Indo China War Simulation Thread

[Joe Shearer]

Would you like to form two teams, to handle the Indian side and the Chinese side respectively? These are not one-man efforts.

If we game on present strengths and capabilities, then a horrible defeat for the Indian forces is inevitable. Not much gaming is needed to postulate the PLA creation of a no-fly zone above the battlegrounds, cutting of mountain roads and BRO creations by several heli-borne sabotage teams to isolate the positioned Indian formations from supplies, and then a leisurely movement forward of a full Field Army to attack and to destroy the two isolated locations piece-meal.

Cannot we intervene while this anaconda movement is going on?

Of course.

It involves losing everything north of the Ranikhet-Almora-Pithoragarh line.

 

[Joe Shearer]

@hit&run can be the observer

Maybe. I am no one to ask.

 

[Angel of War]

If we game on present strengths and capabilities, then a horrible defeat for the Indian forces is inevitable.

It depends on what your definition of defeat is and what the chinese view as their war objectives . We can simply call it a victory for ourselves if we manage to deny them their war objective . Sort of like 65 , I consider 65 as an indian victory because we managed to deny the pakistanis their war objective of cutting of the land corridor to Kashmir via akhnoor despite the fact that our advancing forces towards lahore and sialkot were bogged down by pakistani defences , but again , was it our objective to capture lahore and sialkot ? No , it wasn't , we simply wanted to mess up pakistan's Op Grand slam and Op Gibraltar which we did successfully whereas pakistan had to reorganise it's entire forces in the north and divert them to the planes for punjab's defence . Just like that we have to make a clear distinction about china's war objective , that would require alot of critical thinking tho

 

[Joe Shearer]

It depends on what your definition of defeat is and what the chinese view as their war objectives . We can simply call it a victory for ourselves if we manage to deny them their war objective . Sort of like 65 , I consider 65 as an indian victory because we managed to deny the pakistanis their war objective of cutting of the land corridor to Kashmir via akhnoor despite the fact that our advancing forces towards lahore and sialkot were bogged down by pakistani defences , but again , was it our objective to capture lahore and sialkot ? No , it wasn't , we simply wanted to mess up pakistan's Op Grand slam and Op Gibraltar which we did successfully whereas pakistan had to reorganise it's entire forces in the north and divert them to the planes for punjab's defence . Just like that we have to make a clear distinction about china's war objective , that would require alot of critical thinking tho

Your view.

I read it with interest. That does not indicate agreement.

 

[Super Flanker]

India will keep a tit for tat counter strategy , example - they strike us in Depsang. We strike them at chumbi valley

One thing I know about a potential full scale war between India and China is that India will most probably not be the aggressor like I had pointed out in the above post.

 

[hit&run]

@hit&run can be the observer

If am the observer then I will also call for the nuclear strikes.
I will lose whole arsenal on them before getting down.

The threshold of men I am ready to offer is 1 million.

Therefore please set the rules on escalation ladder spectrum. Currently we at street brawl level that is 1 on the scale of 10 at which nukes will start flying.

 

[Joe Shearer]

If am the observer then I will also call for the nuclear strikes.
I will lose whole arsenal on them before getting down.

The threshold of men I am ready to offer is 1 million.

Therefore please set the rules on escalation ladder spectrum. Currently we at street brawl level that is 1 on the scale of 10 at which nukes will start flying.

Perhaps there is a misunderstanding.

The Observer observes; it is through him or directly by posting on the thread that moves are discovered.

However, these are all self-made rules, and whoever wishes to set them has of course every right to do so. There is nothing preventing the Observer from setting the rules of engagement.

Oh, one more thing: either side may confide in the Observer any special features in their order of battle, any peculiarity of their weaponry, and any confidential moves that they might be making, that would not be known to the other side without satellite reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, or observation.

The rule that has been seen to be used is that if a covert move - moving a Group Army to attacking positions on G219, for instance - is not recorded with the Observer, a player cannot suddenly claim that his formation has jumped from Chengdu to Gar Prefecture overnight.

As I said, it is up to the game players and to you to decide how to set about these details.

 

[hit&run]

Perhaps there is a misunderstanding.

The Observer observes; it is through him or directly by posting on the thread that moves are discovered.

However, these are all self-made rules, and whoever wishes to set them has of course every right to do so. There is nothing preventing the Observer from setting the rules of engagement.

Oh, one more thing: either side may confide in the Observer any special features in their order of battle, any peculiarity of their weaponry, and any confidential moves that they might be making, that would not be known to the other side without satellite reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, or observation.

The rule that has been seen to be used is that if a covert move - moving a Group Army to attacking positions on G219, for instance - is not recorded with the Observer, a player cannot suddenly claim that his formation has jumped from Chengdu to Gar Prefecture overnight.

As I said, it is up to the game players and to you to decide how to set about these details.

That was satirical.

I now understand what is being caricatured here.

My premise however was to set the rules on escalation ladder. The tactical indepence can not over rule strategic triggers, this is my understanding.

 

[Jimih]

As it is stated on this thread that a war or intense clash between us and them could take place in 2030, which is 8 years from now.

Hence the simulation should be based on keeping that particular 'period of time'.

So far the simulations posted by members are considered for present day scenarios only.

 

[Joe Shearer]

That was satirical.

I now understand what is being caricatured here.

My premise however was to set the rules on escalation ladder. The tactical indepence can not over rule strategic triggers, this is my understanding.

Indeed, the rules of escalation, and the types and content of an escalated step, may be defined with benefit to all players (and to the Observer and the Umpire!).

As for tactics and strategy, strategy always trumps tactics and grand tactics alike.

It now remains for @mist_consecutive and @Angel of War to propose an Observer (having got his prior consent, naturally), and an Umpire (the tougher job of the two), for the rest of us to dutifully hail the candidates as the bestest available, for two team leaders to take up their preparatory work, or, in keeping with the trend perceivable, to go ahead and shoot and aim, and for general happiness and enthusiasm to break out.

@mist_consecutive
@Angel of War

Will you invoke the spirit of the all powerful who rule this nation, and fix the Observer and Umpire without any more merrymaking before it is time for making merry? Thanks in advance.

 

[Angel of War]

@mokoman @mist_consecutive
@Love Charger Any suggestions as to who should be the umpire ? @hit&run i believe has accepted my proposal to be the observer . I thank him for that

 

[mokoman]

if u search for "war simulation thread" on google , u get this thread

not sure how u can do a war game in a forum thread , that too without maps .

atleast roads / valleys / major bases and a list of what each side has and where .

seem bit too much effort.

 

[Angel of War]

if u search for "war simulation thread" on google , u get this thread

not sure how u can do a war game in a forum thread , that too without maps .

atleast roads / valleys / major bases and a list of what each side has and where .

seem bit too much effort.

everything will be done gradually . All this while we've been trying to give a background to this thread .

 

[Joe Shearer]

if u search for "war simulation thread" on google , u get this thread

not sure how u can do a war game in a forum thread , that too without maps .

atleast roads / valleys / major bases and a list of what each side has and where .

seem bit too much effort.

It was never supposed to have been done on a forum thread. What has been proposed now is a work-around.

 

[SwordOfDarkness]

Indeed, the rules of escalation, and the types and content of an escalated step, may be defined with benefit to all players (and to the Observer and the Umpire!).

As for tactics and strategy, strategy always trumps tactics and grand tactics alike.

It now remains for @mist_consecutive and @Angel of War to propose an Observer (having got his prior consent, naturally), and an Umpire (the tougher job of the two), for the rest of us to dutifully hail the candidates as the bestest available, for two team leaders to take up their preparatory work, or, in keeping with the trend perceivable, to go ahead and shoot and aim, and for general happiness and enthusiasm to break out.

@mist_consecutive
@Angel of War

Will you invoke the spirit of the all powerful who rule this nation, and fix the Observer and Umpire without any more merrymaking before it is time for making merry? Thanks in advance.

I can volunteer as observer.

 

[WARREN SS]

Example (Attack plan)

Objective:- Capture of Zanda County (the awkward gap between Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh, see the map).

Background:- In case of a Chinese offensive in North-Eastern Ladakh capturing the DBO-Depsang axis, or NEFA regions in Arunachal Pradesh, India has to consolidate its position on the diplomatic table by gaining a big bargaining chip.

The Zanda County gap, sandwiched between Himachal Pradesh and South Ladakh states of India, is an extremely remote and under-developed area. This patch of land, around 60 X 30 km in size, is connected to Tibet by two mountain passes (shown in red). If the Indian Army can successfully block these two mountain passes and move in reinforcements, China will have a pretty hard time defending it.

Plan:-

It will be a two-pronged attack (see green arrows), the Sumdo-side offensive will be handled by the 14th Mtn Division, under Central Command, whereas the Demchok-side offensive will be handled by the 6th Mountain Division under Northern Command.

The operation will start with an overnight-air SEAD + DEAD air campaign on the peninsula to seek out and destroy Chinese ADs (which I don't assume to be too many, as that area lacks any SAM site or major military base). Major supply centers, military outposts, and villages will be targeted by artillery overnight.

By early dawn, ~2 battalions of Para airborne will be airdropped on each of the marked mountain passes (red) to capture and hold them. They will be supplemented by artillery and 1x Squadron each of LCH light attack helicopters.

1 Brigade-each of mountain light infantry from the 14th and 6th Mtn Division will move into the peninsula from Sumdo and Demchok, respectively, and should reach + reinforce the mountain passes by evening the same day, sanitizing and remaining Chinese forces.

Once the brigade-sized forces have reached the mountain passes, holding the peninsula should be straightforward, thereafter. Indian Air Force has to maintain air superiority over the peninsula by conducting regular BARCAPs and also maintaining local numerical superiority.

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For a starter, try to counter it @Angel of War @Joe Shearer, submit a defense plan.

Defense Plan (counter-attack)

Objective: Anahilate Indian Positions in Demchok And Maintain a Strategic presence in the area
To nullify Any reinforcement for Indian Attacks on Zanda County


Background: Attack is Launched against positions of Zanda county.In Retaliation to that To Nullify attack
PLA Tibet HQ command ordered to launch counter Offensive on Demchok to Permanently cut it off from Indian territory

Historical relevance of Demchok


The attack on Demchok

In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22.

According to the book, A View from Other Side of the Hill , which used Chinese sources: “The attack was in the form of two pincers aimed to meet at Kariguo , thus cutting off the route of withdrawal from Shiquan River Valley. The 3 B/11 R Group carried out a wide outflanking move on Night 27/28 Oct from Jiagong southwards to Zhaxigang and then turned northwest towards Kariguo behind Demchok. …This was the northern inner pincer. The outer pincer in the North was provided by 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the 4th Division Reconnaissance Company. Since the southern outflanking move by the 3 B/11 R Group was delayed, the trap could not be closed fully. Indian troops were able to withdraw during the Night 27/28 Oct to Koyul and Dungti in fairly good order.”

The Chinese narrative mentions that on October 28: “the Chinese troops had achieved their objectives and had occupied the Kailash Range that dominated the eastern bank of the Indus Valley. All the seven Indian strongholds in this sub-sector were removed and New Demchok itself was captured.”

The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok .

The Indian media often speaks of ‘difference of perceptions’ between India and China on the LAC’; it is the consequence of Chinese advances in Ladakh in the early 1960s as well as during the 1962 War.

The Chinese attack on Demchok in 1962

The two ‘perceptions’ create a dangerous situation with two de facto Lines of Actual Control (LAC). It is not only in Demchok, but in 11 other places, also that India’s and China’s views differ. From north to south, they are: Samar Lungpa north of the Karakoram pass, Trig Heights, Depsang Plain (which saw a serious incident in April 2013), Pt 6556, Chanlung nalla, Kongka La, the ‘fingers’ at Siri Jap near the Pangong Tso, the Spanggur Gap, Mt. Sajun, Dumchele, Demchok and Chumar (which witnessed a massive incursion as President Xi Jinping arrived in India in September 2014).

Dumchele: a Security Risk

Though since 1962, the border is closed, it does not mean that there are no ‘exchanges’ along the LAC.

Not far from Demchok, a place called Dumchele witnesses a good deal of smuggling between Tibet and Ladakh. Local herders visit the shops in Dumchele, which gets its supplies from a Tibetan mart on the other side of the range; the Chinese goods are later clandestinely brought to Leh. While visiting the bazaar in the capital of Ladakh, if you wonder how there are so many Chinese bowls or other cheap stuff, the answer is Dumchele.

An author describes the place thus: “The right bank, just as is the left bank of the Indus, is dotted with scrub and tsama with many grazing grounds. Directly to the east of this lake and just about 4 km away is the large Chinese market of twenty shops of Dumchele, which is actually in Indian territory. About 6 km behind it is the large and spacious shelf of the Chang La (5,300 m) through which the Chinese have built a truckable road to Dumchele.”

Smuggling happens when the Indus freezes in winter. The ‘trade’ has been going on for years on a rather large scale (some say more than 100 crores annually).

In a paper for Research and Information System , Dr Siddiq Wahid writes: “Dumchele has for some years now been a trading post between residents on this side of the LAC and the Chinese side. The PLA has set up a military post at its edge near a hillock and apparently encourages this trade. This is done with some intensity for a few days in late November or early December. I asked Mr. Zangpo [a resident of Nyoma] if he had ever come to the grazing fields of Dumchele during the winter market fair. He replied that he had, although not very regularly. He then told us about some of the items, other than the usual consumer goods, that were traded (smuggled?) at Dumchele during this market festival. He mentioned tiger bones, tiger skins, rhino horns and sandalwood. He said that the Chinese buy these items enthusiastically from the ‘Tibetans’ who bring them there. Mr. Zangpo knew that this was an illegal activity as he was aware that the Ladakh police have been of late very active in stemming this trade and had made several arrests.”

A mart has been opened by the Chinese at a place called Kakzhung; this is regularly supplied by trucks coming from Tibet. From Kakzhung, goods are sent to Dumchele.

From a military point of view, the situation is far from healthy: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can gather intelligence on what is happening on the Indian side; that is why China closes its eyes (or actively encourages) goods trafficking.


To Be Contnd....

 

[mokoman]

Defense Plan (counter-attack)

View attachment 153654

View attachment 153655

View attachment 153660

View attachment 153663

Objective: Anahilate Indian Positions in Demchok And Maintain a Strategic presence in the area
To nullify Any reinforcement for Indian Attacks on Zanda County


Background: Attack is Launched against positions of Zanda county.In Retaliation to that To Nullify attack
PLA Tibet HQ command ordered to launch counter Offensive on Demchok to Permanently cut it off from Indian territory

Historical relevance of Demchok


The attack on Demchok

In October 1962, the Demchok sub-sector was held by the 7 J&K Militia. The PLA launched an attack on October 22.

According to the book, A View from Other Side of the Hill , which used Chinese sources: “The attack was in the form of two pincers aimed to meet at Kariguo , thus cutting off the route of withdrawal from Shiquan River Valley. The 3 B/11 R Group carried out a wide outflanking move on Night 27/28 Oct from Jiagong southwards to Zhaxigang and then turned northwest towards Kariguo behind Demchok. …This was the northern inner pincer. The outer pincer in the North was provided by 3rd Cavalry Regiment and the 4th Division Reconnaissance Company. Since the southern outflanking move by the 3 B/11 R Group was delayed, the trap could not be closed fully. Indian troops were able to withdraw during the Night 27/28 Oct to Koyul and Dungti in fairly good order.”

The Chinese narrative mentions that on October 28: “the Chinese troops had achieved their objectives and had occupied the Kailash Range that dominated the eastern bank of the Indus Valley. All the seven Indian strongholds in this sub-sector were removed and New Demchok itself was captured.”

The PLA eventually withdrew, but occupied the southern part of Demchok .

The Indian media often speaks of ‘difference of perceptions’ between India and China on the LAC’; it is the consequence of Chinese advances in Ladakh in the early 1960s as well as during the 1962 War.

The Chinese attack on Demchok in 1962

The two ‘perceptions’ create a dangerous situation with two de facto Lines of Actual Control (LAC). It is not only in Demchok, but in 11 other places, also that India’s and China’s views differ. From north to south, they are: Samar Lungpa north of the Karakoram pass, Trig Heights, Depsang Plain (which saw a serious incident in April 2013), Pt 6556, Chanlung nalla, Kongka La, the ‘fingers’ at Siri Jap near the Pangong Tso, the Spanggur Gap, Mt. Sajun, Dumchele, Demchok and Chumar (which witnessed a massive incursion as President Xi Jinping arrived in India in September 2014).

Dumchele: a Security Risk

Though since 1962, the border is closed, it does not mean that there are no ‘exchanges’ along the LAC.

Not far from Demchok, a place called Dumchele witnesses a good deal of smuggling between Tibet and Ladakh. Local herders visit the shops in Dumchele, which gets its supplies from a Tibetan mart on the other side of the range; the Chinese goods are later clandestinely brought to Leh. While visiting the bazaar in the capital of Ladakh, if you wonder how there are so many Chinese bowls or other cheap stuff, the answer is Dumchele.

An author describes the place thus: “The right bank, just as is the left bank of the Indus, is dotted with scrub and tsama with many grazing grounds. Directly to the east of this lake and just about 4 km away is the large Chinese market of twenty shops of Dumchele, which is actually in Indian territory. About 6 km behind it is the large and spacious shelf of the Chang La (5,300 m) through which the Chinese have built a truckable road to Dumchele.”

Smuggling happens when the Indus freezes in winter. The ‘trade’ has been going on for years on a rather large scale (some say more than 100 crores annually).

In a paper for Research and Information System , Dr Siddiq Wahid writes: “Dumchele has for some years now been a trading post between residents on this side of the LAC and the Chinese side. The PLA has set up a military post at its edge near a hillock and apparently encourages this trade. This is done with some intensity for a few days in late November or early December. I asked Mr. Zangpo [a resident of Nyoma] if he had ever come to the grazing fields of Dumchele during the winter market fair. He replied that he had, although not very regularly. He then told us about some of the items, other than the usual consumer goods, that were traded (smuggled?) at Dumchele during this market festival. He mentioned tiger bones, tiger skins, rhino horns and sandalwood. He said that the Chinese buy these items enthusiastically from the ‘Tibetans’ who bring them there. Mr. Zangpo knew that this was an illegal activity as he was aware that the Ladakh police have been of late very active in stemming this trade and had made several arrests.”

A mart has been opened by the Chinese at a place called Kakzhung; this is regularly supplied by trucks coming from Tibet. From Kakzhung, goods are sent to Dumchele.

From a military point of view, the situation is far from healthy: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can gather intelligence on what is happening on the Indian side; that is why China closes its eyes (or actively encourages) goods trafficking.


To Be Contnd....

nice.

asan army thinks he can humiliate China .

only China can humiliate china .

i propose cutting chang chenmo valley (bottom yellow line) , little IA troop presence there ,

comming at gogra from C , D ,

and from PLA base push towards galwan valley pp14 (A) , and towards PP15 (E)

we only take length of valley from pp15 upto gogra .

 

[Joe Shearer]

I can volunteer as observer.

I somehow feel that has a degree of support for @hit&run .
He is the front-running candidate, the one to beat if you want to be the one.
You have to persuade @mist_consecutive and @Angel of War

 

[hit&run]

I can volunteer as observer.

Thanks for taking the call. Please resume your duties as an Observer.

Regards.

 

[Angel of War]

I can volunteer as observer.

thank you for volunteering .