Figure 7:Indian Canals on the Indus River Tributaries Courtesy: Bhakra Beas Management Board
Current Issues on Indus Water Sharing
Issues External to Pakistan
There are a host of factors external to Pakistan that could also affect the Indus River System. One is the climatic changes leading to reduced flows on the Indus per se. Another exogenous factor is the growing demand within India, especially the state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) where people feel that the IWT has wrongfully deprived them of water resulting retarding the growth of agriculture, power generation, and irrigation from rivers that originate and flow from their very state. There was also a widespread demand within India for abrogation of the IWT after the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 by terrorists supported directly by the Pakistani state apparatus.
The Tulbul Navigation Lock/Wullar Barrage Issue
The 74 Sq. Km. Wullar Lake (original size 202 Sq. Kms.) is the largest freshwater lake in India and is situated on the Jhelum and supplies 40% of J&K’s fish catch. The stretch of 22 Km between Sopore and Baramulla becomes non-navigable during the lean winter season with a water depth of only 2.5 ft. It is only in spring that rainfall causes the snow to melt at higher elevations on the surrounding mountains and causes floods. [16] In order to improve navigation, India started constructing in 1985, a barrage 439 feet long and with a lock, at the mouth of the lake to raise the flow of water in winter to 4000 cusecs with a depth of 4 ft with an added storage of 0.3 MAF. Pakistan objected to this project and construction was halted in 1987. Pakistan’s objection [17,18] stems from two issues, one India needs to get concurrence of the design from Pakistan and two, it cannot store waters as per IWT on the Jhelum Main anything in excess of 0.01 MAF as “incidental storage work” (Paragraph 8(h) in Annexure E of IWT). Pakistan ’s real objections may be due to its fear that such a barrage may damage its own Triple-Canal project linking Jhelum and Chenab with the Upper Bari Doab Canal . Pakistan also says that such a barrage would be a security risk enabling the Indian Army to make the crossing of the river either easy or difficult through controlled release of water. India ’s argument [19] is that such a barrage would not reduce the quantum of water flow and it would also be beneficial to Pakistan by regulating water flow to Mangla Dam by controlling floods and also improve the Pakistani Triple-canal irrigation system. The water flow would indeed double during the lean winter period from the current 2000 cusecs. Also, the project does not envisage building any new storage capacity as the Wullar lake already existed and the water is only for non-consumptive use (this term includes such usage as navigation, floating of timber, flood protection or control, and fishing with no diminution in volume of water returned to the river/tributaries after use) which is allowed by the IWT. The Wullar barrage is not a storage project but a control project permissible under the treaty. The two countries had indeed reached an agreement in October, 1991 but then Pakistan suddenly introduced an irrelevant element in February, 1992 by linking the termination of Kishenganga Hydroelectric project with further movements in the Tulbul Navigation Lock project and India ’s refusal stalled further work. The 1991 draft agreement stipulated that India would build a 40-feet wide lock but leave ungated 6.2 Metres of the lake at a crest level of 1574.9 Metres and would also forego 0.30MAF storage while Pakistan would allow the lake to fill to its full capacity at 1578 metres. When the agreement was reached in 1991, the only contention that remained was the timing of the filling up of the lake. The crucial period was between June 21 and August 20 every year. Between October, 1987, and August, 1992, experts from the two countries met eight times to settle the issue. The matter was taken up during the Foreign Secretary-level talks between 1990 and 1994 also. The ninth round was held in July, 2004.
The Salal Hydroelectric Project
This was the first major dispute successfully resolved bilaterally under IWT. On April 14, 1978 , the governments of India and Pakistan entered into a treaty on the Salal project. The Salal hydroelectric project on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir was negotiated by the Janata Party government in India and the Bhutto administration in Pakistan and has not been disputed by subsequent governments in Pakistan . The negotiations and discussions took place for a period of four years between 1974 and 1978 between the Indus Commissioners and the foreign offices. The project provides waters to Pakistan in a regulated manner but involves no diversion by India . However, Pakistan successfully objected to the building of the anti-siltation sluice gates, which were six low-level outlets normally used for controlling sedimentation, resulting in decreased power generation capacity of this project. India also agreed to reduce the heights of the spillway gates from 40 feet to 30 feet.
The Ranbir and Pratap Canals
The Ranbir Canal , built in 1870, was intended to feed the areas of Miran Sahib, Vijaypur and Madhopur. Poor maintenance has ensured that it can now carry just 300 cubic feet per second of water, rather than the 1,000 cusecs it was designed for when originally built. The Pratap Canal , meant to meet the needs of the Akhnoor-Sunderbani belt, has also silted up. [20] These canals off take from Chenab between Salal and Marala headworks. These two canals need urgent repair work to restore their earlier capacities. Under the treaty, India is allowed to take out a fixed quantity of water for these channels. Many restrictions, such as quantum and dates of withdrawal have been imposed on India by the IWT.
The Kishenganga Project [21]
India started the 330 MW Kishenganga hydroelectric projects across River Kishenganga after protracted negotiations between the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), the Defence Ministry, and the environmentalists who fear the loss of the serene Gurez valley. The project involves a 103 metre dam across the river before it crosses the Line of Control (LoC) and a channel and a 27 Km long tunnel through the North Kashmir ranges to bring the water to the Wullar lake where a hydroelectric power station will be built as part of an integrated project. The Kashmir Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah signed an MoU with the Union Power Minister in July, 2000 for the project. The National Hydroelectric Power Corp. (NHPC) was entrusted with this project on a Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) basis. The CEA cleared the project only in June, 2004.
Figure 8 Courtesy: K.E.W.A ( Kashmir Environmental Watch Association)
Pakistan objects to the Kishenganga project fearing an adverse impact on its envisaged 969-MW Neelum- Jhelum power plant to be constructed with Chinese assistance. This project was initially planned for 1994-1997 but lies dormant because of lack of funds. The Indian Kishenganga project is expected to lead to a shortfall of 21% loss of water flow in Neelum resulting in a 9% reduction in power for the Pakistani project. [22] The IWT allows India to store waters on Neelum for power generation and so Pakistan wants to start its project first in order to deny waters to India claiming the principle of “prior appropriation”, per Paragraph 15(iii), Part-3, Annexure-D which states “where a Plant is located on a Tributary of The Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural use or hydroelectric use, the water released below the Plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent existing Agricultural Use or hydroelectric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected”.
India also claims that the waters will ultimately reach Pakistan through Jhelum though not through Kishenganga (Neelum). In the meanwhile, Pakistan has felt the urgency to take up its USD 1.6 Billion Neelum –Jhelum Hydropower Project by appointing a private company, NESPAK, as consultants and complete the international bidding and evaluation by April 2005.
The Baglihar Project
Figure 9 Baglihar Project Courtesy: Lahmeyer International Gmbh
This project, currently under construction by the Jammu & Kashmir Power Development Corp. on the Chenab in Doda Distt , will generate 450 MW of power when commissioned by end-December, 2005. The contract was extended in 2002 to raise the capacity to 900 MW by Dec., 2007. Pakistan claims that this dam will result in a loss of 7000-8000 cusecs of water a day during the rabi season. India has assured Pakistan that the quantum of water will not be diminished in any way. Pakistan disputes India ’s contention that this is a run-of-river[vii] project and the site is unsuitable for an ungated spillway. The works involve the construction of a “Pondage” of 15 Million Cubic Metre (IWT allows for ‘Pondage’, a term meaning Live Storage, of only sufficient magnitude to meet fluctuations in the discharge of the turbines arising from variations in the daily and the weekly loads of the plant) capacity and an underground power station. Pakistan claims that the submerged gate spillways of this 429-feet high 1046-feet long dam, allow India to increase the reservoir’s storage capacity to 164,000 acre feet and the ability to stop water for about 26 days during December, January and February affecting canals taking off Marala headworks. The IWT specifies the following with respect to gated spillways, “If the conditions at the site of a plant make a gated spillway necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed position shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation of the works” (Part-3, Annexure-D of IWT). This project, Pakistan believes, could also lead to inundation of Bajwat Area above Marala headworks due to sudden synchronized releases from Dulhasti, Baglihar and Salal reservoirs on Chenab . Pakistan also claims that India adopted a stonewalling tactics by not allowing the Permanent Indus Commission members of Pakistan from visiting the dam site for four years after having been officially informed of the project in 1998, little recognizing that the 1999 Kargil conflict and the general mobilization of Indian troops as part of Op. Parakram following the Dec. 13, 2001 Parliament attack, both events of Pakistan’s own making, prevented such site visits. In fact, India suspended the site visit on Dec. 24, 2001 following the decision to mobilize troops. Pakistan also contests that it was informed only in 1998 about the Bagilhar project, though the GoI had informed Pakistan as early as 1992. The Pakistani Commissioner of the Permanent Indus Commission had recommended to his government to appoint a neutral expert in Feb. 2003 and accordingly Pakistan claims to have served two notices to GoI in May and November of the same year. Following the February meeting, India allowed a visit by Pakistani experts to the Baglihar project site in October. The Pakistani Commissioner is reported to have made the same recommendation to his Government in January 2004 after another round of PIC meeting. On December 15, 2004 , India supplied Pakistan with more data on the project as a goodwill gesture and rejected Pakistan ’s claims of violation of IWT. However, Pakistan rebuffed India ’s explanations, refused India one week time to study and reply, and decided to discontinue the talks-illustrating Pakistani leadership uncompromising attitude and intransigence. By mid January 2005, Pakistan requested the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert under Article 9(2)(A) of the IWT, claiming one week later that the World Bank chief Mr.Wolfensohn, honored with Pakistan’s highest award of Hilal-e-Pakistan during a visit to that country in early February 2005, had assured Gen. Musharraf that there would be no delay in appointing such an expert. While responding to enquiries from World Bank , India advised the Bank that rather it should allow the suspended bilateral course of action to resume rather than get involved at that stage especially as some convergence of views had appeared in the last round of talks in New Delhi . Meanwhile, Pakistan ’s Minister for Education and former head of the ISI, Javed Ashraf Qazi, warned the Pakistani National Senate that the nation might go to war with India over Baglihar “controversy.”
Embankment on Ravi
Pakistan claims [23] that India has built a 15-Km long embankment (also known as River Training Works, RTWs) on river Ravi in the Narowal sector in 2002, in front of Kot Naina, a village in Shakargarh Distt. Pakistan claims that such a construction “so close to the international border” is violative of both the IWT and the Border Ground Rules, 1961 and has caused flooding on its side. [24] By 2002, Pakistan had also decided to build a similar embankment on its side.
Issues Within Pakistan
The Indus River system, which accounts for 65% of water flow within an arid Pakistan , poses several major challenges to Pakistan today. Pakistan faces both political and non-political problems with respect to The Indus River System.
On the political front, there have been serious differences among the various provinces about sharing of the waters. In Sind, sea water has intruded as much as 54 miles into the estuary of the Indus river due to low or no flow.[25] On the basis of a series of meetings among provinces in March 1991, an agreement, Water Agreement Accord (WAA), [26] was reached on the sharing of the river waters. It stipulated the following allocations
* - Including requirements of Karachi
** - Ungauged Civil Canals above the rim stations where measurements can be made
It was also decided to set up in 1992, an “Indus River System Authority” (IRSA), as per provisions of the 1991 Accord, with representation from all four provinces. However, actual water allocations have been made on the basis of “historic use” rather than on the 1991 settlement leading to more resentment in Sindh.
The climatic changes due to global warming have led to depleting flow in all Indus River system of rivers, especially the Indus , which depends on glacial runoffs for 90% of its waters. Generally, the Himalayan rivers also carry a very heavy sediment load especially during summer and rainy season, which in turn leads to river shifting and silting of dams and barrages. The three largest dams in Pakistan , Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma have already lost ~ 25% of their capacity due to silting [27]. This is a serious problem in a country which depends on river irrigation, rather than the monsoon rains, for 74% of its total cultivated land. It is generally agreed that 40% of all the water drawn through the canals at barrage heads is lost because of seepage due to un-lined and porous beds and banks of the canals. [28] Such problems exacerbate the already poor yield of the crops [29, 30] In addition, there is excessive system-loss of water due to improper and antiquated agricultural techniques and heavy cropping of water-intensive varieties like sugarcane and rice. While reeling under increasing drought for the last six years, it is also predicted that Pakistan will have a certain level of drought conditions for the next 15 years [31, 32].. Since the dams mostly act as storage reservoirs during Kharif season and draw-down reservoirs during Rabi[viii], there is an acute need within Pakistan for more storage
Figure 10 Indus Basin and Crops Courtesy: National Geographic
There have been widespread protests against the proposed dams of Kalabagh at Mianwali, and Basha at Chilas, Gilgit area and the raising of the Mangla dam in Mirpur. Out of the four provinces of Pakistan , three viz. Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP are against these dams. Even the illegally occupied PoK and Balawaristan oppose the dam projects of Mangla and Basha. The proposed raising of the height of Mangla Dam [33] in Mirpur, PoK, by another 40 feet, will further submerge that district. It is also possible that if India exercises its rights to store 1.5 MAF on Jhelum , the raised Mangla Dam will not fill up. The crux of the matter is the lack of agreement among provinces on the total water availability within the country.
Meanwhile, the dwindling flows of water and siltation have led to reduced power generation from the hydroelectric plants that are part of the Indus River System.. There is a real possibility of shutting down power generation permanently at Tarbela, leaving it for irrigation purposes only. [34]
Figure 1 1 Courtesy: WAPDA
The dams, barrages and canals built to satisfy the increasing demands of water upstream have made water scarce in the Indus at the estuaries of the Arabian Sea causing the sea to push in and increase the salinity in 1.2 Million acres of farmlands.[36] The discharge of freshwater from the Indus into the Arabian Sea has declined steadily from 85 MAF in the 1940s to about 10 MAF in the 90s and probably less today. Pakistan also uses the waters of the Indus rivers for another purpose, fortification of its defences along Indian borders. It has built a series of “defence canals” at strategic locations which are flooded at times of wars and tensions to prevent crossing by Indian armour and artillery. In 2002, after India mobilized its forces as part of Operation Parakram , Pakistan diverted waters to these “defence canals” accentuating the then already severe water shortage of 50% to over 70%.[38] [39][40]
The Indus remains important to both India and Pakistan in another less visible way. The extension of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) beyond the 200 nautical mile (nm) limit from coastal baseline depends on the ability to prove the sedimentation of the Indus river into the sea and has to be claimed before May, 2009 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS-III) protocol [37] allows the EEZ to be extended under several conditions. In places like the sedimentary basin of the Indus river, the sediment thickness of the rivers beyond the foot of the continental slope can be used to establish the outer limit of the continental shelf of a claimant. This requires baseline and bathymetry survey data. A crucial part of the claim is the delineation of the Territorial Sea Baseline (TSB) which is the set of coordinate points that define the line from which the seaward boundaries are to be measured. The continuing Pakistani wrangle with regards to Sir Creek has delayed the compilation and validation of the TSB thereby delaying the computation of the zone boundaries. This is important for India in view of the potential it has for national security, energy prospecting, mining, laying pipelines etc.
Conclusions
Pakistan faces one of the severest water shortages in the world as seen in its’ per capita availability of water per annum fall from 5300 m3 in 1951 to less than 1100 m3 today. This figure is alarming given that it is below the internationally recommended level of 1500 m3 and precariously close to the critical 1000 m3 level. Compounded with the failure to fill the country’s two largest reservoirs to capacity, declining flows in the Indus River System, elusive and contentious the inter-provincial water accord due to mutual suspicions among provinces, and an unsustainable population growth rate of 2% do not bode well for Pakistan’s water situation. Disagreements on construction of new reservoirs, declining groundwater potential[ix], and growing number of disputes with India after a relatively uneventful period of 44 years of water sharing will further complicate matters. In summation, the water situation in Pakistan (a country whose landscape is largely arid to semi-arid) is truly disastrous in spite of the Indus , its tributaries, and a treaty with generous concessions that has been implemented faithfully by upper riparian India to date in spite of grave provocations. Pakistani farmers may be forced to change to higher yielding earlier maturating crops, modify their sowing patterns, and employ micro irrigation in coming years to mitigate shortages-all of which will entail higher costs. Its frivolous objections to Indian projects and a general unwillingness to engage India constructively are partly to force India to amend the IWT to accommodate the emerging patterns of water use in Pakistan , such as water sharing during periods of shortage-a situation not envisaged in the treaty.
References and Footnotes
1. No. 6032. The INDUS WATERS TREATY 1960 between THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA , THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT.
2. “A River Story”, Nandita Bhavnani,The Hindu, June 6, 2004
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/thscrip/print.pl?file=2004060600580800.htm&date=2004/06/06/&prd=mag&
3. “The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of the International Rivers”
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/IntlDocs/Helsinki_Rules.htm
4. Inter-Dominion Agreement, between the GoI and GoP on the Canal Water Dispute between East and West Punjab
http://meaindia.nic.in/treatiesagreement/1948/chap7.htm
5. “Water Rationality: Mediating the Indus Waters Treaty”,Undala Z. Alam, University of Durham
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/related_research/Alam1998.pdf
6. “ Indus Water Treaty: Case Study”, Transboundary Fresh Water Dispute Database
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/projects/casestudies/
7. “The Indus Waters Treaty: A History” by The Henry L. Stimson Center
8. “Fostering Riparian Cooperation in International River Basins”, Syed Kirmani, Guy Le Moigne
World Bank Technical Paper # 335, January 1997
9. “World Bank Historical Chronology 1950-1959”
10. The Indus Water Treaty
http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/pdf/iwt.pdf
11. Department of Irrigation, Govt. of Rajasthan
http://www.rajirrigation.gov.in/4bhakhra.htm
12. “Rivers Water Dispute, Making of a Tragedy”, A.A. Musalman,The News International
http://www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-21.htm
13. “Efficient and Sustainable Irrigation Management in Pakistan ”, Illahi B. Shaikh
14. “Water Development for Irrigated Agriculture in Pakistan ”, Hafeez Akhtar Randhawa
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/AC623E/ac623e0i.htm
15. “From Indus to Sutluj”, Frontline, Vol. 21, Issue 16,
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2116/stories/20040813004002900.htm
16. “Turbulence over Wular”,Kamaleshwar Sinha,The Tribune India
http://www.tribuneindia.com/1998/98nov07/nation.htm#8
17. “Water Disputes in South Asia ”, Farzana Noshab, Nadia Mushtaq, Strategic Studies, Summer 2001, No.3, Vol. XXI, the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad
18. “ International River Waters in South Asia : Source of Conflict or Cooperation?”
http://irs.org.pk/spotlight.htm#VIII
19. “Delhi Round of Indo-Pak Talks-II Tulbul Navigation Project/Wular Barrage”, Mallika Joseph
http://www.ipcs.org/newKashmirLevel2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=466&subCatID=null&mod=null
20. “A Treaty Questioned”, Praveen Swami, Vol. 19, Issue 09, Apr. 27- May 10, 2002 ,Frontline
21. “330-MW Kishenganga Project gets Technical Clearance”,Iftikhar Gilani, Kashmir Times
http://kasmirtimes.com/archive/0406/040619/news2.htm
22. Ibid
23. “Pakistani team will raise water issue with India ”,Khalid Mustafa,Daily Times, May 25, 2004
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-5-2004_pg7_26
24. “ India diverts flow of Ravi ”, Daily Times, July 15, 2004
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_15-7-2004_pg7_37
25. “ Indus River dying a slow death”, Shahid Husain, Daily Times, Apr. 26, 2004
26. “The Water Accord, 1991”
http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/fstwr.htm
27. “Consensus on Kalabagh Dam unlikely in near future” ,Nasir Iqbal, Dawn, Mar. 10, 2004
28. “ Indus Waters Imbroglio”,A.A.Musalman,The News, July 21, 2003
29. “Wheat Yields across the border”, Zafar Samdani, Telmed Pak Agriculture,
http://www.telmedpak.com/agriculturenews.asp?a=5218
30. “The Wheat crop”, Dr. S.M.Alam, Pakistan Economist, Oct. 11-17, 2004
http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/page/issue41/i&e3.htm
31. “Drought and Water Planning”, Dr. Faisal Bari, The Nation, Dec. 6, 2004
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/dec-2004/6/columns1.php
32. “The drought to come”, Editorial, The Nation, Dec. 6,2004
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/dec-2004/6/editorials2.php
33. “Raising the height of Mangla Dam”,B.A.Malik,DAWN, Aug. 27, 2001
http://www.dawn.com/2001/08/27/ebr14.htm
34. “Restructuring Tarbela”,Syed Sajid Hussain,DAWN
http://www.dawn.com/2002/11/18/ebr3.htm
35. “The dam debate yet again”, Aamir Kabir, DAWN, Dec. 25, 2000
http://www.dawn.com/2000/12/25/ebr13.htm
36. “A Battle over Indus River Water”, Erik Eckholm, New York Times, Apr. 24, 2003
37. “For an Ocean Outlook”,B.G.Verghese,The Hindu, Nov. 25, 2003
http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2003/11/25/stories/2003112500921000.htm
38. “Rain to decide fate of wheat crop”
http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/NewsDetail.cfm?ID=1021
39. “Countering Baglihar: Pakistan to build Mangla-Head Marala Canal ”
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_25-1-2005_pg1_2
40. “Baglihar to dent defence”
http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/jan-2005/26/index4.php
41. “ADB approves $140 Million Loan to Pakistan for National Drainage Sector Project”, Asian Development Bank
http://www.adb.org/Documents/News/1995/nr1995145.asp
“ Pakistan – National Drainage Program Project: Inspection Panel Request for Inspection”
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?pcont=details&eid=000160016_20040922122706
Referred to Kongrigpoke in Tibet
[ii] Referred to Tsangpo in Tibet
[iii] Tibetan mythology has it that Indus pours out of the mouth of a snow-lion.
[iv] Vyeth in Kashmiri
[v] 1 MAF = 43560 Cubic Feet or 0.274430 Million Gallons of water
[vi] ICA means the total area under irrigated crops in a year, the same area being counted twice if it bears different crops in kharif and rabi.
[vii] means that in any period of 7 consecutive days, the volume of water delivered downstream should equal the volume of water received upstream with a few minor restrictions and allowances.
[viii] Kharif sowing period is April thru’ August, Kharif maturing and Rabi sowing period is September to mid-December and Rabi maturing period is mid-December thru’ March.
[ix] WAPDA estimates that the total groundwater potential is 26 MAF, out of which 20 MAF is non-usable saline water.