Bosch
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India's first line of defence - RAW
- Thread starter Bosch
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Jameson Emoni
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Sekhar Dupatta has been making right noises lately. Any idea why?
Assassin 2.0
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trying to adjust with the mainstream so that narrative he builds stays valid instead of getting ignored
he is a snake funded by hardcore liberals and from US too i guess
he will bite but slowly
sorcerer
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Two yrs before 1971 war, RAW’s RN Kao told Indira Gandhi to be ready for Pakistan partition
Despite a domestic national election at home, Delhi was fully cognizant of the dramatic internal crisis in Pakistan’s body politic. There is also evidence to suggest that some of the ingredients of an interventionist strategy might have already been in place before events in East Pakistan exploded. Internal communications reveal two competing images. One image was represented by R.N. Kao, Chief of R&AW and Indira Gandhi’s trusted confidante, who perceived the crisis in more ominous terms and advocated an advantageous realpolitik to exploit Pakistan’s internal fissures. A second image was represented by sections in the MEA, who perceived the crisis in more benign terms and advocated a non-interventionist posture. Interestingly, as early as 1969, Kao had been arguing that East Pakistan was poised for deeper turmoil and possible secession and that India ‘should be prepared for it’. And his perceptions got stronger as the crisis came closer. In an April 1969 intelligence cable, he had foreseen an impending crisis across the border:
The authorities would have to resort to large-scale use of the Army and other paramilitary forces in East Pakistan to curb a movement, which has already gained considerable strength. The use of force is likely, in turn, to lead to a situation where the people of East Pakistan, supported by elements of the East Bengal Rifles (who are known to be sympathetic towards the secessionist movement as evidenced from the recent East Pakistan Conspiracy Case), may rise in revolt against the Central Authority and even declare their independence … although this possibility may not be immediate at present, it would be desirable that the Government of India should think about the policy it should adopt in such an eventuality and keep its options open.
Kao’s implied advice to exploit a crisis should it arise seems to fit comfortably with Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role. In contrast, the higher levels of the MEA were taking a more conservative view. Senior officials argued that Pakistan’s unity was in India’s interest, and hoped that the Awami League would emerge as the dominant political voice of a unified Pakistan, which in turn would change Pakistan’s external behaviour towards India. A classic exposition of this view was reflected in India’s then high commissioner to Islamabad, Krishna Acharya, who cabled Delhi on 2 December 1970 shortly after elections had been held in Pakistan. Given the relentless hostility of a West Pakistani-dominated government, Acharya argued that majority control of the National Assembly by the Bengalis seemed ‘to be our only hope for achieving our policy objectives towards Pakistan and overcoming this stonewall resistance of West Pakistan’. And, ‘in order that this hope may become a reality, however, it is essential that Pakistan (with its East Pakistan majority) should remain one, so that we may pursue our policy objectives through the leaders of East Pakistan’.
Not only did the Indian envoy espouse the virtues of Pakistani unity, albeit reformed under the influence of moderate Bengalis, he underscored the grave dangers and geopolitical risks of an independent Bangladesh, which might demand unity with India’s adjacent province of West Bengal, and that such a united Bengal was likely to come under the influence of pro-China Naxalites. Acharya warned that India’s ‘strategic and defence problems will be multiplied manifold’ by a breakup of Pakistan. Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul also felt ‘that India should do nothing to encourage the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan but he added that it did not lie in India’s hands to stop it’. Sections of the mainstream media too favoured non-interference. For example, Girilal Jain, a leading journalist, suggested that ‘two propositions—a declaration of interest in Pakistan’s unity and an attempt to persuade the two superpowers not to interfere in its affairs’—could serve as policy guidelines as they did for Nehru.
The above belief from the MEA was a more passive and conservative outlook compared to Kao’s strategic activism, and arguably more consistent with Nehru’s conflict avoidance images. These two competing worldviews again reflected in a 6 January 1971 inter-agency meeting attended by senior MEA and R&AW officials. Kao argued that Bengali national aspirations had deep roots and were at a point of no return, with neither the Awami League nor West Pakistani leaders likely to find common ground after the League’s extraordinary electoral success. The Pakistan Army, moreover, would reject a fundamental change in Pakistani politics and would attempt to re-seize control of the situation. Kao defined the policy problem, as he had suggested in 1969: that India should prepare itself for the succession of East Bengal and develop a capacity to assist the liberation movement to achieve early success.
Kao was supported in this assessment by an MEA official, Asoke Ray, who concurred that a secessionist movement would advance India’s interests. This policy option was challenged by Acharya and another senior diplomat, S.K. Banerji, who argued that succession was not a foregone conclusion, and the Pakistani system’s ability to find a rational arrangement that preserved a unified state could not be ruled out. Why is it that the same material situation was being perceived by two such contrasting perspectives? It appears that Nehru’s core images regarding conflict avoidance and a reluctance to disturb the geopolitical status quo in the subcontinent were still strong in sections of the MEA. These officials perceived and defined events with an eye on stability and tension reduction as Nehru had done in the first East Bengal crisis in 1950. The competing images, embodied by Kao and Ray, were more consistent with Indira Gandhi’s beliefs, where the impulse to reshape the subcontinent’s order, coercively if necessary, was a natural reaction to Pakistan’s domestic problems.
Also read: New book claims Indira Gandhi wanted to recapture Pak-occupied Kashmir after 1971 war
By mid-January 1971, Kao’s perceptions were growing stronger and finding resonance with his colleagues at the apex. In a 14 January assessment, he noted that ‘hard liners’ in the military, the ‘privileged bureaucrats’, and ‘feudal interests’ might exert pressure on General Yahya Khan, the President and Army Chief, to try and reverse the trend towards the transfer of power to the Awami League. However, the Bengalis ‘and even some sections of the people in the Western Wing, would not be hoodwinked by such tactics’. Kao also highlighted the possibility of a diversionary military move by Pakistan in the form of ‘an infiltration campaign into J&K’ to deflect attention from its internal problems. P.N. Haksar too had recorded his uneasiness about Pakistan. The Awami League’s victory had complicated Pakistan’s internal problems and ‘the temptation’ for ‘external adventures’ had become greater. He advised the Prime Minister to instruct the Service Chiefs for an urgent military assessment including ‘recommendations of what the requirements of each of the Services are so that we can feel a sense of security’.
Meanwhile, events on the ground were confirming Kao’s hypothesis. In mid-February, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party ruled out negotiations with the Awami League to frame a new constitution and declared that his party would not attend the new National Assembly sessions. On 1 March, Yahya Khan announced a postponement of the National Assembly. Fearing a conspiracy, Mujibur Rahman responded with a call for a ‘peaceful non-cooperation’ movement, which galvanized people across East Pakistan. Indira Gandhi appears to have been persuaded by Kao’s definition of the problem because on 2 March the Prime Minister authorized the formation of a high level Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary, P.N. Haksar, R.N. Kao, T.N. Kaul, and the Home Secretary to examine the political, economic, and military implications of India assisting a Bangladesh liberation movement. The assessment included ‘the question whether West Pakistan would retaliate against India particularly in Kashmir’ and ‘whether there would be any military reaction on the part of China’. The R&AW Chief now sought to convince Haksar and the Prime Minister as to why India should initiate a sustained and speedy programme of assistance to the East Bengal liberation movement. While the Pakistan Army ‘may gain some temporary successes’, it would be ‘impossible for them anymore to completely crush the liberation movement’. The longer the struggle took, Kao argued, the greater were the prospects of the movement falling ‘into the hands of extremists and pro-China communists, in Bangladesh’. Hence, ‘it would be in our own interest to give aid, adequate and quick enough, to ensure the early success of the liberation movement under the control and guidance of the Awami League and its leaders’.’
It is apparent from her 2 March decision that Indira Gandhi was receptive to exploring the policy option of exploiting the crisis. This was a significant decision and is consistent with Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role. To be sure, policymakers were also being prudent by preparing for a possible diversionary ploy by Pakistan to export its internal vulnerability onto Kashmir or even the Indian heartland, as R&AW’s 14 January appreciation had indicated. Nehru too had agreed to make defensive military preparations to counteract a potential Pakistani move in Kashmir during the 1950 East Bengal crisis. This time, however, Indian intentions are clear from the apex-level Committee’s terms of reference: to examine a role in supporting the Bengali resistance inside Pakistan. The policy option being considered was not just predicated on deterrence but aimed at changing the status quo.
By mid-March, the crisis was out in the open. On 18 March, Delhi received a R&AW cable from Dhaka conveying Mujibur Rahman’s message, which repeated a ‘special appeal for help at this critical hour’. Expecting large reinforcements from West Pakistan, the Awami League leader sought Indian advice before deciding his next move. The telegram emphasized that ‘Mujib has no alternative but to fight for independence’. Haksar quickly reinforced R&AW’s recommendation and advised Indira Gandhi that India should not ‘say anything at all placatory, but be “tough” within reason’. This was ‘not the time to make gestures for friendship to Pakistan. Every such gesture will bring comfort to Yahya Khan and make the position of Mujib correspondingly more difficult … 2½ Divisions of Pak Army is poised to decimate East Bengal’.
https://theprint.in/pageturner/exce...hi-to-be-ready-for-pakistan-partition/325899/
Despite a domestic national election at home, Delhi was fully cognizant of the dramatic internal crisis in Pakistan’s body politic. There is also evidence to suggest that some of the ingredients of an interventionist strategy might have already been in place before events in East Pakistan exploded. Internal communications reveal two competing images. One image was represented by R.N. Kao, Chief of R&AW and Indira Gandhi’s trusted confidante, who perceived the crisis in more ominous terms and advocated an advantageous realpolitik to exploit Pakistan’s internal fissures. A second image was represented by sections in the MEA, who perceived the crisis in more benign terms and advocated a non-interventionist posture. Interestingly, as early as 1969, Kao had been arguing that East Pakistan was poised for deeper turmoil and possible secession and that India ‘should be prepared for it’. And his perceptions got stronger as the crisis came closer. In an April 1969 intelligence cable, he had foreseen an impending crisis across the border:
The authorities would have to resort to large-scale use of the Army and other paramilitary forces in East Pakistan to curb a movement, which has already gained considerable strength. The use of force is likely, in turn, to lead to a situation where the people of East Pakistan, supported by elements of the East Bengal Rifles (who are known to be sympathetic towards the secessionist movement as evidenced from the recent East Pakistan Conspiracy Case), may rise in revolt against the Central Authority and even declare their independence … although this possibility may not be immediate at present, it would be desirable that the Government of India should think about the policy it should adopt in such an eventuality and keep its options open.
Kao’s implied advice to exploit a crisis should it arise seems to fit comfortably with Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role. In contrast, the higher levels of the MEA were taking a more conservative view. Senior officials argued that Pakistan’s unity was in India’s interest, and hoped that the Awami League would emerge as the dominant political voice of a unified Pakistan, which in turn would change Pakistan’s external behaviour towards India. A classic exposition of this view was reflected in India’s then high commissioner to Islamabad, Krishna Acharya, who cabled Delhi on 2 December 1970 shortly after elections had been held in Pakistan. Given the relentless hostility of a West Pakistani-dominated government, Acharya argued that majority control of the National Assembly by the Bengalis seemed ‘to be our only hope for achieving our policy objectives towards Pakistan and overcoming this stonewall resistance of West Pakistan’. And, ‘in order that this hope may become a reality, however, it is essential that Pakistan (with its East Pakistan majority) should remain one, so that we may pursue our policy objectives through the leaders of East Pakistan’.
Not only did the Indian envoy espouse the virtues of Pakistani unity, albeit reformed under the influence of moderate Bengalis, he underscored the grave dangers and geopolitical risks of an independent Bangladesh, which might demand unity with India’s adjacent province of West Bengal, and that such a united Bengal was likely to come under the influence of pro-China Naxalites. Acharya warned that India’s ‘strategic and defence problems will be multiplied manifold’ by a breakup of Pakistan. Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul also felt ‘that India should do nothing to encourage the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan but he added that it did not lie in India’s hands to stop it’. Sections of the mainstream media too favoured non-interference. For example, Girilal Jain, a leading journalist, suggested that ‘two propositions—a declaration of interest in Pakistan’s unity and an attempt to persuade the two superpowers not to interfere in its affairs’—could serve as policy guidelines as they did for Nehru.
The above belief from the MEA was a more passive and conservative outlook compared to Kao’s strategic activism, and arguably more consistent with Nehru’s conflict avoidance images. These two competing worldviews again reflected in a 6 January 1971 inter-agency meeting attended by senior MEA and R&AW officials. Kao argued that Bengali national aspirations had deep roots and were at a point of no return, with neither the Awami League nor West Pakistani leaders likely to find common ground after the League’s extraordinary electoral success. The Pakistan Army, moreover, would reject a fundamental change in Pakistani politics and would attempt to re-seize control of the situation. Kao defined the policy problem, as he had suggested in 1969: that India should prepare itself for the succession of East Bengal and develop a capacity to assist the liberation movement to achieve early success.
Kao was supported in this assessment by an MEA official, Asoke Ray, who concurred that a secessionist movement would advance India’s interests. This policy option was challenged by Acharya and another senior diplomat, S.K. Banerji, who argued that succession was not a foregone conclusion, and the Pakistani system’s ability to find a rational arrangement that preserved a unified state could not be ruled out. Why is it that the same material situation was being perceived by two such contrasting perspectives? It appears that Nehru’s core images regarding conflict avoidance and a reluctance to disturb the geopolitical status quo in the subcontinent were still strong in sections of the MEA. These officials perceived and defined events with an eye on stability and tension reduction as Nehru had done in the first East Bengal crisis in 1950. The competing images, embodied by Kao and Ray, were more consistent with Indira Gandhi’s beliefs, where the impulse to reshape the subcontinent’s order, coercively if necessary, was a natural reaction to Pakistan’s domestic problems.
Also read: New book claims Indira Gandhi wanted to recapture Pak-occupied Kashmir after 1971 war
By mid-January 1971, Kao’s perceptions were growing stronger and finding resonance with his colleagues at the apex. In a 14 January assessment, he noted that ‘hard liners’ in the military, the ‘privileged bureaucrats’, and ‘feudal interests’ might exert pressure on General Yahya Khan, the President and Army Chief, to try and reverse the trend towards the transfer of power to the Awami League. However, the Bengalis ‘and even some sections of the people in the Western Wing, would not be hoodwinked by such tactics’. Kao also highlighted the possibility of a diversionary military move by Pakistan in the form of ‘an infiltration campaign into J&K’ to deflect attention from its internal problems. P.N. Haksar too had recorded his uneasiness about Pakistan. The Awami League’s victory had complicated Pakistan’s internal problems and ‘the temptation’ for ‘external adventures’ had become greater. He advised the Prime Minister to instruct the Service Chiefs for an urgent military assessment including ‘recommendations of what the requirements of each of the Services are so that we can feel a sense of security’.
Meanwhile, events on the ground were confirming Kao’s hypothesis. In mid-February, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party ruled out negotiations with the Awami League to frame a new constitution and declared that his party would not attend the new National Assembly sessions. On 1 March, Yahya Khan announced a postponement of the National Assembly. Fearing a conspiracy, Mujibur Rahman responded with a call for a ‘peaceful non-cooperation’ movement, which galvanized people across East Pakistan. Indira Gandhi appears to have been persuaded by Kao’s definition of the problem because on 2 March the Prime Minister authorized the formation of a high level Committee consisting of the Cabinet Secretary, P.N. Haksar, R.N. Kao, T.N. Kaul, and the Home Secretary to examine the political, economic, and military implications of India assisting a Bangladesh liberation movement. The assessment included ‘the question whether West Pakistan would retaliate against India particularly in Kashmir’ and ‘whether there would be any military reaction on the part of China’. The R&AW Chief now sought to convince Haksar and the Prime Minister as to why India should initiate a sustained and speedy programme of assistance to the East Bengal liberation movement. While the Pakistan Army ‘may gain some temporary successes’, it would be ‘impossible for them anymore to completely crush the liberation movement’. The longer the struggle took, Kao argued, the greater were the prospects of the movement falling ‘into the hands of extremists and pro-China communists, in Bangladesh’. Hence, ‘it would be in our own interest to give aid, adequate and quick enough, to ensure the early success of the liberation movement under the control and guidance of the Awami League and its leaders’.’
It is apparent from her 2 March decision that Indira Gandhi was receptive to exploring the policy option of exploiting the crisis. This was a significant decision and is consistent with Indira Gandhi’s security seeker role. To be sure, policymakers were also being prudent by preparing for a possible diversionary ploy by Pakistan to export its internal vulnerability onto Kashmir or even the Indian heartland, as R&AW’s 14 January appreciation had indicated. Nehru too had agreed to make defensive military preparations to counteract a potential Pakistani move in Kashmir during the 1950 East Bengal crisis. This time, however, Indian intentions are clear from the apex-level Committee’s terms of reference: to examine a role in supporting the Bengali resistance inside Pakistan. The policy option being considered was not just predicated on deterrence but aimed at changing the status quo.
By mid-March, the crisis was out in the open. On 18 March, Delhi received a R&AW cable from Dhaka conveying Mujibur Rahman’s message, which repeated a ‘special appeal for help at this critical hour’. Expecting large reinforcements from West Pakistan, the Awami League leader sought Indian advice before deciding his next move. The telegram emphasized that ‘Mujib has no alternative but to fight for independence’. Haksar quickly reinforced R&AW’s recommendation and advised Indira Gandhi that India should not ‘say anything at all placatory, but be “tough” within reason’. This was ‘not the time to make gestures for friendship to Pakistan. Every such gesture will bring comfort to Yahya Khan and make the position of Mujib correspondingly more difficult … 2½ Divisions of Pak Army is poised to decimate East Bengal’.
https://theprint.in/pageturner/exce...hi-to-be-ready-for-pakistan-partition/325899/
Assassin 2.0
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The man who knew too much
The examination of the life and deeds of the founder of the Research and Analysis Wing
(Left) RN Kao with his successors, AS Dulat (L) and CD Sahay (centre) (Photo: Bloomsbury)
Uthoritative books on India’s external spy agency the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) are rare. Books on its enigmatic founder, Rameshwar Nath Kao, are even more so. In the 51 years since R&AW’s founding by the charismatic Imperial Police officer Kao, there has been just one The Kaoboys of R&AW, written by B Raman in 2007 which documented this secretive spy organisation. It is into this rarefied space that reputed defence analyst Nitin A Gokhale vaults his latest book RN Kao Gentleman Spymaster.
It’s no easy task. Official documentation on the organisation is scarce and absent from the public domain because the agency does not declassify its records. Kao, a charismatic institution builder who passed away in 2002, shunned the limelight. He was rarely photographed and is known to have given just one interview. Gokhale does a commendable job of reconstructing the former spymaster’s life from interviewing his key associates and relying on the few books and papers in the public domain.
He uncovers the story of Kao’s early life, known only to Kao’s closest friends and relatives. Kao, the scion of a family of Kashmiri Pandits settled in Allahabad was left rudderless when his civil servant father died young. His transformation from an awkward, selfconscious and obese teenager who relied on Yoga, to a brilliant college debater who then entered the Imperial Police in 1940 is well documented. His career is a fascinating roller-coaster down postindependent India’s political history. Kao served on the security detail of the first Indian PM Pandit Nehru and was also absorbed into the Intelligence Bureau where he worked in its external intelligence division. In 1968, Kao was tasked by the Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi to set up an external intelligence agency. Kao’s experience with the Directorate General of Security (DGS) a covert paramilitary outfit set up with the CIA after the disastrous 1962 border war with China marked him out to head what became R&AW.
The instructions from the PM were remarkably clear she did not want it to be another organisation staffed by policemen but a unique set of gentlemen spies with diverse specialisations who could collect intelligence. They were handpicked by Kao, hence the Kaoboys’ and came from diverse backgrounds. Who else but the razor sharp, fastidious Kao who had interests as varied as sculpting and repairing clocks, to set up this organisation.
Gokhale zeroes in on what was R&AW’s finest hourthe liberation of Bangladesh. This was an incident almost without precedent post the Second World War. The endstatethe creation of Bangladesh was enabled of course by the hammer blows delivered by the Indian Army, which swept into the province in December 1971. It was preceded by several months where Kao and his operatives put into place an elaborate apparatus to channel Bengali angst against a brutally repressive Pakistani military dictatorship.
The clinically planned operation set into motion several months before the two countries actually went to war in 1971. It was India’s largest ever covert war where R&AW and the Army trained close to 100,000 Mukti Bahini fighters. The details of this massive covert guerilla training programme are hobbled by a lack of documentationmost files relating to it were destroyed after the war on government instructions. Bangladesh began what many say was R&AW’s Golden Agea series of successes over a decade as India used its newly acquired covert capability to shape events in the neighbourhood, from annexing Sikkim to penetrating the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. The book is also a commentary on the need for a political executive sensitised to the use of tools of statecraft. R&AW flourished under Mrs Gandhi. It withered under Prime Minister Morarji Desai.
Gentleman Spymaster is strewn with gems. The author does great service by reproducing some of the spymaster’s correspondence. In letters written between 1998 and 2000 to his protégé V Balachandran, Kao reveals himself unfailingly courteous, impeccably mannered, possessed of a wry sense of humour and deeply concerned about India’s national security. He traces the government’s obsession with secrecy to its colonial origin where the British did not trust the natives. This lack of an institutional memory, Kao believes, led to the frequent reinvention of the wheel.
He was clearly also someone with a deep understanding of history. Hence in the last years of his life, he began transcribing his memoirs. The most controversial ones, including his thoughts on the liberation of Bangladesh, are not set to release until 2025. It’s not difficult to understand why. Kao was a gentleman who didn’t tell tales. But he was also an institution builder. He wanted to help the organisation long after his departure from the scene.
RN KAO: GENTLEMAN SPYMASTER
NITIN A GOKHALE, BLOOMSBURY INDIA; Rs 599
Get real-time alerts and all the news on your phone with the all-new India Today app. Download from
The examination of the life and deeds of the founder of the Research and Analysis Wing
- Sandeep Unithan
- December 8, 2019
- UPDATED: December 8, 2019 05:17 IST
(Left) RN Kao with his successors, AS Dulat (L) and CD Sahay (centre) (Photo: Bloomsbury)
Uthoritative books on India’s external spy agency the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) are rare. Books on its enigmatic founder, Rameshwar Nath Kao, are even more so. In the 51 years since R&AW’s founding by the charismatic Imperial Police officer Kao, there has been just one The Kaoboys of R&AW, written by B Raman in 2007 which documented this secretive spy organisation. It is into this rarefied space that reputed defence analyst Nitin A Gokhale vaults his latest book RN Kao Gentleman Spymaster.
It’s no easy task. Official documentation on the organisation is scarce and absent from the public domain because the agency does not declassify its records. Kao, a charismatic institution builder who passed away in 2002, shunned the limelight. He was rarely photographed and is known to have given just one interview. Gokhale does a commendable job of reconstructing the former spymaster’s life from interviewing his key associates and relying on the few books and papers in the public domain.
He uncovers the story of Kao’s early life, known only to Kao’s closest friends and relatives. Kao, the scion of a family of Kashmiri Pandits settled in Allahabad was left rudderless when his civil servant father died young. His transformation from an awkward, selfconscious and obese teenager who relied on Yoga, to a brilliant college debater who then entered the Imperial Police in 1940 is well documented. His career is a fascinating roller-coaster down postindependent India’s political history. Kao served on the security detail of the first Indian PM Pandit Nehru and was also absorbed into the Intelligence Bureau where he worked in its external intelligence division. In 1968, Kao was tasked by the Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi to set up an external intelligence agency. Kao’s experience with the Directorate General of Security (DGS) a covert paramilitary outfit set up with the CIA after the disastrous 1962 border war with China marked him out to head what became R&AW.
The instructions from the PM were remarkably clear she did not want it to be another organisation staffed by policemen but a unique set of gentlemen spies with diverse specialisations who could collect intelligence. They were handpicked by Kao, hence the Kaoboys’ and came from diverse backgrounds. Who else but the razor sharp, fastidious Kao who had interests as varied as sculpting and repairing clocks, to set up this organisation.
Gokhale zeroes in on what was R&AW’s finest hourthe liberation of Bangladesh. This was an incident almost without precedent post the Second World War. The endstatethe creation of Bangladesh was enabled of course by the hammer blows delivered by the Indian Army, which swept into the province in December 1971. It was preceded by several months where Kao and his operatives put into place an elaborate apparatus to channel Bengali angst against a brutally repressive Pakistani military dictatorship.
The clinically planned operation set into motion several months before the two countries actually went to war in 1971. It was India’s largest ever covert war where R&AW and the Army trained close to 100,000 Mukti Bahini fighters. The details of this massive covert guerilla training programme are hobbled by a lack of documentationmost files relating to it were destroyed after the war on government instructions. Bangladesh began what many say was R&AW’s Golden Agea series of successes over a decade as India used its newly acquired covert capability to shape events in the neighbourhood, from annexing Sikkim to penetrating the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. The book is also a commentary on the need for a political executive sensitised to the use of tools of statecraft. R&AW flourished under Mrs Gandhi. It withered under Prime Minister Morarji Desai.
Gentleman Spymaster is strewn with gems. The author does great service by reproducing some of the spymaster’s correspondence. In letters written between 1998 and 2000 to his protégé V Balachandran, Kao reveals himself unfailingly courteous, impeccably mannered, possessed of a wry sense of humour and deeply concerned about India’s national security. He traces the government’s obsession with secrecy to its colonial origin where the British did not trust the natives. This lack of an institutional memory, Kao believes, led to the frequent reinvention of the wheel.
He was clearly also someone with a deep understanding of history. Hence in the last years of his life, he began transcribing his memoirs. The most controversial ones, including his thoughts on the liberation of Bangladesh, are not set to release until 2025. It’s not difficult to understand why. Kao was a gentleman who didn’t tell tales. But he was also an institution builder. He wanted to help the organisation long after his departure from the scene.
RN KAO: GENTLEMAN SPYMASTER
NITIN A GOKHALE, BLOOMSBURY INDIA; Rs 599
Get real-time alerts and all the news on your phone with the all-new India Today app. Download from
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Assassin 2.0
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R N Kao: India's first and foremost super spy
Kao who was later handpicked to set up R&AW, got his first break in 1955 when he investigated the crash of an Air India plane, the Kashmir Princess
By Nitin A. Gokhale
Published 9.12.19, 7:11 PM Updated 9.12.19, 7:11 PM
R N Kao (centre) was handpicked by Indira Gandhi to set up the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) in 1968
R N Kao (centre) was handpicked by Indira Gandhi to set up the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) in 1968 Wikimedia Commons
R N. Kao was India’s first and foremost super spy. He started his career in the Intelligence Bureau but in 1968 Mrs Indira Gandhi decided that India needed a separate organisation for external intelligence and Kao was handpicked to set it up. That led to the founding of Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Kao – in the best traditions of the secret service – was its low-profile chief of whom only a few photographs exist. Under him, two of R&AW’s greatest triumphs during the 1970s were during the Bangladesh War and the Sikkim merger in which it played a key role.
Kao had been marked out as a rising intelligence world superstar right from the start of his career. In the 1950s he was in charge of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s security for a time. He got his first taste of working outside India after the crash of an Air India plane, the Kashmir Princess. During the investigation he had several meetings with the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who was the intended victim of the Kashmir Princess bomb. An extract from R.N. Kao: Gentleman Spymaster by Nitin Gokhale.
April 1955 was considered to be a turning point in R. N. Kao’s (RNK’s) career, when he was assigned a case that gave him a big boost and proved to be, in his own words, an ‘important landmark’. The case had international ramifications and took RNK to five different countries and gave him an exposure to different cultures, policing approaches and detective works.
This was his first major assignment abroad—one on which RNK spent 6 months abroad. It presented him the opportunity of seeing new lands and meeting a number of foreign dignitaries, the most distinguished of whom was Zhao Enlai (Chou en-Lai, as spelt in those years), the Chinese Premier. RNK’s duty took him to Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong and China. In his own words, ‘This was my first exposure to South East Asia, which, by all accounts, is a fascinating world in itself. It is so close to us, yet about which general knowledge in India is poor.’
The investigation was about the crash of an Air India aircraft named Kashmir Princess.
There is a back story to the entire incident. Prime Minister Nehru had conceived an Afro-Asia conference to be hosted in Indonesia at Bandung. It was scheduled to be held between 18 and 24 April 1955. The Air India International Super Constellation plane was chartered by the Chinese Government to carry its delegates for the inaugural conference, along with the Premier. Zhou Enlai’s adversaries, looking for an opportunity to assassinate him, planted a bomb on the plane during its halt at Hong Kong. The plane crashed in South China Sea. RNK was deputed to represent India in the subsequent investigations.
According to RNK—he put in his own effort at piecing together the sequence of events—the plane took off with 8 crew members and 11 passengers from Hong Kong for Jakarta. About 5 hours after take-off, a muffled explosion was heard. At that time, the aeroplane was flying at about 18,000 feet over the sea. Soon after the explosion, smoke started entering the cabin and fire was detected in the starboard rig behind the third engine. The captain of the aircraft, Captain Jatar, decided to ditch the aeroplane and for this, the prescribed drill was quickly and methodically carried out. The descent was rapid, and its final stage was carried out under extremely difficult circumstances.
The aeroplane fell into the sea, with the starboard hitting the water first and the nose sinking almost immediately. The aircraft was burned and destroyed as a result of the impact and out of the passengers and crew members, only three crew members survived. The survivors were flight navigator Pathak, aircraft mechanical engineer Karnik and co-pilot Dixit. The captain of the aircraft, Captain Jatar, who was one of the most experienced pilots of Air India international, died in his seat and, in fact, when the salvage operations took place later, his body was found in the captain’s seat. The very first accounts received also confirmed that the airhostess, Miss Glori Asponson, had acted most heroically. She maintained her calm in that extremely trying conditions and, as was later confirmed after examining the dead body that was recovered, she issued lifebelts to every single passenger as well as member of the crew, before the aircraft actually hit the water.
It was clear, almost from the very beginning, that the aircraft, Kashmir Princess, had been the victim of sabotage. This incident assumed great importance as a number of countries were involved. The aircraft was Indian, but the passengers were all Chinese. It had taken off from Hong Kong and had crashed in Indonesian waters.
***
As he reached Bandung, RNK was directed to the conference hall where the session was on. K.F. Rustomji, then a Deputy Director in the Intelligence Bureau and in-charge of the prime minister’s security detail, immediately took RNK to Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru, at whose insistence RNK was told to join the investigation, had also arranged for RNK to meet the Chinese Premier that very evening. RNK was with Zhou Enlai for over an hour and then retired for the night.
RNK made an interesting observation during his first meeting with Zhou Enlai. ‘Though he was wearing one of those boiler suits, it was clear that the material was neither ordinary nor was the cut. In spite of the cloth’s colour and rather loose trousers and loose sleeves, all the Chinese leaders at the time sported a look keeping in mind the Mao style. Zhou Enlai was an impressive figure. He had an interpreter all along. He was a Harvard-trained Chinese who spoke English well. Though Mr Zhou Enlai spoke only in Chinese, his knowledge of English was better than he would acknowledge. At this meeting, I was, for the first time, exposed to Chinese green tea and various small eatables like dried lychee and other titbits. What struck me was the formal rectangular arrangement of the sofa and chairs. Opposite to the chairs, there was a table with plenty of ashtrays, with spittoons also provided near each chair. That, I later realised, was a standard Chinese décor.’
During the meeting, Zhou Enlai came quickly to the point and asked RNK to give an up-to-date information about what he had learned from the survivors. Based on what Pathak and Karnik had told him, RNK described the details of the bomb, where it was placed and what effect it had on the plane’s engines that led to the crash. As RNK was explaining the sequence of events, he offered to draw a sketch too and took his fountain pen out.
What happened next can be best described in RNK’s own words. ‘He agreed with this enthusiastically. I took out some paper from my briefcase, which I was carrying, and I had a fountain pen in my pocket. I unscrewed the cap. I did not have much experience of air travel. Before I realised what was happening, I got a lot of ink on my fingers that had leaked out of the fountain pen while flying from Bombay to Singapore, Singapore to Jakarta and Jakarta to Bandung. Hence, I got ink on my fingers and I looked at it and tried to take out some white blank paper from my briefcase to wipe my fingers. Mr Zhou Enlai, without a word, rose from the sofa and left the room. This puzzled me but within a few minutes, he came back accompanied by an attendant who was carrying what looked to me like neatly folded wet towels. As I had never been exposed to Chinese wet towels, I looked at him inquiringly. He motioned that I should wipe my fingers on them. I was most impressed by his courtesy in taking the trouble of getting up, going out of the room and getting those towels for me to wipe my fingers. This was only the first of many polite, generous gestures that Mr Zhou Enlai made during my meetings with him.’ RNK remembers Zhou as a man who spoke briefly but to the point. And also, candidly. At one point, he insisted that RNK should not inform the British authorities of anything that was shared with him. Zhou, however, told RNK to proceed to Hong Kong and then visit Canton, where further arrangements would be made for him to meet Zhou.
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The Bandung conference, which RNK was coincidentally attending, gave him the first opportunity to observe international meetings, protocols and false egos at work. As he entered the main plenary hall, RNK was taken to Prime Minister Nehru who briefly instructed him and moved on to meet others.
‘This was my first presence at an international meet and I was impressed with the solemnity of the occasion and the gravity which seemed to hang in the air. At that time, China had not widely been accepted as a respectable member of the international comity of nations, and as we (India) were one of the few countries that had established diplomatic relations with China, Prime Minister Nehru had taken upon himself the responsibility of introducing Zhou Enlai on the world scene. Or, at least, so he thought. In later years, I learned that Zhou Enlai had mentioned to some reporter that he had not met anyone as arrogant as Jawaharlal Nehru and in support of his statement, he had said that it was incredibly presumptuous on the part of the Prime Minister of India to have introduced the Prime Minister of China on the world scene. Well, whatever Zhou’s ego might have been, the fact of the matter is Nehru did help China to gain recognition in the international field. In fact, in that process, we (India) earned a lot of odium,’ Kao observed.
RNK also had a couple of other interesting anecdotes to share from his first international conference. ‘I have a distinct recollection that Mr Mohammed Ali of Bogra, who was the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, was also there. He had brought along with him his wife, and as the proceedings started, I realised that Mr Mohammed Ali seemed more intent on teaching his wife how to use a cine camera to cover the proceedings, rather than to take part in it,’ Kao remarked.
He also observed the egoistical behaviour of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who had hitched a ride on the Indian plane with Prime Minister Nehru to and from Bandung. ‘It was interesting how unconsciously—although, I do not know whether it was unconscious—I got the impression that President Nasser was keen to give the impression that he, as a political figure, was at least as tall as Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru himself being much older than Nasser tended to take him under his wing and brought him along in the aircraft. An interesting point of protocol was that normally when VIPs travel by aircraft, when you arrive at the place, the most important VIP first sets out of the aircraft. Similarly, when you are departing, everyone else is supposed to board earlier than the most important VIP. When they were leaving Jakarta for Bandung, Nehru put his hand around Nasser’s shoulders and encouraged him to board the plane, but he would not do so, because he was keen on going up the stairs at the last. Finally, they decided to go up together,’ Kao noted.
Kao who was later handpicked to set up R&AW, got his first break in 1955 when he investigated the crash of an Air India plane, the Kashmir Princess
By Nitin A. Gokhale
Published 9.12.19, 7:11 PM Updated 9.12.19, 7:11 PM
R N Kao (centre) was handpicked by Indira Gandhi to set up the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) in 1968
R N Kao (centre) was handpicked by Indira Gandhi to set up the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) in 1968 Wikimedia Commons
R N. Kao was India’s first and foremost super spy. He started his career in the Intelligence Bureau but in 1968 Mrs Indira Gandhi decided that India needed a separate organisation for external intelligence and Kao was handpicked to set it up. That led to the founding of Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Kao – in the best traditions of the secret service – was its low-profile chief of whom only a few photographs exist. Under him, two of R&AW’s greatest triumphs during the 1970s were during the Bangladesh War and the Sikkim merger in which it played a key role.
Kao had been marked out as a rising intelligence world superstar right from the start of his career. In the 1950s he was in charge of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s security for a time. He got his first taste of working outside India after the crash of an Air India plane, the Kashmir Princess. During the investigation he had several meetings with the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai who was the intended victim of the Kashmir Princess bomb. An extract from R.N. Kao: Gentleman Spymaster by Nitin Gokhale.
April 1955 was considered to be a turning point in R. N. Kao’s (RNK’s) career, when he was assigned a case that gave him a big boost and proved to be, in his own words, an ‘important landmark’. The case had international ramifications and took RNK to five different countries and gave him an exposure to different cultures, policing approaches and detective works.
This was his first major assignment abroad—one on which RNK spent 6 months abroad. It presented him the opportunity of seeing new lands and meeting a number of foreign dignitaries, the most distinguished of whom was Zhao Enlai (Chou en-Lai, as spelt in those years), the Chinese Premier. RNK’s duty took him to Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Hong Kong and China. In his own words, ‘This was my first exposure to South East Asia, which, by all accounts, is a fascinating world in itself. It is so close to us, yet about which general knowledge in India is poor.’
The investigation was about the crash of an Air India aircraft named Kashmir Princess.
There is a back story to the entire incident. Prime Minister Nehru had conceived an Afro-Asia conference to be hosted in Indonesia at Bandung. It was scheduled to be held between 18 and 24 April 1955. The Air India International Super Constellation plane was chartered by the Chinese Government to carry its delegates for the inaugural conference, along with the Premier. Zhou Enlai’s adversaries, looking for an opportunity to assassinate him, planted a bomb on the plane during its halt at Hong Kong. The plane crashed in South China Sea. RNK was deputed to represent India in the subsequent investigations.
According to RNK—he put in his own effort at piecing together the sequence of events—the plane took off with 8 crew members and 11 passengers from Hong Kong for Jakarta. About 5 hours after take-off, a muffled explosion was heard. At that time, the aeroplane was flying at about 18,000 feet over the sea. Soon after the explosion, smoke started entering the cabin and fire was detected in the starboard rig behind the third engine. The captain of the aircraft, Captain Jatar, decided to ditch the aeroplane and for this, the prescribed drill was quickly and methodically carried out. The descent was rapid, and its final stage was carried out under extremely difficult circumstances.
The aeroplane fell into the sea, with the starboard hitting the water first and the nose sinking almost immediately. The aircraft was burned and destroyed as a result of the impact and out of the passengers and crew members, only three crew members survived. The survivors were flight navigator Pathak, aircraft mechanical engineer Karnik and co-pilot Dixit. The captain of the aircraft, Captain Jatar, who was one of the most experienced pilots of Air India international, died in his seat and, in fact, when the salvage operations took place later, his body was found in the captain’s seat. The very first accounts received also confirmed that the airhostess, Miss Glori Asponson, had acted most heroically. She maintained her calm in that extremely trying conditions and, as was later confirmed after examining the dead body that was recovered, she issued lifebelts to every single passenger as well as member of the crew, before the aircraft actually hit the water.
It was clear, almost from the very beginning, that the aircraft, Kashmir Princess, had been the victim of sabotage. This incident assumed great importance as a number of countries were involved. The aircraft was Indian, but the passengers were all Chinese. It had taken off from Hong Kong and had crashed in Indonesian waters.
***
As he reached Bandung, RNK was directed to the conference hall where the session was on. K.F. Rustomji, then a Deputy Director in the Intelligence Bureau and in-charge of the prime minister’s security detail, immediately took RNK to Prime Minister Nehru. Nehru, at whose insistence RNK was told to join the investigation, had also arranged for RNK to meet the Chinese Premier that very evening. RNK was with Zhou Enlai for over an hour and then retired for the night.
RNK made an interesting observation during his first meeting with Zhou Enlai. ‘Though he was wearing one of those boiler suits, it was clear that the material was neither ordinary nor was the cut. In spite of the cloth’s colour and rather loose trousers and loose sleeves, all the Chinese leaders at the time sported a look keeping in mind the Mao style. Zhou Enlai was an impressive figure. He had an interpreter all along. He was a Harvard-trained Chinese who spoke English well. Though Mr Zhou Enlai spoke only in Chinese, his knowledge of English was better than he would acknowledge. At this meeting, I was, for the first time, exposed to Chinese green tea and various small eatables like dried lychee and other titbits. What struck me was the formal rectangular arrangement of the sofa and chairs. Opposite to the chairs, there was a table with plenty of ashtrays, with spittoons also provided near each chair. That, I later realised, was a standard Chinese décor.’
During the meeting, Zhou Enlai came quickly to the point and asked RNK to give an up-to-date information about what he had learned from the survivors. Based on what Pathak and Karnik had told him, RNK described the details of the bomb, where it was placed and what effect it had on the plane’s engines that led to the crash. As RNK was explaining the sequence of events, he offered to draw a sketch too and took his fountain pen out.
What happened next can be best described in RNK’s own words. ‘He agreed with this enthusiastically. I took out some paper from my briefcase, which I was carrying, and I had a fountain pen in my pocket. I unscrewed the cap. I did not have much experience of air travel. Before I realised what was happening, I got a lot of ink on my fingers that had leaked out of the fountain pen while flying from Bombay to Singapore, Singapore to Jakarta and Jakarta to Bandung. Hence, I got ink on my fingers and I looked at it and tried to take out some white blank paper from my briefcase to wipe my fingers. Mr Zhou Enlai, without a word, rose from the sofa and left the room. This puzzled me but within a few minutes, he came back accompanied by an attendant who was carrying what looked to me like neatly folded wet towels. As I had never been exposed to Chinese wet towels, I looked at him inquiringly. He motioned that I should wipe my fingers on them. I was most impressed by his courtesy in taking the trouble of getting up, going out of the room and getting those towels for me to wipe my fingers. This was only the first of many polite, generous gestures that Mr Zhou Enlai made during my meetings with him.’ RNK remembers Zhou as a man who spoke briefly but to the point. And also, candidly. At one point, he insisted that RNK should not inform the British authorities of anything that was shared with him. Zhou, however, told RNK to proceed to Hong Kong and then visit Canton, where further arrangements would be made for him to meet Zhou.
Also Read
also read
Remembering Indira Gandhi on her 35th death anniversary
also read
‘Jawahar will be my successor’: Mahatma Gandhi
The Bandung conference, which RNK was coincidentally attending, gave him the first opportunity to observe international meetings, protocols and false egos at work. As he entered the main plenary hall, RNK was taken to Prime Minister Nehru who briefly instructed him and moved on to meet others.
‘This was my first presence at an international meet and I was impressed with the solemnity of the occasion and the gravity which seemed to hang in the air. At that time, China had not widely been accepted as a respectable member of the international comity of nations, and as we (India) were one of the few countries that had established diplomatic relations with China, Prime Minister Nehru had taken upon himself the responsibility of introducing Zhou Enlai on the world scene. Or, at least, so he thought. In later years, I learned that Zhou Enlai had mentioned to some reporter that he had not met anyone as arrogant as Jawaharlal Nehru and in support of his statement, he had said that it was incredibly presumptuous on the part of the Prime Minister of India to have introduced the Prime Minister of China on the world scene. Well, whatever Zhou’s ego might have been, the fact of the matter is Nehru did help China to gain recognition in the international field. In fact, in that process, we (India) earned a lot of odium,’ Kao observed.
RNK also had a couple of other interesting anecdotes to share from his first international conference. ‘I have a distinct recollection that Mr Mohammed Ali of Bogra, who was the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, was also there. He had brought along with him his wife, and as the proceedings started, I realised that Mr Mohammed Ali seemed more intent on teaching his wife how to use a cine camera to cover the proceedings, rather than to take part in it,’ Kao remarked.
He also observed the egoistical behaviour of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who had hitched a ride on the Indian plane with Prime Minister Nehru to and from Bandung. ‘It was interesting how unconsciously—although, I do not know whether it was unconscious—I got the impression that President Nasser was keen to give the impression that he, as a political figure, was at least as tall as Jawaharlal Nehru. Nehru himself being much older than Nasser tended to take him under his wing and brought him along in the aircraft. An interesting point of protocol was that normally when VIPs travel by aircraft, when you arrive at the place, the most important VIP first sets out of the aircraft. Similarly, when you are departing, everyone else is supposed to board earlier than the most important VIP. When they were leaving Jakarta for Bandung, Nehru put his hand around Nasser’s shoulders and encouraged him to board the plane, but he would not do so, because he was keen on going up the stairs at the last. Finally, they decided to go up together,’ Kao noted.
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How RN Kao – India’s top spymaster - helped integrate Sikkim into India
King of Sikkim (Palden Thondup Namgyal), was pressuring India to revise the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, according to which it was a protectorate, and had developed ambitions to have a separate state like Bhutan.
Updated: Dec 13, 2019 16:24:24
By Neeraj Chauhan, Hindustan Times, New Delhi
R.N. Kao the chief of R&AW played a major role in both Sikkim integration and 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. (RN Kao: Gentleman Spymaster/Nitin A. Gokhale)
A new book on the life of founding chief of India’s external intelligence agency — Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) — RN Kao, reveals how the agency ran a 27-month-long, ruthless operation between December 1972 and May 1975 and started an uprising against Sikkim’s ruler to annex it to India.
In the book, RN Kao: Gentleman Spymaster , strategic affairs analyst and author, Nitin A Gokhale, writes that the Chogyal, or the then King of Sikkim (Palden Thondup Namgyal), was pressuring India to revise the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, according to which it was a protectorate, and had developed ambitions to have a separate state like Bhutan. This is when (December 1972) ex-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi turned to Kao and asked him: “Can you do something about Sikkim?”
Gokhale writes that a plan was prepared in Kolkata within a fortnight by the then joint director of R&AW, PN Banerjee, who also had a major role in covert operations in Bangladesh during 1971 war. Kao took the plan to Gandhi, who instantly cleared it. The strategy was to undermine and weaken the Chogyal through agitations launched by political parties led by Kazi Lendhup Dorzi (who was leader of the Sikkim National Congress) and other younger leaders, who had launched a joint action committee (JAC) in Sikkim against the Chogyal.
Kao’s officers, Banerjee and Ajit Singh Syali (who was posted as OSD in Gangtok and primarily collected trans-border intelligence on Tibet) launched their operations, Janamat and Twilight, which were perhaps the code names given to agitation leaders KC Pradhan and Kazi respectively, Gokhale writes. Pradhan and Kazi met Banerjee’s team in February 1973.
Around the same time, Banerjee alerted Kao that one political officer at US Consulate in Calcutta – Peter Burleigh, who according to Banerjee’s assessment was a CIA operative, visited Sikkim as state guest of Chogyal. Kao also received inputs that Chogyal was trying to wean away Kazi by negotiating with him couple of exclusive, one-on-one meetings with the SNC leader.
In a meeting called on R&AW’s request in Delhi, it was decided to “strengthen and encourage the agitation till it came to a stage where the Chogyal would be forced to approach government of India for assistance in dealing with the situation”. It was further decided to publicise that the Chogyal had no right to be the king and once the agitation gained momentum, to send Indian army troops for occasional route marches to remind the people of their presence and make sure that the anti-Chogyal, or pro-democracy, movement was not abandoned as it had been in 1949.
As part the plan, the local R&AW team got down to the task of instigating and guiding the agitation, kept the anti-Chogyal leaders united and focused, and, of course, offered financial help whenever necessary, Gokhale writes.
On Chogyal’s 50th birthday, April 4, 1973, there were clashes on the streets of Gangtok, leading to police firing and a couple of deaths. When Chogyal’s elder son, Tenzing, was stopped on his way to the palace, one of the Sikkim Guards opened fire on demonstrators in panic. This was used by Kazi to whip up anti-Chogyal sentiment. By the next day, there was looting and arson on the streets across Sikkim.
Kao informed Gandhi that the takeover of Sikkim was imminent.
By April 8, Chogyal was forced to sign a draft prepared by India, which stated that administration would be taken over by Indian government and Commissioner of Police would be placed under GOC, 17 Mountain Division, of Indian Army.
Kazi then called off the agitation in Gangtok.
The ministry of external affairs then selected IPS officer, BS Das as Chief Executive of Sikkim. He was briefed about India’s ultimate objective in Sikkim: the merger of the state to the Indian union.
The May 8 agreement signed by the Chogyal, Kewal Singh (the then foreign secretary) and parties led by Kazi, left the Chogyal with control of Sikkim guards and the administration of the palace.
However, Gokhale writes “a bigger challenge awaited Kao since Indira Gandhi had made it clear that she wanted a complete merger of Sikkim with India, and in the shortest time possible”.
In an assessment on May 7, 1973, Kao cautioned that Chogyal may change his attitude any moment and that JAC leaders should not feel frustrated and accuse the government of India of betrayal.
Over the next few months, R&AW instructed further anti-Chogyal demonstrations and rallies in Sikkim. Kao also instructed Banerjee to allow the Nepalese or other extremist elements of Darjeeling to join hands with JAC. “We must ensure that in any agreement reached among the various political parties, India’s special position in Sikkim is further strengthened. Neither the Durbar, nor the preponderant Nepalese community, nor the Bhutias/Lepchas should dominate the future setup of Sikkim. There should be ample scope for us to play one group against the other in future so that no one group becomes too powerful,” Kao wrote on his communication.
Kao added that India should look to have 70% of candidates (who are on its side) in the assembly. He also instructed Banerjee that people must be made aware of the disparity in development and progress between Sikkim and the neighbouring districts of West Bengal like Darjeeling so that they start demanding direct representation in Indian parliament, writes Gokhale.
Over six months of elections in 1975 in Sikkim, Kao wanted the agitation maintained. “Foreign secretary Kewal Singh was equally supportive and was ruthless in implementing India’s eventual plan to merge Sikkim with India,” Gokhale writes.
In April elections, Kazi won with landslide victory, winning 31 of 32 seats. He got a new act — The Government of Sikkim Act, 1974, — passed in the assembly, giving Sikkim the status of an associate state.
Chogyal was meanwhile trying to internationalise the issue.
This is when R&AW launched the final stage of its plan. While the government prepared the ground for a resolution to be passed in the assembly, the R&AW had to make sure no bloodshed took place and it was essential to disarm the Sikkim guards, the Chogyal’s loyal soldiers.
Gokhale writes an elaborate plan was drawn up for justifying the disarming of the Sikkim guards. “The scheme is a classic example of what the R&AW could and can do when required,” he writes.
The Sikkim guards were to be disarmed on the April 8 or 9, 1975, but before that public meetings and processions were planned in Gangtok demanding removal of the Sikkim guards, complete merger with India and removal of the Chogyal.
The R&AW stated in its plan that “In case the Chogyal asks for asylum, he should be moved to the India House. After some time, he may be shifted to a suitable guest house about 15- 20 miles outside Gangtok…”
Gokhale writes that Kazi wrote two letters to the Indian representatives; the first asking the Sikkim guards to be disarmed, and the second requesting for an emergency session of the Sikkim Assembly.
Three battalions of Indian army brigade, led by Brig (later Lt Gen) Depinder Singh were deployed. “Troops marched to the palace and despite one sentry at the gate resisting (he was shot dead), it took less than 20 minutes for the Indian Army to disarm the Sikkim guards. The Chogyal was furious but was helpless,” Gokhale writes.
By May 15, Sikkim officially became the 22nd state of India.
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King of Sikkim (Palden Thondup Namgyal), was pressuring India to revise the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, according to which it was a protectorate, and had developed ambitions to have a separate state like Bhutan.
Updated: Dec 13, 2019 16:24:24
By Neeraj Chauhan, Hindustan Times, New Delhi
R.N. Kao the chief of R&AW played a major role in both Sikkim integration and 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. (RN Kao: Gentleman Spymaster/Nitin A. Gokhale)
A new book on the life of founding chief of India’s external intelligence agency — Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) — RN Kao, reveals how the agency ran a 27-month-long, ruthless operation between December 1972 and May 1975 and started an uprising against Sikkim’s ruler to annex it to India.
In the book, RN Kao: Gentleman Spymaster , strategic affairs analyst and author, Nitin A Gokhale, writes that the Chogyal, or the then King of Sikkim (Palden Thondup Namgyal), was pressuring India to revise the Indo-Sikkim Treaty, according to which it was a protectorate, and had developed ambitions to have a separate state like Bhutan. This is when (December 1972) ex-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi turned to Kao and asked him: “Can you do something about Sikkim?”
Gokhale writes that a plan was prepared in Kolkata within a fortnight by the then joint director of R&AW, PN Banerjee, who also had a major role in covert operations in Bangladesh during 1971 war. Kao took the plan to Gandhi, who instantly cleared it. The strategy was to undermine and weaken the Chogyal through agitations launched by political parties led by Kazi Lendhup Dorzi (who was leader of the Sikkim National Congress) and other younger leaders, who had launched a joint action committee (JAC) in Sikkim against the Chogyal.
Kao’s officers, Banerjee and Ajit Singh Syali (who was posted as OSD in Gangtok and primarily collected trans-border intelligence on Tibet) launched their operations, Janamat and Twilight, which were perhaps the code names given to agitation leaders KC Pradhan and Kazi respectively, Gokhale writes. Pradhan and Kazi met Banerjee’s team in February 1973.
Around the same time, Banerjee alerted Kao that one political officer at US Consulate in Calcutta – Peter Burleigh, who according to Banerjee’s assessment was a CIA operative, visited Sikkim as state guest of Chogyal. Kao also received inputs that Chogyal was trying to wean away Kazi by negotiating with him couple of exclusive, one-on-one meetings with the SNC leader.
In a meeting called on R&AW’s request in Delhi, it was decided to “strengthen and encourage the agitation till it came to a stage where the Chogyal would be forced to approach government of India for assistance in dealing with the situation”. It was further decided to publicise that the Chogyal had no right to be the king and once the agitation gained momentum, to send Indian army troops for occasional route marches to remind the people of their presence and make sure that the anti-Chogyal, or pro-democracy, movement was not abandoned as it had been in 1949.
As part the plan, the local R&AW team got down to the task of instigating and guiding the agitation, kept the anti-Chogyal leaders united and focused, and, of course, offered financial help whenever necessary, Gokhale writes.
On Chogyal’s 50th birthday, April 4, 1973, there were clashes on the streets of Gangtok, leading to police firing and a couple of deaths. When Chogyal’s elder son, Tenzing, was stopped on his way to the palace, one of the Sikkim Guards opened fire on demonstrators in panic. This was used by Kazi to whip up anti-Chogyal sentiment. By the next day, there was looting and arson on the streets across Sikkim.
Kao informed Gandhi that the takeover of Sikkim was imminent.
By April 8, Chogyal was forced to sign a draft prepared by India, which stated that administration would be taken over by Indian government and Commissioner of Police would be placed under GOC, 17 Mountain Division, of Indian Army.
Kazi then called off the agitation in Gangtok.
The ministry of external affairs then selected IPS officer, BS Das as Chief Executive of Sikkim. He was briefed about India’s ultimate objective in Sikkim: the merger of the state to the Indian union.
The May 8 agreement signed by the Chogyal, Kewal Singh (the then foreign secretary) and parties led by Kazi, left the Chogyal with control of Sikkim guards and the administration of the palace.
However, Gokhale writes “a bigger challenge awaited Kao since Indira Gandhi had made it clear that she wanted a complete merger of Sikkim with India, and in the shortest time possible”.
In an assessment on May 7, 1973, Kao cautioned that Chogyal may change his attitude any moment and that JAC leaders should not feel frustrated and accuse the government of India of betrayal.
Over the next few months, R&AW instructed further anti-Chogyal demonstrations and rallies in Sikkim. Kao also instructed Banerjee to allow the Nepalese or other extremist elements of Darjeeling to join hands with JAC. “We must ensure that in any agreement reached among the various political parties, India’s special position in Sikkim is further strengthened. Neither the Durbar, nor the preponderant Nepalese community, nor the Bhutias/Lepchas should dominate the future setup of Sikkim. There should be ample scope for us to play one group against the other in future so that no one group becomes too powerful,” Kao wrote on his communication.
Kao added that India should look to have 70% of candidates (who are on its side) in the assembly. He also instructed Banerjee that people must be made aware of the disparity in development and progress between Sikkim and the neighbouring districts of West Bengal like Darjeeling so that they start demanding direct representation in Indian parliament, writes Gokhale.
Over six months of elections in 1975 in Sikkim, Kao wanted the agitation maintained. “Foreign secretary Kewal Singh was equally supportive and was ruthless in implementing India’s eventual plan to merge Sikkim with India,” Gokhale writes.
In April elections, Kazi won with landslide victory, winning 31 of 32 seats. He got a new act — The Government of Sikkim Act, 1974, — passed in the assembly, giving Sikkim the status of an associate state.
Chogyal was meanwhile trying to internationalise the issue.
This is when R&AW launched the final stage of its plan. While the government prepared the ground for a resolution to be passed in the assembly, the R&AW had to make sure no bloodshed took place and it was essential to disarm the Sikkim guards, the Chogyal’s loyal soldiers.
Gokhale writes an elaborate plan was drawn up for justifying the disarming of the Sikkim guards. “The scheme is a classic example of what the R&AW could and can do when required,” he writes.
The Sikkim guards were to be disarmed on the April 8 or 9, 1975, but before that public meetings and processions were planned in Gangtok demanding removal of the Sikkim guards, complete merger with India and removal of the Chogyal.
The R&AW stated in its plan that “In case the Chogyal asks for asylum, he should be moved to the India House. After some time, he may be shifted to a suitable guest house about 15- 20 miles outside Gangtok…”
Gokhale writes that Kazi wrote two letters to the Indian representatives; the first asking the Sikkim guards to be disarmed, and the second requesting for an emergency session of the Sikkim Assembly.
Three battalions of Indian army brigade, led by Brig (later Lt Gen) Depinder Singh were deployed. “Troops marched to the palace and despite one sentry at the gate resisting (he was shot dead), it took less than 20 minutes for the Indian Army to disarm the Sikkim guards. The Chogyal was furious but was helpless,” Gokhale writes.
By May 15, Sikkim officially became the 22nd state of India.
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Assassin 2.0
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AP police claims to have busted espionage racket, 7 naval personnel arrested
The Andhra Pradesh police claimed to have busted an espionage racket with links to Pakistan and arrested seven personnel of the Indian Navy in this connection.
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Press Trust of India
Press Trust of India
Amaravati(AP)
December 20, 2019
UPDATED: December 20, 2019 14:24 IST
Police sources in Amaravati said those arrested were being produced in court on Friday.
The Andhra Pradesh police on Friday claimed to have busted an espionage racket with links to Pakistan and arrested seven personnel of the Indian Navy in this connection.
A release from police said the Intelligence wing in concert with Central Intelligence agencies and Naval intelligence launched Operation Dolphin's Nose and unearthed the espionage racket.
"An FIR has been lodged and seven Navy personnel and a hawala operator have been arrested from different parts of the country. Some more suspects are being questioned," the police release said.
Investigation is on, it added, without further details.
Police sources here said those arrested were being produced in court on Friday.
(RAW AT WORK?)
The Andhra Pradesh police claimed to have busted an espionage racket with links to Pakistan and arrested seven personnel of the Indian Navy in this connection.
ADVERTISEMENT
Press Trust of India
Press Trust of India
Amaravati(AP)
December 20, 2019
UPDATED: December 20, 2019 14:24 IST
Police sources in Amaravati said those arrested were being produced in court on Friday.
The Andhra Pradesh police on Friday claimed to have busted an espionage racket with links to Pakistan and arrested seven personnel of the Indian Navy in this connection.
A release from police said the Intelligence wing in concert with Central Intelligence agencies and Naval intelligence launched Operation Dolphin's Nose and unearthed the espionage racket.
"An FIR has been lodged and seven Navy personnel and a hawala operator have been arrested from different parts of the country. Some more suspects are being questioned," the police release said.
Investigation is on, it added, without further details.
Police sources here said those arrested were being produced in court on Friday.
(RAW AT WORK?)
Probably not, this is a counter intel op. so probably IB, LIU and DNI
avknight1408
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Seven personnel! Something very serious. Navy's many sensitive installations in vizag.
Assassin 2.0
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Can be related to recent theft from INS Vikrant?
Bosch
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Chapman_attack
As usual Pakistan is involved.
Dramatised in Zero dark Thirty(2012).
https://slate.com/culture/2013/01/z...e-characters-in-the-oscar-nominated-film.html
