MRCA News & Discussions (V)

[chex3009]

Buy MMRCA now, Gen-5 fighter later: US report

With two US fighters — Lockheed Martin's F-16IN Super Viper and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet — apparently trailing in the six-way, US$10-billion race to sell India 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), a new report by a top US-based analyst suggests that India buys the MMRCA as an economical, stop-gap measure, before buying a cutting-edge, fifth generation US-built stealth fighter for the Indian Air Force.

Recommending that the Indian Air Force (IAF) buys "the least expensive, mature, combat-proven fourth-generation fighter"¦ as a bridge toward procuring more advanced stealth aircraft in the future", the report urges Washington to "assure India access to fifth-generation US combat aircraft, and provide strong support for India's strategic ambitions".

The US currently has just one fifth-generation fighter, the F-22, which Washington has not shared with any country. Also nearing completion is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which Lockheed Martin is building in partnership with several other countries. The report, "Dogfight! India's Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision", is authored by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment, a globally respected analyst who has worked closely with the US government and the US Air Force.
Admitting that the European fighters in the fray — which include the Eurofighter Typhoon; the French Rafale; and the Swedish Gripen NG — are "technically superb", Tellis calls the two US fighters "best buys", suggesting that they are ideal choices as stop-gap fighters.

Tellis' report comes just before Aero India 2011, India's premier air show at Bangalore from February 9 to 13, where the MMRCA contest will grab international headlines. Indian commentary, including in Business Standard, has discussed the merits of buying the in-development, fifth-generation F-35, rather than the fourth-generation MMRCA contenders.

Tellis' report, however, goes a step further, suggesting the procurement of the MMRCA for now, as well as a fifth-generation fighter in the future.

Highlighting the need to quickly boost the IAF's fighter numbers, Tellis points out that since 1971, "India's defence (sic) strategy has relied on maintaining superior airpower relative to both China and Pakistan. In the event of a regional conflict, Indian air power would serve as the country's critical war-fighting instrument of first resort."

However, due to procurement delays, accidents and obsolescence, the IAF's authorised force level of 39.5 fighter squadrons has diminished to an unprecedented 29 squadrons. Even without delays in the ongoing procurements, it is unlikely to be made up before 2017.

Indian planners have noted the first test flight of the Chinese fifth-generation J-20 fighter last fortnight. IAF experts, however, say that the J-20 is unlikely to enter service before another 7-8 years of development. The US-built F-35, in contrast, is nearing completion: It is likely to be in operational service by 2014.

Interestingly, Tellis heaps kudos on the IAF for its "scrupulously transparent and extraordinarily neutral" handling of the complex MMRCA flight trials. The report depicts the trials as a rarity: a multi-billion dollar contest, involving six aircraft and eight countries, in which every vendor is satisfied that the IAF has fairly evaluated his fighter.

But with the IAF having submitted its report — which Tellis praises as "impartial to the point of appearing disinterested" — to the Ministry of Defence, political factors will now shape the decision.

Tellis points out that, "In choosing the winning platform, Indian policymakers will seek to: minimise the country's vulnerability to supply cutoffs in wartime, improve its larger military capacity through a substantial technology infusion, and forge new transformative geopolitical partnerships that promise to accelerate the growth of Indian power globally."

The report cautions that, with pressure mounting from the governments that have a horse in this race, Indian security interests could be undermined by a political compromise like splitting the deal between two countries. This would "needlessly saddle the IAF with multiple airframes in return for meagre political gains".

http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/buy-mmrca-now-gen-5-fighter-later-us-report/423364/

 

[slenke]

No. The Gripen IN is supposed to be one of the more advanced versions of Gripen. Saab has accused Norway of falsifying the price tag in favor of the JSF in the report they released after the Norwegian bid failed. There was also a question of underhanded play, but that was not talked about by the Saab CEO.
http://www.thelocal.se/16252/20081210/

Wikileaks also revealed the Americans were pulling strings to bring Norway onto their side by denying Saab the Raytheon AESA components. This leak proved the analysts were right and that price wasn't the only criteria for rejection. the American played the same trick with Israel's El/M 2052.
http://www.thelocal.se/30584/20101203/

The F-35 is a more advanced and capable aircraft than the Gripen NG and the Norwegians did have a more genuine reason to replace their 4th gen platform with a 5th gen platform rather a 4.5th gen platform. But F-35 and Gripen are not related in the Indian MRCA deal. After GE won the LCA engine bid, I see very little problems for Gripen in India. Considering the RM-12 engine may get a lease of life in powering the Gripen NG in the future once the Indian money starts pouring in there may still be hope for removing the American shackles. The Swedish-Italian AESA adds to the mix too.

I am still hoping Rafale would win. But I am willing to accommodate EF as well as Gripen over the Russian and American aircraft.

Of course price wasn't the only reason for it. Though the price of the F-35 wasn't realistic as we are seeing now, and the price of the Gripen was guaranteed by the Swedish state. That whole story was full of nastyness..

But what I mean with different components is that the radar proposed for India isn't the same as the one proposed for Norway. Also, it's been a couple of years since the Norway proposal, the NG-demo platform has evolved and everything is starting to fall into place. There has also been fluctuations in the Dollar, SEK and the Pound. All this makes that price a bit "obsolete" since it's from 2008. I expect the price have gone down since then.

Also, if you compare prices with the Brazilian competition (I know this might be like comparing apples and oranges, but bear with me) the difference in price between Rafale and Gripen is quite large.

Gripen NG $4,5 billion + $1,5 billion maintenance.
SH $5,7 billion + $1,9 billion maintenance.
Rafale $8,2 billion + $4 billion maintenance.

Now in case of Rafale, there are unconfirmed sources that claim France was offering a discount, to $6,2 billion + $4 billion maintenance. As you see, even with the discount, the difference between the Rafale and Gripen NG is almost $2 billion.

Now, noone knows for sure what's included in theese deals (that's what I mean by apples and oranges), but either the price of Rafale in that article is to low or the price of Gripen NG is too high.

I've seen articles where SAAB claimes that the cost per plane for brazil is $70 million.

 

[p2prada]

Those are more realistic figures. Thanks for the info. I did not know the cost comparison between Rafale and NG was that far. But without knowing more details it's difficult to guess anything. Do you have any idea when Brazil may select a fighter?

 

[gogbot]

In your table only Air Superiority role is concrete and work is being carried out. MKI staying post 2030 is difficult considering early versions will start being phased out. I am also speculating PAKFA will be replaced by FGFA in the medium term.

Well, projections 20 years ahead are hardly ever concrete.
MKI will most likely be slowly replaced by the FGFA it seems like a very natural transition.

Any of the MRCA candidates are good. So, 200 look good down the line.

Well i though the Carnegie Endowment analysis made some convince points in favor of the
Rafale and F-18 , depending on how much it is we want to invest in 5ht gen platforms

I would have been fine with the Gripen as opposed to the F-18 , but the pricing has made me slightly skeptical.
But regardless of weather that holds true or not , i the MMRCA aircraft should distance it self from the LCA requirement as much as possible.

Don't worry i am not going to say Tejas can match the Gripen in its current form however Given the Gripens payload and range limitations , it does share a similar mission spectrum with that of the Tejas.

Now if the LCA mkII disappoints this is a good thing , but if it does not and Tejas can actually meet its requirements.
We would have lost an opportunity to bridge the gap between the Tejas low end and MKI high end.
F-18 seems to be the cost compromise plane for the job.

If the MKII does disappoint which i certainly hope not , we could always purchase the Gripen separately.
Not that i would be the most happy person with that decision.

Also you can't say "any" of the MMRCA candidates , You can't possibly want to get the F-16 it has not future , even LM itself makes that point clear , when saying they will replace every F-16 bought with an F-35. It a self admission that they themselves have moved all their R&D away from the F-16 to the F-35. And also since the F-35 has so many bloody orders and they will earn big supplying spares those 1000's of F-35 to be delivered. It might leave us in a tight negotiation position Since we won't be as much of financial matter to their company. Especially so if we are only getting F-16's .

I can make a similar case and point for Boeing but They still have major R&D in the F-18.

Tejas Mk3 is just a Tejas Mk2 MLU.

It would not be an MLU , but more of new Block or Tranche

AMCA is set to replace Jags and Mig-27s. So, if everything goes according to plan then AMCA will see its day.

Well as long ADA can develop that VLO airframe , and GTRE and SCHEMA can give us that Kaveri M-88 Hybrid.
The rest of the systems can either be developed or imported and then developed. I think sensors and sensor fusion will be our biggest hurdle given how much trouble more experienced design agency's have with developing it.

Let's not discount the possibility of any stealthy UCAVs we may develop from the offset clause or on our own. We are looking at 2030 after all.

I am following developments in this area with great interest. Specifically AURA .

But so far IAF has yet to layout a roadmap or picture for UCAV's in it's fleet.

what i have seen with UCAV's in India has been in regards to the tri-serivce rather than a specific branch.

 

[chex3009]

COVER STORY: THE MMRCA – DECISION EXPECTED SOON.

28th Jan 2011

Latest information from New Delhi indicates that the Government's decision-making processes are entering their final stages. In late August 2007, the Indian Ministry of Defence issued the much awaited Request for Proposal (RFP) for procurement of 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for the Indian Air Force, whose combat squadron strength is now below 33. This is well below the government-authorised level of 39.5 squadrons. The cost of the proposal was projected at Rs. 42, 000 crore (approximately US$ 10.2 billion at 2007 average exchange rate). The 211-page document was issued to six global vendors - Russia's MIG-35 (RAC MiG single seat version); Swedish JAS-39 (Gripen); Dassault Rafale (France); American F-16 Falcon (Lockheed Martin) and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon (made by a consortium of British, German, Spanish and Italian firms).

As per the RFP, the first 18 aircraft will come in a 'fly away' condition, while the remaining 108 will be manufactured in India by the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) under a Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreement. To give a further fillip to the domestic defence industry, the offset requirement has been increased from normal 30 per cent to 50 per cent. In other words, offsets worth over US$ 5 billion are to be ploughed back to Indian industry during the MMRCA's supply period. In a first, the RFP has stipulated life-time maintenance support cost of the aircraft as one of the conditions for final selection of vendor. In other words, the cost of owing and operating the aircraft for the next 40 years (the time period as mentioned in the RFP), would be the determining factor for final selection of the technically qualified vendors.

To ward off controversy - which is often a common feature in India's big defence acquisitions - the MMRCA contest has been widely promoted as being "competitive, fair and transparent." According to the MoD, "greater care has been taken to ensure that only determinable factors, which do not lend themselves to any subjectivity, are included in the commercial selection." For this, the US$10 billion plus contract, dubbed the "mother of all deals", is being subjected to the provisions of the MoD's Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP), which stipulates time-lines for each stage of procurement, detailed rules of procurement and empowers various acquisition functionaries in the armed forces, MoD and other governmental bodies, to perform their respective assignments.

As per DPP provisions, the tender documents submitted by the participating vendors are to be evaluated by the IAF's technical team, followed by the extensive field trials to validate the performance with respect to operational and other requirements stipulated in the RFP. Once the IAF shortlists the vendors based on technical and trial evaluations, the MoD would then compare the commercial proposals of shortlisted vendors. Based on the commercial examination, the vendor which quotes the lowest amount is to be awarded the contract. The award of the contract is however subject to the vendor's undertaking that it would undertake the necessary offset-related work in stipulated time frame.

THE CONTENDERS: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANAGES

Among the six contenders, Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, MIG-35 French Dassault Rafale, and Eurofighter Typhoon are twin-engined, while the others (Gripen and F-16) are single engine fighters. In terms of cost, the first three - Super Hornet, Rafael and Typhoon - come with a bigger unit price tag in the range of US$ 65-129 million, while the others are relatively cheaper in the range of US$ 25-50 million. All the aircraft possess distinct advantage and disadvantage, in terms of cost, technology, and other factors. It is noteworthy that given such a big contract, New Delhi may not simply go by techno-commercial parameters. In stead, it may look at broader strategic interest and industrial benefits which serve it in the long run.

F/A-18 Super Hornet: Boeing, which has recently made a great stride in Indian defence market – by signing or in the process of signing several high profile contracts including P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft (US$2.14 billion), C-17 Globemaster (US$ 5.8 billion) – is hoping to add the most coveted of all contacts. The Super Hornet, a substantially upgraded version of the earlier model F/A-18 A-D Hornet, boasts of "true multi-role aircraft, able to perform virtually every mission in the tactical spectrum, including air superiority, day/night strike with precision-guided weapons, fighter escort, close air support, suppression of enemy air defences, maritime strike, reconnaissance, forward air control and tanker missions".

Entering service with the US Navy in 1999, the Super Hornet is powered by two GE F414-GE-400 engines. Boeing received a shot in the arm when the GE F414 engine was selected over the European rival's EJ-200 for an order of 99 units for the indigenous LCA Mk-II. Boeing would be hopeful that New Delhi's engine selection is the precursor to its own victory in the multi billion-dollar competition. In addition to powerful engines, the Super Hornet integrates APG-79 AESA radar, Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) system, Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS), Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS), advanced high capacity computer system, and state-of-the-art cockpit. India would be the third country after the US and Australia to fly this aircraft, and only the second country after the US where a production line would be established.

Although deeper strategic bonhomie between New Delhi and Washington in recent years might have allayed India's long-held distrust with US as a reliable arms supplier, Boeing may find it constrained with respect to cost and performance parameters. Grouped along with Eurofighter and Rafale in the higher price bracket, the US vendor would find it difficult to supply 126 aircrafts within the RFP-stipulated price. In terms of technology, the Super Hornet, according to some reports, "offers poorer aerodynamic performance than the Eurofighter or Rafale, due to inherent airframe limitations." Besides, compared to other non-US vendors, who seem to be generous in their industrial offers to India, Boeing's technology transfer offer may not be that exciting to India because of the inherent stringency of US arms export control rules.

Rafale: In a surprise move in 2006, the French pulled out the Mirage-2000-5, and threw Rafale in the MMRCA contest, hoping that its brand new production line would be an added advantage. The biggest advantage of Rafale lies in its compatibility with the Mirage - of which the IAF operates around 51. The other advantages that Rafale has are its superior aerodynamic performance, compatibility for carrier-borne operations (if it is so required as per the RFP), and optional extended range through conformal fuel tanks. Pitched as an "onminrole" fighter, the French aircraft will be integrated with Thales RBE2 AESA radar, which is still in the developmental stage and be operational from 2012. Having been fielded in real combat situation in Afghanistan, Rafale claims super-cruise speed with its Snecma R88-2 engines, although sceptics prefer to reserve their comments.

The disadvantage of Rafale is its cost and relatively unproven stature. The IAF would also keep in mind - while doing the cost benefit analysis – the difficulty of integrating non-French weapons on to Rafale. Similarly, the yet to be developed AESA radar does not add to its strength, considering that some other contenders have already developed theirs. Rafale's lack of success in the export market - despite some valiant attempts - would also be at the back of mind of IAF. It is to be noted that the French aircraft received a bitter lesson in an international competition when Boeing's F-15 defeated Rafale in a closely watched Singaporean fighter competition in 2005.

Eurofighter Typhoon: With the backing of four participating nations, Eurofigher Typhoon joined MMRCA competition, as the "most advanced new generation multi-role/swing-role combat aircraft" in its class. With an impressive order book of 707 aircraft from six counties (Austria, Germany, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain and UK), and as the largest collaborative programme in Europe, Typhoon's bet lies in its long production line, supercruise capability (without using afterburners), beyond visual range combat ability, and also the huge concessional offer to India. To sweeten its Indian bid, it has offered a very comprehensive industrial package, including a promise to create 20,000 high-skilled jobs in India. In a significant development, the board members of the aircraft consortium met for the first time in New Delhi in October 2010, and proposed "to the potential Indian partners additional opportunities for industrial and technological cooperation."

Although the recent media reports suggest that Typhoon has emerged as the frontrunner along with Rafale after IAF's technical and field-trial evaluation, there are still enough reasons for the consortium to remain worried. The biggest setback came when the Indian MoD selected GE engines for powering the LCA Naval aircraft in stead of EJ200, which happens to be the engine of Typhoon. Although the recent positive media reports have brought back some confidence, Typhoon also suffers the same problem as the Super Hornet and Rafale, namely issues relating to cost and weight. In addition, the yet to be integrated METEOR BVRAAM is something the IAF would ponder over – though this is not considered a fundamental problem.

MiG-35: Incorporating additional developmental features of the MiG-29K/KUB and MiG-29M/M2 fighters, - both of which are in Indian armed forces – the single seat version of the MiG-35 offers the best compatibility with the IAF inventory. When the aircraft was displayed at Aero India 2007 in Bangalore, it was not only the first time that the full version of the Russian aircraft was displayed at an international event, but it went on to generate a lot of interest throughout the country. In comparison with the MiG-29 K which the Indian Navy is process of inducting, the MiG-35 is no doubt a better fighter, with much improved performance. It is fitted with newly rolled-out Phazotron Zhuk-AE AESA radar (considered to be the best among all MMRCA competitors), a unique Optronic locator system (OLS), LCD multi function displays, and an improved, 'smokeless' thrust vectored RD-33 MK engine. Given Russia's long-standing strategic partnership and its industrial and technological offer, the MiG-35 is believed to be a strong contender.

The biggest weakness of MiG-35 is its yet-to-open production line, which is critically dependent on the Indian order. Other weaknesses include India's desire to diversify its supply sources and Russia's poor track record on after-sales support.

Gripen IN: Projected as "the world's most advanced multi role fighter aircraft", the Swedish Saab's Gripen IN, a variant of the next generation Gripen, joined the MMRCA competition as the most cost efficient alternative that meets "all current and future requirements of the IAF." The big advantage of the aircraft lies in Saab's industrial offer to the Indian industry. Saab has in fact proposed a "comprehensive Transfer of Technology programme, ensuring access and transfer of technology to enable India to manage all aspects of the life cycle cost." Technologically, the Indian offer of the fighter, which would powered by GE F414G engine, comes with increased combat range and endurance, additional weapons carriage capability, increased payload, fully integrated advanced sensors and weapons fusion, including AESA radar and freedom of choice in weapons and sensors.

The biggest drawback of Gripen IN may not necessarily lie with its technological capability, rather geo-politics. Unlike in the cases of other MMRCA contenders, the Swedish government has comparatively little geo-political influence in India, which could be a determining factor against it, if New Delhi bases its decision on strategic reasons. Technologically also Gripen suffers from doubts on capability of its AESA radar, and the fighter's range. Indian decision makers will take into account Gripen's limited success in the international market, where the aircraft has been sold in relatively small numbers. The IAF will also be mindful of the aircraft's American parts and components - including the GE engine - and the likely constraints of Saab in obtaining US approval for transferring those elements to Indian industry.

F-16 IN Super Viper: Lockheed Martin's offer of the F-16IN Super Viper is no doubt a tempting one for the IAF. With an envious production figure of more than 4,400 F-16s for 25 countries (with further orders of 53 from 14 users), the Lockheed Martin's F-16 boasts all the required combat and operational virtues. Besides, with a "heritage" with the world's only fifth generation fighters – Lockheed Martin's F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, the Super Viper offers India a chance to obtain some of the best technologies available in world. In term of advanced features, the Super Viper comes with Northrop Grumman APG-80 AESA radar – the only operational AESA radar in the international market today – and possesses net-centric warfare capability. Its all-digital glass cockpit, advanced survivability features and high thrust engine (GE F110-132A), relatively lower initial cost of procurement (around US$ 30 million per unit) makes it one of the strongest contenders in the MMRCA competition. To sweeten its Indian offer, Lockheed Martin has also proposed the naval version of the F-35 JSF to the Indian navy. This is something that India can hardly ignore, given its expanding maritime interest. Like its American counterpart, Boeing, Lockheed Martin also enjoys the backing of the US government.

Despite its strengths, the F-16IN Super Viper has also equally strong weakness. The first and foremost weakness - although not in terms of combat capability of the plane - is the Pakistan factor. Although Lockheed Martin has emphatically projected the difference between its offers to two South Asian arch rivals, it does not seem the IAF is totally convinced. The other weakness of the F-16 is its aging production line. In 2006, the US CRS report has stated that "after decades of successful production, the F-16 production line appears to be approaching its end "¦ and could close in 2008", unless export order of 36 or more are available each year to keep the line open.

MMRCA BID: TECHNO-ECONOMICS VS. GEO-POLITICS

The MMRCA contact poses the biggest challenge yet faced by the Indian MoD in terms of making a decision between pure techno-economics and broader issues of geo-politics. For the first time in the Defence Ministry's procurement history such a big contract has been put to competitive contracting, in which the winner would be selected based on both technical parameters and cost efficiency. In other words, the final vendor will be the one which meets the technical requirements as mentioned in the RFP and also whose cost is cheapest among all the technically qualified contenders. So far the procurement process has gone as per the provisions of Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). What is remaining of the contest is the final commercial decision which will be taken by MoD. According to Air Chief Marshal P. V. Naik, the IAF "has submitted the MMRCA (technical and trial) report with the defence ministry on July 30, 2010 and if everything goes of well, then the contract should be signed by July 30 2011." The MoD's decision is however subject to approval of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) - which comprises of Prime Minster and Ministers of Finance, Defence, Home and External Affairs and which is responsible for ultimate decision regarding India's national security. The CCS is also responsible for final approval of all defence contracts valued beyond Rs. 1,000 crore (approximately US$ 242 million).

Notwithstanding the DPP provisions - which specifies among others things the best value for money - the MMRCA contract is widely believed to be decided on geo-political factors, and India's long term strategic interests. This is the reason why the heads of states from the competing companies' countries have made a beeline for New Delhi towards the end 2010 – a crucial period in MMRCA selection - and made various statements highly favourable to India's long term strategic interests. This started with British Prime Minister David Cameron's visit in July 2010 when he strongly reiterated his country's support for "India to take the seat it deserves in the UN Security Council." The biggest strategic gain for New Delhi came when President Barack Obama while addressing the joint session of Indian parliament on 8th November, also extended US support for India's membership of the UNSC. In addition, Obama also made some other strategic announcements during his Indian visit, including removal of Indian companies from the US sanctions list and easing of export controls for trade in high-tech items between the two countries. Two other heads of state who followed Obama – President Sarkozy (France) and President Medvedev (Russia) - also extended their support for India's aspiration to assume a larger role in global affairs including in the UNSC.

WINNER OR WINNERS

If the IAF chief's words are accurate, the MMRCA contract will most likely be signed in July 2011, nearly four years after the RFP was issued.The first delivery will start in about three years from the date of signing of the contract. The important question of course is who will finally win the multi-billion contract. Although the firm picture would emerge only after the official declaration, rumours are plenty about the winner(s). As mentioned earlier, Eurofighter and Rafale are rumoured to be the frontrunners after the trial evaluation stage. The other story is that MoD may split the contract between two vendors. Although the DPP does not allow split of contract among the lowest and second lowest vendors, the Cabinet Committee on Security is empowered to do so based on its collective wisdom (read geo-political grounds). Doubts about the pending final decision aside, one thing which is certain is that whoever wins the contract will have a long term economic and political relation with India.

http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/71/The-MMRCA-decision-expected-soon

 

[nrj]

Raytheon AESA Promotional Video

 

[JayATL]

Picked this from another forum Btw

Eurofighter offers 'Star Wars' helmet to IAF

SOURCE STRAT POST The European Eurofighter Typhoon consortium is offering its almost science fiction-evoking helmet to the Indian Air Force (IAF) as part of its bid to win the 126 Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) tender, according to company sources. The helmet can enable a pilot to lock-on target and shoot by voice command, merely after looking at the target.

Company sources confirmed to StratPost that the Eurofighter Typhoon Helmet Mounted Symbology System, developed by BAE Systems and released last July, was part of its offering to the IAF. BAE Systems had issued a press release on the helmet earlier this month, calling it something out of Star Wars, in a reference to its seemingly filmy capabilities, where it said the helmet 'lets the pilot see through the body of the aircraft'.
"Using the new helmet system, the pilot can now look at multiple targets, lock-on to them, and then, by voice-command, prioritize them. It's a lightning-fast system to let the pilot look, lock-on, and fire," said BAE Systems of the system, which also brings to mind the thought-controlled weapons system onboard the fictional MiG-31 in the Clint Eastwood-starring Firefox.

The helmet has a number of fixed sensors, which move in relation to the sensors on the aircraft as the pilot moves his head, 'ensuring the aircraft knows exactly where and what he is looking at'. Apparently, the pilot can zero-in on targets even if they're out of line of sight or nowhere in the range of the aircraft vector.
Pilots of British Royal Air Force (RAF) Eurofighter Typhoons are expected to be become the first users of this helmet sometime this year.

 

[nrj]

^^^ Stratpost is highly unreliable & proscribed on DFI.

 

[black eagle]

US will have to offer India generous terms to seal combat aircraft deal: Expert

If the United States is keen to win the race for supplying new medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) to the Indian Air Force, it will need to offer generous terms on the transfer of technology, assure India access to fifth-generation U.S. combat aircraft, and provide strong support for India's strategic ambitions -to counter the perception that the older U.S. designs in the MMRCA race are less combat effective.

Expressing this view in an article for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, senior associate Ashley J. Tellis said that in making its decision, the Indian Government must keep the Indian Air Force's interests consistently front and center to ensure that its ultimate choice of aircraft is the best one for the service.

"This will not only help India to strengthen its combat capabilities in the coming years, but also position it as a rising global power worthy of respect far into the future," Tellis opines.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) is entering the final stages of selecting 126 new medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) at a cost of about 10 billion dollars.

This is the largest Indian fighter tender in years. Eight countries and six companies eagerly await the outcome of the selection process, which has garnered high-profile attention for its sheer size, its international political implications, and its impact on the viability of key aircraft manufacturers.

The winner will obtain a long and lucrative association with India, a rising power and secure a toehold into other parts of India's rapidly modernizing strategic industries.

Once selected, the aircraft will play an essential role in India's military modernization as the country transitions from a regional power to a global giant.

Tellis says that ever since the 1971 war against Pakistan, India's defense strategy has relied on maintaining superior airpower relative to both China and Pakistan.

And therefore, in the event of a regional conflict, Indian air power would serve as the country's critical war-fighting instrument of first resort.

He reveals that India's force levels have reached an all-time low of 29 squadrons due to delays in its defense procurement process as well as accidents and retirements of older fighter aircraft, and that the IAF is not expected to reach the currently authorized force levels of 39.5 squadrons before 2017.

He says in his article titled "Dogfight! India's Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft Decision" that with India's neighbors aggressively modernizing their own air forces, India's need to expand its combat aircraft inventories becomes all the more urgent.

In choosing an aircraft, India must employ a speedy decision process that is focused on the right metrics, taking both technical and political considerations into account, Tellis says.

"The IAF has already evaluated the six MMRCA competitors against 660 technical benchmarks and has provided its recommendations to the Ministry of Defense. While the IAF has paid special attention to the fighters' sensors and avionics, weapons, aerodynamic effectiveness, and mission performance, India's civilian security managers are certain to emphasize technology transfer as well as costs when making their decision," he adds.

"In fact, the winning aircraft for the IAF ought to be chosen on the triangular criteria of technical merit, relative cost, and optimal fit within the IAF's evolving force architecture. Political considerations, however, will be key in the selection process," he states further.

"In choosing the winning platform, Indian policymakers will seek to: minimize the country's vulnerability to supply cutoff s in wartime, improve its larger military capacity through a substantial technology infusion, and forge new transformative geopolitical partnerships that promise to accelerate the growth of Indian power globally," Tellis says.

Given the technical and political considerations, New Delhi should conclude the MMRCA competition expeditiously, avoid splitting the purchase between competitors, and buy the "best" aircraft to help India to effectively prepare for possible conflict in Southern Asia, he adds.

Because of the dramatic transformations in combat aviation technology currently underway, the Indian Government should select the least expensive, mature, combat-proven fourth generation fighter for the IAF as a bridge toward procuring more advanced stealth aircraft in the future.

Under this criterion, the European aircraft are technically superb, but the U.S. entrants prove to be formidable "best buys" Tellis says.

From the summer of 2009 to the summer 2010, the IAF supervised flight trials of the American Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper, the French Dassault Aviation Rafale, the Russian RSK MiG's MiG-35, the European Eurofi ghter Consortium's Typhoon, and the Swedish Saab Gripen NG (Next Generation).

Besides the extensive demonstrations conducted in the home countries of these manufacturers, the IAF also directed grueling fl y-off s in three different Indian locations - Bangalore, Jaisalmer, and Leh-to test the comparative performance of the aircraft under conditions of extreme humidity, intense heat, and high field elevations, respectively.

These field trials constituted just the fourth of the eight stages called for by India's defense procurement procedures for major purchases.

Tellis says that the Indian Request for Proposals (RFP) requires that 60 percent of the aircraft's technology be transferred to India in four phases, with different percentages of technology transfer occurring in each phase.

This conveyance is intended to underwrite both the indigenous manufacture of the selected aircraft and its subsequent maintenance and support, with 50 percent of the foreign exchange component of the purchase costs being defrayed through direct off sets within the Indian aerospace sector.

Given the IAF's weakening force structure, it is a distinct possibility that the eventual Indian MMRCA buy will exceed the initial 126 aircraft.

"The fact that India's civilian security managers in the Ministry of Defense and, ultimately, its political leaders who man the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), will make the final decision about which aircraft will be procured, underscores one critical reality about the prospective MMRCA countdown.

Tellis says that his report on India's MMRCA competition has three broad objectives:

First, it elucidates the kind of combat aircraft that would be necessary for India, given the operational environment that the IAF is likely to confront. Political considerations are likely to influence which aircraft is eventually selected.

Second, it illuminates the difficult tradeoff s that India would be confronted with as it chooses among six excellent airplanes on the triangular criteria of technical merit, relative cost, and force structure integrity.

Third, it seeks to achieve the foregoing aims by advancing three specific injunctions that policymakers in New Delhi should take to heart as they make their fi nal decision: (1) conclude the MMRCA competition expeditiously; (2) do not split the MMRCA purchase; and, (3) buy the "best" aircraft for the mission.

Tellis concludes by saying that the MMRCA bid has been one of the hottest recent aviation procurements not just in India, but internationally, too.

Eight countries and six companies eagerly await the outcome of this contest.

"This has turned into such a sizzling affair not only because of the size of the contract. Indeed, there are bigger procurement battles raging internationally. Rather, this procurement bid has been incandescent because it involves geopolitics, the economic fortunes of major aerospace companies, complex transitions in combat aviation technology, and the evolving character of the IAF itself," he says. (ANI)


http://www.sify.com/news/us-will-have-to-offer-india-generous-terms-to-seal-combat-aircraft-deal-expert-news-others-lb2rujbhjbg.html

 

[JayATL]

^^^ Stratpost is highly unreliable & proscribed on DFI.

oh i had no clue... sry

 

[black eagle]

Battle royale for India's MMRCA crown... Too long.. here is the link....

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/01/31/352411/battle-royale-for-indias-mmrca-crown.html

 

[chex3009]

A news report by Flightglobal gives this diagram regarding performances of the six contenders for the MMRCA in the evaluation trials..........

could this have any substance to it or it is just another speculative theory???

here is the link to the entire article.. not posting it here because it is too long...

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2011/01/31/352411/battle-royale-for-indias-mmrca-crown.html

Look at the date of the article, it shows 31/1/2011. How could it be?????

 

[black eagle]

Look at the date of the article, it shows 31/1/2011. How could it be?????

Sorry mate... My bad... its not a diagram showing performance in the evaluation trials... it only compares the max take off weight of the contenders...

 

[chex3009]

Sorry mate... My bad... its not a diagram showing performance in the evaluation trials... it only compares the max take off weight of the contenders...

I think they are reporting it from outside the earth i guess....2 days ahead of us.

 

[black eagle]

I think they are reporting it from outside the earth i guess....2 days ahead of us.

common problem with all their reports...

 

[ppgj]

^^^ Stratpost is highly unreliable & proscribed on DFI.

perhaps you are referring to the strategypage. stratpost is credible.

oh i had no clue... sry

 

[nrj]

US Commerce Dept. easing rules for India

The U.S. Commerce Department says it's easing restrictions on exports of high-technology goods to India. Its Bureau of Industry and Security will add India as a Missile Technology Control Regime adherent. It will also publish a new rule changing how India was treated under Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including removal of Indian space and defense-related organizations from the U.S. Entity List imposing extra export licensing requirements. Removed companies include Bharat Dynamics Limited, 4 subordinates of the Indian govenrment's DRDO, and 4 subordinates of the All Indian Space Research Organization.

DefenseIndustry

 

[gogbot]

Its Bureau of Industry and Security will add India as a Missile Technology Control Regime adherent.

Someone help me out , what does this mean exactly ?

Do MCTR limitations still apply to us.

 

[ppgj]

even though my own choice is Rafale first, it seems to me - as time passes by the day, it is looking like FA 18E/F making it's way into the IAF - slowly but surely.

consider this -

1. Obama supports india's candidature at the UNSC on the floor of the indian parliament.

2. DRDO/ISRO taken off the sanctions list.

3. GE 414 part of LCA gives the SH a head up - commonality of the engine leading to massive ease of maintainence, savings in costs, operational efficiency besides the local manufacture of the engine.

4. SH has the most sophisticated avionics including the AESA on board.

5. battle proven - though against lesser adversaries. nevertheless.

6. a follow on EA-18G growler/growlerlite possible similar to Australia's case.

7. scale of production brings down the fly-away cost which is 'incomparable' to any.

8. only Boeing and LM can supply the aircrafts on schedule. if needed i guess they can even hasten that by a notch - which addresses IAF's 'major worry' of falling squadrons due to crashes and aircrafts living beyond their life.

9. SH being primarily a strike aircraft would address the Jaguars and the Mig 27s replacement of which the Migs have a bad safety record.

10. US - India common interest in keeping China at bay for obvious self interest geostrategically.

these are just some observations based on the events that have taken place not so long ago.

 

[nrj]

even though my own choice is Rafale first, it seems to me - as time passes by the day, it is looking like FA 18E/F making it's way into the IAF - slowly but surely.

consider this -

1. Obama supports india's candidature at the UNSC on the floor of the indian parliament.

2. DRDO/ISRO taken off the sanctions list.

3. GE 414 part of LCA gives the SH a head up - commonality of the engine leading to massive ease of maintainence, savings in costs, operational efficiency besides the local manufacture of the engine.

4. SH has the most sophisticated avionics including the AESA on board.

5. battle proven - though against lesser adversaries. nevertheless.

6. a follow on EA-18G growler/growlerlite possible similar to Australia's case.

7. scale of production brings down the fly-away cost which is 'incomparable' to any.

8. only Boeing and LM can supply the aircrafts on schedule. if needed i guess they can even hasten that by a notch - which addresses IAF's 'major worry' of falling squadrons due to crashes and aircrafts living beyond their life.

9. SH being primarily a strike aircraft would address the Jaguars and the Mig 27s replacement of which the Migs have a bad safety record.

10. US - India common interest in keeping China at bay for obvious self interest geostrategically.

these are just some observations based on the events that have taken place not so long ago.

Let me add few more -

11. Boeing plans to offset cost by setting up 100$ Million Maintenance & Training Hub in Nagpur.

12. Existing JV between Boeing-Tata will be supplying components to Indian Super Hornets. (also to other Boeing fighters)

13. Boeing already has long-term partnership agreement with HAL, Tata, L&T to fulfill offset requirements & assure smooth production & assembly of fighters.

14. Deliveries of fighter will begin at the end of 36th month from the day of signing order.

15. Better bargain while awarding N-MRCA & possible co-operation for future catapult system for IN.