This is a interesting debate between Scott Ritter and Larry C. Johnson. I think if NATO is really in this for the long term (The next 10 years,) he might have a good point. However, how can the US cope if China invades Taiwan? Also I don't think it's realistic that America or the world can afford a long dragged out conflict. Plus Russia will win at all cost, and there is nothing NATO can do about it. Maybe for the next few months NATO can help drag it out, but not much past that. This insanity needs to stop. Skrew Ukraine and Zelensky, they're not worth it.
DEBATING SCOTT RITTER
22 May 2022 by
Larry Johnson
I present this background because I take issue with the substance of his latest interview with Sputnick. As a sideline, it is worth noting that Scott’s critique of the Russian military strategy is not silenced by Sputnick. They published it. Please show me one American media outlet that would allow a critique of the Biden policy? There is not one.
Scott is insisting that Biden’s decision to supply Ukraine with $40 billion dollars is a “game changer.” Here is
what he wrote in response to questions from Sputnik:
I think Scott is wrong. Let me explain.
Money may make the world go around but it does not magically produce trained, enthusiastic troops willing and capable of using such weapons. During my time at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Counter Terrorism, I was the Deputy Director for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Training Program (ATAP). We discovered that no matter how much money the United States wanted to supply to a specific country to combat terrorism we reached a saturation point. We learned that you reach a point where there are no more people to train or the recipients of the training could not absorb the support.
Ukraine’s problem right now is not a lack of equipment. The had combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery and drones. Russia destroyed a significant amount of that materiel and killed the soldiers and pilots who were trained to operate those systems. Training replacements–competent replacements–can not be accomplished in a one or two day seminar. Training a pilot or an artillery crew, for example, requires weeks and, in some circumstances, months of instruction before the trainees are ready to go to battle.
As I noted in my previous post, the U.S. decision to send M-155 howitzers to Ukraine is another meaningless gesture. These guns can only get into position by being towed by a vehicle. Once the howitzer is set up and starts firing it is immediately vulnerable to counter battery fire. The best method to counteract counter battery fire is to move the artillery piece to a new location immediately after it fires. You can not do this with the M-155.
I have yet to see a list of the equipment this $40 billion is supposed to buy for Ukraine, but it does not appear that the United States is sending its best first generation weapons. Up to this point we have not seen a single instance of the Ukrainian military mounting a counter attack with air and land assets against Russian forces and winning the day. When the Azov battalion was surrounded at Azovstal, we did not see the Ukrainians attempt an operation akin to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s failed attempt to rescue Field Marshal von Paulus at Stalingrad. The answer is simple–the Ukrainians either did not have such a force with the capability to save the Azov thugs or it feared that Russia’s air power and artillery would wipe out or inflict unacceptable casualties on a rescue force. Hence, Azov surrendered unconditionally.
Scott Ritter sees the training of Ukrainian troops in Poland and Germany as a critical variable that could really hurt the Russians. Training reinforcements on new technology might be a potential game changer if the situation on the ground in Ukraine was static. It is not. Russia is grinding down the entrenched Ukrainian forces in the Donbass . Russia is shooting down any Ukrainian planes that dare to take off. Russia is destroying artillery and tank emplacements with counter battery fire. Russia is shooting down drones with regularity. Even if those new trainees graduate and are deployed to the eastern maelstrom, their ability to function as a competent combat unit is limited by Ukraine’s existing and growing deficiencies.
Scott also asserts that intelligence sharing gives the Ukrainians an edge. When you provide intelligence on Russian troop movements, locations or plans, there is an assumption that the recipients of that intelligence will be able to do something to hurt the Russians. How did that work out in Mariupol? How about fending off the Russian missile attack in Desna. In my view, sharing intelligence with Ukraine is an effort in futility. Am empty gesture that will not change anything on the ground.
https://sonar21.com/debating-scott-ritter/