the
government of united India. Shaikh Mujibur Rehman insisted on Bangladesh when he was not allowed to assume the
highest elected office in Pakistan. Jagjitsingh Chauhan was happy with Punjab so long as he was a senior cabinet
minister. When he could not become the Chief Minister, he advocated Khalistan. The partition of nation states as a
means to pander to the greed of power-hungry men can never end since greed is insatiable.
India was partitioned in 1947. Pakistan was further split in 1971. Since 2001, a demand for even a further break-up of
Pakistan has been gradually building up, with Sindhi and Balochi leaders agitating for cessation in certain situations. A
fresh partition of Pakistan would not be the end of the story. In Sindh, there are overt conflicts between Sindhi and
Mohajir communities and a strong resentment against Punjabi domination of the state and Punjabi settlers in the Sindh
province. In Punjab, there are conflicts between Seraikis and Punjabis. In Balochistan, there are conflicts between
tribals and Punjabi migrants. If an independent state is to be created for each community on religious, ethnic or linguistic
basis, there will be perpetual demands for separation.
The case of Jammu & Kashmir most aptly illustrates the futility of power-sharing on ethnic or religious basis. Currently,
the state of Jammu & Kashmir on the Indian side is a plural entity. If it were made a separate state, it would have to be
divided into several parts. In each part, there would be areas dominated by a community that is in minority in the overall
part. For instance, Hindus are a minority in the overall state, but they are in majority in the Jammu division.
In the Hindu-dominated Jammu, districts such as Rajori and Poonch have Muslim-dominated population. Within
Rajouri and Poonch, there are Hindu-dominated tehsils and villages. The part of Jammu & Kashmir on the Pakistani side
is dominated by Sunni Muslims. Within this part, Shi'as and Ismailis dominate Gilgit-Baltistan. Within the Shi'adominated
Gilgit-Baltistan, there are Sunni-dominated tehsils and villages. Thus, if religion or ethnicity is to be used as
the basis of state formation in Jammu & Kashmir, the process of division will go on for a hundred years or more, until
every tehsil becomes an independent republic. This would not be in harmony with the Kashmiriyat that advocates
plurality and peaceful coexistence.
The theory of power-sharing as the basis for division of societies, stands on the flawed assumption that the countries,
which are presently facing ethnic or other sectarian conflicts, are unbridgeably divided on religious or sectarian lines.
The truth is that each of the strife-torn societies in the world has had periods of harmony of hundreds of years and it is
only in the last few decades that they have been engaged in deadly conflicts. The subcontinent was divided into
kingdoms until the British arrived. There were several wars between emperors and princes of the same religious
pursuits, but they never extended to violence between segments of the society. The conflicts between Hindus and
Muslims, Punjabis and Sindhis, Sindhis and Mohajirs, Assamese and Bengalis, Sinhalese and Tamils, Bamas and
Karens, Nagas and Manipuris for power over structures of state are all a twentieth century phenomena.
Since identity is transient and can be manipulated, it cannot be the ideological basis of a durable state. Rather it can be the
basis of a perpetual conflict. At the same time, redefining of identity can be the basis of harmony and progress. The
question before India and Pakistan is whether they want the identity to be based on partitions and divisions or on unity in
diversity. It is healthy to organise administrative units on a linguistic basis to preserve cultural independence within a
federal unit. It is destructive to use religion, ethnicity and language as the ideology for independent countries. For a
thousand years, Europeans fought with each other on the basis of religion and ideology. At the end of the second
millennium, they realised the value of a model that provides cultural autonomy but political unity. The sectarian
conflicts in South Asia are less than a hundred years old. It is to be hoped that we do not experience massive bloodshed
and death to reach similar conclusions.
The final settlement between India and Pakistan must therefore be a settlement between the principles of cultural
identity and political unity. It must be a settlement that allows expression and cohabitation of ethos creating a larger
ethos of peace in the region. Robert Cooper says in The Breaking of Nations very aptly: "To find permanent solutions, we
may need to think in terms of redefining identity. Only if a wider identity can be developed, will there be a chance of
constructing the kind of community that may enable us to be with each other without a war."


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 2: Extremists

The confrontation between India and Pakistan must be seen in the context of evolution of political structures in the two
countries. In the case of India, democracy has deepened in the last fifty years. Representatives of backward castes and
classes have found it possible to acquire power in large states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Representatives of
backward sections of society as well as minorities have made it to the high offices, including that of the President of the
Republic. On the other hand, deterioration in the quality of politics has resulted in the induction of criminals in public
institutions. The concept of dynastic succession has spread with many political families mushrooming at the national,
regional and district levels. Thus, the Indian democracy is a work in progress. It remains to be seen how efficient and
clean governance it can produce in the future; however, the commitment to democracy itself is firm and solid.
Pakistan has experienced basic structural changes in its political system in the last fifty years. In the first decade, there
was essentially a rule of the bureaucracy. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the army ruled the country. In the 1970s, elected
government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was in power, but on account of separatist agitation in Balochistan in 1973 and
demonstration against high prices in Sindh in the mid 1970s, Bhutto had effectively given all power to the army. In the
1990s, there was sharing of power between the army and democratic institutions. Since the end of 1999, the army has
been in control of the formal power structures.
Since the late 1980s, a new force jihadi organisations has emerged in Pakistan's political system. In the 1980s and
1990s, they were tools of the army and Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). Currently, they are junior partners, both
of the army and the democratic institutions. If they continue to grow, it is possible that they may emerge as dominant
partners in a future scenario. There are more than 100 jihadi organisations in Pakistan. It is difficult to estimate their
exact strength. Many independent observers believe that approximately one million young men are associated with this
sector, including many in non-combatant roles such as logistics, propaganda, preaching, organisational work, fund
raising and commercial activities. The number of armed militants is estimated to be around 200,000 but it is important to
bear in mind that there are no defined lines between armed and unarmed militants due to frequent changes in their
respective roles. This compares to the strength of army at around 620,000. At the current rate, the strength of the armed
forces can at the most expand to 650,000 by 2010. During the same period, jihadi forces can increase to over 300,000 and
infiltrate various institutions.
The military leadership obviously had not anticipated that it might at one stage be reduced to play a subservient role to
the jihadi forces. In the next five to ten years, the greatest risk to the development of Pakistan, peace in South Asia and
stability in the world is that the jihadi forces may succeed in turning Pakistan's military into their strategic tool. Twenty
years ago, the military had created jihadi organisations as its own tool of state craft. In this task, the Pakistani military
received ample support from external sources in the form of funds, illicit arms and other wherewithal due to the Western
obsession to drive the (former) Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. As the Russians left Afghanistan, Pakistan began using
the extremist organisations to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan itself, suppress Shi'a minority in Pakistan, intervene in
India and produce terrorists in jihadi factories for export around the world. In the process, Pakistan has created a hydraheaded
monster of terrorism and extremism. Since 2001, Pakistan has accepted the directives from its Western sponsors
to reverse the process. Between 2002-2004 it helped to nab over 600 militants belonging to Al Qaeda. But the military
leadership is proving to be both ineffective and disinclined though taking a different public stance in arresting the genie
it has produced.
Of the 100-125 jihadi organisations that now function in Pakistan, many are small and ineffective. They are created by
the ISI for a specific purpose and for a specific period of time and then forced to lie low until they are required again in
future. Nevertheless, ten of these organisations have managed to grow into a big force, to some extent in partnership with
and to some extent autonomous of the army. In fact, they account for most of the strength of jihadi forces. These
organisations are:
· Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami
· Lashkar-e-Taiba
· Harkat-ul Mujahideen
· Jaish-e-Mohammad
· Sipah-e-Sahaba
· Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
· Hizbul Mujahideen
· Tehreek-ul Mujahideen
· Tanzeem-ul Ikhwan
· Al Badr Mujahideen

Militant organisations with a focus on Kashmir as their primary and substantial objective have formed the United Jihad
Council. When the Council was formed in 1999, it had only seven member organisations. Currently, the membership is
almost 20. The Council includes two big players - Hizbul Mujahideen and Tehreek-ul Mujahideen. However, many of
the other members are either small or have been only sporadically active. These include Al Umar, Muslim Janbaaz
Force, Tehrik-e-Jihad, Lashkar-e-Islam and Al Barq.
Among the ten big players listed above, except for Hizbul Mujahideen and Tehreek-ul Mujahideen, the remaining eight
aspire to destroy India, create a theocratic state covering the entire subcontinent or indeed the whole world. For them,
Kashmir is just one item on their agenda. In other words, irrespective of whatever happens to Kashmir, they will
continue to expand in order to achieve their larger objectives. In fact, Hizbul Mujahideen and Tehreek-ul Mujahideen
also seem to be keen on expanding their agenda to Islamise the entire subcontinent.
The ten big organisations have more in common with Al Qaeda than a Kashmir-focused group like the Jammu Kashmir
Liberation Front. They would like to capture the state of Pakistan, if they can forge unity among themselves, and then
aim to capture Delhi. Once they control the vast assets, particularly strategic and nuclear assets of Pakistan and India,
they dream of taking over the world. In a way, they are more dangerous than Al Qaeda, which currently has barely one
thousand members due to the three years of the war on terror. The ten Pakistani organisations have several hundred
thousand members constituting a mass base for terrorism. They have unlimited supply of manpower through open and
covert sources, and a complex financial base independent of any particular source. They have linkages to legitimate
businesses, smuggling rings and security agencies. They have been able to conduct their recruitment and fund raising
activities in ways that are only possible with official patronage. But their success must be also seen in the context of
Pakistan's social and economic milieu. There are 20 million young men in the age group of 14-40 years, providing a large
pool of potential young terrorists to be tapped by zealous leaders of jihadi groups. Moreover, male dominated social
structures, where boys are alienated from women in early age, support macho tendencies and discount compassion and
care as social values. With these economic and social realities, it is very easy to feel humiliated and tempted to join
groups, which massage egos and provide employment.

Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami
Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami (HUJI) is the largest international terrorist organisation created by Pakistan. It was set up by two
Deobandhi religious bodies in 1979 at the outset of the Afghan war. The initial objective was to organise relief camps for
the Afghan mujahideen. Gradually the organisation was subcontracted by ISI to recruit and train mujahideen, and not
merely to restrict to relief work. The group then developed links with Hizb-e-Islami (Yunus Khalis faction). After the
death of Maulana Irshad Ahmed in 1985, the organisation went through several splits and changes. In 1992, HUJI set up
its Bangladesh unit under the leadership of Shaukat Usman alias Sheikh Farid and Imtiaz Quddus with support from
Osama bin Laden. By 2005, HUJI had spread its wings to 24 countries. These include Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Myanmar,
Bangladesh, Tajikistan, Iran, Malaysia, Fiji, UK, US, Ireland, the Philippines, and parts of Africa and the Middle East. In
Pakistan its network is spread in 40 districts. Some of the units in Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Pakistan have
been asked to lie low since 9/11. In India, HUJI has been primarily active in the north-east, operating from its platform in
The motto of the organisation is "Harkat-ul-Jihadi Islami: the second line of defence for every Muslim". With this motto,
HUJI has ambitions to be seen as the main patron by all Muslims in the subcontinent and possibly elsewhere in the
world. It has an active Department of Preaching, besides a military wing and publishing activities. It is known to have
extremely close links with madrassas. It recruits students for madrassas from different parts of the world and then
absorbs some of them in its ranks. It is known for its ambitious fund raising program including trade in arms and
ammunitions on behalf of different jihadi groups. Thus, HUJI is a growing conglomerate with multiple objectives and
The strategy of HUJI is to capture the state of Pakistan, eastern provinces of India and the western neighbours in Central
Asia. Eventually, it would like to establish its rule around the world in partnership with other like-minded organisations.
In 1995, it supported Major General Zahirul Islam Abbassi and Major Mustansar Billah to revolt against the military
leadership in Pakistan. When the plan backfired, Qari Saifullah turned himself as the government witness. Saifullah was
a member of the first group of Talibs that went from Pakistan to Afghanistan. He is credited for bringing together Mullah
Umar and Osama bin Laden. His release in 1995 enabled him to establish a firm base in Kandahar as an adviser to Mullah
Umar. In 2003, he plotted to kill General Musharraf. In August 2004, he was arrested from his hideout in Dubai and
extradited to Pakistan.
The prospects of HUJI taking over the state of Pakistan appear to be weak, except as a junior partner of LeT, JeM and
SSP, as discussed later. HUJI has now shifted its substantial focus to the eastern provinces of India with an operational
base in Bangladesh. It has also established a branch in Arakan province in Myanmar. Besides, it has a training base in
Bangladesh to impart military training to the youth from Arakan. Because of its emphasis on the eastern part of India, it
has merged its activities in Kashmir with Jamaitul Mujahideen al-Alami. The role of HUJI in fomenting insurgency in
the eastern and north-eastern states of India is discussed in the next chapter.

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is also known by the name of its parent body, Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad, lately renamed as
Jama'at-ud-Dawa. Unlike many other organisations of the Deobandi School, LeT belongs to Ahle Hadith School. It was
set up by Hafiz Saeed in 1986. Jama'at-ud-Dawa/ LeT has their headquarters at Mudrike, 32 km from Lahore on
Gujaranwala-Islambad road, in the heart of the industrial base of Pakistan. Despite being officially banned, it continues
to operate on a campus spread over 190 acres. The campus has a huge mosque, a swimming pool, vocational and
recreation facilities, a garment factory, a wood works factory and fishing farms. There are also free health clinics.
Currently LeT has a large number of recruitment centres and propaganda offices across Pakistan. It has 2,200 camps to
provide armed training. The number of LeT offices is not known, but is estimated to be more than 500. The number of
LeT workers is estimated to be more than 100,000. There are indications that LeT has a presence in the US and Iraq and
has links with the leaders of Mujahideen in Baghdad.
LeT has a very comprehensive and systematic method of recruitment. First, it conducts social welfare activities for
general public and also for the families of the men killed in action. The focus is primarily on health with 3 hospitals, 34
dispensaries, fixed and mobile medical camps, and 11 ambulance services. The patients and their families form an
important catchment area for recruitment. The second sphere of activity used for recruitment is education. LeT has 150
model schools and plans to set up another 126 model schools. These schools are different from madrassas. Whereas in
madrassas education is restricted to the religious scriptures, the LeT model schools teach religion along with
mathematics, science, and political ideologies. In order to reach recruits and supporters beyond patients and students
and their families, LeT also runs a large publishing empire. It has a monthly magazine Majallah Dawa with circulation
of about 140,000, a weekly paper Ghazwa with comparable circulation, and special periodicals for women and students.
Besides, LeT organizes public rallies and conferences to widen its base. The pace of conferences has considerably
increased since the ban on LeT in 2002. There have been several periods of time in 2003 and 2004, when the banned LeT
organized massive public conferences almost on a daily basis. It also has mobile teams to visit schools and houses to
attract youth to its conferences and training programs.
The process of recruitment is followed by training. LeT emphasises the arming of minds before arming the youth
physically for terrorist activities.
There are seminars for ideological and psychological training and night training programs for youth living with their
own families, before they are selected for residential courses. At these introductory seminars, the objective is to win
hearts and minds of the participants. At a later stage, those selected for residential courses are sent for a 15-day course in
religious indoctrination. In the third stage, arms training is provided in the form of courses lasting from 3 weeks to 3
LeT uses its public rallies, conferences, and night seminars for fund raising from general public. It also earns funds from
routine business activities such as fishing farms, sale in hides of animals sacrificed on religious occasions, as well as
illegal business activities. Besides, it is a major recipient of funds from Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. The
estimates of total budget of ISI vary from $500 million to $3 billion. There are indications that LeT receives 20-30 per
cent of ISI's total funding for subversive activities. As a proponent of Wahabi Islam, LeT is also believed to have been a
beneficiary of Saudi charities on a large scale.
LeT has eight objectives. The top seven objectives relate to the creation of Islamic order in the world. Even though as of
now, LeT has been mainly active in Kashmir, its stated objective is to challenge the West and to establish universal
Islamic community. It projects the United States to be its primary enemy, Israel and India as American stooges that need
to be dismembered, and Kashmir as a mere irritant. Accordingly, LeT treats Kashmir as a minor element on its agenda.
Its real priority is reflected in the text of its pamphlet outlining its purpose: Why are we waging jihad? The pamphlet
emphasises the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India. It seeks to bring about a union of all Muslim majority
regions in the countries surrounding Pakistan. Towards that end, LeT is active in Chechnya and parts of Central Asia. It
claims that it has assisted Taliban and Al Qaeda in their fight against the US and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in
December 2001. In India, it is reported to have penetrated in Jammu and a nationwide student organisation. According to
the Maharashtra state police reports, it had helped a student body to organise riots in Malegaon near Mumbai in August
LeT has a network extending beyond South and Central Asia. It is known to be particularly close to Jemaah Islamiyah of
Indonesia. In 2003, it was found to be training Southeast Asian students at its Al Ghuraba cell in Karachi for jihadi
operations in their home countries. In its own literature it proudly announces that it has provided training to Mujahideen
from Bosnia, the Philippines, Somalia, Chechnya, the Middle East, and Muslim migrants in the United States and
At a conference organised by Jama'at-ud-Dawa, Hafiz Saeed, as reported by weekly Ghazwa (a publication of LeT, 16-
22 April, 2004), argued that Pakistan should not be captured within its geographical limits. All Muslims from
Ahmedabad, other parts of Gujarat, Hyderabad Deccan, Bihar, Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh should be treated as
Pakistanis. He has described Pakistan's atomic weapons program as an instrument of Islam and not merely the State of
Pakistan. His utterances at various meetings and the voices of his followers clearly indicate that LeT considers the entire
Indian subcontinent as its potential catchment area. It would like to establish its rule in South Asia and then move on to
conquer the world.

Harkat-ul Mujahideen and Jaish-e-Mohammad
Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM), earlier known as Harkat-ul Ansar, was recently renamed as Jamiat-ul-Ansar. It was
originally founded in 1985 to fight against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and to organise humanitarian relief
operations for the Afghan refugees in NWFP. It went through mergers and separations with HUJI in the following 10
years. It has 48 offices in Pakistan, out of which 24 are working irregularly. It also has four training camps in
Afghanistan though it is not known whether they are fully operational in view of the war on terror there. It has several
thousand members but a small core of 300 Pakistani, Arab and Afghan veterans of the Afghan war. It claims to have
fought on the side of Al Qaeda and Taliban against the US forces in Afghanistan in December 2001.
In February 2000, Maulana Masood Azhar, leader of HuM, formed Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). He managed to take
control of most of the offices and properties of HuM. The organisation maintains close ties with the former Taliban.
Since early 2002, it has been formally banned and therefore maintaining a low profile due to Pakistan's cooperation with
the US war on terror in Afghanistan and JeM's close links with the Taliban. However, Maulana Masood Azhar continues
to be free to build his organisation for use at some point in the future.
It is also operating as Al-Furqan, though some believe that this is a separate organisation.
HuM says in its literature that its primary objective is to provide awareness of jihad. It claims to be determined to liberate
suppressed humanity throughout the world and to eliminate injustice and discrimination. In comparison to the universal
focus of HuM, JeM places equal emphasis on Kashmir and justice for Muslims all over India. It expresses anger for the
demolition of Babri mosque and vows to take revenge against India's Hindu leaders. It was suspected to be associated
with the attack on the Jammu & Kashmir Assembly in October 2001 and the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The
organisation's agenda covers entire India and beyond.
Maulana Masood Azhar clarifies the objective of JeM in his editorial of the June 2001 issue of its official publication
bearing the same name as his organisation. He has described JeM as the world Islamic movement based on the principles
of Sharia. He has identified two targets. First, enemies of Islam around the world are described as military targets.
Second, non-devout Muslims are described as tablighi targets. Thus, the movement is projected as a vehicle for reform
in Islam in order to take the religion to its most puritanical form. The objective of JeM appears to be Islamisation of
Pakistan and take over of the Pakistani state. Towards this end, it has created a hundred active offices around the country,
out of which only three are in Kashmir on the Pakistani side. The rest of the 97 offices are in other provinces with 85 of
them in Punjab and Sindh.

Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) are closely related to each other and also to Jammat-e-Ulema Islami
(JUI), though some of their spokesmen claim separate existence. Both organisations aim to convert Pakistan into a fully
Sunni state. Their main targets are the Shi'as of Pakistan. In fact, SSP came into existence in Jhang district of Punjab
particularly in response to the socio-economic repression of the masses by the Shi'a feudal lords in the area, and partially
as a result of General Zia-ul-Haq's doctrine of Sunni political Islam.
The SSP has reportedly 500 offices and branches in all 34 districts of Punjab. It has approximately 100,000 workers on
its rolls. It also has 17 branches abroad including UAE, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Bangladesh and England, mostly for the
purpose of fund raising. It manages maximum proportion of foreign funded Sunni madrassas in Pakistan. While it
provides funding to the madrassas, in return it recruits young men from them. It also maintains a political profile and
recently changed its name to Millat-e-Islamia. The focus of SSP is internal Pakistan. While it started its operations in
Jhang district in Punjab in 1995, it concentrated heavily on killing doctors and other professionals in Karachi in 2000-
2005. At one stage, SSP wanted to bring about a Taliban type revolution in Pakistan, but this agenda was put on a back
burner in the context of the war on terror after 9/11. On 24 October 2001, Munir Bhat, Section Officer in Pakistan's Home
Ministry, slapped a notice on the organisation for registering 50,000 youth for military training in Afghanistan. Further,
the Home Ministry official charged the organisation with the intention to use the trained youth for internal operations in
Pakistan on their return. The SSP leadership did not deny these charges. Nevertheless, the organisation was banned in
January 2002 and 1,600 of its members were rounded up. By the end of March 2002, most of the SSP members were
released and were reported by the Pakistani press to be campaigning for General Musharraf's referendum to maintain
presidency of the country. Its sister organisation LeJ has had very close relationship with the Taliban. In fact, whenever
conflict took place between factions of LeJ, Taliban appointed other jihadi leaders to help resolve them. Like SSP, the
objective of the LeJ is to change the character of the Pakistani state and society.

Tanzeem-ul Ikhwan and Al Badr Mujahideen
Like SSP and LeJ, Tanzeem-ul Ikhwan aims to change the character of the Pakistani state and society. It was set up in
1986, a year after the formation of SSP. Its leadership comprises preachers and retired army officers. Tanzeem-ul
Ikhwan does not have a strong organisational structure. Most of its activities centre around assemblies for religious
prayers, the time for which is set throughout the country. It plans to bring about a social revolution through education and
religious activities. It has a strong presence in Gilgit-Baltistan with a view to undermine the work of the Aga Khan
Foundation and foreign missionaries.
This group uses social services to tap vulnerable youth in far-flung areas. It supplies human and material resources
to other organisations such as the LeT. It also has a good base in the army and civil service. It is mostly active
underground and therefore manages to remain unnoticed most of the time.
Al Badr is considered to be a reasonably large jihadi organisation, which has been changing its colours since its
establishment in the 1970s. In the beginning it was active in East Pakistan just about the time it became Bangladesh.
Later, it was involved with the war in Afghanistan and began its activities in Kashmir in 1989. It maintains a very close
relationship with the Hizbul Mujahideen and had even been part of the HM for some time. Its headquarters are located
between Rawalpindi and Islamabad. It is a large complex with a mosque, madrassas, a hostel, hospital and library. This
organisation has the maximum proportion of foreign mercenaries among its cadres including those from Sudan, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, Turkey, Algeria, Afghanistan and Egypt.
Al Badr was involved in the Kargil adventure of 1999 and has consistently opposed any dialogue between India and
Pakistan. Al Badr projects Kashmir as the gateway to India and states that acquisition of Kashmir is essential to occupy
the rest of India. Thus, it is clear that it will not be satisfied with any negotiated solution to Kashmir unless the
organisation is able to establish a physical base in the state to be used as a platform to attack the rest of India. There are
also indications that in the mindset of its own leaders, Al Badr seeks a global space, much beyond the Indian
subcontinent. It is opposed to policies of the US, Saudi Arabia and Israel. It has been exhibiting replicas of a nuclear
bomb in its fund raising campaign, projecting it as an Islamic weapon. In reality, unlike HUJI or LeT, Al Badr does not
have operational experience outside South Asia. Therefore, its criticism of the United States and its allies may remain
confined to its publications and speeches of its leaders. However, it will seek to extend its presence from Jammu &
Kashmir to other parts of India if it can create a space for itself.

Jhang-Peshawar Consensus
It is not merely a few selective jihadi organisations that are spreading the philosophy of Islamic rule in the subcontinent,
as the first step for establishing Islamic rule all over the world. There is growing consensus among a section of the armed
forces, political parties, intellectuals, media and citizens that the time has come to prepare for taking over the region and
the world. This school of thought obviously has to contest with the liberal school, which is in favour of improving
economic and cultural relations with India and the West. Thus, Pakistan is seized by a competition between the forces of
socio-economic modernism and religious orthodoxy. Those representing orthodoxy have a strong base in Jhang and
Peshawar. The army is split between two schools of thought. The corps commanders, including the Chief of Army Staff,
claim to be on the liberal side. But they show no hesitation in using extremism as a tool in their internal games, as well as
external policies. The fact that those representing orthodoxy are able to create huge empires, organise public meetings
every day, and aggressively recruit young men for their enterprises shows the implicit or explicit support they enjoy
from authorities in Rawalpindi. Indeed, whatever are the winds of change in parts of Islamabad and Karachi towards
pragmatism, there is a growing Jhang-Peshawar consensus about a theocracy in the entire subcontinent and a universal
Islamic Caliphate.
Qazi Hussain Ahmed, chairman of Jamaat-e-Islami party has clarified time and again that his priority is to bring about
education 'reform' in Pakistan in order to influence the minds and hearts of people in favour of jihad. His second priority
is to establish a Muslim ummah all over the world and the third priority is to separate Kashmir from India. Since Kashmir
is the most proximate, it makes immediate action feasible. However, JI leaders make it clear that Kashmir is only a
means and not an end in itself.
Hafeez Idrees, JI Amir for Punjab, announced while addressing a meeting of Hizbul Mujahideen that the ultimate
objective of his party was to hoist a green flag on the White House. He appealed to the HM cadres to be prepared to bring
this about. This would require spreading jihad across the Atlantic. Javed Kasuri, Deputy Supreme Commander of Hizbul
Mujahideen, states in Jasarat (June 12, 2004): "The entire West is Islam's enemy. All the Muslim sects must unite and
wage jihad against the West."
Some leaders are not as ambitious as Qazi and his followers. They would be satisfied if they could merely capture New
Delhi. On May 20, 2004, Hizbul Mujahideen had organised a public rally in Muzaffarabad. Several leaders used the
occasion to condemn peace moves between India and Pakistan. Sheikh Jamil-ur-Rehman, a leader based in
Muzaffarabad, declared: "The Hindus can never be our friends. In clear words, Allah also says that Jews and
Christians cannot be our friends either. Those who are attempting friendship between India and Pakistan are deceiving
the nation. Friendship with Hindus is unnatural, illegal and unprincipled." Syed Salahuddin, the leader of Hizbul
Mujahideen, declared at the rally that the jihad movement would liberate "crores of Muslims and other minorities in
India oppressed by Brahmin imperialists." Abu Sayyaf Kashmiri, an Islamic scholar who writes in the Voice of Islam
(April 2004), urges that the maps of India and Pakistan should be redrawn. He argues that all Muslim areas adjacent to
Pakistan and Bangladesh should be handed over by India to these two states. Moreover, a state of Deccan should be
created in southern India as an independent state for Muslims in the peninsula.
It is possible to identify several statements from public rallies, news reports and columns from Pakistan advocating the
Jhang-Peshawar Consensus. Hafiz Saeed summarises them in several of his articles in the official organ of his group.
"We request Muslims of India to rise, since jihad is the only defence of the oppressed Muslims. There is a need to
organise a pure Islamic movement in the subcontinent. The Muslims can be steered to the right path by giving them right
ideology, enabling them to participate in jihad, and forging integrity among their ranks."

Hindu Extremists
India's democratic ethos places constraints on the extremists in the Indian political system. There are organisations such
as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha (RSS) and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which advocate Hindu nationalism. They
have often taken an antagonistic stand against Muslims in India. They argue that Pakistan cannot be trusted at all and
therefore India should have a huge military budget including strategic weapons. They also support the strategy of
surgical strikes in Pakistan to cut supply lines to the militants in Kashmir. However, no Hindu extremist leader has ever
launched a campaign for dismantling the state of Pakistan or for flying either the tricolour or the saffron flag in
Islamabad. Dr Praveen Togadia, who is considered to be one of the most hard-line Hindu leaders, has often asked
Pakistan in his public speeches to stop terrorism and urged the Indian government to attack terrorist camps across the
Line of Control if they are not closed. Neither he, nor any other leader of the Hindu organisations has sought to acquire
the territory of Pakistan. In fact, when Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Lahore in 1999, he made it a point to
visit Minar-e-Pakistan as a symbolic acceptance of the Pakistani state.
In the 1950s, there were sections in the Indian public opinion, which found it difficult to accept Pakistan as an
independent state. Over the last 50 years, the Indian mind has evolved in its perception of Pakistan. Most Indians,
particularly the strategic thinkers, may not trust Pakistan and therefore may lack enthusiasm to build friendship with
their neighbour. However, there is no sign of any interest in capturing Pakistani territory. India's acceptance of the
government's decision to hand over the territory and prisoners secured in the 1971 war, without any significant returns,
demonstrates the underlying desire to live and let live. The people of India are not ready for any cartographical changes
that would adversely affect their country. At the same time, they are not seeking any cartographical changes to the
detriment of Pakistan or any other country. The fact that even the most extremist leaders confine themselves to this
school of thought is a consequence of democracy. If any political group wants to come to power, it needs a genuine
mandate of people, which is not possible to secure on an agenda of violence and war. Whether Pakistan would have had a
similar experience had it nurtured democracy in the last half century is a matter of speculation. The growing interest in
sections of the Pakistani society to seek reconciliation with India and the international community perhaps indicates that
in a genuine democracy, organisations such as HUJI, LeT, JeM, and others would have found it difficult to create space
for themselves. The conflict between India and Pakistan may appear to be a territorial conflict on the surface, but in
reality it is very much a conflict between the respective political structures of the two countries.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 3: Vulnerabilities

India and Pakistan were born as post-colonial states with wounds of partition. Fifty-five years later, India is searching for
its destiny and Pakistan its identity. On periphery, it appears that they are in a conflict over Jammu & Kashmir, one
province that could not make up its mind at the time of partition. However, a closer look would reveal a kaleidoscope of
conflicts in areas that have apparently never been disputed.
India's search for destiny and Pakistan's exploration of its identity have exposed both the countries to various
vulnerabilities. If the two nations had normal relations since their birth, it would have been possible for both of them to
address internal weaknesses. Instead, Pakistan has defined India's failure as its own success and therefore tried to
accentuate it. India, until recently had not sought its destiny by rising above the regional rivalries. As a result, it has
allowed itself to be consumed by the animosity of the most hostile elements in its neighbourhood. As a consequence, the
two countries are involved in a violent chess game all across South Asia, far away from their borders and the Line of

India's North-East
One of the most significant theatres of India-Pakistan conflict is the north-eastern Indian state of Assam, which along
with its neighbouring states, has witnessed insurgency for over three decades. It began with resentment of the local
people against refugees from Bangladesh. Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) has taken advantage of the
conflict to penetrate several of the secessionist organisations in the state to stoke fires. Between 2001-04, more than 100
organisations in the Indian north-east were involved in launching approximately 5,200 attacks on civilians, militants,
security forces and others.
For years, ISI used the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) as the main interlocutor in the region. Lately, it has
expanded its network to cover and create several organisations. It has reportedly provided several passports for Paresh
Baruah, the head of the military wing of the ULFA, and other cadres. He has visited Pakistan, particularly Karachi,
several times during 1993-2003. At least 200 ULFA activists have taken training in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
training included courses in the use of rocket launchers, explosives, assault weapons, disinformation and counter
intelligence. ULFA has been buying arms from Cambodia, Thailand and other South East Asian countries through
madrassas in Sylhet and Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh. It has also established a commercial network with LTTE of Sri
Lanka, whereby the latter has undertaken to transport arms for a fee to the former. In April 1996, the Government of
Bangladesh seized more than 500 AK-47 rifles, 80 machine guns, 50 rocket launchers and 2,000 grenades meant for
ULFA from two ships off Cox Bazaar. In 1999, at the time of India-Pakistan war in Kargil, ULFA openly supported the
Pakistani position in its newsletter, Swadhinata. ULFA has been involved in sustained attacks against police and civilian
targets in Assam.
While ULFA began with an anti Bangladeshi agenda, it shifted its policy to secession from India. Besides the training
received by top ULFA cadres in Pakistan, the organisation has entered into a collaboration with HUJI for training a large
number of cadres in Bangladesh. The HUJI training camps, typically impart skills in the use of sophisticated arms and
explosives in Rangamari, Sundermari, Masaldanga, and other villages of Bangladesh.
Besides supporting ULFA, ISI is also involved in providing specific kind of assistance to several other terrorist groups in
the North-east. In Meghalaya, it has focused on circulation of fake Indian currency using Hynniewtrep National
Liberation Council and Achik National Volunteer Council. It has provided finance and logistic support to the National
Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), All Tripura Tiger Force,
National Liberation Front of Tripura, People's Liberation Army (Manipur) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation
(KLO). ISI plays a critical role in building networks and linkages between the terrorist organisations in India's northeast,
Nepal, Sri Lanka and also uses ULFA to establish linkages with People's War Group in the Indian States of Andhra
Pradesh, Jharkhand and Bihar. Thus, ISI has created a huge conglomerate of terrorist groups in India's north, east and
north-eastern states. While the organisations mostly came into being on their own, ISI's role has been to strengthen them
through training, networking and material support.
An important target where India is vulnerable is the Siliguri corridor of West Bengal that has a very narrow width
of 22 miles. A serious terrorist attack and the capture of the corridor by militant groups can undermine communication
links between the North-east and the rest of India. The ISI and ULFA have particularly backed the KLO to concentrate its
activities in Jalpaiguri and Siliguri subdivisions of Darjeeling, very close to the "Chicken's Neck."
ISI does not completely depend on ULFA and other ethnic militant groups in the North-east. It has developed a new
strategy to create religion-based Islamic organisations. There are reportedly around 15 Islamic extremist organisations
operating in Assam and other north-eastern states. These include the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam
(MULTA), Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA), People's Liberation Front (PLF), Islamic Liberation
Army (ILA), Muslim Security Force (MSF), Liberation of Islam Tiger Force (LITF), Muslim Security Council of
Assam (MSCA), United Liberation Militia of Assam (ULMA), Minority People's Action Committee (MPAC), Muslim
Volunteers Force (MVF), Mujahid Vahini and Jubo Command. All of them have links with terrorist organisations
outside India for moral and financial support.
The ISI has also been attempting to organise a grand alliance, namely All Muslim Liberation Forum of Assam
(AMULFA), by unifying several small Islamic fundamentalist organisations under one banner. In fact, MULTA,
MULFA and LITF have already started operating under the AMULFA. This body in future would be part of a greater unit
called United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS). Two Manipur-based Islamic organisations, i.e. People's
United Liberation Front and Islamic Liberation Army already operate under the ULFSS.

Heart of India
Besides the North-east, India's communal fabric has become the target of terrorist organisations in Pakistan. In addition
to its Jihad-e-Kashmir operation, LeT launched a Jihad-e-Hind operation in early 2003, signifying a shift of focus from
Kashmir to the rest of India. HUJI has used its clout with ULFA and AMULFA to establish linkages with Maoists in
Nepal and through them People's War Group in Central India. There is a growing effort to build mosques and madrassas
in the Terai region in Nepal bordering India. Between 1984 and 2004, approximately 275 mosques and madrassas have
come up in the districts of Rupandehi, Banke, Kapilvastu, and Bardiya. The estimate of madrassas on the entire Indo-
Nepal border is not available. However, Arun Shourie, an eminent Indian columnist and Husain Haqqani, an eminent
Pakistani columnist, have both placed the estimate at around 1,000 in their various articles. Also, many Muslim youth
organisations have been promoted in Nepal, particularly in areas bordering India. These include Nepal Islamic Yuva
Sangh, Nepal Muslim League, Nepal Muslim Ekta Sangh, All Nepal Anjuman Islah Samiti, Nepal Muslim Seva Samiti,
Jam Serajul Alam, All Nepal Muslim Sudhar Samiti, Muslim Jan Kalyan Samiti, Millat-e-Islamia, Nepal Muslim Sangh
(NMS), and the Bazm-e-Abab. Considering that only 4 per cent of Nepal's population is Muslim, it is odd to see the
growth of so many Islamic organisations. It is even more odd that most of these organisations have found homes in areas
bordering India and that they have all come up in the last 20 years.
There are reports indicating that ISI has established about 60 modules in nine states across India. Most of them are
"sleepers", springing to action only when directed. Many of these centres are in Uttar Pradesh, which borders Nepal and
also in neighbouring Bihar. The centres in Uttar Pradesh have been found to be in Muzafarnagar, Saharanpur, Bijnor,
Muradabad, Bareilly, Kanpur, Varanasi and Azamgarh. The centres in Bihar and Jharkhand are found to be Siwan,
Madhubani, Purnia, Kishanganj, Katihar, Gaya, Sitamarhi, Patna, Hazaribagh, Giridih and Jamshedpur. Another state,
which has many ISI cells, is West Bengal, particularly the Siliguri area.
It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000 workers and agents of ISI in India. According to Pakistani scholars, if
ISI manages to persuade even 1 per cent of 150 million Muslims in India to take up arms, these 1.5 million would be a
formidable force to foment turmoil in India. The theory is that with increasing Muslim militancy, India would find it
difficult to contain communal conflagration. This would provide an incentive to the jihadi groups in Pakistan to fight for
the cause of Indian Muslims.
However, this theory has not found practical application, since most of the Muslims in India have opted to live in
communal harmony. There have been incidents such as the carnage in Gujarat in 2002 and communal riots in the early
1990s, when India's social fabric was severely strained. Whenever such eruptions have taken place, most of the leaders
of Hindu and Muslim communities have attempted to build bridges between communities. Nevertheless,
ISI continues to be active and transfers approximately Rs.600 million to illegal madrassas in India, with a hope to gain

Pakistan's Provinces
If India suspects the involvement of ISI in India's north-eastern, and northern states, Pakistan suspects the involvement
of Indian intelligence agencies in the strife being witnessed in Pakistan's Balochistan and Sindh provinces.
Since 2000, soon after General Musharraf took over as the Chief Executive, Sindh and Balochistan have seen the flame
of secession growing into a fire of moderate size, which can transform itself into a full-blown inferno in 3-4 years if the
events of 2004-05 are any indication. At the beginning of 2005, the military leadership introduced a fresh division of the
districts of Sindh. On the surface, this is meant to be an administrative arrangement. Beneath the surface, it is a ploy by
the military rulers to divide Sindhi leaders and break the Sindhi nationalist agitation. Instead of creating conflicts
between Sindhi leaders, it appears that this strategy is likely to backfire and bring together the separatist leaders with a
much greater resolve. In particular, the issue of the division of Hyderabad district is very emotional. The agitation in
Sindh against Punjab's domination is driven by shortages of water, General Musharraf's proposal to construct Kalabagh
dam and Thal canal and skewed fund allocation. Between 2001-04, the supply of water to Sindh was cut by 30-40 per
cent every year. Due to an increasingly weak flow of Indus, the sea has been intruding in parts of Sindh causing salinity
and other environmental problems. Since General Musharraf took over as the Chief Executive, he has proposed plans to
establish Kalabagh dam, which will further affect the flow of water in Sindh. This issue is discussed at length elsewhere
in the publication. However it is sufficient to note here that water is the source of Sindhi discontent.
In Balochistan, people are incensed by discrimination by the federal government, cantonments in Gwadar and Dera
Bugti area as well as those in Kohlu, lack of returns for its natural gas supply to Punjab and the construction of the
Gwadar Port, which has led to immigration of outsiders. They are worried that cantonments and mega projects would
turn them into a minority in their own province. Also, Balochis are upset about water shortages and the plans to construct
the Kalabagh Dam. Finally, they perceive the military's actions in the name of war on terror as an excuse to change the
social landscape of the state by converting autonomous B areas into federally managed A areas.
These grievances have led to demonstrations for autonomy and even separation since 2003. In most of these
demonstrations and rallies, speakers compare the situation to the one prevailing in 1971, when Pakistan was bifurcated.
There are growing incidences of violence involving killings, kidnappings, bomb blasts and shelling of gas pipelines.
The slogans of Sindhudesh Zindabad and Independent Balochistan Zindabad (Long Live Sindh, Long Live Independent
Balochistan) have become commonplace. It is not only the leaders of separatist and regional movements like Jiye Sindh,
Pakhtoonkwa Milli Awami Party and Pakistan Oppressed Nation Movement (PONM) who are comparing the situation
to 1971, but also many independent columnists do so.
There are also reports of some of the separatist groups preparing for a violent confrontation. For instance, Dr Chisti
Mujahid has suggested in many of his columns (Akhbar-e-Jehan, August 13, 2004) that there are 60 terrorist training
camps in Kharan district of Balochistan. He estimates that about 250-300 militants receive weapons related training at
each of these camps, which would bring the total to somewhere above 15,000. He also reports that there are about 500
terrorists running various camps in Kallanch mountain range near Gwadar.
Dr Chisti Mujahid is amongst those analysts who ascribe the growing terrorist networks in Balochistan to Indian
intelligence agencies. In an article in Akhbar-e-Jehan on June 16, 2004, he has quoted a confidential report of the
Pakistan intelligence agencies addressed to General Musharraf giving details of Iranian, Indian and Afghan intelligence
support to the insurgency movement in Balochistan. Mirza Aslam Baig has added CIA, Mossad, KGB and MI6 to the
Indian and Iranian intelligence agencies as operating from Afghanistan to undermine the security of Balochistan
(Jasarat, August 6, 2004). Other columnists have mentioned external intelligence support to camps in Dadu area in
Pakistani sources blame Hindu families in Zilla Bola Khan, Zilla Ahmad Khan and Kotri for indulging in arms
smuggling at the behest of the Indian intelligence. On the other hand, several Pakistani scholars suggest that the Hindu
families are only accused of connivance with India to justify the killings of young men in these families so
that the local vested interest can take control of the Hindu-owned businesses.
Pakistani political parties and the media openly debate the issue of Indian intelligence support for insurgency in
Balochistan and Sindh. Whereas columnists such as Dr Chisti Mujahid and former army officials are convinced of the
Indian involvement, many others believe that the bogie of Indian intelligence is being resurrected after a long time
merely to whitewash the failure of the Pakistani army to contain violence in provinces outside Punjab. For instance, an
article in Jasarat (September 6, 2004), a newspaper owned by the hardliner Jamaat-e-Islami party, Shahnawaz Farooqi,
squarely blames General Musharraf for raising the Indian bogie.
Balochistan Chief Minister, Jam Mohamad Baloch, ISPR Director, Shaukat Sultan, and Punjab Rangers Director,
General Hussein Mehdi, are some of the Pakistani officials who have gone on record in their public speeches to blame
the Indian agencies for turmoil in Pakistan. Similarly, the Institute of Strategic Studies, which is known for its proximity
to the Pakistani government, has published a report blaming India for setting up training camps in Pakistan and Indian
Punjab on the border of Pakistan.
Whether and to what extent India is involved in Pakistan's internal strife, is difficult to say due to views supporting and
challenging this theory expressed by various Pakistani analysts in the country's public discourse. The government of
Pakistan has not provided any proof, merely adding to speculation. If it is assumed that there is no such involvement,
there are at least fears in Pakistan that it is feasible in the future. Intelligence and counter-intelligence activities create a
vicious cycle, which drag the victims into an endless downward spiral.
The fires lit in India and Pakistan due to their bilateral animosity have spread to neighbouring countries of Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar. The presence of ISI-sponsored groups in Nepal and the HUJI base in Myanmar has
been discussed earlier. In the case of Afghanistan and Bangladesh, India-Pakistan rivalry has affected the very core of
the body politic of the two countries.
In Afghanistan, Pakistan first supported Mujahideen and then created Taliban to achieve strategic depth against India.
Several jihadi groups ranging from Jaish-e-Mohammad to HUJI have conducted training camps in Afghanistan for
preparing militants to be despatched to India. Since 2001, many of these camps have closed down. Instead, the Pakistan
government has used diplomatic skills to facilitate gradual induction of Taliban or sympathisers of Taliban in the
political system.
Since India has good relations with the Northern Alliance leaders, one of Pakistan's strategies has been to use the
international community to sideline the Northern Alliance from the Afghan government. This has been gradually
achieved, though at the cost of growing polarisation in Afghanistan and concentration of Northern Alliance in the
northern part of the country, where they have base. If the trend continues, it can sow the seeds of ethnic division in the
country, once international security forces leave in response to some other crisis in the world, or they simply atrophy.
India-Pakistan rivalry has also contributed to polarisation in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia is perceived to be
close to Pakistan. Sheikh Hasina, the leader of opposition, is known for her desire to improve relations with India. The
rivalry between Begum Khaleda and Sheikh Hasina is largely based on domestic issues. It has its roots in the history of
Bangladesh in the last 20 years and the conflict of egos between the two women leaders. They had collaborated in the
agitation to restore democracy during General Irshad's period. They fell apart as soon as they had to compete for power.
Therefore, it would not be appropriate to ascribe their rivalry to either India or Pakistan.
Nevertheless, once the bitterness of the Khaleda-Hasina competition was established, it is argued that Pakistan and India
offered sympathies and support to them on a competitive basis. The regime of Begum Khaleda is seen to be turning a
blind eye to the presence of HUJI and other terrorist organisations on the Bangladeshi territory. Some analysts even
suspect active cooperation between Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence agencies.
The experience of Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal suggests that the hostility between India and Pakistan is
spreading far and wide. Almost a fifth of India in northern and north-eastern states and a third of Pakistan in parts of
Balochistan and Sindh provinces are affected by conflicts, which are being increasingly intertwined with the India-
Pakistan hostility. At least three countries in the neighbourhood are being drawn into this fire. If the deterioration
continues thus, the future of a large population of over 1.5 billion people of these countries will be at risk. Once a fire is
lit, it is impossible to predict its reach, pace or direction.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 4: Irrationality

The rivalry between India and Pakistan is proving increasingly expensive for both the countries. The cost is not only to
be measured in terms of military expenditure, but also on the basis of varied parameters such as discounting of GDP
growth, terror-economy growth, negative transformation of institutions, politicide, diplomatic losses, education costs,
value deficit, and, most importantly, human lives.
Some costs are directly associated with hostility between the two countries. Some costs may appear to be indirect. Some
costs constitute a small but critical component of a larger picture. For instance, India has the potential to raise its GDP
growth rate from 7 per cent to over 10 per cent. A friendly India-Pakistan relationship is just one of the many factors
required for such an increase. But because of its inter-dependence with other factors, it contributes to over 3 per cent
deficit in India's potential growth rate. Similarly, Pakistan is in the grip of extremist religious forces and terrorist groups
and India is only one of the many factors in determining the future of terrorism in Pakistan. But because of its
interdependence with other factors, it adds to Pakistan's social costs.

Economic, Diplomatic and Socio-political Costs
India granted the Most Favoured Nation status to Pakistan in 1995-96. Pakistan has refused to reciprocate. Except for
nine years between 1965-74, India-Pakistan trade has been uninterrupted and the volumes of official trade have been
negligible. India-Pakistan bilateral trade amounts to only about one per cent of their respective global trade. However,
the volume of third country and illegal trade indicates the tremendous potential for bilateral trade between the two
countries. Prospects for bilateral India-Pakistan trade could be to the tune of $3-4 billion in a favourable environment
and nearly $5 billion under SAFTA.
Conflictual relations have hampered the possibility of creating trade transit rights and pipeline projects. Lack of trade
transit rights prevents both the countries from exploiting other geographically closer markets in the region. This also
negates possible IndiaPakistan joint pipeline projects to tap the major gas deposits of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia.
India is thus forced to import natural gas through other expensive options, whereas Pakistan loses an opportunity to earn
more than $500 million per year in transit fees.
India and Pakistan account for approximately 80 per cent of the GDP of SAARC countries. A conflictual relation
between its two largest member states has hindered the progress of SAARC. An agreement on South Asian Free Trade
Agreement (SAFTA) was reached at the Islamabad SAARC Summit in January 2004; however, implementation of
SAFTA can be severely hampered if the two nations go back to their warring ways.
Since independence, India and Pakistan have looked at the world through the prism of the other. This has affected not
just their mutual relationship but also their relations with other countries. Both countries have rigid, counter productive
policies vis-à-vis each other, and mutually exclusive polices when dealing with third countries. Bilateral diplomatic ties
between the two countries reflect the border situation between them. The necessity to sign a special bilateral code of
conduct, stipulating the norms for treatment of the diplomats, itself indicates that even diplomats are not spared from the
web of antagonism. Diplomats of both the countries have often complained about harassment and ill treatment.
Diplomatic ousters become a pattern during heightened tensions. Hostility between the two neighbours has in the past
impeded their entry into various regional groups and blocs, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Cumbersome visa procedures and restrictions on movement has ensured minimal people to people contact. Severance of
transport links on many occasions has also caused drop in the number of people travelling across the border. For
instance, the stopping of Samjhauta Express in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian Parliament led to a loss in traffic
of about 150,273 passengers between January 2002 and December 2003. The media flow across the border is also
minimal, though Internet access makes up for it to some extent.
The most significant cost for Pakistan is the transformation of Pakistan's political and social institutions. Growing
military and jihadi influence has reduced the significance of democratic institutions. The military has over the years
pervaded every segment of Pakistani society - industry and commerce, diplomatic services, and civil institutions,
not to forget education and health care services. The core of the military business empire is a group of four foundations -
Fauji Foundation, Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation, and Bahria Foundation - initially set up to help retired
service personnel. With assets worth $5 billion, these foundations represent the biggest business and industrial
conglomerate in the country and run some of the largest listed companies on the Karachi Stock Exchange. The stake of
military in the economy is very high, and it needs to control politics to safeguard its own interests. Accordingly, the
Musharraf government created a constitutional role for the army in the form of the National Security Council. Also, the
military has become the largest contributor to the bureaucracy in Pakistan, with approximately 1,000 serving or retired
military men filling important positions in government institutions and state corporations.
The influence of jihadi forces is growing on the Pakistani society, as well as lower grades of army. Various jihadi outfits
like Jama'at-ud-Dawa are involved in social activities like schooling, free medical treatment and welfare of the poor to
expand their reach to wider sections of the society. As discussed elsewhere, so far the jihadi forces have been instruments
of the military, but in the next 5-10 years, they have the potential to turn dominant and use the military as their tool.
For India, the socio-political costs of conflict with Pakistan lie in the spread of terror to various parts of the country, the
changing nature of internal ethnic resistance movements, risk of communal flare up, curbing of civil liberties and growth
of hard-line political culture in parts of the country.
Over the last decade, India has faced more than a dozen major incidents of terror. Since the attack on World Trade Centre,
the targets of attacks in India have also been symbolic in nature, from the State Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir, the
Gateway of India to the Indian Parliament. Mumbai, the commercial capital of India, has been a preferred target over the
years. Since January 18, 1993, 31 blasts have rocked the city killing more than 300 people. The responsibility for
Mumbai blasts was claimed by individuals with no or minimum criminal records or by previously unknown
organisations. In early 2003, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) launched Jihad-e-Hind operation, in addition to its Jihad-e-
Kashmir operation, signifying the shift of LeT focus from Kashmir to the rest of India.
A lesser form of security and liberty has come to be accepted in both the countries. This is perhaps the greatest cost that
the countries for their hostility.

Arms Race
India and Pakistan have fought four wars resulting in total casualties of 8,733 military personnel for India and 13,896
military personnel for Pakistan. Apart from the combined death toll of 22,600 for India and Pakistan, there were
approximately 50,000 wounded or maimed on both sides. Though reliable data on disappearances and civilian
casualties is not available, it would be safe to assume that at least 100,000 families suffered direct human costs on
account of the four wars between India and Pakistan. It is not possible to calculate the actual economic costs incurred in
these four wars. However, the 2002 mobilisation and the Siachen conflict can both serve as an example of economic
costs to the two countries. The 2002 mobilisation cost $1.8 billion to India and $1.2 billion to Pakistan. In percentage
terms, this came to 0.38 per cent of GDP for India and 1.79 per cent of GDP for Pakistan. Assuming an average growth of
7 per cent for India and 4.5 per cent for Pakistan, such a confrontation will account for approximately 0.43 per cent of
GDP for India and 2.25 per cent for Pakistan in 2007. Such a confrontation would cause internal displacement of about
100,000 people on the Indian side and 50,000 people on the Pakistani side. Similarly, the localised conflict of Siachen
will cost $1.6 billion and about 900 lives to India and $0.3 billion and about 450 lives to Pakistan if it continues to rage
over the next five years.
India's defence expenditure has taken quantum leap in the past decade. In 1995, India's defence expenditure was $8.34
billion, and that of Pakistan was $2.96 billion. In the 2004-05 defence budgets, the figures stand at $16.7 billion for
India, an increase of $2.23 billion from the fiscal year 2003-04 and $3.32 billion for Pakistan, $0.6 billion more than that
for 2003-04. As percentage of GDP, the Indian defence expenditure comes to 2.89, whereas for Pakistan it comes to 5.19.
Thus, though the defence expenditure of Pakistan is much lesser than that of India's in absolute, it is much higher in terms
of percentage of GDP.
The statistics of defence expenditure tell only half the story. The real picture is revealed in the form of shopping spree
and manufacturing of conventional weapons, nuclear arms and ballistic missiles.
According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2004, arms imports by India increased by more than 100 per cent in 2003 over 2002,
maintaining a constant increase since 2000. According to the same report, India stands second in the list of the recipients
of major conventional weapons in a period 1999-2003, with a total arms import bill of $11,800 million; Pakistan claims
the ninth spot in that list, with an arms import bill of $2525 million. Every successful arms acquisition deal by one
country triggers off yearning for better weapons in the other.
The arms race in the subcontinent started with the US reopening its pipeline to Pakistan within months of 9/11 for
operations against Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The arms supply has moved away from the war on terror and has, arguably, an
anti-India orientation. Weaponry earmarked for exports to Pakistan include eight P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft, 2000
TOW-2A and 14 TOW-2A anti-armour guided missiles for the army, six Phalanx rapid-fire 20mm guns for surface ships
and an upgrade of six additional gun systems. The US is also mulling over the possibility of refurbishing Pakistan's fleet
of 28 old F-16 planes and permitting the sale of 12 used F-16s from Belgium. The $750 million Pakistan-China deal for
the supply of four frigates to Pakistan is all but completed, pending financial discussions. In July 2004, Pakistan
purchased a fleet of grounded Libyan Mirages including 50 jets and 150 engines. Pakistan Air Force will induct JF-17
'Thunder' aircraft, being produced jointly with China in 2006. Pakistani defence planners have also started looking at
other potential suppliers such as Sweden and France.
The Indian budget for 2004-05 witnessed nearly 60 per cent hike in allocation of capital expenditure; parlance for funds
provided for arms purchases, from $4.57 billion in 2003-04 to $7.31 billion in 2004-05. The year 2004 saw renewed
defence ties with Russia India's dominant defence supplier. In January 2004, India signed a $1.5 billion dollar deal with
Russia to overhaul and procure a Soviet-era aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, and to supply 28 MiG-29 maritime jets
to India. In December 2004, India and Russia signed a $1.5 billion contract for exporting 40 warplanes to India. In March
2004, India signed its biggest ever deal with UK worth £795 million to purchase 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers.
Around the same time, Israel also agreed to sell three Phalcon airborne early warning systems worth $1 billion to India.
Nearly completed deals include a $2.5 billion proposal to import six Scorpene submarines and 36 SM-39 missiles from
France, and a $230 million deal with Israel to acquire 50 Eagle/Heron unmanned aerial vehicles.
Though deterrence by definition should be minimum, India and Pakistan are increasing the threshold of nuclear
deterrence with each passing year. The missile race between the two nuclear-armed neighbours continues on a quid pro
quo basis since 1998, and the current peace process has not brought about any change in that. Since the November 2003
ceasefire between the two countries, together they have test fired almost 20 missiles. The pre-1995 period saw the tests
of Prithvi I and Agni I missiles in the case of India and Hatf 1, 1A, 2 and M 11 in the case of Pakistan. In fact, India
suspended the development of the Agni missile project in 1995-96, but later revived it in 1997 amidst reports of nuclear
and missile technology transfers from China to Pakistan. Post 1995, India developed and test fired a plethora of ballistic
and cruise missiles including Prithvi II, Agni II, Trishul, Dhanush, Akash and Brahmos. The Pakistan missile inventory
now boasts of Hatf 1, Hatf 1A, Hatf 2, Hatf 3, M 11, Shaheen I, Ghauri I and Ghauri II.
Currently, India is developing Agni III and IV, surface-to-surface ballistic missiles, with respective ranges of 3,000-
3,700 km and 4,000-5,000 km; Surya, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a range exceeding 5,000 km; and
Sagarika, a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 300-350 km. Pakistan is developing Ghauri III, a
surface-to-surface ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,500-3,000 km and Shaheen II with an estimated range of
2,500 km. Thus, the extensive missile development program in India and Pakistan continues amidst peace plans.
There are various speculations about the stockpile of nuclear warheads in both the countries. India is estimated to have
enough fissile material to produce 60 to 90 nuclear warheads, but may have assembled only 30-50; whereas Pakistan is
believed to have fissile material sufficient for 30-52 warheads, but is estimated to have assembled between 24 to 48
warheads. At the time of testing in 1998, India was suspected to have about 30-40 warheads and Pakistan about 15-20.
Both sides have increased their stockpiles considerably during 1998-2005, despite the peace process of 2004-05.
Thus, both the countries continue to talk peace amidst their missile tests and defence-shopping spree. At least in the days
of hostility, missile tests by one country were met with lot of opposition by the other. Similarly, a lot of concern was
shown over arms deals and weapons acquisitions in the subcontinent.
Thus, both the countries continue to talk peace amidst their missile tests and defence-shopping spree. At least in the
days of hostility, missile tests by one country were met with lot of opposition by the other. Similarly, a lot of concern was
shown over arms deals and weapons acquisitions in the subcontinent. Currently, the missile program and weapons deals
are in overkill mode in both the countries, but there is hardly any opposition to this. It is almost as if the arms build-up is
continuing in the neighbouring country with the implicit consent of the other. The peace process has also made the
international community turn a blind eye to the increasing threshold of arms and missiles race in the region. Given the
swing pattern of relationship between India and Pakistan, if they go back to their warring ways, the current accumulation
of arms will have grave consequences for the region.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 5 :Options

India and Pakistan have currently chosen to ignore the fire between them. It is much more convenient to concentrate on
a neatly defined issue like Jammu & Kashmir, while fires are being lit all over the landscape behind us. The US, Europe
and other members of the international community are always in search of conflicts they can resolve. It also suits them
to ignore the fires and just look at one flame. However fires once ignited spread on their own. Whether one looks at
them or not, fires consume all, including those who light them. Under the circumstances, India and Pakistan do not have
the choice of inaction; instead they have only two options.

Playing With Fire
The option presently pursued is to play with fire and hope that while others are burnt, the ones who light the fires are
saved. This option is perceived to be pragmatic if the process of ignition is handled in a calibrated manner, and when
necessary balanced with dodging fires in places where it gets too hot or too close.
The policy of playing with fire is based on the systematic strengthening of jihadi groups. It also involves temporarily
closing, shifting and transforming them. This strategy was introduced by General Zia in the 1980s. It has been
strengthened since January 2000, coincidently within three months of General Pervez Musharraf's dismissal of the
elected government of Pakistan. It was perfected in January 2002. There are indications that it will be taken to an even
higher level of sophistication in 2005.
Soon after General Musharraf took over as Chief Executive in October 1999, an Indian Airlines aeroplane was hijacked.
Maulana Masood Azhar was released in return for airline passengers held as hostages at Kandahar. He established a new
organization, Jaish-e-Mohammed, which began flourishing by March 2000 under the military rule of General Pervez
Musharraf. The newly formed group took over the assets of Harkat-ul Mujahideen with ease. It also recruited boys
openly from the government schools. It emerged as a star among terrorist organizations and enjoyed this position until
9/11. Since then, due to its close links with the Taliban and Pakistan's cooperation with the US in the war on terror, it has
been lying low. It has been formally banned; nevertheless all its assets are intact. Its recruitment and fund-raising drive
is currently on. The JeM leadership claimed to have 300,000 members in 2003, two years after the war on terror was
launched, though this might be an exaggeration. Maulana Massood Azhar is at large.
In January 2002, General Musharraf announced on television that Pakistan would not allow its territory to be used for
terrorism. His government arrested a few thousand members of militant groups and quietly released them in March
2002. He also announced that a Madaris Ordinance would be introduced by March 23, 2002. However, the Ordinance
has not been announced as of March 2005. General Musharraf banned terrorist groups including SSP, LJP and LeT. The
three groups have become more active and currently enjoy 'star' status, now that JeM is under wraps. General Musharraf
never even pretended to ban Hizbul Mujahideen. This group continues to be active, though it is as yet restricted to
Kashmir. Some of the recent public statements by the leaders of Hizbul Mujahideen indicate their plan to extend the span
of their activities from Jammu & Kashmir to other parts of India. SSP and LJP have stepped up their attacks on the Shi'a
community. The LeT has been busy with 'defence of religion' public conferences, taking its recruitment and fundraising
to new heights. The combined membership of SSP, LJP, LeT, HM and JeM has swollen to anywhere between 300,000
and 500,000 between General Musharraf's famous address in January 2002 and January 2005.
The only organization, which has suffered at the hands of the Pakistani military, is Al Qaeda. The military has
cooperated with the US FBI and security forces to nab 600 Al Qaeda members between October 2001 and October 2004
including key second-rung leaders in the organisation. While doing so, the Pakistan military has made a clear distinction
between Al Qaeda and Taliban. While Al Qaeda leaders are arrested, Taliban leaders and former ministers move about
freely in Balochistan and NWFP. They have been able to coordinate attacks on the US and other international security
forces in Afghanistan. In 2004, the Pakistan military agreed to attack tribal areas as part of the war on terror and obstruct
the movement of Taliban from tribal areas to Afghanistan. At the same time, some of the tribal leaders reportedly
mediated between the Karzai government and Taliban to facilitate a deal between them at the cost of the Northern
The dual approach of arresting Afghan and Arab members of Al Qaeda, while formally banning but really enabling
Pakistani militant groups to grow, has satisfied the international community. It is therefore feasible for Pakistan to
continue playing with fire. This option will involve:
· Using diplomatic skills to ensure gradual induction of elements of Taliban in the Afghan government to sideline
the Northern Alliance and to regain strategic depth for Pakistani terrorist groups; even though this may lead to a
civil war in Afghanistan by the end of the decade.
· Ordering groups such as JeM and HUJI, with close connections with Al Qaeda, to lie low or shift their base to
Bangladesh, Central Asia or other parts of the world.
· Containing infiltration in Jammu & Kashmir but intensifying it in the Indian north-east using ULFA and other
· Encouraging civil society exchanges and peace moves across India-Pakistan border while using Bangladesh as
the key platform to build a network of terrorist groups in India's north-east with linkages to Nepal, Sri Lanka and
India's Naxal affected heartland.
This strategy will require the continuation of the Pakistan military in power, with a façade of democracy. In order to
perpetuate the military in the economy and the political system, it will be necessary to weaken popular political parties.
This will create a vacuum that can only be filled by increasing the strength of religious parties, jihadi groups and
secessionist organizations. Will it be possible to use brutal force against Balochi separatists as was successfully done in
the 1970s and use a policy of 'divide and rule' in Sindh? Will it be then possible to claim success of the policy of 'playing
with fire'?
India does not have too many alternatives in this trajectory. It can continue to build a rapport with forces of social
modernism in Pakistan's government and society. It may feel dismayed by continuing terrorism and decide to snap or
weaken ties; this will only be at the cost of progressive tendencies in Pakistan. India's primary focus will have to be
restoring order in its own territory in the north-eastern segment and also in the central and northern states. Indian and
Pakistani leaders will carry on the conflict, until they suddenly reach a moment in time, an event such as 9/11, when they
will either have to ensure complete mutual destruction or make a genuine U-turn and dodge fires.

If the Pakistani and Indian leaders do not want to depend on some unforeseen event to determine their destiny, the only
option available to them is to counter extremism with aggressive fire-fighting, which may result in a temporary increase
in the inferno. The two societies can then rise in a new, progressive form from the ashes of the current degenerated
For India, this option would mean cracking down on extremist groups all over, while addressing genuine grievances of
the people who sympathize with them. It is necessary to bear in mind that many terrorist groups indulge in crimes such
as extortion and smuggling and counterfeit currency transactions. They must be treated within the framework of law.
At the same time, India will need to introduce agrarian and land reforms and provide real attention to bring about the
prosperity of its periphery.
For Pakistan, this option would be tougher, but inevitable. The alternative to tough crackdown against extremist groups
would be allowing transformation of the state to reach its logical end, from a partnership between bureaucracy and
military in the 1950s to a partnership between jihadi forces and military latest by 2010 2020. It will not be enough to
merely ban the concerned outfits enabling them to operate in different names after a lapse of some time. A complete
crackdown must include:
· Arrest of top leaders of all of the 100-odd organizations.
· Trial of all such leaders who might have been involved in any unlawful activities either within or outside the
country, including murder, extortion, smuggling and transfer of weapons.
· Freezing of assets and bank accounts of certain organizations and their members, including any new
organizations with which any of the members associated with previously banned organizations might be
Pakistan will also have to introduce education reforms, including:
· Identification of, and action against any madrassas that may be imparting training of violence or may be linked
to any militant organizations.
· Ban on schools sponsored by LeT and other organizations (or their parent bodies, such as Jama'at-ud-Dawa).
· Changes in the curricula to emphasise economic and social modernism.
· Protection to government and private schools from encroachment by militant organizations in terms of
recruitment and indoctrination drives.
Besides internal measures the two countries will need to undertake bilateral measures with each other to prevent
movement of criminals, drug traffickers and militants in each other's jurisdiction. This will primarily mean cooperation
between intelligence agencies and militaries of the two countries. It is only possible with mutual trust. Thus, the option
of dodging fires and rising as a pair of phoenix birds is completely predicated on the highest-level of political decision
makers to establish mutual trust.
This option is also predicated on a shared vision of the region. If Pakistan wants to launch an offensive in India's northern
and north-eastern states, it needs to set up terrorist training camps in Nepal and Bangladesh. Pakistanis are worried that
India may set up bases in Afghanistan to intervene in Balochistan. In the process India and Pakistan will not only weaken
each other but may also undermine the stability and unity of countries in the entire South Asian region from Afghanistan
to Bangladesh. The 'Phoenix' option will involve a shared vision of South Asia and joint efforts to help other countries
stabilize their political systems or at least not erode them deliberately to serve the selfish ends of the region's two big
countries. This is not a plea for idealism. It is the law of nature that when fire spreads around the circle, it begins
consuming the periphery, but it finally reaches the centre of the circle and destroys the entire territory. India and
Pakistan need to commit themselves to a circle of reason in the South Asian region.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 6: The Secret

In 1990, a bright and ambitious Pakistani brigadier at the Royal College of Defence Studies in London was asked to
prepare a dissertation as part of his one-year training programme. In September of that year, he presented his dissertation
with the rather lengthy title: The Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent, Conflicts with the Pressing
Requirements of Socio-economic Development. What are its Causes and Implications? Is there a Remedy? The paper
provided a new analytical framework to define the security paradigm in South Asia. Despite its rather lengthy and
cumbersome title, the paper was clear in its diagnosis of the South Asian security situation. The brigadier argued that the
basic problem in the region was the divide between the Hindu and Muslim mindset. Since it was a psychological
problem, nothing much could be done about it. He reasoned that there were two other core problems and since they were
of practical nature it should be possible to resolve them. One of them was the issue of Jammu & Kashmir, which was
known to the international community. The other was about the distribution of the Indus Rivers between India and
Pakistan. According to the brigadier, the two issues were interdependent if one were resolved the other would not exist.
In fact, he contended that it was essential to craft a lasting arrangement, ensuring fair distribution of river waters from the
Pakistani perspective, if there were to be any solution to the Jammu & Kashmir conflict.
The argument differed from the public stance taken by the Pakistani government in the last fifty years. Successive
Pakistani governments still insist that Jammu & Kashmir is the unfinished business of partition. As a Muslim majority
state, it should belong to Pakistan. India has argued that it belongs to India on the basis of instrument of accession signed
by Maharaja Hari Singh, then ruler of the state, and the wish expressed by Shaikh Abdullah, leader of the people's
movement. The public debate has always focussed on issues of terrorism, human rights and the legality of accession. It
has never linked the conflict to the rivers of Jammu & Kashmir. The brigadier was suggesting that the rivers hold the key
to the solution. His theory implied that the Kashmiri people's aspirations were secondary.
The brigadier returned to Pakistan to briskly climb the ladder of the army ranks. In 1998, he replaced General Jehangir
Karamat as Chief of Army Staff.
Soon after General Pervez Musharraf's elevation, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief opened a track-two channel with the
Government of India. The main thrust of the Pakistani proposal, mooted in early 1999, was that rivers should be used as
the basis for resolving conflicts between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. It advocated
using Chenab River as the border. The special envoy of Pakistani Prime Minister, made this proposal to his Indian
interlocutor on March 29, 1999 in New Delhi.
His visit to New Delhi was a secret known only to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. By a curious coincidence, on the
same day when the envoy was in New Delhi, General Musharraf summoned Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief for a
discussion at General Head Quarters. The General concluded that the only solution acceptable to Pakistan, to settle
its conflicts with India, was the Chenab Formula. The envoy returned to Islamabad on April 1, 1999, oblivious of
the meeting that had taken place between the army chief and the Prime Minister.
On the following day, the envoy was taken to the General Head Quarters for consultations with General Musharraf. This
meeting was meant to last for 30 minutes. It went on for 3 hours, from 8 pm to 11 pm. Besides General Musharraf and the
envoy, only the head of ISI was present in the room. The meeting concluded that the Chenab Formula should be the basis
of discussion with India to resolve the Kashmir conflict.
In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf staged a coup against the elected government. He declared himself the
Chief Executive. Western donors, especially the US, suspended cash flows to Pakistan.
In November 1999, on a cool afternoon in New York, a Pakistani head of an international political organisation, with
very strong network in the Pakistani army and political parties, met a senior ICPI functionary. The meeting took place at
the Manhattan office of the political organisation, a few blocks away from the UN office. The eminent Pakistani cited
that finding a permanent solution to the India-Pakistan conflict would depend on ensuring Pakistan's water
security beyond the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. Perhaps, Chenab River could be the border. Perhaps, some other
formula could be worked out but the fundamental determinant should be water. There was no mention of selfdetermination
of the Kashmiri people.
The following week, the ICPI functionary was invited by a top Pakistani lobbyist, known for his strong network in the
General Head Quarters in Rawalpindi, to dinner in a suburb of Washington DC. Once the formalities of the welcome
drinks were over and before the dinner was served, the Pakistani lobbyist said that he had an idea for resolving the India-
Pakistan conflict for good. A detailed proposal would need to be worked out by experts but its basis must be face-saving
for both the countries, while the substance must ensure water security for Pakistan from the rivers of Kashmir.
In December 2001, when terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament, India blamed Pakistan and withdrew her High
Commissioner, in protest. On the very next day, a high profile seminar was organised in Lahore on how to respond to the
possibility of India using water as a weapon against Pakistan. New Delhi had not even alluded to water. It had snapped
rail, road and air links but there was no reference to water. In Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi, there was little regret
about the breaking down of rail, road and air links the greatest apprehension was water. At a seminar in Karachi in the
last week of December 2001, attended by ICPI, the only occasion when tensions rose, was when someone alleged that
the Indian government had plans to use the water weapon. A participant warned that any conflict over water would lead
to Pakistan using nuclear weapons on a first strike basis against India.
A month and half later, on February 8, 2002, the editorial of Jang, a moderate Urdu daily, said that Pakistan's water
scarcity could threaten relations between provinces and lead to a nuclear war against India. Since then, a lively debate
has ensued in the Pakistani press, which continues till date with the President, Prime Minister, senior army officers and
leaders of various Kashmiri groups offering their views underlining the centrality of water in India-Pakistan relations.
For instance, in June 2002, Syed Salahuddin, chairman of the United Jihad Council, entered the debate. UJC is an
umbrella organisation responsible for coordinating the activities known as liberation movements in Pakistan of all
jihadi groups. This organisation has been placed on the US State Department's list of groups involved in terrorism. Syed
Salahuddin is also the leader of Hizbul Mujahideen a member of UJC that has claimed responsibility for many acts of
violence in Jammu & Kashmir. Salahuddin was quoted in Ausaf on June 18, 2002: "Kashmir is the source from where all
of Pakistan's water resources originate. If Pakistan loses its battle against India, it will become a desert." Since then in
most public meetings that Salahuddin has addressed, he has emphasised that Kashmiri freedom fighters were actually
fighting for Pakistan to enable it to gain control over Kashmir's rivers.
A few months later, Sardar Mohammad Anwar Khan, President of Kashmir under Pakistani control, known as Azad
Kashmir in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir in India, joined the debate. He was quoted in most Urdu
newspapers of October 21, 2002, saying: "Pakistanis who believe that they can survive without Kashmir are wrong. The
Pakistani economy is dependent on agriculture and hence on water, and therefore on Kashmir." Two weeks later, he
explained in a public forum: "Kashmiris are fighting for the security, strength and prosperity of Pakistan. Building dams
in Kashmir can irrigate Punjab and Sindh. Kashmir is important as Pakistan's water resources originate in Kashmir.
Even peace between Punjab and Sindh depends on water, and therefore on Kashmir."
Sardar Sikandar Hayat, Prime Minister of Kashmir under Pakistani control, said in a seminar on March 6, 2003:
"Without the rivers of Kashmir, Pakistan will become a desert. The freedom fighters of Kashmir are in reality fighting
for Pakistan's water security and have prevented India from constructing a dam on the Wular barrage."
Finally, on March 27, 2003, a senior officer of the Pakistan army, Lt General Zarar Azim, the then Corps Commander of
Lahore, was quoted in Khabrain, a newspaper known for its proximity to ISI, saying: "Kashmir is our lifeline and its
importance increases in view of our water security."
Immediately after the announcement of peace initiatives by India and Pakistan in mid-2003, Sardar Sikander Hayat
began advocating the Chenab Formula for resolving the Kashmir dispute. He argued that an autonomous Kashmir
was not acceptable as it would be difficult to safeguard the freedom acquired. However, this suggestion evoked very
strong criticism from all political and jihadi leaders of Pakistan as it meant bifurcation of
Kashmir. Most leaders wanted him to quit as Prime Minister for having advocated such a formula. The jihadi leaders
were clear they wanted a united Kashmir.
Little known is the fact that as per the Kashmir (Pakistan) charter, a person who does not uphold the vision of accession
to Pakistan cannot stand for elections or even aspire for a job in the government. While applying for a post in the
government of Kashmir (Pakistan), the applicant has to sign an affidavit affirming their belief in the ideology of
"Kashmir banega Pakistan" (Kashmir will become Pakistan). Sikander Hayat ostensibly has some powerful backing,
for despite his differences with the President of Kashmir (Pakistan), he seems unrelenting. He definitely has some
powerful backing in a country where the General Head Quarters has the monopoly of power.
In the summer of 2003, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the head of Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI (F)), visited India. On his
return, he suggested in his press briefings that he had proposed a resolution to the Kashmir conflict on geographical
basis. This was interpreted as subtle advocation of the Chenab Formula. It is important to note that Maulana Fazlur
Rehman was then reportedly engaged in quiet negotiations with General Musharraf on power sharing and a role for
himself in Islamabad.
In November 2003, Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali announced a ceasefire in preparation for the SAARC
summit to be held in Islamabad in January 2004. Suddenly, since this announcement, the debate in Pakistan on the
linkages between water and the Kashmir conflict almost disappeared. As frozen relations between India and Pakistan
thawed, General Musharraf announced on December 18, 2003 that he was prepared to give up Pakistan's traditional
insistence on the UN resolutions to address the Kashmir conflict. This provoked strong reactions from the leader of
Jamaat-e-Islami AJK wing, Abdul Rashid Turabi, who stated: "If LoC is accepted as a permanent border, then the
provinces of Punjab, Sindh and NWFP would be deprived of water resources which is irrigating their land and flowing
from the other side of Kashmir."
On the eve of the SAARC summit in Islamabad beginning on January 3, 2004, General Musharraf was quoted saying
that he was aware of a dozen options to resolve the Kashmir conflict. While he did not indicate preference for any
particular formula, the media quoted so-called sources close to the General as advocating the Chenab Formula. It is
difficult to state whether the media was indulging in speculation or whether it was indeed, given some serious
The peace process initiated at Islamabad in January 2004 proved to be most sustainable. It continued despite the change
of government in India when Dr. Manmohan Singh of the Congress Party replaced Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the Bhartiya
Janata Party as the Prime Minister, in May 2004. This period saw new heights in people-to-people contacts such as a
warm reception for the Indian cricket team, numerous political leaders visiting Pakistan, unprecedented sojourns of
Pakistani journalists and pilgrims to Kashmir in India.
Amidst this new bonhomie between the two countries, General Pervez Musharraf announced on several different
occasions in September-October 2004 that he had a new formula to resolve the Kashmir conflict. It was akin to the old
Dixon plan rejected by India fifty years ago! The most striking element in the Musharraf/Dixon plan is to treat Jammu-
Kashmir-Ladakh in the Indian side as a set of five, instead of three, regions. This would entail dividing Jammu into sub
regions roughly along the Chenab River. The President of Pakistan did not refer to the river waters in his formula but the
implications of the division of Jammu were obvious.
General Musharraf's proposal in the autumn of 2004 was the first time that a Pakistani leader came close to mentioning
rivers in public, and even then he did not cross the line of convention. Otherwise, the reference to the role of rivers in
India-Pakistan relations has been confined to secret talks and internal debate in Pakistan. Even academic seminars
involving scholars from the two countries rarely debate on the issue.
A clause in the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, signed between Pakistan and India, explicitly prohibits linkage
between the water issue and the general position of both parties on the Kashmir issue. Also, it is much more
convenient to support the Kashmiris for their cause than openly admit the truth that Kashmiri youth are being
sacrificed to safeguard Pakistan's lifeline.
In the Hindu-dominated Jammu, districts such as Rajori and Poonch have Muslim-dominated population. Within
Rajouri and Poonch, there are Hindu-dominated tehsils and villages. The part of Jammu & Kashmir on the Pakistani side
is dominated by Sunni Muslims. Within this part, Shi'as and Ismailis dominate Gilgit-Baltistan. Within the Shi'adominated
Gilgit-Baltistan, there are Sunni-dominated tehsils and villages. Thus, if religion or ethnicity is to be used as
the basis of state formation in Jammu & Kashmir, the process of division will go on for a hundred years or more, until
every tehsil becomes an independent republic. This would not be in harmony with the Kashmiriyat that advocates
plurality and peaceful coexistence.
The theory of power-sharing as the basis for division of societies, stands on the flawed assumption that the countries,
which are presently facing ethnic or other sectarian conflicts, are unbridgeably divided on religious or sectarian lines.
The truth is that each of the strife-torn societies in the world has had periods of harmony of hundreds of years and it is
only in the last few decades that they have been engaged in deadly conflicts. The subcontinent was divided into
kingdoms until the British arrived. There were several wars between emperors and princes of the same religious
pursuits, but they never extended to violence between segments of the society. The conflicts between Hindus and
Muslims, Punjabis and Sindhis, Sindhis and Mohajirs, Assamese and Bengalis, Sinhalese and Tamils, Bamas and
Karens, Nagas and Manipuris for power over structures of state are all a twentieth century phenomena.
Since identity is transient and can be manipulated, it cannot be the ideological basis of a durable state. Rather it can
be the basis of a perpetual conflict. At the same time, redefining of identity can be the basis of harmony and
progress. The question before India and Pakistan is whether they want the identity to be based on partitions and
divisions or on unity in diversity. It is healthy to organise administrative units on a linguistic basis to preserve
cultural independence within a federal unit. It is destructive to use religion, ethnicity and language as the ideology
for independent countries. For a thousand years, Europeans fought with each other on the basis of religion and
ideology. At the end of the second millennium, they realised the value of a model that provides cultural autonomy
but political unity. The sectarian conflicts in South Asia are less than a hundred years old. It is to be hoped that we
do not experience massive bloodshed and death to reach similar conclusions.
The final settlement between India and Pakistan must therefore be a settlement between the principles of cultural
identity and political unity. It must be a settlement that allows expression and cohabitation of ethos creating a larger
ethos of peace in the region. Robert Cooper says in The Breaking of Nations very aptly: "To find permanent
solutions, we may need to think in terms of redefining identity. Only if a wider identity can be developed, will there
be a chance of constructing the kind of community that may enable us to be with each other without a war."
For more than forty years the two countries have avoided conflict over water despite three wars over issues
pertaining to land. It would be difficult to continue with this legacy of tolerance and co-operation for the next
decade in the times of conflict as well as peace. If there were a war between the two countries ostensibly on any
other issue, Pakistan would finally aim to control the river catchment areas. On the other hand, if the peace process
initiated in January 2004 gathers momentum, it will reach its final roadblocks when the implications for water
security are considered. This is an unfortunate reality, which must be carefully addressed from technical and
political perspectives. Otherwise, the concerns expressed by Brigadier Pervez Musharraf at the Royal College of
Defence Studies in London in 1990 may prove to be too overwhelming for the optimism expressed by the President
of Pakistan on various occasions throughout 2004.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 7: Lifeline

Pakistan's obsession with water in the secret diplomacy must be understood in the context of tremendous importance of
the quietly flowing rivers of the Indus Basin for the survival of Pakistan and parts of Northern India. For centuries, the
Indus River Basin constituted a unified geography spreading over almost 1.2 sq km in today's Tibet, India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan. In 1960, it was divided under the Indus Waters Treaty. Accordingly, the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum
and Chenab were awarded to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India. This division
provided Pakistan with 56 per cent of the catchment area and India with 31 per cent. The authors of the Treaty then hoped
that the division of the Indus Water Basin would eventually lead to the unity of people in Pakistan and India. Fifty years
later, they seem to be proved wrong. In fact, the concern over the distribution of the Indus catchment area raises a basic
question: whether short term divisive solutions can be sustained in the long run, or whether they can actually worsen the
Perhaps water would not have been a central issue had it been utilised efficiently over the last half century.

Unfortunately, that has not been the case.

Northern India
India's overall per capita water availability has declined from over 5000 cubic metres in 1950 to 1800 cubic metres in
2005. India may reach the threshold level of 1000 cubic metres per capita in 2025. However, some parts of the country
are already facing water scarcity conditions below the threshold level.
The northern states of Punjab and Haryana, which form part of the Indus River Basin along with Jammu & Kashmir and
Himachal Pradesh, are fearful of a substantial decline in water availability in the next 5-10 years. The underground water
levels have been falling at the rate of 5 per cent per year in Punjab and Haryana. The two states are in dispute over the
sharing of the Ravi and Beas waters. Punjab has 10 million acres of cultivable land and receives 12 MAF of water, while
Haryana with 8 million acres of cultivable land is entitled to 14.5 MAF of water. Punjab has therefore refused to
complete the construction of the Yamuna-Sutlej Link Canal. In 2004 the Punjab assembly passed a resolution annulling
all its water treaties with its neighbouring states. The ruling as well as the opposition parties in the state supported the
resolution. The relations between Punjab and Haryana area expected to deteriorate as overall water availability in the
northern states of India declines by 2010.

Pakistan's per capita availability of water has declined from 5600 cubic metres in 1947 to 1200 cubic metres in 2005, fast
approaching the threshold level of 1000 cubic metres by 2007.
The decline in water availability has particularly meant disaster for irrigation. In Pakistan, over 80 per cent of the
cropland is irrigated. The country has the world's largest contiguous irrigation network. The rivers of the Indus Basin
provide 60 per cent of the water utilised for irrigation, while groundwater accounts for the rest. The inflow of water for
irrigation has declined from 140 MAF in the 1980s to an average of 100 MAF in 2005. It is feared that it will decline
further as the flows in the three rivers are reducing at the rate of 6.6 per cent per year. While Pakistan's irrigation network
is vast, it is managed in an extremely inefficient manner. Seepage from irrigation canals has resulted in water logging in
low-lying areas, disturbing the composition of salts in the soil. It has reduced the delivery efficiency of the canal system
to hardly 40 per cent.
The Indus River System carries about 43,500 hectare metres of silt every year. About 40 per cent of the silt load
settles before reaching the Indus mouth and erodes the storage capacity of the three main dams Tarbela, Mangla and
Chashma. In particular, the Tarbela dam is losing storage capacity of 100,000 cusecs each year. At this rate, it will
be difficult to support cotton sowing and wheat maturity by 2010, even though the designed life span of this dam is
until 2030.
The ground water resources are also fast depleting. As compared to 3.34 MAF in 1959, ground water pumping is
estimated to reach 55 MAF by 2009. As a result of over-pumping, about 70 per cent of Pakistan's half-a-million tube
wells produce hard or brackish water.
If the network of canals and tubewells continue to provide gradually reducing quantities of fresh water, Pakistan will
face serious crisis in its agricultural output by 2010. Already the country faces a shortfall in foodgrain availability of
about 4 million tonnes per year. It is feared that this will treble by the end of the decade. Besides, production of cotton,
which is the most important source of foreign exchange revenue, will be severely affected. Most important, the unity of
the country will be undermined.
Crises in Pakistan's Provinces
While all of Pakistan is affected by declining supply of water, the impact on Sindh and Balochistan is the worst. Sindh,
almost completely depends on canal irrigation, as groundwater sources have become unfit for use. Salinity and
waterlogging has affected 88.8 per cent of Sindh's agricultural land.
Sindh has had to bear the maximum brunt of the large and inefficient irrigation network. The diversion of water upstream
has resulted in the decline of water downstream to Sindh. As a result, discharge of freshwater into the sea has come
down, thus causing intrusion of sea waters into the mainland. Sea intrusion has already destroyed 1.5 million acres of
farmland in the two coastal districts of Badin and Thatta. It has resulted in the demise of three commercial towns
Ghorabhari, Shah Bandar and Ketti Bandar and displacement of a quarter million people. The cumulative economic
loss is estimated to be close to 2 per cent of GDP.
With drought conditions prevailing since the last few years, between 2000 and 2005, Sindh's share in irrigation water
was cut by an average of 25-40 per cent per year. During the same period, the share of Punjab was also cut. Like Sindh,
Punjab also suffers from waterlogging and salinity, though of a lower intensity. The groundwater level in Lahore area
has been declining at the rate of 30 cm per year. However, Punjab has exclusive rights to the Mangla Dam, whereas
Sindh has to share its access to Tarbela dam with Punjab as well as the other provinces.
Punjab has 31 small dams that provide irrigation facilities to about 36,000 acres of land. Punjab has lately been
undertaking projects to develop and integrate its irrigation system for securing water availability. They have envisaged a
five-year project worth Rs.20 billion to revamp the irrigation system in the province to overcome system losses. Most
important, a scheme to divert the Chenab to join it with the Ravi and Sutlej is on the anvil. To improve the water
conditions in rainfed areas, the government intends to build three small dams in Pothohar, DG Khan and Cholistan areas.
A drinking water pipeline to Cholistan is nearing completion. Also, plans were afoot to build 60 mini dams, 100 link
canals and 200 village reservoirs in the Pothohar region. Over and above the initiatives taken by the provincial
government, the federal government is also assisting to improve water availability in the province. The upcoming
contentious Greater Thal canal project would help irrigate the southern parts of Punjab.
Punjab and Sindh are at loggerheads over deciding a formula to distribute shortages in water flows. Sindh demands the
implementation of the Water Accord of 1991, whereas Punjab insists on a formula worked out in 1994. The politicians in
Punjab and Sindh launch a war of words every year at the end of winter regarding water. This altercation reaches its peak
at the time of Kharif sowing in May-June and then subsides with the onset of rains. This is because the water flows in the
Chenab and Indus is relatively low during early Kharif sowing (April-June), while that in the Jhelum is relatively high
during the same period. With Punjab's exclusive rights on the Mangla, it is able to draw sufficient waters. Sindh is left
dry and to the mercy of the rain gods.
The conflict between Sindh and Punjab is expected to aggravate on account of the proposal to construct the Kalabagh
dam and Thal canal. Punjab supports Kalabagh dam as it is expected to provide additional storage to meet the existing
water shortages during the early Kharif season of April-June. It is also expected to produce 3400 MW of electricity, and
control high floods in the Indus. Sindh believes that Kalabagh will leave no surplus water for areas below Kotri and
render the province into a desert. Sea water intrusion will further increase. NWFP is also opposed to the dam, but seems
satisfied by the proposal to reduce its height by 10 metres.
Sindh is also opposing the construction of the Thal canal. The canal is designed to provide additional 1.9 MAF
water to Punjab from the Tarbela reservoir. The project covers four districts of Punjab Bhakker, Layyah, Khushab
and Jhang. Interestingly, this is precisely the area where there is concentration of jihadis and the private landholdings of
senior military officials. The Board of Revenue of Punjab revealed in June 2003 that 112 military officers including
General Pervez Musharraf had been allotted land at Cholistan at nominal rates. The Thal canal is required to build small
dams to irrigate Cholistan for the benefit of the military officials. Some analysts believe that the Thal canal will become
operation in any case. However, the construction of Kalabagh dam may prove to be difficult due to the fear of bloodshed
in Sindh and even Balochistan.
There is also a proposal to construct Basha and Skardu dams in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. However, Sindh and
Balochistan as well as many sections of society in the NWFP oppose any proposal for new dam projects. As a result,
Pakistan will have to move further upstream in search of storage sites. Kashmir, under Pakistan's jurisdiction has
facilities for only small dams. The development of large dams can only be possible in the Chenab catchment area in the
Indian side of Jammu & Kashmir.
Thus, in order to prevent a conflict between Punjab and Sindh, and to prevent a possible secession of Sindh and
Balochistan, Pakistan needs physical control over the Chenab catchment region in Jammu & Kashmir in India. It needs
sites to build dams, to store, divert and regulate water flows. It also needs additional fertile land. Thus, Jammu &
Kashmir is a source of Pakistan's water and food security. It is a real estate dispute for strategic resources.
To the outside world, it is projected that Pakistan is supporting a struggle for self-determination for the people of
Kashmir. To the leaders of Pakistan, Syed Salahuddin, chairman of the United Jihad Council, often assures that the
Kashmir youth are fighting a war to help Pakistan secure its lifeline.

Table 1: Existing Storage Reservoirs in Pakistan

Dam (Year) River Live Storage (MAF)
Tarbela (1976) Indus 9.69
Mangla (1966) Jhelum 5.34
Chashma (1971) Indus 0.61
Warsak (1960) Kabul 0.04
Baran (1962) Kurram 0.09
Hub (1983) Hub 0.76
Khanpur (1984) Haro 0.09
Tanda (1965) Kohat Toi 0.06
Rawal (1962) Kurang 0.04
Simly (1972) Soan 0.02
BKD Khan (1900) Pishin 0.04
Hamal Lake - 0.08
Manchar Lake Indus 0.75
Kinjhar Lake Indus 0.32
Chotiari Lake Indus 0.78
Total Storage: 18.71 MAF

Source: Pakistan Development Forum, Presentation on Planning for Water Resources, by Dr. Shahid Amjad Chaudhry,
Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, May 2003

Table 2: Reservoir Sedimentation in Pakistan
Source: Pakistan Development Forum, Presentation on Planning for Water Resources, by Dr. Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, Deputy
Chairman, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, May 2003

Reservoir Original Storage Capacity Storage Loss by 2001 Storage Loss by 2010
Tarbela 11.616 2.834 (24%) 3.951 (34%)
Mangla 5.882 1.059 (18%) 1.510 (26%)
Chashma 0.870 0.373 (43%) 0.481 (55%)
Total 18.368 4.266 (23%) 5.942 (32%)
Table 3: On-going Water Storage and Canal Projects in Pakistan
Name of Project Storage (MAF) Cost (Rs. Billion) Completion Date
Mangla Dam Raising 2.90 62.5 June 2007
Gomal Zam Dam 1.14 12.8 September 2006
Mirani Dam 0.30 5.9 June 2006
Kurram Tangi Dam 1.20 9.3 June 2009
Sabakzai Dam 0.02 1.0 June 2005
Satpara Dam 0.08 2.1 March 2006
Greater Thal Canal 30.5 June 2007
Kachhi Canal 32.4 June 2007
Rainee Canal 17.9 December 2007
Total increment in next 5 years 5.64 174.5
Basha Dam 7.10 Feasibility in progress
Kalabagh Dam 6.10 Feasibility completed
Skardu Dam 15.52 Pre-Feasibility Study
Akhori Dam 3.60 Feasibility in progress
Katzarah Dam 35.00 Reconnaissance Study
Total increment in future 32.32*
Note: Total storage capacity excludes the Katzarah Dam project
Source: Website of the Parliamentary Committee on Water Resources website,
Last edited:


Regular Member
Apr 10, 2010
Just a suggestion, instead of posting such large articles, it'd be easier to read with just the links.
Interesting book, I will reply once I've read all of it =)



Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 8: Kashmir Vs Pakistan

Pakistan's primary interest in Kashmir to secure its water resources in order to satisfy Punjab and contain Sindh is in
confrontation with the interests of the people of Kashmir on both sides of line of control. For the last 15 years, Kashmiri
youth have been preoccupied with a conflict with India. However, a water war with Islamabad is in the offing.
Kashmir on the Pakistani side of the line of control is predominantly agriculture-based, depending on farming, livestock
and related activities. Of the total cultivated area in the region, only 10 per cent is irrigated, compared with about 80 per
cent in Pakistan. The average farm size is only 1.2 hectares, as compared with 4.7 hectares in Pakistan. The average
annual per capita income in Kashmir is half of the national average. Industry is underdeveloped, with only 930 industrial
units, mostly in the private sector. There is no railway network. Road and air transport is the only means of
transportation. Per capita electricity consumption is around 232 kWh, as compared with 325 kWh in Pakistan. With
regard to health, as of 1999, there were 1,382 hospital beds in the province, averaging 0.46 beds per thousand persons as
compared with 0.67 in Pakistan.
In Kashmir (Pakistan), 13 per cent or 172,721 hectares of land is under farming. Agriculture is an important sector of the
Kashmir economy, providing livelihood to 84 per cent of the household. About 97 per cent of the farmers have less than 5
hectares of land and the farming system is based upon cereals and livestock production. The typical farmer has, on an
average, 1.2 hectares land in which 60 per cent of land is either under forest or wasteland, with only 0.47 hectares
constituting the farm size. Average household size is 7-8 persons. There is an intense population pressure that is already
evident in many areas.
Though this region is well endowed with water resources, it is marginally irrigated. Worse, hardly any development
projects have been envisaged. Apart from lack of development, the province also suffers from manipulations. Its
resources are tapped, but the region is not duly compensated. The Mangla dam, constructed in Mirpur has revolutionised
agriculture in Punjab, but at the cost of Kashmir's deprivation. The Mangla dam, a major asset to the region, irrigates the
canals in Punjab and also generates electricity. This dam supplies 20 per cent of the hydro-electricity needs of Pakistan.
However, till early 2003, the province had not received any royalty for the electricity generated from Mangla dam.
NWFP, however, has been receiving due compensation for the electricity generated from its Tarbela dam.
In late 2002, during General Musharraf's regime, it was decided to raise the height of Mangla dam by another 30 feet to
1,264 feet. This issue had long been under dispute due to objections from Kashmir. It was feared that by raising the dam,
around 44,000 persons and 8,000 households in Kashmir would be displaced, and the district of Mirpur would be
Following the federal government's decision, Kashmiris organised several protests. Though the water authorities
assured building a new city adjacent to Mirpur for the project-affected people, the locals are not inclined to trust the
authorities and almost all the political parties in the province opposed to the project.
To appease the government in Kashmir, Pakistan decided to pay royalty to the province for the electricity generated
from Mangla dam. It was also decided to charge domestic consumer electricity rates, as against the prevailing bulk
rates, which are considerably higher.
Whilst the debate was on between WAPDA and the Kashmir government over the issue of tariffs and royalty, the
Pakistan government proposed to bring the Mangla dam territory under the federal jurisdiction, which would have
deprived Kashmir of its constitutional rights to claim net profits from Mangla Dam power station and fishing in the
lake. However, this proposal did not materialise and finally, by end-June 2003, Kashmir and WAPDA managed to
reach a compromise over the issue based on receiving a royalty of 50 paise per unit of electricity generated, more
compensation for the people displaced and a reduction in electricity tariffs. Though the AJK government accepted
the package, the people of the province did not receive this proposal well, and agitations against the project
continued. By late 2004, the agitations slowed down temporarily, and Pakistan government was pumping in funds to
aid various development projects in the region. The lull in protests can be partially explained, as the construction
has not yet started. The Pakistani authorities fear resurfacing of protests once construction of the dam commences.
General Musharraf while inaugurating the Mangla dam extension project stated: "This raising of Mangla dam
project will first be benefiting Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan and would then accrue benefits for Azad Kashmir."
This clearly reflects Pakistan's policy towards Kashmir an intermediate for the development of its provinces, especially
Punjab. Kashmir is needed for developing water and hydropower projects that will ensure reliable supply to the
provinces in Pakistan. But at the same time, Kashmir's own development needs are being neglected.
The Mangla dam project and the royalty earmarked encouraged the Kashmir (Pakistan) government to demand a share
in the National Finance Commission allocations and also in the Public Sector Development Programme. Kashmir
(Pakistan) has never been granted the status of being a province of Pakistan. Such demands reflect their assertion to not
remaining a mere surrogate to Pakistan's interests, but also seek their share from the national exchequer.
At a seminar held by the Urdu daily Ausaf in early March 2003, the President of Pakistani Kashmir, Sardar Mohammad
Anwar Khan, categorically demanded that the Kashmir in Pakistan be strengthened in every sense in comparison to the
Kashmir in India, so as to entice the latter to join Pakistan. Similar statements are often heard from leaders in Pakistani
Kashmir and these statements definitely mirror their sense of deprivation.
Punjab has always claimed the Mangla dam to be its exclusive compensation for the three eastern rivers ceded to India
under the Indus Waters Treaty. It is on account of provisions of the same treaty that Pakistan has a direct conflict of
interest with Kashmiris on the Indian side.

Indus Waters Treaty
As pointed out in the previous chapter, the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 divided the Basin between India and Pakistan. As
per Article III of the Treaty, India is under obligation to let flow the waters of western rivers to Pakistan. India can only
use these waters for household and agricultural purpose. For instance, the new areas developed by withdrawals from
river flows cannot exceed 120,000 hectares. The treaty also puts a restriction of 3.6 MAF of storage capacity on the
western rivers.
A major achievement of the treaty was to end the decade-long bitter controversy since partition. It opened the way for
large development works in the basin in both countries. The post-treaty period led to an agricultural boom in both the
countries, leading to higher levels of production, acreage, yield and rapid growth.
The treaty assured Pakistan, permanent water supply for its canal system. The principal benefits were:
§ Gaining independence from India for ensuring its supplies by binding the latter to a formal international
§ The treaty helped regulate the flows of the Indus and its tributaries. About 80 per cent of the total water is
produced during the monsoon period July to September. Storage projects undertaken due to the treaty
ensured water availability during winters and enhanced canal diversions.
§ It helped to overcome shortcomings and revolutionize agriculture
The negative outcome for Pakistan was the loss of eastern rivers, and with this, land surrounding these rivers largely
irrigated by traditional methods was adversely affected. However, this loss was compensated by the construction of
storage reservoirs, canals and diversions. The other drawback was the rise in inter-provincial discord, especially in
recent years, due to reduced flows in the Indus. Sindh's stance towards Punjab is comparable to that of Pakistan towards
The partition gave India very little of the already-developed areas of the canal and irrigation system. India was free to
undertake development works on the eastern rivers, thus helping in irrigating even arid areas like Rajasthan. However,
having earlier enjoyed complete rights over the waters of these rivers, the treaty was a compromise. The major benefits
that accrued from the treaty are:
§ Fully harness the eastern rivers to its benefit. It helped in diverting waters to arid areas like Rajasthan and
develop irrigation facilities
§ Could build run-of-river hydroelectric plants on the western rivers and flood control storage facilities,
though no storage facilities have been built so far.
The losses to India were:
§ Ceding western rivers to Pakistan hampered growth of Jammu & Kashmir, as water resources in the state
could not be harnessed (this part is discussed later)
§ Increased differences amongst basin states as they began contending higher allocation of water
§ The treaty does not augur well as it has no exit clause, though Article XII of the treaty provides for a
modification of the treaty.
Pakistan's awareness of its vulnerability to its upstream neighbour for economic viability had grown during the period of
formulating the treaty. Furthermore, its justification for acquiring the Kashmir valley also found credence with the
signing of the treaty.
President Ayub Khan in his broadcast to the nation on September 4, 1960 stated: "The very fact that we will have to be
content with the waters of three western rivers will underline the importance for us of having physical control on the
upper reaches of these rivers to secure their maximum utilisation for the ever growing needs of West Pakistan."
The treaty has thus far safeguarded Pakistan's water requirements. It has faithfully served both the countries as a means
of forestalling water-related disputes. And despite being the upper riparian state, India has never used it as a 'black
mailing' tool in spite of two major wars and constant skirmishes.
Post-treaty, after 45 years, Pakistan can now argue that by submitting to man-made reservoir water, which has inherent
complications, Pakistan has accepted an unjust principle of replacing perennial stream water. But it has to be borne in
mind that had it not been for the treaty, Pakistan would have been forced to remain in eternal conflict with its neighbour.
Pakistan still has a solution in hand by improving management of water resources and developing new projects, though
it involves huge capital outlay.
India, on its part, has never used the treaty as a bargaining lever to restrain Pakistan from providing support to Jihad-e-
Kashmir. Nevertheless, there is bound to be an eternal sense of insecurity in Pakistan's mind given that any call on India's
part to change the treaty can jeopardise Pakistan's water supply situation. After all, India is the geographical and political
owner of the three rivers ceded to Pakistan by the treaty. If the treaty is revoked, Pakistan stands to lose its lifeline.
In the long-term, the Indus Waters Treaty has favoured Pakistan. Assessing the present water situation, it is evident that
India has had much to lose while Pakistan has been insulated from water-related adversities. For India, abrogating the
treaty is an extreme step, which may be taken under coercive circumstances. On the other hand, given the bounty that the
treaty has bestowed on Pakistan, the country might not entertain even the proposition of renegotiating the treaty.
The Indus Waters Treaty would subsist till such time that:
§ India demands an irrevocable renegotiation of the treaty, for reasons including, inter alia, water shortage
§ The political status of Kashmir changes drastically
§ India decides to abrogate the treaty an extreme step in retaliation to cross-border terrorism.
If the treaty subsists, northern India would eventually reach a point where meeting growing water requirements would
become difficult.
International laws do not permit linking one river basin to another. India then might be compelled to tap the rivers given
away to Pakistan, especially the Chenab. Treaty-bound, India might fail in fostering socio-economic growth in northern
states like Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab.
The World Bank had envisioned that mutual trust would finally bind the two countries to the treaty. Instead, the two
countries have chosen the path of hostility and terrorists have assumed control of conflict dynamics since 1989.
The treaty has engendered a vicious cycle. Lack of trust between India and Pakistan forced the bifurcation of Indus River
Basin. As the gap between water availability and requirements widen in Pakistan, its desire to intensify jihadi operations
will grow. Agricultural development will be affected, which in turn will produce a stratum of unemployed youth willing
to service terrorist groups. This in turn would aggravate the mistrust and hostility between the two countries. This
vicious cycle of depleting resources spawning unemployment and fuelling terrorism is feared to intensify in the near
Kashmir's Woes
Jammu & Kashmir in India has been the foremost loser as a result of this treaty as all the rivers surrendered to Pakistan
were the major water resources for the state. Due to restrictions imposed on tapping of water resources, in conjunction
with faltering policies of successive state governments, Jammu & Kashmir has been unable to grow to the optimum
potential of its agriculture and electricity sectors.
The limitations imposed by the Indus Waters Treaty that affect Jammu & Kashmir are:
§ The Treaty permits building storage aggregating 3.6 MAF on the three rivers of the Indus, Jhelum and
§ Of the 3.6 MAF water storage capacities, 1.6 MAF is for hydropower, 0.75 MAF for flood moderation and
1.25 MAF for general storage for non-consumptive uses including power generation.
§ It permits additional irrigation of just 1.21 lakh hectares from the Effective Date, 1 April 1960.
The treaty permits additional 1.21 lakh hectares, over and above the 2.6 lakh hectares already irrigated at the time of
signing the treaty. This implies that Kashmir can irrigate a total area of just 3.81 lakh hectares, or hardly out of a total
cultivable area of over 10 lakh hectares. As of 2000, Jammu & Kashmir had already irrigated 3.1 lakh hectares of
agricultural land. The present situation provides for just an additional 0.7 lakh hectares of irrigated land.
Hydro-electricity potential in the state has been estimated to be around 15,000 MW, of which only 10 per cent has been
harnessed so far. Currently, projects worth 1,600 MW are in various stages of development. Of the existing installed
capacity in the state of 1,473 MW (state and central sector), 99 per cent is from hydel plants. There is little scope for any
other forms of power generation, particularly thermal, in the state since there are not many feasible sites for such plants
and the state's difficult topographical condition makes transportation of raw material impracticable.
Moreover, all the power projects currently under construction in the state have become controversial due to the
continuous interference of Pakistan on the pretext of the treaty. The projects end up having long gestation periods and
short working lifespan.
Abrogating the Indus Waters Treaty would provide greater benefits and open up several avenues for unrestrained
development of the state of Jammu & Kashmir. It can:
§ Improve hydro-electricity sector's potential as storage facilities could be developed
§ Pave the way for industrialization of the state
§ Improve irrigation facilities which in turn would boost agricultural growth
§ Give rise to employment opportunities, which will indirectly keep a check on external interference in state
§ Help attract private investments, propelling the state's position on India's investment map.
The opportunity to tap the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers would provide windfall gains not only to Jammu & Kashmir, but
also to the neighbouring states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Haryana. The three states share the eastern rivers and are in
conflict over the sharing of waters. The addition of Chenab and Jhelum would secure water availability for these states.
The Indus Waters Treaty casts unilateral responsibility on India for compliance. It is an obligation that necessarily falls
on all upper riparians. Abrogation would not be defensible on any understanding of international water laws or
international humanitarian laws. Further, abrogation will necessarily have to be followed by an engineering feat that
would greatly strain the Indian economy.
In any case, legally speaking, it is virtually impossible for India to abrogate the treaty. Article XII (4) states that
"provisions of this treaty shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose
between the two Governments." The treaty does not provide an exit clause for India per se.
Article 54 of Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Convention (1949) prohibits any measures which could result in the
starvation of people. It specifically refers to water resources and irrigation works.
There is yet relatively little international law governing transboundary rivers and defining the rights and obligations of
riparian states. The International Law Commission of the United Nations is developing guidelines to help settle waterrelated
conflicts. In 1994, the commission presented a draft on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses, which is regarded as a Framework Convention. Some articles of the Framework Conventions that have
been widely adopted are:
§ Article 5: transboundary rivers should be used in an equitable, reasonable and optimum manner
§ Article 6: 'equity' does not mean equal distribution. It rather depends on a wide range of factors which have
to be taken into consideration
§ Article 7: individual water course states must exercise due diligence to make sure that they do not give
significant harm to others
§ Article 8 and 9: call for cooperation and the regular exchange of information between riparian states
Abrogation is bound to incite reactions from the World Bank and the countries that were party to the treaty and have
provided funds. The countries, including Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Britain and the US, are also India's
major export destinations.
India is aware of the implications of abrogation of the treaty. Therefore, despite growing protests from the Kashmiri
people, no policy maker in New Delhi is ever likely to even contemplate this move. The act of abrogation on the part of
India could cause insecurity among the other countries that are lower riparian to India. India's relations with its
neighbours would also be affected, as India also has water treaties with Nepal and Bangladesh. SAARC would be
Table 1: Apportionment of Indus Waters in Pakistan as per Water Accord of 1991
* - Excluding the supplies to the civil canals in NWFP
Source: Indus Water Accord of 1991
Table 2: Irrigated Cropped Area permitted for India under
the Indus Waters Treaty
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India
Table 3: Catchment Areas of Indus River System in the Indian Subcontinent
Source: Pakistan Water Gateway
Province Kharif Rabi Total
Punjab 37.07 18.87 55.94
Sindh 33.94 14.82 48.76
NWFP 3.48 2.30 5.78
Civil Canals 1.80 1.20 3.00
Balochistan 2.85 1.02 3.87
Total* 77.34 37.01 114.35
Punjab 37%
Sindh 37%
NWFP 14%
Balochistan 12%
Distribution of balance river supplies
(including flood waters and future storages)
Basin ICA as on Additional Net ICA Total ICA
effective date ICA permissible achieved till
(hectares) permissible 1999-2000
(hectares) (hectares)
Indus 17,070 28,329 45,398 20,619
Jhelum 209,595 60,704 270,299 258,671
Chenab 33,342 20,235 53,577 46,790
Total 109,268 369,274 326,081
Indus Jhelum Chenab Ravi Sutlej Beas Total
Jammu & Kashmir 47,298 11,171 10,831 Nil Nil Nil 69,300
India (Excl. Jammu
& Kashmir) Nil Nil 1,735 4,408 12,138 7,719 26,000
Pakistan 158,078 10,188 13,469 Nil Nil Nil 181,735
(in MAF)

Source: Pakistan Water Gateway


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 9: Options

As the abrogation of the Indus Water Treaty is impossible, it is necessary to identify other options to resolve the conflict
of interest between Pakistan and Kashmir over water resources. Pakistan's response is to seek the physical control of the
entire state of Jammu & Kashmir. While the ostensible reason for Pakistan's interest in Kashmir is support for selfdetermination,
the discussion so far clearly proves its real interest in Kashmir's rivers.

Chenab Formula
Pakistan has directly or indirectly emphasised the Chenab Formula as the most preferred option. It is based on the 'Dixon
Plan', proposed in 1950 by Sir Owen Dixon, who came as a United Nation's representative for India and Pakistan;
assigned Ladakh to India, the Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir to Pakistan, split Jammu between the two
and envisaged a plebiscite in the Kashmir valley. The proposal, though accepted by Pakistan, was rejected by India.
As per this formula, the city of Jammu and some districts of Jammu province would go to India, while the city of
Srinagar and most parts of the Kashmir valley as well as parts of Jammu region would be transferred to Pakistan. This
division would be based on the flow of the Chenab, but it would to some extent coincide with religious demography.
Why is then Pakistan interested in the Chenab formula that includes parts of Jammu? With a small twist to this proposal,
consider the hypothetical situation, as suggested by many experts, of only Kashmir being a part of Pakistan, and entire
Jammu province and Ladakh under India. One evident outcome of such an arrangement would be the dissolving of the
Indus Waters Treaty, as the political status of Kashmir would change. The distribution of water resources would be
altered. Pakistan would then have complete control over only the Indus, Jhelum, and some of their tributaries. The
Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers would fall under India's jurisdiction.
This arrangement would be detrimental to Pakistan, as it would lose a major water source the Chenab. This implies a 30
billion cubic metre or 17 per cent reduction in water flows in the Indus System in Pakistan, provided, of course, that India
is able to block the Chenab completely. The incumbent major water resources for Pakistan Indus and Jhelum have
already been exploited to the maximum in Pakistani Punjab itself where over half their water flows is diverted for
irrigation. The Chenab also is a major source of water to Punjab. Moreover, the Chenab-Jhelum combine is the only
tributary of the Indus that enhances the latter's flow downstream Punjab. Losing Chenab to India would mean drastic
reduction in water supplies to Sindh, which is already on the brink of a water crisis. It is imperative to note here that the
location where the eastern tributaries merge to join the Indus River is at a point just prior to entering Sindh. Moreover,
Sindh receives water only from the Indus River. Losing Chenab would also warrant a major rearrangement of the
irrigation network in Punjab.
This clearly explains Pakistan's insistence on making Chenab the basis of the international border and including parts of
Jammu and not merely the Kashmir valley, under its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, accepting the Chenab Formula implies that India would have to part with approximately 32,000 sq km of
area, which includes the districts of Anantnag, Baramulla, Budgam, Doda, Kupwara, Pulwama, Poonch, Rajouri,
Srinagar, and the Gool Gulabgarh and Reasi tehsils of Udhampur that is giving away 57 per cent of the total land area of
Jammu & Kashmir, excluding Ladakh and the area under China and Pakistan.
An interesting aspect of Pakistan's claim over these districts is that the catchment areas of all the rivers important to
Pakistan Indus, Jhelum and Chenab would come under Pakistan's jurisdiction. Evidently, issues of Kashmir and Indus
are intertwined, as General Pervez Musharraf revealed in his dissertation at the prestigious London College.
The physical control over the Chenab valley is being sought, as it would help Pakistan build dams upstream and regulate
the river flows to Punjab and Sindh, as discussed earlier in the Chapter Crises in Provinces. Moreover, it provides
strategic depth for the Mangla Dam and the Pothohar region. While Mangla is an exclusive dam for Punjab, Pothohar
provides the Pakistani army with more than half of its recruits. However, this proposition is a zero-sum game from the
perspective of Indian security.
Foremost, India would have to part with the strategically vital Akhnoor area in Jammu, which is the only all-weather
route available to India. To the south of Akhnoor lies the 'Chicken's Neck' a narrow strip of Pakistani territory. It is
interesting to note that during the Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, Pakistan had launched attacks to capture Akhnoor
and the strategic bridge across the Chenab, which clearly highlights Akhnoor's significance.
The Akhnoor Bridge is currently India's sole link to Poonch valley. Besides, the area around Akhnoor is of primary
strategic importance as it provides the best terrain for inter-border movement and is most conducive for large-scale
Worse, Ladakh's accessibility will be compromised, with India turning dependent on Pakistan to access supply routes to
Ladakh. Thus, based purely on military considerations, India cannot accept Chenab as the basis of the new international
border. Moreover, losing Chenab would not bode well for parts of Jammu the districts of Jammu, Kathua, Kargil and
parts of Udhampur that would remain with India.
Thus, if hostility reaches a degree where Pakistan formally proposes the Chenab Formula, and not merely as a
suggestion in track-two diplomacy, India's response will be in the negative and belligerent.

Kashmir in Chenab Formula
The Chenab Formula appears to be Pakistan's desired solution to the Kashmir issue. Acquiring the territory of Kashmir,
including parts of Jammu, can provide Pakistan with the opportunity to tap rivers in the present Indian Kashmir. Storage
facilities that it is unable to develop within its own territory can then be constructed in Kashmir.
A major benefit of tapping the rivers would be the increased hydropower generation, which to a great extent can help
electrify Kashmir under its jurisdiction, as well as regulate supplies to Punjab. The construction of canals and
watercourses can also bring better irrigation to Kashmir, and regulate water flows to Punjab.
However, a caveat to this proposal cannot be overlooked. Once Pakistan takes control of Kashmir as another federating
unit of the country, its development needs and demands will have to be on par with the other provinces in the country.
Bringing it into the mainstream will entail a cost in terms of pumping in funds and at the same time attracting
investments for developing the water resources of the region. However, once irrigation canals are constructed, Kashmir
being an agricultural region, itself will begin demanding its share of waters. This would imply having another
contending recipient to the already controversial water sharing formula.
Further, diverting waters to irrigate Kashmir's lands would mean reducing flows to Punjab and Sindh, which will never
be acceptable to the two leading provinces of the country. Moreover, Sindh, which is already suffering the consequences
of reduced water flows, will witness a further decline and erosion of its economy. This will add another dimension to the
protracted water dispute in Pakistan with Punjab and Sindh joining hands to resist Kashmir. Under such circumstances,
Pakistan will be caught in a perennial web of provincial disharmony.
By this, clearly it will be in Pakistan's interest to not make Kashmir another federating unit of Pakistan, but rather have it
as an 'independent' state sub-let to Pakistan.

Vale as the Base
Since Chenab Formula and the consequent division of Jammu portends war, consider an alternate solution, put forward
by some experts, of handing over the Vale of Kashmir to Pakistan. Pakistan's ISI acts on the belief that it can conquer the
Vale of Kashmir by low intensity insurgency. If indeed we envisage a situation whereby terrorist groups manage to
control the Vale through hostile means, the consequence could be worse.
India's immediate response would be to block the flow of the Chenab. Pakistan would be deprived of a major tributary
for the Indus. Chenab is the most vulnerable among the western rivers given to Pakistan considering that it flows hardly
50 km away from Ravi River in the Indian plains. It is technically feasible to divert the Chenab through the Marhu tunnel
and join with the Ravi, thus retaining Chenab for India's sole use.
Under such circumstances, Pakistan would head for disaster, foremost because the water flows in the Indus River would
drastically reduce, as the Jhelum would be the only main tributary. The Indus River could dry up even before reaching
the Arabian Sea.
This would have serious repercussions on Pakistan's economy, especially Sindh, an agriculturally important province in
the country. Sindh would not only suffer devastation of agriculture, but also acute water shortages and an ecological
Punjab would also be affected, though not severely, as it would still continue to draw waters from the Indus and Jhelum
and the tributaries of all the eastern rivers flowing in Pakistan, which are its main source of water supply even now. The
central and southern parts of Punjab depend on the Jhelum for irrigation. On losing the waters of Chenab, Punjab would
increase diversions of Jhelum to the eastern parts of the province and draw more waters from the Indus as well. However,
Punjab would witness a rise in arid zones in certain portions of the eastern parts of the province. Drawing more from the
waters of the Jhelum and Indus would considerably reduce the flow of the Indus downstream Punjab.
Conflicts between Sindh and Punjab would aggravate. Punjab, being the more dominant province in Pakistan, would try
to capture the waters of the Indus entirely. Sindh being the lower riparian, would helplessly remain at the mercy of
As for India, such a situation would be propitious, as it would get access to an additional river, Chenab. Further, it would
no longer remain under any obligation to allow rivers to flow into Pakistan. It can pursue unrestrained harnessing of the
rivers under its control for the benefit of even those states that do not form part of the Indus Basin. India can begin to
exploit Chenab's hydroelectric potential of 3,000 MW, which currently is largely untapped, directly or indirectly, due to
restrictions imposed by the treaty.
Even if for topographic reason, India is unable to completely block the flow of the rivers in its control, Pakistan would
still be at a loss. Though the Chenab will continue to enhance the Indus, the flows of the river would be erratic, and the
overall flows into Pakistan will reduce, as India will be free to tap the river for economic use. During heavy rains, the
rivers, including the eastern rivers would cause heavy floods and during dry spells the flow would be a trickle. As India
would stop providing any data regarding the flow of the rivers, as is being done under the treaty, it would become
difficult for Pakistan to pre-empt any adversities. Here, Pakistan would be completely at the mercy of India. In the
absence of cooperation and goodwill, India, being the upper riparian state, will always enjoy the strategic advantage.
India could perhaps be constrained by the implementation of another treaty, which restricts it from exhibiting its upper
riparian status. Nevertheless, the fact that India would be free to use the waters of the Chenab adds to India's advantage.
At the same time, Pakistan would be unable to plan any future projects owing to the unpredictable flows of the Chenab
and the other eastern rivers.
The extreme consequence of the scenario of losing Chenab to India, and the Vale of Kashmir becoming the base for
redrawing the map, would be the entire reworking of the canal and irrigation system in Pakistan.
It is thus clear that merely capturing Kashmir would not ensure Pakistan's water security. It would also need that
part of Jammu where the Chenab flows an area strategically too important for India to give up.
Thus, the option of controlling only the Vale of Kashmir is futile for Pakistan, while the Chenab Formula is an
invitation to war with India.

Integrated Development Approach
Both the above options discussed above are extreme and bound to invoke hostilities.
· The option of the Chenab formula benefits Pakistan, but it inflicts heavy costs on the people of Jammu &
Kashmir and security costs on India
· The option of the Vale as the Base is destructive for both India and Pakistan
A sustainable solution is possible only if it is based on a win-win formula. Currently, the root of the problem lies in the
lack of harmony between the interests of Pakistan and Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan needs Jammu & Kashmir to build
dams to divert water flows to Punjab and Sindh. On the other hand, Jammu & Kashmir needs to come out of the Indus
Waters Treaty to improve its own irrigation, hydro-electricity and employment prospects. The irony is that deeper the
conflict grows between Punjab and Sindh in Pakistan, the greater would be the desperation of Pakistan's military to
annex Kashmir, resulting in increase in terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir and all over India. More the tensions mount,
greater are pressures on New Delhi to take a hard line against Pakistan.
An alternative approach to the Indus treaty issue could be an integrated development plan for the conservation of the
Indus Basin. The plan, to be jointly developed by India and Pakistan, would involve a creative solution to the political
dimension of the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.
It is imperative for both India and Pakistan to envisage comprehensive development and planning in the River Basin. A
holistic approach to water resources recognizing the interaction and economic linkages between water, land, the users,
the environment and infrastructure is necessary to evade the impending water crisis in the subcontinent.
Water needs to be managed as an economic good. It is essential to jointly set up an organisation with representatives
from both countries whose functions would entail identifying short term and long term supply capacity of the basin and
its integrated development, setting up infrastructure and coordinating activities of the different technical agencies of the
respective governments.
A set of specific goals needs to be identified which formally defines a joint management programme and also provides
for a stable funding source. This approach will give due consideration to both water quantity and the quality aspects. At
the same time, explicit mechanisms defining ownership of resources of either country should be put in place based on
requirements. The primary objective should be towards fostering cooperation in the management of shared water
resources. The infrastructure developed in the basin and shared by both countries can be under the supervision of a joint
authority. The development of such a plan would require vast amount of financial and technical resources. It should be
possible to mobilise such resources from around the world, perhaps with the World Bank agencies playing the lead role.
The integrated development approach is Utopian. It is only possible with a paradigm shift in mindset and complete end
to hostilities, both physical and psychological.
The prerequisite of such an approach would be the following:
· Complete end to terrorism and brutal counter-terrorism measures
· Change in mindset in Pakistan about using Kashmiri youth as a tool to ensure Punjab's prosperity and
consolidate control over an increasingly alienated Sindh
· Acceptance by both, India and Pakistan, to treat Kashmir for the good of the Kashmiri people, and increase
efficiency in domestic water management
· Restoration of mutual trust and confidence between both countries.
The integrated water development approach can only be an outcome of a change in mindset, not its cause. It is a
question of politics. It is a question of values. India and Pakistan have to decide if they want to coexist on the basis
of civility and cooperation or in fear and terror. They have to choose between politics of division and the arithmetic
of multiplication. If the two states rise above their rivalries, a final settlement can be sustainable.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 10: Autonomy

While the conflict between India and Pakistan is multi-dimensional, the issue of Jammu & Kashmir has attracted
maximum attention. Maharaja Hari Singh, who ruled the state in 1947 tried to seek independent status. As Pakistani
tribesmen attacked his kingdom, he signed an instrument of accession with India in exchange for autonomy.
However, Pakistani forces succeeded in seizing the control of a part of the state, leading to a division. As the result,
Jammu is with India. Kashmir is divided into Indian and Pakistani parts. Gilgit-Baltistan is also divided into Kargil
and Ladakh in India and Gilgit and Baltistan in Pakistan. It is presumed that the readers are familiar with the history
of manipulation and public protest on both sides of the state. In 1988, Gilgit in Pakistan initiated violent revolt,
which was quickly suppressed by the Pakistani armed forces. A year later, the Kashmir division on the Indian side
saw the outbreak of violence that India has not fully succeeded in quashing. At the beginning of 2005, there were
groups on both sides that are content with the status quo while there are forces that want new political structures.

Varied Opinions
The opinions in Jammu & Kashmir (on both sides) can be divided into three schools of thought.
§ Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), APNA, GBNA groups are in favour of unity and independence of
the entire state.
§ The ruling party in Kashmir (Pakistan), the Muslim Conference, and local branches of national parties such
as Pakistan Muslim League and People's Party are in favour of belonging to Pakistan, with autonomy. The
ruling party in Kashmir (India), People's Democratic Party, the main opposition in the state assembly,
National Conference, Panthers' Party and local branches of national parties such as Congress and BJP are in
favour of belonging to India, with autonomy.
§ Some parties on the Pakistani side (e.g. Balawaristan National Front) are in favour of integration with India,
while some parties on the Indian side (e.g. sections of the Hurriyat) are in favour of accession with Pakistan.
With such a diverse and mutually contradictory body of opinion, there is no commonality of thought about the
future of Jammu & Kashmir. Since most parties and groups have sub-regional presence, it would be unrealistic to
propose a solution based on the views of any one party or group. Under the circumstances, the current trend is to
allow the conflicting forces to contest with each other with bullets, causing the death of innocent thousands. An
alternative would be to open a process of dialogue between India and Kashmiri groups, as well as Pakistan and
Kashmiri groups on the respective sides of the Line of Control. Also included in the process must be groups from
Jammu and Ladakh in India and Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan. If it proves unrealistic to expect the groups seeking
accession to the 'other' country to join a process of dialogue, the process must be based on the principle of 'sufficient
inclusion', whereby most groups on each side, if not all, are involved.
It is not fair, or realistic to negotiate complete independence, merely because JKLF wants it, since Muslim
Conference, National Conference, Pandits, Balawaristan National Front do not want it.
It is also unfair for Hurriyat or Balawaristan National Front to dictate terms. If India and Pakistan were to accommodate
their demands, the Kashmir valley would have to be annexed to Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan would have to accede to
India. This would tantamount to a third partition with covenant bloodshed.

A realistic option, which would be a via media between extremes, would be to offer autonomy on both sides. The
exact degree of autonomy or devolution must be negotiated directly by the people of Jammu & Kashmir. In the case
of Pakistan, the negotiating team must comprise Muslim Conference, Balawaristan National Front, All Parties
National Alliance and JKLF. On the other side, the negotiating team must include the People's Democratic Party,
National Conference, Panthers' Party, representatives of Pandit and Ladakhi Buddhist groups, Hurriyat and JKLF. It is
for the parties themselves to determine the agenda and terms of the final settlement. However, a threshold level of
autonomy must be outlined.
On the Indian side, it must be ensured that the role of the Governor is ceremonial, with no executive powers and a
constitutional amendment must be introduced to restrict Article 356, not only with regard to Jammu & Kashmir, but also
other states. The draconian powers given to security forces must be gradually reduced in proportion to and in
anticipation of a decline of violence and terrorism. The state government should be empowered to earn local revenue
with a view to reducing Central dependence.
On the Pakistani side, the artificial division between Kashmiri (Pakistan) and Gilgit-Baltistan should be abolished. In
the interim period, in Gilgit-Baltistan, the powers of President must be reduced to that of a Governor in AJK; the post of
Chief Executive of Gilgit-Baltistan must be scrapped. Currently, there is elected Legislative Council but it is headed by a
nominee of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad. Moreover, such a federal Chief Executive appoints Deputy
Chief Executive from among members of the Legislative Council. Instead, the government of Gilgit-Baltistan should be
headed by a locally elected Chief Minister. Also, the Chief Secretary must be locally appointed, and not posted from
Islamabad. The draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations should be repealed and a provincial judiciary must be instituted.
On the Indian, as well as Pakistani sides, it is essential to have provincial public service commission to recruit civil
servants. The practice of appointing bureaucrats from federal or central services must be discontinued. The same
can apply to police and paramilitary forces. This will be obviously feasible when terrorist infrastructure on both
sides of the Line of Control is atrophied.
It should be possible to devolve authority to sub-district administration levels. India is examining a model of
financial and administrative azadi for local bodies. Accordingly, local bodies can raise funds through local taxes for
developmental work. This can be done by local administration under the guidance of elected bodies. Pakistan can
institute similar local democracy in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
It is necessary to clarify the objectives of autonomy. In 1947, Gilgit-Baltistan would have preferred accession to
Pakistan. But Pakistan decided to create an autonomous status for them so that they could be counted in the case of
a plebiscite. Technically, Kashmir on the Pakistani side is 'Azad' or free, but a serving officer of the Pakistan army
has been appointed as its President. The elected officer, as well as jobs in the government, are conditional upon
explicit endorsement of accession to Pakistan. There is no political mobility between Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
The political parties in Pakistan can establish branches in Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan but the political parties in
Kashmir cannot have presence in Gilgit-Baltistan and vice versa. As far as India is concerned, it has granted
autonomy to Jammu & Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Over the years, this provision has
been eroded, sometimes resulting in direct rule of the central government. As a result, Freedom House rates
Kashmir on the Pakistani side as Not Free and Kashmir on the Indian side as Partially Free.
If the objective of the autonomy is to provide a temporary reprieve, it will not be sustainable. Also, if autonomy or
devolution is perceived as an arrangement to share powers with locally influential parties, it will not survive for too
long. The final settlement must be based on certain principles, and not merely as a deal to include local leaders in
power structures.
In summary, the objectives of the final settlement must be to create a new society, not just supply new rulers.

Unifying Institutions
It is also necessary to clarify the nature of autonomy both divisive or unifying autonomy are possible. Several
proposals have been made for divisive autonomy, including one by the President of Pakistan in late 2004.
Accordingly, Jammu & Kashmir should be divided into several parts on religious, ethnic or linguistic basis to
consolidate the cleavages. Each part was proposed to be autonomous with a different political arrangement. The
experience of Yugoslavia in recent history shows that a policy of divisions and sub-divisions can result in human
catastrophe. It is necessary therefore to conceptualise positive or unifying autonomy.
The unifying version would create maximum autonomy on both sides of Line of Control if lessons are drawn from each
other to establish maximum parity. Jammu & Kashmir (India) can have local decision making powers that Kashmir
(Pakistan) may have, and vice versa. Gilgit-Baltistan should have a locally elected chief minister and ministers (not
advisors) as is done in Jammu & Kashmir in India, with further autonomy for managing hill development as granted to
Once parity of maximum autonomy is established on both sides of the Line of Control, it is necessary to ensure that the
central governments do not erode it over the years, as it has happened in the past. Therefore, a permanent monitoring
mechanism should be created, perhaps by converting the negotiating body into a standing committee to have regular
consultations with New Delhi and Islamabad respectively. This mechanism can be used to highlight the abuse of
authority by the Governor, draw attention to any efforts to undermine the provision of autonomy or devolution and seek
redressal of grievances.
The basic philosophy of such an institutional mechanism should be prevention, though it can also be used for cure.
Most important, if the central or federal goverment retains the right to appoint provincial governors in the course of
autonomy negotiations, it is also necessary to have representatives of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan in the National
Assembly of Pakistan. The Indian Parliament has representatives from Jammu & Kashmir, and it must be ensured
that this arrangement is preserved forever.
Besides institutions between Jammu & Kashmir on the one hand and India or Pakistan on the other, it is necessary
to create institutions linking Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh on the Indian side with Kashmir, Gilgit, Baltistan on the
Pakistani side. There are many ways to achieve this objective. It might be possible to draw lessons from Northern
Ireland, South Tyrol and other, where such institutions have been created to link divided provinces with support of
the respective federal governments. One way could be to establish standing committees of the provincial legislatures
on both sides for a structured and regular dialogue. The standing committees should have a fixed number of sessions
every year, where they can discuss possibilities of fostering practical cooperation between the two parts of Jammu
& Kashmir.
The mechanisms and processes of political dialogue and reconciliation are important because they can ensure freedom,
human rights and human dignity. As these mechanisms are proposed to be representative, they would foster democratic
spirit. They would also facilitate good governance. Moreover, they can be transformed to facilitate welfare and
development of people.
To this end, it would be very useful to design and establish a Joint Economic Development Council for Jammu &
Kashmir. In the subsequent chapters on reconciliation and reconstruction, we have proposed ideas for employment
generation, rural industrialisation, transport, electricity, health, education on local basis and several projects with
linkages across Jammu & Kashmir. Integrated water development, as discussed earlier, is an issue that would span
across all parts of the state on both sides of the Line of Control, as well as Punjab in India and Pakistan, extending to
Sindh and Rajasthan. The Jammu & Kashmir Joint Economic Development Council is required to make such extensive
cooperation possible. The Council would require huge technical and financial input. However, it should be possible to
raise both soft funds and commercial investments from India, Pakistan, multilateral institutions, non-resident
Kashmiris, and private foreign capital.
Close cooperation between the two parts of Jammu & Kashmir will require free interchange of goods and people.
Therefore, it is essential for all concerned to end terrorism as quickly as possible. There is no alternative but to convert
Line of Control into the Line of Cooperation.
We propose that this should be jointly managed by the Indian and Pakistani troops to prevent terrorists, smugglers
and other enemies of civil society from abusing the open space. It would not be feasible to have a completely free
movement of people so long as terrorism and smuggling persist. Therefore, in the interim period, fast track visa
systems can be introduced for the benefit of bona fide travellers who have family or business ties on the other side.
Eventually, as confidence grows, so can freedom of movement for all factors of production.
It is possible to elaborate on the vision of cooperation between the two parts of Jammu & Kashmir. There will be
disagreements over details, but they can be addressed. The critical question is whether the conflict should be allowed to
go on amidst contesting voices or whether systematic efforts should be made to find solutions to the aspirations of all
Shias and Sunnis, Pandits and Gujjars, Buddhists and Ismailis. If the Indian and Pakistani elite determines that the way
forward is that of peace, they must first decide in favour of a vision of unifying autonomy, and not ethnic division.
The subcontinent has been partitioned twice. It does not need any more fragmentation in the name of religion or
ethnicity. The spirit of Kashmiriyat is that of unity; unity in plurality. This spirit needs to be nurtured with the
process of reconciliation and reconstruction.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
Chapter 11: Reconstruction

The conflict in Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan has caused damage that is both visible and otherwise. As an
example, visible damage would include the destruction of buildings and infrastructure, such as roads, rail, water,
telecommunication, health, education and electricity. The not so visible damage includes injury to social structures,
institutions, and human dignity. In order to bring about reconciliation and reconstruction, these structures have to be
woven together.

Communal Harmony
The conflict in Kashmir is often mistaken as a communal confrontation between the Hindus and the Muslims on the
Indian side and Shi'as and Sunnis in Gilgit-Baltistan on the Pakistani side. On the contrary, life in Kashmir, provides
some of the clearest instances of shared religious identities. Many customs and beliefs are common to Kashmiriyat,
irrespective of religion or sect of the individual. Popular Sufism has served as a common way of understanding the
world. The belief in the powers of Sufi saints and attendance at their shrines has helped promote an everyday interaction
between the Muslims and the Pandits, Shi'as and Sunnis.
The Sufi traditions of Jammu and Kashmir still play an important role in the lives of people, despite the efforts of groups
such as the Ahl-i-Hadith and the Tablighi Jama'at among the Muslims, fiercely opposed as they are to popular Sufism,
and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad among the Hindus, hostile to any manifestation
of what they see as Islamic culture. It is important to build bridges between people of different faiths and to highlight
religious perspectives on inter-faith dialogue and co-operation that can play a vital role in challenging the politics of
religious hatred.
Besides the majority Muslim community, it is necessary to address the grievances of the local minorities. The Ladakhi
people complain of low representation in Ladakh's administration. The Gujjar leaders from Jammu complain of low
level of education in their community. Panun Kashmir, representing the Pandit community, desires a protected enclave
for the Pandits.
The woes of Kashmir on the Pakistan side and Gilgit-Baltistan consisting of Gilgit and Baltistan are even worse.
Kashmir (Pakistan) is technically an independent state with its own Prime Minister, Legislative Assembly, Supreme
Court, High Court, Auditor General, Chief Election Commissioner and Chief Secretary. In reality it is governed by
the federal government out of Islamabad. Gilgit-Baltistan has no status, as they are neither a province of Pakistan
nor a part of "Azad Kashmir." The extent of deprivation of the people of this region can be seen by the fact that
there is only one doctor per 6,000 plus people. There is increasing tension between the majority Shi'a population
who seeks independence and the Sunnis who want to merge with the adjoining Kashmir province. In 1947, about 80
per cent of the population was Shi'a. It whittled down to 55 per cent in 2005, with the systematic immigration of
Punjabi and Pathan population. Tanzeem ul-Ikhwan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and other terrorist groups, aim to annihilate
the Shi'a population. Reconciliation in Gilgit-Baltistan will require the dismantling of extremist groups.
Kashmir's social fabric will be weakened if Ladakh and Gilgit-Baltistan are granted separate status or if the Pandits
are settled in a cantonment. It is essential that all communities are integrated as per the tradition of the society over
centuries. Peaceful co-existence of a plural society should be the basis of the envisaged Kashmiri society.

Widows and Children
Women in Jammu & Kashmir have been most affected during the conflict. At present, there are few schemes to enable
about 54,000 widows in the records of Department of Social Welfare in Srinagar, to take over as the breadwinners of
their families. Also, there are accusations made that some of the schemes are available only to those who have been
bereaved by militant actions and not to those affected by actions of the security forces. This perception, whether true or
not, should be changed with immediate effect.
Women can set up enterprises based on local customs and traditions such as handicrafts. It is necessary to encourage
NGOs to set up projects for the capacity building of women in production as well as marketing.
There are an estimated 100,000 children in Jammu and Kashmir, on the Indian side, affected by violence and
orphaned by the conflict. There are no reliable statistics available for the Pakistani side. The fate of these children
needs to be closely monitored. Many of them are forced to fend for themselves as laborers and are severely traumatized.
Here again, NGOs can play a critical role in providing vocational training.

Internally Displaced Persons
As many as 350,000 people have been displaced within India as a result of the conflict in Kashmir. In 1990, more than 90
per cent of the Hindu Pandits from the Kashmir valley fled south. It is estimated that today there are less than 20,000
Hindus in the Kashmir valley. A large majority of those displaced within India are living in and around the city of
Jammu, mainly in refugee camps. The internally displaced also consist of Muslim and Sikh families, though they are
relatively few. Also, Pakistan government runs camps for 22,000 refugees. Most of these camps are located near
Muzaffarabad. There is no record of what happens to a Shi'a victim of terrorist violence in Gilgit-Baltistan. It is not clear
if they simply disappear into oblivion or are housed in any of the Pakistani refugee camps. It is necessary for the
International Committee of Red Cross to investigate the changing composition of population in Northern Area and the
status of Shi'a refugees.
The camps in Jammu and Muzaffarabad need regular up-gradation and maintenance of water, electricity, drainage and
communications. Most important, there should be a vision to resettle refugees in the society. On the Indian side, Pandits
hope to go back to the valley. On the Pakistani side, there is no clue about the eventual resettlement policy.

Rebuilding Civil Society
In Jammu and Kashmir, on both sides of the Line of Control, there is a handful of youth groups, blood banks and
orphanages, but no development NGOs or trade associations. An important exception is Gilgit-Baltistan where the Aga
Khan Foundation has an excellent network. Some NGOs, from the Mumbai-Pune belt, are active in rehabilitation
efforts, in the Kashmir valley, but there are not too many local NGOs that can implement large-scale development work
if initiated and funded by NGOs elsewhere. It should be possible to create such a capacity with appropriate and largescale
training. The Kashmiri youth appears to be highly competent, articulate and aware. If provided training and
exposure, they should be in a position to construct a vibrant civil society in a short period of time.
In recent years, many new local newspapers mostly edited and managed by young journalists, have emerged in both
sides of Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The critics may flay the nascent media for technical and editorial
lacunae. Nevertheless several new publications have survived despite financial and technical constraints and a difficult
working environment. This shows the intrinsic potential that the people of Jammu and Kashmir have for building a
vigorous civil society.
Instead of encouraging young talent, Pakistani authorities have banned several local newspapers in Gilgit-Baltistan. In
October 2000, the Gilgit district magistrate revoked the publication license of K-2, an independent weekly. A year later,
extremist groups attacked the offices of Naqqara, a Gilgit-based weekly and assaulted its staff. In 2004, Kargil
International, another periodical, was banned. Gilgit-Baltistan has no local broadcast media. It is necessary to have
freedom of press for capacity building of young media persons.

Youth Employment
Many of those who have opted out of militancy consider reverting because of the lack of jobs and opportunities in
Jammu & Kashmir (India). Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh took a step in the right direction in November 2004
when he announced an Rs.240 billion plan to reconstruct the economy of Jammu & Kashmir. While the main thrust
of the economic plan is the electrification of all villages in the state by 2007, the Prime Minister announced the
immediate creation of 24,000 jobs, which include 15,000 jobs for women in pre-school children centres. It has been
estimated that another one lakh jobs, albeit temporary, will be generated by the electrification projects. Lifting of the
ban on further recruitment into state government services and plans to boost the tourism industry are also expected
to help alleviate unemployment.
Opportunities need to be created for ex-militants as well. There are several sectors in which they can be trained
furniture making, handicrafts, tourism and agro-industries. There is potential for development of electronics units,
mini cement plants, computer hardware, TV and watch manufacturing, that would be low volume, high value
sunrise industries, pollution free and benefiting from moderately cheap labour. Sericulture and silk industry, textiles and
ready made garments, sports goods industry, processing of gems and precious stones, selective mining projects and
mineral based industry, welding electrodes, pesticides, are some other areas that have potential. It would be important to
change the attitude of society to accept ex-militants in jobs, and in facilitating and helping them to acquire skills.
So far, surrendered militants have been offered jobs in the para-military and the state police. The Indian Army has also
engaged the services of a large number of ex-militants as "Ikwanis". They are on the regular pay rolls of the army and are
armed with AK 47 rifles. Since they have surrendered and offered to fight militancy, they have been given employment
and security for their families. Former militants can also be helpful in identifying locations of landmines. In Kashmir, as
well as Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu, landmines have maimed innocent people. A de-mining operation has to
be urgently undertaken on a large scale with the involvement of ex-militants.
Rural Reconstruction
Jammu & Kashmir on the Indian side has tremendous potential for horticulture, floriculture, fruit processing and food
processing. The government has already established a model floriculture centre in Srinagar, one of the nine centres set
up nation wide, in order to formalize the traditional industry.
The state is predominantly a mono-cropped and rain-fed with about 40 per cent of the area in Jammu division and 60 per
cent in Kashmir division having assured means of irrigation. Agriculture is the mainstay of the state's economy. The
productivity level of paddy, at about 40 quintals per hectare in Kashmir valley, is the highest in the country. Rice, maize,
and wheat are the major crops. In Kashmir, wheat, oil seeds and fodder cultivation is being introduced as a second crop.
In Jammu, farmers are raising paddy as an additional crop.
Walnut is another important crop that has tremendous potential in Jammu & Kashmir. The state is already the largest
producer of walnut in India with an annual production of approximately 60,000 tonnes. Currently, the area under walnut
cultivation is 61,000 hectares. There is scope to increase it in Doda, Rajouri, Poonch and Udhampur. Kargil also needs
diversification since the agricultural season is very short, running from May to September.
Currently, about 20 per cent of the cultivated area in Jammu & Kashmir is under fruit cultivation. About half a
million families are engaged, directly or indirectly, in horticultural activities. Sopore is the main fruit producing
district in the valley that accounts for 50 per cent of the total fruit production. Apple occupies a predominant
position amongst horticultural crops, constituting 45 per cent of the total area under tree crops. Enlarged facilities
are being set up for processing and canning of fruits in the state. There is a need to improve marketing of these
Horticulture activities are also being given a major thrust in the hilly areas of the state. Other fruits that grow here
are pears, cherries, apricots and peaches in the temperate areas and mango and citrus in the sub-tropical areas.
Saffron cultiviation is unique to Jammu & Kashmir, the only place producing the flower crop outside Spain. Annual
production of saffron confined to Pampore in the Kashmir valley and to the Kishtwar valley of Jammu province, varies
from 10 to 12 tonnes. Honey, herbs and herbal products also have tremendous opportunities for export worldwide. To
impel horticultural activities creation of cold storage facilities, through public or private investments, is warranted.
On the Pakistani side, both Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan have been completely neglected and the basic conditions of
livelihood need to be created. This is unlike the Indian side, where fundamental elements of the economy are in place. In
Gilgit-Baltistan, almost 94 per cent of the land is mountainous and therefore difficult to cultivate. According to
economists of All Parties National Alliance, the federal government needs annual investment of Rs.15 billion against the
current Rs.2 billion. It is necessary to train the youth in new agricultural techniques, and learning from experiences of
mountainous regions elsewhere in the world. Also, there is tremendous scope for developing mineral resources. In the
Kashmir part, irrigation covers only 10 per cent of the cultivated land, as against 85 per cent in Punjab, Sindh and NWFP.
For realising agricultural potential, there is need to examine integrated water development to protect and promote the
interests of Kashmiris on both sides of the Line of Control. This issue is discussed elsewhere in this publication.
Finally, it is necessary to attract investments for ecologically sensitive industrialisation. The Indian side has good
infrastructure, though there is tremendous scope for improvement. The main problem is legal in nature; Article 370 that
places restrictions on the ownership of property and dissuades external investment. The Pakistani side is characterised
by very poor infrastructure. As a result, Kashmir (Pakistan) has less than 1,000 small-scale industrial units and Gilgit-
Baltistan has no more than a few brick kilns.

The state of Jammu & Kashmir has tremendous hydropower potential, estimated at over 15,000 MW. Out of this hardly
10 per cent has been harnessed till date. With a view to tapping the available hydel potential, the state government is
exploring the possibility of attracting private local and foreign capital. Currently, the state generates just 25 per cent of
the actual demand for electricity. Power transmission and distribution losses are over 40 per cent.
As per the Indus Water Treaty, Jammu & Kashmir cannot erect dams on its rivers, thereby limiting the options to
power projects that are based on run-of-the-river schemes. Even a modest exploitation of the huge power potential
of Jammu & Kashmir's rivers will need an integrated water development approach instead of the current divisive
basis of the Indus Water Treaty.
At present, the Uri Civil generates only around 50 MW of power as against its actual capacity of 489 MW. This is
because the average water available at the plant during winter is only 700 cusecs, as against its design capacity for
7,500 cusecs. Due to the takeover of the project by the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), the state
gets a small proportion of the power generated by this power station. One of the many other factors responsible for
low power production in the valley is the elimination of the dam at the Lower Jehlum Hydel Project to facilitate
linear water flow to the Uri Civil power plant. As a result, during lean season, only 10 MW of installed capacity of
100 MW can be utilized. The Ganderbal and the Upper Sindh Hydel Projects are currently operating at a meagre 5
MW each.
During sub-zero temperatures in winter, people in the state face acute energy scarcity to meet the domestic and
commercial heating needs. As a result, power remains the only source of energy to meet the needs. Although much is
being expected from the proposed Baglihar and Kishen Ganga Hydel Projects, however, like the Uri Civil project, the
state is unlikely to get the required power from these projects. Like the Uri Civil project, the financial considerations of
these projects are likely to fall under the purview of the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation.
Indian Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, visited Jammu & Kashmir in late 2004 and announced a package of
Rs.180 billion for power development (out of the total transfers of Rs.240 billion) in the state. The Government of
Pakistan needs to invest substantial funds in Gilgit-Baltistan where about 70 per cent of the population has no access
to electricity at all. There is only one small power station, Kargah Power House, which is unable to fulfil the
requirements of even the capital city.

Health and Education
A major emphasis of restructuring has to be in the field of health and education. On the Indian side, there is a need to
expand psychiatric health care as the annual number of cases in the only psychiatric hospital in the valley has increased
from 775 in 1985 to 43, 650 in 2002. The cases in 2003-2004 were estimated to be in the range of 35,000-45,000, though
exact statistics are not available.
The basic healthcare in Jammu & Kashmir is better than many other Indian states. Srinagar alone has quite a few
hospitals: SMHS, Institute of Medical Sciences (SKIMS), Bones and Joints Hospital, Govind Balabh Pant Hospital for
children, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Hospital. New hospitals are being set up or old hospitals are being upgraded in
district capitals of Anantnag, Baramullah and Sapore. The hospital in Jammu is being modernised to the level of All
India Institute of Medical Science, the best in the country. There are innumerable small hospitals and clinics.
On the Pakistani side, the main problem is in Gilgit-Baltistan area. There are only 25 small hospitals serviced by
140 doctors, as compared to 830 hospitals and 75,000 doctors in the rest of Pakistan. There is an urgent to multiply
health facilities in the area.
Both sides need to upgrade their educational facilities as well. Jammu & Kashmir hopes to achieve total literacy by
2007. The government of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed has created 30,000 new posts of teachers, increased the coverage of
students entitled to free text books, added new subjects like biotechnology and computer education at the higher
secondary level. However, the state needs to increase the number of colleges and higher education institutions.
Gilgit-Baltistan has an overall literacy rate of 33 per cent (male 40 per cent; female 25 per cent). Educational indicators
are especially poor for girls and women. Approximately 82 per cent of government run primary and middle schools are
for boys only. There are only twelve high schools and two regional colleges in Gilgit-Baltistan, with no post-graduate
facilities. A few locals are able to secure government jobs and they are paid up to 25 per cent less than non-native
entrants. Apart from the government jobs, there are no jobs except in the tourism sector.
In the last decade, the number of religious seminaries in Gilgit-Baltistan and Kashmir (Pakistan) has gone up from 102 to
185 and 76 to 151, respectively. Poor economic conditions and lack of educational facilities have aggravated this trend.
At present Gilgit-Baltistan stand third after NWFP and Balochistan in Pakistan in producing ulemas (religious scholars).
Obviously, a complete overhaul of the education system in Kashmir (Pakistan) and Gilgit-Baltistan is overdue.

Gilgit-Baltistan, spread over 72,000 sq. km has a rich collage of human and natural resources with varying cultures,
languages, flora and fauna. There are 14 National Parks in Pakistan and Kashmir (Pakistan), out of which 4 are in Gilgit-
Baltistan and one in Kashmir (Pakistan). The area attracts tourists from all over the world to its mountain peaks, glaciers,
alpine pastures, forests, lakes, plateaus, valleys and rivers. However, rapid growth in population, lack of sanitation, and
abject poverty have led to deforestation, depleted pastures, declining wildlife and severe soil erosion. Uncontrolled
urbanization and unplanned tourism have further degraded the environment and the ecological balance in Gilgit-
The mountainous regions of Pakistan are famous for a number of wildlife species including Snow Leopard, Hunting
Leopard, Brown Bear, Black Bear, Ibex, Grey Goral, Musk Deer, Kashmir Stag, Himalyan Monal, Pheasant, Western
Tragopan, Snow Pheasant, Partridge, Peacock, Eagle and Dusk Markhor. Many of these are endangered and given the
very poor quality of life in this region. It is hard for the people to cooperate with the authorities to protect these species
when their own survival is at stake. It is important to find solutions that are beneficial to both the people and the wildlife.
Eco-tourism is one of these, as there is tremendous scope of employment in this field.
Forestry is an area where clearly a huge amount of employment and wealth can be created. Kashmiris use a lot of
wood to make their houses. In addition, firewood is the primary fuel used for cooking and heating, even in towns.
Srinagar alone consumes some 50,000 tonnes of firewood every year. Therefore, there is big demand both local and
external for Kashmiri wood. A community forest management programme is needed to help afforestation.

Line of Cooperation
It is possible to identify many other areas for the reconstruction and development of Jammu & Kashmir. The most
obvious is tourism, which has attracted attention in many studies and reports. The development of rural industry,
agriculture, horticulture and other spheres will depend on establishing a network of transport and communication
across the different parts of the area. Some of the most interesting ideas, which have been discussed by experts,
§ The introduction of rail link between Jammu and Srinagar and improvement in the condition of road
connecting the two cities
§ The launch of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service along with the construction of a good quality road
between the two cities.
§ Establishment of a road network between Jammu and Sialkot
§ Establishment of a road network in Gilgit-Baltistan, since currently a region of 72,500 sq km has a road
length of less than 500 km length in the form of the Karakoram Highway
§ Establishment of an integrated market development plan with several agri processing units, cold chains,
small size container services, bonded trucking service, and joint tourism package.
The creation of such a network of transport and business services will first require the establishment of Joint
Economic Development Council and an atmosphere free of violence. This is only possible if India and Pakistan
reach a final settlement about the terms of co-existence and cooperation in the future.
The conversion of Line of Control into Line of Cooperation can take place gradually. At the Foreign Secretary level
talks held in the last week of December 2004, a proposal was mooted to create zones of family interaction along the
Line of Control. The specific places identified were Tangdhar, Poonch, Mendhar and Uri, along the Line of Control
and Suchetgarh along the international border. According to this proposal, divided families could meet once or twice
a week on designated days without going through formalities of passports and visas. Some independent scholars
have proposed that the same zones of family interaction can also be used for trade facilitation. Thus, the traditional
South Asian concept of a weekly bazaar may be introduced to enable traders and business leaders from both sides of
Line of Control to come together for commercial exchange. Eventually, family interaction and trade facilitation can
be made a permanent activity in these designated zones. In the next phase, the number of zones may be increased
from five to ten or fifteen. This can pave the way for a gradual conversion of the entire Line of Control into Line of


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Chapter 12: Options

It has already been pointed out that there is diversity of views on the political status of Jammu & Kashmir. The elected
representatives on both sides of the Line of Control want to belong to their respective country. There are others who want
independence or accede to the 'other' side.
The UN resolutions call for Pakistan to vacate the Jammu & Kashmir territory. In the modern context, it must not only
involve withdrawal of military forces but also dismantling of terrorist infrastructure. The second part of the UN
resolutions calls for a plebiscite to determine accession to India or Pakistan. Mere demilitarisation without vacating nonstate
groups is leaving the field open for unprecedented violence.
Accession of the entire state as it existed in August 1947 to either India or Pakistan is unviable. It is true that a significant
section of the Kashmiri society has violently resorted to protest against the current political structure on the Indian side
of the Line of Control. It is also true that there is significant discontent on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control
including Gilgit-Baltistan. If there is accession to India, at least a section of the population will want to migrate to
Pakistan. If there is a accession to India, Shi'as of Gilgit-Baltistan, some of the Muslims in the Kashmir Valley, Gujjars,
Ladakhis and Pandits will want to move to India. Such a massive migration, on the basis of arithmetic of plebiscite, is
invitation to human tragedy, which will have severe repercussions in the South Asian region. Thus, the plebiscite
proposal of 1949 is completely inhuman and unrealistic in the context of the realities of 2005 or 2009.
The option of advocating complete independence is confusing. At the superficial level, this appears to project a desire
for freedom. However, a closer look suggests that all the votaries of independence actually want political independence
but full economic integration with Pakistan, and specially India. They want free movement of factors of production, as
well as goods and commodities. This is like Poland or Hungary wanting to join the European Union for economic
benefits, without their accepting the political objectives and commitment to democracy and plurality. Pakistan and India
are both opposed to this option. Moreover, an independent and land-locked Jammu and Kashmir will only mean
continuation of India-Pakistan rivalry to control it by other means. It will merely transform of the conflict, not eliminate
Some scholars propose conversion of the Line of Control into an international border. Most Kashmiri leaders oppose
such a division of state. Pakistan's rulers describe this as an Indian strategy to freeze the status quo, while the Indian
government is bound by a parliamentary claim to Kashmir on the other side of the Line of Control. People of India are
bound to oppose it when they learn about the plight of people of Gilgit-Baltistan and their desire to join India.
As accession, independence and conversion of Line of Control into the international border are not viable, search
for unconventional options has seized the minds of scholars and practitioners. Some of them aim at empowerment
and enrichment of the Kashmiri identity by restoring its shattered self to its original glory. Some aim at decimating
the Kashmiri identity into narrow cleavages in the fashion of post-Yugoslavia formation of the Balkans. The latest
of the proposals for Kashmir resolution has come from General Pervez Musharraf.

Option 1: Converting Line of Control into several Lines of Conflict
This option, originally proposed by Sir Owen Dixon in 1950, is based on division, sub division, and sub-sub
division of the state. General Musharraf proposed the formula again in 2004 that could result in consolidating the
existing cleavages.
General Musharraf's proposal provides for division of Kashmir into seven parts on the basis of religion, and the
formation of a separate political system for each division thus created. The divisions suggested hereby are:
On the Pakistani side:
1. Azad Jammu and Kashmir, with predominant Sunni population
2. Shi'ite and Ismailis dominated Gilgit-Baltistan

On the Indian side:
3. Shi'ite dominated Kargil
4. Sunni dominated Kashmir Valley
5. Sunni dominated Rajouri, Poonch and Doda districts
6. Hindu dominated Jammu
7. Buddhist dominated Ladakh.
This proposal is on the lines of the break up of Yugoslavia into Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia
and Montenegro, and Slovenia. It is also bound to result in the same fate that the fragmented Yugoslavia has met
infinite violence and military takeover by some institutions such as Nato.
Moreover, there is likelihood that an overall minority community in a divided region may have predominance in some of
the tehsils of the same region. Will this mean that such divided region will be further divided as per the tehsil-wise
religion predominance? General Musharraf's proposal fails to identify and address this issue. In any case, this proposal
aims to accentuate cleavages in the state. This is against the spirit of Kashmiriyat, which is a culture of plurality and
harmonious co-existence. Also, the formula of consolidation of cleavages is based on power-sharing at descendingly
lower denominator levels.

Option 2: Converting the Line of Control into the Line of Cooperation
This proposal is based on gradual unity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and gradual amity between the people
of India and Pakistan. It reflects some aspects of Northern Ireland and South Tyrol formulae, though designed in
tune with the local realities. It has already been discussed earlier in the Chapter on Autonomy. It can be summarised
as follows:
1. Creating autonomy for Kashmir on both sides of the Line of Control this includes Jammu and Kashmir,
Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The extent and degree of the autonomy should be negotiated between a
provincial negotiating team and a central negotiating team.
On the Indian side, the provincial negotiating team could consist of the state government, the main
opposition party in the assembly, All Party Hurriyat Conference, as well as the representatives from the
Pandit, Gujjar and Ladakhi communities. The Indian national negotiating team could consist of the Central
government leading the team along with the nominees recommended by the Parliament, to include
opposition parties.
On Pakistani side, the national team could consist of the federal government and the Kashmir Committee of
Parliament, whereas the provincial team could consist of Muslim Conference, All Parties National Alliance,
Gilgit-Baltistan National Alliance and various groups like Balawaristan National Front from Gilgit-Baltistan.
2. Creation of following institutions:
a. A permanent body with the task of monitoring the effective functioning of the autonomy. The negotiating
teams, which negotiate the autonomy issue, could form this body.
b. Committees appointed by the assemblies of both sides of Kashmir should meet biannually to discuss
economic, social and cultural issues.
c. The governments of India and Pakistan should also hold official meetings on a regular basis, specifically
on Kashmir.
3. Establishment of a Joint Economic Development Council of Jammu & Kashmir to promote trade, investment
and joint ventures. The Council should also undertake the task of joint development of the Indus Water Basin.
1. Institution of a fast track visa process for all Kashmiris, who have bona fide business or family interest. Visa
windows can be established in Srinagar and Muzaffarabad for this purpose. This fast track visa process can
slowly move towards the free flow of people once
a. Terrorism subsides; as borders cannot be opened up if the violence persists.
b. A similar arrangement for the free flow of all the citizens of India and Pakistan is reached; as it will
not be possible to open up the borders for the Kashmiri people and then restrict them from entering
other parts of either India or Pakistan.
5. Provision of joint patrolling of the Line of Control by Indian and Pakistani troops to stop flow of
criminals, drug dealers and terrorists who will be tempted to take advantage of the privileges offered
under fast track and the Joint Economic Development Council.
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Conclusion: Principles

Sixty years is too long a time to waste in hostility. During this period, the countries that have been engaged in conflict for
centuries have turned a new leaf. This has only been possible because of a genuine desire of the concerned states to make
a new beginning and concentrate their energies on progress of their people. Once the states are determined to commit
themselves to the future of their people, they find it easy to renounce the excuse they have been holding to justify
acrimony. UK and Ireland, Germany an France, Italy and Austria, Japan and Russia, Iran and UAE, Israel and Egypt, and
many other neighbouring states have demonstrated that it is possible not to mortgage the future to conflicts of the past.
Some of them have found innovative solutions to issues straining their relationship and some have allowed the overall
bilateral relations to supercede unnecessary conflicts.
India and Pakistan can reach the final settlement and make a new beginning. This is possible if and only if they are
determined to restructure their bilateral relations and also restructure and re-orient their internal dynamics. The final
settlement between India and Pakistan is essentially about the final settlement of individual identities, power structures
and resource management. Any effort to resolve conflicts that are purely of bilateral nature is bound to be temporary at
best, and counter productive at worst. Therefore, this volume has not paid any attention to bilateral issues such as
Siachen, Wular Barrage, Sir Creek and others. It is an open secret that official talks have nearly found solutions to these
issues. It is possible to convert near solutions into real ones if and when India's political leaders and Pakistan's military
leaders decide to do so.
The issue of Jammu & Kashmir is more difficult to resolve than the issues mentioned above, but much easier to resolve
than the issues mentioned below. It is critical for India and Pakistan to agree to a set of principles and values, if they want
to resolve this specific issue. There must be an agreement that the resolution would be based on the victory of principles
of freedom and justice, over the principles of terror and coercion. There must also be an agreement to consider and
accommodate, as much as possible, perspectives of all those groups who represent different sections of people of all
parts of Jammu & Kashmir from Jammu and Ladakh to Gilgit and Baltistan. It is much more important to consider the
perspective of such groups that have the courage and confidence to test their representative credentials, and not resort to
violence and terror.
The tragedy of debate on Jammu & Kashmir so far has been that the authorities in India and Pakistan, as well as the
international community have short far too much interest in the views of those professing violence and ignoring those
pursuing peaceful reconciliation.
Once India and Pakistan decide to honour the principles of peace and justice, they will have to decide whether the
operational principle for finding the solution has to be division and partition or unity and reconciliation. If the
leaders of India and Pakistan decide to pursue a solution based on discussion and a third partition of the subcontinent,
they must take responsibility for the outcome that will follow in terms of millions of deaths, injuries and
If they decide to apply the principle of unity and reconciliation, they should convert the Line of Control into the
Line of Cooperation. We have suggested a method to do so in a phased manner, deriving from nothing else but the
discussions between the Foreign Secretaries in 2004. However, we believe that it is possible to construct many other
formulae to achieve this objective.
A significantly more important issue is that of water security of Pakistan and Northern India. Pakistan's per capita
water availability has declined substantially since 1947. It is expected to reach the threshold level of 1000 cubic
metres by 2007 or latest by 2010. This will affect agriculture, the mainstay of Punjab and Sindh economy, sparking
off conflicts between the two provinces. There is a serious risk of Sindh's secession, in the next 5-10 years, perhaps
along with Balochistan.
Pakistan hopes to come out of this dilemma by securing physical control of the river water upstream in Jammu &
Kashmir on the Indian side. Therefore, it wants sovereignty over the Kashmir valley and parts of Jammu, covering
most of the catchment area of river Chenab. Thus, the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, which was based on the
principle of division, has succeeded in postponing the crisis by fifty years. Any further division will case the final
Instead, India and Pakistan need to find a solution on the basis of the principle of unity and reconciliation. When
applied to the water situation, it translates into integrated water development to be urgently planned and
implemented. This will be predicated on an atmosphere free of terror in the entire Indus Water Basin.
A much greater challenge is to limit the spread of fire of the India-Pakistan hostility across South Asia. Both
countries have their respective vulnerabilities. Pakistan accuses India of exploiting the internal conflict of Sindh and
Balochistan. India accuses Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) of fuelling fires in Assam and other
parts of the north-east. More recently, there were reports of ISI building networks of Maoists in Nepal, Naxalities
from the Indian states of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh and ethnic insurgents in Assam. There is also an active effort to
change the nature of the Assamese agitation from an ethnic to a religious one. The final settlement must be on the
principle of non-interference in internal affairs by the military, political, diplomatic or through propaganda or any
other means.
Obviously, internal problems are a result of many factors including flawed domestic policies, which are distinct
from the India-Pakistan resolution. India and Pakistan must reach the full, final and comprehensive agreement that
now or in the future they will not assist any insurgency either from the rival, own or third country territories. India
argues that it is not involved in any such activity since Pakistan has been unable to produce concrete evidence.
However, India must undertake, on a reciprocal basis, a commitment to the principle of non-interference in the
An associated challenge is to develop a shared vision of the South Asian region. India and Pakistan have allowed the fire
to spread beyond their own boundaries. They appear to be supporting rival political groups in Afghanistan and
Bangladesh. As bigger neighbours, it is their moral responsibility to promote the principle of unity and reconciliation
across the region.
In order to contain and gradually douse fires, it is essential to curb extremism. The final settlement is possible if and only
if it is predicated on disallowing the state and parastatal agencies to use terrorism as instruments of state policy,
annihilate all groups that spread violence as an instrument of public strategy, and reform education and economy to
enable the forces of progress to thrive. The final settlement between India and Pakistan is essentially about the final
settlement of conflict between social modernism and religious orthodoxy within Pakistan. It is also about containment
of extremism in India's religious right.
The question of internal restructuring is closely linked to the world-view and identity of the two states. India has
accepted the identity of Pakistan as a sovereign state. If there are any doubts on this account, India must do
whatever possible to clarify its perspective. On its part, Pakistan needs to establish and project its identity as a
progressive state for the welfare of its 150 million people, and not a movement to protest against religious statistics
of the region or an instrument of conquest of South Asia and the world. At the same time, India has to develop a
global vision to its role and carry Pakistan with it as a friend and a partner.
The core issue between India and Pakistan is about the kind of people we want to be. It is about the redefinition of
us. It is also about the path we want to take in our mission of redefining our states, our nations and re-dedicating
them to the future of our people.
For sixty years we tried the path of so called realpolitik. It included wars, arms race, hostile propaganda, terrorism,
secret negotiations and official and unofficial third party mediation. This realpolitik did not take into account real
facts about the situation in Gilgit-Baltistan, importance of rivers and the spreading of fire. Obviously, realpolitik,
which is not grounded in real facts, has not delivered. The time has now come to re-orient our politics from that of
power games, excuses, division and destruction to a process based on recognition of hard facts on the ground. The
time has also come to question the strategy of division, which has failed repeatedly at the cost of the lives of
innocent people. As if the earlier two partitions are not enough, Pakistan's military rulers now want to apply it on a
much wider scale to divide everything they possibly can from the district of Hyderabad in Sindh to Jammu division
in Jammu & Kashmir. Even on the Indian side, right wing ideologues propagate four-way division of Jammu &
Kashmir. The time has come for the people of India and Pakistan to examine the consequences of the strategy of
division and partition. Let us for once, give the principles of unity and reconciliation a chance and make a new
beginning in this region. Sixty years of bloodshed and hostility is enough.


Tihar Jail
Oct 2, 2009
most of the problem this book highlighted we already know.My interest was in the second part of the book where it deals with the pakistan's real intention behind the raising kashimr issue which was always water.Remember wat Jinnah said in 1947 ,"Kashmir is Pakistan's jugular vein".And the solution this book suggests is all idealistic which can never be implemented on the ground reality of wahabi pakistani mindset.This book fails to recognise that the real problem between india and pakistan is not kashmir or water but the difference of ethos ie pluralism vs antagonism
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