Pakistan misleading people on Indus Water Treaty

ajtr

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As far as the Indus agreement is considered it is pretty clear- Ravi, Beas and Satluj belong exclusively to India. So even if India reduces these rivers into sewers like Ahmedmadani sahib observes, that is kosher. Now as regards the three Western rivers is concerned- Indus, Chenab and Jhelum belong exclusively to Pak except that some amount of local irrigation in Kashmir Valley can be carried out with Jhelum waters.

What IWT does not prevent is India building run of the river hydel projects with limited pondage that is India can use the water for power generation without any restriction provided it does not build small dams of greater than certain height and size. This allows a limited amount of impoundment (not so much that it shud seriously disturb waterflow patterns downstream) but absolutely no diversion at all. If my understanding of the Baglihar judgement is correct, the arbitrator had merely suggested a minor reduction in height rather than the dam being illegal per se.

The claim that India is diverting the water of Western rivers illegally is hogwash. Yes, waterflows have fallen in these rivers but that is becuase rain and snow in Western Himalayas have been rather erratic lately plus the glaciers are receding.

The problem that Pakistan is two fold. First, weather changes plus disappearance of glaciers will result in longterm downward availability of waters in the Western rivers. This will also affect Indian-BD rivers but at least Central and Eastern Himalayas have substantial (although variable) monsoon rains so impact will be a bit less severe. Second, (again unlike India or BD) Pakistan does not have much rain in monsoon and is dependent on river waters to a much greater extent. So even stuff like rainwater harvesting will be irrelevant in Pak.

What Pakistan will have to do is to economise on water usage thru change in cropping patterns (less rice and no sugarcane, more pulses, oilseeds for eg) and thru more water efficient crops.
 
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ajtr

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This article is must read for everyone.It shows the engineering and technical expertise of pakistanis in building dams ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,no doubt their dams ams reservoirs have high silt problem and less water holding capacity.

Baglihar And Other Chestnuts

By Zafar Choudhary

26 February, 2007
Countercurrents.org

On February 12, the Indian Water Resource Minister Saif-ud-Din Soz (a Kashmiri) was exceptionally joyful as equally was his Pakistani counterpart Liaqat Ali Khan Jatoi. Soz said it is a “win-win” situation for India while Jatoi described it as victory for Pakistan when World Bank appointed Neutral Expert Prof Raymond Lifette delivered his verdict on Baglihar hydro-electric project –a bone of contention between both countries.

The 450 MW run of the river project coming up on river Chenab in Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar ran into troubled waters two years back when Pakistan accused India of violating the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. At the time of independence, the boundary line between the two newly created independent countries i.e. Pakistan and India was drawn right across the Indus Basin, leaving Pakistan as the lower riparian. Moreover, two important irrigation head works, one at Madhopur on Ravi River and the other at Ferozepur on Sutlej River, on which the irrigation canal supplies in Punjab (Pakistan) had been completely dependent, were left in the Indian Territory. A dispute thus arose between two countries regarding the utilization of irrigation water from existing facilities. Negotiations held under the good offices of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), culminated in the signing of Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. The Treaty was signed at Karachi by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, the then President of Pakistan, Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister and. W.A.B. Ill if of the World Bank on 19th September, 1960. The Treaty however is effective from 1st April, 1960.

In 2004-05 Pakistan lodged severe protest against India for raising height of the dam, at Baglihar hydro-electric project, which it said violated the treaty that has weathered all storms between both countries over past 47 years. The matter came up for discussion at the Indus Water Commission (as provided under the treaty, India and Pakistan both have a special commission on Indus Water). During several rounds of meetings between the officials of Indus Water Commission from both countries in New Delhi, Islamabad and then site visit to Baglihar; Pakistan outrightly rejected what India had offered to resolve the dispute. Following, protests from Pakistan, which were already telling on the bilateral relations between both countries, India offered well thought out concessions which included: 1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard –a safety device to prevent overtopping of the dam in event of surging of sudden storm. Pakistan did not agree. The matter was reported to the World Bank for arbitration. On January 15, 2005 Pakistan rushed to the World Bank with its Baglihar complaint. Subsequently after consulting the governments of India and Pakistan, the World Bank appointed Prof. Raymond Lafitte, Professor at the Federal Institute of Technology of Lausanne, Switzerland as the Neutral Expert (NE) on 10th May, 2005, to determine the claims.

Pakistan’s request made on 15th January, 2005 raised a number of Points of Difference for Expert Determination in respect of the design of the Project on the basis that certain features of the design did not confirm to criteria specified in the Treaty. Pakistan contended, inter alia, that conditions at the Baglihar site did not require a gated spillway; that the spillway gates were not at the highest level; Indian calculations of the design, flood and the height of the dam (Freeboard) were excessive; India’s calculation of the required Pondage of 37.5 Mm was also too high as the correct Pondage should be 6.22 Mm; and that the level of intakes for the Power Plant were not at the highest level as required by the Treaty”.

Third Party intervention

After two years of arbitration, meetings, spot survey, case studies and wastage of time, Prof Raymond Lifette has delivered almost nothing beyond what India had offered as concession to Pakistan. And interestingly, the Neutral Expert refused to entertain what Pakistan had demanded. India had offered Pakistan 1.5 meter reduction on the 4.5 meter freeboard –the only significant recommendation made by NE in his verdict. Pakistan had demanded reduction of Baglihar pondage from 37 million cu m to 6.22 million cu m to convert the project from peaking to constant load station –contention firmly rejected by Pakistan.

Both countries have agreed to a verdict which was already under discussion. Save for the mutual mistrust between India and Pakistan, the issue could have been resolved two years back when India had offered to Pakistan what now Prof Raymond Lafitte has suggested. Prof Raymond Lafitte was appointed as Neutral Expert by the World Bank which is a signatory to the Indus Water Treaty and not the guarantor. The settlement described by India and Pakistan in their battle term phraseology of “win-win and victory” has been arrived at by a third party intervention. The countries made their people think that they had little choice but to accept ruling made by a third party –though neutral.

Baglihar is not the only water dispute between India and Pakistan and also water is not the only point of conflict between two neighbours divided at birth for a mutual animosity ever after. There is politics, there is territorial conflict. The rejoice in New Delhi and Islamabad over the Baglihar verdict has made the peacenicks to think beyond the water disputes about the possibility of a third party brokering. The verdict has thrown some questions: is this unprecedented agreement between India and Pakistan to agree on a third party verdict an indication of a mutual will between both countries on moving from conflict management to conflict resolution. Does this change in approach points a way to setting a maritime boundary in Sir Creek by the international cut off date; Can India and Pakistan accept a UN monitored peace zone in Siachen glacier –the world’s coldest, highest, bloodiest and costliest battlefield. Though India has always been suspicious about motives of the West but has shown amenability to Baglihar; it has to be seen keenly if Pakistan uses Baglihar to make a way for third party intervention on Kashmir.

The Verdict

During the 18 months of study Prof Lafitte had five meetings-in Paris, Geneva, London, and Washington and a visit to the Baglihar site and its hydraulic model at Roorkee. The Parties made written and oral submissions during the course of the Expert Determination. The NE upheld the overall design of Baglihar Dam who also recognized India’s right to utilize waters of western rivers more effectively within ambit of Indus Water Treaty for Power generation.


The NE after a detailed analysis of a data base of about 13000 dams from the International Commission on Large Dams’ world Register of Dams to analyse the type of spillway, gated or ungated, and a historical review of construction of large orifice outlets as well as a consideration of International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) guidelines, held that the site conditions at Baglihar require a gated spillway, and also held that in view of the high flood discharges and heavy silt loads, India’s design of gated spillways-both chute (surface) spillway and sluice spillways, as well as the number, size and location of their gates for the Baglihar dam complies with the design criteria set out in Annexure D of the Indus Water Treaty.


This important element in the NE’s Determination will deeply influence all future interpretations of the Indus Water Treaty. The NE has observed that the present day state of scientific and technical knowledge with advances in technology in dam design, not known or developed in 1960, can and should be utilized in dealing with problems such as those posed by heavy sediment which shorten the effective life of a plant. He is of the view that the reference in the Treaty to conceptual notions such as the need to ensure “satisfactory construction and operation”, “sound and economical design” and “customary and accepted practice of design” clearly not only permit but require use of latest technology. The NE has adopted the principle of effective interpretation which gives full effect to the rights and obligations provided by the Treaty, taking into account its object and purpose set out in the Preamble which is “attaining the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the waters of the Indus System of rivers”.
The NE accepts and regards as prudent India’s calculation of the design flood of 16,500 cumec (as against Pakistan’s figure of 14,900 cumec). After observing that for such possibilities India has developed all possible methods of analysis specially climatological and geo-morphological analysis.

The NE observes that the designer of a spillway is not only faced with the problem of flood control but also with that of sediment control and cites the “ICOLD” to note that the state of the art is today that “Bottom outlets may be used for under sluicing of floods, emptying of reservoirs, slucicing of sediments and preventing sediment from entering intakes etc”.
Accordingly, India’s design of sluice spillway at Baglihar with five outlets is regarded as appropriate and permissible under the Treaty for sediment control of the reservoir and evacuation of a large part of the design flood and being in conformity with the international practice and the state of the art. This decision will help India to deal more effectively with the problems of sedimentation in its future projects as the NE has confirmed India’s design of large bottom outlets (sluice spillway) as the most important technique to be employed in managing the high volumes of sediment which characterise the Himalayan Rivers. Incidentally, this had been an element of strenous objection and India, in the course of the Expert Determination, constantly maintained that India’s design to deal with sedimentation problems by modern methods does not in any way interfere with the flow of waters of Chenab River into Pakistan as required by the Treaty Based on the guidelines of ICOLD, the NE considers that the freeboard could be reduced by 1.5 metres. In this context, it is to be noted that India, in the spirit of good neighbourly relations, had offered possible reduction of freeboard to Pakistan even before the process of Expert Determination had started.

According to the NE, the first objective of “Pondage” is to regulate the flow of the river to meet the consumer demand. He considers that “Pondage” volume should be calculated taking into account only the variations in the load thus confirming the methodology adopted by India for calculation of Pondage. He disagrees with Pakistan’s method of determination of “Pondage” i.e. with the objective of operating the plant at constant power and regulating the fluctuations in the river flow. The NE has recognized the uncertainties in projecting future load variations. The NE has arrived at a slightly lower value of 32.56 Million Cubic Metre (MCM) of maximum permissible “Pondage” as against India’s design of 37.50 MCM. NE arrived at the lower value as he adopted a daily pattern of power generation which is slightly different from that adopted by India. As a result, there will be a minor change in the schedule of peak power generation. However, the number of hours of power generation per week would remain at about 49 hours as designed by India. According to Pakistan’s calculations, the maximum “Pondage” allowed was 6.22 MCM.

Another point of difference raised by Pakistan was regarding the elevation of Intakes for the Turbines for the Plant. The Treaty requires these to be located at the highest level, consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the Plant and with customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the Plant’s operation. Pakistan had suggested that provision of anti-vortex devices could raise the intake levels by about 7 metres from that designed by India. According to the NE, the normal practice is to go for an appropriate arrangement of the intake structure. In particular cases where this is not possible for technical or economic reasons, then resourse could be taken to anti-vortex devices. The NE has also observed that the intakes should be so located as to avoid asymmetrical flow of water towards them. From his application of well know semi-empirical formulae, the NE considers that it is necessary to raise the power intakes by 2 metres and an additional 1 metre to allow for the slight reduction in “Pondage”. While the Indian designers of the project do not agree with the NE’s approach, as it reduces the water seal by 2 metres, no difficulty is expected in incorporating this change in the design of the Baglihar Plant.

The three elements of design which require marginal changes, i.e. reductions in freeboard and Pondage and increase in the height of the intakes all arise from calculations and not from basic principles.

The NE’s Final Determination confirms that India’s design has been compliant with the basic principles of the Indus Waters Treaty.

The Project

One of the most prestigious hydro-electric projects coming up in Jammu and Kashmir, Baglihar’s problems run beyond the conflict with Pakistan which though have been sorted out. The 450 MW project conceived long back was contracted out in anticipation of financial closure to two contractors –Jayprakash Industries Limited and Siemens for Civil and Electro Mechanical works respectively in the year 1999. The initial deadline for project completion was set for 60 months –which means project should have been operational by ending December 2004.

Two years have already passed by; project has overrun its estimated cost by several hundred millions of rupees. It is still nowhere near completion. The Construction companied and the government both have announced another deadline of December 2007, but a cursory project assessment suggests that this deadline too is not realistic.

The project was appraised by IDBI led consortium at a cost of Rs.3810 crores, but the financial closure could not be achieved upto the year 2003. Owing to non achievement of financial closure, delay in land acquisition, difficult Geological strata and labour problems the project could not be completed by the due date, says Jammu and Kashmir’s Minister for Power Nawang Rigzin Jora. Meanwhile the expenditure on project in anticipation of the financial closure was met from Bonds of Rs.1054 crores raised from financial market and annual plan outlays of the state.
Another consortium, led by PFC, was approached in the year 2003 for the financial closure of the project and PFC appraised the project at a revised cost of Rs.4000 crores and financial closure was achieved in the year 2004. Revised date of completion of the project was fixed for December 2006. That too could not be achieved.

A loan amount of Rs.1131 crores has been lifted so far and an expenditure of Rs.3274 crores excluding financing costs of Bonds of Rs.508 crores have been spent till December 2006 on the project. In July-August 2005, heavy and sustained flood discharge in the River Chenab followed by sudden draw down triggered heavy slides on the up stream sloops of diversion tunnel inlet faces which blocked the diversion tunnels causing the river to over flow the dam blocks and eventually leading to scouring of the right bank on down stream of dam side and damaging the trail track.

Later, after series of deliberations between Jammu and Kashmir State Power Development Corporation, Foreign Consultants Lahmeir International, Contractor and CWC, the strategies to tackle these damages were decided and the new date of completion of the project was determined as December 2007.


The Other Chestnuts


Baglihar is not a case in isolation, there are at least 27 power projects being built or already operational on Indian side which have been objected to by Pakistan. Quite often, Pakistan uses its logic of objections on these projects, under the ambit of Indus Water Treaty, to halt progress on Kashmir issue resolution.

Pressing with its objects hard and linking up with the political issues, Pakistan has already made India suffer tremendously. Over two decades back, Pakistan made serious objections over the 480 MW Salal projects, on river Chenab in Jammu province. Pakistan contended that storage of water in dams on this project could dry the rivers and canals downstream and can also later be used for flooding of the lower riparian states. India budged to the pressure and made design change in the dam. The project now faces siltage.

Actually a flood retardation scheme, Tulbul Navigation Project too has been under severe resentment from Pakistan. This project is actually about retaining water of the river Jhelum, as a natural rise, and then releasing it after October in a regulated manner. This is used for impounding water from Uri hydro-electric project and for navigational purposes. But Pakistan insists that it is a dam –which actually is not. Following objections from Pakistan laced with too much of politics, construction on the project had to be stopped in 1987. No significant development after that.

Another serious bone of contention between India and Pakistan is the Kishanganga project –a tributary based project on river Jhelum.

The Kishanganga project has to dam the Kishanganga (Neelum) River. The proposed 103-metre high reservoir could submerge almost the entire Gurez valley. From this reservoir, water will flow through a channel and a 27-kilometre tunnel dug south through the North Kashmir mountain range. The channel will change the course of Neelum River by around 100 kilometres, which will finally join the Wullar Lake and Jhelum River near the northern township of Bandipur. Presently, the Neelam and Jhelum rivers join each other at Muzaffarabad (in Pakistan administered Kashmir) at a point called Domail. Through the proposed Wullar barrage project, India plans to maintain constant yearly flow in Jhelum. Pakistan has serious objections on this project. As a consequence of this 100- kilometre diversion of the Neelum River, Pakistan's Neelum Valley could dry up and become a desert.

India has made a significant headway on resolving dispute over Kishanganga project but Pakistan is yet to agree to the proposed design change. In a bid to end a long-standing dispute over the Kishanganga project, India has now proposed to Pakistan modifications in the 330 mw hydro-electric power plant to convert it into a run-of-the-river project instead of generating electricity from water stored in a dam.

The decision was taken by the Union Cabinet on April 18, 2006, to convert the project into a run-of-the-river scheme comes in the wake of Pakistan`s objection of storage of 220 million cubic metres of Indus River water in a reservoir and produce power.

This has been done to end objections raised by Pakistan that India could not store water (under annexure E of the Indus Water Treaty). Now the project is sought to be covered under Annexure D of the treaty. While New Delhi continues to contend that it has the right to construct reservoirs on tributaries of Indus and has not violated the treaty, the cabinet decision was actually aimed at ending the dispute over the project, which was originally proposed in 1994.


The author is Editor-in-Chief, Epilogue, monthly magazine and news portal www.epilogue.in on Jammu and Kashmir. He can be reached at [email protected]
 
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ajtr

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Pakistan’s unfinished business of Partition

India-Pakistan relations took another knock last month with Yusuf Gilani’s remark to US defence secretary Robert Gates that his government could not guarantee against another 26/11 attack on India. He argued that if Pakistan could not defend itself against routine terrorist attacks by non-state actors at home it could not prevent them striking India.
The argument wears thin because these non-state actors are Pakistan’s own creation and some of them continue to be patronised by sections of the establishment. On being banned some time ago, the LeT under Hafiz Saeed was renamed Jamat-ud Dawa (JuD), This has now under pressure morphed into yet another ‘charity’ in Lahore called Al Noor University Trust. These aliases do not change the nature of the beast. The statements of Headley and Rana, both non-resident Pakistanis, now under trial in Chicago, chart their movements and actions over the past several years in training, planning and reconnoitering the ground for the 26/11 Mumbai attack under the direction of Pakistani handlers. The trial of Lakhvi and eight other Pakistani LeT operatives in Rawalpindi for the 26/11 terror attack has also come up with clear evidence of their complicity.
Further evidence from the Headley-Rana interrogation points to LeT training a group of Indian-origin jihadis in Karachi for further terrorist strikes against India. Such adventures cannot be planned, let alone launched, without the support and connivance of the ISI. It is in these circumstances Gilani’s bland statement disavowing responsibility for any further 26/11 attacks on India must be seen. The failure to act against JuD and other jihadi elements that appear to be able to move freely in Pakistan is indefensible. Some Pakistani interlocutors privately admit that Hafiz Saeed is too popular and powerful a figure with such influential contacts in high places that none dare touch him for fear of a backlash.
Many in Pakistan are known to be deeply worried by the drift they see in their weak and divided structure of governance with several power centres in which non-state actors have a niche. There is no alternative to dialogue as stated by the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers at Sharm el-Sheikh last summer. The Indian position is that the Sharm el-Sheikh theorem was posited on Pakistan taking credible steps to dismantle its terror outfits and bring the guilty men of 26/11 to justice.
A hard pressed President Zardari, now very much on the back foot, told the J&K Council in Muzaffarabad a week into the new year that regional peace is linked to a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. He referred to the state as Pakistan’s ‘jugular vein’, demanded ‘self-determination’ for it and promised to wage a ‘thousand year war’ for its ‘liberation’ — not through war (as his father-in-law Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ranted) but through an ‘ideological war’ to complete what is often to this day described as ‘the unfinished business of Partition’. And what is that ideology other than the disastrous and discredited two-nation theory, which Jinnah in his moment of triumph sought to jettison before its logic destroyed his new state.
The reference to Jinnah follows several recent statements by Pakistanis recalling the Qaid-e-Azam’s stirring call to the new Pakistan constituent assembly on August 11, 1947 to divorce religion from affairs of state and treat it purely as a personal matter. Jinnah was ignored, even censored subsequently, and himself retracted five months later, calling for a constitution based on the Sharia that would ensure Pakistan’s future as a great Islamic state. This was the beginning of the radical Islamisation of and, now, talibanisation of Pakistan beginning with the expulsion of the Ahmediyas from the fold. The humanist Sufi Islam of what is now Pakistan was steadily replaced by the hardline Wahabi Islam imported from Saudi Arabia through madrasas that sprouted with Gulf oil money seeking the restoration of lost glory through jihad. Afghanistan became the cauldron from which emerged al-Qaeda and the Taliban to take revenge. Kashmir was over time sought to be portrayed by some as yet another symbol of the larger ‘cause’.
It is by such logic that J&K is a ‘dispute’ for some in the OIC and even in the west, which has long embraced Pakistan as a ‘front line state’ and bastion against the spread of communism and a useful ally in stabilising and protecting its west Asian oil empire. The lack of ‘self-determination’ in PAK and the Gilgit-Baltistan area and the deep discontent in Balochistan is well-known and was narrated in graphic detail by representatives from those areas at a seminar in Delhi last month.
Many other myths are repeated, as at that seminar and elsewhere, by even liberal elements from Pakistan. One is about India encircling Pakistan through its activities and consulates in Afghanistan. The other is that India is somehow stealing Pakistan’s share of waters under the ‘unjust’ Indus Treaty that was heavily loaded against Pakistan. This has become a constant refrain of late though the assertions (rather than arguments) made are by and large trivial, political and emotional. The hard fact is that India has yet to utilise fully its prescribed share of storage and irrigation from the three Western rivers in J&K and is also letting down water to Pakistan from the eastern rivers that have been exclusively allocated to it under the Indus Treaty.
Refusal (or delayed) visas to Pakistani publishers wishing to attend the Delhi book fair was another avoidable snub. People-to-people contact must be encouraged and Pakistanis invited for talks on matters like trade and other CBMs even pending the composite dialogue. Meanwhile, the internal dialogue in J&K that has been re-initiated cannot be allowed to flag and should be carried forward. While no one in J&K or Delhi must be allowed a veto, every effort must be made to educate all sections of opinion at home, countrywide, on the issues and stakes involved.
 

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Save Punjab from becoming a desert

THE talk in the villages of Punjab these days is centred on the diminishing returns on paddy and wheat and the failing level of underground watertable. This problem of water, believe me, is not new, but of late it is getting the desired attention. We, the Punjabis, are by nature a carefree lot. Small problems just don’t matter in our everyday life. The underground watertable has been going down for the past four decades, but in the initial years the drop was minor and tubewells were deep enough to take it in stride. The problem of course was originated by the cultivation of paddy in the unconventional areas. In the original undivided province of Punjab, rice, especially Basmati, was cultivated in the Gujjranwala and Sheikhupura belt and on both sides of the Ravi in Sialkot, Gurdaspur, Lahore and Amritsar as well as in the Beas basin in Hoshiarpur and Kapurthala. Now every district is growing it and the rivers are no longer perennial.

From October to June for a period of nine months all the rivers in Punjab are just like dry beds of sand which don’t help in recharging the underground watertable. The waters generated by melting snows and rainfall in the hilly areas of Himachal Pradesh are dammed up in Bhakra and Pong reservoirs and are conveyed to the arid areas of Punjab, Rajasthan and Haryana.

Water from the hill areas is utilised to the optimum extent, but no effort is being made to store Punjab’s own annual rainfall of 25 inches plus. Given our callous indifference to the storage of our own rainfall, even without cultivation of rice, Punjab’s watertable was supposed to go down gradually. Lack of recharging potential due to negligible flow and no storage in the rivers for nine months in a year is the principal cause of our problem of falling underground watertable. What would have happened slowly anyway has been marked accelerated by the cultivation of rice.

The State-wide watertable has dropped more significantly during the past two decades. Where the watertable was 50 feet deep in 1980, it is 250 feet deep in 2002. Such a significant drop in the level of water should have rung alarm bells long ago, but our nature is to keep on ignoring our problems in the hope of getting some miracle to happen. Scientific thinking suggests that such a miracle has neither happened nor will happen. The solutions, at this late stage, are difficult but not impossible.

Under the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan, out of six Western rivers called waters of the Indus basin, India has been given full rights to utilises the waters of three rivers, the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi Pakistan gets the right to use the waters of the remaining three rivers namely the Chenab, the Jhelum and the Indus. What has been given to India in a treaty India has miserably failed to make use of.

Until 2001 India, by not damming the Ravi was letting its entire water into Pakistan. The story is not as dismal in the case of the Sutlej and the Beas. The discharge contributed by its catchment area in the hills is dammed up and released into canals for the use of three States. Only the inflow contributed by the drainage area in Punjab goes into Pakistan. Pakistan on its own part has constructed several barrages, especially in its Sind to irrigate the formerly desert-like areas of that province. Farmers from west Punjab have settled in big numbers in these newly irrigated but otherwise virgin tracts of land. The area is blooming with all sorts of plantations.

At the level of the state government and other agencies a lot of advice is being given to the cultivators in Indian Punjab to abandon the practice of cultivation of rice and adopt other low water requirement crops instead. Can the people issuing these sermons guarantee that the watertable will come back after the plantation of rice is discontinued? The answer to this question is a big no. By stopping the cultivation of rice, we can certainly arrest the further downward slide in the watertable, but recharging will happen only if lakes are developed for constantly seeping the surface waters into the sub-soil.

At this stage we need to develop a series of cascade lakes by damming the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ghaggar at intervals of three to four miles each. First two such lakes should come up near Beas town on the Beas and close to Phillaur on the Sutlej. The Ghaggar dam should logically come up somewhere between the crossing of the Chandigarh-Ambala highway and the Grand Trunk Road. The primary purpose of these lakes will be to surcharge the underground watertable. The secondary purposes can be the production of fish, creation of recreational opportunities and augmentation of rural and urban supplies of potable water for the cities and districts of Amritsar, Jalandhar, Ludhiana Chandigarh and Patiala. At this time all the big cities of Punjab are suffering terrible shortage of potable as well irrigation quality water.

These dams need not be very expensive to build. What is needed is a basic dam structure at each location. The height above ground may range between ten to fifteen feet. Since these dams shall not be capable of generating significant amounts of electricity, their designs can be very simple. The impoundment structures could be either roller compacted concrete gravity dams or more slander reinforced concrete dams. They should be safe in sliding, overturning and against forces of uplift pressure. Eliminating seepage from underneath the dams should not be important. Earth dams are slightly cheaper to build and they are aesthetically pleasing, but their problems are not easy to detect and are more difficult and expensive to address. The concrete dams mostly develop problems on the upstream side and the symptoms appear on the downstream side. Such problems are easy to detect during the periods of low impoundment and the remedies can also be applied during droughts. These dams built on the rivers will be able to hold the entire amount of water during a weak monsoon. During normal or heavy monsoon however, some water will flow into Pakistan.

Punjab’s water problem is very serious. It deserves serious action. The solutions are not cheap, but they are a dire necessity, no matter what the price-tag is. Once these dams are in place, the rise in the underground watertable will be noticed in the very first year in the areas located up to two miles from the river banks. Within a few years the impact on the watertable will travel to more than 10 miles on each side. Ultimately the entire state and some parts in Pakistan and Haryana will also benefit from these dams. In America wherever a dam has been built across a stream its impact on the underground watertable has been positive and permanent. The excessive consumption of water during the peak years of industrial revolution of the nineteenth century resulted in deepening of water table all over the industrial America. With the construction of hundreds of small and medium sized dams the imbalance was rectified in the early part of the twentieth century. A lot of dams are still coming up in the areas of water shortage.

During the eighties a phenomenal spurt in urban grown in Monmouth County of New Jersey created scarcity of water on a countywide basis. After years of planning a new dam was built across the Manasquan river during the early years of the nineties. The result was abundance of water in the immediate future and sufficiency of water up to 2020. In the intervening period another dam will be built and more water will be harnessed.

Punjab needs extensive conservation of water. The village ponds need to be deepened and made bigger. The ‘choes” of Ropar and Hoshiarpur need to be dammed. Sukhna lake in Chandigarh needs to be deepened so much that all the flood water in “Sukhna choe” for the entire monsoon season can be stored in the lake. The Railways need soil for the Chandigarh-Ludhiana rail link. Let them dig this lake up and cart the soil to the alignment of the railway line. There is another “choe” passing through the leisure valley in Sectors 3,10 and 16. This “choe” should be dammed in several spots in the gardens it is passing through. By the time it reaches Mohali, its bed should be dry.

I hope this article will prompt our planners to think of not only abandoning the cultivation of rice, but also to plan evolving new strategies to harness the waters of our rivers for rehabilitating the depleting water levels of the State. My suggestions are for agricultural abundance and food sufficiency of the entire nation and not just for the benefit of its bread basket, Punjab.
 

ajtr

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Water war with India?

At the moment, India and Pakistan lack a legal forum to sort out issues of water scarcity. The tension relating to water resources held by India has heated up again and Pakistan has complained that India is holding back the waters of rivers flowing from Indian-administered Kashmir. Some analysts have termed this as a clear violation of the Indus Water Treaty.
In a sense, the availability of less water from the rivers is a security issue for Pakistan as it could put the country’s very survival at stake. The media in Pakistan and the general public, too, appear convinced that India is withholding the waters in violation of the Indus Water Treaty. Pakistan's Prime Minister also wanted for dialogues not for war with their archival rivals. On the other hand, the Indian perception is that Pakistan is assuming that India had restricted the flow, and that this assumption was incorrect as the water level was low the previous year as well.
Pakistan has unlimited amount of river & rainwater, except that they do not know how to exploit it. Yearly water flow in Indus alone is about 170 MAF. Rivers Jhelum & Chenab carry about a quarter of that amount. Hence Pakistan has about 300 MAF of water flowing down the rivers. This does not include tremendous amount of water, which comes down with Monsoon downpour. Indus has about ten times more water than Colorado River in US and three times more water than Nile in Egypt. Anybody with that amount of water in the rivers should be awash with water. What is missing is will to do anything worthwhile to manage water resources. Successive military governments are to be blamed. Most monies are appropriated to build up the military. Monies for economic projects are always in short supply. Hence these projects are lower on priority. For example, with looming water shortage, the Kalabagh Dam is still stuck in a controversy. The missing element is the unfair water distribution policy. Leaders favor Pakistani Punjab as it has more muscle in the military and at the central government. This leaves other provinces angry, annoyed and ready to revolt. For the military rulers it is easy to raise the bogey of India stealing water to incense the public. India’s plan to build hydroelectric projects on rivers allocated to Pakistan in Kashmir is big news in Pakistan. The leaders know fully well that the Indus Water Treaty clearly gives India right to use the Rivers Indus, Jhelum & Chenab to generate electricity and draw water for personal use. They ignore that part. They also know that every electricity generation project requires significant water storage so that electricity generation could continue uninterrupted during the lean months. The same right is given to Pakistan. It is that right that has become of dispute.
From a legal point of view, this argument is interesting as it actually raises the issue of jurisdiction and the scope of the Indus Water Treaty itself. The Indus Water Treaty does not deal directly with the issue of water scarcity. In fact, when the treaty (signed in 1960) was being negotiated, a future possibility of water scarcity was not a priority or a leading concern for the negotiators.
Hence, we find that there is no provision perse that provides a mechanism to both the countries if climate-based water scarcity occurs. The critical provisions of the Indus Water Treaty simply say that India and Pakistan were obliged to “let flow” the river waters without interfering.
Hence any obstruction by India would be seen as an outright breach of the treaty by Pakistan.
Despite speculations by the Pakistani side there is no specific evidence brought forth so far that India is actually obstructing the flow or is diverting the waters. The Indian argument remains that reservoirs such as the Wullar Barrage and others are built within the regulatory framework of the treaty itself. Pakistan, naturally, has a different view and in one case Pakistan was seeking third-party resolution through a neutral expert who did not support fully the Pakistani version.
If the Indian version is correct then the issue cannot be addressed within the framework of the Indus Water Treaty and, in that case, Pakistan is pursuing a remedy in the wrong direction.The question remains as to who determines whether the reduced amount of water flowing into the rivers of Pakistan from the Indian side is because of obstructions or on account of climatic water scarcity. For that both countries would need to agree on an independent and a separate framework or neutral experts’ assessment. The determination by such a panel would make matters clearer for Pakistani and Indian policymakers who could then follow a bilateral remedial course of action.
The argument is also advanced that even if the water flowing into Pakistani rivers is less due to genuine climatic water scarcity, India cannot escape responsibility as a state to maintain and manage the water resources that it exercises control over. India’s responsibility comes under the general framework of international law that calls on the upper riparian state to take the necessary measures to minimise water scarcity.
In Europe and elsewhere, water scarcity has promoted trans-boundary water cooperation instead of inciting war over this issue. The UN Convention on Uses of International Water Courses 1997 obliges states to conserve, manage and protect international water courses. Pakistan and India are not party to the said convention but the latter nevertheless offers a comprehensive framework for trans boundary water cooperation.
If this issue is not handled technically without a legal mechanism, then it has the potential to further aggravate tensions between India and Pakistan as it will be clubbed with the Kashmir dispute. Further, a reduced water flow could be perceived as India’s ploy to put additional pressure on Pakistan and, in that event, the response would be equally unmeasured and misdirected.
Finally, whether India is actually blocking the water or the decrease in water flow is due to scarcity and climatic change, needs objective and transparent determination by experts. This determination of the real reason should be agreed to beforehand through a bilateral agreement confined to fact-finding. If the finding is that the reduced flow of water is due to obstructions, then Pakistan could take action under the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty immediately.
On the other hand, if it is determined that there is genuine water scarcity then the issue is outside the jurisdiction of the Indus Water Treaty and needs to be sorted out by both states on a bilateral basis. India, in that case, should undertake its obligations under international law for proper water conservation and management and share the details with Pakistan through a mutually agreed mechanism.
 

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The climatic changes due to global warming have led to depleting flow in all Indus River system of rivers, especially the Indus , which depends on glacial runoffs for 90% of its waters. Generally, the Himalayan rivers also carry a very heavy sediment load especially during summer and rainy season, which in turn leads to river shifting and silting of dams and barrages. The three largest dams in Pakistan , Tarbela, Mangla and Chashma have already lost ~ 25% of their capacity due to silting. This is a serious problem in a country which depends on river irrigation, rather than the monsoon rains, for 74% of its total cultivated land. It is generally agreed that 40% of all the water drawn through the canals at barrage heads is lost because of seepage due to un-lined and porous beds and banks of the canals. Such problems exacerbate the already poor yield of the crops In addition, there is excessive system-loss of water due to improper and antiquated agricultural techniques and heavy cropping of water-intensive varieties like sugarcane and rice. While reeling under increasing drought for the last six years, it is also predicted that Pakistan will have a certain level of drought conditions for the next 15 years.. Since the dams mostly act as storage reservoirs during Kharif season and draw-down reservoirs during Rabi, there is an acute need within Pakistan for more storage
There have been widespread protests against the proposed dams of Kalabagh at Mianwali, and Basha at Chilas, Gilgit area and the raising of the Mangla dam in Mirpur. Out of the four provinces of Pakistan , three viz. Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP are against these dams. Even the illegally occupied PoK and Balawaristan oppose the dam projects of Mangla and Basha. The proposed raising of the height of Mangla Dam in Mirpur, PoK, by another 40 feet, will further submerge that district. It is also possible that if India exercises its rights to store 1.5 MAF on Jhelum , the raised Mangla Dam will not fill up. The crux of the matter is the lack of agreement among provinces on the total water availability within the country.

The dams, barrages and canals built to satisfy the increasing demands of water upstream have made water scarce in the Indus at the estuaries of the Arabian Sea causing the sea to push in and increase the salinity in 1.2 Million acres of farmlands.The discharge of freshwater from the Indus into the Arabian Sea has declined steadily from 85 MAF in the 1940s to about 10 MAF in the 90s and probably less today. Pakistan also uses the waters of the Indus rivers for another purpose, fortification of its defences along Indian borders. It has built a series of �defence canals� at strategic locations which are flooded at times of wars and tensions to prevent crossing by Indian armour and artillery. In 2002, after India mobilized its forces as part of Operation Parakram , Pakistan diverted waters to these �defence canals� accentuating the then already severe water shortage of 50% to over 70%.

Pakistan faces one of the severest water shortages in the world as seen in its� per capita availability of water per annum fall from 5300 m3 in 1951 to less than 1100 m3 today. This figure is alarming given that it is below the internationally recommended level of 1500 m3 and precariously close to the critical 1000 m3 level. Compounded with the failure to fill the country�s two largest reservoirs to capacity, declining flows in the Indus River System, elusive and contentious the inter-provincial water accord due to mutual suspicions among provinces, and an unsustainable population growth rate of 2% do not bode well for Pakistan�s water situation. Disagreements on construction of new reservoirs, declining groundwater potential, and growing number of disputes with India after a relatively uneventful period of 44 years of water sharing will further complicate matters. In summation, the water situation in Pakistan (a country whose landscape is largely arid to semi-arid) is truly disastrous in spite of the Indus , its tributaries, and a treaty with generous concessions that has been implemented faithfully by upper riparian India to date in spite of grave provocations. Pakistani farmers may be forced to change to higher yielding earlier maturating crops, modify their sowing patterns, and employ micro irrigation in coming years to mitigate shortages-all of which will entail higher costs. Its frivolous objections to Indian projects and a general unwillingness to engage India constructively are partly to force India to amend the IWT to accommodate the emerging patterns of water use in Pakistan , such as water sharing during periods of shortage-a situation not envisaged in the treaty.
 
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INTER-DOMINION AGREEMENT, BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ON THE CANAL WATER DISPUTE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PUNJAB

New Delhi
4 May 1948

A dispute has arisen between the East and West Punjab Governments regarding the supply by East Punjab of water to the Central Bari Doab and the Depalpur canals in West Punjab. The contention of the East Punjab Government is that under the Punjab Partition (Apportionment of Assets and Liabilities) Order, 1947, and the Arbitral Award the proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers in East Punjab vest wholly in the East Punjab Government and the West Punjab Government cannot claim any share of these waters as a right. The West Punjab Government disputes this contention, its view being that the point has conclusively been decided in its favour by implication by the Arbitral Award and that in accordance with international law and equity, West Punjab has a right to the waters of the East Punjab rivers.

2. The East Punjab Government has revived the flow of water into these canals on certain conditions of which two are disputed by West Punjab. One, which arises out of the contention in paragraph 1, is the right to the levy of seigniorage charges for water and the other is the question of the capital cost of the Madhopur Head Works and carrier channels to be taken into account.

3. The East and West Punjab Governments are anxious that this question should be settled in a spirit of goodwill and friendship. Without prejudice to its legal rights in the matter the East Punjab Government has assured the West Punjab Government that it has no intention suddenly to withhold water from West Punjab without giving it time to tap alternative sources. The West Punjab Government on its part recognise the natural anxiety of the East Punjab Government to discharge the obligations to develop areas where water is scarce and which were underdeveloped in relation to parts of West Punjab.

4. Apart, therefore, from the question of law involved, the Governments are anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit on the basis of the East Punjab Government progressively diminishing its supply to these canals in order to give reasonable time to enable the West Punjab Government to-tap alternative sources.

5. The West Punjab Government has agreed to deposit immediately in the Reserve Bank such ad hoc sum as may be specified by the Prime Minister of India. Out of this sum, that Government agrees to the immediate transfer to East Punjab Government of sum6 over which there is no dispute. 6. After an examination by each party of the legal issues, of the method of estimating the cost of water to be supplied by the East Punjab Government and of the technical survey of water resources and the means of using them for supply to these canals, the two Governments agree that further meetings between their representative6 should take place.

7. The Dominion Governments of India and Pakistan accept the above terms and express the hope that a friendly solution will be reached.

(Signed)
(Signed)

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
SWARAN SINGH
N.V. GADGIL
GHULAM MOHD.
SHAUKAT HYAT KHAN
MUMTAZ DAULTANA

New Delhi
May 4, 1948
 

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The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers

Adopted by the International Law Association at the fifty-second conference, held at Helsinki in
August 1966. Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers
(London, International Law Association, 1967)
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL
Article I
The general rules of international law as set forth in these chapters are applicable to the use of
the waters of an international drainage basin except as may be provided otherwise by
convention, agreement or binding custom among the basin States.
Article II
An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending over two or more States
determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters, including surface and underground
waters, flowing into a common terminus.
Article III
A "basin State" is a State the territory of which includes a portion of an international drainage
basin.
CHAPTER 2. EQUITABLE UTILIZATION OF THE WATERS OF AN
INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASIN
Article IV
Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.
Article V
I. What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of article IV to be
determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.
II. Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
1. The geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in
the territory of each basin State;
2. The hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each
basin State;
3. The climate affecting the basin;
4. The past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization;
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5. The economic and social needs of each basin State;
6. The population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
7. The comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social
needs of each basin State;
8. The availability of other resources;
9. The avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters of the basin;
10. The practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means
of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
11. The degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin State.
III. The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its importance in comparison
with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is reasonable and equitable share,
all relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis of
the whole.
Article VI
A use or category of uses is not entitled to any inherent preference over any other use or
category of uses.
Article VII
A basin State may not be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an international
drainage basin to reserve for a co-basin State a future use of such waters.
Article VIII
1. An existing reasonable use may continue in operation unle ss the factors justifying its
continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it be modified or
terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.
2. (a) A use that is in fact operational is deemed to have been an existing use from the time of
the initiation of construction directly related to the use or, where such construction is not
required, the undertaking of comparable acts of actual implementation.
(b) Such a use continues to be an existing use until such time as it is discontinued with the
intention that it be abandoned.
3. A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational it is
incompatible with an already existing reasonable use.
CHAPTER 3. POLLUTION
Article IX
As used in this chapter, the term "water pollution" refers to any detrimental change resulting
from human conduct in the natural composition, content, or quality of the waters of an
international drainage basin.
Article X
1. Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an international
drainage basin, a State:
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(a) Must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing
water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in
the territory of a co-basin State;
(b) Should take all reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution in an international
drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial damage is caused in the territory of a cobasin
State.
2. The rule stated in paragraph 1 of this article applies to water pollution originating:
(a) Within a territory of the State, or
(b) Outside the territory of the State, if it is caused by the State's conduct.
Article XI
1. In the case of a violation of the rule stated in paragraph 1 (a) of article X of this chapter, the
State responsible shall be required to cease the wrongful conduct and compensate the
injured co-basin State for the injury that has been caused to it.
2. In a case falling under the rule stated in paragraph 1 (b) of article X, if a State fails to take
reasonable measures, it shall be required promptly to enter into negotiations with the injured
State with a view towards reaching a settlement equitable under the circumstances.
CHAPTER 4 . NAVIGATION (Articles XII-XX)
CHAPTER 5. TIMBER FLOATING (Articles XXI-XXV)
CHAPTER 6. PROCEDURES FOR THE PREVENTION AND SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES
Article XXVI
This chapter relates to procedures for the prevention and settlement of international disputes as
to the legal rights or other interests of basin States and of other States in the waters of an
international drainage basin.
Article XXVII
Consistently with the Charter of the United Nations, States are under an obligation to settle
international disputes as to their legal rights or other interests by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered.
It is recommended that States resort progressively to the means of prevention and settlement of
disputes stipulated in articles XXIX to XXXIV of this chapter.
Article XXVIII
1. States are under a primary obligation to resort to means of prevention and settlement of
disputes stipulated in the applicable treaties binding upon them.
2. States are limited to the means of prevention and settlement of disputes stipulated in treaties
binding upon them only to the extent provided by the applicable treaties.
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Article XXIX
1. With a view to preventing disputes from arising between basin States as to their legal rights
or other interest, it is recommended that each basin State furnish relevant and reasonably
available information to the other basin States concerning the waters of a drainage basin
within its territory and its use of, and activities with respect to, such waters.
2. A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish to any
other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected, notice of any
proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the basin in a way
which might give rise to a dispute as defined in article XXVI. The notice should include
such essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an assessment of the probable effect
of the proposed alteration.
3. A State providing the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this article should afford the
recipient a reasonable period of time to make an assessment of the probable effect of the
proposed construction or installation and to submit its views thereon to the State furnishing
the notice.
4. If a State has failed to give the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this article, the alteration
by the State in the regime of the drainage basin shall not be given the weight normally
accorded to temporal priority in use in the event of a determination of what is a reasonable
and equitable share of the waters of the basin.
Article XXX
In case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other interests, as defined in article
XXVI, they should seek a solution by negotiation..
Article XXXI
1. If a question or dispute arises which relates to the present or future utilization of the waters
of an international drainage basin, it is recommended that the basin States refer the question
or dispute to a joint agency and that they request the agency to survey the international
drainage basin and to formulate plans or recommendations for the fullest and most efficient
use thereof in the interests of all such States.
2. It is recommended that the joint agency be instructed to submit reports on all matters within
its competence to the appropriate authorities of the member States concerned.
3. It is recommended that the member States of the joint agency in appropriate cases invite
non-basin States which by treaty enjoy a right in the use of the waters of an international
drainage basin to associate themselves with the work of the joint agency or that they be
permitted to appear before the agency.
Article XXXII
If a question or a dispute is one which is considered by the States concerned to be incapable of
resolution in the manner set forth in article XXXI, it is recommended that they seek the good
offices, or jointly request the mediation of a third State, of a qualified international organization
or of a qualified person.
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Article XXXIII
1. If the States concerned have not been able to resolve their dispute through negotiation or
have been unable to agree on the measures described in articles XXXI and XXXII, it is
recommended that they form a commission of inquiry or an ad hoc conciliation
commission, which shall endeavor to find a solution, likely to be accepted by the States
concerned, of any dispute as to their legal rights.
2. It is recommended that the conciliation commission be constituted in the manner set forth in
the annex.
Article XXXIV
It is recommended that the States concerned agree to submit their legal disputes to an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal, to a permanent arbitral tribunal or to the International Court of Justice if:
(a) A commission has not been formed as provided in article XXXIII, or
(b) The commission has not been able to find a solution to be recommended, or
(c) A solution recommended has not been accepted by the States concerned, and
(d) An agreement has not been otherwise arrived at.
Article XXXV
It is recommended that in the event of arbitration the States concerned have recourse to the
Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure prepared by the International Law Commission of the
United Nations at its tenth session b/in 1958.
Article XXXVI
Recourse to arbitration implies the undertaking by the States concerned to consider the award to
be given as final and to submit in good faith to its execution.
Article XXXVII
The means of settlement referred to in the preceding articles of this chapter are without
prejudice to the utilization of means of settlement recommended to, or required of, members of
regional arrangements or agencies and of other international organizations.
 

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From Indus to Satluj

The dispute between India and Pakistan over the use of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries and its resolution through a treaty in 1960 constitute a useful precedent to solve the present row.

KARNATAKA, ruled the Supreme Court in 1991, answering a Presidential Reference under Article 143 of the Constitution, "has assumed the role of a judge in its own cause... The action (of the State) forebodes evil consequences to the federal structure under the Constitution and opens doors for each State to act in the way it desires, disregarding not only the rights of the other States, the orders passed by instrumentalities constituted under an Act of Parliament but also the provisions of the Constitution. If the power of a State to issue such an Ordinance is upheld, it will lead to the breakdown of the constitutional mechanism and affect the unity and integrity of the nation".



September 19, 1960: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru being received by Pakistan President Field Marshal Ayub Khan at the Karachi Airport. Nehru was in Pakistan to sign the Indus Water Treaty.
Every word of this unusually strong opinion in the Cauvery water disputes case, directed at the Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance issued by the Governor of Karnataka in 1991 to frustrate an Interim Order of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, applies fully, if not with greater force, to the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004, passed by the Punjab Assembly on July 12 in order to defeat a mandatory injunction granted by the Supreme Court itself to complete the Satluj-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal.

Faced with similar intransigence by an erring State, and a similar response by the Union government - following the 1991 precedent, the President referred the Punjab Act to the Supreme Court on July 22 for its advisory opinion - it is highly unlikely that the court will take a different view of the matter this time even though the Punjab Act is far more carefully worded than the Karnataka Ordinance and has the advantage of a preambulary recital no less than 20 paragraphs long.

In addition to the larger considerations that prevailed with the Supreme Court in the Cauvery case - the threat to the federal structure and the lack of legislative competence in States to enact laws affecting the rights of other States - the Punjab case involves an issue of even greater import extending beyond federal or national boundaries: the sanctity of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan.

Rightly described by N.D. Gulhati, the principal negotiator of the treaty from the Indian side, as the "biggest and the most complicated river dispute in the world, national or international", the dispute over the use of the Indus waters (including the waters of its tributaries, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Satluj) and its resolution in 1960, constitute a necessary historical and legal background to the current dispute among Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan over the waters of the Ravi and the Beas.

The manner in which the dispute was resolved adds not inconsiderably to the value of the conclusion.

THE Indus diplomacy, writes Gulhati in his book on the treaty, was neither like the highly stylised diplomacy of the old days nor of the "gold-fish bowl" variety. "There was no mass audience to address, no occasion for rhetoric nor for inflammatory debating tactics." The approach was functional and highly professional. The negotiators were "not just playing with opinions and views, they were measuring and proving ideas by facts and figures".

Signed finally by Jawaharlal Nehru and Field Marshal Ayub Khan (and, for certain specified purposes, by Sir William Iliff for the World Bank that had brought the two nations together), the treaty effected a lasting division of the Indus waters to the mutual advantage of India and Pakistan, a division that has survived two full-fledged wars plus a third, the Kargil conflict, that was almost so. A division between the so-called "Eastern Rivers" - the Satluj, the Beas and the Ravi taken together - was made available for the unrestricted use of India (Article II) and the so-called "Western Rivers" - the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab taken together - for Pakistan's unrestricted use (Article III).

The significance of the opening clause of Article II - "All the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India" - the single most important provision in the treaty from the Indian point of view, is writ large over the whole of Gulhati's book, a work as indispensable for a proper understanding of river water disputes in the Indus basin as, say, Granville Austin's work on the labours of the Constituent Assembly is for understanding the Constitution. The following passage on page 246 of the book is, however, particularly instructive in the context of the present crisis:

"After ten years of hard and devoted work, we had secured almost a world-wide recognition of our claim to use in India all the waters of the Eastern Rivers, including the 12 MAF which was actually being let down for use in Pakistan as at the time of partition... In India, we had already allocated all these waters, including the 12 MAF referred to above, between Punjab (including the present Haryana), Rajasthan and Jammu and Kashmir. The scope of the Bhakra-Nangal project had been considerably increased, the Madhopur-Beas Link and the Sirhind Feeder had been completed and opened for operation, several new channels had been built on the Upper Bari Doab Canal and the Rajasthan Canal was under construction."

For anyone to suggest, adds Gulhati, that India should forego the use of the 12 MAF of waters of the Eastern Rivers and allow them to flow into Pakistan "seemed to us more dangerous than a fifth-column activity in the battle for the Indus waters or, to put it more charitably, showed a complete lack of appreciation of the large and vital role this quantity of river flow could play in meeting the food deficit of the country, in the development and prosperity of north-west India".

Both, then, the actual wording of Article II of the Indus Waters Treaty (all the waters of the Eastern Rivers being made available for use by "India" rather than any particular State therein), and its understanding and application by India, embodying what lawyers call contemporanea expositio (contemporaneous exposition) of a statute, rule out a claim or an exclusive claim to the waters of the Satluj, the Beas and the Ravi by any individual State within India.

The fact that a sum of £62.06 million (over Rs.100 crores) was paid to Pakistan by India, rather than any State or States within India, under Article V of the Indus Waters Treaty, towards the cost of construction by Pakistan of a system of replacement" works such as link canals (envisaged by Article IV) that would convey the waters of the Western Rivers to areas in Pakistan hitherto dependent for irrigation on the waters of the Eastern Rivers, further confirms this interpretation.

This financial assistance or contribution by India to Pakistan was the third main plank of the Indus Waters Treaty as proposed by the World Bank, the first two being the allocation of the use of the Eastern and the Western Rivers respectively to India and Pakistan.

More than anything else, therefore, Punjab's claim to the ownership of the waters of the Satluj, the Ravi and the Beas flies in the face of the Indus Waters Treaty which, strictly speaking and subject to the provisions of Article IV(15) thereof, recognises no such title or right of ownership even in India - nor, for that matter, in Pakistan in relation to the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab - and grants India only the right of "unrestricted use" of these waters.

Clause (15) of Article IV preserves, no doubt, "existing territorial rights over the waters" of both the Western and Eastern Rivers, a clear reference to territorial sovereignty on either side of the border. This is subject, however, to the phrase with which the clause opens: "Except as otherwise required by the express provisions of this Treaty", which is, by all accounts, a phrase of limitation and cannot be construed otherwise.

Determination of the precise extent of the limitation would entail a minute analysis of all the provisions of the Indus Waters Treaty and its various Annexures (which form, by virtue of Article XII, a part of the treaty) and the rights and obligations of India and Pakistan set out therein, an exercise not possible in the present article. It would suffice and be safe to state that any such analysis would vindicate the opinion of the outstanding German international lawyer and expert on river waters, Professor F.J. Berber, that even though "fairly elastic" and not free of "lacunae, obscurities and inaccuracies" the principle of "restricted" and not absolute territorial sovereignty should prevail in this area of international law.

Especially engaged by the Government of India in the 1950s to provide the necessary legal back-up in the negotiations over the Indus Waters Treaty, at first on a whole-time basis and later as a consultant after he left to join the University of Munich, Prof. Berber contributed significantly to the general plan and final text of the treaty. Translated from the German and published by the London Institute of World Affairs in 1959, his work Rivers in International Law is not likely to be surpassed for its depth and maturity of comprehension.

The principle of absolute territorial sovereignty, he adds, joining issue with Max Huber, may be pertinent for the problems of two neighbouring nations in relation to their territory composed of land. Water, however, is not an immovable but a movable element which today is in the territory of one state (or country) and tomorrow in the territory of another, and that creates further problems which are not exhausted by the principle of absolute sovereignty.

COMING back to Punjab's case, its claim to "proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers in East Punjab" was noticed in so many words, albeit only as a contention, in the Inter - Dominion Agreement concluded at Delhi on May 4, 1948 and signed by Jawaharlal Nehru, N.V. Gadgil and Swaran Singh on behalf of India and Finance Minister Ghulam Mohamed, Shaukat Hyat Khan and Mumtaz Daultana on behalf of Pakistan.

Staked by the then government of East Punjab, the claim was strongly disputed by the West Punjab government, contending that West Punjab had a right to the waters of the East Punjab rivers "in accordance with international law and equity".

Neither of the Dominion governments stated their views with respect to the rival contentions, resting content with the "hope" that a friendly solution would be reached. Behind the dull prose of East Punjab's claim in the Agreement of May 1948 lay a dramatic action on the ground, whose reverberations continued to be felt in the corridors of power in Asia and the West long thereafter. In a sudden, unprecedented move on April 1, 1948, East Punjab stopped all delivery of waters to West Punjab from the Upper Bari Doab Canal.

"In an area as arid and densely populated as the Indus basin," Pakistan was to state five years later, unable to forget the incident, "the appropriation by one community of the water of another is an act with tragic and far-reaching consequences. In its implications and results, such an act can be more devastating than an armed attack."

Had the Inter-Dominion Agreement of May 1948, containing East Punjab's claim to proprietorship of the river waters, remained in force, Punjab would have had an eminently arguable case today, Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act notwithstanding. Its challenge to the constitutionality of Section 78, now rather thin, would also have carried far greater conviction in that event.

Unfortunately for Punjab, however, the May 1948 Agreement did not survive the Indus Waters Treaty. Incorporated in Annexure `A' to the treaty is the Government of India's express declaration, agreeing with Pakistan, that the 1948 Agreement and "the rights and obligations of either party thereto claimed under, or arising out of, that Agreement" shall be without effect as from April 1, 1960, the date on which the treaty itself came into force pursuant to its ratification.

All its claims under the 1948 Agreement having been thus effaced, how can Punjab now legally claim what under the Indus Waters Treaty belongs only to "India" or not even to India?

For all my reservations about the twin judgments of the Supreme Court in the SYL canal case - the specious reasoning employed in the first to assume a jurisdiction expressly denied under Article 262 and the obsessive preoccupation with the technicalities of ordinary civil law in the second - and for all the intensity of sentiment in Punjab today, it is apparent that, in the ultimate analysis, Punjab has no case.
 

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India rubbishes Pak's 'water stealing' allegations

Rejecting recent allegations by Pakistan of non-adherence to the Indus Water Treaty, India [ Images ] on Tuesday said it was yet another move to raise an 'anti-India' bogey to create 'popular resonance' to cover-up their internal domestic water woes and asked Islamabad [ Images ] to do better water management.

Pakistan is trying to deflect its own domestic water problem by raising the 'India bogey,' sources said adding that the attempt from that country is always to 'stall' or 'delay' any project undertaken by the Indian side.

There are 33 hydroelectric projects by India including Baglihar and Kishanganaga, which are run-of-river projects permissible under the treaty, the sources said.

The information about all these projects, based on their various stages, have been provided to Pakistan, they said.


"India has all along adhered to the provisions of the treaty. There has never been the slightest of tinkering from our side," sources said, adding that most of the issues raised by Pakistan have been those of technical nature and should be addressed by the mechanism of the Permanent Indus Commission.

The allegations by the adviser to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Education, Sardar Aseff Ali, that India 'steals' water has whipped public hysteria.

Even terror groups like the Lashkar-e-Tayiba [ Images ] and Jamaat-ud-Dawa have been trying to hype the issue by blaming India for growing scarcity of water in Pakistan and their leaders Hafiz Saeed [ Images ] and his deputy Abdur Rahman Makki were making public statements like 'Muslims dying of thirst would drink the blood of India.'

"We would ask them (the Pakistan government) to get their act together and do a better management of water. 38 million acre feet (MAF) water constitutes what is known as average escapage to sea," the sources said.
 
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A redundant treaty

M.S. MENON

THE 46-YEAR-OLD history of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) is the story of a tragedy that began with hope as demonstrated by past events and confirmed by the recent verdict of Raymond Lafitte, the World Bank appointed neutral expert for the Baglihar project.

The treaty, signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan with the aim of achieving the optimum development and utilisation of the Indus waters, has miserably failed not only in accomplishing the objectives but also in settling water disputes between the two all these years.

A perusal of the treaty would reveal that it is biased in favour of Pakistan, ignoring international rules on equitable distribution of waters. Against India's rightful share of more than 40 per cent of the Indus waters, we got only about 20 per cent in the allocation.

Further, using the loopholes in the treaty, Pakistan succeeded in stalling/delaying Indian projects, 30 in all, planned for the development of Jammu and Kashmir. At every stage, India agreed to the demands of Pakistan such as stopping the Tulbul project works and closing the sluices in the Salal project, only to maintain good neighbourly relations. This conciliatory approach emboldened Pakistan to allege IWT violations by India on the Baglihar hydroelectric project (450 MW).

India had given the project features of Baglihar to Pakistan in May, 1992 as per treaty provisions. Despite many meetings at Commissioner and Secretary levels, Pakistan continued to harp on treaty violations by India on project designs, etc. It was willing for negotiations, if India stopped the work, but this time India did not oblige. Our neighbour then approached the World Bank seeking the appointment of a neutral expert to look into the dispute. Accepting Pakistan's plea, the Bank appointed Raymond Lafitte.

After site visits, discussions with the parties concerned and studying the presentations made by them, the expert has now given his verdict.

Both India and Pakistan have claimed that their contentions have been upheld by the expert. But will the incendiary politics of the subcontinent further trigger more conflicts?

A perusal of the verdict would reveal that while provision of sluices and gated spillway has been accepted by the expert, India would have to modify the design to reduce the height of the dam, limit the pondage and raise the level of the power intake. India has therefore to incur additional costs to carry out these changes and get reduced peak power benefits and flood moderation advantages. By awarding such a decision the expert has overlooked the very basis of the treaty i.e. the maximum utilisation of Indus waters for mutual benefit.

Years of wrangling in the interpretation of the clauses has proved beyond doubt that the treaty has outlived its utility, to address the changing geopolitical situations and emerging norms of international laws. Hence India has to insist on a review of the treaty.

The rights and obligations of the parties to a treaty are well laid down in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, 1969 which inter alia states that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose."

If Pakistan does not agree for a review, India must draw its attention to Article 62 of the Convention which permits terminating or withdrawing from a treaty due to a fundamental change of circumstances.

Pakistan has already cut out its strategy to delay the Indian projects, next in its agenda being the Kishanganga project (J&K). Hence we cannot and should not allow our development efforts in J&K to be sabotaged by Pakistan wrongly using the provisions of a redundant treaty.

(The writer is former Member-Secretary, Indian National Committee on Irrigation and Drainage)
 

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Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis

New Asia Program Report Finds Water Situation Deeply Troubling, But Offers Recommendations
September 15, 2009

“Water shortages,” warns South Asia scholar Anatol Lieven, “present the greatest future threat to the viability of Pakistan as a state and a society.”

This warning may be overstated, but Pakistan’s water situation is deeply troubling, as described in a new report from the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Asia Program, Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis.

Water availability has plummeted from about 5,000 m3 per capita in the early 1950s to less than 1,500 m3 per capita today. As Simi Kamal reports in the first chapter of Running on Empty, Pakistan is expected to become “water-scarce” (below 1,000 m3 per capita) by 2035—though some experts project this could happen in 2020, if not earlier.

In an unstable nation like Pakistan, water shortages can easily become security threats. In April 2009, alarm bells sounded when the Taliban pushed southeast of Swat into the Buner district of the Northwest Frontier Province. Not only is Buner close to Islamabad, it lies just 60 kilometers from the prized Tarbela Dam, which provides Pakistan with billions of cubic meters of precious water for irrigation each year.

Soaked, Salty, Dirty, and Dry

According to Kamal, Pakistan faces significant and widespread water challenges:

• Inefficient irrigation.
• Abysmal urban sanitation.
• Catastrophic environmental degradation.
• Lack of water laws to define water rights.
• Lack of a sound policy on large dams.


An arid country dependent on agriculture, Pakistan allocates more than 90 percent of its water resources to irrigation and other agricultural needs. Unfortunately, intensive irrigation and poor drainage practices have waterlogged and salinized the soil.

Women and Water in Rural Pakistan

Rural women and small farmers are particularly affected by Pakistan’s water crisis. Women bear the primary responsibility for obtaining water, but have been traditionally been shut out of government water-planning and decision-making processes. However, government and media initiatives, described by Sarah Halvorson in Running on Empty’s chapter on water and gender, are increasingly highlighting the importance of women’s participation.

Meanwhile, Adrien Couton reports that Islamabad’s water projects mainly benefit large and wealthy farmers—even though Pakistan has approximately four million farms smaller than two hectares.

Pakistan’s Thirsty Cities

With most of Pakistan’s water dedicated to agriculture, less than 10 percent is left for drinking water and sanitation. A quarter of Pakistanis lack access to safe drinking water—and many of them reside in the country’s teeming cities.

Worse, the drinking water that does exist is quickly disappearing. Lahore, which relies on groundwater, faces water table declines of up to 65 feet, as described by Anita Chaudhry and Rabia M. Chaudhry in their chapter on the city.

The scarcity of clean water in the cities—exacerbated by a lack of wastewater treatment—is a leading cause of deadly epidemics. At least 30,000 Karachiites (of whom 20,000 are children) perish each year from unsafe water.

Pakistan Must Act Now To Solve the Water Crisis

Pakistan arguably has the technological and financial resources to provide clean water. So what’s the hold-up? In her chapter on public health, Samia Altaf argues that the problem is the absence of a strong political lobby to advocate for water—and that no one holds Islamabad accountable for fixing the problem.

The report offers more recommendations for addressing Pakistan’s water crisis:

• Invest in existing infrastructure and in modest, indigenous technology.
• Strike appropriate balances between centralized and decentralized management.
• Devote more attention to water allocation and distribution on local/individual levels.
• Understand the links between agricultural and urban water pressures.
• Embrace the role of the private sector.
• Conserve by favoring water-saving technology; less water-intensive crops; and water-conserving urban building design.
• Address structural obstacles like systemic inequality and gender discrimination.
• Take immediate action. Tremendous population growth and rapidly melting glaciers in the Himalayas ensure that the crisis will deepen before it eases.


The need for immediate action cannot be overstated. While Pakistan’s water crisis may not threaten its viability, it is undeniable that so long as the crisis rages on, essential components of the nation—such as the vital agricultural economy, the health of the population, and political and economic stability—lie very much in the balance.

Michael Kugelman is the Wilson Center’s South Asia specialist. He is co-editor, with Robert M. Hathaway, of the recently published Wilson Center book Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis, on which this post is based. Much of his work has focused on resource shortages in Pakistan and India.
 

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The main aspect to be considered for run-of-the-river system within the ambit of IWT is that the "impounded" waters must be let within the system within 7 days (with a 10% variation permitted). A storage system, OTOH, will obviate the need to let waters back within 7 days. The Storage need not necessarily be very large like say in Bhakra dam.

The IWT allows India the following provisions on the tributaries of Jhelum for non-consumptive use:
0.50 MAF for General Storage
0.25 MAF for Power Storage and another
0.75 MAF for flood storage

This allows India to "store" 0.75 MAF ( or ~ 1 Billion Cubic Metres of operating pool, that excludes any Dead Storage. Compare this with 35 Million Cu. M for Baglihar) on Jhelum's tributary. The success of the 280 MW Uri-II project , downstream of Uri-I depends on waters of the Kishanganga diverted thro' Wullar into Jhelum main.
 

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I was asked to provide a rough translation for this article.



Well essentially you have the founder of the JuD Hafeez Muhammad Saeed. Most of the article gives background like where he was talking about giving a speech in a protest rally. The Main point is he said "India has not been able to prove our involvement in Mumbai attacks or attack on their parliament. India by stopping our water wants to start war in the region. " And He said that he will keep raising voice against Indian cruelty. and that India wants to cut Pakistan into pieces by stopping water sources originating from J&K and in which India will never be successful.

"And now is the time that our leaders should feel shame and talk clearly with India on issue of water and Kashmir."
 

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Indian writer and critic B.G. Vergese talks about Indian relations to Pakistan. Learn more about this project at South Asia's Troubled Waters>Here he clearly states about the shenanigans wrt to water.

 
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WATER: Pakistan's Water Policies

Mustafa Talpur, a water activist in Islamabad, talk about Pakistani water policies Learn more about this project at South Asia's Troubled Waters:

 
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Dunya TV-Tonight With Najam Sethi-01-03-2010-4
Pak India Relationships & indo-pak water disputes.where he concedes that till now india has not violated the indus water treatty.hence india is not stealing pakistan water which pakistamni media,people jehadi,politicians blame india for..

 
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WATER: Reporting on South Asia's Troubled Waters

Reporters William Wheeler and Anna-Katarina Gravgaard talks about what they've seen in Nepal, India and Pakistan. Learn more about this project at South Asia's Troubled Waters:


 
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Pak takes water route to attack India

NEW DELHI: Water sharing is becoming yet another irritant in the Indo-Pak relationship with Lashkar founder Hafiz Saeed’s rhetoric against India on the matter being seen as part of the Pakistani propaganda.

At a public rally, Saeed accused India of constructing illegal dams and diverting water from Pakistani rivers and went on to launch a movement against India. The fact that Saeed, who is seen as a proxy for the ISI, is now focusing on water issues is being seen as part and parcel of the Pakistani “propaganda”. The Pakistan government had started highlighting water as a major concern ahead of the foreign secretary level engagement and has since continued to do so. Sources said Pakistan is trying to deflect its own water problems and inter provincial water issues by creating the India bogey. Water is also seen as an emotive issue that can easily whip up anti-India sentiment.

Sources pointed out it is convenient to blame India when other factors are responsible for Pakistan’s water woes. It is also being seen as a ploy to get a larger share of the water. The steady rise in the Pakistani population, particularly in Punjab in Pakistan, increased use of water and intensive irrigation are being seen as reasons for Pakistan’s water woes. Also, data has shown that water volume in both the eastern and western rivers are fluctuating due to fluctuating snowmelt and rainfall. Only the Indus river has bucked the trend with water levels actually increasing.

Water sharing between India and Pakistan is guided by the Indus water treaty. Under the treaty, Pakistan has water rights over three western rivers—the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — while India has complete access to the eastern rivers—Sutlej Beas and Ravi. At the same time, Article II of the Indus Water Treaty also gives India certain rights over the western rivers including domestic use, navigation, limited agriculture use including irrigation over 1.34347 million acres and generation of hydropower. India is also allowed to create storage on western rivers of up to 3.6 million acre feet of storage.

Sources said that contrary to “the propaganda”, India has not built any storage facility on the western rivers and till 2008/9 has only irrigated 0.7924 million acres. At this point, India has 33 river projects that are completed or in different stages of completion. Sources said information on all the projects had been shared with Pakistan. But there was a pattern, sources pointed out that, in the way Pakistan has raised technical issues to stall or delay the implementation of projects.

India and Pakistan have continued to hold meetings of the Indus water commissioners through the lowest points in the relationship. And even after the Mumbai attacks, the commissioners have been meeting to discuss water related issues.
 

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