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http://koenraadelst.bharatvani.org/books/demogislam/
Select Quotes: Book was written in 1998 by Koenraad Elst of Belgium
1. Visions of a demographic doomsday
1.1. Hindus, the dying race
Demography can change the cultural orientation of a country or region by making an originally small group numerically dominant. Thus, demographic success was a decisive factor in the Christian takeover of the Roman Empire: in the first three centuries, Christian numbers grew by 40% per year, due to conversion and to the rejection of birth control (whether primitive contraception, abortion or infanticide).[1] Demographic shifts can lead to violence: in Lebanon, the tilt of the demographic balance in favour of the Muslims, leading to demands of a redistribution of political power shared with the Christians, was one of the causes of the civil war. Hindus ought to know, for they themselves have also done it once: "After years of immigration by ethnic Nepalis, [Sikkim] lost its sovereignty when a Nepali majority chose to be part of India."[2] Finally, a certain demography can lead to selfannihilation: many members of India's Parsi community have resigned to the perspective that their community will soon disappear due to a suicidal demographic selfforgetfulness.[3]
1.2. Ominous census figures
Swami Shraddhananda quotes from the 1911 Census Report (para 172 ff.) to show the reasons why the Muslim population is growing faster than the Hindu population, whose percentage of the total population is steadily declining. The Census Director had written: "The number of Muhammadans has risen during the decade [190111] by 6.7 per cent as compared with only 5 p.c. in the case of Hindus. There is a small but continuous accession of converts from Hinduism and other religions, but the main reason for the relatively more rapid growth of the followers of the Prophet is that they are more prolific."[5] Follow a number of social customs which encourage the Muslim birth rate, e.g. fewer marriage restrictions and common remarriage of widows, and the Muslim insistence that the children of mixed marriages be brought up as Muslims.
This pessimistic prognosis of the numerical HinduMuslim proportion defines the problem to which Swami Shraddhananda (who knew Mukherji personally) tried to offer a solution. One of Mukherji's concluding sentences, "They count their gains, we calculate our losses”
For the Hindu the slogan is: We are two, and we have two. The slogan for a Moslem is: We are five and we have twentyfive.
The following table shows the percentage of Hindus and Muslims in British India in every successive census since 1881:
yr. 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941
H. 75.09 74.24 72.87 71.68 70.73 70.67 69.46
M. 19.97 20.41 21.88 22.39 23.23 23.49 24.28
The Muslim percentage has not only increased, but the rate of increase itself has increased. This is very clear when we take a longterm perspective: in the fifty years between 1941 and 1991, their percentage has risen 5.64% (from 24.28% to 29.92%), substantially more than the 4.31% gain in the sixty years between 1881 and 1941. At this rate, the Muslims in the Subcontinent must have passed the 30% mark in the mid1990s and will pass the milestone of becoming more than half the number of Hindus (ca. 32% to ca. 64%) before the census of 2011.
Religious differential in the use of birth control since the 1960s is having a bigger impact than hitherto assumed.
It gets even more dramatic when you look at it this way: in 1984, a generation of Muslims which was about 12% of the population had produced a generation of children, certainly not more than 30 years younger on average, which constituted more than 16%. This would mean an unprecedented growth rate of more than 4% in less than 30 years, or rather, a growth with over a third of the original percentage (4 to 12). For a little thought experiment: if this differential growth rate is kept constant, we get 16.81% of Muslims in ca. 2014, over 22% in 2044, nearly 30% in 2074, 40% in 2104, crossing 50% in ca. 2125 etc., all without counting the effect of Muslim immigration.
1.7. The Subcontinental context
The subcontinental total shows a faster growth of the Muslim percentage than the official figures for the Indian republic, and should be considered the more important indicator for the long‑term evolution, given the increasing spill‑over of population surplus from Pakistan and especially Bangladesh. Apart from the millions of Bangladeshis staying illegally in India, there is also an increasing number of Pakistanis overstaying their visas or otherwise settling in India
In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Muslim percentage has continually increased, partly by pestering the nonMuslims out, partly by conversions under pressure (pressurizing people to marry their daughters off to Muslims, allocating jobs on conditon of conversion, etc.), and partly by higher birthrates.
Incidentally, in Nepal the breakthrough of Islam (nearly nonexistent in the 1970s) is simply spectacular, and is again due in large measure to immigration from Bangladesh. In Sri Lanka, the Muslim percentage is slowly rising by demographics alone.
So, every decade the Muslim percentage in the Subcontinent increases by more than 1%, with the rate of increase itself increasing. In India, the rate of increase in the Muslim percentage is considerable, though lower than the subcontinental total, but is rising faster due to the differential in the use of birth control and the increasing Muslim immigration. In Hindutva circles, this remarkable demographic differential is interpreted as the result of Muslim "demographic aggression"
2. Immigration from Bangladesh
2.1. The uses of migration
In the demographic competition, simple procreation is not the only factor. There are cases where Muslims are in a minority and use migration to remedy their minority condition. This does not, of course, mean that all Muslims involved in such migration are conscious soldiers in a demographic offensive ("infiltrators"), but an element of planning may nonetheless be involved, or may arise in certain activist circles once the political potential of an ongoing migration process becomes apparent.
The Islamic calendar starts with a momentous migration, that of Mohammed and his followers from Mecca to Medina. The result of this immigration from the Medinese viewpoint was that the city lost its autonomy to Mohammed, who became its dictator and expelled or killed sections of its population.
"Between 1971 and 1981, Bangladesh census records show a reduction of 39 lakhs in the minority population.
"Between 1981-89, 36 lakh religious minorities were missing from that country.
2.3. An estimate of the numbers
"In 1972, there were 7.5 lakh Bihari Muslims in the camps in Dacca. As a result of mediation by Saudi Arabia only 33,000 of them were accepted by Pakistan.[5] At present, there are less than two lakhs in the camps, where have the rest gone?
The Hindu population in East Bengal had declined from 33% in 1901 to 28% in 1941. It fell to 22% by 1951 due to the Partition and the post-Partition exodus, and to 18.5% in 1961. By 1971, it had fallen to 13.5%, partly due to the 1971 massacre by the Pakistani Army, partly due to intermittent waves of emigration. The 1981 figure was 12.1%
3. The Muslim birth rate
3.1. Muslim fertility
It is safe to predict that the 2001 census will show another sharp increase in the rate at which Muslims are demographically catching up with the Hindu majority. It is then that the full effect of the birth control campaigns of the 1960s and 70s will become visible. Given the higher Hindu participation in the birth control effort of the 1960s and 70s, we must now be witnessing a cumulative effect, of a proportionately smaller number of Hindu mothers (born in that period) having in their turn each a smaller number of children than the proportionately larger number of Muslim mothers, on average.
3.2. The economic explanation
This is the old Marxist clich�: reduce everything to economic factors. among Kerala Muslims, who have a high level of education and a relatively high standard of living. Kerala Muslims have a higher birth-rate than the national Hindu average and even than the Hindu average in poor and backward states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan: the population growth (+28.74% for 1981-91) in the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram (with female literacy at 75.22%, far higher than among Hindus in the Hindi belt) is more than twice as high as the average for Kerala (+13.98), and well above the Hindu national average (+23.50).[5]
A secularist journalist confirms: "In spite of this 'near total literacy' the population growth rate of Muslims who constitute one-fourth of Kerala's population is as high as 2.3 per cent per year, which is more than even the national PGR [= population growth rate] of 2.11 per annum and is almost double the PGR of Hindus in Kerala itself."[6]
The figures for Kerala exemplify a general rule: at any given level of literacy and economic status, Muslims will have a markedly higher birth rate than their Hindu counterparts, even to the extent of having a higher birth rate than Hindus in a lower educational or income bracket. A secularist journalist, Pranay Gupta, estimates that in Hyderabad, which has a large Muslim middle-class, a typical Muslim family has eight children while a Hindu family has four
3.3. The literacy factor
Ever since the propagation of birth control among the Hindu masses, rich and literate Muslims have more children than poor and illiterate Hindus -- the religious determinant overrules the economic determinant. This comes out clearly when we compare with the admittedly high growth rate for the Scheduled Castes: "The high growth rate of Muslims, due to poverty, illiteracy etc., is comparable to the growth rate of Scheduled Castes", writes Ashish Bose; but he himself gives the SC growth rate as 31% for the decade 1981-91 against the Muslim growth rate of 32.8%.[8] True, some Muslims fall in the same low-income category as the SCs; but taking into account the Muslim middle-class, some old landed gentry and a lot of guest workers in the Gulf states, the average Muslim income is considerably higher than the average SC income.
3.4. The Muslim growth rate worldwide
3.5. Islamic government policies
4. Islam and birth control
4.1. Islam condoning birth control
So, the Prophet condoned hostage-taking and rape.[8] Nonetheless, these two instances of clumsy apologetics do confirm that Islam approves of birth control.
4.2. Islam prohibiting birth control
Hence the Prophet's prohibition, at least on one occasion, of knowingly marrying a sterile woman; his prohibition of non-vaginal intercourse (another primitive form of birth control); and his strict prohibition of sterilization and of voluntary celibacy.
4.3. Islamic natalism
K.S. Lal quotes Mohammed as saying in so many words: "Marry women who will love their husbands and be very prolific, for I want you to be more numerous than any other people".[14] Ram Swarup quotes the Prophet as saying: "In my Ummah, he is the best who has the largest number of wives."[15] Even a secular Muslim candidly calls it "one of the fundamental tenets of Islam -- namely, to multiply the tribe."[16]
4.4. The Rabita's natalism
The natalist and anti-contraceptive line is even defended by the world's most powerful Islamic organization, the Rabita al-Alam al-Islamiyya (World Islamic League). At the UN Conference on Population in Cairo 1994, a number of Muslim countries joined hands with the Vatican in opposing contraceptives and abortion.
While some Muslims favour a realistic population policy, it is undeniable that others approach the matter in terms of demographic warfare.
4.5. Why Muslim natalism?
4.6. So, who was right?
The Hindu revivalists are essentially right about the ongoing substantial increase in the Muslim percentage of the Indian population. A realistic extrapolation into the future of present demographic (including migratory) trends does predict a Muslim majority in the Subcontinent well before the end of the 21st century, and a Muslim majority in the Indian Union sometime later, but in some regions much earlier. The demographic differential is not of such a magnitude that Muslims will soon outnumber Hindus in the whole of India; but it is large enough to create Muslim‑majority areas in strategic corners of the country, "two, three, many Kashmirs!"
Hindu revivalists who argue that Muslim have a higher birth rate, that their percentage is growing fast, and that this is the result of an intentional policy on the part of at least a section of the Muslim leadership, are right. It is not just that they "have a point" or that they "deserve a hearing", no: they are nothing less than right.
And why stop our conclusion with finding the Hindu position right? The data just surveyed also teach us something about the secularists who have ridiculed and thoroughly blackened the said Hindu position: they are wrong. We have not used any esoteric figures inaccessible to the common man; all these data were at the disposal of the secularists. Yet, some of them insist that the Muslim percentage will remain constant, or that the Muslim increase is proportionate to relative Muslim poverty. The fact deserves to be noted: a whole class of leading intellectuals brutally denies easily verifiable facts, i.c. the accelerating increase of the Muslim and the decrease of the Hindu percentage, and the intentionality behind this Muslim demographic offensive.
5. Hindu response to the demographic challenge
5.1. Some panicky solutions
This leaves enough time to do something, assuming that "doing something" is in principle possible and desirable. So, what are the options? React to this demographic aggression with a Hindu demographic counter-offensive, as suggested by the Puri Shankaracharya, birth control should be made compulsory for all, e.g. by enforcing vasectomy on every father of two children
alternative routinely imputed to the RSS is the expulsion of all Indian Muslims to Pakistan, "the state which was, after all, created for them". This kind of statement can be heard in speeches by the more extreme wing of the Hindutva organization, e.g. in the popular audio-taped speeches by Sadhvi Ritambhara propagating this position, including the slogan: "Mussalman ke do hi sthan, Pakistan ya qabrastan", "There are only two places for Muslims, Pakistan or the graveyard".
At that time, the evacuation of Muslims from India was, coupled with an ordered evacuation of Hindus from Pakistan, an entirely serious proposal: all Hindus would vacate Pakistan, and all Muslims would go to Pakistan, leaving only their buried ancestors behind in graveyards in India. The proposal was formulated by Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar in his Thoughts on Pakistan (1940), and meant to save millions of lives (including those yet to be lost in future clashes resulting from Hindu-Muslim co-existence in the respective countries of the subcontinent, esp. India). Today, however, it could only be done by means of extreme violence, comparable in intensity to (but a hundred times larger than) the full-scale civil war which led to the expulsion of the French inhabitants of Algeria in 1962.
A few years ago, Anwar Shaikh, a convert from Islam, offered a political solution (which he later retracted): "There is only one solution to this horrendous problem, that is, disenfranchise all Muslims of India. A vote is the right of a patriotic citizen who thinks good of his country and acts accordingly. These people lost their Indian citizenship by dividing their own motherland to create Pakistan."[4] Apart from the questionable desirability of such a disenfranchisement, it is obviously a recipe for civil war, for how long would an ever-larger Muslim community tolerate it?
Perhaps Baljit Rai is thinking along the same lines when he offers the undefined concept Hindu Rashtra as a solution: "Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Buddhists and others (Muslims excluded) living in India have no option but to live either in a Hindu Rashtra or Muslim India, i.e. India as Dar-ul-Islam. That is the stark reality."
Islamic immigration and Christian proselytization, which are fast destroying the Hindu character of the country.
Hindus have advocated the reintroduction of polygamy, e.g. one Ashok Vashisht in Britain pleads for adoption of polygamy to counter the effects of Muslim polygamy.[6] His argument is that Muslim polygamy, even if it does not yield a higher birth rate by itself, is nevertheless a decisive trump card in the Muslim demographic offensive, because it limits the availability of women for other Muslim men and thereby forces them to scout around for non-Muslim women
5.2. Reconversion
5.3. A secular afterthought
Appendix (1998, but not included in the book The Demographic Siege):
Using Kafir women in the service of Muslim demography
One of the most painful aspects of Muslim demographic warfare is the open attempt by Muslims to grab non-Muslim girls to use them for their own demographic ambitions, meanwhile also inflicting a good dose of humiliation on the accursed kafirs. In Bangladesh and in Muslim-major�ity areas inside India, this often takes the form of simply kidnapping girls, or of threatening their families to marry them out to Muslims. In the open market-place of the West and of westernized circles in India, it takes the form of normal courtship, with the limitation that in case of a Muslim girl befriending a non-Muslim, family pressure is used on her, or physical threats on him or on both, to stop the affair; since the same is much less likely to happen in the reverse case, the net result is a considerable traffic of non-Muslim girls into Muslim households.
For example, after summing up some discriminations imposed by the Muslim state and district authorities on the Buddhists of Kargil (in Jammu & Kashmir), representatives of the Ladakh Buddhist Association compla�in: "As if this is not enough, there is a deliberate and organised design to convert Kargil's Buddhists to Islam. In the last four years, about 50 girls and married women with children were allured and con�verted from village Wakha alone. If this continues unchecked, we fear that Buddhists will be wiped out from Kargil in the next two decades or so. Anyone objecting to such allurement and conversions is harassed."
In late 1995, "the Chalvey Muslim boys" in the Chalvey area of Slough (between London and Oxford), circulated a "notice" in and around the Slough & Eton Secondary School, informing the public that: "We Muslims don't want Kafirs such as Sikh and Hindu children to mix with our children, specially our girls. Two years ago a Sikh boy was friendly with a Muslim girl and we made his life so difficult that he committed suicide. If your children come to this school, we will bully your boys the way we did to the boy who committed suicide, and we will make your daughter pregnant and change them into Islam. We mean what we are saying, and if you ignore it you will be very sorry."
A piece of practical advice to conclude with: before you start teaching Muslims, teach your own community first. Your daughter will think twice about becoming the breeding cow of a Muslim family if she is properly informed about Islam. And to get a proper perspective on Islam, she should first know what mighty heritage she is carrying, what treasure she would throw to the wind if she were to drop her native tradition in favour of Islam.
Select Quotes: Book was written in 1998 by Koenraad Elst of Belgium
1. Visions of a demographic doomsday
1.1. Hindus, the dying race
Demography can change the cultural orientation of a country or region by making an originally small group numerically dominant. Thus, demographic success was a decisive factor in the Christian takeover of the Roman Empire: in the first three centuries, Christian numbers grew by 40% per year, due to conversion and to the rejection of birth control (whether primitive contraception, abortion or infanticide).[1] Demographic shifts can lead to violence: in Lebanon, the tilt of the demographic balance in favour of the Muslims, leading to demands of a redistribution of political power shared with the Christians, was one of the causes of the civil war. Hindus ought to know, for they themselves have also done it once: "After years of immigration by ethnic Nepalis, [Sikkim] lost its sovereignty when a Nepali majority chose to be part of India."[2] Finally, a certain demography can lead to selfannihilation: many members of India's Parsi community have resigned to the perspective that their community will soon disappear due to a suicidal demographic selfforgetfulness.[3]
1.2. Ominous census figures
Swami Shraddhananda quotes from the 1911 Census Report (para 172 ff.) to show the reasons why the Muslim population is growing faster than the Hindu population, whose percentage of the total population is steadily declining. The Census Director had written: "The number of Muhammadans has risen during the decade [190111] by 6.7 per cent as compared with only 5 p.c. in the case of Hindus. There is a small but continuous accession of converts from Hinduism and other religions, but the main reason for the relatively more rapid growth of the followers of the Prophet is that they are more prolific."[5] Follow a number of social customs which encourage the Muslim birth rate, e.g. fewer marriage restrictions and common remarriage of widows, and the Muslim insistence that the children of mixed marriages be brought up as Muslims.
This pessimistic prognosis of the numerical HinduMuslim proportion defines the problem to which Swami Shraddhananda (who knew Mukherji personally) tried to offer a solution. One of Mukherji's concluding sentences, "They count their gains, we calculate our losses”
For the Hindu the slogan is: We are two, and we have two. The slogan for a Moslem is: We are five and we have twentyfive.
The following table shows the percentage of Hindus and Muslims in British India in every successive census since 1881:
yr. 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941
H. 75.09 74.24 72.87 71.68 70.73 70.67 69.46
M. 19.97 20.41 21.88 22.39 23.23 23.49 24.28
The Muslim percentage has not only increased, but the rate of increase itself has increased. This is very clear when we take a longterm perspective: in the fifty years between 1941 and 1991, their percentage has risen 5.64% (from 24.28% to 29.92%), substantially more than the 4.31% gain in the sixty years between 1881 and 1941. At this rate, the Muslims in the Subcontinent must have passed the 30% mark in the mid1990s and will pass the milestone of becoming more than half the number of Hindus (ca. 32% to ca. 64%) before the census of 2011.
Religious differential in the use of birth control since the 1960s is having a bigger impact than hitherto assumed.
It gets even more dramatic when you look at it this way: in 1984, a generation of Muslims which was about 12% of the population had produced a generation of children, certainly not more than 30 years younger on average, which constituted more than 16%. This would mean an unprecedented growth rate of more than 4% in less than 30 years, or rather, a growth with over a third of the original percentage (4 to 12). For a little thought experiment: if this differential growth rate is kept constant, we get 16.81% of Muslims in ca. 2014, over 22% in 2044, nearly 30% in 2074, 40% in 2104, crossing 50% in ca. 2125 etc., all without counting the effect of Muslim immigration.
1.7. The Subcontinental context
The subcontinental total shows a faster growth of the Muslim percentage than the official figures for the Indian republic, and should be considered the more important indicator for the long‑term evolution, given the increasing spill‑over of population surplus from Pakistan and especially Bangladesh. Apart from the millions of Bangladeshis staying illegally in India, there is also an increasing number of Pakistanis overstaying their visas or otherwise settling in India
In Pakistan and Bangladesh, the Muslim percentage has continually increased, partly by pestering the nonMuslims out, partly by conversions under pressure (pressurizing people to marry their daughters off to Muslims, allocating jobs on conditon of conversion, etc.), and partly by higher birthrates.
Incidentally, in Nepal the breakthrough of Islam (nearly nonexistent in the 1970s) is simply spectacular, and is again due in large measure to immigration from Bangladesh. In Sri Lanka, the Muslim percentage is slowly rising by demographics alone.
So, every decade the Muslim percentage in the Subcontinent increases by more than 1%, with the rate of increase itself increasing. In India, the rate of increase in the Muslim percentage is considerable, though lower than the subcontinental total, but is rising faster due to the differential in the use of birth control and the increasing Muslim immigration. In Hindutva circles, this remarkable demographic differential is interpreted as the result of Muslim "demographic aggression"
2. Immigration from Bangladesh
2.1. The uses of migration
In the demographic competition, simple procreation is not the only factor. There are cases where Muslims are in a minority and use migration to remedy their minority condition. This does not, of course, mean that all Muslims involved in such migration are conscious soldiers in a demographic offensive ("infiltrators"), but an element of planning may nonetheless be involved, or may arise in certain activist circles once the political potential of an ongoing migration process becomes apparent.
The Islamic calendar starts with a momentous migration, that of Mohammed and his followers from Mecca to Medina. The result of this immigration from the Medinese viewpoint was that the city lost its autonomy to Mohammed, who became its dictator and expelled or killed sections of its population.
"Between 1971 and 1981, Bangladesh census records show a reduction of 39 lakhs in the minority population.
"Between 1981-89, 36 lakh religious minorities were missing from that country.
2.3. An estimate of the numbers
"In 1972, there were 7.5 lakh Bihari Muslims in the camps in Dacca. As a result of mediation by Saudi Arabia only 33,000 of them were accepted by Pakistan.[5] At present, there are less than two lakhs in the camps, where have the rest gone?
The Hindu population in East Bengal had declined from 33% in 1901 to 28% in 1941. It fell to 22% by 1951 due to the Partition and the post-Partition exodus, and to 18.5% in 1961. By 1971, it had fallen to 13.5%, partly due to the 1971 massacre by the Pakistani Army, partly due to intermittent waves of emigration. The 1981 figure was 12.1%
3. The Muslim birth rate
3.1. Muslim fertility
It is safe to predict that the 2001 census will show another sharp increase in the rate at which Muslims are demographically catching up with the Hindu majority. It is then that the full effect of the birth control campaigns of the 1960s and 70s will become visible. Given the higher Hindu participation in the birth control effort of the 1960s and 70s, we must now be witnessing a cumulative effect, of a proportionately smaller number of Hindu mothers (born in that period) having in their turn each a smaller number of children than the proportionately larger number of Muslim mothers, on average.
3.2. The economic explanation
This is the old Marxist clich�: reduce everything to economic factors. among Kerala Muslims, who have a high level of education and a relatively high standard of living. Kerala Muslims have a higher birth-rate than the national Hindu average and even than the Hindu average in poor and backward states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan: the population growth (+28.74% for 1981-91) in the Muslim-majority district of Malappuram (with female literacy at 75.22%, far higher than among Hindus in the Hindi belt) is more than twice as high as the average for Kerala (+13.98), and well above the Hindu national average (+23.50).[5]
A secularist journalist confirms: "In spite of this 'near total literacy' the population growth rate of Muslims who constitute one-fourth of Kerala's population is as high as 2.3 per cent per year, which is more than even the national PGR [= population growth rate] of 2.11 per annum and is almost double the PGR of Hindus in Kerala itself."[6]
The figures for Kerala exemplify a general rule: at any given level of literacy and economic status, Muslims will have a markedly higher birth rate than their Hindu counterparts, even to the extent of having a higher birth rate than Hindus in a lower educational or income bracket. A secularist journalist, Pranay Gupta, estimates that in Hyderabad, which has a large Muslim middle-class, a typical Muslim family has eight children while a Hindu family has four
3.3. The literacy factor
Ever since the propagation of birth control among the Hindu masses, rich and literate Muslims have more children than poor and illiterate Hindus -- the religious determinant overrules the economic determinant. This comes out clearly when we compare with the admittedly high growth rate for the Scheduled Castes: "The high growth rate of Muslims, due to poverty, illiteracy etc., is comparable to the growth rate of Scheduled Castes", writes Ashish Bose; but he himself gives the SC growth rate as 31% for the decade 1981-91 against the Muslim growth rate of 32.8%.[8] True, some Muslims fall in the same low-income category as the SCs; but taking into account the Muslim middle-class, some old landed gentry and a lot of guest workers in the Gulf states, the average Muslim income is considerably higher than the average SC income.
3.4. The Muslim growth rate worldwide
3.5. Islamic government policies
4. Islam and birth control
4.1. Islam condoning birth control
So, the Prophet condoned hostage-taking and rape.[8] Nonetheless, these two instances of clumsy apologetics do confirm that Islam approves of birth control.
4.2. Islam prohibiting birth control
Hence the Prophet's prohibition, at least on one occasion, of knowingly marrying a sterile woman; his prohibition of non-vaginal intercourse (another primitive form of birth control); and his strict prohibition of sterilization and of voluntary celibacy.
4.3. Islamic natalism
K.S. Lal quotes Mohammed as saying in so many words: "Marry women who will love their husbands and be very prolific, for I want you to be more numerous than any other people".[14] Ram Swarup quotes the Prophet as saying: "In my Ummah, he is the best who has the largest number of wives."[15] Even a secular Muslim candidly calls it "one of the fundamental tenets of Islam -- namely, to multiply the tribe."[16]
4.4. The Rabita's natalism
The natalist and anti-contraceptive line is even defended by the world's most powerful Islamic organization, the Rabita al-Alam al-Islamiyya (World Islamic League). At the UN Conference on Population in Cairo 1994, a number of Muslim countries joined hands with the Vatican in opposing contraceptives and abortion.
While some Muslims favour a realistic population policy, it is undeniable that others approach the matter in terms of demographic warfare.
4.5. Why Muslim natalism?
4.6. So, who was right?
The Hindu revivalists are essentially right about the ongoing substantial increase in the Muslim percentage of the Indian population. A realistic extrapolation into the future of present demographic (including migratory) trends does predict a Muslim majority in the Subcontinent well before the end of the 21st century, and a Muslim majority in the Indian Union sometime later, but in some regions much earlier. The demographic differential is not of such a magnitude that Muslims will soon outnumber Hindus in the whole of India; but it is large enough to create Muslim‑majority areas in strategic corners of the country, "two, three, many Kashmirs!"
Hindu revivalists who argue that Muslim have a higher birth rate, that their percentage is growing fast, and that this is the result of an intentional policy on the part of at least a section of the Muslim leadership, are right. It is not just that they "have a point" or that they "deserve a hearing", no: they are nothing less than right.
And why stop our conclusion with finding the Hindu position right? The data just surveyed also teach us something about the secularists who have ridiculed and thoroughly blackened the said Hindu position: they are wrong. We have not used any esoteric figures inaccessible to the common man; all these data were at the disposal of the secularists. Yet, some of them insist that the Muslim percentage will remain constant, or that the Muslim increase is proportionate to relative Muslim poverty. The fact deserves to be noted: a whole class of leading intellectuals brutally denies easily verifiable facts, i.c. the accelerating increase of the Muslim and the decrease of the Hindu percentage, and the intentionality behind this Muslim demographic offensive.
5. Hindu response to the demographic challenge
5.1. Some panicky solutions
This leaves enough time to do something, assuming that "doing something" is in principle possible and desirable. So, what are the options? React to this demographic aggression with a Hindu demographic counter-offensive, as suggested by the Puri Shankaracharya, birth control should be made compulsory for all, e.g. by enforcing vasectomy on every father of two children
alternative routinely imputed to the RSS is the expulsion of all Indian Muslims to Pakistan, "the state which was, after all, created for them". This kind of statement can be heard in speeches by the more extreme wing of the Hindutva organization, e.g. in the popular audio-taped speeches by Sadhvi Ritambhara propagating this position, including the slogan: "Mussalman ke do hi sthan, Pakistan ya qabrastan", "There are only two places for Muslims, Pakistan or the graveyard".
At that time, the evacuation of Muslims from India was, coupled with an ordered evacuation of Hindus from Pakistan, an entirely serious proposal: all Hindus would vacate Pakistan, and all Muslims would go to Pakistan, leaving only their buried ancestors behind in graveyards in India. The proposal was formulated by Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar in his Thoughts on Pakistan (1940), and meant to save millions of lives (including those yet to be lost in future clashes resulting from Hindu-Muslim co-existence in the respective countries of the subcontinent, esp. India). Today, however, it could only be done by means of extreme violence, comparable in intensity to (but a hundred times larger than) the full-scale civil war which led to the expulsion of the French inhabitants of Algeria in 1962.
A few years ago, Anwar Shaikh, a convert from Islam, offered a political solution (which he later retracted): "There is only one solution to this horrendous problem, that is, disenfranchise all Muslims of India. A vote is the right of a patriotic citizen who thinks good of his country and acts accordingly. These people lost their Indian citizenship by dividing their own motherland to create Pakistan."[4] Apart from the questionable desirability of such a disenfranchisement, it is obviously a recipe for civil war, for how long would an ever-larger Muslim community tolerate it?
Perhaps Baljit Rai is thinking along the same lines when he offers the undefined concept Hindu Rashtra as a solution: "Hindus, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis, Buddhists and others (Muslims excluded) living in India have no option but to live either in a Hindu Rashtra or Muslim India, i.e. India as Dar-ul-Islam. That is the stark reality."
Islamic immigration and Christian proselytization, which are fast destroying the Hindu character of the country.
Hindus have advocated the reintroduction of polygamy, e.g. one Ashok Vashisht in Britain pleads for adoption of polygamy to counter the effects of Muslim polygamy.[6] His argument is that Muslim polygamy, even if it does not yield a higher birth rate by itself, is nevertheless a decisive trump card in the Muslim demographic offensive, because it limits the availability of women for other Muslim men and thereby forces them to scout around for non-Muslim women
5.2. Reconversion
5.3. A secular afterthought
Appendix (1998, but not included in the book The Demographic Siege):
Using Kafir women in the service of Muslim demography
One of the most painful aspects of Muslim demographic warfare is the open attempt by Muslims to grab non-Muslim girls to use them for their own demographic ambitions, meanwhile also inflicting a good dose of humiliation on the accursed kafirs. In Bangladesh and in Muslim-major�ity areas inside India, this often takes the form of simply kidnapping girls, or of threatening their families to marry them out to Muslims. In the open market-place of the West and of westernized circles in India, it takes the form of normal courtship, with the limitation that in case of a Muslim girl befriending a non-Muslim, family pressure is used on her, or physical threats on him or on both, to stop the affair; since the same is much less likely to happen in the reverse case, the net result is a considerable traffic of non-Muslim girls into Muslim households.
For example, after summing up some discriminations imposed by the Muslim state and district authorities on the Buddhists of Kargil (in Jammu & Kashmir), representatives of the Ladakh Buddhist Association compla�in: "As if this is not enough, there is a deliberate and organised design to convert Kargil's Buddhists to Islam. In the last four years, about 50 girls and married women with children were allured and con�verted from village Wakha alone. If this continues unchecked, we fear that Buddhists will be wiped out from Kargil in the next two decades or so. Anyone objecting to such allurement and conversions is harassed."
In late 1995, "the Chalvey Muslim boys" in the Chalvey area of Slough (between London and Oxford), circulated a "notice" in and around the Slough & Eton Secondary School, informing the public that: "We Muslims don't want Kafirs such as Sikh and Hindu children to mix with our children, specially our girls. Two years ago a Sikh boy was friendly with a Muslim girl and we made his life so difficult that he committed suicide. If your children come to this school, we will bully your boys the way we did to the boy who committed suicide, and we will make your daughter pregnant and change them into Islam. We mean what we are saying, and if you ignore it you will be very sorry."
A piece of practical advice to conclude with: before you start teaching Muslims, teach your own community first. Your daughter will think twice about becoming the breeding cow of a Muslim family if she is properly informed about Islam. And to get a proper perspective on Islam, she should first know what mighty heritage she is carrying, what treasure she would throw to the wind if she were to drop her native tradition in favour of Islam.