Putin has Defended the Nazi-Soviet Pact

[asianobserve]

Putin has defended the Nazi-Soviet pact. Time for the west to wake up | Linas Linkevičius | Comment is free | The Guardian

Vladimir Putin has stated that there was nothing wrong with the Nazi-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which was made 75 years ago on 23 August 1939. The Soviet Union simply did not want to go to war, Putin added.

Vladimir Putin says there was nothing wrong with Soviet Union's pact with Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany - Telegraph

Vladimir Putin has said there was nothing bad about the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the non-aggression treaty which led to the carve-up of Poland at the outset of the Second World War, suggesting Britain and France were to blame for Adolf Hitler's march into Europe.

 

[pmaitra]

Putin is right.

Yes, I know western propaganda masquerading as "news-sites" would have been happier had the war started earlier resulting in deaths of the people of the USSR, but what Stalin did, he did for the benefit of his country. A leader who looks out for his own people is a leader worth respecting.

Perhaps el-Guardiane should try to explain why the British government secretly supported the rise of Hitler?

Yet another pathetic article to deflect from the fact that the west is supporting the Ukro-Nazis.

 

[asianobserve]

Putin is right.

Yes, I know western propaganda masquerading as "news-sites" would have been happier had the war started earlier resulting in deaths of the people of the USSR, but what Stalin did, he did for the benefit of his country. A leader who looks out for his own people is a leader worth respecting.

Perhaps el-Guardiane should try to explain why the British government secretly supported the rise of Hitler?

Yet another pathetic article to deflect from the fact that the west is supporting the Ukro-Nazis.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ensured that WW2 really happened and sooner. The Western powers were doing everything they can to prevent war by appeasing Hitler (they gave him the smaller countries without much grumbling), that Hitler ass-licking defeatest Chamberlain even allowed himself to be fooled by Hitler just so he can have his peace in Europe dream. But POland was a different story since it was allied with UK and France. So he needed the USSR to be on board first so that even if UK and France decides to go to the aid of Poland then at least the USSR is not a threat (he knows that the USSR was salivating to get back what it believes was its rightful territory in Poland). Hitelr does not want to immediately open up 2 fronts (West and East) when they march into Poland.

 

[pmaitra]

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ensured that WW2 really happened and sooner. The Western powers were doing everything they can to prevent war by appeasing Hitler (they gave him the smaller countries without much grumbling), that Hitler ass-licking defeatest Chamberlain even allowed himself to be fooled by Hitler just so he can have his peace in Europe dream. But POland was a different story since it was allied with UK and France. So he needed the USSR to be on board first so that even if UK and France decides to go to the aid of Poland then at least the USSR is not a threat (he knows that the USSR was salivating to get back what it believes was its rightful territory in Poland). Hitelr does not want to immediately open up 2 fronts (West and East) when they march into Poland.

I am not disputing what you are saying about the other instances. They are correct.

Hitler hated the Russians, and the Russians knew it.

It was a game of chess being played at that time. The west hoped Hitler would invade USSR first, and Stalin's job was to somehow give Hitler a reason not to invade the USSR, but allowing resources from Russia and from the territories controlled by Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, and allow the Germans to carry out training and tests on Soviet territory, and in return get some technological knowledge from the Germans, which would eventually give the USSR more capability to produce armaments, in case it had to fight the Germans, because, Stalin knew that a German invasion was going to happen, sooner or later.

 

[asianobserve]

I am not disputing what you are saying about the other instances. They are correct.

Hitler hated the Russians, and the Russians knew it.

It was a game of chess being played at that time. The west hoped Hitler would invade USSR first, and Stalin's job was to somehow give Hitler a reason not to invade the USSR, but allowing resources from Russia and from the territories controlled by Japan via the Trans-Siberian Railway, and allow the Germans to carry out training and tests on Soviet territory, and in return get some technological knowledge from the Germans, which would eventually give the USSR more capability to produce armaments, in case it had to fight the Germans, because, Stalin knew that a German invasion was going to happen, sooner or later.

I don't think the West wanted Germany to invade Russia. The West was still in dire financial condition in 1939 and its population was still trying to forget the carnage and devastation of WW1 and was certainly had no appetite for a new European war.

It was true that the West had no love for the USSR at the time (well until the dissolution of the USSR). But the West was in no mood for a war even between Germany and Russia since it would surely drag them into it. Remember that Poland lie in between Germany and Russia and any war between these two powers will include the violation of Polish sovereignty. And since UK, France and POland were allies at the time, any attack on Poland would have surely sucked UK and France into the War.

 

[pmaitra]

I don't think the West wanted Germany to invade Russia. The West was still in dire financial condition in 1939 and its population was still trying to forget the carnage and devastation of WW1 and was certainly had no appetite for a new European war.

It was true that the West had no love for the USSR at the time (well until the dissolution of the USSR). But the West was in no mood for a war even between Germany and Russia since it would surely drag them into it. Remember that Poland lie in between Germany and Russia and any war between these two powers will include the violation of Polish sovereignty. And since UK, France and POland were allies at the time, any attack on Poland would have surely sucked UK and France into the War.

Whether the west wanted Germany to invade Russia or not is debatable. What is certain is that Hitler hated the Russians. It is also certain that Hitler wanted to avenge the French for the humiliation of WWI, of which, Hitler was a veteran.

We can conclude that Hitler deeply wished to attack the Russians (USSR), and the French, which he did eventually.

 

[pmaitra]

This railway coach had a special significance to Hitler.

 

[asianobserve]

Whether the west wanted Germany to invade Russia or not is debatable. What is certain is that Hitler hated the Russians. It is also certain that Hitler wanted to avenge the French for the humiliation of WWI, of which, Hitler was a veteran.

We can conclude that Hitler deeply wished to attack the Russians (USSR), and the French, which he did eventually.

There's no dispute about Hitler's dislike and ideological differences with the Soviets. But if the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is any indication it appears that he dislikes the West more than the USSR since he is more willing to enter into a pact with the latter against the West (Poland was part of the Western Alliance at the time).

 

[pmaitra]

There's no dispute about Hitler's dislike and ideological differences with the Soviets. But if the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is any indication it appears that he dislikes the West more than the USSR since he is more willing to enter into a pact with the latter against the West (Poland was part of the Western Alliance at the time).

That is an assumption. His dislike against the west was political, but his dislike against the Russians was racial. Political differences are temporary, racial differences are not. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a product of the circumstances.

 

[asianobserve]

That is an assumption. His dislike against the west was political, but his dislike against the Russians was racial. Political differences are temporary, racial differences are not. Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a product of the circumstances.

Hitler's dislike for the Soviets were not only racial but also ideological. From the start of the rise of NAZIsm Hitler had consistently declared that Marxism as their enemy (German communists were among the first to be rounded up and exterminated by the NAZIs). But I think Stalin's opportunistic instinct got the best of him when he decided to take German's non-aggression and spheres of influence proposal.

Had Stalin only resisted the temptation of partaking in Hitler's proposal to carve up Poland then I have no doubt that the latter would have had second thoughts of invading Poland as it would mean that he will simultaneously face the four biggest military powers in Europe (UK, France and Poland, and USSR).

 

[pmaitra]

Hitler's dislike for the Soviets were not only racial but also ideological. From the start of the rise of NAZIsm Hitler had consistently declared that Marxism as their enemy (German communists were among the first to be rounded up and exterminated by the NAZIs). But I think Stalin's opportunistic instinct got the best of him when he decided to take German's non-aggression and spheres of influence proposal.

Had Stalin only resisted the temptation of partaking in Hitler's proposal to carve up Poland then I have no doubt that the latter would have had second thoughts of invading Poland as it would mean that he will simultaneously face the four biggest military powers in Europe (UK, France and Poland, and USSR).

I have a slightly different view.

Stalin had no choice. He had already purged many of the well trained Russian generals because they were loyal to the Tsarist cause, and knew that his army of peasants was going to have a hard time fighting the trained German army. He had no opportunity, except an opportunity to settle for a crucial peace, even if temporary.

Carving up Poland was not a temptation. It was merely a buffer. Had Staling not carved up Poland, all of it would have been occupied by Hitler.

 

[asianobserve]

I have a slightly different view.

Stalin had no choice. He had already purged many of the well trained Russian generals because they were loyal to the Tsarist cause, and knew that his army of peasants was going to have a hard time fighting the trained German army. He had no opportunity, except an opportunity to settle for a crucial peace, even if temporary.

Carving up Poland was not a temptation. It was merely a buffer. Had Staling not carved up Poland, all of it would have been occupied by Hitler.

If Stalin's intention in invading Poland was only defensive then why did he order the extermination of the POlish leadership, its military officers and people who could be leaders? You have to reconcile that dark part of Soviet's history in Poland since the extermination order did not come from impulse.

But you know what I think, Stalin was compelled by these 3 main factors (in the order of importance):

1. Stalin wants to get Eastern Poland, which it believed it is entitled to;
2. Stalin wants to avenge Soviet shame when they lost their first war against Poland; and,
3. Stalin wants a buffer zone for what he believed would be a war between capitalists in Europe.

 

[jouni]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8raDPASvq0

Here is a secret recording from Mannerheims birthday. Hitler talks about his reasons for war and other things.

 

[Ray]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8raDPASvq0

Here is a secret recording from Mannerheims birthday. Hitler talks about his reasons for war and other things.

This indicates that militarily the Germans were not that superduper in their mode of conducting warfare since they were violating most Principles of War.

But then it must be that the others were worse.

 

[Ray]

New Evidence on the 1941 'Barbarossa' Attack:
Why Hitler Attacked Soviet Russia When He Did

Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg ("Stalin's Trap: He Wanted War"), by Adolf von Thadden. Rosenheim: Kultur und Zeitgeschichte/Archiv der Zeit, 1996. Hardcover. 170 pages. Photos. Bibliography.

Until his death in July 1996, Adolf von Thadden was a prominent and respected figure in German "right wing" or "nationalist" (conservative) circles. note 1 In this, his final book, this prolific writer concisely and cogently explains why Hitler was compelled, for both political and military reasons, to launch his preemptive strike against the Soviet Union when and how he did. "Stalin's Trap" is also his final legacy to future generations, a sort of testament to young Germans.

For decades the prevailing and more or less official view in the United States and Europe has been that a race-crazed Adolf Hitler, without warning or provocation, betrayed a trusting Josef Stalin by launching a treacherous surprise attack against the totally unprepared Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Von Thadden's book -- which is based in large part on recently uncovered evidence from Russian archives, Stalin's own statements, and new revelations of Russian military specialists -- persuasively debunks this view.

Many Soviet documents captured by the Germans during the course of the war, as well as German intelligence reports on the Soviet buildup in 1941, amply justify Hitler's decision to strike. Presented before an impartial tribunal, this evidence surely would have exonerated the German military and political leadership. Unfortunately, all of these documents were confiscated and kept by the victorious Allies.

In his lengthy December 11, 1941, speech declaring war against the United States, Hitler described in detail the Soviet menace, which was being aided and abetted by Britain and the (still officially neutral) USA. In this historic Reichstag address, the German leader said: note 2

"Already in 1940 it became increasingly clear from month to month that the plans of the men in the Kremlin were aimed at the domination, and thus the destruction, of all of Europe. I have already told the nation of the build-up of Soviet Russian military power in the East during a period when Germany had only a few divisions in the provinces bordering Soviet Russia. Only a blind person could fail to see that a military build-up of unique world-historical dimensions was being carried out. And this was not in order to protect something that was being threatened, but rather only to attack that which seemed incapable of defense ...

"When I became aware of the possibility of a threat to the east of the Reich in 1940 through [secret] reports from the British House of Commons and by observations of Soviet Russian troop movements on our frontiers, I immediately ordered the formation of many new armored, motorized and infantry divisions ...

"We realized very clearly that under no circumstances could we allow the enemy the opportunity to strike first into our rear. Nevertheless, the decision in this case was a very difficult one ...

"A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available that confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time, and has given me the strength to do what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence.

"I may say this today: If the wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost ..."

During the great Nuremberg trial of 1945-1946, former high-level Third Reich officials testified about the background to the Barbarossa attack, describing the Soviet threat in 1941, and the staggering amounts of war materiel they encountered after their forces penetrated Soviet territory. But this evidence was brusquely dismissed by the Tribunal's Allied-appointed judges.

Von Thadden cites, for example, the Nuremberg testimony of Hermann Göring: note 3

"We learned very quickly, through our close relations with Yugoslavia, the background of General Simovic's coup [in Belgrade on March 27, 1941]. Shortly afterwards it was confirmed that the information from Yugoslavia was correct, namely, that a strong Russian political influence existed, as well as extensive financial assistance for the undertaking on the part of England, of which we later found proof. It was clear that this venture was directed against the friendly policy of the previous Yugoslav government toward Germany ...

"The new Yugoslav government, quite obviously and beyond doubt, clearly stood in closest relationship with the enemies we had at that time, that is to say, England and, in this connection, with the enemy to be, Russia.

"The Simovic affair was definitely the final and decisive factor that dispelled the Führer's very last scruples about Russia's attitude, and prompted him to take preventive measures in that direction under all circumstances."

As von Thadden also relates, General Alfred Jodl, one of Hitler's closest military advisors, similarly testified before the Nuremberg Tribunal about Germany's "Barbarossa" attack: note 4

"It was undeniably a purely preventive war. What we found out later on was the certainty of enormous Russian military preparations opposite our frontier. I will dispense with details, but I can only say that although we succeeded in a tactical surprise as to the day and the hour, it was no strategic surprise. Russia was fully prepared for war."

Allied authorities at Nuremberg denied to the German defendants access to the documents that would have exonerated them. note 5 Germany's military and political leaders were hanged, committed suicide, or were deported to the Soviet Union for slave labor or execution. As a result, the task of setting straight the historical record has been left to others, including scholars in Russia and the United States, as well as such honorable Germans as von Thadden.

Further evidence cited by von Thadden about the German-Russian clash was provided by Andrei Vlassov, a prominent Soviet Russian general who had been captured by the Germans. During a conversation in 1942 with SS general Richard Hildebrandt, he was asked if Stalin had intended to attack Germany, and if so, when. As Hildebrandt later related:

"Vlassov responded by saying that the attack was planned for August-September 1941. The Russians had been preparing the attack since the beginning of the year, which took quite a while because of the poor Russian railroad network. Hitler had sized up the situation entirely correctly, and had struck directly into the Russian buildup. This, said Vlassov, is the reason for the tremendous initial German successes."

No one has done more than Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), a one-time Soviet military intelligence officer, to show that Stalin was preparing to attack Germany and the West as part of a long-range project for global Sovietization, and that Hitler had no rational alternative but to counter this by launching his own attack. (note 6) In "Stalin's Trap," von Thadden discusses and confirms Suvorov's analysis, while also citing the findings of other Russian military historians who, working in archives accessible only since 1990, support and elaborate on Suvorov's work. These include retired Soviet Colonel Aleksei Filipov, who wrote "The Red Army's State of War Preparedness in June 1941," an article published in 1992 in the Russian military journal, Voyenni Vestnik, and Valeri Danilov, another retired Soviet Colonel, who wrote "Did the General Staff of the Red Army Plan a Preventive Strike Against Germany?," which appeared first in a Russian newspaper, and later, in translation, in the respected Austrian military journal, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift.

On the 46th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, the influential Moscow daily Pravda (May 8, 1991) told readers:

"Unrealistic [Soviet] plans of an offensive nature were drawn up before the war as a result of an overestimation of our own capabilities and an underestimation of the enemy's. In accordance with these plans we began deploying our forces on the western frontier. But the enemy beat us to it."

More recently, two prominent European historians, one German and one Austrian, have presented further evidence of Soviet preparations for an attack against Germany. The first of these is Joachim Hoffmann, who for many years was a historian with the renowned Military History Research Center in Freiburg. He lays out his evidence in Stalins Vernichtungskrieg, 1941-1945 ("Stalin's War of Annihilation"), a work of some 300 pages that has appeared in at least three editions. The second is Heinz Magenheimer, a member of the Academy of National Defense in Vienna, and an editor of the Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift. His detailed book has recently appeared in English under the title Hitler's War: German Military Strategy, 1940-1945 (London: 1998).

Von Thadden also reviews a series of articles in the German weekly Der Spiegel about Soviet plans, worked out by General Georgi Zhukov, to attack northern Germany and Romania in early 1941. Commenting on this, Colonel Vladimir Karpov has stated:

"Just imagine if Zhukov's plan had been accepted and implemented. At dawn one morning in May or June thousands of our aircraft and tens of thousands of our artillery pieces would have struck against densely concentrated enemy forces, whose positions were known down to the battalion level -- a surprise even more inconceivable than the German attack on us."

Stalin's Speeches

Von Thadden cites and quotes at length from several speeches by Stalin, as well as from an order he issued in 1943. According to the author, these show that Stalin -- like his predecessor, Lenin -- always considered war to be the ultimate vehicle by which to promote world Communist revolution and usher in the global dictatorship of the proletariat.

Perhaps the most revealing of these speeches is Stalin's address to a Politburo meeting on August 19, 1939. Delivered to an intimate circle of associates, it shows his astute but utterly cynical evaluation of political forces, and reveals his cunning foresight. (To this writer's knowledge, no American historian has yet taken public notice of this speech.)

Stalin delivered this speech just as Soviet officials were negotiating with British and French representatives about a possible military alliance with Britain and France, and as German and Soviet officials were discussing a possible non-aggression pact between their countries. Four days after this speech, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop met with Stalin in the Kremlin to sign the German-Soviet non-aggression pact.

It is important to point out here that Stalin could have prevented war in 1939 by agreeing to support Britain and France in their "guarantee" of support to Poland, or simply by announcing that the Soviet Union would firmly oppose any violation by Germany of Polish territory. He decided instead to give Hitler a "green light" to attack Poland, fully anticipating that Britain and France would then declare war on Germany, making the localized conflict into a full-scale, Europe-wide war.

In this speech, Stalin laid out his shrewd and calculating view of the European situation:

"The question of war or peace has entered a critical phase for us. If we conclude a mutual assistance pact with France and Great Britain, Germany will back off from Poland and seek a modus vivendi with the Western powers. War would be avoided, but down the road events could become dangerous for the USSR. If we accept Germany's proposal and conclude a non-aggression pact with her, she will of course invade Poland, and the intervention of France and England in that would be unavoidable. Western Europe would be subjected to serious upheavals and disorder. Under those conditions, we would have a great opportunity to stay out of the conflict, and we could plan the opportune time for us to enter the war.

"The experience of the last 20 years has shown that in peacetime the Communist movement is never strong enough to seize power. The dictatorship of such a party will only become possible as the result of a major war.

"Our choice is clear. We must accept the German proposal and politely send the Anglo-French mission home. Our immediate advantage will be to take Poland to the gates of Warsaw, as well as Ukrainian Galicia ...

"For the realization of these plans it is essential that the war continue for a long as possible, and all forces, with which we are actively involved, should be directed toward this goal ...

"Let us consider a second possibility, that is, a victory by Germany... It is obvious that Germany will be too occupied elsewhere to turn against us. In a conquered France, the French Communist Party will be very strong. The Communist revolution will break out unavoidably, and we will be able to fully exploit this situation to come to the aid of France and make it our ally. In addition, all the nations that fall under the "protection" of a victorious Germany will also become our allies. This presents for us a broad field of action in which to develop the world revolution.

"Comrades! It is in the interest of the USSR -- the workers' homeland -- that war breaks out between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French block. Everything should be done so that this drags out as long as possible with the goal of weakening both sides. For this reason, it is imperative that we agree to conclude the pact proposed by Germany, and then work that this war, which will one day be declared, is carried out after the greatest possible passage of time..."

The Soviet leader's daring calculation to use Germany as an "icebreaker" for war was, von Thadden says, "Stalin's trap."

A version of this speech has been known since 1939, but for decades it has been widely dismissed as a fraud. However, in 1994 Russian historians found an authoritative text of it in a special secret Soviet archive, and quickly published it in a prominent Russian scholarly journal, as well as in an academic publication of Novosibirsk University. note 7 Shortly after this August 1939 speech, von Thadden points out, Stalin ordered a two-year military mobilization plan, a massive project that culminated in the summer of 1941 with powerful Soviet forces poised to strike westwards against Germany and the rest of Europe.

On May 5, 1941, just seven weeks before the German attack, Stalin delivered another important speech, this one at a ceremonial banquet in the Kremlin to graduates of the Frunze Military Academy. Also attending were the members of Stalin's "inner circle," including Molotov and Beria. During the war, von Thadden relates, the Germans reconstructed the text of this speech based on recollections of captured Soviet officers who had attended the banquet.

As von Thadden notes, a number of historians have predictably denied its authenticity, rejecting it as a product of German propaganda disinformation. However, several years ago Russian historian Lev Bezymensky found the text of a portion of the speech, which had been edited for anticipated publication, in Kremlin archives. He published this text in a 1992 issue of the scholarly journal Osteuropa.

In this speech, Stalin stressed that the recent peaceful policy of the Soviet state had played out its role. (With this policy, the Soviet Union had greatly extended its borders westward in 1939 and 1940, absorbing some 30 million people.) Now, Stalin bluntly announced, it was time to prepare for war against Germany, a conflict that would begin soon. He cited the tremendous buildup of Soviet military power, both in quantity and quality, during the last few years. The recent German "occupation" of Bulgaria, and the transfer of German troops to Finland, he went on, are "grounds for war against Germany."

Stalin said:

"Our war plan is ready ... We can begin the war with Germany within the next two months ... There is a peace treaty with Germany, but this is only a deception, or rather a curtain, behind which we can openly work ...

"The peaceful policy secured peace for our country ... Now, however, with our reorganized army, which is technologically well prepared for modern warfare, now that we are strong, we must now go from defense to attack.

"In fully defending our country, we are obliged to act offensively. We most move from defense to a military policy of offensive action. We must reorganize our propaganda, agitation, and our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army.

"The motto of a peaceful policy of the Soviet government is now out of date, and has been overtaken by events ... A new era in the development of the Soviet state has begun, the era of the expansion of its borders, not, as before, through a peaceful policy, but rather by force of arms. Our country has available all the necessary conditions for this.

"The successes of the German army are due to the fact that it has not encountered an equally strong opponent. Some Soviet commanders have falsely overestimated the successes of the German army ...

"Therefore, I propose a toast to the new era that has dawned in the development of our socialist fatherland. Long live the active offensive policy of the Soviet state!"

In the face of all the new evidence that has become available in recent years, von Thadden contends here, obviously it will be necessary to reexamine the long-standing official interpretation of the war.

To shore up the beleaguered "establishment" view of the Hitler-Stalin clash, a group of concerned scholars met at an international conference in Moscow in 1995. Historians from Europe, Israel, the United States and Canada met with their Russian counterparts to coordinate the "official" line, in both Russia and the West, on the German-Russian clash and its origins. These historians simply ignored most of the abundant and growing body of evidence for the revisionist view of this chapter of history, including the Stalin speeches and other evidence cited by von Thadden, or the recent substantiating findings of Russian historians.

To show that even "establishment" scholars can change their view about this chapter of history, von Thadden cites French historian Stéphane Courtois. note8

"I work for a reevaluation of Stalin. He was the greatest criminal of this century. But at the same time he was the century's greatest politician: its most competent and most professional. He understood best of all how to utilize all means in the service of his goals. From 1917 onwards, he had a global vision, and sticking to his project, he achieved it ... Of course, one can easily say that Hitler unleashed the war. But the evidence of Stalin's responsibility is shattering. Stalin wanted to eradicate anyone who opposed the Marxist-Leninist social order."

"Because of the resistance of German soldiers," concludes von Thadden, "the Russians and the Anglo-American 'liberators' met each other not in western Europe, but rather on the Elbe in central Germany."


Notes

1. Von Thadden wrote numerous articles and essays, and was a co-publisher of the Coburg monthly Nation und Europe. Other books by him include Zwei Angreifer: Hitler and Stalin, 1993; Adolf Hitler, 1991; Die verfemte Rechte, 1984; Guernica: Greuelpropaganda oder Kriegsverbrechen?

2. "Hitler's Declaration of War Against the United States," The Journal of Historical Review, Winter 1988-89 (Vol. 8, No. 4), pp. 389-416.

3. This portion of Göring's testimony, given on March 15, 1946, is in the IMT "blue series" (Nuremberg), vol. 9, pp. 333-334. On March 27, 1941, Serbian officers in Belgrade, with backing from Britain, and possibly also the United States, overthrew the pro-German Yugoslav government of prime minister Cvetkovic. The new government, headed by General Simovic, quickly concluded a pact with Moscow. The subsequent German invasion of Yugoslavia, launched on April 6, delayed the Barbarossa attack against the USSR by several weeks. See: Germany and the Second World War (Oxford Univ. Press: 1995), vol. 3, pp. 480, 498, 499.

4. This portion of Jodl's testimony, given on June 5, 1946, is in the IMT "blue series," vol. 15, pp. 394-395.

5. See David Irving's study, Nuremberg: The Last Battle, reviewed in the July-August 1998 Journal of Historical Review. See also, M. Weber, "The Nuremberg Trials and the Holocaust," Summer 1992 Journal, pp. 167-213.

6. Suvorov's first three books on World War II have been reviewed in The Journal of Historical Review. The first two, Icebreaker and "M Day," were reviewed in Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal (Vol. 16, No. 6), pp. 22-34. His third book, "The Last Republic," was reviewed in the July-August 1998 Journal (Vol. 17, No. 4), pp. 30-37.

7. A portion of this speech is quoted in part in the Nov.-Dec. 1997 Journal of Historical Review, pp. 32-34, and in the July-August 1998 Journal, p. 31.

8. Works by Courtois include Histoire du parti communiste français (1995), L'etat du monde en 1945 (1994), Rigueur et passion (1994), 50 ans d'une passion française, 1991), Qui savait quoi? (1987), and, perhaps best known, Le livre noir du communisme: Crimes, terreur, repression (1997).

From The Journal of Historical Review, May-June 1999 (Vol. 18, No. 3), pp. 40 ff.

About the Author

Daniel W. Michaels retired from the US Department of Defense after 40 years of service. He is a Columbia University graduate (Phi Beta Kappa, 1954), and a Fulbright exchange student to Germany (1957). He writes from his home in Washington, DC.

New Evidence on the 1941 'Barbarossa' Attack (Review)

I have always maintained and held the opinion that history is never the real and full truth, but that of half truth, conjecture, imagination and agenda driven,

It is the view made popular by vested interests who dictate the terms of the world.

 

[jouni]

It is pretty certain that Germany carried out in 1941 a preemptive strike against Russia. History is written by the winners.

 

[asianobserve]

@Ray

That the Soviets were planning of dominating by invasion Europe should not have been remote to World leaders at the time since Marxism is an internationalist ideology. The first time that it tried to do it (in 1920) after the Bolshivek's consolidation of power in Russia was stopped by the Polish. But by the late 1930's Stalin was dusting up plans for Soviet expansion to Europe. But In 1939, when it was becoming increasingly clear that Europe was about to be plunged into another great war thanks to Hitler, Stalin strategized that the USSR will stay neutral and let the Western "imperialists" destroy each other. And when they are severely weakened by their own war the USSR will roll into Europe.

Stalin had defined the premise during his March 10, 1939, speech in Moscow:

Nonintervention represents the endeavor... to allow all the warmongers to sink deeply into the mire of warfare, to quietly urge them on. The result will be that they weaken and exhaust one another. Then... (we will) appear on the scene with fresh forces and step in, naturally "in the interest of peace," to dictate terms to the weakened belligerents.2

On August 25, 1939, the Swiss periodical Revue de droit international published the text of a speech Stalin delivered on August 19 to a closed session of the Political Bureau in Moscow. He was quoted as follows:

It must be our objective that Germany wage war long enough to exhaust England and France so much that they cannot defeat Germany alone.... Should Germany win, it will itself be so weakened that it won't be able to wage war against us for 10 years.... It's paramount for us that this war continues as long as possible, until both sides are worn out.5

Stalin's Secret War Plans: Why Hitler Invaded the Soviet Union. Richard Tedor.

Unfortunately for Stalin, German concluded the war in the West quickly with France's early capitulation. As a result of its quick victory Germany was not exhausted when it turned its attention to the USSR (after abandoning its attempt to invade Britain). The UK was also able to preserved a lot of its manpower through Dunkirk.

 

[Ray]

@asianobserve,

I am aware of military history, as has been written from the Western perspective, after the defeat of Germany and Japan.

However, I have always wondered if the German lost all because of Hitler's rants and insanity.

All said and done, to believe that the Germans were some superior military to cover Allied defeats was a perplexing issue to digest. Defeat does not happen because someone is beyond challenge. It happens because someone has also blundered against the better machine & better leadership. The defence of Leningrad and Stalingrad are cases in point.

Further, cases in point is the fact that while Patton moved through the Germans with the ease of a knife cutting butter, Montgomery was floundering all through. Same enemy and near same conditions. And Patton was held back so that the British image is not tarnished!!!!!!

These cases in point highlight the fraud that is perpetuated in historical accounts, of course couched and conjured with some rationale to appear presentable and 'fair'.

BTW has there been any films to show WW II from the German or the Japanese point of view?

How come there are none, except the one allowed to be released that have been very cautious and has in no way indicated the real Japanese and German nationalist viewpoint and justification of teh rationale of that time.

It is only of late, that some Japanese films on WWII have been allowed, even so they are politically very cautious.

Are we to understand that the Germans and Japanese were only villainous blokes with no victories to talk about?

You can revel in what the Western historians pan out as the sole truth.

Take the case of history of India written by the British Raj British historians. I believed it. However, now that facts are tumbling out, the fraud is being unravelled.

As I said earlier, I am not gullible. I analyse and I also have the faculty to question when I am not convinced.

Take the case of Gorbachev. He is a good chap as per the West. Is he? Was he not heading the same apparatus that all other Communist headed? And had that apparatus become benign and cute just because of him? That would be codswallop to believe.

And was the world not fooled that Saddam was sitting on a huge pile of WMD that would be released within 45 mins as per Blair?

If it did not come out, thanks to the failure to produce evidence, the world would have indeed believed that it was the case so.

Likewise, notwithstanding all the theories put out about the Malaysian Airline flight going to China, I refuse to believe that it just fell off from the air. There has to be a reason and someone is not telling the truth.

 

[asianobserve]

I don't know where you got your claim that Western sources does not depict German and Japanese victories in some of the battles in WW2. From SEA perspective, I have always known the German and Japanese victories in numerous battles specially at the start of WW2 (we know in Malaya how ruthless and effective the Japanese Imperial Forces were). But when attrition came in and the ability to keep on producing weapons and men, hands down the Allies (+USSR) had the initiative. Both Japan and Germany cannot replace the soldiers that they were losing as the war progressed. Hence, towards the end of the war you only had children and the elderly fighting for Germany. Japan on the other hand cannot resupply fast enough their garrisons all over Asia towards the latter part of the war. The allies on the other hand, especially UK and the US which are pratically untouched by war (except for few bomb damage in London for UK), were able to produce both men and material on a continuous basis until the end of the war. Their resupply system kept on getting better as the war progressed.

 

[Ray]

I don't know where you got your claim that Western sources does not depict German and Japanese victories in some of the battles in WW2. From SEA perspective, I have always known the German and Japanese victories in numerous battles specially at the start of WW2 (we know in Malaya how ruthless and effective the Japanese Imperial Forces were). But when attrition came in and the ability to keep on producing weapons and men, hands down the Allies (+USSR) had the initiative. Both Japan and Germany cannot replace the soldiers that they were losing as the war progressed. Hence, towards the end of the war you only had children and the elderly fighting for Germany. Japan on the other hand cannot resupply fast enough their garrisons all over Asia towards the latter part of the war. The allies on the other hand, especially UK and the US which are pratically untouched by war (except for few bomb damage in London for UK), were able to produce both men and material on a continuous basis until the end of the war. Their resupply system kept on getting better as the war progressed.

]I don't know where you got your claim that Western sources does not depict German and Japanese victories in some of the battles in WW2.

I get it from reading military history.

You read history as a reader of historical events.

We read military history for analysis.

we know in Malaya how ruthless and effective the Japanese Imperial Forces were

Of course you do not recall atrocties of the British in Malaysia. Why should you? It serves your purpose and your complacency to bask in ignorance and believe what you are told.

How about this to open your eyes?

Britain destroyed records of colonial crimes

Thousands of documents detailing some of the most shameful acts and crimes committed during the final years of the British empire were systematically destroyed to prevent them falling into the hands of post-independence governments, an official review has concluded.

Those papers that survived the purge were flown discreetly to Britain where they were hidden for 50 years in a secret Foreign Office archive, beyond the reach of historians and members of the public, and in breach of legal obligations for them to be transferred into the public domain.

The documents show that colonial officials were instructed to separate those papers to be left in place after independence – usually known as "Legacy files" – from those that were to be selected for destruction or removal to the UK. In many colonies, these were described as watch files, and stamped with a red letter W.

Documents that survive from Malaya suggest a far more haphazard destruction process, with relatively junior officials being permitted to decide what should be burned and what should be sent to London

http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/apr/18/britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes

UK atrocities in Malaysia revealed

An extraordinary "licence to kill" law had been introduced by senior British diplomats in an attempt to legalise the colonial-era killing of 24 villagers by UK troops in Malaysia, according to news reports.


The Batang Kali massacre took place on December12, 1948, as British troops carried out a counter-insurgency operation against Chinese Malayan communists.

The shootings took place after a 16-man patrol group of Scots Guards surrounded a rubber estate at Sunga Rimoh by the Batang Kali river. The bodies of several unarmed villagers were reportedly mutilated and the village was burned to the ground.

An informal investigation of the incident, carried out in 1949, exonerated all the soldiers involved. But claims of a cover-up by families of the victims have ensured that the killings in the village of Batang Kali remain one of the most contentious in British colonial history.

The campaign for a thorough investigation into the incident will reach a climax in London this week when a court will finally rule on whether to open an official inquiry into the killings, The Observer said in a report.

The Observer has seen documents revealing that after the killings the British authorities hastily passed a regulation empowering troops in the country to use "lethal force" to prevent escape attempts.

According to papers recovered from previously secret Foreign Office archives at Hanslope Park, Buckinghamshire, Regulation 27A was unveiled on 20 January 1949 by Sir Alec Newboult, chief secretary of what was then Malaya, little more than a month after the massacre.

They show that Newboult's command authorised "the use of lethal weapons" to "prevent the escape from arrest," so long as a warning was issued first. It explains that the law is applicable to any "officer" belonging to the UK military serving in Malaya.

"In their own way, the British officials responsible for Regulation 27A were making legal history, but in the most insidious and immoral way imaginable. This law was carefully crafted to immunise those involved in the killings from the legal consequences of their actions. It was an attempt to use the statute book to excuse and legitimise an atrocity that could never withstand the scrutiny of a court", said John Halford, of law firm Bindmans, which is representing families of the victims.

http://www.presstv.ir/detail/239817.html

These are just a few links.

But then ofcourse, you will declare them as fiction, even though it is from the Western media, right?

Lesson to be learnt is that ALL AGGRESSORS AND IMPERIALIST are cruel and have to be so to ensure that there is no opposition to their rule.

I am surprised that you know so little of your country and its history.

Enjoy your reverie.

******************************

I am awaiting your comments on this

How come there are none, except the one allowed to be released that have been very cautious and has in no way indicated the real Japanese and German nationalist viewpoint and justification of the rationale of that time.

Interesting that you are silent to Post #18 and your silence is very conspicuous.

Focus and not be light scattering though the irregularities in the propagation medium i.e your vision of history and biases.