Solution of Afganistan quagmire!!!

[Neil]

Airdrops break records in Afghanistan"

SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, Ill. - When your unit is surrounded by an enemy
hitting you with small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades, and
mortar rounds are screaming in and you're running low on food, ammo and
everything else, you can't exactly send someone to Wal-Mart for
supplies.

That's when you pray for an airdrop. Now.

"Sometimes these missions are like driving an 18-wheeler through a 5
o'clock traffic jam while trying to ask for directions with a cell phone
that isn't getting any reception," said Air Force Capt. Scott
Huffstetler, an airdrop mission planner with the 8th Airlift Squadron in
Afghanistan. "Eventually, you just muscle your way through and get the
job done.

"The airspace in [Afghanistan] can be incredibly busy, and often times
the terrain makes radio reception poor," Huffstetler added. "Last night,
my crew and I flew a mission into an area of the country where the air
traffic congestion could rival Frankfurt, Atlanta or Chicago."

Huffstetler said communication and coordination had to be accomplished
during that mission by talking with many different air traffic control
areas, none of which could hear the other.

"One of the biggest challenges that we face during the airdrop missions
is coordinating clearance into the different airspaces within the
country," Huffstetler said. "With about 10 minutes until the drop, we
had four different radios which were actively being used to accomplish
this. With dozens of aircraft flying a wide variety of missions, and all
of them needing access to the same airspace at the same time, things can
get complicated quickly.

"In short," he continued, "with three pilots talking on four radios,
some of which were less than 'loud and clear,' and driving 20 minutes
out of our way in order to avoid traffic and blocked airspace, we
successfully got the drop off and delivered the goods to the user. All
of this being at night and on [night-vision goggles]."

In spite of communication glitches and other problems encountered on
these missions, during a recent 12-week period, about 500 bundles were
dropped per week, which amounts to 450 tons dropped each week.

For comparison, during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, 482 tons
of supplies were dropped in a two-day period in December 1944. In
Vietnam, during the battle of Khe Sahn, 294 tons were dropped in a
77-day period.

Air Force Col. Keith Boone, recently reassigned after serving as
director of the Air Mobility Division at the Combined Air and Space
Operations Center in Southwest Asia, managed airdrops since his arrival
in Afghanistan last year. He's been chosen to be vice commander of the
621st Contingency Response Wing at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst,
N.J.

April set a record for monthly bundles dropped, with more than 2,700
delivered, Boone said, with April 7 setting a single-day record of 200
bundles, equaling 160 tons.

"We have been steadily increasing since sustainment airdrop operations
began in 2005," he said. "Undoubtedly, this is the longest aerial
delivery sustainment in the history of military operations. With the
exception of about five days, we have had at least one drop every day
since I have been here, and I suspect that is true for the past two
years."

Methods of delivering supplies to troops in the field have improved
dramatically since the early airdrops of World War II were conducted by
pushing small crates with parachutes out of the aircraft's side cargo
doors.

"Lots of great innovations [are] happening in theater," said Air Force
Brig. Gen. Barbara Faulkenberry, recently reassigned after serving as
director of mobility forces and commander of Air Mobility Command's 15th
Expeditionary Mobility Task Force. "The end result is we're providing
what the warfighter needs, when he needs it, and where he needs it."
Faulkenberry has been selected to be deputy chief of logistics for U.S.
Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany.

Among those innovations are the Joint Precision Airdrop System, the
Improved Container Delivery System and the most recent development, the
C-130 "low-cost low-altitude" combat airdrop to resupply soldiers at a
forward operating base.

JPADS uses GPS, steerable parachutes and an onboard computer to steer
loads to a designated point on a drop zone. It integrates the Army's
Precision and Extended Glide Airdrop System and the Air Force's
Precision Airdrop System program. ICDS allows for improved precision by
factoring in the altitude, wind speed, wind direction, terrain and other
circumstances that might affect the drop. A low-cost, low-altitude
airdrop is accomplished by dropping bundles weighing 80 to 500 pounds,
with pre-packed expendable parachutes, in groups of up to four bundles
per pass.

"The LCLA drops will meet the needs of a smaller subset of the units,"
Boone said. "This is a significant step forward in our ability to
sustain those engaged in counterinsurgency operations throughout
Afghanistan.

"Our main method of supply will continue to be through air-land missions
- landing at airfields and offloading supplies," Boone continued. "Where
that isn't possible, we will deliver sustainment requirements through
larger-scale [Container Delivery System airdrops] - everything from
ammunition to meals."

These resupply missions are coordinated by U.S. Transportation Command
with its component commands: the Army's Military Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command, the Air Force's Air Mobility Command and the
Navy's Military Sealift Command.

Air Force Gen. Duncan J. McNabb, TRANSCOM commander, recently flew on
one of the airdrop resupply missions in Afghanistan.

"The work these airmen do every day is saving lives," McNabb said. "I am
amazed by our airmen -- no matter the size of the challenges they face,
they find solutions and get the job done. These airdrop missions are a
terrific example of how our phenomenal people in the field will always
deliver to the warfighter."

U.S. Central Command Combined Air and Space Operations Center officials
said 97 percent of the airdrops have been on target.

"Tactical airlift has never been so responsive, so agile in our
[tactics, techniques and procedures], and critical in a fight,"
Faulkenberry said. "Airdrop is enabling the small, dispersed
[counterinsurgency] unit to engage and operate. This April, we dropped
4,860,000 pounds to ground forces who needed the food, fuel, or ammo. It
is taking air-ground teamwork to succeed, and together, we're making our
history."

http://www.transcom.mil/pa/body.cfm?relnumber=100713-1

 

[Neil]

Afghanistan aid spending boost expected to be announced

UK spending on Afghanistan aid projects is set to rise by 40% in efforts to hasten the withdrawal of troops from the country.

International Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell is to say securing progress there is his top priority.

The government has already committed £500m on projects in Afghanistan over the next five years.

Meanwhile, Defence Secretary Liam Fox has restated a target of removing combat forces from the country by 2014.

The £7.3bn international development budget is one of only two Whitehall budgets - along with health - set to be protected from far-reaching spending cuts being imposed by the Treasury.

Britain currently gives aid to about 90 countries, but Mr Mitchell has already said that after an ongoing review some countries, such as China and Russia, will no longer receive it.

He told the Politics Show on Sunday that India was "roaring out of poverty" and would be looked at very closely.
'Well-spent aid'

It is believed the money for Afghanistan would be used to stabilise the most insecure areas, with more policing, emergency food and medicine, and thousands of job and training opportunities.

Mr Mitchell also wants to boost education, with an aim of getting six million children into school within two years.

He told the Politics Show the government had been looking "very carefully" at the way money was being spent in Afghanistan.

"We've found some additional funding from less good programmes, so in principle we have an additional 40% money going into the development budget," he said.

On Monday, Mr Mitchell will give a speech saying that aid is an essential part of efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan.

The minister is expected to say that "well-spent aid" is in the UK's interest because it promotes political progress and supports the military's work to bring security and peace to the country.

"The UK is there to prevent the Afghan territory from again being used by al-Qaeda as a base from which to plan attacks on the UK and our allies," he will say.

"While the military bring much-needed security, peace will only be achieved by political progress backed by development.

"I am determined to back up the efforts of our armed forces as we work towards a withdrawal of combat troops."

Shadow International Development Secretary Douglas Alexander called on the minister to clarify exactly how the aid money would be spent.

He said: "Thanks to the efforts of the last government, the UK was already the second-largest donor to Afghanistan and Helmand is already amongst the most heavily aided regions on earth.

"The primary challenge in those areas affected by the insurgency has not been a lack of money but a lack of security.

"At a time when there remain serious questions about corruption across Afghanistan, Andrew Mitchell must explain more clearly than he has to date how this cash will be spent effectively to secure the outcomes he seeks."
'Conditions-based transition'

Meanwhile, it has been reported that Afghan President Hamid Karzai will use a forthcoming international conference to publish a blueprint for the withdrawal of international troops by 2014.

Leaked documents show a timetable for a "conditions-based and phased transition" to Afghan forces taking control of military operations, starting within months, the Independent on Sunday said.

Last month Prime Minister David Cameron said he wanted troops home by the time of the next general election - set to be in May 2015.

Defence Secretary Dr Liam Fox refused to comment on the Independent on Sunday's report during an interview on the Andrew Marr Show.

However, he said 2014 was the existing target date in the military strategy for the handover of security control to Afghan forces.

"It has always been our aim to be successful in the mission, and the mission has always said that the Afghan national security forces would be able to deal with their own security by 2014," he said.

But he said only combat troops would be expected to be withdrawn at that time, with a continued presence likely for training.

Mr Cameron's aim of 2015 was "quite conservative by comparison", he said.

British and US forces moved into Afghanistan following the 11 September attacks.

It was widely believed that the al-Qaeda-inspired attacks were masterminded inside Afghanistan, which was then governed by the fundamentalist Taliban.

The UK death toll since operations began in 2001 now stands at 322, with four British serviceman dying since Friday.

Meanwhile, at least three people were killed on Sunday by a suicide bomber in the Afghan capital Kabul.

The bombing came despite heightened security across Kabul ahead of the international conference of foreign ministers on Tuesday.

Foreign Secretary William Hague, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon are among those scheduled to attend.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10675583

 

[ajtr]

We're Not Winning. It's Not Worth It.
Here's how to draw down in Afghanistan.​

Justin Sullivan / Getty Images
A U.S. soldier in Jeluwar, Afghanistan
GOP chairman Michael Steele was blasted by fellow Republicans recently for describing Afghanistan as "a war of Obama's choosing," and suggesting that the United States would fail there as had many other outside powers. Some critics berated Steele for his pessimism, others for getting his facts wrong, given that President George W. Bush ordered the invasion of Afghanistan soon after 9/11. But Steele's critics are the ones who are wrong: the RNC chair was more correct than not on the substance of his statement, if not the politics.
The war being waged by the United States in Afghanistan today is fundamentally different and more ambitious than anything carried out by the Bush administration. Afghanistan is very much Barack Obama's war of choice, a point that the president underscored recently by picking Gen. David Petraeus to lead an intensified counterinsurgency effort there. After nearly nine years of war, however, continued or increased U.S. involvement in Afghanistan isn't likely to yield lasting improvements that would be commensurate in any way with the investment of American blood and treasure. It is time to scale down our ambitions there and both reduce and redirect what we do.

Tim A Hetherington
View a gallery of the war in Afghanistan's Korengal Valley
At Outpost Restrepo
The first thing we need to recognize is that fighting this kind of war is in fact a choice, not a necessity. The United States went to war in October 2001 to oust the Taliban government, which had allowed Al Qaeda to operate freely out of Afghanistan and mount the 9/11 attacks. The Taliban were routed; members of Al Qaeda were captured or killed, or escaped to Pakistan. But that was a very different war, a necessary one carried out in self-defense. It was essential that Afghanistan not continue to be a sanctuary for terrorists who could again attack the American homeland or U.S. interests around the world.
The Bush administration was less clear on what to do next. Working in the State Department at the time, I was appointed by President Bush as the U.S. government's coordinator for the future of Afghanistan. At a National Security Council meeting chaired by the president in October 2001, I was the one arguing that once the Taliban were removed from power there might be a short-lived opportunity to help establish a weak but functional Afghan state. There and at subsequent meetings I pressed for a U.S. military presence of some 25,000–30,000 troops (matched by an equal number from NATO countries) to be part of an international force that would help maintain order after the invasion and train Afghans until they could protect themselves.

My colleagues in the Bush administration had no interest in my proposal. The consensus was that little could be accomplished in Afghanistan given its history, culture, and composition, and that there would be little payoff beyond Afghanistan even if things there went better than expected. They had no appetite for on-the-ground nation building. The contrast with subsequent policy toward Iraq, where officials were prepared to do a great deal because they hoped to create a potential model for change throughout the Middle East, could hardly be more stark.
As a result, the United States decided not to follow up its ouster of the Taliban with anything ambitious. U.S. troop levels did top out at about 30,000, but most of those just hunted the handful of Al Qaeda who remained. The United States never joined the international force sent to stabilize Afghanistan and in fact limited its size and role.
By the time Obama became president in 2009, the situation inside Afghanistan was fast deteriorating. The Taliban were regaining a foothold. There was concern in Washington that if left unchecked they could soon threaten the existence of the elected government in Kabul headed by Hamid Karzai. Trends were judged to be so bad that the president ordered 17,000 more American combat troops to Afghanistan even before the first review he'd ordered up was finished.

Since then Obama has had several opportunities to reassess U.S. goals and interests in Afghanistan, and in each instance he has chosen to escalate. Upon completion of that first review in March 2009, he declared that the U.S. mission would henceforth be "to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future." But in reality the U.S. objective went beyond taking on Al Qaeda; the president announced in those same remarks that the additional U.S. troops being sent to Afghanistan would "take the fight to the Taliban in the south and the east, and give us a greater capacity to partner with Afghan security forces and to go after insurgents along the border." In short, the return of the Taliban was equated with the return of Al Qaeda, and the United States became a full protagonist in Afghanistan's civil war, supporting a weak and corrupt central government against the Taliban. Another 4,000 U.S. troops were sent, to train Afghan soldiers.
Just five months later, a second, more extensive policy review was initiated. This time the president again described U.S. goals in terms of denying Al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan, but again he committed the United States to something much more: "We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future."
The decisions that flowed from this were equally contradictory. On the one hand, another 30,000 U.S. troops were pledged, both to warn the Taliban and to reassure the shaky government in Kabul. Yet the president also promised that "our troops will begin to come home" by the summer of 2011—to light a fire under that same government, as well as to placate antiwar sentiment at home.

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Today the counterinsurgency strategy that demanded all those troops is clearly not working. The August 2009 election that gave Karzai a second term as president was marred by pervasive fraud and left him with less legitimacy than ever. While the surge of U.S. forces has pushed back the Taliban in certain districts, the Karzai government has been unable to fill the vacuum with effective governance and security forces that could prevent the Taliban's return. So far the Obama administration is sticking with its strategy; indeed, the president went to great lengths to underscore this when he turned to Petraeus to replace Gen. Stanley McChrystal in Kabul. No course change is likely until at least December, when the president will find himself enmeshed in yet another review of his Afghan policy.
This will be Obama's third chance to decide what kind of war he wants to fight in Afghanistan, and he will have several options to choose from, even if none is terribly promising. The first is to stay the course: to spend the next year attacking the Taliban and training the Afghan Army and police, and to begin reducing the number of U.S. troops in July 2011 only to the extent that conditions on the ground allow. Presumably, if conditions are not conducive, Petraeus will try to limit any reduction in the number of U.S. troops and their role to a minimum.
This approach is hugely expensive, however, and is highly unlikely to succeed. The Afghan government shows little sign of being prepared to deliver either clean administration or effective security at the local level. While a small number of Taliban might choose to "reintegrate"—i.e., opt out of the fight—the vast majority will not. And why should they? The Taliban are resilient and enjoy sanctuary in neighboring Pakistan, whose government tends to view the militants as an instrument for influencing Afghanistan's future (something Pakistan cares a great deal about, given its fear of Indian designs there).
The economic costs to the United States of sticking to the current policy are on the order of $100 billion a year, a hefty price to pay when the pressure to cut federal spending is becoming acute. The military price is also great, not just in lives and matériel but also in distraction at a time when the United States could well face crises with Iran and North Korea. And the domestic political costs would be considerable if the president were seen as going back on the spirit if not the letter of his commitment to begin to bring troops home next year.
At the other end of the policy spectrum would be a decision to walk away from Afghanistan—to complete as quickly as possible a full U.S. military withdrawal. Doing so would almost certainly result in the collapse of the Karzai government and a Taliban takeover of much of the country. Afghanistan could become another Lebanon, where the civil war blends into a regional war involving multiple neighboring states. Such an outcome triggered by U.S. military withdrawal would be seen as a major strategic setback to the United States in its global struggle with terrorists. It would also be a disaster for NATO in what in many ways is its first attempt at being a global security organization.
There are, however, other options. One is reconciliation, a fancy word for negotiating a ceasefire with those Taliban leaders willing to stop fighting in exchange for the chance to join Afghanistan's government. It is impossible, though, to be confident that many Taliban leaders would be prepared to reconcile; they might decide that time is on their side if they only wait and fight. Nor is it likely that the terms they would accept would in turn be acceptable to many Afghans, who remember all too well what it was like to live under the Taliban. A national-unity government is farfetched.
One new idea put forward by Robert Blackwill, a former U.S. ambassador to India, is for a de facto partition of Afghanistan. Under this approach, the United States would accept Taliban control of the Pashtun-dominated south so long as the Taliban did not welcome back Al Qaeda and did not seek to undermine stability in non-Pashtun areas of the country. If the Taliban violated these rules, the United States would attack them with bombers, drones, and Special Forces. U.S. economic and military support would continue to flow to non-Pashtun Afghans in the north and west of the country.
This idea has its drawbacks as well as appeal. A self-governing "Pashtunistan" inside Afghanistan could become a threat to the integrity of Pakistan, whose own 25 million Pashtuns might seek to break free to form a larger Pashtunistan. Any partition would also be resisted by many Afghans, including those Tajik, Baluchi, and Hazara minorities living in demographic "islands" within the mostly Pashtun south, as well as the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and others elsewhere in the country who want to keep Afghanistan free of Taliban influence. And even many Pashtuns would resist for fear of the harsh, intolerant rule the Taliban would impose if given the chance.
Another approach, best termed "decentralization," bears resemblance to partition but also is different in important ways. Under this approach, the United States would provide arms and training to those local Afghan leaders throughout the country who reject Al Qaeda and who do not seek to undermine Pakistan. Economic aid could be provided to increase respect for human rights and to decrease poppy cultivation. There would be less emphasis on building up a national Army and police force.
The advantage of this option is that it works with and not against the Afghan tradition of a weak ruling center and a strong periphery. It would require revision of the Afghan Constitution, which as it stands places too much power in the hands of the president. The United States could leave it to local forces to prevent Taliban inroads, allowing most U.S. troops to return home. Leaders of non-Pashtun minorities (as well as anti-Taliban Pashtuns) would receive military aid and training. The result would be less a partition than a patchwork quilt. Petraeus took a step in this direction last week by gaining Karzai's approval for the creation of new uniformed local security forces who will be paid to fight the insurgents in their communities.
Under this scenario, the Taliban would likely return to positions of power in a good many parts of the south. The Taliban would know, however, that they would be challenged by U.S. air power and Special Forces (and by U.S.-supported Afghans) if they attacked non-Pashtun areas, if they allowed the areas under their control to be used to supply antigovernment forces in Pakistan, or if they worked in any way with Al Qaeda. There is reason to believe that the Taliban might not repeat their historic error of inviting Al Qaeda back into areas under their control. Indeed, the United States should stop assuming that the two groups are one and the same and instead start talking to the Taliban to underscore how their interests differ from Al Qaeda's.
Again, there are drawbacks. This approach would be resisted by some Afghans who fear giving away too much to the Taliban, and by some Taliban who don't think it gives enough. The Karzai government would oppose any shift in U.S. support away from the central government and toward village and local leaders. Fighting would likely continue inside Afghanistan for years. And again, areas reclaimed by the Taliban would almost certainly reintroduce laws that would be antithetical to global norms for human rights.
So what should the president decide? The best way to answer this question is to return to what the United States seeks to accomplish in Afghanistan and why. The two main American goals are to prevent Al Qaeda from reestablishing a safe haven and to make sure that Afghanistan does not undermine the stability of Pakistan.
We are closer to accomplishing both goals than most people realize. CIA Director Leon Panetta recently estimated the number of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan to be "60 to 100, maybe less." It makes no sense to maintain 100,000 troops to go after so small an adversary, especially when Al Qaeda operates on this scale in a number of countries. Such situations call for more modest and focused policies of counterterrorism along the lines of those being applied in Yemen and Somalia, rather than a full-fledged counterinsurgency effort.
Pakistan is much more important than Afghanistan given its nuclear arsenal, its much larger population, the many terrorists on its soil, and its history of wars with India. But Pakistan's future will be determined far more by events within its borders than those to its west. The good news is that the Army shows some signs of understanding that Pakistan's own Taliban are a danger to the country's future, and has begun to take them on.
All this argues for reorienting U.S. Afghan policy toward decentralization—providing greater support for local leaders and establishing a new approach to the Taliban. The war the United States is now fighting in Afghanistan is not succeeding and is not worth waging in this way. The time has come to scale back U.S. objectives and sharply reduce U.S. involvement on the ground. Afghanistan is claiming too many American lives, requiring too much attention, and absorbing too many resources. The sooner we accept that Afghanistan is less a problem to be fixed than a situation to be managed, the better.
Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, is the author of War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.