India's Look-East Policy - Targets China, says commentator

SHASH2K2

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Details about this would be unknown until the time comes.
I dont think chabahar is for military purpose. It may be used to support Indian operation or assets in Afghanistan. Iran will not allow any other country to interfere militarily. Moreover Indo Iran relationship has deteriorated in recent days due to USA pressure.
 

SHASH2K2

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Chabahar

Chābahār (Persian: چابهار), previously also Bandar Beheshti, is an Iranian city and a free port (Free Trade Zone) on the coast of the Gulf of Oman.

Chabahar is situated on the Makran Coast of the Sistan and Baluchestan province of Iran and is officially designated as a Free Trade and Industrial Zone by Iran's government. Due to its free trade zone status, the city has increased in significance in international trade. The overwhelming majority of the city's inhabitants are ethnic Baluchis speaking the Balochi language.
Contents

* 1 Economic significance
* 2 History and culture
* 3 Chabahar Port a symbol of the new India Iran strategic alliance
* 4 Colleges

Economic significance

Chabahar is the closest and best access point of Iran to the Indian Ocean. For this reason, Chabahar is the focal point of Iran for development of the east of the country through expansion and enhancement of transit routes among countries situated in the northern part of the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. The hope is that with the development of transit routes, and better security and transit services, the benefits will reach the area residents.

Chabahar's economic sectors are fishery industries and commercial sector, fishery sectors with largest amount of country's fish catch, mainly located out of the Chabahar Free Trade-Industrial Zone. Growing commercial sector located at free trade area with high potentiality to turn to a place that would connect business growth centers in south Asia (India) and Middle East (Dubai) to central Asian and Afghanistan market. Government plan to link Chabahar free trade area to Iran's main rail network which is connected to central Asia and Afghanistan would provide more capability for Chabahar to foster faster logistics sector that is a basic to achieve better position comparing to its competitor (Pakistani port of Gwadar)

History and culture

The majority of Chabahar people are Baluchi with tribal Baluchi culture but in recent years, after the establishment of Chabahar free trade zone many people from other parts of Iran immigrated to the city for jobs and better life. The Chabahar Baluchi community is classified as high and low ranked tribes.

Chabahar Port a symbol of the new India Iran strategic alliance

India is helping develop the Chabahar port that would give it access to the oil and gas resources in Iran and the Central Asian states, in this it is competing with the Chinese which is building the Gwadar port, in Pakistani Baluchistan.

Iran plans to use Chabahar for transhipments to Afghanistan and Central Asia while reserving the port of Bandar Abbas as a major hub mainly for trade with Russia and Europe.

India, Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods, heading for Central Asia and Afghanistan, preferential treatment and tariff reductions at Chabahar

Work on the Chabahar-Melak-Zaranj-Dilaram route from Iran to Afghanistan is in progress. Iran is with Indian aid upgrading the Chabahar-Melak road and constructing a bridge on the route to Zaranj. India's BRO is constructing the 213-kilometer Zaranj-Dilaram road. It is a part of its USD 750 million aid package to Afghanistan.

The advantages that Chabahar has compared to Gwadar are the greater political stability and security of the Iranian hinterland and the hositlity and mistrust that the Pakistani Baluchis hold against the Punjabi dominated Pakistani Federal government. The Baluchis consider the Sino-Pak initiative at Gwadar as a strategy from Islamabad to deny the province its deserved share of the development pie. They also look with suspicion on the settlement of more and more non-Baluchis in the port area.

The Chabahar port project is Iran's chance to end its US sponsored economic isolation and benefit form the resurgent Indian economy. Along with Bandar Abbas, Chabahar is the Iranian entrpot on the North - South corridor a strategic partnership between India, Iran and Russia to establish a multi-modal transport link connecting Mumbai with St. Petersburg, providing Europe and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia access to Asia and vice-versa.
http://www.worldlingo.com/ma/enwiki...mbol_of_the_new_India_Iran_strategic_alliance

one more useful link to prove that Its purely commercial project.
http://www.iranexportsmagazine.com/Archive/mag%2097/freezone97.htm
 
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civfanatic

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Any Ideas on what should be Indian strategy in Indian Ocean?
India needs to develop full-fledged military bases in Andaman/Nicobar Islands for both air and naval operations. We should place air assets like Su-30MKIs, AWACS, Jaguar IMs (maritime interdiction), and transport aircraft to ensure our superiority in Bay of Bengal region.

We also need to negotiate with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam for friendly ports that IN can use. If China wants to build a string of pearls, then why don't we build a string of diamonds?
 

SHASH2K2

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India needs to develop full-fledged military bases in Andaman/Nicobar Islands for both air and naval operations. We should place air assets like Su-30MKIs, AWACS, Jaguar IMs (maritime interdiction), and transport aircraft to ensure our superiority in Bay of Bengal region.

We also need to negotiate with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam for friendly ports that IN can use. If China wants to build a string of pearls, then why don't we build a string of diamonds?
We already have good military Infrastructure there and we are improving it further . Andaman will be one of our Stationary Aircraft carrier against Chinese aggression. check earlier articles. We also have policy of Iron curtain against string of pearls.
 

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String of pearl is not just about military bases, but also about Chinese ability and intention to get their bases in foreign soil. While the 'Iron Curtain' may be a good military response, it still doesn't address the fundamental problem, where a lot of the neighbouring countries are willing to harbour an adversary without any fear of consequences from India.
 

SHASH2K2

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String of pearl is not just about military bases, but also about Chinese ability and intention to get their bases in foreign soil. While the 'Iron Curtain' may be a good military response, it still doesn't address the fundamental problem, where a lot of the neighbouring countries are willing to harbour an adversary without any fear of consequences from India.
All Chinese projects except COCO island are non military in nature. We also have good port facility in Iran. we donot need commercial ports in sri lanka or Bangladesh so we are not investing there. we also have listening post in many countries like maldives, seychells to monitor Chinese activity.
Our port in Iran has dealt very big blow to Chinese plans for Gwadar .
 

SHASH2K2

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A different perspective .

The Indian Ocean occupies the center of the world sea power system. In particular, the northern Indian Ocean is the centre of the world's resources politics, which makes it a core objective of competition for world hegemony.

Russia, the US and India are the powers with direct interests in the Indian Ocean and its northern shores, and they have a direct competitive relationship there, while Europe and China have an indirectly competitive relationship. From China's point of view, Indian development on the Indian Ocean is good for China's security.

The more India develops toward the Indian Ocean, the safer China's Tibetan border is. The more influence India has in the area, the better it can contain US power. The Indian Ocean is the heart of Western energy networks and is thus important for the Western powers to control.

Some people in India say that the development of the Indian Navy is aimed at "containing China." This is not true - if it wants to do so, it can just focus on its northern border.

Why should it bother to contain China at the Indian Ocean? If India can contain China on the Indian Ocean, it means that it can also contain other maritime powers, including the US. If the long-range missile launched by India from the Indian Ocean can reach major cities in China, it can also cover major cities in the US or other Western countries.

History shows that India's future security lies in the Indian Ocean. Several US-led wars in the northern regions of the Indian Ocean in the early 21st century show that India's real opponent in the area is the US rather than China.

The most direct threat to India is the US military presence backed by the bases at Diego Garcia, part of the British In-dian Ocean territory, and elsewhere. So the development of Indian strength on the Indian Ocean will first influence the interests of the US and other Western countries rather than those of China.

This is why Russia's main policy toward India is to expand Indian maritime influence. Russia sells large amounts of military equipment, particularly sea combat equipment, to India in order to support its development of sea power.

It should be noted that control of the sea is the lifeblood of US and British national strategy.

In the past, the Soviet Union and the US seemed to clash over Afghanistan in Central Asia, but in fact they were fighting for the sea control power over the Indian Ocean.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Sino-US relations improved on the premise that China had no urgent need to develop on the Pacific while the escalation of conflict between China and the US since the late 1990s is due to China's increasingly urgent demand for sea control power, due to Taiwan question, resource imports and protection of overseas interests, especially in the Western Pacific.

In recent years, India has strengthened relations with Vietnam and its ships have moved into the South China Sea, which was thought to indicate that India has a large "Indian Ocean control strategy."

But it is impossible for India to have the appropriate financial resources to support such a large ocean strategy in a long time. In modern history, only the UK and the US, who dominate the world's resources, have had the capacity to implement such a maritime strategy.

Even if India really implements such a strategy, it will first threaten the US and Western countries, instead of China.

The West has a directly competitive relationship with India in the Indian Ocean and the North Shore region. India will face the same pressure from the US as China in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea.

In this sense, India's maritime expansion is complementary to the reunification of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan and the expansion of Chinese sovereignty in the West Pacific, and will benefit both countries.

http://www.ittefaq.com/issues/2010/07/01/news0657.htm
 

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Last month, delegations from the naval fleets of 14 nations met at the Chinese port of Qingdao to mark the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA-Navy). It was a chummy affair of joint exercises and processions at sea, overseen by white-clad officers in full regalia. In a speech there, Chinese president Hu Jintao trumpeted his country's emergence as a budding maritime power, while assuring foreign observers that China "would never seek hegemony, nor would it turn to arms races with other nations." Instead, Hu claimed, the retooled and expanding Chinese navy would lead the region into "harmonious seas."

But China's cuddly rhetoric has seduced few. In 2008, Beijing's annual military budget increased by almost 20% to $60 billion, according to official figures, though the Pentagon estimates that number could actually be closer to $150 billion. Its most recent report on the PLA warned grimly of China's ability to "develop and field disruptive military technologies" — tactics which the Pentagon thinks will change "regional military balances and... have implications beyond the Asia-Pacific." China's strategic interests now rim most of the world's continents and it remains embroiled in lingering territorial disputes with its neighbors. Though publicly muted, there is growing concern in capitals across the rest of Asia over Beijing's burgeoning pre-eminence. "There's no escaping the fact that, in the past ten years, China's negotiating power has increased while others have weakened," says C. Raja Mohan, a leading Indian foreign policy expert and professor at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School for International Studies. (Read "China's Navy: How Big a Threat to the U.S.?")

In response to China's gains — which include putting out three new submarines a year since 1995 — neighboring countries have also set about beefing up their fleets. Just a week after the ceremonies in Qingdao, Vietnam announced its purchase of six kilo-class submarines from Russia. On May 2, the Australian government published a white paper outlining a twenty year, $74 billion plan to revitalize its navy so it could be ready, if need be, to counter a "major power adversary" — a thinly veiled reference to how some defense officials there imagine China's military project. "The front line of the Cold War may have been in Western Europe," says Andrew Davies, an expert on Asian military modernization at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a Canberra-based think tank. "But a future one could well be drawn through the western Pacific."

A decline in American influence is at the core of the region's changing geo-political landscape. For decades after World War II, the U.S. authored the status quo in Asia's waters, with a series of naval bases from Guam to Japan, and a high-powered presence of marine corps and air-craft carriers to back up its interests with muscle. In 1996, when tensions between China and Taiwan bubbled over into threats of war, Washington was able to check Beijing's aggression by deploying two carrier battle groups off Taiwan's shores. That kind of move is unthinkable now, not just because the US is entangled in costly operations in the Middle East, but because of China's growing stature and military resources. "We were in a period that was essentially unipolar," says Davies. "Now the U.S. and China are going to have to reach some sort of an accommodation."

Other nations in China's neighborhood are not holding their breath. Over the next five years alone, Asian navies will lavish an estimated $60 billion on upgrades and new technologies, outstripping all the combined spending of countries in NATO, excluding the U.S. Apart from China, the top Asian spenders include Japan and South Korea, nations that over the past 40 years relied on American military support to deter the communist states to their west. Now, Japan is due to launch its largest ship since World War II, a "Hyuga" class helicopter carrier — Japan's pacifist constitution forbids the use of carriers with more offensive aircraft — that is designed chiefly for anti-submarine warfare. Seoul paraded a similar 14,000 ton vessel at Qingdao.

Of course, with many Asian countries bound together by their dynamic economies, few analysts expect a full-blown arms race that could disrupt the region's growth. Mike McDevitt, a retired U.S. admiral and director of the strategic studies division at the Center for Naval Analyses in Washington D.C., envisions a more tacit struggle for strategic supremacy, based on stealth and surveillance. "There'll be a capabilities competition between the U.S. and China going on for the foreseeable future," he says, with navies seeking to interfere with rival sea lines of communication, probing maritime borders with deep sea patrols likely involving submarines capable of bearing ballistic missiles.

Two tense standoffs in recent months between American and PLA surveillance vessels near China's southern Hainan island may be an augur of what lies ahead. A new submarine base there gives Beijing a vital edge in the South China Sea, whose waters are contested by five other governments. The disputed Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes, which sit above reserves of natural gas, have been an ongoing bone of contention between China, Taiwan and Vietnam. Further afield, China and India, Asia's other rising giant, are locked in a protracted contest of influence over the Indian Ocean, with China setting up a "string of pearls" — or listening posts — from Burma to Pakistan. New Delhi has stepped up its own military ties with Hanoi in an attempt to keep Beijing busy in its own backyard.

Strategic analysts stress there's nothing wrong with emerging nations like India and China improving their naval prowess to match their heightened role in world affairs. "It is logical that these countries will build navies and project their power," says Raja Mohan. "The question is how does this all get managed?" As of yet, there is no regional treaty alliance in place, no new diplomatic structures like NATO in Europe, for example, that could reflect or bring order to the shifting power lines of the Asian 21st century. Last year, Japanese prime minister Taro Aso floated the idea of an "arch of freedom," a security consensus threading together democracies like India, Japan and Australia, but its obvious anti-Chinese subtext meant the notion gained little traction. "Nobody is going to sign up to an actual containment policy," says McDevitt of the Center for Naval Analyses.

For now, a cloud of uncertainty looms over the shape of things to come. Experts talk of China's maritime rise in the same continuum as that of the British Royal Navy in the days of Victorian empire, and the U.S. fleet during the Cold War. At present, China's naval capabilities are still that of a regional power — its own state planners aim for the PLA to finally have "risen" only in half a century's time. By then, the world could be very a different place. The Chinese navy could act as a stabilizing force — or a source of conflict that threatens its neighbors. "It should not shock us that they're going to be there, out and about," reckons McDevitt. "We might as well get used to it."

Read more: http://www.time.com/time/world/arti...=feed-yahoo-full-nation-related#ixzz0t7CyMP4Y

http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1897871,00.html?xid=feed-yahoo-full-nation-related
 

amoy

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why u want a fear out of yr underdeveloped neighbors? why not give them 'benefits' so that they're willing to orbit around INd.?
 

SHASH2K2

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http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LG09Ad03.html

China flexes its naval muscle
By Peter J Brown

China this week again used the East China Sea as a setting for military maneuvers and exercises that it knew would rattle the United States and its allies. After recently calming Japanese concerns about rising tensions in this area, China shut down all vessel traffic in a large zone off the coast of Zhejiang as the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted a series of live fire drills.

The PLAN engages in such drills each year, and does so in waters considered part of China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). All ships, including US military surveillance ships, are given fair warning to stay clear.

At the same time, because US Navy carriers do not frequent the Yellow Sea for a variety of reasons, China was sending



messages in advance that "national interests could be damaged" if the US proceeds to deploy a US carrier during a joint exercise with the South Korean navy later this summer.

"Under current situations, relevant parties should exercise restraint and refrain from doing things that may escalate tensions and harm the interests of the countries in the region," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang.

Having this floating symbol of US military might deployed so close to China is perceived by Beijing as more than a very unfriendly gesture on the part of the US. Another US aircraft carrier has just passed through the Panama Canal and will soon transit the Pacific Ocean - something else that Beijing must keep in mind.

Simply put, seldom have so many warships been exercising all at once in the Pacific. A large fleet of US and allied warships are engaged in the RIMPAC exercise off Hawaii, and the Russians are conducting a very large exercise in the western Pacific region.
Speculation swirled in the US and elsewhere about the possibility that the PLAN would launch Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM) - known as "carrier killers" - during its East China Sea exercises just north of Taiwan.

Although photographs of the PLAN exercises have appeared, including numerous so-called Type 022 Houbei fast attack craft (FAC) and some of FACs firing YJ-83 missiles, there has been no independent verification of an actual ASBM launch by the PLAN in 2010. [1]

China vigorously denies any connection between its coastal defense exercise and the US carrier. However, the Chinese have engaged in their own spirited discussion about what is unfolding off their coastline, and many Chinese see a distinct connection.

"Though the Chinese government did not say anything about the drill, anybody with common sense on military strategy will bet that they are related," said Shi Yinhong, a senior expert on US studies at Beijing-based Renmin University of China, according to a China Daily report.

Chen Hu, editor-in-chief of Xinhua's World Military magazine, attempted to prod the PLAN into accepting the presence of a US aircraft carrier so close to China as an unusual opportunity to conduct further drills using the US ship as a hypothetical target. [2]

"Chinese naval activities and maritime claims in the Western Pacific have become more assertive," said Tetsuo Kotani, a research fellow at the Tokyo-based Ocean Policy Research Foundation. "The PLA naval exercise was an attempt to check the expected US-ROK exercise in the Yellow Sea, especially the participation of the USS George Washington. In other words, that shows how much China is concerned about the US carrier based in Japan."

Kotani sees no reason why the US should refrain from sending its carrier to the exercise.

"It is totally legitimate under international law. Otherwise, the freedom of action and strategic mobility of the US military would be severely undermined,' said Kotani. "The US should be more assertive, hopefully with the Self-Defense Force. The US and Japan should consider trilateral exercise with ROK, too."

As much as the increasing size and power of the PLAN is a concern for the US-Japan alliance, the PLA's asymmetric warfare capabilities - such as anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-satellite attack capabilities, quieter submarines, sophisticated mines, cyber and info attack capabilities - constitute a much more serious concern.

"The introduction of those asymmetric warfare capabilities can destabilize the balance of power in the region. So Japan needs to join the development of the 'AirSea Battle' concept to further support US forward presence," said Kotani.

The Japanese media's analysis of the situation, at the same time, is reflecting the unease and growing anxiety of the Japanese people over China's "saber-rattling" and attempts to fend off the US. The Chinese government seems to take these attitudes in stride.

"Naval tensions in the region have been high since the March 26 sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan , which has been blamed on a North Korean torpedo attack," the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun declared this month. "China has long considered the Yellow Sea to be its 'backyard' and the dispatch of the aircraft carrier is being characterized as an 'attempt to invade the Yellow Sea using the sinking as a pretext'," according to the Chinese global affairs journal Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times). [3]

According to Yukie Yoshikawa, senior research fellow at the Edwin O Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in Washington, DC, the fact that the Japanese government is remaining rather quiet about the PLAN exercise in the East China Sea is a bit deceiving because both the Japanese government and Japanese people are quite concerned about it.

"The Japanese view it in extension of a series of incidents involving Chinese ships which invaded the Japanese EEZ in April and May," said Yoshikawa. "Since then, the Japanese understand that China is willing to expand its control so as to be able to access the Pacific. Japan happens to be in between which will be a growing concern."

By the way, when Qin made his remarks about the need for restraint, he said nothing about the fact that two PLAN warships from the North China Sea Fleet had once again passed close to Okinawa on their way to the Pacific in early July.

While the PLAN drill is a regularly scheduled event, this year it has happened at the exact time when the US and Japan may be close to resolving the bitter and lengthy argument over the future of the Futenma military base on Okinawa. China may be exploiting the instability of US-Japan relations, and even experimenting to see how far it can go before US and Japan will respond.

"The US and Japan should show China that it has gone far enough and needs to back off. In that sense, terminating the current stalemate was one good sign, and announcing a joint exercise with Korea, though postponed, was another," said Yoshikawa. "But the US should do more, and anything that demonstrates that the US is still committed to the security of Northeast Asia is necessary, including proceeding with the deployment of a US carrier in the joint exercise with Korea."

Yoshikawa also recommends that military-to-military exchanges between the US and China "should be resumed, more seriously, in order to not escalate the situation any further".

In terms of the US military posture in the western Pacific, Yoshikawa supports the status quo.

"The US should be in the picture, since all the neighboring countries have designed and planned their defense structures under the assumption that the US would be stationed in Japan, the ROK," said Yoshikawa. "In order for the US military presence to fade, Japan needs to enhance its military capabilities that are now designed to rely on the US, while discussing arms reduction with China, the ROK, and ASEAN [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations], and making collective agreements on sea-lane defense between Japan and the Middle East. As far as none of this is happening, the US needs to stay."

At the same time, mounting concerns in Japan over China's activities and recent behavior should not be misunderstood as somehow transforming China into some sort of a direct threat to Japan in the eyes of the Japanese.

"The reality is that while Japan cannot overtly say China is a threat because Japan already depends heavily on China economically, Japan has not given enough serious thought to China, nor its future and its military ambitions," said Yoshikawa. "This concern will be expressed more indirectly as 'the US military role is and continues to be important to Japan', rather than saying 'China is a threat, so we need to team with the US to contain China'. This is a lesson from former Japanese prime minister Junichiri Koizumi's time in office."

Russia's presence cannot go unmentioned. Despite the intense focus on the PLAN and the whereabouts of a US aircraft carrier, Russia quietly assembled several warships in the Sea of Japan from its North, Black Sea and Pacific fleets in order to conduct its largest naval exercise in many years. With Russian President Dmitry Medvedev looking on, Russian battle cruisers and destroyers that had arrived in the region weeks earlier fired anti-ship missiles over long distances, and performed other anti-carrier maneuvers in the Sea of Okhotsk earlier this month.

In doing so, Russia is sending a strong signal to both China and Japan.

"It is hardly surprising that such exercises are conducted on the Pacific theater of war, as this region is and will remain one of the most conflict-prone areas for Russia in the next 20-30 years," said RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik. "Russian-Japanese disagreements over the disputed South Kuril archipelago, called the 'Northern Territories' by Tokyo, and Russia's proximity to a powerful China prompt Moscow to find new ways to defend its Far East possessions in the event of a hypothetical conflict." [4]

Amid all the talk about exercises and China's rapidly improving naval capabilities, the US Navy is raising questions about its own state of readiness. Navy Times obtained a copy of the long-awaited report prepared by a US Navy panel headed by retired Vice Admiral Phillip Balisle about the questionable condition of some of the US Navy's Aegis-equipped warships.

The findings of the Balisle panel are considered a wakeup call in terms of the US Navy's important and expanding anti-missile mission. In a nutshell, the report identified numerous serious problems including a lack of adequately trained and experienced personnel, degraded radar operations on numerous ships, the presence of a failure to understand the importance of strong, reliable and consistent system performance. [5]

This report will be required reading to many, given the fact that AEGIS-equipped warships are vital components in the ballistic missile defense networks now in place in the US, Japan and soon Europe. In light of the looming ASBM threat in particular, the dependence of US aircraft carriers upon the anti-missile screen provided by these ultra-high-tech warships is only going to increase.
 

SHASH2K2

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why u want a fear out of yr underdeveloped neighbors? why not give them 'benefits' so that they're willing to orbit around INd.?
We donot have any Intention to instill fear among our neighours. Its your string of pearls that forcing us to act with policy of Iron curtain. Why dont you guys let us live in peace.
 
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SHASH2K2

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Later this week, a flotilla of Indian warships will complete a month-long deployment to the Pacific that included visits to Australia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. Such an event may be surprising to some, because India is rarely considered a major Asia-Pacific power. However, over the past 18 years, New Delhi has made a concerted effort to direct its foreign, economic and military policies eastward. If the country stays on this course, it could become an important force for regional economic and security stability.

India's eastward focus began in the economic sphere in 1991 with attempts to link its own liberalizing economy to the dynamic "tigers" of South-East Asia. This process has been slow and sometimes halting. But two decades on, India is set to ink a free trade agreement with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations that will link 1.6 billion people with a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of $1.5 trillion by 2012.

These economic linkages are leading to military cooperation with countries such as Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia. Those governments see India as, in the words of Singaporean minister-mentor Lee Kuan Yew, "a useful balance to China's heft". This is all the more important as the Barack Obama administration appears to be paying less attention to Asia even as China is increasingly asserting itself.

India already possesses the world's fifth largest navy and Asia's only operational aircraft carrier. Having introduced its first indigenously constructed nuclear submarine last year, the navy is in the process of acquiring a number of new diesel-electric submarines and surface vessels, as well as three aircraft carriers that will house the most advanced maritime strike aircraft in the region.

New naval facilities constructed in India's eastern island chains, roughly 500 miles from the mouth of the Straits of Malacca, will facilitate its power projection into the Pacific. The navy has been conducting joint exercises with other South-East Asian countries for years. These drills run the gamut, from annual training with the Singaporean navy on anti-submarine warfare and advanced naval combat to the manoeuvres with both Indonesia and Thailand emphasizing coordinated anti-piracy exercises in the Straits of Malacca.

Now India is extending its influence beyond South-East Asia. Shared concerns over the Beijing-Islamabad- Pyongyang nuclear proliferation axis led to a "long-term cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity" with South Korea, which includes a free trade pact, bilateral security cooperation and agreements on joint defence production.

More significant is India's strategic partnership with Japan, founded on a shared desire to see a peaceful multipolar Asia based on democratic values. The two countries will sign a free trade agreement later this year and have already institutionalized defence cooperation, high-level military exchanges and joint naval exercises in both the Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan.

And though Australia's ties with India have cooled somewhat under Sinophile Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, a 2009 strategic partnership between the two nations pledges "policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia region", which is a euphemism for shared concerns over China's growing power.

India's increasing role in the Asia-Pacific has been firmly supported by the US. Since 2001, the US and India have conducted at least 40 joint military exercises, including one of the largest multilateral naval exercises ever held in the region, Malabar 2007, which featured three aircraft carriers, 28 surface vessels and 150 aircraft from India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore. A 10-year Indo-US defence pact signed in June 2005 deepened intelligence sharing, military technology transfers, missile defence collaboration and arms sales.

The question for New Delhi will be how best to leverage this progress for additional security and improved relations throughout the region. Though India's "Look East" policy has clearly met with success, there are many in India who still fail to acknowledge the vital role it is poised to play in Asia. The ability of countries in the region to partner effectively with India would be enhanced significantly, were New Delhi to define more concretely its vision for the country's broader role in Asia.

India's partners also will need to learn how to work with the rising regional power. It will be critical to understand that India is not seeking to be a junior partner in an anti-China coalition, but is pursuing its own interests as an emerging power. Heartache will result if policymakers, especially in the US, attempt to force India into a familiar mould such as the US-Britain "special relationship". Instead, the US should champion India's robust participation in key regional economic and political institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group and the Asean Regional Forum.

The Obama administration to date has placed a higher priority on strengthening its ties with Beijing than on pursuing the closer relationship with India initiated during the Bush years. That may be changing. President Obama himself recently said that the US-India relationship is the "indispensable partnership of the 21st century". Now it's time to partner more effectively with India in practice.
http://www.livemint.com/2010/06/10212045/India-sets-sail-for-a-bigger-r.html
 

Ray

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It is time for India to assert itself on its own rather than worrying if Obama is paying attention to Asia or not.

Did China care as to who thought what about them?

They took off on their own and are moving like uncontrolled Scud Missiles!
 

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I dnot think that we are dependent on America . We are trying the best we could to secure Indian Ocean. Moreover when it come to access to new technology we are getting some help from USA . I donot see any harm in it . Atleast we are not trying to steal technologies the way our big neighbour is doing .
 

Ray

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I think I could not explain myself.

What I implied is that we cannot legislate what the US or any other country decides to do. I meant that we cannot force them to do what is beneficial for us, for after all, they will look after their national interests and not ours. At best, we can tell them of our sensitivities and encourage them to see as much as feasible towards our point of view.

Likewise, India should have foreign policy goals and work towards on their own and co-opt other nations wherever it is feasible and not get unnecessarily worried if the friendly countries follow some line that is not totally towards our interests.

For instance, our Look East policy. It worked well and then cooled off. While we must build bridges with the US, we must also ensure we are on very friendly terms with the SE Asian countries, notwithstanding what is the relationship the US or any other friendly countries have with such countries.
 

SHASH2K2

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This is unique since the great powers in history such as France, Germany, Japan, and
the Soviet Union had either been a continental or a naval power. This had restricted
these countries to have constrains in maneuvering in International Strategic circle.

However, India is not single country in this. China is equally considered a naval and a
continental power and it wants to get its strategic depth with the capture of Taiwan.

Further, China wishes to expand itself by claiming rights in the South China Sea.
While, there is a feeling in China that India could rival its supremacy in the oceans
and so particularly in the Indian Ocean. It has started to adopt a strategy of "String
of Pearl" which infers to build bases around India and encircle it like a string.

China started this with building deep sea portion the southern coast of Sri Lanka,
ten miles from one of the world's busiest shipping routes; a vast construction site is
engulfing the once sleepy fishing town of Hambantota.

Second, China has helped Pakistan to build a deep sea port in the town of Gadara in
Baluchistan. On the other hand, China has started to court the littoral states in the
Indian Ocean such as Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles and helped them with funds
to boost their economy. In return, China wishes to allow its bases to be stationed in
these littoral states.

China's strategy is simple. It doesn't want Indian Ocean to be India's Ocean as it
understands that the centre stage for the 21st century lies not in the Atlantic or the
Pacific Ocean but in the Indian Ocean.

Though with its useful slumber ness, Indian government has understood Chinese
strategy of late. To counter this Indian government has embarked the policy of Naval
Diplomacy. Before that Indian government has strengthened itself by having a tri-
command service in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Secondly, it has also started
to court those littoral states such as Maldives which could be of strategic importance
to India.

As a part of the strategy, India is sending its naval officers on a routine trip to these
countries. There are regular exchanges at the naval officer's level.

Traditionally, all great powers that aspired to control the Indian Ocean have sought
a base in the Maldives – Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States,
and the Soviet Union. The southern most island of the Maldives, the Gan Island
in the Seenu Atoll, served as a base for the British Royal Navy during World War
II. Gan met the requirements for safe, deep anchorage in a strategic area.

In addition to Gan, Antsiranana (Diego-Suarez), Diego Garcia, Aldabra and Farquhar
islands and ÃŽle Desroches in Seychelles are other important strategic locations in
the Western Indian Ocean. These are the vital choke points in the Indian Ocean.
The Naval Base in Gan was set up by Britain in response to Japanese advances
against Singapore and Indonesia during World War II. During the Cold War, in 1957,
it was transferred to the British Royal Air Force (RAF). The RAF vacated it in 1971
after Maldives gained independence in 1965.

Following the British departure, the Shah of Iran, Mohammed Gadaffi of Libya, and the Soviet Union all tried to secure the Gan Island base to counter the US military presence in Diego Garcia.

The network of radars that India will be installing in the Maldives is chiefly to benefit
the island nation which does not have a Navy of its own. During discussions, the
Maldivian authorities had expressed concerns over the "crucial tasks of safeguarding
and protecting their vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Maldives, while
expressing its need to develop and enhance maritime surveillance and aerial mobility
capabilities." Maldivian President, Mohammed Nasheed has said that the installation
of the radars was already in progress across 10 atolls.

On the other hand, talks are on to send the Naval officers who have acquaintance
in diplomacy to these countries as Ambassadors or High Commissioners. One such
classic example is that of sending former Admiral Suresh Mehta to far way New
Zealand as a High Commissioner. Suresh Mehta will ensure that India's strategic
concerns are fulfilled even in the far way Pacific Ocean that includes courting the
littoral states in the South Pacific where China has started to court countries such as
Fiji, Vanatalu, and Cook Islands.

Finally, Indian government has understood the need to counter China's rise in the
oceans around the world, if it has any chance to push itself as a great power beyond
South Asia.

However, the first step in that direction will to be have Indian embassy and High
Commission in many of these countries where Indian presence is far too less. That
will do a lot of favor to the Naval Diplomacy.
http://internationalreporter.com/News-5964/india-counters-china%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%9Cstring-of-pearls%E2%80%9D-through-naval-diplomacy.html
 

SHASH2K2

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Small contentious issues in history are harbingers that tend to shape the larger power plays between nations. The naked truth in international affairs as articulated by strategist Paul Kennedy, is that India and China are two rising military and economic powers who will cooperate with each other for trade, and in competition for the same markets and influence, in the coming decades. Such countries are dubbed 'competitive friendly enemies'. China is India's largest trading partner, and has entered the Indian Ocean region with its PLA Navy via anti piracy patrols. It has also planted its footprint in India's neighbourhood and Africa, with its chequebook diplomacy. Pakistan and China are proclaimed all weather friends, and China has built the deep-water port at Gwadar, and plans to transfer military supplies and nuclear plants to Pakistan.

Recent incidents at the naval encirclement of India, at Hambantota and Gwadar, and possibly Bangladesh, dubbed as China's 'string of pearls,' put an end to the rapidly improving relations with India. China dismissed the theory, arguing that India built ports with ADB and World Bank loans, which some developing countries find difficult to obtain. China's naval analyst, Zhang Ming, contends that India's Andaman and Nicobar islands could be used as a 'metal chain' to block Chinese access to the Straits of Malacca, known as China's 'Malacca Dilemma' and argues India is building an 'Iron Curtain' with its influence in the Indian Ocean islands, and ganging up with US on a defense framework. During the Second World War the Japanese built airfields in the Andaman Islands, and China worries that India could emulate this strategy, as well.

Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, had predicted that nations with geography and population would gain ascendancy in the 21st century. He juxtaposed it with maritime strategist Mahan's prediction that the future may well be decided on the waters of the Indian Ocean. The first signals came when India and China clashed in Bahrain on 2 June 2010, at the monthly SHADE (Shared Awareness and De confliction) anti-piracy conference jointly chaired by the EU and US-led Combined Maritime Force. India stalled China's bid for co-chairmanship. All 18 naval delegates, Interpol, and shipping reps around the table which have ships deployed and interests for anti piracy patrols in the Horn of Aden, supported China's long standing bid, but the Indian delegate, Deepak Bisht, was the lone objector. He stated that before China takes the chair, the terms of the reference of chairmanship of SHADE needed to be laid down. Senior Col, Zhou Bo PLA(N), was taken aback.

A visibly surprised Chairman, Cmde Adrain Vander Linde, the EU Task Force Commodore from the Netherlands, asked if India wished to bid for a rotating chair. Only then, would a subcommittee attempt the terms of reference. India's delegate contented, India would consider the option to chair only if India knew the terms, and this upturned China's bid, which was accepted at the last meeting. Murmurs round the table were heard, as this writer was present with Foreign Service reps in the audience. India had successfully blocked China on this minor issue.

Currently the IMO has marked a 400-mile International Recognised Transit Corridor (IRTC) off Aden for the safe transit of ships to and from the Red Sea. Indian Navy's single ship deployment on patrol since 2008 (presently INS Bhahmaputra) has successfully escorted 1,000 Indian and other flagged ships, and INS Brahmaputra is on station. The Navy promulgates the convoy schedule through India's DG Shipping, as on 2 June, 17 ships were in captivity in Somali waters. Russia plans to replace the Udaloy-class guided-missile destroyer Marshal Shaposhnikov that stormed and rescued MV Moscow University by Admiral Levchenko Neustrashimy and Yaroslav Mudry. Dutch Defence Minister, Eimert van Middelkoop, announced its Navy will deploy a submarine in the area and Singapore has increased its patrol strength with two Puma helicopters.

Unwritten in China's bid is an attempt to break up the 400-mile IRTC into patches, and allocate it to national navies amounting to parcelling the Indian Ocean. China could stipulate Chairmanship criteria to make number of ships multiplied by hours on patrol to count and India may not qualify with one ship on patrol.

The Chinese and Indian swords are sheathed for the time being, but India has to be prepared for the Pearls versus the Iron Curtain competition. India has banned Chinese firms from partaking in projects and placed restrictions on Huawei, which has supplied communications gear to India's mobile operators. India has geography and a large young population on its side and will have to cope with the meteoric rise of China. It has been said, 'India is like boiling water, steam and froth on top but rather calm below'. 'China is like boiling oil, calm above but violent and seething below.' If an eruption does take place in one nation, it could be violent. The jury is out whether the Chinese top down approach will prevail over India's rather slower and democratic bottom-up approach. But the competition for influence in the Indian Ocean region has begun.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006294052/india-checkmates-chinese-moves.html
 

SHASH2K2

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India 'Looks East' as history
July 17th, 2010
Author: Sandy Gordon, ANU

India's Look East policy was initiated out of failure: the failure of India's Cold War strategy of 'playing both ends against the middle' while at the same time attempting to adopt a pro-Soviet 'tilt'; and the failure of India's command economy, which by 1990 had managed to command only 0.4 per cent of world trade – insufficient to cushion India from the 1989-90 oil shock. While the collapse of the Soviet Union was no fault of India, it left New Delhi searching for an alternative set of economic and strategic approaches. The 'Look East' policy seemed to fit both needs.



India, however, initially had a hard job to claw its way back into those parts of Asia to its east. ASEAN itself was borne out of concern about an encroaching communist bloc and tempered in the fires of the Vietnam War. It viewed India's still clunky economy and former Soviet bloc 'tilt' with suspicion.

India also took some time to learn Asian diplomatic mores. In 1994, in a major address in Singapore, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao expressed surprise at the title of the speech he had been given – India's 'new' relationship with Asia. Rao pointed out India's influence in Asia was hardly 'new' – indeed Indian religion and culture lay at the heart of today's South East Asia. True enough, but to miss the point from ASEAN's perspective. The ASEANs were a bunch of hard-nosed pragmatists intent on getting on with the job – and the job was making money and development.

Of course, ASEAN was only part of India's Look East policy. Vietnam and Burma had not yet jointed the Association. India had a friendship with the first and was already rivals with China over the second. And Japan was being eyed off as a source of technology and Direct Foreign Investment as early as the birth Sanjay Gandhi's 'Indian' Maruti in 1981 – which was, of course nothing more than a semi-knock kit of a Suzuki.

But in Asia – and especially ASEAN – nothing succeeds like success. ASEAN only really sat up and took notice of India once the latter appeared (before the GFC) to be locked into 8-9 per cent growth, a pattern now seemingly to have resumed. India is now much more highly regarded in ASEAN than in the 1990s. It is part of the ARF, ASEM and the EAS. Not yet in APEC, it has good prospects there too. It has extensive defence dealings with Singapore, Australia and Japan and defence relationships with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam.

Yet for all this recent success, the India-ASEAN Free Trade Association was extremely hard-won. India's farmers were committing suicide at unprecedented levels over supposedly unbridled agricultural imports caused by globalisation. The FTA, when it finally emerged in 2009, was not only intensely criticised in India but also highly protective of Indian agriculture, especially edible oils. It took over six years to negotiate and will not be fully implemented for non-sensitive goods till 2016 (later for poorer countries, and India).

Moreover, ironically, at the very time India has gained significant traction in ASEAN and other East Asian forums, those venues are being overshadowed by larger, and some would say ominous, regional developments. ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN plus 3, the EAS and even APEC are no longer the only games in town – if they ever were.

Increasingly the debate has devolved onto the growing strategic, diplomatic and financial critical mass of China. Kevin Rudd saw this early on and tried to hone Asian security architecture to accommodate a rising China and provide it with a forum to be, if not first among equals, then equal among equals. The profound implication of this purpose was that all major powers should be part of that architecture, not least India.

Increasingly, however, it looks as if the horses have fled from this particular stable. Rudd lost interest in his Asian architecture in favour of the G20 –perhaps correctly in the context of the GFC – but nonetheless unfortunately. More importantly, the rise of China and to a lesser extent India has 'gone around the edges' of existing Asian architecture. Not that architecture is irrelevant in the debate about rising China, but rather that any architecture that might evolve is likely to provide a venue for other systems of power relations such as a 'concert of powers' or 'power balancing' rather than critically shaping those systems.

This de-emphasising of security architecture leaves us with a different kind of debate and, potentially, a different kind of role for India.

Initially at least, it looks as if China holds the key. How China chooses to rise to power in Asia will be the seminal factor in the future of Asian security. And further, how Sino-US relations unfold – especially in the Asian context – will be seminal to the process of how China rises.

India is definitely there in the equation but not till some way down the track. Meanwhile, it is the Sino-US relationship that will define the character of China's rise more than any other single factor excepting, of course, the innate character of the Chinese polity.

So where does India fit?

The US knows it will lose power in Asia and even globally to China over the longer-term. Hence the 'strategic' quality of the India-US relationship, the fact that the Indo-US deal nuclear deal was intended above all to enable the US to provide strategic military assistance (read hi-tech weapons) to India, and that Washington remains unabashed that its intention is to build India over this century as a major strategic factor in Asia. Read for this, traditional power balancing against China.

At the moment India is especially weak vis à vis China. China can play virtually at will in India's South Asian backyard . For all India's economic success, the Chinese economy and its defence spending are still growing more rapidly. That is to say, a China that is already far more powerful than India is actually pulling away.

China's great long-term enemy is, of course demography. Not only will India be larger by 2030 but more significantly, it will have a higher proportion of young people than China. But to take advantage, it needs to set in place labour and infrastructure policies to position it to become the new labour-intensive workshop of the world. And despite India's long-term demographic advantage, China may well 'do a Japan' and use its enormous capital reserves to substitute for labour.

While Sino-US relations will initially hold the key, Sino-Indian relations will emerge as increasingly important as India gains in strength, increasing the prospect of an emerging 'strategic triangle' between China, the US and India. At present, the US and India each uses the other as a 'hedge' against a difficult rise for China in Asia. Thus what may one day become a 'strategic triangle' cannot yet be accorded that label.

Such a negative prospect depends both on how Sino-US and Sino-Indian relations develop. In terms of the Sino-Indian relationship, the most favourable term that could be used is 'ambiguous'. On the negative side, China has changed its position in relation to the border issue – now resolutely sticking to its claim to Arunachal Pradesh, populated with 1.1 million Indians, located below the strategic barrier of the Himalayas and source of much of the water of Bangladesh and India's north east. China is actively involved in the South Asian countries surrounding India, which is Beijing's way of hedging against the possibility its vital energy SLOCs might one day come under pressure in time of high tension or conflict.

This is profoundly unsettling for India, whatever it may say publicly about blossoming people-to-people relations and trade – the positive side of the ledger. Anyway, trade is a double-edged sword for India, with India being heavily in deficit in the US $57 billion trade.

Seen in this light, there is a depressing prospect of a slide from the idea of a 'concert of powers' in Asia to traditional power balancing. Were this to occur (and virtually nobody, including the key players, would want it to happen), **** Cheney's 'Quadrilateral' could actually be revived as a strategic entity.

Certainly, New Delhi would rather India were part of a concert of powers in Asia. Although India will continue to get what it can from the US and Israel on hi-tech such as space, computation and anti-ballistic missile technologies, New Delhi believes India is too large ever to be any other country's ally. India will also seek to have a range of relations with other large powers, including Russia, the EU, Japan and China. It avidly seeks to engage more successfully in resources competition in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

But in either case – that of a concert of powers or of power balancing – it seems that The 'Look East' policy may retreat to a moment in history – a moment when a tentative India was feeling its way, a relationship on the rebound, as it were.

That is not to say, of course, that South East Asia will not remain extremely important to India in the strategic and to a lesser extent the economic spheres. In the strategic context, the two share interests and responsibilities in the North East Indian Ocean – a region beset by non-conventional security challenges. India has a growing role in the Andaman Sea and is expanding its naval capacities centred on Port Blair. ASEAN also has important responsibilities for security in the Straits of Malacca.

It is to say, rather, that South East Asia will be only one of many regions of importance to a rising, global power such as India.
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/07/17/india-looks-east-as-history/
 

SHASH2K2

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India to provide aircraft to Seychelles

India to provide aircraft to Seychelles
Monday, July 19, 2010
By Saurabh Joshi

The Indian Defense Minister AK Antony, on Monday, agreed to provide three aircraft to Seychelles on its request. An Indian Ministry of Defense statement said, "On a specific request from the Seychelles, Mr. Antony agreed to provide one new Dornier and two Chetak helicopters from the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited for maritime surveillance, at the earliest." The statement quoted him as saying that although delivery would normally take 18 to 24 months, New Delhi would try to provide the aircraft in 15 months. In the meantime, India is to provide an in-service Dornier Aircraft to carry out maritime surveillance. This comes after Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh committed $ 5 million assistance to Seychelles for defense-related projects during the visit of Seychellois President James Alix Michel to India earlier.

Antony met President Michel, Vice President Danny Faure, the Minister for Home Affairs Joel Morgan and Foreign Minister Jean Paul Adam in Mahe, while leading a delegation comprising Defense Secretary Pradeep Kumar and the Vice Chief of Naval Staff Vice Admiral DK Dewan.

India also agreed to extend help for maritime and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surveillance operations and capacity building of Seychellois forces to tackle the spread of piracy in the Indian Ocean region . Antony said India would help the Seychelles carry out EEZ surveillance as frequently as possible, with additional Indian naval visits this year, to conduct surveillance and hydrographic surveys. Seychellois personnel would be invited to embark Indian vessels for maintenance training and drills.

While the Seychelles has accepted the assistance of the United Nations to set up courts to try alleged pirates, India has not so far offered specific assistance in this regard. The Indian Navy and the Ministry of Defense have mooted draft legislation to amend the Indian Penal Code to include piracy as a separate offense, enabling courts in India, such as the Maritime Bench of the Mumbai High Court to try suspected pirates, also signaling a willingness to take on responsibility for investigation and prosecution of such offenses. The draft is currently under consideration by the Indian Law Ministry.

The US Africa Command (AFRICOM) had decided to base MQ-9 Reaper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the Seychelles last year, in addition to deploying P-3 Orion aircraft for anti-piracy operations. The Indian announcements are in line with policies meant to ensure that its engagement with the littoral nations of the Indian Ocean precludes any significant growth of the presence of any other power. For instance, the Indian Navy had provided sea-front security to the capital of Mozambique, Maputo, during international events there in 2003 and 2005, and has also offered assistance to other nations.http://www.stratpost.com/india-to-provide-aircraft-to-seychelles
 

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