Russia's KKV capabilities

iPower

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Rage, I would like to declare the following: China is the second country, after U.S.A., that has conducted a successful mid-course interception, in which a Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) and a ground-based interceptor missile were used.

The Russian A135 system used the nuclear-tipped (1 megaton), SH-11 'Gorgon' exoatmospheric interceptor missiles. The nuclear warheads were removed and replaced with high-explosives in later years. The Soviet Union, and later Russia, has never conducted a successful mid-course interception with a ground-based, KKV-tipped missile. The Russians admitted in 2002 that the A135 system was obsolete.
 

Rage

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Rage, I would like to declare the following: China is the second country, after U.S.A., that has conducted a successful mid-course interception, in which a Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV) and a ground-based interceptor missile were used.

The Russian A135 system used the nuclear-tipped (1 megaton), SH-11 'Gorgon' exoatmospheric interceptor missiles. The nuclear warheads were removed and replaced with high-explosives in later years. The Soviet Union, and later Russia, has never conducted a successful mid-course interception with a ground-based, KKV-tipped missile. The Russians admitted in 2002 that the A135 system was obsolete.
Actually, ipower, the Russians recently upgraded the Moscow ABM system to use conventional kinetic-kill interceptors. I remember having read a translated russian article on it some time ago that I can no longer find. But Ryan Crierie, who compiles this website, and is a pretty renowned defense analyst, certainly seems to think so:

ArmsControlWonk: Russia's EW Is Worse Than You Thought


Let me reiterate this: Russia is the second country, after the U.S., to conduct and employ a successful mid-course interception, using conventional kinetic kill vehicles and ground-based interceptors.


The Fakel 51T6 may have been taken out of service, but there are credible 'reports' of a new ABM interceptor being developed, designated 45T6, as possible replacement for the exoatmospheric interceptors.
Russian/Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

And while the SH-11/'Gorgon' component may have been 'deactivated' as of 2007, it does not mean that subsequent tests using the system as a boost vehicle were not conducted. One, atleast, was conducted in October 2009.

You might also want to read this, as of 2008, about the operational status of Gorgon missile launchers:

"Uncertainty abounds about the operational status of the A-135 system: rumors persist that atleast two of four Gorgon missile launch sites are no longer operational. All five Gazelle launch sites appear operational, however, and test launches of the Gazelle, an interceptor missile with a range of 80 km (50 miles) were conducted in 2006 and 2007.

Moreover, in early 2008, the Russian military announced that at sites in northwest Russia, the SA-10 (Grumbler) will soon be replaced by the SA-21 Growler (S-400)."



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The A-135 system is obsolete? I am yet to hear a Russian source claim that. I'd like some official links please, if it ain't too much of a doo-wopper.

Atleast one source also suggests that Russia has been working on ground-based kinetic-kill weapons since as early as 2005.

"In 2005, more advanced work on ground-based kinetic-kill weapons was also conducted in China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States".

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badguy2000

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Actually, ipower, the Russians recently upgraded the Moscow ABM system to use conventional kinetic-kill interceptors. I remember having read a translated russian article on it some time ago that I can no longer find. But Ryan Crierie, who compiles this website, and is a pretty renowned defense analyst, certainly seems to think so:

ArmsControlWonk: Russia's EW Is Worse Than You Thought


Let me reiterate this: Russia is the second country, after the U.S., to conduct and employ a successful mid-course interception, using conventional kinetic kill vehicles and ground-based interceptors.


The Fakel 51T6 may have been taken out of service, but there are credible 'reports' of a new ABM interceptor being developed, designated 45T6, as possible replacement for the exoatmospheric interceptors.
Russian/Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems

And while the SH-11/'Gorgon' component may have been 'deactivated' as of 2007, it does not mean that subsequent tests using the system as a boost vehicle were not conducted. One, atleast, was conducted in October 2009.

You might also want to read this, as of 2008, about the operational status of Gorgon missile launchers:

"Uncertainty abounds about the operational status of the A-135 system: rumors persist that atleast two of four Gorgon missile launch sites are no longer operational. All five Gazelle launch sites appear operational, however, and test launches of the Gazelle, an interceptor missile with a range of 80 km (50 miles) were conducted in 2006 and 2007.

Moreover, in early 2008, the Russian military announced that at sites in northwest Russia, the SA-10 (Grumbler) will soon be replaced by the SA-21 Growler (S-400)."



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The A-135 system is obsolete? I am yet to hear a Russian source claim that. I'd like some official links please, if it ain't too much of a doo-wopper.

Atleast one source also suggests that Russia has been working on ground-based kinetic-kill weapons since as early as 2005.

"In 2005, more advanced work on ground-based kinetic-kill weapons was also conducted in China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States".

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guy,don't you find that Russian now is better at "to do" than "have done"?

During Sovet era, RUssian were once good at "have done" too......
 

Armand2REP

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Actually, ipower, the Russians recently upgraded the Moscow ABM system to use conventional kinetic-kill interceptors. I remember having read a translated russian article on it some time ago that I can no longer find. But Ryan Crierie, who compiles this website, and is a pretty renowned defense analyst, certainly seems to think so:

ArmsControlWonk: Russia's EW Is Worse Than You Thought
And where does it say Russia has KE interceptors? In the comments section...

Let me reiterate this: Russia is the second country, after the U.S., to conduct and employ a successful mid-course interception, using conventional kinetic kill vehicles and ground-based interceptors.
Russia doesn't use KE kill vehicles for ABM, they use frag warheads or nuclear. S-300V Antey or ABM-3 system.
 

Rage

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And where does it say Russia has KE interceptors? In the comments section...
That's what I said, didn't I ?

The Armscontrolwonk is not a regular defence forum, like this one. It boasts as its members, defense journalists and research scholars, several of whom have access to the military establishment or the White House in ways the regular papparazzi could not imagine. The site itself is the blog of Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation. Dr. Lewis is the author of Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (MIT Press, 2007). It is also co-blogged and co-editted by Jane Vaynman, a Fullbright scholar from Moscow. If you do a read-thru the comments, you''ll find that they're not like the comments on a regular defence forum but are written pretty-much like articles or crude journalistic entries. James Crierie's reputation is beyond incredulity, which is why yes, I am inclined to give his positings some weight. Paul Kerr, research analyst at the Arms Control Association, 2005-2006, and James Acton, lecturer at the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, are some of the other regular contributers and posters on that website. The blog has, as one of its mottos, "reporting items of interest that wouldn’t make it into the New York Times", after all.

Russia doesn't use KE kill vehicles for ABM, they use frag warheads or nuclear. S-300V Antey or ABM-3 system.
The S-300 and A-150 systems used directional explosive charges or nuklear warheads, but as previously evinced, the latter upgraded with 'conventional' KIV's following a spate of tests in 2009, after a telling lapse in 2008 (particularly after 2007, saw an announcement that at least two tests would be conducted at Sary Shagan for ABM systems every year). I am sufficiently convinced of that, not only because of the source but also because of Russia's considerable experience in ASAT homing technologies. However, in light of the dates, I might have to concede that China is the second country in the world after the United States to achieve an exoatmospheric intercept KKV-capability, pending accurate info on 2009 tests.

http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cach...rs&cd=18&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca&client=firefox-a


As an aside, I'm also beginning to realize that the silver-bullet hit-to-kill KEI vehicle is greatly exaggerated- in terms of its actual efficacy.

An attacker could overwhelm the system by using "anti-simulation balloon decoys," that is, by deploying its nuclear weapons inside balloons and releasing numerous empty balloons along with them. Or an attacker could cover its nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds, which would prevent the kill vehicles from detecting and therefore from homing on the warhead.

The following report on countermeasures certainly seems to think so:

Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (2000) | Union of Concerned Scientists
 

Armand2REP

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That's what I said, didn't I ?

The Armscontrolwonk is not a regular defence forum, like this one. It boasts as its members, defense journalists and research scholars, several of whom have access to the military establishment or the White House in ways the regular papparazzi could not imagine. The site itself is the blog of Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation. Dr. Lewis is the author of Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age (MIT Press, 2007). It is also co-blogged and co-editted by Jane Vaynman, a Fullbright scholar from Moscow. If you do a read-thru the comments, you''ll find that they're not like the comments on a regular defence forum but are written pretty-much like articles or crude journalistic entries. James Crierie's reputation is beyond incredulity, which is why yes, I am inclined to give his positings some weight. Paul Kerr, research analyst at the Arms Control Association, 2005-2006, and James Acton, lecturer at the Centre for Science and Security Studies in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, are some of the other regular contributers and posters on that website. The blog has, as one of its mottos, "reporting items of interest that wouldn’t make it into the New York Times", after all.
It doesn't matter who blogs it, they didn't mention anything about a KKV. What matters is who wrote the comment and it is no one you mentioned.

The S-300 and A-150 systems used directional explosive charges or nuklear warheads, but as previously evinced, the latter upgraded with 'conventional' KIV's following a spate of tests in 2009, after a telling lapse in 2008 (particularly after 2007, saw an announcement that at least two tests would be conducted at Sary Shagan for ABM systems every year). I am sufficiently convinced of that, not only because of the source but also because of Russia's considerable experience in ASAT homing technologies. However, in light of the dates, I might have to concede that China is the second country in the world after the United States to achieve an exoatmospheric intercept KKV-capability, pending accurate info on 2009 tests.

IS anti-satellite system
There is ZERO evidence to suggest any of the aformentioned KKV capabilities. Russia still maintains their nuclear warheads for their ABM purpose and nothing has changed to suggest it has anything else. S-500 is what the Russians are currently working on and it hasn't even come close to a testing stage.

As an aside, I'm also beginning to realize that the silver-bullet hit-to-kill KEI vehicle is greatly exaggerated- in terms of its actual efficacy.

An attacker could overwhelm the system by using "anti-simulation balloon decoys," that is, by deploying its nuclear weapons inside balloons and releasing numerous empty balloons along with them. Or an attacker could cover its nuclear warheads with cooled shrouds, which would prevent the kill vehicles from detecting and therefore from homing on the warhead.

Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (2000) | Union of Concerned Scientists[/url]
The US is developing micro-interceptors launched from a mother vehicle that will intercept everything. Cooled shrouds will hardly work when it is entering the atmosphere.
 

Rage

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It doesn't matter who blogs it, they didn't mention anything about a KKV. What matters is who wrote the comment and it is no one you mentioned.
From my previous post:

I remember having read a translated russian article on it some time ago that I can no longer find. But Ryan Crierie, who compiles this website, and is a pretty renowned defense analyst, certainly seems to think so:

ArmsControlWonk: Russia's EW Is Worse Than You Thought

There is ZERO evidence to suggest any of the aformentioned KKV capabilities. Russia still maintains their nuclear warheads for their ABM purpose and nothing has changed to suggest it has anything else. S-500 is what the Russians are currently working on and it hasn't even come close to a testing stage.
The evidence is there, particularly in respect of homing technologies for IS spacecraft, in line with the early Homing Overlay Experiment (H.O.E.), by the US Army for hit-to-kill interceptors.

Oct. 19: Cosmos-248. Assumed a 551 by 490-kilometer orbit. Described in Western sources (31) as an unusually large target satellite (4,536 kilograms) presumably equipped with sensors to monitor interceptor miss distance, shrapnel pattern and explosion effects. Served as target for Cosmos-249.

Oct. 20: Cosmos-249. Entered an initial 254 by 136 kilometer orbit then maneuvered to a 2,177 by 514-kilometer orbit. This orbit matched the perigee of the "killer" with the apogee of the target. Just three-and-a-half hour, or two orbits after the launch, as the "killer" was descending from its apogee, it flew by Cosmos-248 and exploded, generating 80 or 109 detectable fragments. According to Western sources, the detonation of the killer satellite took place outside one-kilometer "kill radius" (31). Russian sources (97), however, suggested that the Cosmos-249 only tested the homing system and had no goal of destroying the target, which became a "privilege" for the next IS spacecraft.
If the Russians could achieve that in 1968, I have no doubt they could achieve KKV's in the 2000's.

The US is developing micro-interceptors launched from a mother vehicle that will intercept everything. Cooled shrouds will hardly work when it is entering the atmosphere.
Then it wouldn't be an exo-atmospheric kill vehiclle.

I'd be interested in this micro-interceptor concept if you have a link. However, how many micro-interceptors can a mother-vehicle convey?

A sophisticated attacker could deploy manifold multiplicities of decoy warheads for instance to escalate the costs of microinterception. And it has always been cheaper to add attacking warheads than to add defences.

A sophisticated attacker having the technology to use decoys, shielding, maneuvering warheads, defense suppression, or other countermeasures would have multiplied the difficulty and cost of intercepting the real warheads.

In which case, it would be cheaper, and perhaps more effective to return to directional FRAG warheads. The requirement of being "cost effective at the margin" was first formulated by Paul Nitze in 1985.
 

Armand2REP

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From my previous post:

"But Ryan Crierie"
You just typed that in there. Do you think I'm stupid? Ryan Crierie plays space games.

Battlefront Forum - View Profile: Ryan Crierie

He is no expert on Russia, I doubt if he's ever been there.

The evidence is there, particularly in respect of homing technologies for IS spacecraft, in line with the early Homing Overlay Experiment (H.O.E.), by the US Army for hit-to-kill interceptors.
Their homing technologies were never designed to be KKV. If you read the link you posted, you will notice the packages carried explosives. KKVs do not.

If the Russians could achieve that in 1968, I have no doubt they could achieve KKV's in the 2000's.
They didn't achieve it. The only intercepts were HE frag.

A History of Anti-satellite (ASAT) Programs | Union of Concerned Scientists

Then it wouldn't be an exo-atmospheric kill vehiclle.
Who said it has to be killed outside the atmosphere?

I'd be interested in this micro-interceptor concept if you have a link. However, how many micro-interceptors can a mother-vehicle convey?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hsPKYDcfw4k&feature=related

A sophisticated attacker could deploy manifold multiplicities of decoy warheads for instance to escalate the costs of microinterception. And it has always been cheaper to add attacking warheads than to add defences.
Costs more to build a couple warheads than to build several relatively cheap micro KKVs.

A sophisticated attacker having the technology to use decoys, shielding, maneuvering warheads, defense suppression, or other countermeasures would have multiplied the difficulty and cost of intercepting the real warheads.
The US is working on it as we speak. They know all that and more. Their cost spiral on MKV will be low since it is based on already tried technologies.

In which case, it would be cheaper, and perhaps more effective to return to directional FRAG warheads. The requirement of being "cost effective at the margin" was first formulated by Paul Nitze in 1985.
You still have to direct a frag warhead, you might as well save the money on the explosives and make it KKV. USSR already tried it and it doesn't work that well.
 

Rage

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You just typed that in there. Do you think I'm stupid? Ryan Crierie plays space games.

Battlefront Forum - View Profile: Ryan Crierie

He is no expert on Russia, I doubt if he's ever been there.
That is not the same Ryan Crierie. Do you think I'm stupid?

This is the Ryan Crierie I'm talking about:

Closing Velocity: Biden: SM-3 Interceptors To Be Installed In Poland

He's from DC, not Rockville Maryland. I've been following him for several years.

Now, whether he plays "space games" or not, I do not know, and is frankly irrelevant. But he is also the author of this book:

About the "Big Book of Warfare"

and maintains this website:

Alternate Wars

and this blog:

Alternate Wars


Their homing technologies were never designed to be KKV. If you read the link you posted, you will notice the packages carried explosives. KKVs do not.
I know KKV's do not.

The homing technologies from ASAT and Miniature Homing Vehicles are the same homing technologies applicable to kinetic energy interceptors.


They didn't achieve it. The only intercepts were HE frag.
Well, other sources certainly wouldn't agree.


Who said it has to be killed outside the atmosphere?
Isn't that the whole point of an exo-atmospheric interceptor.

Intercept above the sensible atmosphere, in the layer where atmospheric interaction is minimal.


Cheers!


Costs more to build a couple warheads than to build several relatively cheap micro KKVs.
Costs more to build a couple of decoy warheads than several relatively cheap micro KKV's? What cost parameters are you looking at?


The US is working on it as we speak. They know all that and more. Their cost spiral on MKV will be low since it is based on already tried technologies.
Let's hope that's true. Do you have an article I can read?


You still have to direct a frag warhead, you might as well save the money on the explosives and make it KKV. USSR already tried it and it doesn't work that well.
Fakel's Missiles book suggests that the 51T6 missile introduced a command/inertial guidance with onboard digital computer for the first time, allowed retargetting in flight, and extended periods of standalone guidance without assistance from the ground, as well as improved flight profiling. As for the warhead and guidance, didn't the era of semi-active radar homing + command radio guidance end with the S-300PMU-1 48N6E? With the S-300PMU-1 and the subsequent PMU-2 using Track-via-Missile + Active Radar Homing?

Also I would think a directional explosive warhead would offer greater payload-mass efficiency.

And the ABM-3 incorporated several improvements over the Galosh, mechanically steered radars were replaced by much more capable phased-array radars and the missile took advantage of atmospheric bulk filtering to discriminate decoys from actual warheads.

Wrt KKV's, I also came across this fairly interesting counter-pose:

The Kinetic Energy Interceptor: Missile Without a Cause
 

Armand2REP

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That is not the same Ryan Crierie. Do you think I'm stupid?
Your OP stated "JamesCrierie's reputation is beyond incredulity"

You didn't even know his name and you are vouching for his credability?

You mean the guy who posted in the comments section? The blog is by someone named Mckittrick who claims a false identity for "security reasons." :sarcastic:

He's from DC, not Rockville Maryland. I've been following him for several years.
Rockville is a suburb 10km outside DC... same guy.

Now, whether he plays "space games" or not, I do not know, and is frankly irrelevant. But he is also the author of this book:

About the "Big Book of Warfare"
Author of a book with no ISBN. :stinker:

and maintains this website:

Alternate Wars

and this blog:

Alternate Wars
I had a websight and blog once too. $10 a year and a computer is all you need. My googlepagerank was 2, better than his 0.

The facts are, the guy isn't published, has a dead webpage, likes to comment on blogs, and participates in sci-fi game forums. He isn't worth vouching for.

I know KKV's do not.

The homing technologies from ASAT and Miniature Homing Vehicles are the same homing technologies applicable to kinetic energy interceptors.
Soviet technologies of the sixties were primitive, even China has slighlty surpassed those efforts. The technologies today include high speed control loops for Divert and Attitude Control Systems (DACS). Only the US/Japan has this control system for space interceptors, France is trailing with a less sophisticated DACS for the atmospheric Aster dart which will reach space maturity with Block II.

Well, other sources certainly wouldn't agree.
Who says Russians achieved KKV in the sixties? The link you provided for the timetable listed misses that would in theory, have been able to be hit by a detonation. Certainly not a KKV intercept.

Isn't that the whole point of an exo-atmospheric interceptor. Intercept above the sensible atmosphere, in the layer where atmospheric interaction is minimal.
BMD is several layers. If the mid-course interceptors fail there is a backup which makes the idea of warheads with a freezer system redundant. It is already hard enough to minaturise payloads to carry multiple MIRVs. Making MIRV payloads with their own freezer units would take up too much space to be practical when they would be easily detectable entering the atmosphere anyway.

Costs more to build a couple of decoy warheads than several relatively cheap micro KKV's? What cost parameters are you looking at?
It costs far more to build nuclear warheads than micro KKVs. A couple million compared to a couple hundred thousand. If a Bulava is launching 3 warheads with three decoys you're talking about $6-7 million in payload. If MKV is carrying 6 interceptors a payload is just over $1.2- 1.5 million.

Let's hope that's true. Do you have an article I can read?
No... I just found out MKV was cancelled in Gate's cuts. :( No F-22, no MKV, and no ABL... Gate's sucks. France will have to pickup the banner! Hopefully Europe will follow.

Fakel's Missiles book suggests that the 51T6 missile introduced a command/inertial guidance with onboard digital computer for the first time, allowed retargetting in flight, and extended periods of standalone guidance without assistance from the ground, as well as improved flight profiling. As for the warhead and guidance, didn't the era of semi-active radar homing + command radio guidance end with the S-300PMU-1 48N6E? With the S-300PMU-1 and the subsequent PMU-2 using Track-via-Missile + Active Radar Homing?
51T6 is the same missile known as Gorgan. Gorgan is nuclear, not KKV. Whatever guidance it has is not accurate enough for a KE kill and was never meant to be.

The primary mobile ABM missile used by Russian air defence is the 9M82M. It is SARH with radio command uplink using fins and servo stabalisers. It won't work as a space interceptor since it needs DACS.

Also I would think a directional explosive warhead would offer greater payload-mass efficiency.

And the ABM-3 incorporated several improvements over the Galosh, mechanically steered radars were replaced by much more capable phased-array radars and the missile took advantage of atmospheric bulk filtering to discriminate decoys from actual warheads.
I am not about to debate the value of explosive over KKE vehicles.

If you want to know more about ABM-3, read this...

MissileThreat :: System A-135

None of it is KKV...
 

Rage

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Your OP stated "JamesCrierie's reputation is beyond incredulity"

You didn't even know his name and you are vouching for his credability?
That was an honest mistake. It was not in my OP, but in my second post. The OP stated "Ryan Crierie". Let me clarify that the mistake occurred because I was reading something by a James Rainey while I was typing in haste.


You mean the guy who posted in the comments section? The blog is by someone named Mckittrick who claims a false identity for "security reasons." :sarcastic:

The facts are, the guy isn't published, has a dead webpage, likes to comment on blogs, and participates in sci-fi game forums. He isn't worth vouching for.
Read the "comments section" again. You'll find plenty of defense analysts, former defense/space professionals and investigative journalists who are "worth vouching for": including Andrew Tubbiolo, who has worked in the planetary space program since 1992, Mark Gubrud, policy intern at the Federation of American Scientists, Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Stephen Young, senior Analyst & Washington Representative, Global Security Program and hawk21, which is a pseudonym for Eric Alterman, senior fellow at the World Policy Institute and who also uses a "false identity" for "security reasons" :sarcastic:

You still think it is not worth "vouching for"?


Rockville is a suburb 10km outside DC... same guy.

Rockville is about 21 miles or 35km by car. About 14 miles or 23 kilometers in a straight line. It is also a major city.

Stamford is about 45 km. from New York by car. But nobody in New York says they live in Stamford, and vice versa.

If he said he was from Rockville, he was from Rockville.


I had a websight and blog once too. $10 a year and a computer is all you need. My googlepagerank was 2, better than his 0.
Good for you.



Soviet technologies of the sixties were primitive, even China has slighlty surpassed those efforts. The technologies today include high speed control loops for Divert and Attitude Control Systems (DACS). Only the US/Japan has this control system for space interceptors, France is trailing with a less sophisticated DACS for the atmospheric Aster dart which will reach space maturity with Block II.

So, if Japan and the United States are the only ones to have access to the SM-3's ATK Divert and Attitude Control Systems (SDACS), and China managed to achieve an exo-atmospheric interception using its claimed 35 kg KKV without this technology, which in all possibility bears some connection with its micro satellite and nanosatellite buses, do you think the Russians, with a far more advanced space-based program, could not have achieved a KEi without these technologies?


Who says Russians achieved KKV in the sixties? The link you provided for the timetable listed misses that would in theory, have been able to be hit by a detonation. Certainly not a KKV intercept.
Who says ? I said this:

"If the Russians could achieve the (Cosmos 248 and 249) in 1968, I have no doubt they could achieve KKV's in the 2000's."

My premise is based on Ryan Crierie's premise that the Moscow ABM systems were retroactively upgraded with KKV's.

Moreover I found this, as of October 1986, indicating that the Soviets have been working on KKV's since at least 1986:

Another controversial Soviet radar is the "Flat Twin" tracking radar 12. Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense Star Wars" in Perspective (Lanham, Maryland and London: Hamilton Press, 1986), p. 47 13. Moreover, while in Fiscal Year 1986 Congress funded only 74 percent of the Pentagon's request for SDI, the Soviets continued to spend ten times the U.S. level of effort on strategic defense. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberaer on the FY 1987 Budnet (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986), pp. 59-60, 75 7- for the new Moscow ABM system, which potentially violates the 'ABM Treaty's ban on mobile radars as is required by the ABM Treaty, but is transportable and capable of being disassembled, moved, and reassembled in a few months The Moscow ABM system, moreover, has been supplemented by an indeterminate number of SA-10 surface-to-air missiles, which could be used to defend against a cruise missile- and the new.SA-X-12 GAM, which has the pgtential to intercept certain types of ballistic missiles. Moscow currently has over 60 SA-10 sites operational with roughly 520 launchers and is working on at least another,30 with approximately 175 more launchers be used against missiles and bombers. They are mobile and could be upgraded as part of a nationwide point defense ABM system. Intelligence sources estimate, in fact, that the new SA-X-12'SAM 'could be used to defend 88-25 mobile missile bases, SS-18 ICBM silo complexes against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or to intercept intermediate-range nuclear missiles such as the Pershing 11 The "Flat Twin" radar is not fixed I Both of these SAM systems could I The Soviet Union launched a large research program on advanced strategic defense technologies in the late 1960s. Moscow currently has over 10,000 scientific and technical personnel working at a half-dozen research and development centers on four important areas of technologies applicable to ballistic missile defense: 1) high' energy lasers 2) particle beams; 3) radio frequency weapons; and 4) kinetic energy weapons. While the U.S. is ahead of the Soviet Union in BMD-related technologies that can be applied to strategic defense in the distant future (such as microelectronics, sensors, and high-speed data processing the Soviets are ahead in technologies which have a potential near-term application to ballistic missile defense system such as anti-tactical ballistic missiles, radars, some laser,s and particle beams I The Soviets are ahead of the U.S. in laser weapons research and development. In 1984, Robert Cooper, then Director of the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA claimed that Soviet I 14. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Soviet Noncompliance (Washington, ,D.C Government Printing Office, February 1, 1986), pp. 3-4 15. Soviet Military Power 1986 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1986). p. 57 I I 16 Soviet Militarv Power 1985 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1985). p 50. I 17. Payne, 9 cig p. 56 18. soviet Military Power 1986. pp. 47-8 I I I i I spending on laser research was around three to five times greater than that of &he U.S in 1970 U.S. and may already have built one or more underground testing facilities deployment of the worlds first operational ground-based laser anti-satellite system, which could also be used against ballistic missiles. The Soviets have"'also conducted weapons' tests in space from a ground-based laser stationed at Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan, a test prohibited under the 10-year ban on SDI-testing proposed by the Soviets at the Iceland summit. The Pentagon estimates that a Soviet ground-based laser defense against ballistic missiles could be deployed as early as the late 1990s or shortly after the year 2000.
"While Opposing Reagan's SDI , Moscow Pushes Its Own Star Wars"

I also found this from the Federation of American Scientists:

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilometers per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum.

Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid 1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are adequate for effective kinetic energy weapons for use against some objects in space.
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

....to further corroborate 'Ryan Crierie's" claim.


BMD is several layers. If the mid-course interceptors fail there is a backup which makes the idea of warheads with a freezer system redundant. It is already hard enough to minaturise payloads to carry multiple MIRVs. Making MIRV payloads with their own freezer units would take up too much space to be practical when they would be easily detectable entering the atmosphere anyway.
That is not the point. Our argument is purely with respect to mid-course exoatmospheric interception with KKV's. If the mid-course interceptors are defeated by cool-shrouds or decoy balloons to intercept in the endo-atmosphere, then the purpose of mid-course interception is defeated, and the system (that system) has failed. That is our relative point, for then those countries that have achieved "successful exoatmospheric interception using KKV's" are reduced to the status of countries that have endoatmospheric interceptors.


It costs far more to build nuclear warheads than micro KKVs. A couple million compared to a couple hundred thousand. If a Bulava is launching 3 warheads with three decoys you're talking about $6-7 million in payload. If MKV is carrying 6 interceptors a payload is just over $1.2- 1.5 million.
What?

Anti-simulation balloons depends on the principle of the attacker deploying nuclear weapons inside balloons and releasing numerous empty balloons along with them. In this case, the anti-simulation balloon is the only component that would involve some expense, for it is made of aluminized mylar. The decoys are not made to look exactly like a specific warhead, but the warheads are disguised to make them look like decoys. Even if the defender had different sensors to tell which balloon contains the warhead -- by the radar reflections of the balloons, by observing their motions or shapes, or by measuring their temperature and thermal behavior, which is feasible, the dummy warhead could be configured with shells having an external configuration matched to the real warhead and a radar image resembling the radar image of the real warhead, which stacks would then be attached to one or more extremities of the real warhead in a coaxial relationship and secured together forming a package comprising a plurality of dummy warhead shells and a real warhead. Above the atmosphere, there is no air resistance and lightweight objects travel on the same trajectory as heavy objects. How expensive do you think it is to deploy a couple dozen empty balloons? :sarcastic:



No... I just found out MKV was cancelled in Gate's cuts. :( No F-22, no MKV, and no ABL... Gate's sucks. France will have to pickup the banner! Hopefully Europe will follow.
Aw shucks!


51T6 is the same missile known as Gorgan. Gorgan is nuclear, not KKV. Whatever guidance it has is not accurate enough for a KE kill and was never meant to be.
Yeah, I know 51T6 is the Gorgon. And I know it was designed to be nuklear, not KKV. Refer to the above.


The primary mobile ABM missile used by Russian air defence is the 9M82M. It is SARH with radio command uplink using fins and servo stabalisers. It won't work as a space interceptor since it needs DACS.
9M82M is an upgrade to 70's tech: moreover it is simply a range upgrade to what was the first mobile system developed for a counter ISR role. Since then ther've been the S-300PMU-1 5V55U / SA-10, the S-300PMU-2 / 48N6E2 and the S-300PMU-1 9M96, all of which use Track-via-Missile Active Radar Homing. Block upgrades are always ongoing, with the S-300V eventually being upgraded to the S-300 PMU / PMU-1 / PMU-2 Favorit standard (Antey-2500 (S-300V / SA-12 / SA-23)). My focus is one whether the technology exists, not on which system is the "primary" or which has a multiplicity of missiles, just as China's mid-course interceptor is not its "primary" ABM missile.



I am not about to debate the value of explosive over KKE vehicles.
Suit yourself.


If you want to know more about ABM-3, read this...

MissileThreat :: System A-135

None of it is KKV...
Thanks for the redundant link- redundant to this discussion.
 

Armand2REP

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That was an honest mistake. It was not in my OP, but in my second post. The OP stated "Ryan Crierie". Let me clarify that the mistake occurred because I was reading something by a James Rainey while I was typing in haste.

You still think it is not worth "vouching for"?
Ryan is the only one saying it is so. The guy is no authority unless he worked for Roscosmos or the KVR.

Rockville is about 21 miles or 35km by car. About 14 miles or 23 kilometers in a straight line. It is also a major city.
No, it isn't. It is 10km from the DC border and only 4km from the Beltway. It is a suburb of DC as stated everywhere.

DC suburb rockville - Google Search

Stamford is about 45 km. from New York by car. But nobody in New York says they live in Stamford, and vice versa.

If he said he was from Rockville, he was from Rockville.
You just proved the point, if you live in a suburb of a city, you will mention the city since no one will have heard of the suburb. :stinker:

Good for you.
Too bad for him.

So, if Japan and the United States are the only ones to have access to the SM-3's ATK Divert and Attitude Control Systems (SDACS), and China managed to achieve an exo-atmospheric interception using its claimed 35 kg KKV without this technology, which in all possibility bears some connection with its micro satellite and nanosatellite buses, do you think the Russians, with a far more advanced space-based program, could not have achieved a KEi without these technologies?
According to the photographs provided by badguy, it was accomplished with a nuclear warhead. :sarcastic:

China has been working on this programme since the 1960s. Russia quit in 1982 and has only begun to work on the problem with S-500. When China has dumped billions and decades into it using modern computers and Russia nothing, yes they are going to achieve what Russia cannot. What they have achieved is a rigged intercept that was used as a propoganda piece for Taiwan arm sales. The S-500 isn't for propoganda but a real application system. The Gorgon launches were for propoganda after the ABM withdrawal, it has little utility in modern warfare the same as the Chinese tests.

Who says ? I said this:

"If the Russians could achieve the (Cosmos 248 and 249) in 1968, I have no doubt they could achieve KKV's in the 2000's."

My premise is based on Ryan Crierie's premise that the Moscow ABM systems were retroactively upgraded with KKV's.

Moreover I found this, as of October 1986, indicating that the Soviets have been working on KKV's since at least 1986:
You found something that makes no reference to a KKV intercept, just that they worked on it. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists those ABM reports from the eighties were widely exaggerated.

A History of Anti-satellite (ASAT) Programs | Union of Concerned Scientists

If Ryan knows the Moskva defences were upgraded with KKV, then he has access to priviledged information and shouldn't be talking about it. Which leads me to know he is talking out of his arse.

I also found this from the Federation of American Scientists:

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

....to further corroborate 'Ryan Crierie's" claim.
Those old reports were exaggerated according to the UCS. There is ZERO evidence to show they actually achieved a KKV intercept regardless of what they are claimed to have worked on. The Soviets worked on alot of things that never achieved results.

That is not the point. Our argument is purely with respect to mid-course exoatmospheric interception with KKV's. If the mid-course interceptors are defeated by cool-shrouds or decoy balloons to intercept in the endo-atmosphere, then the purpose of mid-course interception is defeated, and the system (that system) has failed. That is our relative point, for then those countries that have achieved "successful exoatmospheric interception using KKV's" are reduced to the status of countries that have endoatmospheric interceptors.
The title of the thread is Russian KKV capability. It really doesn't have anything to do with it. Cooling off a warhead is unrealistic and redundant is my point.


What?

Anti-simulation balloons depends on the principle of the attacker deploying nuclear weapons inside balloons and releasing numerous empty balloons along with them. In this case, the anti-simulation balloon is the only component that would involve some expense, for it is made of aluminized mylar. The decoys are not made to look exactly like a specific warhead, but the warheads are disguised to make them look like decoys. Even if the defender had different sensors to tell which balloon contains the warhead -- by the radar reflections of the balloons, by observing their motions or shapes, or by measuring their temperature and thermal behavior, which is feasible, the dummy warhead could be configured with shells having an external configuration matched to the real warhead and a radar image resembling the radar image of the real warhead, which stacks would then be attached to one or more extremities of the real warhead in a coaxial relationship and secured together forming a package comprising a plurality of dummy warhead shells and a real warhead. Above the atmosphere, there is no air resistance and lightweight objects travel on the same trajectory as heavy objects. How expensive do you think it is to deploy a couple dozen empty balloons? :sarcastic:
What?

How do you stick a warhead in a balloon? You going to run a ship in a bottle too? :sarcastic:

Yeah, I know 51T6 is the Gorgon. And I know it was designed to be nuklear, not KKV. Refer to the above.
No KKV...

9M82M is an upgrade to 70's tech: moreover it is simply a range upgrade to what was the first mobile system developed for a counter ISR role. Since then ther've been the S-300PMU-1 5V55U / SA-10, the S-300PMU-2 / 48N6E2 and the S-300PMU-1 9M96, all of which use Track-via-Missile Active Radar Homing. Block upgrades are always ongoing, with the S-300V eventually being upgraded to the S-300 PMU / PMU-1 / PMU-2 Favorit standard (Antey-2500 (S-300V / SA-12 / SA-23)).
S-300V was upgraded to S-300VM, its role is for high altitude and missile defence. None of the PMU series have the engagement altitude of the V series.

My focus is one whether the technology exists, not on which system is the "primary" or which has a multiplicity of missiles, just as China's mid-course interceptor is not its "primary" ABM missile.
We are discussing Russia's modern ABM capabilities, S-300V(M) is the best they have and it is nowhere close to mid-course intercept or KKV.

Thanks for the redundant link- redundant to this discussion.
Redundant to the point there was no KKV intercept.
 

Rage

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Ryan is the only one saying it is so. The guy is no authority unless he worked for Roscosmos or the KVR.
Yeh, and what authority are you?

I have a tendency to believe that website because of the quality of discussions I've read there over the years, and because of the stellar coterie of its patrons.


No, it isn't. It is 10km from the DC border and only 4km from the Beltway. It is a suburb of DC as stated everywhere.

DC suburb rockville - Google Search
No, it ain't.

Your google search provides no indication anywhere that Rockville is "10 km" from Washington, nor do any of the links in it.

Here let me help you out:

http://www.findlocalweather.com/for...2x=Rockville,+MD&Find+distance=How+far+is+it?

WikiAnswers - What is the distance between Rockville MD and Washington DC



You just proved the point, if you live in a suburb of a city, you will mention the city since no one will have heard of the suburb. :stinker:
You have a problem with your logic. I said: "nobody in New York says they live in Stamford, and vice versa." Let me make this simple for you: if you live in New York, you don't say you live in Stamford. And if you live in Stamford, you don't say you live in New York. Living in this side of the world, I would know. Just as, if you live in D.C., you don't say you live in Rockville, and if you live in Rockville, you don't say you live in D.C.

Point proven.



Too bad for him.
No, just good for you.


According to the photographs provided by badguy, it was accomplished with a nuclear warhead. :sarcastic:
ROFLMAO. so that doesn't make China the "second country to have successfully accomplished a mid-course interception, using KKV technologies, does it?


China has been working on this programme since the 1960s. Russia quit in 1982 and has only begun to work on the problem with S-500. When China has dumped billions and decades into it using modern computers and Russia nothing, yes they are going to achieve what Russia cannot. What they have achieved is a rigged intercept that was used as a propoganda piece for Taiwan arm sales. The S-500 isn't for propoganda but a real application system. The Gorgon launches were for propoganda after the ABM withdrawal, it has little utility in modern warfare the same as the Chinese tests.
Give me a link that says they stopped working on the system in 1982- specifically, the KKV system.


You found something that makes no reference to a KKV intercept, just that they worked on it.

My link from the 1985 FAS article says:

"The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilometers per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum.

Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid 1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are adequate for effective kinetic energy weapons for use against some objects in space. "

That directly disproves your point above about them "having quit in 1982".



A History of Anti-satellite (ASAT) Programs | Union of Concerned Scientists

Those old reports were exaggerated according to the UCS. There is ZERO evidence to show they actually achieved a KKV intercept regardless of what they are claimed to have worked on. The Soviets worked on alot of things that never achieved results.

Your link says:

The Soviets resumed testing of the Co-Orbital system in 1976. At the time, the aerospace trade press was reporting a renewed US interest in anti-satellite technology, an interest that was largely generated by exaggerated reports of Soviet laser and particle beam ASAT/ABM technology. In addition, the Space Shuttle, which also had intrinsic anti-satellite capability, was in advanced development. The Soviets reportedly showed some success at extending the range of the Co-Orbital system to as low as 160 km and as high as 1,600 km, and at minimizing attack time by enabling the interceptor to maneuver to its target in a single orbit. Systems using optical and infrared sensor systems instead of onboard radar are thought to have had problems. At that time, the system was considered ready to operate.
What do you take me for, a smoking crack? The 1970's is not the 1980's.

Your link also says this:

The Soviets did honor their moratorium [on ASAT testing], although they continued pursuit of some missile defense technologies.

If Ryan knows the Moskva defences were upgraded with KKV, then he has access to priviledged information and shouldn't be talking about it. Which leads me to know he is talking out of his arse.
Seeing as virtually all of the 'commentators' on that website have access to "priviledged information", including those who claim privileged access to the White House, I don't see why they wouldn't have access to information you would not.

Here is further evidence to suggest that the Russians had developed atleast a rudimentary KEI capability as early as the 1980's. The report is from 1997, so you can't claim those 80's reports were exaggerated even though your site states 1976 :sarcastic:

Space battle stations

The third major industrial organisation involved in these programmes was NPO Energia based in Kaliningrad. As the Soviet Union's foremost space development centre, Energia was given the task in 1976 of developing space-based platforms for novel weapon technologies. Energia co-ordinated the efforts of the other weapon design bureaux to make certain that their weapons were compatible with Energia's 'space strike systems'. In contrast to the US SDI programme, which was primarily oriented toward destroying re-entry vehicles in their boost phase, the Energia programme had a much broader range of space-based military missions. This was driven in part by the Soviet assessment of the military nature of the US space shuttle. The Soviets feared that the space shuttle was the central element in a new generation of space strike weapons and was viewed as a suitable platform for delivering weapons from space against targets on earth. Its second military role was assessed as being the delivery and support of combat spacecraft. It is not clear if this Soviet perception of the shuttle was due to a mistaken and paranoid assessment of actual US intentions for the space shuttle, or whether this view was a conscious ruse on the part of the Soviet Defence Ministry to win support for its own space strike systems, mirroring the imagined US space strike systems. In either case, the defence ministry remained the strongest backer of the Buran space shuttle effort in spite of reservations within the Russian civil space community, which feared that the Soviet Buran space shuttle would eat up too much of the civil space budget.

Energia worked on two other space-based weapon systems. The first development was a small missile interceptor similar to the US Brilliant Pebbles concept. This small autonomous device was designed to intercept re-entry vehicles and destroy them using the kinetic energy of impact. It is not clear how these devices were to be deployed, whether by satellites, the Buran shuttle or by some form of earth-launched booster.

The final Energia project was the most elaborate space strike system envisioned. It consisted of a central battle station based around a DOS-7K space station module. To this was added a command module and a targeting module. The central battle station core played host to four or more 'combat modules'. These were derivatives of the Buran space shuttle, minus their wings. The combat modules could operate alone or in combat groups, could dock at the central station and would receive targeting data from the central control module. Their armament was expected to be ballistic missiles or unpowered nuclear glide bombs. The primary mission of the battle station was to attack high-value targets on earth. This system, which violated prevailing treaties on the militarisation of space, apparently did not proceed beyond design studies.
Jane's



The title of the thread is Russian KKV capability. It really doesn't have anything to do with it. Cooling off a warhead is unrealistic and redundant is my point.
You're running around in circles.

Let me bring to your attention what you said:

"BMD is several layers. If the mid-course interceptors fail there is a backup which makes the idea of warheads with a freezer system redundant. It is already hard enough to minaturise payloads to carry multiple MIRVs. Making MIRV payloads with their own freezer units would take up too much space to be practical when they would be easily detectable entering the atmosphere anyway."

You're talking about the "several layers of a BMD system". When, as you just pointed out, the topic of this thread is about Russia's "KKV capabilities". I'm telling you that your telling me about the 'several layers' of a BMD system is irrelevant to this discussion, for if an exo-atmospheric KKV interceptor is defeated, then a country has to rely on nuclear directional explosive warheads/endoatmospheric interceptors to meet the missile, putting them in the realm of other countries that have not perfected 'KKV' technologies, and making the concept and development of 'KKV' redundant in that defeat.

This entire chain of conversation started with me saying that I found KKV 'not as great' as it was touted, because of the several countermeasures that could defeat it.



What?

How do you stick a warhead in a balloon? You going to run a ship in a bottle too? :sarcastic:
You don't stick the warhead in all the balloons, you dimwit. Now, you're just beginning to tick me off.

I explained to you in detail the whole concept of how anti-simulation decoy balloons work. Warheads are put in only a limited number of balloons, with the other balloons- the vast majority of them- configured with shells to resemble the radar reflections, motions and shapes of the real balloons. They contain no fissile material. These are then deployed simultaneously in a co-axial relationship with the few or even a real warhead, in the same trajectory, because of the atmospheric pressures at that altitude.


No KKV...
Again, Refer to the above.


S-300V was upgraded to S-300VM, its role is for high altitude and missile defence. None of the PMU series have the engagement altitude of the V series.
What ? Are you trippin'? The problem wit you is that you're separating my paragraphs into disjunct lines so you that can be cocky. Don't. Even though the S-300V is upgraded to the Antey VM now, I just gave you a link saying that: "Russia is currently working on integrating the Russian made Tor M-1 and S-300 PMU-1 systems into a unified air defense system."

Read the last line of this:

Antey-2500 (S-300V / SA-12 / SA-23)

Let me also tell you that the difference between the the engagement altitudes of the S-300VM vis-a-vis the PMU are far less than you've imagined. The S-300 VM has an engagement altitude for ballistic targets of "upto 30 km".

http://en.allexperts.com/e/s/s/s-300vm.htm

The S-300 PMU-1 'can engage targets at ranges of 5-150km, and at altitudes between 10m and 27,000m'.

http://cns.miis.edu/cyprus/s300tdms.htm


We are discussing Russia's modern ABM capabilities, S-300V(M) is the best they have and it is nowhere close to mid-course intercept or KKV.
You understand that the guidance system can be applied to other missiles? You understand that by incorporating a seeker into the missile and electronics to amplify, demodulate and analyse the direction of the target, the S-300V(M) can be modified into Track Via Missile active radar homing, and is in all likelihood, already being worked on, as any rational, self-seeking country would do, if not already. Furthermore you understand, that this is not a difficult process? See: ACTIVE AND SEMIACTIVE RADAR MISSILE GUIDANCE. The fact is that the technology is developed, and therefore exists. End of discussion.


Redundant to the point there was no KKV intercept.
No. Redundant to this discussion, and redundant to your contribution to my information.
 

Armand2REP

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Yeh, and what authority are you?

I have a tendency to believe that website because of the quality of discussions I've read there over the years, and because of the stellar coterie of its patrons.
You can believe whatever you want, Je m'en fiche. Your beliefs however do not equate to fact or evidence.

No, it ain't.

Your google search provides no indication anywhere that Rockville is "10 km" from Washington, nor do any of the links in it.

Here let me help you out:

http://www.findlocalweather.com/for...2x=Rockville,+MD&Find+distance=How+far+is+it?

WikiAnswers - What is the distance between Rockville MD and Washington DC
You know how to read the map legend? 10km to the District border, it ain't hard. You know how to read a google search? Rockville, Washington DC suburb listed six times on the first page, it is all right there in front of your face.

You have a problem with your logic. I said: "nobody in New York says they live in Stamford, and vice versa." Let me make this simple for you: if you live in New York, you don't say you live in Stamford. And if you live in Stamford, you don't say you live in New York. Living in this side of the world, I would know. Just as, if you live in D.C., you don't say you live in Rockville, and if you live in Rockville, you don't say you live in D.C.
A search of the White Pages doesn't bring up Ryan Crierie in DC, he is listed now in Silver Spring which is 3km closer to the DC border than Rockville. All of this is in the DC metro area, when someone out of town asks where are you from, you will mention the metro area, not the suburb. That is common knowledge that has apparently slipped your experience.

Point proven.
Point failed... there is no Ryan Crierie listed in DC according to the White Pages. He lives in Silver Spring 5 miles north with his brother. :sarcastic:


ROFLMAO. so that doesn't make China the "second country to have successfully accomplished a mid-course interception, using KKV technologies, does it?
If that is what they used, it wouldn't.

Give me a link that says they stopped working on the system in 1982- specifically, the KKV system.
They never had an active KKV system, 1982 was the end of their co-orbital testsusing explosives as cited in the Union of Concerned Scientist link I have already provided.


My link from the 1985 FAS article says:

"The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic energy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilometers per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum.

Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid 1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are adequate for effective kinetic energy weapons for use against some objects in space. "

That directly disproves your point above about them "having quit in 1982".
It doesn't disprove anything I have said. The Soviets stopped testing new interceptors in 1982, they never deployed any of that science fiction you cited.


Your link says:

What do you take me for, a smoking crack? The 1970's is not the 1980's.

Your link also says this:


Seeing as virtually all of the 'commentators' on that website have access to "priviledged information", including those who claim privileged access to the White House, I don't see why they wouldn't have access to information you would not.
I take you for a believer of US ColdWar propoganda. Just as Chenny and the CIA doctored the Iraqi threat, the neocons and the CIA did the same with the Soviet threat.

A recently declassified study on Soviet intentions during the Cold War identifies significant failures in U.S. intelligence analysis on Soviet military intentions and demonstrates the constant exaggeration of the Soviet threat.

The study, which was released last week by George Washington University’s National Security Archive, was prepared by a Pentagon contractor in 1995 that had access to former senior Soviet defense officials, military officers, and industrial specialists...

The neocons (known as Team B) and the CIA (Team A) then wrongly predicted a series of Soviet weapons developments that never took place, including directed energy weapons, mobile ABM systems, and anti-satellite capabilities. CIA deputy director Gates used this worst-case reasoning in a series of speeches to insinuate himself with CIA director Bill Casey and the Reagan administration.

Exaggeration Of The Threat: Then And Now | The Public Record
According to the authors' sources, for guidance on strategic policy Brezhnev came to rely heavily on Professor Mstislav Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who opposed major investments in ABMs and supported arms control and more survivable ICBMs. [I: 50-52, 53; II: 82 (Illarionov)]

Candid Interviews with Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades


Here is further evidence to suggest that the Russians had developed atleast a rudimentary KEI capability as early as the 1980's. The report is from 1997, so you can't claim those 80's reports were exaggerated even though your site states 1976 :sarcastic:
Space battle stations?? :sarcastic: :sarcastic:


You're running around in circles.

This entire chain of conversation started with me saying that I found KKV 'not as great' as it was touted, because of the several countermeasure that could defeat it.
You sidetracked the conversation by bringing it up, if you want to talk about the effectiveness of certain countermeasures you have to look at the entire system. BMD isn't just midcourse interceptors.

You don't stick the warhead in all the balloons, you dimwit. Now, you're just beginning to tick me off.
I never said stick the warhead in all the balloons. I asked you how you plan on getting warheads in a balloon.


I explained to you in detail the whole concept of how anti-simulation decoy balloons work. Warheads are put in only a limited number of balloons, with the other balloons- the vast majority of them- configured with shells to resemble the radar reflections, motions and shapes of the real balloons. They contain no fissile material. These are then deployed simultaneously in a co-axial relationship with the few or even a real warhead, in the same trajectory, because of the atmospheric pressures at that altitude.
So how do they get it inside a balloon? Then how do you keep the gas expansion from throwing the payload off course? Then how do you keep the balloon from burning up in the atmosphere and revealing the real payload? It is just easier to make dummy warheads with the same casing as the real payload than waste your time with a balloon.

Again, Refer to the above.
Again... more ColdWar hype.

What ? Are you trippin'? The problem wit you is that you're separating my paragraphs into disjunct lines so you that can be cocky. Don't. Even though the S-300V is upgraded to the Antey VM now, I just gave you a link saying that: "Russia is currently working on integrating the Russian made Tor M-1 and S-300 PMU-1 systems into a unified air defense system."

Read the last line of this:

Antey-2500 (S-300V / SA-12 / SA-23)
The problem wit you is that you're mind is still euphoric on Cold War propoganda. Tor-M1 is designed to provide point defence of high-value targets including S-300. Integrating it into an IADs doesn't make one iota of difference for BMD. S-300V(M) will take the top tier of any IADs the Russians make and includes greater emphasis on BMD than any other system until S-500 comes out.



You understand that the guidance system can be applied to other missiles? You understand that by incorporating a seeker into the missile and electronics to amplify, demodulate and analyse the direction of the target, the S-300V(M) can be modified into Track Via Missile active radar homing, and is in all likelihood, already being worked on, as any rational, self-seeking country would do, if not already. Furthermore you understand, that this is not a difficult process? See: ACTIVE AND SEMIACTIVE RADAR MISSILE GUIDANCE. The fact is that the technology is developed, and therefore exists. End of discussion.
I'm not concerned with the guidance system, I'm concerned with the control surfaces. Fins don't work in outerspace or the upper reaches of the atmosphere. Without a quantum leap in DACs and highspeed control loop technology, the S-300V(M) will remain an endoatmospheric interceptor. I presume the Russians are working on the needed technologies for S-500 which will replace S-300V(M) as their primary mobile BMD.
 

Rage

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You can believe whatever you want, Je m'en fiche. Your beliefs however do not equate to fact or evidence.
ça m'est égal. And that goes all the same to you.

You know how to read the map legend? 10km to the District border, it ain't hard. You know how to read a google search? Rockville, Washington DC suburb listed six times on the first page, it is all right there in front of your face.

A search of the White Pages doesn't bring up Ryan Crierie in DC, he is listed now in Silver Spring which is 3km closer to the DC border than Rockville. All of this is in the DC metro area, when someone out of town asks where are you from, you will mention the metro area, not the suburb. That is common knowledge that has apparently slipped your experience.

Point failed... there is no Ryan Crierie listed in DC according to the White Pages. He lives in Silver Spring 5 miles north with his brother.

So, now you tell me, if our man montage lives in one suburb, why would he say he lives in another? If as your "legend" would indicate, our man montage lives in Silver Spring, which is clearly closer to D.C. than it is to Rockville, why would he say he lives in Rockville? Or is it customary to tell an outsider when he asks you where you live, that you live in an even more obscure neighborhood to him, which is farther from your actual residence the than the most well-known city in the area?


I am going to answer only the relevant part since I grow weary of this argument.


Space battle stations?? :sarcastic: :sarcastic:
Yeah.

Soviet Space Battle Station Skif and Its Prototype Polus


You sidetracked the conversation by bringing it up, if you want to talk about the effectiveness of certain countermeasures you have to look at the entire system. BMD isn't just midcourse interceptors.
I did say, "As an aside....".

The effectiveness of countermeasures is here evaluated only w.r.t. to the KKV system. I know that the BMD system isn't just midcourse inteceptors, and it will eventually overwhelm those countermeasures either by other means such as nucklear interceptors in the exoatmosphere or endoatmospheric interceptors. But the fact that the KKV system can be defeated by relatively simple countermeasures, rendering its present known and near future technologies useless with respect to those countermeasures is my point.


I never said stick the warhead in all the balloons. I asked you how you plan on getting warheads in a balloon.

So how do they get it inside a balloon? Then how do you keep the gas expansion from throwing the payload off course? Then how do you keep the balloon from burning up in the atmosphere and revealing the real payload? It is just easier to make dummy warheads with the same casing as the real payload than waste your time with a balloon.

And why is that a problem? The warhead/s is/are hid in anti-simulation balloon decoys that use alumnized mylar balloons that inflate in space with technology similar to airbags in cars. The balloons surround and encapsulate both the RV's and the decoys, so that the RV's and decoys are made to resemble each other. There is littler or no trajectory turbulence because a simple gas generator containing a few grams of material or compressed gas is used, or alternatively an internal inflation system similar to that used in the meter balloon:



For example:

Depending on the preferences of the adversary, this
countermeasure could take the form of a large enclosing
balloon around the reentry vehicle that contains the nuclear
warhead. Immediately after achieving full velocity, the
warhead would separate from the final stage of the missile,
and a simple gas generator containing a few grams of
material (like that in every airbag in modern automobiles)
would gently inflate a metallized plastic balloon that had
been crumpled down onto the warhead by a household vacuum
cleaner exhausting most of the air. Or inflation could be
done simply by compressed gas. A warhead that might be five
feet long could be enclosed in a balloon 30 ft in diameter,
so that it would be perfectly well visible to the radars and
to the hit-to-kill homing vehicle of the ground-based
interceptor. But the homing vehicle which would strike the
balloon (if all goes according to plan) would have very
little probability of striking the warhead contained within.
A thin aluminum coat on the plastic is opaque to radar and
also to infrared invisible light, which are the means by
which the homing kill vehicle (HKV) is expected to strike
its target.
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE


Now, to impart radar simulation decoy characteristics and to retain structural integrity, activated carbon fibers of high surface area are used in the structural matrix, as well as a reinforcingly effective amount of non-ignitable binder fiber, to provide the activated carbonfiber matrix sufficient mechanical strength. More sophisticated models could also be equipped with verniers, allowing them to register on infra-red sensors and to maneuever in a realistic fashion. It doesn't burn because the material used is biaxially-oriented polyethylene terephthalate (boPET), a polyester film made from stretched polyethylene terephthalate, that has among its basic qualities high tensile strength, chemical and dimensional stability, transparency, reflectivity, gas and aroma barrier properties and electrical insulation. It doesn't burn because metallized boPET is the same material used in solar sails as an alternative means of propulsion for spacecraft.


It is not just more difficult but more expensive to make dummy warheads than to make decoy balloons.

For a specific discussion why, view the last paragraph of pg. 2 onwards of this brief:

http://www.twq.com/summer00/garwin.pdf


The problem wit you is that you're mind is still euphoric on Cold War propoganda. Tor-M1 is designed to provide point defence of high-value targets including S-300. Integrating it into an IADs doesn't make one iota of difference for BMD. S-300V(M) will take the top tier of any IADs the Russians make and includes greater emphasis on BMD than any other system until S-500 comes out.
You've misunderstood the purpose and intent of the paragraph: the point was not to convey the integration of the Tor-M1 as point area defence into the ABM system, but the integration of the S-300PMU. The S-300PMU has several advantages over the VM, including better guidance, range, speed, the better and more capable 30N6E TOMB STONE radar, the use of two new missiles, the 9M96E1 and 9M96E2 both with significantly smaller weights and warheads, and a gas-dynamic system for a much better probability-of-kill, in exchange for a marginally mitigated engagement altitude.



I'm not concerned with the guidance system, I'm concerned with the control surfaces. Fins don't work in outerspace or the upper reaches of the atmosphere. I presume the Russians are working on the needed technologies for S-500 which will replace S-300V(M) as their primary mobile BMD.
Hence the gas dynamic system, as supplement to aerodynamic fins.
S-300PMU2 Favorit SA-20 GARGOYLE



And I apologize for having lost my cool.
 

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