Main Battle Tanks and Armour Technology

[Damian]

Militarysta, please correct typos and mistakes in Your post.

 

[militarysta]

@methos

DASA (Deutsche Aerospace( reportedly also estimated the T-72A/M1 at ~50 cm vs KE

Methos can You wrote smth.more about this? It's interesting.

 

[Andrei_bt]

And why not, how effective will be 300mm steel block over composite armor compared to ERA + composite armor over rest of surface, effectiveness will probably be smaller, so it can be seen as a weak zone.

What protection provides 300 mm armor steel at /68 degrees?

 

[Andrei_bt]

1. Have You and argument how to hell assumptions about the Leo2 armour from article from 1979 can by placed like a armour estimation for Leopard-2A4 from at least 19841985??

can you provide sorses about Leopard-2A4 armour ? Not that data from gamers.

ps. I forgot - test Knife and others havy ERA made on APFDS with dual partial rods (rods made from tungsten slug with metal sheet, or on two parts penetrator) are one big bullshit. During test on Bm15 and Bm22 even stupid polish ERAWA can reduce it possibilities for 40-60%! So tests on 3БМ-17 3БМ-22 3БМ-26 and propably 3БМ-42 can't be authoritative for western havy long rods.
BTW: test on OLF F1 are interesting, but after test in Poland (T-72M1 with ERAWA vs DM-33A1) for me it's sure that is very easy to manipulated that tests. BTW: F1 is almoust the same like rejected Dm43 - think why after DM33 in service is not DM43 but DM53 and DM63

Noz was tested in foreign country by real 120 mm amunition of Leclerc tank. Also tested with Israeli apfsds aquired by Ukraine.

Erawa - it is some ill joke, a mistake of nature. It is example of absence of basic understanding of ERA functioning - ERA tiles are placed on the turret without giving them angle of 60...70 degrees which makes them effective.

And try to paint such red squares showing ERA on PT-91 - it has no stell blocks between container lines http://btvt.narod.ru/1/situation2/erawa2.gif .
Btw Why Poland still manufactures tanks with old glass-plastic like o\ld T-72M1 ? It is 21 century now, the hull provides only 405 mm equivalent of protection – very bad.

 

[Andrei_bt]

rest later

It is some writings by from shoolboy for gamers, fantasy. I may comment some ideas which a close to normal, but i can't coment sombody's fantasy world.

 

[Andrei_bt]

effectiveness will probably be smaller, so it can be seen as a weak zone.

so you don't know exact dimentrions of steel, don't know the effectivenes - so your paintings may be examples of modern art but not the subject of discussion of military forum.

 

[Andrei_bt]

. Have You and argument how to hell assumptions about the Leo2 armour from article from 1979 can by placed like a armour estimation for Leopard-2A4 from at least 19841985??

from 1979 estimation
400...450 apfsds
550...600 CE

I have from 2010 from Russian armor research institute.
450...470 apfsds
650...700 CE

The numbers are comparable but only the former is officially published.

 

[Damian]

What protection provides 300 mm armor steel at /68 degrees?

Compared to what and against what?

Noz was tested in foreign country by real 120 mm amunition of Leclerc tank. Also tested with Israeli apfsds aquired by Ukraine.

If You call OFL120F1 and some Israeli APFSDS modern ammunition of this type by western standards then I wonder what specialist You are. OFL120F1 is just DM43 that was rejected by Germans as not effective enough, it never reached mass production status for German Army and was quickly replaced by much more effective DM53.

Erawa - it is some ill joke, a mistake of nature. It is example of absence of basic understanding of ERA functioning - ERA tiles are placed on the turret without giving them angle of 60...70 degrees which makes them effective.

You have some problems with understanding people's point? Militarysta made constructive criticism of Knife ERA, and he never claimed that ERAWA is some kind of super ERA, it's just preatty good and effective light ERA, especially in ERAWA-2 version. You really have some complex do You? Anyone dare to criticise Your beloved designs and You call him troll, start a war with such person etc... go to head doctor, because You have some serious issues...

And try to paint such red squares showing ERA on PT-91 - it has no stell blocks between container lines http://btvt.narod.ru/1/situation2/erawa2.gif .
Btw Why Poland still manufactures tanks with old glass-plastic like o\ld T-72M1 ? It is 21 century now, the hull provides only 405 mm equivalent of protection – very bad.

Because ERAWA is just 1st generation ERA for christ sake! And why Poland still manufactures old composite armor? Because CAWA was never adopted for mass production due to financial priorities and other factors.

so you don't know exact dimentrions of steel, don't know the effectivenes - so your paintings may be examples of modern art but not the subject of discussion of military forum.

Ah, but You know, then You of course will give us a hard proof that effectivenes of this steel block over glacis plate composite armor will have the same effectiveness as Knife ERA + composite armor.

You have problems with comprehending argumentation of other side?

from 1979 estimation
400...450 apfsds
550...600 CE

I have from 2010 from Russian armor research institute.
450...470 apfsds
650...700 CE

The numbers are comparable but only the former is officially published.

Yeah, right, it is so easy to make estimations without knowing from what materials armor was made, what is internal structure etc. I and Militarysta long time ago understanded that making any RHAe protection estimations is pointless... Not to mention that these silly estimations are probably made by using knowledge of Soviet and current Russian/Ukrainian armor materials, that are not nececary same as these in western MBT's... but still it looks great in marketing and propaganda materials.

 

[Andrei_bt]

Compared to what and against what?

What protection provides 300 mm armor steel at /68 degrees?

If You call OFL120F1 and some Israeli APFSDS modern ammunition

It is modern ammunition used on Leclerc, as I remember Leopards-2 from Poland, for example, use DM 33?

You have some problems with understanding people's point? Militarysta made constructive criticism of Knife ERA

You have some problems with understanding people's point? I said that he made not criticism but some funny picture not showing nothing.

Ah, but You know, then You of course will give us a hard proof that effectiveness of this steel block over glacis plate composite armor will have the same effectiveness as Knife ERA + composite armor.

I can not proof or even comment such stupid ideas. You don't understand what you are talking about, return to your virtual world, play PC tank simulators.

Yeah, right, it is so easy to make estimations without knowing from what materials armor was mad

Do you know such materials?
Or do you know, that soviet/russian sources of the specialized research facilities don't know them?
You can try to criticize them, I newer made no armor estimations, it is job for professional scientists of this area.

that are not necessary same as these in western MBT's.

I can say that you don't have idea of both of them. It is evident.

silly estimations are probably made by using knowledge of Soviet and current Russian/Ukrainian armor materials.

Unlike the Soviet-Russian-Ukrainian the German and US use magic enchanted pixy dust as they materials probably )))))

Btw. I posted the pic of typical armor material of western type – same as Soviet-Russian-Ukrainian, also I posted M1 armor array – nothing familiar? I suppose you still live in wonderland of some fantasies of PC games like P Lakovski ))))

I can hardly persuade the "belivers" like you.

 

[Damian]

What protection provides 300 mm armor steel at /68 degrees?

Relative armour thickness calculator

Everyone can calculate it here, however it will give only thickness of such armor block when angled, not protection against modern ammunition.

It is modern ammunition used on Leclerc, as I remember Leopards-2 from Poland, for example, use DM 33?

And? It is old ammunition by current standards, if Ukraine would test DM53, DM63, M829A3 or OFL120F2 (not fielded yet) or other more modern types of ammunition.

You have some problems with understanding people's point? I said that he made not criticism but some funny picture not showing nothing.

I do not, You have. And You instead of using counterarguments and proving that he is wrong called him a troll... very "adult".

I can not proof or even comment such stupid ideas. You don't understand what you are talking about, return to your virtual world, play PC tank simulators.

Ahh, so You can't proof that it is not weaker protected zone than that protected by Knife + glacis armor. Yeah, very constructive counter argumentation.

Do you know such materials?
Or do you know, that soviet/russian sources of the specialized research facilities don't know them?
You can try to criticize them, I newer made no armor estimations, it is job for professional scientists of this area.

I do not know such materials this is why I do not do any estimations of armor protection. These estimations made even by scientists are worthless, they never tested these armors, they do not know their structure and from what materials they were really made. they do not know how much material x and how much material y is in armor. So all these estimations are just silly.

Unlike the Soviet-Russian-Ukrainian the German and US use magic enchanted pixy dust as they materials probably )))))

I never said that Soviet made materials are inferior in quality. But armors are very different in design, quantities of used materials etc. So basing estimations of armor x using known values of armor y (and probably it's design principles) is naive... I was thinking that You are smart enough to at least consider this... I was wrong, this is how much faith in people is worth... nothing.

Btw. I posted the pic of typical armor material of western type – same as Soviet-Russian-Ukrainian, also I posted M1 armor array – nothing familiar? I suppose you still live in wonderland of some fantasies of PC games like P Lakovski ))))

I can hardly persuade the "belivers" like you.

What means typical? Designs can differ, what You see? Only Merkava Mk4 armor array, and fragment yes only a fragment of M1 side turret armor array, and I explained using logic, why side turret armor design of M1 tanks proposed by You is immposible.

And I explain it again, because it seems You have problems with understanding in English.

1) Back plate of side turret armor cavity is smooth, no attache points, no welding marks.
2) Bolts of this armor array also do not have any visible attache points nor weld marks.
3) This means that it is highly possible that these bolts are placed in another layers of armor array.
4) These additional layers for saving weight are not nececary thick, not nececary there are many of them, there can be also only 3 layers, maybe even with bigger gaps between them.
5) Only because You did not seen something it doesen't mean that it don't exist, but there are details that can suggest that design is different than You propose.

 

[Andrei_bt]

Everyone can calculate it here

What is your calculations in numbers?

hese estimations made even by scientists are worthless, they never tested these armors, they do not know their structure and from what materials they were really made.

How can you support your statement?

so what did you calculated?
What is armored steel equivalent of so called "weakened zones"?

I do not do any estimations of armor protection

I seen a lot made by you and your teem mates, or it is just measurements of armor "LOS"?
I may advice you to discover what is weight equivalent is.

And I explain it again, because it seems You have problems with understanding in English.

No, I have no problems understanding English, but I am rather puzzled by what game boys like you are talking about, it is a different language - language of different insane lines on my pictures.


So, I can hardly persuade the "believers" like you. Discussion with you, and your-alike does not give no sense, continue to make "lines" on the pictures from my site

 

[Damian]

What is your calculations in numbers?

487.2807736448233

If I made it correct.

How can you support your statement?

Well I don't know, these scientists have Leopard 2 or M1 in garage and test them? It is sarcasm by the way...

so what did you calculated?
What is armored steel equivalent of so called "weakened zones"?

? What weak zones, I'am not talking about any weak zones.

I seen a lot made by you and your teem mates, or it is just measurements of armor "LOS"?

Long time ago we were playing with RHAe estimations, but more we learn about armor designs, we concluded that any RHAe estimations are useless, these are based on not full data or some people make them without any hard data. Line of Sight thickness estimations are the only ones that can be done and will be at least partially close to truth, rest is pure speculation close to fantasy.

No, I have no problems understanding English, but I am rather puzzled by what game boys like you are talking about, it is a different language - language of different insane lines on my pictures.

First thing, I'am not a game boy. I used Steel Beasts simulator only to explain in simplified way how fire control system of some western tanks work, nothing else, If You would read more of my posts on different forums or hear what I say in private discussions about tanks, You would know that actually I think that in terms of armor simulation and ammunition penetration values, SBProPE is completely biased and failed. For example Leopard 2A5/A6 and Challenger 2 are over estimated in terms of frontal protection, while M1A1HA, T-80U for example are completely underestimated. Or ammunition, values for DM53 fired from RH-120/L55 gun are just... insane!

Second thing, we have different point of view, we do not think that one tank design are ultimate superior or inferior to another tank design. And it seems You do not understand idea standing behind western tanks protection design.

It is a fact, that if we look at western tanks composite armor volume at any predictible hit angle, and compare it to Soviet T-xx tanks composite armor volume in cavity, there is actually less composite armor in cavity in Soviet tanks than in western tanks... even if overall thickness of armor is comparable.

But this doesen't mean that one design or another have less or more protection levels. I'am saying this for a long time, 3rd generation western MBT's and Soviet T-xx tanks from T-64 and also current Russian and Ukrainian MBT's, have very much comparable protection over their frontal arc, achieved however, by different means.

Argumentation that one designs are ultimate better than others in terms of pure armor quality, it's protection, without any objective comparision tests is just... pure propaganda and marketing.

I may advice you to discover what is weight equivalent is.

And it is really important in times where even composite armor is "semi-reactive". I know that single NERA panels is less effective than 1 ERA cassette, but what if we do not have 1 NERA panel but approx 20 NERA panels? Of course, ERA still will have advantage of less weight and less volume with still high effectiveness, but if it will be really more effective than these 20 NERA like panels? And what about materials? What if NERA panel instead of only RHA and rubber/non energetic reactive element will use titanium, or tungsten, or DU, or mix of all of these? How much effectiveness of such NERA like array will increase over similiar array made from RHA only?

It is very easy to say "this immposible, because when whe or these people tested this and this it was not working that way", yeah ok, but what if the other designers team used different solution?

Did You ask Yourself about such circumstances? I do not say that such composite NERA like array will have greater protection than let's say BM Oplot composite armor (that it's still unknown to us) and Knife/Duplet, not it will not have, but comparable yes, good enough against any probable threats, yes, probably yes.

You have very limited knowledge to what actually happens in west, western tanks have "semi-modular" composite armor (relatively easy composite inserts replacement process), so it is actually not that difficult to improve these tanks armor protection, even without deep modernisation. I would not be surprised to see old M1A1HA with M1A2SEP armor package, this only example, and very probable to happen, because older version are reciving M1A2SEP suspension system, this means probable weight increase, and the older suspension types had malfunctions due to pure maintnance and wear and tear process without repairs and spare parts.

And these are only examples from one country. Leopard 2 tanks also have armor upgrades, it would not be even difficult to my country to just buy A5/A6 versions armor package and replace with it the old armor package without turret redesign.

Leclerc also had armor upgrades over it's production process.

Challenger 2 is big unknown, but it seems that not all of it's protection solutions, especially turret were... good choices, for example cast front turret backplates, as it is strange to be in use, in 90's. (This is also why I think that CR2 in SBProPE is absurdaly overestimated in protection values)

So, I can hardly persuade the "believers" like you. Discussion with you, and your-alike does not give no sense, continue to make "lines" on the pictures from my site

I'am not beliver, but You are not giving any hard proof counter arguments.So I will ask, Knife effectiveness is same in the center of cassette and on it's edges or not, and please without any propaganda and marketing of Microtec product, simple answer based on common sense.

So maybe try to discuss and not see every criticism or doubts about Your arguments as personal attacks on You or attacks on Your country, KMDB or other Ukrainian military industry company's. It's just silly when I see, Khlopotov critics about BM Bulat... war on Russia and "fools" from UVZ on Your blog... here we have critical view on Knife... war with these evil Poles in Your posts.

Are You capable even to admit that BM Bulat or BM Oplot have weak point in their design compared to other currently used tanks?

I can admit, yeah, M1 Abrams could be a better tank, I myself see weak point in it's design, for example I would redesign turret, I would redesign turret to be more symetrhic, with two man crew, without angled side armor, so better internal volume distribution. I would decrease ammunition bustle side protection to increase crew compartment protection over sides. New turret could have more space in bustle, Meggitt company autoloader in standard turret could handle 34 rounds, I do not see a reason why the same autoloader could not handle even 40 rounds in completely new turret.

I would slightly redesign hull, leaving thick "beak" armor but redesigning glacis plate to increase protection there. More compact engine could give some advantages, for example shortening hull. etc. etc. etc.

Same with any other tank design, So i'am not biased to not see weak points of all tank designs.

Weak point of BM Oplot? For example ammunition storage, even if part of ammunition was placed in armored box mounted to turret rear, still such autoloader type is not safe, and overconfidence to armor protection can be dangerous. Other examples? Why no ERA over turret sides? If Knife is so good ERA, even single layer could be good enough.

Other weak points? PNK-6 placement, it would be better placed behind tank commander hatch, so tank commander would still have vision blocks over it's hatch frontal arc, giving him better situational awareness.

And probably many more thing to improve could be pointed out. But! I did not see, in any, single of Your texts, and constructive criticism of BM Bulat or BM Oplot.

Everyone can go to Your site Танковая мощь - Сталь и Огонь: современные и перспективные танки and read Your texts, I have a question for other users now, when You will read, please make here Your own comments, if there is any single constructive criticism text about BM Bulat or BM Oplot on Andrei site, besides ongoing criticism of other tanks designs.

 

[Twinblade]

Thanks Damian, Militarysta and Methos for your contributions. This thread has the best analysis on modern armour outside Tanknet

 

[methos]

So, I can hardly persuade the "believers" like you. Discussion with you, and your-alike does not give no sense, continue to make "lines" on the pictures from my site

Andrei, what you fail to understand (or do not want to understand) is that the turret armour thickness is more than 80 cm, that has been written in German sources, on TankNet and on Russian boards - and militarysta even provided images. But you still stick with your beliefs/imaginations.
Then we should ask us: "How sensefull is a comparision between Leopard 2A4 and T-64BM Bulat?" - it doesn't make much sense, as most Leopard 2 users operate upgraded versions, only very few operate the "basic model". With the exception of Poland non of these countries have a common border with a T-64BM operator. Comparing a from 1999 tank with a tank from 1984 is also questionable, when of the later one models exist closer to the first.
Furthermore your article contains a lot of mistakes. E.g. you are identifying the DM13 as DM23, the DM23 as DM33 etc. The table also does not include some of the most important factors for armour penetration like diameter or pressure. The shorter 125 mm gun (compared to the typical L52 one) will have some troubles achieving even the typical penetration values.
Regarding protection, as militarysta already said, you are citing a source from 1979, but the tank model was made in 1984! Notice some discrepancy? Regarding the DM43, you might notice that the French use this round in combination with a longer barrel. The figures in the "Mobility" section are also questionable, especially since the whole section is unreferenced and very biased.
Your "findings" critize the ammo protection of the Leopard 2, claim that the Rh120 is worse than some shortened 125 mm gun and that the T-64BM Bulat is more cost efficient. You then should remember that Chile bought their Leopard 2A4s for less than 700.000 € per tank and the Poles got them for even less.

Btw. I posted the pic of typical armor material of western type – same as Soviet-Russian-Ukrainian, also I posted M1 armor array – nothing familiar?

You didn't post any armour array. Just some speculative image of the rear side armour of the ammo compartment.

For example Leopard 2A5/A6 and Challenger 2 are over estimated in terms of frontal protection, while M1A1HA, T-80U for example are completely underestimated.

Opinions. If you ask me, the Leopard 2, Challenger 2 and the M1A1HA are overclaimed by at least 10 cm.

What if NERA panel instead of only RHA and rubber/non energetic reactive element will use titanium, or tungsten, or DU, or mix of all of these? How much effectiveness of such NERA like array will increase over similiar array made from RHA only?

Imo DU does not make sense without ceramics. While older opinions (which can be found on TTK's site) often supposed that the uranium is used as uranium oxide (which then could replace possible aluminium oxide in the armour), some others have come with the theory that DU is used as backing of the ceramics, which would make sense. For both of these theories we have publishied scientistic data proving that it would be more efficient vs KE and vs CE than RHA (per mass at least). Uranium itself would be less mass efficient than RHA against KE and similar vs CE, using it as NERA would imo not improve it's efficiency vs KE in some magical way, especially as I don't know wether high-density alloys can be used as NERA. Unless the US have some super alloy increasing the KE protection of uranium by 3 times (and I don't think this is possible), I would rather stick with the other theories and see Burlington as ceramic-based armour instead of seeing it as NERA layout.

 

[Damian]

Imo DU does not make sense without ceramics. While older opinions (which can be found on TTK's site) often supposed that the uranium is used as uranium oxide (which then could replace possible aluminium oxide in the armour), some others have come with the theory that DU is used as backing of the ceramics, which would make sense. For both of these theories we have publishied scientistic data proving that it would be more efficient vs KE and vs CE than RHA (per mass at least). Uranium itself would be less mass efficient than RHA against KE and similar vs CE, using it as NERA would imo not improve it's efficiency vs KE in some magical way, especially as I don't know wether high-density alloys can be used as NERA. Unless the US have some super alloy increasing the KE protection of uranium by 3 times (and I don't think this is possible), I would rather stick with the other theories and see Burlington as ceramic-based armour instead of seeing it as NERA layout.

Maybe it is mixed array with NERA like layout closer to the outer plate and heavy, more passive backing layers using dense materials?

Besides this we do not know the exact armor array, we do not know nothing about metal alloys (also DU ones) used by US military etc.

We need to remember that different countries or design teams have different priorities in their research, one team can do real breakthrough with ERA, second RHA alloys, third with Tungsten alloys and forth with DU alloys. We need to remember that Americans were working on DU alloys for preatty long time compared to others and maybe they find a way to improve DU alloys. It of course does not mean that such armor will be better than other types.

Also we should remember that DU is used in combination with other materials. It is officialy claimed to be steel encased, this steel can be high hardness steel, the latest generation of this armor is also reporting to use additionale graphite coating for DU.

Maybe configuration looks like this.

Outer NERA like layers (number of them of course unknown) and then DU alloy with graphite (and other materials?) coating encased in high hardness steel with some ceramic materials?

For example HHS + Ceramic + Graphite (and/or other materials?) coating + DU + Graphite (and/or other materials?) coating + Ceramic + HHS (or RHA?)?

It is possible, it would combine high hardness steel, high hardness (but light) ceramic with dense DU alloy and maybe something more (what bonus for protection can give graphite? Maybe something we do not know?).

 

[militarysta]

@Andriej

What protection provides 300 mm armor steel at /68 degrees?

~323mm RHA. Even if Oplot nacked hul have ~500mm RHA vs KE (loosely specified value, I'm shooting -it is just example) it means that ex M829A3 can overpas this small fragmnet whit totally ~800mm RHA in 1,5km. Of course it is only very simple example. But it's not the point.
The point of this picture with Oplot hull and Knife era:
Whole idea this Oplot-M hull photo with "Knife" and red marks on it is that - part "in red" are not protected by Knife ERA. That's all - nothing more. But when we compare it to russian "Relikt" we can see that hull cover by ERA for Oplot-M is no better (or even worse) then ERA cover for T-90MS. Where is big deal?

Noz was tested in foreign country by real 120 mm amunition of Leclerc tank. Also tested with Israeli apfsds aquired by Ukraine.

Yes, I know it was tested against:
a) F1 (clon of DM-43 - rejected by Germans in middle 90.)
b) propably CL3143 (M322) wich can penetrate about 650mm for 2000m. This ammo isreplaced in Chal by new M338 with the possibility of overpass modern ERA. Old M332 was bought by Spain and Italy, it was used on test against Leo2A6HEL turret (and faild).
Both of them (F1/DM43 and M322) aren't modern ammo, it's somthing middle - between old APFSDS from late 80. (DM33, M829, M829A1) and new generation from late 90./2000. which can overpass havy ERA (DM53, M829A3,DM63, M339, F2, etc.
It'f first problem (it wasn't modern ammo!)
Second problem - what kind of test was that? We know about static tast, and dinamic but we dosn't know distance, ERA slopped (angle), and in what part of ERA bricks APFSDS hit. Of course guys from developer test know that - but on your blog and btvt there is only marketing stuff with best of the best performance.
Third problem - after CCCP fail free Ukraina and Belarus was one big candy shop for western intelligence -for money guys form developer (design offices) where able to sell just everything.
Examples? Buk, Tor, S-300PMU, S-300P, S-300W, T-64, T-80, T-80U, T-84 in USA, ATGM's, APFSDS's in western Nato, Kontak-1, Kontakt-5 and as I know part of Knife in USA and Germany. This all is fully available to buy on Ukraine, and was able to buy on Belarus in 90. Even Polish army bought on Ukraina some part equipment and weapons to test. And how about little how-know between GIAT and Charkov guys? 120mm barrel, autoloader, Catherine from Thales, work on T-72AG and T-84-120 Kern etc. As I said - just "candy shop" for western intelligence. Thats the reson why DM53 and M829A2 and M829A3 where developed so fast.

Erawa - it is some ill joke, a mistake of nature. It is example of absence of basic understanding of ERA functioning - ERA tiles are placed on the turret without giving them angle of 60...70 degrees which makes them effective.

First - Im not talkin about ERAWA but T-64BM Bulat and Knife ERA And it's obious that ERAWA is whorse then K-5, Relikt, Nóż, etc. I haven't problem with that.
Second - this "ill joke" performance:

but ERAWA in Polad is "the Past" new solutions looks that:

And it's mass efficiency is 1-4/4,5 (1kg of this NERA pannel with spall liner works like 4-4,5kg of RHA plate).

And try to paint such red squares showing ERA on PT-91 - it has no stell blocks between container lines http://btvt.narod.ru/1/situation2/erawa2.gif .
Btw Why Poland still manufactures tanks with old glass-plastic like o\ld T-72M1 ? It is 21 century now, the hull provides only 405 mm equivalent of protection – very bad.

Becouse Polish PT-91 is monkey model of the T-72M1?
BTW: deep modernization PT-91 - PT-91MZ just beat Ukrainian tank during test for Malaysia - show off how poorly cames ukrainian tank in engine and mobility thema, and Fire Control System Both of us know taht - do You really whant to write about that? What a shame - Ukrainian newest tank was beaten by polish deeply modernization T-72M1 monkey model with western components

from 1979 estimation
400...450 apfsds
550...600 CE

I have from 2010 from Russian armor research institute.
450...470 apfsds
650...700 CE

The numbers are comparable but only the former is officially published.

First - do You really don't realize that Leopard-2 armour was improvmend at lest 4 times, and Leo2A4 armour was definitely diffrent then Leo2A0 from 1979? C'mon Andriej -you are not so stupid -aren't you?
Second -this numbers are hmm "not wery good"
For erly Leo2A0 it's looks rather that:
Leopard2A0/A1:
APFSDS: 410- 470mm RHA (first value for 740mm LOS, second for 840mm LOS - the first one is more relevant of course.)
Turret sides at 30. - ~380mm RHA (for ~650mm LOS)
HEAT: 700mm - 800mm RHA
Turret sides at 30. - ~650mm RHA
of course this upper is estimation.

BTW: In Poland PT-91 on test shoot to erly Leo2A4 armour (in fact Leo2A3) with using 3BM-22. This old round have certified penetration at 2000m about 380mm RHA and it can perforate even 430mm RHA for 2000m.
This round was not able to penetrate this Leo2A3 armour for even less then 500m How many armour can perforate 3BM-22 from 500m? More then 450mm propably So this all " 2010 from Russian armor research institute" are rather incorrect for Leo2A3 -not even for Leo2A4! But for Leo2A0/A1 they are quite good
BTW: propably you just mistake this "2010 Russian armor research institute." dates for Leo2A0/A1 and A3/A4(erly) , becouse this value in Your post is almoust propper for Leo2A0/A1 - they are very accurate for this erly Leo2, but not for later 2A3 and 2A4(since 1986).

 

[Austin]

A bit older Vasiliy writeup on US Armour in Iraq but still interesting

US Armor in Operation "Iraqi Freedom"
Vasiliy Fofanov

Moscow Defense Brief ( 2005 )
Moscow Defense Brief

US-led Operation "Iraqi Freedom" and the subsequent occupation have fueled debate on the future of armor systems over the next few decades. Supporters of the latest generation tank designs can justifiably claim that the Main Battle Tank (MBT) and the Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) have proven their value on the Iraqi battlefield. This was clear especially during the initial stages of combat, when heavy brigade combat teams made up of the M1AHA Abrams and the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Systems (BFVS), and the British Challenger II Mk2 and Warrior IFVs, destroyed Iraqi combat systems with little resistance along the road to Baghdad and Basra, respectively. On the other hand, critics of this model point to the surfeit of heavy armor and the unacceptably high burden placed on supply chains to sustain heavy brigades so far removed from their bases. Moreover, the second phase of the operation and the occupation revealed certain shortcomings of current MBT protection and firepower systems. The US-Iraq war can hardly provide conclusive evidence in support of either side in this debate, since it is unlikely that the US will ever enjoy such an overwhelming technological and organizational superiority over the enemy. A more even contest will require radically different tactics and result in much higher losses. Nevertheless, the combat experience of medium and heavy fighting machines in Iraq provides some useful lessons for the future.

Protection

The Abrams tank armor system was not really put to the test during military operations in Iraq. There were virtually no reported hits on the highly protected frontal arc or on the "heavy" ballistic skirts; all tank losses to enemy fire were defeated from the top, side and rear. Iraqi soldiers had clearly familiarized themselves with the capabilities of American tanks during operation Desert Storm and avoided engaging them in direct battle. For example, there were no reported cases of anti-tank guide missiles (ATGM) being fired at any US army vehicle. At the same time, Iraqi resistance fighters, whose ranks were bolstered by scores of trained Iraqi soldiers, have clearly learned to exploit the vulnerabilities of the US systems. They managed to destroy up to 20 enemy tanks even with their antiquated light anti-tank weapons, mostly Soviet rocket-propelled grenades such as the RPG-7 or its Chinese and Egyptian variants, with rounds developed in the 1970s-early 1980s. The results of combat operations show that the side armor of the Abrams tank is completely inadequate to fire from light anti-tank weapons, including older generation weapons, making these tanks unsuitable for operations in built-up areas.

For example, in a widely-discussed incident, an M1 tank from the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment, 1st Armor Division was hit and disabled during a routine patrol on 28 August 2003. The American press, deluded by its own reports of the "invulnerability" of the Abrams, claimed that some kind of "secret weapon" was responsible for the damage. In fact, published photographs clearly show that the offending weapon was none other than a simple RPG. The hollow-charged jet penetrated the side skirt and turret ring and continued into the crew compartment as it disintegrated before finally coming to rest after boring a cluster of craters 30-50 mm deep in the hull on the far side of the tank. The crew was lucky to have suffered only minor shrapnel wounds as the projectile passed through the gunner's seatback and grazed his flak jacket. On April 2, 2003 an RPG attack from the side disabled another tank by penetrating the turret's hydraulic drive.

The side protection of the M1 turret is also inadequate. On 7 April 2004 an anti-tank RPG penetrated the side of the turret resulting in serious wounds to two crew members. The top of the tank is equally vulnerable, and even the glacis was easily defeated by anti-tank weapons. For example, on April 10, 2004 a tank was hit on the right side of the glacis by an RPG fired from an overpass and destroyed. Additional measures designed to increase protection for the Abrams tank have showed mixed results. Halon firefighting gear has proven largely ineffective. Practically all secondary fires resulting from enemy fire, engine breakdown or overheating destroyed the tank completely. For example, the 7 April attack noted above ignited the tanker's personal effects attached to the outside of the turret, and since the crew had abandoned the vehicle, the fire was left unchecked, while on 10 April, fuel leaked out of a damaged fuel tank and ignited. Externally stored items, including on one occasion an external auxiliary power unit (EAPU), caught fire on several occasions and led to catastrophic losses. On the other hand, the vulnerability caused by externally stored items only underlined the wisdom of storing ammunition in a separate compartment protected by blast doors, which contained fires and saved the crew when the main rounds ignited.

The distribution of catastrophic damage to the Bradley IFV was somewhat different. In spite of the vehicle's explosive reactive armor (ERA), its protection proved to be completely inadequate in combat against even outdated generations of light anti-tank weapons. This led to several episodes of defeat from RPGs, accompanied by crew casualties and in several cases the complete destruction of the vehicle from resulting fires. Significant losses of Bradley vehicles resulted from Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) placed in cars or on roads. IEDs made from one or two 122 and/or 152 mm shells with between 4 and 14 kg of explosive proved more than adequate to inflict heavy damage to equipment and crew. The worst case was on January 17, 2004 when the explosion from an IED made from two 152 mm shells overturned the vehicle and destroyed the crew compartment, killing all five crewmen. The Abrams tank proved much more resistant to IED, as only one tank was destroyed on October 27, 2003 by an IED, presumably constructed from a 240 mm Soviet-made mortar-bomb with an explosive charge of 32 kg.

It is interesting to compare the losses sustained by the Bradley Fighting Machines from light anti-tank weapons and IED to the experience of the new Stryker Medium Armored Vehicle. This wheeled 8x8 has about the same ballistic protection as the Bradley (360-degree protection from 14.5 mm shells). Enhanced survivability against RPG is provided by slat armor: testing and combat experience in Iraq has shown that this steel grille is able to prevent the proper functioning of anti-tank grenades and the formation of a hollow-charged jet. The Stryker also has higher survivability against mines. Whereas exploding mines have almost always stopped the Bradley in its tracks, the Stryker as a rule has been able to escape from the area of detonation. For example, on 9 September a Bradley was blown up by an IED placed in a parked car on Haifa Street in Baghdad with an explosive charge of about 10 kg. The IFV suffered damage to its tracks and lost mobility. Two crew members were injured and another four were hit by small arm fire and RPGs when they tried to exit the vehicle. Reinforcement units evacuated the crew and the vehicle burned unchecked. On 11 October, 2004, a car in Mosul rammed into the side of a Stryker, detonating a similar explosive charge. The MAV suffered serious damage, the commander was killed, and seven out of 8 wheels were punctured, but the vehicle retained mobility and was able to return to base on its own. In another pair of incidents, a Bradley and a Stryker each lost their front suspension arm, on 12 October and 20 December respectively. Again, the Stryker retained mobility while the Bradley did not.

Firepower and Target Acquisition

The American tank system is distinguished by the high quality of its infrared equipment. Second-generation forward looking infrared (FLIR) has a resolution that can distinguish small targets and people at far distances, at night and in bad weather, and even during sandstorms. But like its armor protection, the main gun of the Abrams tank, the 120 mm M256 often failed to meet expectations. Firepower problems were exacerbated by an initial reliance on a basic load appropriate for battle against enemy tanks, but not against infantry. High explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds at first made up only 25% of the stowed munitions. This share increased to 60% by the end of combat operations, but the lack of dedicated anti-personnel rounds reduced firepower effectiveness. Other problems, typical of the use of tank guns in urban conditions and against infantry ambushes, also played a role: the extension of the cannon beyond the hull of the tank, significant blind spots along the vertical, especially towards the rear, the gunner's restricted field of vision, etc.

One unexpected failing of the Abrams main cannon derived from the use of a fibreglass bore evacuator. Combat operations revealed that the bore evacuator is easily disabled by small arms fire, and the smoke generated by a malfunctioning bore evacuator drives the crew out of the tank after the firing of just two or three rounds. In battle with mobile enemy, Abrams crews used mostly open mounted machine guns (the commander's 12.7 mm gun and the loader's 7.62 machinegun on skate mount). A lack of protection for the machine gunner from small arms fire led to several casualties and created opportunities for the destruction of the crew compartment through the open hatch. A tank was disabled on March 26, 2003 when an anti-tank grenade ricocheted off a roof and through the commander's hatch. The tank commander was hit and killed while he was manning his machine gun.

The Bradley also had trouble applying firepower in urban areas. The fragmentation ammunition of the IFV's 25 mm automatic cannon was not effective against enemy infantry in buildings, and so the vehicle's Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire command-link guided (TOW) missiles had to be used. The firepower of these missiles was more than adequate, but limited to two rounds since they are impossible to reload under the protection of armor. The firepower of the Stryker APC is even more limited. Depending on configuration it consists of either one 12.7 mm machine gun or a 40 mm grenade launcher, and was applied only in battle against enemy personnel in the open. Due to the unreadiness of Mobile Gun System (MGS) Strykers with 105 mm tank guns, support fire was provided by ATGM Strykers equipped with TOW missiles. The weak firepower of the APC Stryker limited its use during periods of heightened confrontation with Iraqi resistance.

Mobility

On the whole, the Abrams tank demonstrated a high level of mobility in combat operations. Notwithstanding instances where the tank may have flipped over or got stuck, the road system and bridges of Iraq were able to sustain the traffic of fighting machines weighing more than 63 tons; off-road mobility was also satisfactory. Nevertheless the quick pace of attack, extremely dusty conditions and sandstorms raised a host of problems. There was a high rate of failure on the road arms and assemblies. Road wheels and track wear proved to be significant. Just as during "Desert Storm" the air filters required continuous cleaning and servicing. Units used more fuel than expected due to the use of the antiquated gas turbines as a power plant, especially on those tanks not equipped with an auxiliary power unit. The Bradley APC, in spite of its smaller size, faced similar problems and, on the whole, did not prove to be more mobile than the tanks. The extensive use of armor in urban areas, especially during the occupation, created additional problems due to the limited manoeuvrability on the narrow Iraqi streets. In practice, the use of armor was possible only on wide thoroughfares and on squares. The use of heavy vehicles also caused significant damage to the urban infrastructure and to property, though the use of rubber-padded tracks helped to reduce the damage to roads.

The Stryker APC was deployed in Iraq only after the end of active combat operations, so its ability to sustain a high tempo of attack under difficult climatic conditions remains to be seen in practice. Nevertheless, the high centre of gravity of these relatively heavy vehicles, combined with the crews' lack of experience led to several unfortunate accidents. For example, on 8 and 16 December, 2003, three vehicles were severely damaged when they flipped into a canal, killing three soldiers. At the same time, the wheeled Stryker has an edge over the tanks in terms of speed and minimization of the damage to the urban infrastructure. Integrated C4SI provides enhanced situational awareness and allows the crew to navigate unfamiliar streets and rapidly come to the aid of ambushed comrades.

Conclusions

The examples above show that the Abrams M1 tank, on the whole, failed to live up to its full potential in combat, while the Iraqi resistance was able on several occasions to exploit faults in the vehicle's design. Nevertheless, the Abrams tank proved itself to be a formidable fighting machine with no serious competitor on the battlefield, while losses resulting from combat or technical causes remained within reasonable limits. Accounting for variations in national design, it is likely that other modern MBTs would have performed more or less the same under similar circumstances. It is worth recalling the range of measures proposed by American specialists to enhance the survivability of the Abrams tank under urban conditions: extra smoke grenade launchers along the perimeter of the turret that provide cover from all aspects; extra gun-slaved mount for 7.62 or 12.7 mm calibre machine guns or a 40 mm grenade launcher (CSAMM); improved protection side skirts and engine deck roof; slat armor for the stern; the PDCue computer system of directing to the sound of fire; commander-activated claymore mines on the side skirts for battle against infantry in blind spots; a retractable mast with observation instrumentation; video-camera on the sides and rear, etc. The vast majority of these measures are entirely appropriate for conditions of urban battle.

The Bradley Fighting Machine on the whole performed rather well, though the destruction of several vehicles by anti-tank RPG suggests that in spite of the significant resources devoted to the development of additional anti-hollow charge defences, U.S. engineers have not yet solved the problem of 360-degree protection even from older generations of light anti-tank weapons. The installation of slat armor on the Stryker APC marks a real breakthrough in this regard. This extremely simple design reduced the effectiveness of the older types of light anti-tank weapons by some 200% or more. Several firms, including the Russian Scientific Research Institute of Steel, have developed similar grilles. We can only voice regret over the tardy introduction of such grilles for use in active combat in Chechnya. The Stryker fighting vehicle performed somewhat better than predicted, and undoubtedly confirmed the relevance of wheeled armor. Nevertheless, the incredibly high cost of such vehicles (over 2 million dollars for the basic model) is not matched by military utility. That said, the development of this type of vehicle for Russian procurement and export seems justified.

Operations similar to the current occupation of Iraq require the development of a specialized heavy vehicle that compensates for the deficiencies of the MBT and maximizes its lethality. This machine could sacrifice heavy frontal armor, but in exchange would have 360-degree protection from modern infantry anti-tank weapons. All equipment should fit within the crew compartment. It is essential to increase the number of times a fire-fightingsystem can engage to five or six in place of the two or three currently in place. The vehicle should have a high degree of system redundancy, especially for sighting and target acquisition, and should not have any significant blind spots for scanning and firing. Auxiliary power units should ensure the reliable functioning of all main systems when the vehicle is parked or in case the engine is disabled. The vehicle's firepower should be optimized for battle against both mobile and fixed infantry in the field and in urban conditions. All firepower should be controlled from under armor. It is essential to allow for the substitution of weapons systems of comparable dimensions to satisfy the demands of the customer in accordance with the appropriate standards or for the further optimization of weapons systems to address specific tasks. It would be very good to have a super-close-in anti-personnel armament. This role could be fulfilled by e.g. fragmentation grenades fired from the conventional smoke grenade launchers.The continued use of tracks would appear inevitable, but all possible measures to prevent the destruction of the road surface should be taken, including the use of "rubber-clad tracks."

The combat support vehicle currently under development at the Ural Tank Factory may be a step in the right direction. However the firepower system envisaged for this vehicle, essentially a doubled 30 mm automatic cannon and four ATGMs, is far from ideal, and should be replaced with a 50-60 mm cannon that can fire fragmentation or shrapnel rounds with high explosive fill ratio and preformed subprojectiles. The use of powerful guided missiles to defeat hardened targets is justified, but rather than using common ATGMs, it would clearly be preferable to look towards the development of dedicated assault missiles with reduced range (2-3 km would be sufficient), but with enhanced effectiveness against installations and personnel. The launcher must be protected against 12.7 mm rounds. Such a vehicle would be useful in low intensity conflicts, for patrols and to escort convoys in the context of peacekeeping operations, law enforcement and the battle against armed separatism and international terrorism. Insofar as several nations will evidently need to pursue such missions, the development of such a vehicle would have good prospects for export sales, modernization and subsequent maintenance contracts.

 

[Damian]

The Abrams tank armor system was not really put to the test during military operations in Iraq. There were virtually no reported hits on the highly protected frontal arc or on the "heavy" ballistic skirts; all tank losses to enemy fire were defeated from the top, side and rear. Iraqi soldiers had clearly familiarized themselves with the capabilities of American tanks during operation Desert Storm and avoided engaging them in direct battle. For example, there were no reported cases of anti-tank guide missiles (ATGM) being fired at any US army vehicle. At the same time, Iraqi resistance fighters, whose ranks were bolstered by scores of trained Iraqi soldiers, have clearly learned to exploit the vulnerabilities of the US systems. They managed to destroy up to 20 enemy tanks even with their antiquated light anti-tank weapons, mostly Soviet rocket-propelled grenades such as the RPG-7 or its Chinese and Egyptian variants, with rounds developed in the 1970s-early 1980s. The results of combat operations show that the side armor of the Abrams tank is completely inadequate to fire from light anti-tank weapons, including older generation weapons, making these tanks unsuitable for operations in built-up areas.

For example, in a widely-discussed incident, an M1 tank from the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor Regiment, 1st Armor Division was hit and disabled during a routine patrol on 28 August 2003. The American press, deluded by its own reports of the "invulnerability" of the Abrams, claimed that some kind of "secret weapon" was responsible for the damage. In fact, published photographs clearly show that the offending weapon was none other than a simple RPG. The hollow-charged jet penetrated the side skirt and turret ring and continued into the crew compartment as it disintegrated before finally coming to rest after boring a cluster of craters 30-50 mm deep in the hull on the far side of the tank. The crew was lucky to have suffered only minor shrapnel wounds as the projectile passed through the gunner's seatback and grazed his flak jacket. On April 2, 2003 an RPG attack from the side disabled another tank by penetrating the turret's hydraulic drive.

The side protection of the M1 turret is also inadequate. On 7 April 2004 an anti-tank RPG penetrated the side of the turret resulting in serious wounds to two crew members. The top of the tank is equally vulnerable, and even the glacis was easily defeated by anti-tank weapons. For example, on April 10, 2004 a tank was hit on the right side of the glacis by an RPG fired from an overpass and destroyed. Additional measures designed to increase protection for the Abrams tank have showed mixed results. Halon firefighting gear has proven largely ineffective. Practically all secondary fires resulting from enemy fire, engine breakdown or overheating destroyed the tank completely. For example, the 7 April attack noted above ignited the tanker's personal effects attached to the outside of the turret, and since the crew had abandoned the vehicle, the fire was left unchecked, while on 10 April, fuel leaked out of a damaged fuel tank and ignited. Externally stored items, including on one occasion an external auxiliary power unit (EAPU), caught fire on several occasions and led to catastrophic losses. On the other hand, the vulnerability caused by externally stored items only underlined the wisdom of storing ammunition in a separate compartment protected by blast doors, which contained fires and saved the crew when the main rounds ignited.

Well, frontal armor was hit by RPG-29 and protected vehicle from this, really good anti tank weapon. Also as we see in text, even side or top armor perforations not ended directly with vehicle being destroyed but only damaged, a proof that isolated ammo compartments idea meet expecations. I do not understand glacis plate criticism, it is reather obvious that firing from the overpass, glacis is more exposed to the attacker, and from such hit angle, ~50-80mm armor plate will offer less protection than against fire from ground level.

I agree that many tanks were unnececary losses due to the fact that soldiers just left them after these were disabled, so or they were comsumed by not extuinguished fire, or Iraqis just vandalized them (also putting fire on them).

However in reality, dedicated anti tank weapons were not a threat (serious one) to M1 crews, IED's were, and tank crews had a long time waiting for TUSK kits.

But like its armor protection, the main gun of the Abrams tank, the 120 mm M256 often failed to meet expectations. Firepower problems were exacerbated by an initial reliance on a basic load appropriate for battle against enemy tanks, but not against infantry. High explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds at first made up only 25% of the stowed munitions. This share increased to 60% by the end of combat operations, but the lack of dedicated anti-personnel rounds reduced firepower effectiveness. Other problems, typical of the use of tank guns in urban conditions and against infantry ambushes, also played a role: the extension of the cannon beyond the hull of the tank, significant blind spots along the vertical, especially towards the rear, the gunner's restricted field of vision, etc.

I do not understand how armament not meet expecations? Sometimes Vasily views are mystery to me (and I talk with him sometimes)...

But this is probably preatty old article, from 2003 to 2004/05 so long time before Americans adapted their vehicles and learned how to properly use them in such difficult enviromnment.

 

[Austin]

Article is from 2005 Moscow Defence Brief , so I assume it covers things till 2004 , since you know him you can ask him and let us know what does he think about what he said. Thanks

 

[Damian]

In some points he is more or less correct, in some I will not agree, I also have conversations with well informed people about what happend there and then, and in some points I have a bit different opinion. If I will have time I will ask him.