Stinger missiles in Afghanistan

[pmaitra]

American propaganda at work again, and this video shows a fake Mil-24/35 being shot down by a Stinger. As usual, Discovery Channel either lies on your face, or is thoroughly incompetent to comment on defence matters.


See 0:45 onwards.

• Notice the landing gear. The landing gear of the Mil-24/35 always retracts when flying.
• Moreover, the Mil-24/35 as a tri-cycle landing gear. The video shows a helicopter with 4 wheels.
• The Mil-24/35 has 5 blade rotor, but the helicopter in the video has only 3 blades.

Too bad Discovery Channel, you cannot fool everyone.

 

[asianobserve]

@ LETHALFORCE

Sorry I don't know how to reply private message so I'm making it here. No, insignificant comment refers to my comment so I took it down voluntarily. I was being needlessly defensive in the comment. It did not refer to your comment.

 

[pmaitra]

Fake Propaganda in Discovery Channel

Discovery Channel peddles fake propaganda against Mil Mi-24/35 Hind in favour of Stinger.

 

[asianobserve]

I agree that it's not an Mi24. It looks like a training exercise...? It looks like a Harbin Z-6 modified to look like an Mi24 although Z-6s have 4 main rotor blades and 3 tail rotor blades located on the right side.

But Discovery Channel aside, you cannot deny that Stingers helped the Mujahideens a lot during their fight against the USSR, both in terms of shooting down air assets and psychologically.

 

[pmaitra]

I agree that it's not an Mi24. It looks like a training exercise...? It looks like a Harbin Z-6 modified to look like an Mi24 although Z-6s have 4 main rotor blades and 3 tail rotor blades located on the right side.

But Discovery Channel aside, you cannot deny that Stingers helped the Mujahideens a lot during their fight against the USSR, both in terms of shooting down air assets and psychologically.

Psychologically, yes; but what do you mean by 'a lot?' Rather subjective.

The point of my post was it was all part of the propaganda. Such propaganda also helps secure sales contracts.

That helicopter could have been an RC-helicopter with an explosive kept inside it. Never noticed any misled trail before the explosion.

 

[asianobserve]

"The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan" by Alan J. Kuperman
I shorten the post to the Stinger's impact; the beginning text details the policy decisions to provide the
missile-Hist2004

The Stinger's Impact

A number of important questions about the Stinger's use in Afghanistan have never been addressed satisfactorily. Most fundamentally, what was the Stinger's military impact? Second, what was its political impact, if any, on the Soviet decision to withdraw and on the end of the cold war, and did it match U.S. expectations? Third, was the Stinger supply program, once approved, handled responsibly by the CIA? Finally, from a longer-term perspective, what was the net impact of the Stinger decision on global security in light of the hundreds of missiles apparently still unaccounted for?

U.S. Intentions

Before assessing the Stinger's impact, it is necessary to explore precisely what the Reagan administration hoped to achieve by this watershed escalation. Former officials concur on the basic rationale—the Stinger would increase the Soviets' costs in Afghanistan, convince them it was unwinnable, and compel a decision to withdraw. In the words of Peter Rodman, deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs at the NSC, the United States intended to show the Soviets that Afghanistan was "indigestible."

However, Reagan officials differ on several important points. One is the extent to which the Stinger decision was a reaction to Gorbachev's ascension to power. According to former Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé, a scholar of war termination and author of the seminal work Every War Must End, the decision was not spurred by the presence of a new Soviet leader but rather was part of an older U.S. strategy to escalate the war gradually. Indeed, as early as 1983, President Reagan had signed NSDD 75, stating: "The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues." In 1985, NSDD 166 boosted aid for the rebels with the explicit goal of helping them compel a Soviet withdrawal. Thus, the Stinger decision of 1986 can be seen as but one step—albeit a major one—in a steady escalation of U.S. pressure against the Soviet occupation. For Iklé, Gorbachev was "just the beneficiary" of this gradually escalating policy.

According to Mort Abramowitz, however, Gorbachev was the key. The administration's assessment of the new general secretary as a moderate, not personally committed to the war, led it to conclude that escalating the war would compel withdrawal rather than counter-escalation. "If it had been another Stalin, you might have thought about it differently," he explains.

Another bone of contention is whether the Stinger escalation was informed by secret intelligence from high-placed sources in the Kremlin or public reports on Red Army tactics and the deteriorating condition of the Soviet Union. The Washington Post reported in 1992 that: "An intelligence coup in 1984 and 1985 triggered the Reagan administration's decision to escalate the covert program in Afghanistan. The United States received highly specific, sensitive information about Kremlin politics and new Soviet war plans in Afghanistan.... The Reagan administration moved in response to this intelligence to open up its high-technology arsenal to aid the Afghan rebels."

Similarly, Peter Schweizer's book Victory reports that, "In January 1985, the administration received detailed knowledge of Soviet plans to dramatically escalate the war in Afghanistan." According to an account Schweizer attributes to Robert McFarlane, President Reagan responded by telling his national security team: "Do whatever you have to to help the Mujahedin not only survive but win."

Pillsbury likewise was impressed by the "super information about KGB and General Staff decision-making" available to the administration, at least until the CIA's Aldrich Ames began exposing U.S. agents at the end of 1985. Based on the reams of unconfirmed intelligence reports that crossed his desk, as well as CIA studies, Pillsbury says he perceived a serious schism in the Kremlin. General Zaitsev, together with the General Staff and KGB, were escalating the war aggressively and distorting their reports to the Kremlin on the war's status and prospects. "I believed the information was going through several filters before reaching Gorbachev and Shevardnadze," says Pillsbury. It was this filtering, he argues, that made it necessary for U.S. officials to find a way to convey directly to Gorbachev that the United States would not permit a Red Army victory. Shooting down Soviet aircraft with American-made missiles, he says, was the perfect solution.

Many other administration officials, however, discount the influence of secret intelligence. Iklé says his support for the Stinger was prompted by the well-publicized 1985 Soviet escalation and by his assessment—based on public reports on the unhealthy state of the Soviet military and economy—that the Red Army would not respond by invading Pakistan. Abramowitz says that while the United States knew "there was a controversy" in the Kremlin about what to do in Afghanistan, he recalls the information coming from open sources rather than raw intelligence. "The highly sensitive intelligence came later," he says. Rodman reports the administration found out only subsequently about the General Staff's secret plan to win the war within two years and that "we just saw they were going for broke." Rather than secret intelligence reports, he says, the Stinger escalation was based more on "objective factors" and "changes in Gorbachev's rhetoric."

The Initial Military Impact

Without question, the Stinger had an immediate military impact. Although initial estimates may have been somewhat overblown—claiming the Stinger downed approximately one aircraft per day during the first three months of its deployment—the missile clearly represented an enormous qualitative improvement in the rebels' air-defense capability. As ISI's Yousaf details in his memoirs, previous antiaircraft technology provided to the rebels paled in comparison. The Oerlikon, for example, required "some twenty mules to transport a section of three guns... [making] the weapon more of a liability than an asset." It was especially ill-suited to Afghanistan's mountainous terrain, since "the long, heavy, cumbersome barrel had to be positioned across the animal, making it impossible to go through defiles, where it snagged on every bush." Likewise, the Blowpipe, which arrived in 1986, "was a disaster." During one engagement, thirteen of the missiles were fired at exposed enemy aircraft without a single hit—"a duck shoot in which the ducks won." The weapon was not man-portable "over any distance," says Yousaf, who cannot "recall a single confirmed kill by a Blowpipe" before he left ISI in 1987.

The Stinger was different. While the kill rate and number of targets destroyed are still disputed, the missile unquestionably shot down Soviet and especially Afghan aircraft at an unprecedented rate in its first few months of use. Selig Harrison has attempted to rebut this conclusion relying on Soviet statistics, but even if the reported statistics are accurate, his argument is flawed by several lapses. First, in attempting to prove the Stinger did not trigger an increase in downed aircraft, he counts 1986 as a pre-Stinger year because the missile was used only in its final four months. However, 1986 was the year of the missiles' greatest effectiveness, as opposing pilots had yet to adopt counter-measures. Second, he fails to grasp the significance of his own findings that while the Soviets themselves experienced no significant increase in aircraft losses, there was a sharp jump in the loss of Afghan government aircraft. Rather than indicating any Soviet imperviousness to the Stinger, as he implies, such evidence is consistent with reports the Soviets responded to the missile by abstaining from dangerous missions, shifting them to Afghan pilots. From the Mujahedin perspective, the nationality of pilots was of little consequence so long as enemy aircraft finally were being shot down.

Third, Harrison appears to conflate aircraft losses with aircraft shoot-downs, a key distinction underscored in an earlier analysis by Scott McMichael. As McMichael states: "During the first two years of the war, the great majority of Soviet aircraft losses (75-80 percent) must be attributed to non-combat causes, plus losses suffered on the ground due to raids, rocket attacks, and sabotage.... There can be no doubt at all that the Stinger turned the ratio on its head." The Stinger's effectiveness was due mainly to six technological advantages: it required little training; it was truly man-portable, weighing just 35 pounds; it was a "fire-and-forget" weapon; it was faster and had greater range than earlier SAMs; it could attack fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters from any angle, unlike the relatively primitive SA-7 and Redeye, which could focus only on a jet engine's exhaust from the rear; and once locked on target, it could not be deflected by flares.

Yousaf presents a detailed accounting of the Stinger's first ten months in service until his departure from ISI in August 1987. During this time, he claims, 187 Stingers were fired, of which 75 percent hit their target, for a total of approximately 140 downed aircraft. Such detailed statistics must be based on Mujahedin self-reporting, the reliability of which is unknown. Nevertheless, these figures are more reliable than those in an oft-cited September 1987 U.S. analysis, which estimated "the destruction of about 270 aircraft per year." That study's author, Aaron Karp, acknowledged his projections were pure conjecture based on arbitrary assumptions the Mujahedin would fire all their missiles and achieve a low kill rate of 33 percent. While these two assumptions may have seemed reasonable at the time, evidence suggests both were mistaken. Unfortunately, Karp's study has contributed to popular confusion about the Stinger's performance, as his estimates have been widely reported without indication of their lack of empirical basis.

A more rigorous U.S. Army analysis was conducted in early 1989 by a team sent to "go sit with the Mujahedin" in Pakistan for several weeks. It concludes that by war's end the rebels had scored "approximately 269 kills in about 340 engagements" with the Stinger, for a remarkable 79 percent kill ratio. Selig Harrison rejects such figures, quoting a Russian general who claims the United States "greatly exaggerated" Soviet and Afghan aircraft losses during the war. However, the findings of the U.S. study are not necessarily out of line with the Soviets' own statistics that he cites. From 1986 through 1988, the years that include all Stinger launches, Harrison reports that Soviet and Afghan forces lost a total of 310 aircraft. If one discounts for the number of aircraft shot down in 1986 prior to introduction of the Stinger in September, those lost to attrition, and those shot down with other weapons, it is not implausible that somewhere in the range of 269 were shot down with Stingers.

As for the kill ratio, it is impossible to confirm. A U.S. Army analyst involved in the study claims that "several levels of verification" were used to ensure that rebel descriptions of the engagements were consistent with each other, with the limited amount of available physical evidence, and with known characteristics of the missile system. Among factors reportedly responsible for the rebels' high success rate is that distribution of the weapons was limited to their best educated, most effective warriors, who were trained to hold fire unless a kill was extremely likely. Yousaf also cites the rebels' daring tactics, which included positioning Stinger teams at the ends of Soviet runways. Another tactic was for one team of rebels to stand vulnerably in the open, acting as bait to draw enemy aircraft into range, while a second hidden team waited to fire the missiles. By contrast, the Pakistan Army utilized more conservative tactics, necessitated in part by having to stay on its own side of the border, which led to miserable results. Yousaf reports that, to his knowledge, the army "fired twenty-eight Stingers at enemy aircraft without a single kill."

War correspondent Mark Urban, however, claims the Mujahedin Stinger kill ratios reported by the U.S. Army were grossly inflated, venturing his own alternative estimate of only 10 percent. While Urban's skeptical views have been widely cited, it is rarely noted that the primary basis for his conclusions appears to have been the anecdotes of TV journalists, who reported great difficulty in videotaping successful missile hits. In retrospect, there are several plausible reasons why journalists might have observed a lower kill ratio than occurred overall, including: taping Stinger firings on the safer, Pakistani side of the border, where the Pakistani Army reportedly had much lower kill ratios than the Mujahedin; viewing launches of missiles other than Stingers, without knowing the difference; observing Stinger firings during the war's last year or two, after Soviet adoption of counter-measures that significantly reduced the Stingers' effectiveness; and for logistical reasons, being unable to tape Mujahedin employing their most daring and dangerous—and, therefore, most successful—tactics. In sum, a host of selection effects may have distorted the sample of missile firings that TV journalists were able to view, making it unrepresentative of the total universe. In this light, it is possible that the reports of both Urban and the U.S. Army are essentially accurate—the Mujahedin achieved a high Stinger kill ratio overall, but TV journalists witnessed a low kill ratio in the firings they observed.

Soviet Counter-Measures

In response to the Stinger's immediate success, the Red Army initially restricted its pilots to less dangerous missions, shunting the rest onto Afghan flyers. The Afghans, however, soon lost their nerve as well. According to Yousaf, they would pretend to go out on missions, fire off their ammunition, return to base, and falsely report success. A former Afghan pilot confirms that he and his fellow "pilots went on strike and refused to fly in areas where Stinger missiles were present."

Fairly quickly, however, Soviet forces adopted a series of technical and tactical countermeasures that mitigated the impact of the Stinger. In the technical area, Soviet aircraft were retrofitted with improved flares, infrared beacons, and baffles on their exhausts to impede the Stingers' ability to lock on target. Aircraft also were equipped with a missile radar warning system to notify pilots of the need for evasive action.

Tactically, the Soviets had numerous responses. Fixed-wing aircraft flew at higher altitudes outside the Stinger's three-mile range, which averted the missile threat but reduced the pilots' effectiveness, earning them the derisive sobriquet "cosmonauts" from Soviet ground troops. Helicopter pilots pursued the opposite strategy, adopting low-altitude, nap-of-the-earth techniques to hide from the Stingers, which function best when hot aircraft are silhouetted against a cool, blue sky. At the lower altitude, however, helicopters became more vulnerable to small-weapons fire. Interestingly, the same tactical countermeasures had been reported as early as the first year of the war and several times thereafter in response to earlier-model SAMs. However, the Stinger's introduction apparently triggered a dramatic renewal and expansion of their use.

The Soviets also reportedly shifted many air operations to cover of darkness, as the rebels initially were not equipped with night-vision equipment. They increasingly relied on human intelligence to discover the location of Stingers, then either destroyed the missiles, purchased them, or avoided the locations entirely. Some daredevil Soviet pilots utilized a tactic that was a mirror-image of the rebels' own: flying in tandem within the Stinger's range but separated by a large distance, the first of two Soviet aircraft would make itself vulnerable in order to flush a Mujahedin Stinger team from its perch, after which the second aircraft would appear and fire on the exposed rebels. For important air support missions that could not be conducted safely in the presence of Stingers, such as facilitating insertion of special operations forces, the Soviets sometimes substituted long-range suppressive artillery fire, which was effective but required more ground forces and sacrificed the element of surprise.

Despite the army's claim that the "Stinger was the war's decisive weapon" —echoed by many others including 60 Minutes, which declared, "The Stinger is generally credited with having won the war for the Mujahedin" —the net effect of Soviet counter-measures eventually was to offset the Stinger. David Isby, an expert military analyst of the Afghan conflict, concluded in 1990 that, "although none of the Soviets' countermeasures were totally successful, the Stinger... did not succeed in forcing Soviet helicopters out of the sky." A leading French expert on Afghanistan, Olivier Roy, confirms from his experience among the rebels in late 1988 that, "by 1989, the Stinger could no longer be considered a decisive anti-aircraft weapon."

Ironically, one of the JCS's original concerns had been vindicated. The combat effectiveness of the Stingers—at least in their original configuration—was indeed compromised. The resulting impact on American security interests, however, was minimal. By war's end, U.S. Stinger technology had already advanced two generations and, more importantly, the cold war was drawing to a close.

Impact on Soviet Withdrawal

A key question is what impact, if any, the Stinger's deployment had on the power struggle between Gorbachev—already seeking withdrawal—and General Staff hardliners claiming Soviet escalation could enable military victory. As commonly reported, "the supply of high-tech American weaponry to the Mujahedin played a key factor in the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.... [T]here is evidence it helped convince the Kremlin that the war was unwinnable." Likewise, the NSC's Cannistraro says that when the Stingers arrived, the Soviets "started taking losses that were unacceptable." His NSC colleague Rodman attributes the diplomatic breakthrough in part to "the escalation of U.S. military aid to the Mujahedin, especially the furnishing of 'Stinger' antiaircraft missiles."

Former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, however, presents a contrary view: "The Stinger definitely prolonged our stay.... It made our military men, our hawks, much more determined than ever not to withdraw, not to appear to be giving in under duress." This view is shared by Georgi Arbatov, Andrey Kokoshin, and General Akhromeev, and is the main thesis of Harrison and Cordovez in Out of Afghanistan. More generally, George Kennan and Raymond Garthoff argue that the militarized version of U.S. containment strategy, including the Reagan Doctrine, prolonged the cold war as a whole. As Garthoff puts it, "Gorbachev pressed ahead... not owing to the Reagan hard line and military buildup, but despite it." According to these authors, reduced U.S. pressure would have enabled an earlier withdrawal by permitting the Soviets to save face while doing so.

Rodman rejects such revisionist assessments of the Stinger as "liberal fantasy." Abramowitz, despite being present when Shevardnadze made his comment, says, "I don't believe that for a minute." Iklé cautions that "too much face-saving might have saved the Soviet regime." He believes the humiliating defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan was integral to reducing the status and influence of hard-liners in the Kremlin. "Otherwise, we might still have the Cold War." French expert, Olivier Roy, concurs that "by undermining the prestige of both the old Brezhnevian guard and the army, [the failure in Afghanistan] gave Gorbachev more room for manoeuvre."

Implicit in all such assessments of the political impact of the Stinger decision are counter-factual claims—that is, what would have happened in its absence. These must be separated from actual facts and evaluated for plausibility. Two facts are clear. First, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he initially escalated the war. Second, had the United States not countered with NSDD 166, followed by the Stinger and other U.S. technology, the Soviets would have gained militarily against the Mujahedin. However, at least three important counter-factual questions remain: How badly damaged would the Mujahedin have been? Would this have reversed the rebels' opposition to the unfavorable negotiated settlement then on the table? How would this military progress have affected Politburo decision making? While counter-factual reasoning never is certain, answers to these questions can be found with relative confidence.

First, despite the claims of some, it is highly unlikely that the Soviet escalation of 1985-1986, if not countered by the United States, would have succeeded in eliminating the Mujahedin. Indeed, the Mujahedin had proved able to survive even in the early 1980s, when they were considerably more out-matched than they would have been in this subsequent scenario. The Soviets' fundamental problem was their unwillingness to increase troop levels, forcing them into a strategy of coercion based mainly on air power. Throughout the twentieth century, such an approach had failed to produce victory against a people on its home territory.

Second, it is extremely unlikely that even substantial Soviet military progress would have compelled the rebels to accept a negotiated settlement that left a pro-Soviet government in Kabul. As demonstrated in subsequent years, the rebels preferred to face death rather than cede power even to each other, let alone to a pro-Soviet regime.

Third, regardless of the situation in Afghanistan, Gorbachev was intent on his two-track strategy of consolidating power, by placing allies in key Communist party positions, and establishing nontraditional sources of expertise. By late 1986, therefore, he likely could have pushed his views through the Politburo despite any military gains in Afghanistan. The ultimate question, therefore, is whether Gorbachev's own preference would have changed had the 1985 Soviet escalation gone unopposed and produced military gains in Afghanistan. The key fact here is that Gorbachev's primary objective in Afghanistan was to eliminate a thorn in East-West relations that inhibited Soviet economic revitalization. The West, especially the Reagan administration, would not have dropped its insistence on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as a precondition for renewed détente, regardless of progress in the war. Thus, it is very likely that Gorbachev still would have pushed for the withdrawal deadline in late 1986, even had the Soviets made gains against the Mujahedin. Red Army hard-liners would have protested, as they did in any case, but Gorbachev had sufficient votes in the Politburo to prevail.

Although counter-intuitive and contrary to popular wisdom, it appears the U.S. counter-escalation of 1985-1986 was largely irrelevant to the Soviet withdrawal decision of November 1986. This is clearly the case for the Stinger, which was not utilized in Afghanistan until September 1986, a mere two months before the Politburo's decision to adopt a withdrawal deadline. At the key November 1986 Politburo meeting, no mention was made of the Stinger nor any other U.S. escalation. Rather, Defense Minister Akhromeev blamed Moscow for capping troop levels and Kabul for failing to coopt the opposition. Moreover, the Stinger effectively was neutralized by technical and tactical counter-measures well before the Soviets actually completed their withdrawal. Thus, there is no evidence the Stinger even hastened Soviet withdrawal. Neither is there evidence it delayed the Soviet pullout.

Had Gorbachev not decided autonomously to withdraw, it is unlikely the Stinger could have chased him out of Afghanistan. Prior to his entering office, the Red Army's strategy in Afghanistan had presumed a protracted occupation, relying only on holding key cities and garrisons as bases for attacks on population, infrastructure, and supply lines in rebel-controlled areas. These bases were never seriously threatened by the Mujahedin even after they acquired the Stinger. Previous Soviet conquests had required occupations of far greater duration. Indeed, in the mid-1980s, there was a cottage industry among U.S. Sovietologists trying to figure out which historical model the Soviets would use to absorb Afghanistan: Mongolia, Central Asia, Finland, Eastern Europe generally, or Poland specifically. In 1982, General Secretary Yuri Andropov reminded Politburo colleagues that it had required almost fifteen years to subdue Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kirgizstan. In June 1985, the United States Central Command, unaware of the changes Gorbachev was bringing to the Kremlin, concluded the Soviets could "be expected to show their historical persistence in Afghanistan, anticipating a slow, gradual domination of the country.... [where] time may be on their side." The study, citing previous Soviet triumphs over indigenous anticommunist movements, concluded that "the Afghans will likely suffer a similar fate." According to a key Pakistani official, Islamabad likewise believed Soviet "costs [in Afghanistan] were not intolerable and appeared to be on the decline."

The Stinger's Impact (Soviet-Afghan-War) [Archive] - Military Photos

 

[pmaitra]

The Afghan government made repeated requests to the Soviet government for military intervention. Brezhnev personally rebuffed 11 such requests, but agreed the 12th time. The USSR feared Islamic fundamentalism spreading to Soviet Central Asia, along with narcotics. The Afghan government feared a radical takeover by Islamists, while Pakistan wanted a strategic depth, as well as constant trouble in Afghanistan to keep tabs on Pashtun Nationalism. Had it not been for Brezhnev era economic recession in the USSR, Afghanistan would have been completely subdued and modernized.

 

[LETHALFORCE]

ASIANOW - Asiaweek


INSIDE STORY AFGHANISTAN
ON THE HUNT FOR A STINGER MISSILE

 

[hitesh]

According to a book written by former ISI in command during 1st Afgan war in a book

ISI/Mujhaidains were first provided with British blowpipe SAM which failed miserably alter on Stinger was provided which was a new system in america too pakistan army instructors were provided with basic training in america which in turn trained Afgan warlords in pakistan & afganistan training camps .Money was funded by Saudies & Amaricans Logistics were handled by pak army & ISI

 

[Neeraj Mathur]

hey guys

what kind of EW pod can jam Stinger?

 

[JBH22]

hey guys

what kind of EW pod can jam Stinger?

Stinger fires heat seeking missile which essentially locks on helicopters based on heat signature. So reducing the heat signature helped the Soviets.

They adopted the following tactics:
1. Nap of the earth flying (low flying but making the helicopter vulnerable to HMG fire)
http://www.ausairpower.net/SP/DT-Helo-Survivability-June-2009.pdf
2. Installed Heat Dissipaters [See boxes just below rotor blades)

3. Also installed chaff and flares dispensers on all choppers to confuse heat seeking missiles

Refer to video gives better insight on the tactics used by designers of MI-24 in A-stan. (as from 11.00 it gives details on the same)

 

[LETHALFORCE]

http://www.fool.com/investing/gener...r-missiles-deter-russian-aggression-agai.aspx

Can stinger missiles deter Russian aggression again?

 

[Bornubus]

Soviet captured 100s of Stingers apart from rare M 16 and Mp 5 from mujahedeen.


Meanwhile Paki Stinger captured by Indian troops - Kargil War

 

[Bornubus]

On some related note TTP and Baloch separatists should be provided with IGLA to shot down Paki Mi 8 and Cobra etc

 

[curryman]

On some related note TTP and Baloch separatists should be provided with IGLA to shot down Paki Mi 8 and Cobra etc

You want to give TTP portable SAMs? Not a good idea. You don't know where those things will end up. You want to be used against Pakistan, but may end up being used against you.

Besides, TTP is no friend of India. They hate Hindus, too. It's just that they hate takfiris more.

 

[Bornubus]

You want to give TTP portable SAMs? Not a good idea. You don't know where those things will end up. You want to be used against Pakistan, but may end up being used against you.

Besides, TTP is no friend of India. They hate Hindus, too. It's just that they hate takfiris more.

I am not saying India should give it, i am a civilian what do i know if they are our friend or foe.

Our govt "official" stand is that they are terrorists.


On a side note Indian Army captured Paki "Anza" mk 1 in 2002 ~ from Kashmiri terrorist - google the news.

Their Anza was found in Libya only proof Pak is a rogue terrorist state.


If they can arm terrorist against our Army we should do the same.

 

[Bornubus]

One more paki stinger captured by Gurka - Kargil war