Risk reduction
Following several rounds of bid clarification it was concluded in early 1997 that the risks were too high to proceed directly to development. The UK's Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) and Sweden's Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) therefore launched a Project Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) programme. This gave the two teams twelve months in which to refine their designs, and identify and understand the risks and how they would be mitigated. PDRR contracts were placed in August 1997 with a second ITT following in October. The results of the PDRR programme were expected in March 1998 but the procurement became ensnared in the run-up to and aftermath of the UK General Election in May 1997, as the new Labour government conducted its Strategic Defence Review. By 1998 the in-service date (ISD), defined as the first unit equipped with 72 missiles, had slipped to 2007.[20] The UK MoD hosted a government-to-government level briefing on 14/15 July 1997 with Italy, Germany, and Sweden to discuss the BVRAAM programme and how it might meet their requirements, with the aim of pursuing a collaborative procurement.[21] There were issues at this time over the funding of the risk reduction contracts and some nations were discussing possible financial contributions to the studies in return for access to the data. The European team hoped that, if chosen by the UK, Meteor would also be adopted by Germany, Italy, Sweden, and France. However, Germany had now formulated an even more demanding requirement.[22] In response, DASA/LFK proposed a modified A3M, called Euraam, using a DASA Ulm K-band active seeker, with a passive receiver for stealthy engagements, and a redesigned BC propulsion system. The high energy of the high frequency radar (compared to the I-band used on AMRAAM) was claimed to provide an ability to "burn-through" most ECM and the shorter wavelength would allow the target's position to be determined more precisely allowing the use of directional warheads. At one stage DASA was pushing their government for a two year demonstration programme which would culminate in four unguided flight tests.[23] This was presented as a fallback position in case the UK chose Raytheon's proposal. More cynical observers regarded this as a tactic to push the UK towards Meteor.
Revised BVRAAM bids were submitted on 28 May 1998, with final reports in August. The U.S. Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, wrote to his UK counterpart, George Robertson, with assurances that procurement of the Raytheon missile would not leave the UK vulnerable to U.S. export restrictions, which could potentially handicap Eurofighter exports, a major concern highlighted by Meteor supporters.[24] The letter assured "open and complete technology transfer", adding that FMRAAM would be cleared for countries already cleared for AMRAAM and that a joint commission could be set up to consider release to other "sensitive countries". In July 1998 a formal statement of intent was signed between the governments of the UK, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Spain which, subject to the UK's selection of Meteor, agreed to work towards joint procurement of the same missile. In September 1998, Raytheon supplied the UK with estimated costs for AIM-120B AMRAAMs to be fielded on Tornado and as an interim weapon on Eurofighter on initial entry into service while BVRAAM was still in development.[25] The U.S. declined to sell the improved AIM-120C version. This was the first stage in Raytheon's incremental approach to fielding the full capability FMRAAM. The MoD had offered both teams the opportunity to propose alternative acquisition strategies which would have involved reaching the full capability on an incremental basis by initially providing an interim capability which could later be upgraded.[26] Raytheon's staged approach to meeting the full SR(A)1239 requirement offered an interim weapon with a capability between the AIM-120B AMRAAM and the FMRAAM. The Extended Range Air-to-Air Missile (ERAAM) had the FMRAAM seeker and guidance section mated to a dual-pulse solid propellant rocket motor. Raytheon estimated that ERAAM could be ready by the then Eurofighter ISD of 2004 and provided 80% of the FMRAAM capability but at only half the price. This approach played to perceived MoD budget limitations and a realisation that the main threat on which the SR(A)1239 requirement had been predicated, the advanced R-77 derivatives, did not look like entering development any time soon. An incremental approach would allow any technological advances to be incorporated into future upgrades. These could have included multi-pulse rocket motors, thrust vectoring, hybrid rockets, gel propellants, and ductless external combustion ramjets. The Meteor team had considered an interim design, also powered by a dual-pulse solid rocket motor,[27] but decided to offer a fully compliant solution, believing that the staged approach was not cost-effective due to concerns that upgrading from one version to the next would be more complicated than Raytheon claimed. In February 1999 Raytheon added another interim level to their staged approach. The AIM-120B+ would feature the ERAAM/FMRAAM seeker and guidance section but attached to the AIM-120B solid rocket motor.[28] This would be ready for Eurofighter's 2004 ISD and could be updated to the ERAAM or FMRAAM configurations in 2005 and 2007 by swapping the propulsion system and updating the software. At the 1999 Paris Air Show the French Defence Minister expressed his country's interest in joining the Meteor project, putting further pressure on the UK to use BVRAAM as a focus for the consolidation of the European guided weapons industry.[29] The French offered to fund up to 20% of the development if Meteor won the UK contest. Inter-governmental letters of intent were exchanged between the UK and French defence ministers in advance of signing the official MoU prepared by Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.[30] The French officially joined the programme in September 1999. In July 1999 the Swedish air force announced that it would not be funding development of Meteor due to a shortfall in the defence budget.[31] However, this decision was not expected to affect Sweden's participation in the programme, with funding being found from other sources. The political stakes were high. On 4 August 1999 U.S. President Bill Clinton wrote to the UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair.[32] Clinton said that "I believe transatlantic defence industry cooperation is essential to ensuring the continued interoperability of Allied armed forces".[33] Blair also faced lobbying from the French President and Prime Minister, the German Chancellor, and the Spanish Prime Minister. In response, Clinton later wrote a second time to Blair, on 7 February 2000, timed to arrive before the 21 February EAC meeting to discuss the decision. He put the case for Raytheon's bid, underlining the phrase "I feel strongly" about the decision. The direct intervention of the U.S. President emphasised the political and diplomatic significance that the BVRAAM procurement had acquired.
In autumn 1999 Raytheon offered yet another twist to its staged approach with the ERAAM+.[34] If chosen, the U.S. Government, in an unprecedented move, offered to merge the U.S. AMRAAM and UK BVRAAM programmes, under joint control. ERAAM+ would be adopted by both countries, equipping Eurofighter, JSF, and the F-22, allowing economies of scale from large U.S. procurement. ERAAM+ would retain the ERAAM dual-pulse motor but fitted to a front end incorporating all the features of Phase 3 of the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) AMRAAM Pre-Planned Product Improvement (P3I) programme, which was planned out to 2015. These included upgraded seeker hardware and software to provide improved performance against advanced threats and replacement of the longitudinally mounted electronics boards with a circular design which reduced the volume occupied by the electronics allowing space for a longer rocket motor. As equal partners the U.S. and UK would jointly specify and develop the new missile. It was estimated that ERAAM+ could be delivered for less than half the budget allocated for BVRAAM with a 2007 ISD. According to Raytheon, the programme would have initially provided the UK with 62% of development, production, and jobs for the MoD BVRAAM procurement and would give the UK 50% of the significantly larger US air-to-air market. The UK would have participated in the production of every AMRAAM-derivative sold around the world, projected at that time to be about 15000 over the following 15 years.[35] The ARC dual-pulse motor would not enable full compliance with the SR(A)1239 requirement, however it was believed to be adequate to counter the threats expected until 2012-15 when improvements to the warhead, datalink, and propulsion would be available. The slow pace of Russia's ramjet powered R-77 derivative, a mock-up of which had been displayed at the Paris Air Show but which had not progressed past component ground tests and for which the Russian air force had no requirement due to lack of funding,[36] was offered as evidence that the full capability required by SR(A)1239 would not be necessary for some time. At a press conference to launch ERAAM+ Raytheon said that a ramjet powerplant "is not needed today". Countering Raytheon's proposed transatlantic tie-up, Boeing was added to the European team,[37] to provide expertise on aircraft integration, risk management, lean manufacturing technology and marketing activities in selected markets. Boeing also brought vast experience of dealing with the U.S. DoD, essential in any future attempts to get Meteor on U.S. aircraft. Raytheon were delighted that "MBD has validated our transatlantic approach." Although initially interested in developing a suppression of enemy air defence variant of Meteor as a successor to HARM,[38] Boeing has become less and less an active partner as development has progressed, possibly having served their political purpose. In late 1999, in advance of December's EAC meeting to discuss the BVRAAM competition Sweden rejoined the programme.[39] By early 2000 both teams had submitted best and final offers. The Government was expected to announce a decision in March, following a meeting of the EAC on 21 February.[40] The decision was so politically delicate that some believed that the EAC would leave it to the Prime Minister when he chaired the defence and overseas policy committee.[41] MBD announced a proposal to work with Boeing to offer Meteor derived technology to the U.S. MBD and Boeing urged the U.S. to agree to a governmental-level transatlantic cooperation on the Meteor programme. In a last-minute bid to sway the decision Raytheon proposed increased European involvement in its programme. Last minute intervention by the UK Treasury delayed the decision, after concerns about the cost of Meteor, believed to be the preferred solution, compared to the cheaper incremental approach offered by Raytheon.[42]
Decision
In May 2000 the UK Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon, announced that Meteor had been selected to meet SR(A)1239. Fabrice Bregier, then Chief Executive Officer of MBD, said "This decision marks an historic milestone in the establishment of a European defence capability. For the first time, Europe will equip its fighter aircraft with a European air-to-air missile, creating interoperability and independence to export".[43] By this stage the ISD was 2008. After cross-examination of the Chief of Defence Procurement, the UK House of Commons Defence Select Committee summarised the reasons behind the decision in its Tenth Report: "Eurofighter needs the BVRAAM capability to give it the air superiority for which it is designed. We therefore welcome the fact that the MoD has now selected a missile and contractor to provide that capability. The Meteor missile has some clear advantages over its Raytheon competitor—it appears to offer the more militarily effective solution; it should help rationalise and consolidate the European missile industry, and provide future competitions with a counterweight to U.S. dominance in this field; and it entails a lower risk of constraints on Eurofighter exports. Although the programme is in its early days, it also offers the prospect of avoiding some of the problems that have plagued other European procurement collaborations, without arbitrary workshare divisions and with a clear project leadership role to be provided by the UK. The MoD needs to take advantage of that leadership role to keep momentum behind the project, including an early contract which will lock-in not just the contractor but also the commitments of our international partners. The cautious definition of the missile's target in-service date may be realistic, particularly in view of the technological challenges that will have to be overcome, but in BVRAAM's case it is a date that must be met if Eurofighter is to fulfil its potential."[26] The selection of Meteor was not a total loss for Raytheon. As a consolation prize the UK ordered a number of AIM-120s to arm Eurofighter on entry into service which was expected before Meteor development was complete.
Pre-contract
The final deal was a long way off, however, and negotiations to conclude a smart procurement contract continued. In a ceremony at the Paris Air Show on 19 June 2001 defence ministers from France, Sweden, and the UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) committing their nations to the Meteor programme.[44] The nations of the other industrial partners, Germany, Italy, and Spain, only signalled an intention to sign within a few weeks, claiming procedural delays within their national procurement systems. Following parliamentary approval in August, Italy signed the MoU on 26 September 2001, for an anticipated procurement of about 400 missiles.[45] Spain followed on 11 December 2001 but Germany remained a stumbling block. Germany's financial contribution to the programme was considered absolutely essential but for more than two years development was hamstrung by the repeated failure of the German defence budget committee to approve funding. The UK CDP told the Defence Select Committee that without the Germans it could not go ahead.[46] Without the German propulsion system, MBDA deemed that Meteor could not realistically proceed. During this gap in the programme MBDA was funding Meteor from its own resources and, by June 2002, had spent around GBP70m - most of which had gone, ironically, to BC to reduce technical risk in the propulsion system, the performance of which was critical to meeting the requirements. Germany had set two conditions for participation in the project: that the UK should place a contract for the weapon; and that MBDA give a guaranteed level of performance, both of which were achieved by 30 April 2002.[47] It was hoped to sign an agreement at that summer's Farnborough Air Show. However, Meteor was not on the agenda of the German defence budget committee meeting on the 3 July which meant that a decision could not be made until 12 September, after the German Parliament's summer recess. This was claimed to have been due to a delay in paperwork being transferred between the defence and finance ministries.[48] However, there were concerns that this meeting might not even happen until after the German elections on 22 September which would push a decision to the last quarter of the year. An article in the German press claimed that the Rechnungshof (independent federal audit division) urgently recommended "to work up an alternative solution in US-European co-operation and to negotiate a solution with the foreseeable partners" because of the "recognisably high risks in all areas".[49] These delays led to high-level diplomatic contacts over the summer with both the UK and Italian Defence ministers writing to their German counterpart stressing the importance of the Meteor programme.[50] On 18 December 2002 Germany finally approved the funding that would allow development to commence. However, this decision came hand-in-hand with a cut in Germany's planned acquisition, from 1,488 to 600 missiles.[51]
Contract
Finally, on 23 December 2002, over two and half years after the original decision was announced, full-scale development and production of Meteor was launched with contract signature by the UK DPA on behalf of the six partner nation governments.[52] The GBP1200m fixed-price contract was signed at the DPA headquarters at Abbey Wood, Bristol. This only covered production for the RAF. At this point none of the other nations had signed up for production.[2] The percentage share of the programme allocated to each partner nation has changed several times over the years. Germany's decision to reduce its intended acquisition resulted in the UK taking 5% of the programme from Germany, giving the UK 39.6% and Germany 16%. France is funding 12.4%, Italy 12%, and Sweden and Spain 10% each. A thirty strong Integrated Project Team (IPT) was established in the International Joint Project Office (IJPO) at Abbey Wood with representatives from all six partner nations seconded to the team. The programme will be managed by the UK MoD through the IPT on behalf of the partner nations. The IJPO report to the UK Chief of Defence Procurement, the Executive Board of the DPA, and to an International Steering Committee comprising a one or two star representative from each partner nation's air force. As prime-contractor MBDA will manage and execute the programme through its operating companies in France, Italy, and the UK, working in close partnership with Bayern-Chemie in Germany, Inmize in Spain, and Saab Bofors Dynamics in Sweden. It is estimated that over 250 companies across Europe will be involved. Work will be allocated by MBDA to its risk-sharing partners on an "earned value basis" under which work is placed according to best commercial value, taking into account technical excellence, but with a view to aligning "broadly" with the share of development funding provided by each nation. The programme will initially create and sustain 2500 jobs across Europe, 1200 in the UK, but successful exports could double these figures. The development programme will make large-scale use of computer simulation, so should require a relatively small number of firings, some of which will cover activities more traditionally associated with aircraft-integration trials. The first firing, from Gripen, was expected in 2005 with an ISD of August 2012.
Key milestones
The UK MoD stipulated four "tightly defined" contractual milestones that had to be met otherwise the programme would be cancelled with MBDA expected to repay the development funding:[53]
To demonstrate successful transition from boost to sustain propulsion.
To demonstrate control of the asymmetric airframe. There was concern that the intake air flow would be disrupted during manoeuvres resulting in a loss of propulsion performance or even control. The asymmetric configuration also poses unique control problems. Achievement of this milestone was to be demonstrated using computer models validated from the Air Launched Demonstrator (ALD) trials results.
To demonstrate transfer alignment of the missile's inertial measurement system. This process ensures that the missile knows where it is at launch. Good knowledge of initial position is essential to accurate navigation, particularly for long range engagements.
This milestone relates to Meteor's electronic counter-countermeasures(ECCM) capability. This is highly classified work to be conducted in MBDA's hardware-in-the-loop laboratory at Rome.[54]
Achievement of these milestones will be evaluated by QinetiQ acting as an independent auditor.
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