Neo, if your purpose (as it seems) by the article is to insinuate that India's policy on Maoist surrenders is akin to Pakistan's policy of financial compensation to the Taliban, then it is not. Here is why:
- The INR 268.1 million transferred to militants in Kashmir and the North-east over a protracted period of 3 years was a form of financial rehabilitation intended to ensure that the militants would
completely abandon their guerrilla war and enter mainstream civilian life. This is evident in that the policy was implemented firstly in the form of a general amnesty, an immediate grant (to both extricate themselves from their precarious involvement with militancy and to serve as an incentive) and a monthly stipend (for sustenance and to give them a financial leg-up as it were).
- As opposed to this, the USD 6 million handed over by Pakistan to the Taliban was for
a mere cessation of hostilities: an 'indefinite ceasefire' -
not, as is commonly supposed, for laying down arms or disbanding... or even adopting a permanent, lasting ceasefire. The money was also handed over to the militia in: a) its
entirety, meaning that individual repatriation for relinquishing militancy is an impossibility; and b) and as a
whole, implying that there is no guarantee that such could not be used to mitigate the TTP's losses, or procure more weapons or even recruit even more insurgents to augment their depleted strength. The two policies are entirely different, their goals and methods of implementation completely divergent, and therefore the expected short and long-term results incomparable- a difference that is self-evident if one would only read the article instead of merely getting a hard-on at its title.
- In the Indian case, the transfer was also subject to a
non-return to recalcitrance,
monitored and observed closely by the relevant state enforcement agencies. Moreover, the immediate grant was locked in fixed deposits subject to a three year probation, and forfeited upon even the slightest suspicion of taking up arms against the state. In other words, the policy is both political and economic, as well as social in terms of being rehabilitative: an excellent strategy all in all since the Maoist conflict is primarily an economic and social one.
- On the other hand, the Pakistani transfer was contingent upon the declaration of an 'indefinite' ceasefire, the amount handed over in lumpsum, and furthermore (and troublingly so) not subject to any conditions of either monitoring, relinquishment or submission. If anything, the Taliban have indicated their intention to continue waging low-level insurgency against the p'stani state and target assassinations against p'stani politicians as is evident in
this post as of Feb 24th. Since then there has also been tribal violence that killed 14 in Dera Ismael Khan, yet more bomb blasts in Darra Adam Khel and Kohat, multiple rockets fired at a police outpost in Mattani, as well as an incident today involving the Taliban stopping your forces from entering Mingora by planting roadside bombs in the Balogram area....and this is not even an exhaustive account.
There is far more to this than meets the eye, unless the Pakistani government has begun a policy of unconditional and foolish prostration of itself before militants.