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July 8, 2008
India is generally estimated to have approximately 50 strategic nuclear warheads. They can be delivered by short-range ballistic missiles and by aircraft.
In 1974, India tested what it dubbed a “peaceful nuclear device.” Nearly 25 years later, India conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998. Many analysts believe that two primary factors drive India's nuclear program: the need to achieve regional balance and ongoing tensions with Pakistan. Despite never having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Indian government released a nuclear doctrine in 1999 that committed the country to a “credible minimum deterrence” and a “no-first-use” policy. In addition, it recommended that India's nuclear forces should eventually be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based forces. It further stated that India intends, through a combination of redundant systems, mobility, dispersion, and deception, to heighten the survivability of its nuclear arsenal.
India currently has two models of nuclear-capable missiles: the Prithvi and the Agni, each of which has several variants. The Prithvi I and Prithvi III missiles both have ranges of under 500 kilometers (km) and were deployed between 1995 and 2001 (the Prithvi II is not believed to have a nuclear role). The Agni I has a range of around 700 km, but in January 2004, India test fired an Agni II missile (with a range of over 2,000 km) and in 2008, the Agni III was tested with a range of at least 3,000 km. India possesses the technical ability and the resources to construct ICBMs (which require ranges on the order of 9000 km) but has so far apparently not chosen to pursue this option.
India also has several aircraft that could deliver nuclear weapons, though they may require modifications – it is unclear which, if any, can do so in their current configurations. The Mirage 2000H has reportedly been certified for delivery of nuclear gravity bombs, and some Indian Jaguars may also have a nuclear delivery role. Other candidates for nuclear missions include India’s MiG-27s and SU-30MKIs.
The naval component of India’s nuclear forces has encountered technical difficulties – while Delhi leases Russian attack submarines, they are not capable of carrying ballistic missiles. The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program has been underway since 1985, but it has encountered numerous setbacks and has yet to produce a workable underwater missile launch platform. However, comments made by Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Madhvendera Singh at the height of the 2002 Pakistan-India crisis implied the ATV itself might already be operational.
Officially, the Indian navy anticipates that its first nuclear submarine will be launched in 2009 and inducted into regular service in 2010. Additionally, the Indian navy has been developing an SLBM, the Sagarika, about which very little is known. Initially slated for completion in 2005, the program has run into setbacks and it is unknown when the missile will become operational. India is also working on another sea-launched missile, the Dhanush, which is a naval adaptation of the Prithvi II. It has also encountered trouble in development and its status is unclear. With no submarine to launch from, both these weapons use surface ships for test launches. For example, in February 2008, India successfully launched a Sagarika missile from a pontoon modified to simulate a launch from submarine.
India’s military stockpile of fissile material is estimated to contain roughly 500 kilograms (kg) of plutonium and roughly 200 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough material for around 100 and 15 simple warheads, respectively. Although India’s nuclear weapons primarily use plutonium cores, India has a robust uranium enrichment program and has tested several devices for which HEU may have been desirable. India also possesses substantial civilian stockpiles of fissile materials.
In 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement which, among other things, would allow the U.S. to share civilian nuclear technology with India in return for India’s acceptance of certain safeguards and other conditions. Despite being initially approved by Congress in 2006, the agreement is controversial in both countries. Some parties in the Indian Parliament, upon which the current government depends for a majority, oppose the deal as an unacceptable abrogation of Indian sovereignty; in the U.S. Congress there are concerns about setting a precedent for other states which, like India, have tested nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT.
While the deal would only apply to India’s civilian nuclear program, detractors contend that it would nonetheless free up Indian resources for the country’s nuclear weapons program. The deal’s future is far from clear, given the strong opposition from the Indian Communist party combined with the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. Congress, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group must all approve the deal before it can move forward.
Because India utilizes liquid fuel in its missiles, it is unlikely that it stores their components fully assembled, though some of the Prithvis have solid fuel stages and others may be completely converted to solid fuel. As is the case with Pakistan’s nuclear program, while weapon ranges are more or less known, the yield of each warhead is still unknown.
India probably keeps its nuclear delivery vehicles separate from its warheads. Further deterioration in its relationship with Pakistan could lead to changes in this policy.
Strategic Nuclear Warheads: ~50
Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: ?
Total Nuclear Warheads: ~50+?
http://www.cdi.org/program/document...from_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm
India is generally estimated to have approximately 50 strategic nuclear warheads. They can be delivered by short-range ballistic missiles and by aircraft.
In 1974, India tested what it dubbed a “peaceful nuclear device.” Nearly 25 years later, India conducted five nuclear tests in May 1998. Many analysts believe that two primary factors drive India's nuclear program: the need to achieve regional balance and ongoing tensions with Pakistan. Despite never having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Indian government released a nuclear doctrine in 1999 that committed the country to a “credible minimum deterrence” and a “no-first-use” policy. In addition, it recommended that India's nuclear forces should eventually be based on a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based forces. It further stated that India intends, through a combination of redundant systems, mobility, dispersion, and deception, to heighten the survivability of its nuclear arsenal.
India currently has two models of nuclear-capable missiles: the Prithvi and the Agni, each of which has several variants. The Prithvi I and Prithvi III missiles both have ranges of under 500 kilometers (km) and were deployed between 1995 and 2001 (the Prithvi II is not believed to have a nuclear role). The Agni I has a range of around 700 km, but in January 2004, India test fired an Agni II missile (with a range of over 2,000 km) and in 2008, the Agni III was tested with a range of at least 3,000 km. India possesses the technical ability and the resources to construct ICBMs (which require ranges on the order of 9000 km) but has so far apparently not chosen to pursue this option.
India also has several aircraft that could deliver nuclear weapons, though they may require modifications – it is unclear which, if any, can do so in their current configurations. The Mirage 2000H has reportedly been certified for delivery of nuclear gravity bombs, and some Indian Jaguars may also have a nuclear delivery role. Other candidates for nuclear missions include India’s MiG-27s and SU-30MKIs.
The naval component of India’s nuclear forces has encountered technical difficulties – while Delhi leases Russian attack submarines, they are not capable of carrying ballistic missiles. The Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) program has been underway since 1985, but it has encountered numerous setbacks and has yet to produce a workable underwater missile launch platform. However, comments made by Navy Chief of Staff Adm. Madhvendera Singh at the height of the 2002 Pakistan-India crisis implied the ATV itself might already be operational.
Officially, the Indian navy anticipates that its first nuclear submarine will be launched in 2009 and inducted into regular service in 2010. Additionally, the Indian navy has been developing an SLBM, the Sagarika, about which very little is known. Initially slated for completion in 2005, the program has run into setbacks and it is unknown when the missile will become operational. India is also working on another sea-launched missile, the Dhanush, which is a naval adaptation of the Prithvi II. It has also encountered trouble in development and its status is unclear. With no submarine to launch from, both these weapons use surface ships for test launches. For example, in February 2008, India successfully launched a Sagarika missile from a pontoon modified to simulate a launch from submarine.
India’s military stockpile of fissile material is estimated to contain roughly 500 kilograms (kg) of plutonium and roughly 200 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), enough material for around 100 and 15 simple warheads, respectively. Although India’s nuclear weapons primarily use plutonium cores, India has a robust uranium enrichment program and has tested several devices for which HEU may have been desirable. India also possesses substantial civilian stockpiles of fissile materials.
In 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reached a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement which, among other things, would allow the U.S. to share civilian nuclear technology with India in return for India’s acceptance of certain safeguards and other conditions. Despite being initially approved by Congress in 2006, the agreement is controversial in both countries. Some parties in the Indian Parliament, upon which the current government depends for a majority, oppose the deal as an unacceptable abrogation of Indian sovereignty; in the U.S. Congress there are concerns about setting a precedent for other states which, like India, have tested nuclear weapons but have not signed the NPT.
While the deal would only apply to India’s civilian nuclear program, detractors contend that it would nonetheless free up Indian resources for the country’s nuclear weapons program. The deal’s future is far from clear, given the strong opposition from the Indian Communist party combined with the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. Congress, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group must all approve the deal before it can move forward.
Because India utilizes liquid fuel in its missiles, it is unlikely that it stores their components fully assembled, though some of the Prithvis have solid fuel stages and others may be completely converted to solid fuel. As is the case with Pakistan’s nuclear program, while weapon ranges are more or less known, the yield of each warhead is still unknown.
India probably keeps its nuclear delivery vehicles separate from its warheads. Further deterioration in its relationship with Pakistan could lead to changes in this policy.
Strategic Nuclear Warheads: ~50
Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: ?
Total Nuclear Warheads: ~50+?
http://www.cdi.org/program/document...from_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm