Indian Special Forces (archived)

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abingdonboy

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Isn't the start of a SOCOM unit great news?

Regarding equipment, look how better equipment always makes its way to lower tier forces. See below the after effects of NSG training State Police SRU (Special Response Units) and crosstraining between the SRUs themselves.

NSG


View attachment 36390

View attachment 36391

View attachment 36392 View attachment 36393

State Police SRU (Special Response Unit)

View attachment 36394

View attachment 36395
View attachment 36396

View attachment 36397
SOD is not quite a SOCOM yet. It is more like JSOC for now. Hopefully one day India gets its own SOCOM but the SOD is surely a great step in the right direction and I hope things are done properly and they don’t just inherit left overs from parent units but get their own budget and buy their own brand new world class kit from the outset.

As for NSG, am very happy with their progress. There are just a few areas where they need improvements in terms of equipment.

But as @Unknowncommando 2 said now NSG is focusing on support equipment and training which is perhaps More important. NSG needs to stay on top of contemporary threats and the best way to respond to them.
 

ALBY

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SOD will only be used for the most high profile and strategic missions. That won’t change a thing. Vanilla SOF units will be doing the same job they do today in 10 years time.
What will happen to SG post SOD? Will they get absorbed into SOD or will remain outside its ambit just like CIA's SAG?
Does anyone have any odea about the training and duration about Special Group
@rkhanna @COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @abingdonboy @Unknowncommando 2
 

armyofhind

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What will happen to SG post SOD? Will they get absorbed into SOD or will remain outside its ambit just like CIA's SAG?
Does anyone have any odea about the training and duration about Special Group
@rkhanna @COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @abingdonboy @Unknowncommando 2
It's kept under wraps mostly.
I know that SF guys can apply for SG. And thereafter they undergo intelligence training for around 8 months.
Size of SG is not known but by estimate, around 200 guys.
 

MuzzleVelocity

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It is encouraging that the Indian army is sending a team to an international sniping competition. Should be a massive learning curve.
 

vampyrbladez

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Yes Im aware of that. I was answering the question on training and duration.
Unless you're Tibetian you don't have any training beyond tradecraft. If you're SF, you're on deputation. Remember Madras Cafe?
John Abraham's character was a Para SF on deputation to RAW.

Same goes for many shadow soldiers AFAIK.
 

rkhanna

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What will happen to SG post SOD? Will they get absorbed into SOD or will remain outside its ambit just like CIA's SAG?
Does anyone have any odea about the training and duration about Special Group
@rkhanna @COLDHEARTED AVIATOR @abingdonboy @Unknowncommando 2
It's kept under wraps mostly.
I know that SF guys can apply for SG. And thereafter they undergo intelligence training for around 8 months.
Size of SG is not known but by estimate, around 200 guys.
From what i have been told. 3 different Sources - each in the know - almost all had varying answers -

1. You cant opt for SG. Whenever positions open up a discrete enquiry is sent via SG Staff to various Infantry Commanders for recommendations. Post review 'selected' soldiers are approached to come to SG. If they wash out they RTU with a very very strict NDA/Official Secrets act etc

2. 6-8mths the new Joinees cant take part in active operations - Their training outside Physical training and continuous shooting drills (far higher rate than in SF) concentrates on Intel / Counter Intel Field Craft, UC operations, SSE, Cultivating Assets, ELINT, Computers etc

3. There is no formal selection process. Everything you do is ALWAYS being evaluated. you can be RTUd for the smallest thing.

4. AFAIK there is no fixed tenure. I have heard of guys do 3-4 years in SG and some selected for a very specific task and then RTUd once done. But i have heard that after a while SG themselves will ask for a break and RTU an operator before calling him back. The stress levels at SG are higher. (No Safety net)

5. Beyond that SG continue to train in various Vehicle handling (including Aircraft) and other mission specific training as needed - NEST, etc (not all SG components are NEST qualified)

6. The Downside is that SG MOE is very compartmentalized and with no permanent CADRE - institutional memory is weak and most of the time lies only with instructors and not leadership/NCOs


My 2 Paisa

- SG should continue to operate for RAW
- A Secondary SG unit (same capability) should be raised along the lines of the American (JSOC) ISA to Support SOD

There will be massive overlap in missions, training and equipment - There has to be a need for Jointness


PS - NOTE Above is a completely segregated and exclusive capability from our Vanilla SOF - WHICH will continue to suffer from no jointness, budget infighting and capability loss unless they are PUT under a Unified Command

SOFCOM and SOD should remain seperate


-
 

armyofhind

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You cant opt for SG. Whenever positions open up a discrete enquiry is sent via SG Staff to various Infantry Commanders for recommendations. Post review 'selected' soldiers are approached to come to SG.
Yup, that's what I know too. Known SG positions are applied for by the men in Para SF.
Post selection or review or whatever is th official terminology, they undergo intelligence specific training.

6-8mths the new Joinees cant take part in active operations - Their training outside Physical training and continuous shooting drills (far higher rate than in SF) concentrates on Intel / Counter Intel Field Craft, UC operations, SSE, Cultivating Assets, ELINT, Computers etc
Yup, 8 months is what I heard too.
I also heard that SG takes men who are already fairly experienced with SF.

SG should continue to operate for RAW
- A Secondary SG unit (same capability) should be raised along the lines of the American (JSOC) ISA to Support SOD
Totally second this. Talent and the specific skill set for SG should be retained within the unit and not lost through RTU. Atleast for some period after joining of the new recruits into SG.
I think that under the new setup,their role should be relegated primarily to Special Reconnaissance, with the offensive part of any operation being catered for by the SOD personnel.
Unless some target or intel input is extremely time sensitive.
 

rkhanna

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I also heard that SG takes men who are already fairly experienced with SF.
From What i have been told the Average age is 28-30. Basically soldiers who have displayed a way higher degree of intelligence and problem solving ability and outstanding leadership in the midst of continuous ops. Experience for SG is worth its weight in gold.

Keep in mind that the SG breaks down the modus of operanda from 5-6 man small units to 2 man teams and sometimes even solitary missions. Its a paradigm shift and outside of ability you need someone with a high degree of IQ (along with everything else) to manage the mission shift successfully
 

SatanHell

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Why Special Forces Of India, MARCOS & Para SF Are No Match To US Navy SEALs?



Why the Special Forces of India including MARCOS and Para SF are nowhere close to the US Navy SEALs and other Western Special Forces. Though MARCOS and Para SF commandos are more resilient and daring, however, the lack of resources impairs their operations and thus the success rate. So, how do the special forces of India, MARCOS & Para SF stand against the western counterparts? A EurAsian Times analysis.

There is an almost embarrassing lack of adequate acquisition within the elite regiments of the Special Forces of India. The Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and Paramilitary Special Forces (Para SF) are highly undervalued than their American counterpart – Navy SEALs.

The Indian Army’s wing of Special Force commandos called Para SF was created in 1966 during the Indo-Pakistan War (1965). They came in existence under a maverick military endeavour undertaken by Major Megh Singh who constituted a small group of lethal soldiers to operate behind enemy lines and thwart enemy defences.

The team was initially called the ‘Meghdoot Force’ owing to the ad-hoc nature of the operation under Major Megh Singh. This group was disbanded and joined with the Parachute Regiment, which became the first special operations unit.

The current strength of the Para SF stands around 5000-6000 personnel. The Para SF has participated in many combat operations including Operation Bluestar, conflict in the Maldives and the 1999 Kargil War. Para SF is considered one of the oldest special force of India having real combat experience.

Special Forces Of India – MARCOS ::

The Marine Commandos (MARCOS) is an elite force within the Indian Navy who are trained to perform missions on all terrains. In terms of capabilities, the MARCOS are the closest to that of the Navy SEALs.

Formerly known as Indian Marine Special Force, the group is said to be particularly specialised in maritime operations. With a strength around 2000, most of their operations remain classified.

Among the known active combat involvements, the group has participated in Operation Pawan (Sri Lanka-LTTE conflict), Operation Black Tornado (2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks) and the 1999 Kargil War. The training programme of the outfit is modelled around that of the Navy SEALs and harbours a lot of comparison in that line.

The combined capabilities of the special forces units like MARCOS and Para SF are effective in many situations of “unconventional combat.” These regiments are heavily involved in counter-insurgency operations and special reconnaissance for the Indian Navy and Indian Army respectively and national security sustenance as a whole.

These outfits are also heavily vested in hostage rescue operations, the difference being that MARCOS involves itself in mostly maritime environments while the Para SF largely seeks operations within and beyond Indian territories.

The MARCOS is heavily involved in clandestine operations on vital maritime assets behind enemy lines, amphibious operations and pre-assault ops in support of military operations. The Para SF, on the other hand, is involved in almost similar activities but on largely on land. They are involved in subversion and sabotage operations behind enemy lines along with covert and direct action operations.

Special Forces of India – Where are they Lacking?

Combat in recent times has achieved an aggregated impetus with growing tensions in different parts of the nation’s borders. In an attempt to combat this crisis, the armed forces have instituted elite regiments to cater to threats that might hamper India’s sovereignty.

The special forces of India such as the MARCOS (Marine Commandos – Indian Navy), PARA SF (Paramilitary Special Forces – Indian Army) find themselves ill-prepared in modern covert and direct warfare as compared to their American counterparts.

There is a glaring lack of modernisation within the special forces of the Indian military. There is a major setback in the weapons of warfare with the Para SF using the Israeli TAR 21 Tavor, Israeli rifle that fails to give the same impact than the use of arms by the Navy SEALs.

More often than not, the ammunitions provided to the Navy SEALs are largely technically sound and highly modernised. There is a great use of technology and amalgamation of tactile arms use and modern resources.

There is a lack of equipment and weapons within Indian special forces. Where the Navy SEALs have M88 .50 PIP and M-14 sniper rifles and AT4 anti-tank rockets, the Para SF finds themselves highly undermined with most of their kit supplied by the Ordnance Factory Board.

There is a lack of good anti-material rifles, long-range sniper rifles. A common complaint within the special forces outfits in the military is the lack of regiment specific equipment which is solely dedicated to the particular unit of the special forces.

Commenting on the Bin Laden mission by the Navy SEALs, an Indian SF officer pointed out (as per secondary research by the EurAsian Times) that the entire mission was carried out in Special Operations Black Hawk helicopters. The officer suggested, “We can only boast of Mi-17V5 transport choppers which too are not dedicated for us.”

Special Forces of India – What’s Going Wrong?

There is a lack of coordination within the command circles for these forces as a result of which there is a lack of cohesiveness in their response. There is a separate intelligence wing for each special forces outfit which makes it chaotic to pass and share information for effective execution of the mission.

Apart from an overall lack of coordination, there are rampant turf wars that often end up in wasteful expenditure. An example is, the purchase of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) by the Air Force, Army and Navy in that order. Each of these was bought at different prices from Israel unmindful of the repair and maintenance costs.

It is rumoured that most of the acquired UAVs now collect dust in some military warehouse. There is an argument to be made for a centralised authority among the Special Forces units of all faction of the military. This system is followed by the US Navy SEALs and other Special Force units under the aegis of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

The JSOC has all the special operatives under its wing and directly reports to the US Secretary of Defence and the President while carrying out its missions. There is a need to free the Indian special forces from the trampling Indian bureaucracy of the Defence Ministry and allow them to acquire weapons and services by vesting spending on to their command.

The extensive delay to even acquire a rifle maims the purpose of the elite nature of the outfit. The newly raised 11 and 12 Para SF units were found to deployed with basic infantry weapons in the North-East and lacked enough weapons to carry out the operation.

MARCOS has been asking for special platform V-22 Osprey helicopters which can stealthily take small teams in and out of terrains, which was shot down and almost entirely disregarded in the alleys of defence bureaucratic circus.

Special Forces of India – Lacking Technology?

The major difference between the Navy SEALs and the special forces of India (MARCOS, Para SF) is the fact that the SEALs are involved in a heavily centralised chain of command. Their missions take a national value and any and every instrument is left at their disposal.

This does not seem to be the case with the special forces of India. Another factor is the fact that there is heavy investment in modernisation tendencies within the US and this spills over to the military spending as well. The investment in UAVs and such arms and ammunitions that are largely driven by technology are seen as tactical advantages on the ground.

The units tend to have a better knowledge of the domain than their Indian counterparts due to artificially available and highly capable alternatives. There is also the added advantage of experience in combat that the Navy SEALs can boast about. The most recent teams have been involved in more than 20 years of collective combat experience.

It is an important advantage that the special forces of India lack, comparatively. It is also important to factor in the tightly knit relationship between the CIA and JSOC which helps in the effective execution of any mission. The coordinated efforts of intelligence agencies, defence innovation industry and the operatives make for easy execution.

The state of coordinated efforts in Indian special forces circles is abysmal as it is maimed by a turf war, bracketed lines of communications with each wing having its trail of intelligence. There is a lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence. The ineffectiveness of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to innovate due to never-ending red tape and jingoism leads to further shoddiness in work ethic and therefore precision-driven results.

There is the fact that in recent times, the value of these elite forces has been degrading consistently. The elite status bestowed upon these operatives owing to their specific training for carrying out specific operations is being undermined.

It is found that nowadays the special forces personnel are being utilised as lower corps formation in infantry battalions. There is a decadent inability to see the value of special forces operative as a strategic asset rather than a tactical asset.

It is imperative that the Indian special forces are kept away from Cordon and Search Operations (CASO) and daily counter-terror operations. At a time when the world is seen to utilise tactical gear and highly modernised machinery, Indian forces still seem to live in the world of using Maruti Gypsy.

It is important that the special forces acquire the state of the art technology to combat the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat of the modern world. Essentially, Indian special forces need the technology of tomorrow and not yesterday to come at par with the US Navy Seals.

There must be an increase in training opportunities in foreign countries. The ramping up of Para SF, MARCOS and other Indian SF units training sessions with US Army SF, Navy SEALs, Sayeret Matkal and the British SAS. The involvement of the unorthodox but effective tactics of the Russian Spetsnaz have seen to take effect in modern warfare, the Indian units can gain from engaging with these foreign outfits.

Improvements in Special Forces of India ::

In recent years, there have been some improvements in the initiatives taken for the sake of the Indian Special Forces. The recent constitution for central command, Armed Forces Special Operations Division, has taken shape.

Major General AK Dhingra is said to helm the initiative and this division would be the first point of contact for major counter-terrorist operations. This division would have a strength of 3000 personnel drawn from all special forces services in the country. There are reports that the said Armed Forces Special Operations Division would have its coordinated cyber agency to collect, coordinate and execute intelligence for any given operation.

In terms of weaponry, the special forces can see an upgrade with the purchase of new long-range sniper rifles and portable anti-tank systems and modernisation efforts to the clandestine warfare arm. The government has called for specialised weaponry from Finland, Germany, Sweden, Israel and Russia.

According to sources, more attention is being paid to elite forces as a result of growing insurgency near the borders. Contracts for new Finnish Sako sniper rifles, Swedish Carl Gustaf Mark-4 lightweight rocket-launchers, Italian Beretta pistols with silencers, for instance, have been inked for the Army’s existing nine Para-SF battalions, suggests sources.

Russian VSS suppressed sniper rifles, air-droppable rubberised inflatable boats, remotely operated underwater vehicles for explosive disposal, combat free-fall parachutes, hands-free power ascenders and opposed boarding equipment are all in the pipe for the MARCOS.

There is no doubt in the capabilities of the Indian special forces especially MARCOS and Para SF. In terms of physical and intellectual abilities during combat, the Indian elite soldiers are at par or if not better than their US counterparts.

Modern warfare isn’t just about grit anymore, there are many moving pieces and technological integration that gives an edge on the ground. If special forces of India wishes to reach the standards of the Navy SEALs, British SAS or Russian Alpha Group, it is important that the system is overhauled. The debilitatingly chronic delays on items as fundamental as parachutes and new rifles stifle the morale of the officers. Until these glaring holes in the bureaucracy are not addressed, India may never truly realise the full potential of MARCOS and Para SF.

http://defencenews.in/article/Why-S...-Para-SF-Are-No-Match-To-US-Navy-SEALs-586147
 

armyofhind

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Why Special Forces Of India, MARCOS & Para SF Are No Match To US Navy SEALs?



Why the Special Forces of India including MARCOS and Para SF are nowhere close to the US Navy SEALs and other Western Special Forces. Though MARCOS and Para SF commandos are more resilient and daring, however, the lack of resources impairs their operations and thus the success rate. So, how do the special forces of India, MARCOS & Para SF stand against the western counterparts? A EurAsian Times analysis.

There is an almost embarrassing lack of adequate acquisition within the elite regiments of the Special Forces of India. The Marine Commandos (MARCOS) and Paramilitary Special Forces (Para SF) are highly undervalued than their American counterpart – Navy SEALs.

The Indian Army’s wing of Special Force commandos called Para SF was created in 1966 during the Indo-Pakistan War (1965). They came in existence under a maverick military endeavour undertaken by Major Megh Singh who constituted a small group of lethal soldiers to operate behind enemy lines and thwart enemy defences.

The team was initially called the ‘Meghdoot Force’ owing to the ad-hoc nature of the operation under Major Megh Singh. This group was disbanded and joined with the Parachute Regiment, which became the first special operations unit.

The current strength of the Para SF stands around 5000-6000 personnel. The Para SF has participated in many combat operations including Operation Bluestar, conflict in the Maldives and the 1999 Kargil War. Para SF is considered one of the oldest special force of India having real combat experience.

Special Forces Of India – MARCOS ::

The Marine Commandos (MARCOS) is an elite force within the Indian Navy who are trained to perform missions on all terrains. In terms of capabilities, the MARCOS are the closest to that of the Navy SEALs.

Formerly known as Indian Marine Special Force, the group is said to be particularly specialised in maritime operations. With a strength around 2000, most of their operations remain classified.

Among the known active combat involvements, the group has participated in Operation Pawan (Sri Lanka-LTTE conflict), Operation Black Tornado (2008 Mumbai Terror Attacks) and the 1999 Kargil War. The training programme of the outfit is modelled around that of the Navy SEALs and harbours a lot of comparison in that line.

The combined capabilities of the special forces units like MARCOS and Para SF are effective in many situations of “unconventional combat.” These regiments are heavily involved in counter-insurgency operations and special reconnaissance for the Indian Navy and Indian Army respectively and national security sustenance as a whole.

These outfits are also heavily vested in hostage rescue operations, the difference being that MARCOS involves itself in mostly maritime environments while the Para SF largely seeks operations within and beyond Indian territories.

The MARCOS is heavily involved in clandestine operations on vital maritime assets behind enemy lines, amphibious operations and pre-assault ops in support of military operations. The Para SF, on the other hand, is involved in almost similar activities but on largely on land. They are involved in subversion and sabotage operations behind enemy lines along with covert and direct action operations.

Special Forces of India – Where are they Lacking?

Combat in recent times has achieved an aggregated impetus with growing tensions in different parts of the nation’s borders. In an attempt to combat this crisis, the armed forces have instituted elite regiments to cater to threats that might hamper India’s sovereignty.

The special forces of India such as the MARCOS (Marine Commandos – Indian Navy), PARA SF (Paramilitary Special Forces – Indian Army) find themselves ill-prepared in modern covert and direct warfare as compared to their American counterparts.

There is a glaring lack of modernisation within the special forces of the Indian military. There is a major setback in the weapons of warfare with the Para SF using the Israeli TAR 21 Tavor, Israeli rifle that fails to give the same impact than the use of arms by the Navy SEALs.

More often than not, the ammunitions provided to the Navy SEALs are largely technically sound and highly modernised. There is a great use of technology and amalgamation of tactile arms use and modern resources.

There is a lack of equipment and weapons within Indian special forces. Where the Navy SEALs have M88 .50 PIP and M-14 sniper rifles and AT4 anti-tank rockets, the Para SF finds themselves highly undermined with most of their kit supplied by the Ordnance Factory Board.

There is a lack of good anti-material rifles, long-range sniper rifles. A common complaint within the special forces outfits in the military is the lack of regiment specific equipment which is solely dedicated to the particular unit of the special forces.

Commenting on the Bin Laden mission by the Navy SEALs, an Indian SF officer pointed out (as per secondary research by the EurAsian Times) that the entire mission was carried out in Special Operations Black Hawk helicopters. The officer suggested, “We can only boast of Mi-17V5 transport choppers which too are not dedicated for us.”

Special Forces of India – What’s Going Wrong?

There is a lack of coordination within the command circles for these forces as a result of which there is a lack of cohesiveness in their response. There is a separate intelligence wing for each special forces outfit which makes it chaotic to pass and share information for effective execution of the mission.

Apart from an overall lack of coordination, there are rampant turf wars that often end up in wasteful expenditure. An example is, the purchase of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs) by the Air Force, Army and Navy in that order. Each of these was bought at different prices from Israel unmindful of the repair and maintenance costs.

It is rumoured that most of the acquired UAVs now collect dust in some military warehouse. There is an argument to be made for a centralised authority among the Special Forces units of all faction of the military. This system is followed by the US Navy SEALs and other Special Force units under the aegis of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

The JSOC has all the special operatives under its wing and directly reports to the US Secretary of Defence and the President while carrying out its missions. There is a need to free the Indian special forces from the trampling Indian bureaucracy of the Defence Ministry and allow them to acquire weapons and services by vesting spending on to their command.

The extensive delay to even acquire a rifle maims the purpose of the elite nature of the outfit. The newly raised 11 and 12 Para SF units were found to deployed with basic infantry weapons in the North-East and lacked enough weapons to carry out the operation.

MARCOS has been asking for special platform V-22 Osprey helicopters which can stealthily take small teams in and out of terrains, which was shot down and almost entirely disregarded in the alleys of defence bureaucratic circus.

Special Forces of India – Lacking Technology?

The major difference between the Navy SEALs and the special forces of India (MARCOS, Para SF) is the fact that the SEALs are involved in a heavily centralised chain of command. Their missions take a national value and any and every instrument is left at their disposal.

This does not seem to be the case with the special forces of India. Another factor is the fact that there is heavy investment in modernisation tendencies within the US and this spills over to the military spending as well. The investment in UAVs and such arms and ammunitions that are largely driven by technology are seen as tactical advantages on the ground.

The units tend to have a better knowledge of the domain than their Indian counterparts due to artificially available and highly capable alternatives. There is also the added advantage of experience in combat that the Navy SEALs can boast about. The most recent teams have been involved in more than 20 years of collective combat experience.

It is an important advantage that the special forces of India lack, comparatively. It is also important to factor in the tightly knit relationship between the CIA and JSOC which helps in the effective execution of any mission. The coordinated efforts of intelligence agencies, defence innovation industry and the operatives make for easy execution.

The state of coordinated efforts in Indian special forces circles is abysmal as it is maimed by a turf war, bracketed lines of communications with each wing having its trail of intelligence. There is a lack of coordination and sharing of intelligence. The ineffectiveness of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to innovate due to never-ending red tape and jingoism leads to further shoddiness in work ethic and therefore precision-driven results.

There is the fact that in recent times, the value of these elite forces has been degrading consistently. The elite status bestowed upon these operatives owing to their specific training for carrying out specific operations is being undermined.

It is found that nowadays the special forces personnel are being utilised as lower corps formation in infantry battalions. There is a decadent inability to see the value of special forces operative as a strategic asset rather than a tactical asset.

It is imperative that the Indian special forces are kept away from Cordon and Search Operations (CASO) and daily counter-terror operations. At a time when the world is seen to utilise tactical gear and highly modernised machinery, Indian forces still seem to live in the world of using Maruti Gypsy.

It is important that the special forces acquire the state of the art technology to combat the dynamic nature of the terrorist threat of the modern world. Essentially, Indian special forces need the technology of tomorrow and not yesterday to come at par with the US Navy Seals.

There must be an increase in training opportunities in foreign countries. The ramping up of Para SF, MARCOS and other Indian SF units training sessions with US Army SF, Navy SEALs, Sayeret Matkal and the British SAS. The involvement of the unorthodox but effective tactics of the Russian Spetsnaz have seen to take effect in modern warfare, the Indian units can gain from engaging with these foreign outfits.

Improvements in Special Forces of India ::

In recent years, there have been some improvements in the initiatives taken for the sake of the Indian Special Forces. The recent constitution for central command, Armed Forces Special Operations Division, has taken shape.

Major General AK Dhingra is said to helm the initiative and this division would be the first point of contact for major counter-terrorist operations. This division would have a strength of 3000 personnel drawn from all special forces services in the country. There are reports that the said Armed Forces Special Operations Division would have its coordinated cyber agency to collect, coordinate and execute intelligence for any given operation.

In terms of weaponry, the special forces can see an upgrade with the purchase of new long-range sniper rifles and portable anti-tank systems and modernisation efforts to the clandestine warfare arm. The government has called for specialised weaponry from Finland, Germany, Sweden, Israel and Russia.

According to sources, more attention is being paid to elite forces as a result of growing insurgency near the borders. Contracts for new Finnish Sako sniper rifles, Swedish Carl Gustaf Mark-4 lightweight rocket-launchers, Italian Beretta pistols with silencers, for instance, have been inked for the Army’s existing nine Para-SF battalions, suggests sources.

Russian VSS suppressed sniper rifles, air-droppable rubberised inflatable boats, remotely operated underwater vehicles for explosive disposal, combat free-fall parachutes, hands-free power ascenders and opposed boarding equipment are all in the pipe for the MARCOS.

There is no doubt in the capabilities of the Indian special forces especially MARCOS and Para SF. In terms of physical and intellectual abilities during combat, the Indian elite soldiers are at par or if not better than their US counterparts.

Modern warfare isn’t just about grit anymore, there are many moving pieces and technological integration that gives an edge on the ground. If special forces of India wishes to reach the standards of the Navy SEALs, British SAS or Russian Alpha Group, it is important that the system is overhauled. The debilitatingly chronic delays on items as fundamental as parachutes and new rifles stifle the morale of the officers. Until these glaring holes in the bureaucracy are not addressed, India may never truly realise the full potential of MARCOS and Para SF.

http://defencenews.in/article/Why-S...-Para-SF-Are-No-Match-To-US-Navy-SEALs-586147
I was just about to say what rkhanna did.

No point reading defencenews because first of all, their writing style is childish. And secondly, their articles are far from the truth.
 

rkhanna

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Thats old - Was a command failure. Before this "Scandal" and post the Men and women of the SFF have done outstanding things and have demonstrated a real Mountain Asymmetrical Warfare Capability.

That being said. I wont go into the motivations and details of the articles above - But do note the date/year and do a quick check of when the TSD "scandal" was revealed. Not going to mention more on the matter.
 

armyofhind

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Thats old - Was a command failure. Before this "Scandal" and post the Men and women of the SFF have done outstanding things and have demonstrated a real Mountain Asymmetrical Warfare Capability.

That being said. I wont go into the motivations and details of the articles above - But do note the date/year and do a quick check of when the TSD "scandal" was revealed. Not going to mention more on the matter.
It's an outright attempt at a political hitjob.

By the way, this is the same guy who's here.
https://www.newslaundry.com/2016/06/22/oops-dilip-bobb-did-it-again

So who's to question his credibility right?
#justsaying
 

vampyrbladez

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Thats old - Was a command failure. Before this "Scandal" and post the Men and women of the SFF have done outstanding things and have demonstrated a real Mountain Asymmetrical Warfare Capability.

That being said. I wont go into the motivations and details of the articles above - But do note the date/year and do a quick check of when the TSD "scandal" was revealed. Not going to mention more on the matter.
Nope. They have been used flawlessly in 1965 and 1971 war.

https://scroll.in/article/758465/forget-orop-tibetan-war-veterans-arent-even-getting-pensions

http://www.thetibetpost.com/en/feat...s-life-in-exile-and-china-s-invasion-of-tibet

The entire intelligence and unrest network in Tibet wasted away. We could have turned Tibet into China's Kashmir but sat on our asses till China has developed tools for mind control and 24x7x365 live tracking of it's citizenry.

Now under Modi the entire thing is getting revamped. SSB (Special Service Bureau) has been revived.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/wap.bu...ove-to-ib-for-special-ops-118121800876_1.html
 
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