On transitions and conspiracies
Reality check
Friday, May 28, 2010
Shafqat Mahmood
There is a theory that transition to democracy after a long period of military rule is very difficult. It presupposes that the military as a dominant institution keeps the civilians under pressure. This does not allow the government and even the system to settle down.
This theory has been tested and found valid in a number of countries, particularly in South America. Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Chile went through many hiccups before their democracy stabilised. Something similar happened in South Korea and is now the case in Thailand.
It has also been true of Pakistan, especially in the post-Zia period. As a witness to this particular transition, I have little doubt that Gen Mirza Aslam Beg and his intelligence people actively destabilised the PPP government. This continued after Nawaz Sharif took power in 1990, though the chiefs changed.
The two army commanders who did not have any political ambition were Generals Waheed Kakar and Jehangir Karamat. It is not that they did not have opportunities. They did, but decided not to intervene. The track record of their successor, Gen Musharraf, is a part of our history.
What is the reality of our current transition? A study of this would have to begin with the 2008 election. There is little doubt that Musharraf had every intention to rig it, but two things came in his way. The assassination of Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto and the approach of the new army chief, Gen Kayani.
Mohtarma's assassination was a terribly traumatic event. It galvanised the PPP support base and raised political temperatures to an extent that outright rigging would have led to a very difficult situation. This was a serious deterrence to any result fixing plan.
In passing, it would not be out of place to mention that the 2002 election under Musharraf was thoroughly rigged. Results were blatantly changed even after the candidates themselves had conceded defeat. A particularly egregious example of this was in Lahore, where the winner went on to become a pillar of the Musharraf regime.
The other reason why rigging in 2008 became difficult was the attitude of Gen Kayani. In a series of directives, he warned his rank and file against any political contact. This ensured that any officer, including any in the intelligence services, doing anything on behest of Musharraf would face the sack.
Second, he strictly kept the troops away from polling stations and only assigned them law-and-order duties. This may not seem significant, but compared to the past when the army virtually ran the elections, it was an important change. It obviated the possibility of any direct interference by troops assigned polling duties.
After the elections, the military had no role in formation of the government. It was also not drawn into political battles that inevitably followed. It could have taken a position when Musharraf looked like being ousted from the Presidency, but it did not. It only ensured a decent departure for him.
The one event where an ambitious general could have engineered circumstances for his takeover was the judicial crisis in March 2009. With the multitudes moving towards Islamabad, Gen Kayani only had to let the situation deteriorate to assume power.
Instead, he actively defused it by advising the president to give in. He also requested the leaders of the lawyers' movement and Mr Nawaz Sharif to call off the march. This ensured a peaceful ending to a potentially destabilising crisis. Hardly the handiwork of an ambitious general!
Since then, the military has been quite with regard to the political give and take, but not entirely on the sidelines. It has taken an active position on many security-related issues, including dealings with India and the United States. The public stand taken by it on the Kerry-Lugar Bill caused deep concern in government and parts of the media, but it was specific to a particular issue and has been resolved.
The active role taken by Gen Kayani to coordinate and participate in the strategic dialogue with the US has also elicited comment. Given capacity issues in the government, I, for one, am glad that he was a key player. The nation's future cannot be trifled away to preserve form.
This brings me to the current tussle between President Zardari and the Supreme Court and any potential role of the army in it. The media has occasionally hinted at it and it is often discussed in private conversations. This is not a surprise, given our history of conspiracy theories that have in time come out right.
President Zardari has himself given fuel to these rumours by openly saying that he will fight conspiracies of the pen and the bayonet. Did he have any evidence to say this? He did not reveal any and none is obvious in the public domain, other than our penchant for assuming that nothing serious or sinister can happen without the army being involved.
The problem with this proclivity of ours is that there is no hard evidence to support it. In fact, if anything, there are reasons to discount it. First is the personality of the chief justice. This man who stood up to Musharraf and perhaps believes in his heart that he has been chosen by God and the people to do good in this land, will he take dictation from the military?
Unlikely, very unlikely. Second is the personality of Gen Kayani himself. This man is no Musharraf. He is more likely to stay in the background than thrust himself forward. He obviously has views on what is happening in the country, as head of a major national institution, and must be worried on many scores. But is he the sort who would like to take over, and that too through judicial interventions?
Again, there is no evidence to support it. Had the military and the judiciary colluded, Mr Zardari would now be resting in a pleasure boat in Cannes than in the house on the hill. The NRO judgment in December would have been a very convenient handle to get rid of him.
Much to the chagrin of those who want Zardari out, we are at the end of May and after Babar Awan's "brilliant" performance, the next date of a hearing on the implementation of the NRO decision is June 10. Does this show any kind of urgency, or indeed collusion, on the part of the army and judiciary to get rid of the president?
If I were of a kind who believed this, I would be severely disappointed by now in Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry and Gen Kayani. They have shown themselves to be very incompetent conspirators. Or, I would recognise the reality that they are not implementing some grand plan to get rid of Zardari, Gilani or this virtual mela that our democracy is.
What is happening, though, is that people are getting fed up with the results after two years of democratic rule. Poor governance, corruption, and just a sheer lack of ability in the leadership are bothering the people. This is what Zardari and Co should worry about. Not some imaginary conspiracy being hatched against them.