Ashley J. Tellis
Summary
The recent arrests of several high profile Afghan Taliban leaders by Pakistan have raised expectations
that Islamabad’s longstanding support for the “Quetta shura” may at last be waning. The arrests have
prompted the view that Pakistan has indeed changed its traditional strategy of protecting the Afghan
Taliban leadership. Unfortunately, the realities are less encouraging. A closer look at the recent arrests
suggests that:
• The seizure of Mullah Beradar and some others was prompted by U.S. intelligence initiatives,
was entirely fortuitous, and certainly not part of any premeditated detention plan by Pakistan.
• Although several other arrests have taken place entirely on Pakistani initiative, some of these
detentions involve low-level al-Qaeda associates, whose arrests are consistent with Islamabad’s
standing policy of aiding the United States.
• Of the remaining Afghan Taliban leaders arrested independently by Islamabad, many are either
not particularly significant or represent a housecleaning by Pakistan’s military intelligence.
As a result, the Afghan Taliban’s leadership in Pakistan is certainly not decimated. Nor do Pakistan’s
actions constitute the “sea change” in its behavior, as some observers have argued. Instead, they
represent a recalibration of Pakistan’s evolving policy: rather than supporting the declared U.S. goal of
defeating the Taliban, the recent arrests exemplify a Pakistani effort to seize control over the process of
negotiations and reconciliation that its military leaders believe is both imminent and inevitable in the
Afghan conflict. And it is emphatically motivated by the conviction that India, not the Afghan Taliban,
is the main enemy to be neutralized in the Afghan endgame.
The author thanks Robert D. Blackwill, Jack Gill, Daniel Markey, Aroop Mukharji, and George Perkovich for their
thoughtful comments on this paper. Special thanks are also owed to B. Raman for discussions about
Pakistan's actions regarding the Afghan Taliban.
March 2010
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Introduction
Over a month ago, the New York Times broke the dramatic news that Mullah
Abdul Ghani Beradar Akhund, the Afghan Taliban’s second-in-command and
the head of its military committee, was apprehended in Karachi in a secret
joint operation by Pakistani and U.S. intelligence operatives. Initial reports
about the arrest were confusing, but the news was certainly welcome: the
arrest was the first detention of a rahbari shura (leadership council) member
since the arrest of Mullah Obaidullah Akhund in 2007, and this operation was
apparently led by Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, the Directorate,
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).1 The ISI traditionally played a key role in
protecting the fugitive Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan and for this
reason, its role in this operation raised questions about whether Islamabad’s
longstanding strategies toward New Delhi and Kabul were at last changing.
Beradar’s surprise arrest was quickly followed by a wave of other detentions:
Maulavi Abdul Kabir, the former Taliban governor of Nangarhar and the
eastern provinces and also a member of the rahbari shura, was picked up a
few weeks later, and within a month the Christian Science Monitor was
reporting that “nearly half of the Afghanistan Taliban’s leadership” had been
arrested by the ISI, “dealing what could be a crucial blow to the insurgent
movement.”2
Pakistan’s sudden cooperation in targeting the Afghan Taliban’s core
leadership—after almost a decade of feigning ignorance about the shura’s
presence within the country—surprised many and raised expectations in
Washington that Islamabad’s decision signaled a quiet but decisive shift in
Pakistan’s geostrategic policy. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Senator John Kerry argued that the Beradar operation represented “a new
level of cooperation”3 between Pakistan and the United States. Bruce Reidel,
the convener of President Barack Obama’s task force on Afghanistan and
Pakistan, was more expansive: speaking to the New York Times, he asserted
that Islamabad’s action regarding Beradar constituted a “sea change in
Pakistani behavior,”4 also claiming subsequently that it “was not a one off or
an accident, but a turning point in Pakistan’s policy towards the Taliban.”5
David Ignatius, writing in the Washington Post, reported that many White
House officials held similar views, some even maintaining that Pakistan’s
latest decisions constituted a “strategic recalibration”6 of the U.S.–Pakistan
relationship to include renewed cooperation on counterterrorism. And White
House press secretary Robert Gibbs even offered a reason why when he
declared that Islamabad’s newly rejuvenated effort against the Afghan Taliban
shura is rooted in “the recognition on the Pakistani military side that
extremists in their country posed not simply a threat to us, but an existential
threat to them.”7
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Making Sense of the Arrests
Were the above claims true, it would be great news indeed, not only for the
United States and Afghanistan, but also for Pakistan’s long-term political
prospects. But is it? And does Pakistan’s recent targeting of the Afghan
Taliban truly represent a “turning point” in how it views the value of this
insurgency? The answers to these questions are vital, particularly as the
United States commits to sustained military operations in Afghanistan. If
Islamabad has in fact changed course and put an end to the state-supported
sanctuary that had benefited the Taliban, the impediments to the insurgency’s
success increase considerably.
Unfortunately, the realities are less encouraging—at least on the issue of
whether Pakistan is in fact changing course strategically with regard to the
Afghan Taliban. First, one must evaluate the facts surrounding the arrests.
Although the arrest of Mullah Beradar was in fact a joint operation conducted
by the ISI and U.S. intelligence, there is little doubt now that Beradar’s
Pakistani captors had no idea that he was among the individuals apprehended
at the Karachi madrassa at the time of his capture. Although the operation
itself was initiated in response to a U.S. tip, it is as yet unclear whether even
U.S. intelligence officials knew for a fact that Beradar would be present at this
location when the operation began.8 That the ISI partnered in the operation
and physically made the arrest itself is not surprising, given that the United
States has no legal authority to apprehend, detain, or interrogate anyone in
Pakistan. In fact, joint ISI-CIA seizures of terrorism targets in Pakistan
invariably take this form: U.S. sources provide critical data about the suspect
and the ISI directorates that liaise with U.S. intelligence then collaborate to
complete the arrest.9
Weeks after the event, enough information has now surfaced to suggest that
the Pakistanis held Beradar for some time before even realizing his identity.10
Because U.S. intelligence assets were deeply involved throughout in this
operation, albeit in ways respectful of Pakistani sensitivities, it would have
been difficult for the ISI to simply release Beradar after he was discovered.11
(This has occurred in several other instances when individuals too
embarrassing to detain have simply been released quietly by their ISI captors.)
The news leaks of his capture soon after he was identified in custody made it
even more difficult for the ISI (and its more shadowy directorates) to simply
“lose” him surreptitiously.
Whatever else may be at issue, Beradar’s arrest was certainly not part of any
premeditated detention plan by the ISI—and as such cannot be counted as
evidence of any dramatic change of course by Pakistan, or at least one that
involves conclusively turning its back on the rahbari shura. As if to make this
point plain, the ISI did two other things even as Beradar’s detention in
Pakistani custody was underway. First, it continued to release other Taliban
leaders who managed to get inadvertently caught in other counterterrorism
dragnets elsewhere in Pakistan.12 And, second, it began to warn key Taliban
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protectees about the enhanced counterterrorism sweeps underway, pushing
some operatives even further underground while warning others to exercise
better operational security, given the mishaps that had just befallen Beradar
through his (and his cohort’s) careless communications.13
But don’t these actions run counter to all the other arrests of Afghan Taliban
leaders by the ISI? Indeed they do—and therein lies a tale. To be sure, the
Pakistani intelligence services apprehended several other individuals in the
aftermath of Beradar’s seizure, although some of these arrests have yet to be
confirmed independently. The earliest such detentions, however, including the
two Afghan Taliban “shadow governors,” were not products of any Pakistani
initiative. Rather, they resulted from information secured through Beradar’s
interrogation, which was kept secret for as long as possible because, as one
news report put it, “American officials … were determined to roll up as much
of the Taliban’s leadership as they could.” 14 This questioning, initially
conducted by the ISI, was closely monitored by the United States, and even
though U.S. intelligence was denied physical access to him at the very
beginning, grilling Beradar nonetheless yielded fruit because, odd as it may
Key Arrests in Pakistan in 2010
1. Mullah Abdul Ghani Beradar - Second-in-command of the Afghan Taliban
2. Maulavi Abdul Kabir - Commander of Taliban fighters in eastern Afghanistan
and former Taliban governor of Nangarhar province
3. Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir - Former Guantanamo Bay detainee
4. Mullah Muhammad Hassan - Former Taliban minister
5. Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhunzada - Former Taliban governor of Zabul
6. Mullah Abdul Raouf - Taliban leader in northeastern Afghanistan
7. Agha Jan Mohtasim - Former Taliban finance minister
8. Mullah Abdul Salam - Taliban ‘shadow governor’ of Kunduz
9. Mullah Mir Mohammed - Taliban ‘shadow governor’ of Baghlan
10. Mullah Muhammad Younis (a.k.a. Akhunzada Popalzai) – Former Taliban
police chief in Kabul
11. Ameer Muawiya - Osama bin Laden associate in charge of foreign al-Qaeda
militants in Pakistan’s border areas
12. Abu Hamza - Former Afghan army commander in Helmand province during
Taliban rule
13. Abu Riyad al Zarqawi - Liaison with Chechen and Tajik militants in
Pakistan’s border area
14. Abdolmalek Rigi - Jundallah leader
15. Chota Usman (aka Iliyas) - Taliban commander accused of operating a
Taliban court in the Mohmand Agency
16. Umar Abdul Rehman - Taliban operative
17. Abu Yahya Mujahdeen al-Adam – al-Qaeda operative
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seem at first sight, some ISI directorates are actually more cooperative with
their U.S. counterparts on counterterrorism matters than some others.
Several subsequent arrests, however, took place entirely on Pakistani initiative,
but there may be less here than meets the eye. For example, although the
international press has widely trumpeted the notion that half of the Taliban’s
“top” leadership is now behind bars, these claims are grounded largely on
either Pakistani claims or poor information about the composition of the
rahbari shura and the structure of its relationships with the four regional
shuras and their subordinate formations. Even a cursory survey of those
Taliban leaders detained by Pakistan since mid-February shows that besides
Mullah Abdul Ghani Beradar Akhund and Maulavi Abdul Kabir, none of the
other captives are likely members of the rahbari shura. Two of the
individuals arrested, Mullah Abdul Salam and Mullah Mohammad, are
Taliban “shadow governors” who, however impressive these titles sound, are
neither involved in formulating Taliban strategy or directing its military
operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Shadow governors in the
Taliban structure are essentially “enforcers.” They are responsible principally
for meting out the harsh justice that is the Taliban trademark in the areas
under its control, rather than making strategic decisions or planning military
activities against the coalition. Thus the arrest of the two shadow governors is
less significant from a political and an operational point of view than it
appears.
Of the remaining fifteen-odd detainees, the most interesting captures are those
who might be problematic for Pakistan’s evolving national strategy toward
Afghanistan. At least two of the individuals arrested, Mullah Abdul Rauf
Aliza and Mullah Ahmed Jan Akhundzada, are Durrani Pashtuns who, besides
being members of the same tribal confederation as President Hamid Karzai,
arguably were potential threats to the Gilzai Pashtun leadership of the ISI’s
key protégé, the Afghan Taliban’s emir Mullah Mohammed Omar. These men
also are among the more moderate voices within the Taliban and reputedly
have been supporters of Mullah Beradar’s efforts to explore Karzai’s
overtures at reconciliation. 15 As Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason have
acidly concluded, these particular arrests do not signify particularly
transformative actions on the part of Pakistan. Rather, as they put it, “the
Quetta Shura has used the ISI, its loyal and steadfast patron, to take out its
trash. Those few mullahs suspected of being amenable to discussions with the
infidel enemy and thus ideologically impure have now been removed from the
jihad. This is not cooperation against the Taliban by an allied state; it is
collusion with the Taliban by an enemy state.”16 The remaining detainees are
low-level al-Qaeda associates whose arrest by the Pakistanis is quite
consistent with Islamabad’s longstanding policy of aiding the United States to
target al-Qaeda in the settled areas of Pakistan, even as it protects the senior
shura of the Afghan Taliban simultaneously.
On balance, therefore, the recent arrests in Pakistan do not signify
Islamabad’s turn against the Afghan Taliban leadership writ large, only a turn
6
against some of its members, as it has done intermittently before. In the most
important cases, the arrests now touted as evidence of a “sea change” in
Pakistani behavior happen to be fundamentally accidental and, in some
instances, unavoidable consequences of initially fortuitous events. The
seizures that seem to have been entirely a product of Islamabad’s initiative
appear to be either self-serving or the continued targeting of acknowledged
adversaries such as al-Qaeda. The purported shift in Pakistan’s approach to
the Afghan Taliban, then, turns out to be less a change in its national strategy
than a recalibration—and certainly not of the kind that some American
officials imagine or hope for. The fact that the most significant captures in
Pakistan were inadvertent and the less noteworthy ones intended to clean
house while simultaneously signaling Islamabad’s continuing centrality for
success in Afghanistan suggests that the reorientation is not intended to bring
Pakistan closer to the declared U.S. goal of defeating the Taliban but, rather,
to better reposition Islamabad in what it believes is now the endgame in
Afghanistan. As Carlotta Gall and Souad Mekhennet summarized succinctly,
“Pakistan’s arrest of the top Taliban military commander may be a tactical
victory for the United States, but it is also potentially a strategic coup for
Pakistan…. Pakistan has removed a key Taliban commander, enhanced
cooperation with the United States, and ensured a place for itself when parties
explore a negotiated end to the Afghan war.”17
Pakistan’s Policy Calculus
A genuine transformation in Pakistan’s strategy toward the Afghan Taliban
would involve two components: first, an acceptance of the notion that the
Taliban, and not India, represents the biggest threat to success in Afghanistan;
second, and flowing from that foundational principle, a willingness to
sacrifice the rahbari shura in order to help defeat the insurgency so that the
current U.S. stabilization effort in Afghanistan might succeed. Nothing in
Pakistan’s current actions suggests an acceptance of these two elements. To
the contrary, the recent captures seem little more than a Pakistani response to
the belief that because an early American exit from Afghanistan is inevitable,
Islamabad must do everything within its power to inject itself ever more
vigorously into the strategic direction of the insurgency. The urgency for such
forceful intervention is driven by the conviction that if a “reconciliation” with
the Taliban is to define the termination of the Afghan conflict, Pakistan must
not find itself, as its officials now tell Western interlocutors, “standing in the
wrong corner”18 when the music finally stops.
This concern has in fact become central to Islamabad’s calculations since
President Obama’s December 1, 2009, speech on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
Prior to that address, Pakistani defense and intelligence officials were coming
around to the possibility that the United States would remain militarily
involved in Afghanistan over the long term. Obama’s December speech,
however, with its formal enunciation of a July 2011 deadline for beginning
the drawdown of American forces, put paid to those expectations. All of a
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sudden, Pakistani security managers had to reckon with the possibility that the
United States would once again precipitously depart Afghanistan, leaving
their hated rival, India, in an established position of privileged access in Kabul.
All taken together, New Delhi’s substantial reconstruction efforts in
Afghanistan, the consistently high support among Afghans for India’s
development contributions, and the warm relationship India enjoys with the
Karzai regime unnerve Islamabad and arouse fears that a withdrawing United
States will leave behind a hostile Indian presence on its western borders and
increased threats in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in
Balochistan. Further, the emerging certainty in Islamabad that the Afghan
conflict will end not through a political-military victory that brings the
Taliban to the negotiating table on coalition terms but through a
“reconciliation” process has only strengthened the Pakistani conviction that it
cannot afford to lose out in Afghanistan at the tail end, when it had done a
remarkably good job thus far of protecting its interests by keeping the Afghan
Taliban’s shura more or less safe and in line during the last decade of intense
conflict.19
The January 2010 London conference was, in many ways, the turning point in
this regard. As a result of conspicuously absent American leadership, the
meeting’s British hosts were able to position political reconciliation with the
shura as the centerpiece of the Afghan endgame. This approach differs
considerably from the current U.S. stance, which views any reconciliation—if
it can be consummated at all—as either the culmination of political-military
success in the contested areas or contingent on key conditions that the Taliban
has rejected historically: renunciation of all ties with al-Qaeda; acceptance of
the Afghan constitution; laying down of arms and the cessation of rebellion;
and agreement to the Afghan government’s oversight of the reconciliation
process. Because this American position was eclipsed at London by the
British drumbeat for early negotiations with the shura itself, the perception
that the Afghan conflict was rapidly turning in the direction of reconciliation
with the Taliban leadership—in order to facilitate a speedy coalition military
exit from the country—began to deepen in Islamabad. 20 This view is
undoubtedly far removed from official U.S. expectations of how the Afghan
conflict is likely to evolve. Most American policy makers expect energetic
counterinsurgency operations for some time to come, a U.S. military presence
in Afghanistan that lasts many years, enhanced efforts at reintegrating the
Taliban’s rank and file (vice negotiating with the shura on the latter’s terms),
and a progressive strengthening of the Afghan state to ensure a relatively
uneventful exit of coalition forces eventually.
This is categorically not the expectation in Islamabad. Policy makers there
imagine that an American departure is far more imminent than advertised and
that Washington, consequently, is looking to smoothen that exit by attempting
negotiations directly with the shura itself. Given these perceptions, the recent
Pakistani arrests of some Taliban leaders represent an adjustment that is
intended to serve two objectives simultaneously.
8
First, it signals the United States that Islamabad can reach the Taliban
leadership as and when required, despite years of denying any knowledge of
its whereabouts. No other inference is yielded by the fact that Islamabad could
rapidly roll up half a dozen wanted fugitives—individuals who ostensibly
could not be found for the better part of the decade—within two weeks once it
put its mind to the task. By apprehending them so rapidly, Islamabad seeks to
highlight its centrality to the future of American success in Afghanistan even
as it subtly reinforces the importance of Washington accepting General
Ashfaq Kayani’s offer of the ISI as the principal mediating conduit for all
discussions on reconciliation with the shura.21 Islamabad believes that any
reconciliation would require that Pakistan’s primary clients, the Ghilzai
Pashtuns represented by Mullah Omar, be given a formal share of power in
Kabul. This integration at the highest levels of the Afghan state would occur
as part of a complex bargain wherein the Taliban promise to renounce al-
Qaeda and give up their armed struggle in exchange for the exit of all
coalition forces from the country.22 Whether these assurances can be enforced
once NATO departs Afghanistan is another matter, but the attractiveness of
such a deal from Islamabad’s point of view is obvious: by placing its clients in
the seat of power in Kabul, an ISI-brokered reconciliation allows Pakistan to
acquire a key role in shaping Afghanistan’s strategic direction, which above
all would be conditioned by the exigencies of Pakistan’s ongoing struggle
with India.
General Kayani candidly spelled out Islamabad’s aims in a rare press briefing
recently by stating, “We want a strategic depth in Afghanistan.” Elaborating
further, he noted that “‘strategic depth’ does not imply controlling
Afghanistan,” but “if Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly, we have our
strategic depth because our western border is secure…. [Then,] you’re not
looking both ways.” 23 This fervid struggle for strategic depth has
characterized Pakistan’s policies toward Kabul since at least the time of the
Soviet Union’s departure in 1989. It drove Pakistan’s efforts to support the
Taliban throughout the 1990s and it has undergirded the ISI’s decision to
protect Mullah Omar and his cohort since their ejection from power in
December 2001. Today, as the departure of the United States from
Afghanistan looms large in Islamabad’s perception, the Pakistani military
anxiously seeks to control the transition in order to secure the three elements
essential to strategic depth: a friendly government in Kabul (one that
preferably includes Pakistan’s clients in its inner sanctum); the ejection of
India from Afghanistan or, failing this, a sharply reduced Indian presence and
influence; and, finally, the acquisition of preponderant influence, if not a
formal veto, over Afghanistan’s strategic choices and geopolitical direction.
These goals, which are important enough for Pakistan to warrant the country’s
protection of the Afghan Taliban leadership for years, are still vital enough to
justify the arrest of a few Taliban leaders, if such actions promise to bestow
on Islamabad increased influence in shaping the final outcome in Afghanistan
to its advantage.
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Second, seizing some Taliban officials who do not serve Pakistan’s current
purposes is a signal to the Afghan Taliban’s rahbari shura that all discussions
about reconciliation with Karzai (and with the coalition more generally) must
occur solely through Pakistani interlocutors and in a manner that is mindful of
Pakistani interests. Such a reminder, even to the senior shura, which has long
been protected by the ISI, is essential from Islamabad’s point of view because
this group has on many occasions declined to blindly follow Pakistan’s
directives or pursue Islamabad’s aims when these conflicted with its own
interests. Throughout the years when the Taliban have been both in and out of
power, they have often behaved as unruly agents pursuing goals not favored
by their principals in the ISI and the Pakistani military. Whether these
pertained to the surrender of Osama bin Laden, the destruction of the
Bamiyan Buddhas, the strict implementation of sharia in Afghanistan, or the
regressive attitude toward women’s education, the leadership of the Afghan
Taliban frequently pursued autonomous policies that undermined and caused
much embarrassment to their Pakistani sponsors. Preventing a recurrence of
such behavior on the issues that matter—when Islamabad judges the endgame
to be underway in Afghanistan—is critical to Pakistani strategy because it
could impact Pakistani efforts to limit the spread of Indian influence in
Afghanistan. It will also determine whether Islamabad can resolve its own
outstanding disputes with Kabul on favorable terms.
From Pakistan’s point of view, the stakes are simply too high. And given their
significance, focusing the shura’s attention on its vulnerabilities through a
few pointed arrests would be certainly worth the sacrifice if it elicits a
stronger Taliban commitment to Islamabad’s interests in Afghanistan. Playing
hardball in this way is not new to the ISI. But under the present circumstances
it also reflects a dramatic upsurge in confidence in Islamabad.24 Most Western
observers, engrossed by Pakistan’s increasing economic woes and its unstable
internal circumstances, appear to have overlooked the self-assurance that has
characterized Pakistan’s strategy since the London Conference―an event that
conclusively highlighted India’s international isolation on the key issues of
defeating the insurgency and negotiating with the Taliban. This vindication of
Pakistan’s advocacy of integrating the Taliban into Afghan governance
structures occurred at a time when the Pakistani military too feels increasingly
confident that it has, thanks to American assistance, put its most dangerous
internal threat, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, on the defensive. Its successful
military operations in the troubled Federally Administered Tribal Areas now
unambiguously reinforce, in Pakistan’s view, Islamabad’s standing as a
credible ally on counterterrorism. This belief has empowered Pakistani leaders
not only to demand—as Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi
phrased it—that the United States “do more” to help Pakistan since the latter
has “already done too much,”25 but also to require of their Afghan Taliban
clients greater concord with Islamabad’s own interests.
Not surprisingly, the most recent round of Pakistani arrests appears to be
accompanied by earnest internal negotiations between the movement’s
representatives and the ISI. Even if Islamabad’s maneuverings eventually
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result in a formal Taliban presence within the Afghan government, there is of
course no guarantee that this regime would become a puppet of the Pakistani
state. Based of past events, it is likely that such an authority would, despite
being beholden to Islamabad, retain sufficient freedom of maneuver. As a
further example, even the Taliban government that held power in Kabul from
1996–2001 refused to accept the legitimacy of the Durand Line, much to the
chagrin of its protectors in Pakistan. Pakistan’s relations with the Afghan
Taliban are therefore delicate, to say the least. Yet in spite of the group’s
obduracy and its antediluvian worldview, Islamabad will continue to support
it because that remains the best of all available options today—while
concurrently attempting to discipline it in order to shape its political choices
and bring it more firmly in line with Pakistan’s own strategic interests. An
occasional seizure of a few Taliban leaders may be just the thing to
concentrate the shura’s attention.
Conclusion
The dramatic captures of some Taliban officials by Pakistan during the last
several weeks have turned out to be less significant than they first appeared.
Far from presaging surrender, or the demise, of the Taliban’s senior shura,
these arrests—at least those that were not accidental—represent an effort by
Islamabad to exert control over the process of negotiation and reconciliation
that all Pakistani military leaders believe is both imminent and inevitable in
the Afghan conflict. And it is emphatically motivated by the conviction that
India, not the Afghan Taliban, represents the main enemy to be neutralized in
the Afghan endgame. Given these complex impulses, the recent seizures of a
few Taliban leaders by Pakistan isn’t much of a turning point in Islamabad’s
traditional strategy after all.