The success of afghanistan lies in pakistan.decimate pakistan one will automatically slove afghanistan.USSR,USA did same mistakes so they slogged it out in afghanistan.BTW Todays russia and china have their own gameplan in afghanistan .they said no to usa doesnt mean they are not in the game coz they are are afraid of afghan quagmire.they are right there playing their own games and parts.like in 1980 usa was the hidden hand in afghanistan.or like 19 vietnam war china/ussr were the hidden players.there are many players in afghanistan including saudi arab and iran along with central asian republic.secondly if india has relations with usa israel why does it matter to jehadis even if india doesnt have relation with both jehadi even then will attack india.coz we for them are another kafirs in their ideology to be attacked.BTW we indian care about a lot it i do this what others will think.
Indian Role in Afghanistan
- Thread starter A.V.
- Start date
Rahul Singh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Mar 30, 2009
- Messages
- 3,652
- Likes
- 5,790
You never know which side a camel will sit.
Rahul Singh
Senior Member
- Joined
- Mar 30, 2009
- Messages
- 3,652
- Likes
- 5,790
Indian envoys in Afghanistan face kidnap threat
TNN, Mar 13, 2010
NEW DELHI: After unarmed Indian citizens, Indian diplomats in Afghanistan are now under threat from Pakistan-supported terrorists.
According to government sources, India has received "credible" intelligence inputs on a terrorist plot to abduct Indian diplomats.
Coming against the backdrop of a determined effort by ISI to terrorise India into withdrawing from Afghanistan, India has taken the threat seriously, rushing 40 ITBP personnel to ramp up security of its diplomatic corps in Afghanistan.
The diplomats, an eyesore for Pakistan since their effort to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure has enhanced India's appeal in the country Islamabad considers its backyard, have been asked to be vigilant.
While Indian officials have been under constant threat in Afghanistan, the recent spate of intelligence inputs comes in the wake of the February 25 attack on Indians in Kabul.
The fear is also because of the track record of Pakistan-backed terror groups. Several years ago, they had massacred members of Iran's mission in Afghanistan.
An Indian diplomat in Afghanistan would be a huge prize for the Taliban and their Pakistani handlers, sources said.
Apart from everything else, it would create the kind of diplomatic crisis between India and Pakistan that would serve as a pretext for Pakistan to take its attention off the Taliban and the US campaign.
India sees the threat as coming principally from Pakistan's terror groups like the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba which are being used against India.
The Haqqanis are Pakistan's favourite Taliban group. Pakistan's army, seeing a growing advantage for itself in Afghanistan, is now more determined than ever to get India out of that country. After two attempts to attack the Indian embassy in Kabul, the Taliban have been training their sights on Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.
Since the Indian embassy in Kabul is deemed to be reasonably secure, the additional personnel will be deployed in nearby areas with guesthouses and other residential quarters being used by Indian officials and their family members.
A senior official said, "A team of security/intelligence officials will soon go to Afghanistan to make detailed assessment of security arrangements at Indian establishments in Kabul, Kandahar and other cities. More forces will be sent, if needed, in due course."
At present, 163 ITBP personnel are deployed at the Indian embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.
TNN, Mar 13, 2010
NEW DELHI: After unarmed Indian citizens, Indian diplomats in Afghanistan are now under threat from Pakistan-supported terrorists.
According to government sources, India has received "credible" intelligence inputs on a terrorist plot to abduct Indian diplomats.
Coming against the backdrop of a determined effort by ISI to terrorise India into withdrawing from Afghanistan, India has taken the threat seriously, rushing 40 ITBP personnel to ramp up security of its diplomatic corps in Afghanistan.
The diplomats, an eyesore for Pakistan since their effort to rebuild Afghanistan's infrastructure has enhanced India's appeal in the country Islamabad considers its backyard, have been asked to be vigilant.
While Indian officials have been under constant threat in Afghanistan, the recent spate of intelligence inputs comes in the wake of the February 25 attack on Indians in Kabul.
The fear is also because of the track record of Pakistan-backed terror groups. Several years ago, they had massacred members of Iran's mission in Afghanistan.
An Indian diplomat in Afghanistan would be a huge prize for the Taliban and their Pakistani handlers, sources said.
Apart from everything else, it would create the kind of diplomatic crisis between India and Pakistan that would serve as a pretext for Pakistan to take its attention off the Taliban and the US campaign.
India sees the threat as coming principally from Pakistan's terror groups like the Haqqani network and the Lashkar-e-Taiba which are being used against India.
The Haqqanis are Pakistan's favourite Taliban group. Pakistan's army, seeing a growing advantage for itself in Afghanistan, is now more determined than ever to get India out of that country. After two attempts to attack the Indian embassy in Kabul, the Taliban have been training their sights on Indian consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad.
Since the Indian embassy in Kabul is deemed to be reasonably secure, the additional personnel will be deployed in nearby areas with guesthouses and other residential quarters being used by Indian officials and their family members.
A senior official said, "A team of security/intelligence officials will soon go to Afghanistan to make detailed assessment of security arrangements at Indian establishments in Kabul, Kandahar and other cities. More forces will be sent, if needed, in due course."
At present, 163 ITBP personnel are deployed at the Indian embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.
Lisa Curtis' point in Taliban Reconciliation: Obama Administration Must Be Clear And Firm is clear, but so far US indications are that they do not intend to follow that advice. It might be a bit of this and a bit of that, but not quite! pakistan has offered the tired, effette American leadership of a sort of victory without too much more of costs - and the leadership, tired and bumbling it is, seems to find the prospect tantalising!
(pakistan OTOH, makes the usual mistake of punching above its weight - it might put up unacceptably high prices that might eventually be its undoing - but then this thread is about Afghanistan!) India's options seem limited. Having taken a clear stance against placing military on the ground (for whatever reasons- good or bad), the role will be similar to that Japan - aid giver, hard worker but always reviled and derided behind the back, and with zero influence! However we may feel, a bit of retreat is inevitable. We can keep up the dialog with the players and seek to influence through them. But right now, on that count pakistan's cards are stronger. Any request from them will be have to be conceded by practically all the players.
The objectives of US / UK / NATO and that of Iran / Afghanistan (as in current leadership) do not coincide. pakistan seeks to join the side that will pay more. China and Central Asian states seem to be hedging by playing both sides. Russian also hedging their bet with pakistan as indicative of Putin's speech in delhi as he advices new delhi to recognise pakistan's effort in curbing terror as seen in this article: Old allies, new friendship . India is definitely isolated. In the long run though, we can recover. Good work done and the links established will eventually pay off. But short term retreat appears inevitable. Medium term chaos too appears quite likely. India currently has a leadership that has no stomach for these kinds of things - this is the problem with placing non political academics (Manmohan Singh,PM) and failed local politicians (SM KRISHNA, the external affairs minister) in power. A successful politician would have fought many such fights in his/ her career, and will have his/her adrenalin pump at the situation. But I cannot see economists or local caste leaders doing that (hell, even Gurus like K. Subrahmanyam sing a new song!).
(pakistan OTOH, makes the usual mistake of punching above its weight - it might put up unacceptably high prices that might eventually be its undoing - but then this thread is about Afghanistan!) India's options seem limited. Having taken a clear stance against placing military on the ground (for whatever reasons- good or bad), the role will be similar to that Japan - aid giver, hard worker but always reviled and derided behind the back, and with zero influence! However we may feel, a bit of retreat is inevitable. We can keep up the dialog with the players and seek to influence through them. But right now, on that count pakistan's cards are stronger. Any request from them will be have to be conceded by practically all the players.
The objectives of US / UK / NATO and that of Iran / Afghanistan (as in current leadership) do not coincide. pakistan seeks to join the side that will pay more. China and Central Asian states seem to be hedging by playing both sides. Russian also hedging their bet with pakistan as indicative of Putin's speech in delhi as he advices new delhi to recognise pakistan's effort in curbing terror as seen in this article: Old allies, new friendship . India is definitely isolated. In the long run though, we can recover. Good work done and the links established will eventually pay off. But short term retreat appears inevitable. Medium term chaos too appears quite likely. India currently has a leadership that has no stomach for these kinds of things - this is the problem with placing non political academics (Manmohan Singh,PM) and failed local politicians (SM KRISHNA, the external affairs minister) in power. A successful politician would have fought many such fights in his/ her career, and will have his/her adrenalin pump at the situation. But I cannot see economists or local caste leaders doing that (hell, even Gurus like K. Subrahmanyam sing a new song!).
Last edited:
gogbot
Regular Member
- Joined
- Oct 2, 2009
- Messages
- 937
- Likes
- 120
Indians nervous after Kabul attacks
Indians nervous after Kabul attacks
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8575745.stm
An Afghan policeman carries his machine gun at scene of attacks 26 Feb 2010
The attacks targeted an area popular with foreigners
By Sambuddha Mitra Mustafi
BBC News, Kabul
These days, the once thriving outpatient clinic at Afghanistan's leading hospital in the capital, Kabul, is shut - and the doctors are away.
A dozen Indian doctors and paramedics who run the clinic at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health have also left, leaving the patients in the lurch.
They were shaken after a suicide attack in the city last month killed one of their own - a young doctor from India's north-eastern state of Manipur.
Seventeen people were killed in the 26 February attack on a number of guest houses in the Shar-i-Naw area. Seven of them, including the doctor, were Indians.
Cutting back
The doctors are not the only ones who have left Kabul after the latest attack, which many believe targeted Indians.
Robin Ghosh
"I get scared every time there is a blast or an attack"
Robin Ghosh, Waiter
An Indian company setting up mobile phone networks has decided to cut its Indian staff to 30 employees from 50 before the attacks.
"We will cut back on Indian employees and employ more locals," says Murali Shankar, who heads the Afghan operations of the firm. The firm already employs 50 Afghan employees.
The latest attack in Kabul has shaken the 3,500-odd Indians working in Afghanistan. They are mostly working on government-funded infrastructure and humanitarian projects.
India is one of Afghanistan's largest donors - it has pledged $1.3bn in development assistance.
Analysts say that India's arch-rival Pakistan is uneasy with its neighbour's expanding influence and reach.
Reports in India have blamed Pakistan-based groups of being behind two attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul over the past two years and the 26 February attacks. Pakistan has denied such reports.
Indian workers confess that they are shaken by the attacks, especially the most recent ones.
"I get very scared every time there is a blast or an attack. I heard that the blast in February targeted Indians. Now I don't go out at all, nor do I speak to many locals," says Robin Ghosh, who works as a waiter in a Kabul curry house.
Mr Ghosh says he came to Kabul to work because the pay is much better - he earns $250 a month here, more than double what he earns at home.
Afghan concerns
He may be staying on to help keep the curry house running, but the departure of Indian doctors - authorities say it is a temporary measure - has hit Kabul's hospital hard.
The doctors treated some 250 patients every day at the out-patient department, many of them suffering from terminal diseases.
"Angry patients ask us why the Indian doctors have left," says Dr Noorulhaq Yousafzai, chief of the hospital.
"Their treatment and medicines were free of cost as they were funded by the Indian government - the same medicines are either unavailable or very expensive here," he says.
Embassy officials hope the doctors will return in a month's time.
"We are just waiting for an adequate number of volunteers," an official said.
The deserted outpatient department of Kabul hospital
They also dismiss a rash of media reports suggesting that India is scaling down its presence in Afghanistan.
Security has been tightened in places where Indians live and work, officials say.
India has already built a 218km (135-mile) road linking the south-western border town of Zaranj with the town of Delaram and completed work on a 200km (124-mile) electricity line from Uzbekistan to Kabul.
Indians are also building the new Afghan parliament in Kabul and the Salma dam in Herat province.
"There are no plans on reducing or downsizing our staff strength or our assistance programmes," an embassy official said.
Some names in the article have been changed to protect identities
Indians nervous after Kabul attacks
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8575745.stm
An Afghan policeman carries his machine gun at scene of attacks 26 Feb 2010
The attacks targeted an area popular with foreigners
By Sambuddha Mitra Mustafi
BBC News, Kabul
These days, the once thriving outpatient clinic at Afghanistan's leading hospital in the capital, Kabul, is shut - and the doctors are away.
A dozen Indian doctors and paramedics who run the clinic at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health have also left, leaving the patients in the lurch.
They were shaken after a suicide attack in the city last month killed one of their own - a young doctor from India's north-eastern state of Manipur.
Seventeen people were killed in the 26 February attack on a number of guest houses in the Shar-i-Naw area. Seven of them, including the doctor, were Indians.
Cutting back
The doctors are not the only ones who have left Kabul after the latest attack, which many believe targeted Indians.
Robin Ghosh
"I get scared every time there is a blast or an attack"
Robin Ghosh, Waiter
An Indian company setting up mobile phone networks has decided to cut its Indian staff to 30 employees from 50 before the attacks.
"We will cut back on Indian employees and employ more locals," says Murali Shankar, who heads the Afghan operations of the firm. The firm already employs 50 Afghan employees.
The latest attack in Kabul has shaken the 3,500-odd Indians working in Afghanistan. They are mostly working on government-funded infrastructure and humanitarian projects.
India is one of Afghanistan's largest donors - it has pledged $1.3bn in development assistance.
Analysts say that India's arch-rival Pakistan is uneasy with its neighbour's expanding influence and reach.
Reports in India have blamed Pakistan-based groups of being behind two attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul over the past two years and the 26 February attacks. Pakistan has denied such reports.
Indian workers confess that they are shaken by the attacks, especially the most recent ones.
"I get very scared every time there is a blast or an attack. I heard that the blast in February targeted Indians. Now I don't go out at all, nor do I speak to many locals," says Robin Ghosh, who works as a waiter in a Kabul curry house.
Mr Ghosh says he came to Kabul to work because the pay is much better - he earns $250 a month here, more than double what he earns at home.
Afghan concerns
He may be staying on to help keep the curry house running, but the departure of Indian doctors - authorities say it is a temporary measure - has hit Kabul's hospital hard.
The doctors treated some 250 patients every day at the out-patient department, many of them suffering from terminal diseases.
"Angry patients ask us why the Indian doctors have left," says Dr Noorulhaq Yousafzai, chief of the hospital.
"Their treatment and medicines were free of cost as they were funded by the Indian government - the same medicines are either unavailable or very expensive here," he says.
Embassy officials hope the doctors will return in a month's time.
"We are just waiting for an adequate number of volunteers," an official said.
The deserted outpatient department of Kabul hospital
They also dismiss a rash of media reports suggesting that India is scaling down its presence in Afghanistan.
Security has been tightened in places where Indians live and work, officials say.
India has already built a 218km (135-mile) road linking the south-western border town of Zaranj with the town of Delaram and completed work on a 200km (124-mile) electricity line from Uzbekistan to Kabul.
Indians are also building the new Afghan parliament in Kabul and the Salma dam in Herat province.
"There are no plans on reducing or downsizing our staff strength or our assistance programmes," an embassy official said.
Some names in the article have been changed to protect identities
Last edited:
IMO, I do not want indian troops in afghanistan on a combat role, yes a small contigent can be there with an operational command coordinating with the us and afghan authorities to protect indian assets, the number can be increased. We should avoid being pulled into the the fight against taliban. We should be thinking of sending in our troops for combat only if taliban link to terrorist attacks in india are established..!!!!
nandu
Senior Member
- Joined
- Oct 5, 2009
- Messages
- 1,913
- Likes
- 163
Af-Pak and India’s Strategic Innocence
If the grand design of the Manmohan Singh government is to forge peace with Pakistan as a liberating step in our sub-continental rivalry, India should surely be more understanding of Pakistani sensitivities in Afghanistan and its larger paranoia. Can a nation which has been done in once in the past, of course largely by its own blunders but also with some strategic help from India (the creation of Bangladesh), afford on its Western borders a government which is seen to be kowtowing to India? Much of this haranguing about strategic depth is nothing but a desperate desire in Pakistan for a friendly dispensation on its West, so that it is free from the fear of being destabilized from the rear. India’s good friend Hamid Karzai himself has alluded to the reality of the triangular matrix by describing Afghanistan and Pakistan as “conjoint twins” with India being a mere “friend.” In the dance for influence and power, therefore, why not gracefully allow the “twin” a larger role? Unless of course there are overwhelming compulsions of national interest, in which case we must recognize the prevalent hardball, take necessary risks and act with far greater persuasion and resolve so as to apply soft and hard power in an appropriate mix to get a foothold in the emerging power dynamic. The problem with India’s posture is that we seem to be shying away from the existing realities and simply hoping that economic engagement alone will secure our interests. It takes some strategic innocence to aspire for influence in a country as dangerous, conspiratorial and bloody as Afghanistan, without being willing to muddy our boots. And it is plainly ridiculous to expect Mr. Jayant Prasad and a lone military attaché to match the power and guile of Jallaluddin Haqqani and Shuja Pasha. If we seek greater influence in Afghanistan, we need to recognize the salience of military drivers therein and leverage our capacities accordingly. And if we are unwilling or unable to do so, simply and gracefully stay out. The reason we seem to be falling in between two stools is because we seek influence while being unwilling to take attendant risks (reiterating our resolve to stay engaged times without number, without spelling out as to how precisely we shall secure our interests).
India’s engagement in Afghanistan has been based on a set of soft choices - economic, infrastructural, developmental and humanitarian assistance (an estimated 4000 Indians are involved in the reconstruction effort with an investment of 1.3 billion dollars) with security guarantees coming from the Karzai government and its infantile tools. We eschewed a more deterministic military role for ourselves, even though short of direct military committal we could have done much more to shape the security dynamic in Afghanistan. We could have opted for greater involvement - through some direct military diplomacy and a broad based training commitment for instance (a stake in the planned training of 300,000 ANA/ANP personnel by 2013 is of course a gargantuan challenge but also a huge opportunity), so that we had friends, linkages and far greater leverage in the emerging security framework, but we chose not to. There were many who had cautioned against the adoption of this effete strategic outlook, whereby, even as we kept on enlarging our civilian engagement we did not do enough to shore up attendant security concerns, but we hung on to our bravado. There were others who advocated keeping channels open with some elements in the Taliban leadership but their calls went unheeded, defying not only common sense but also mathematical logic. The Taliban, it bears reiteration, represents the Pashtuns - the single largest ethnic identity in Afghanistan numbering about 40 million - how can you simply refuse to do business with such a numerically significant entity? Today, many liberal Pashtuns complain that India did not back them strongly enough. Of course, the choices were never and are still not easy, with each of the major players being a bundle of contradictions - Karzai is reportedly doing a deal with Pakistan because he feels that India did not put its weight behind him with sufficient resolve, the Taliban is grateful that India did not intervene militarily but openly claims responsibility for the recent attack in Kabul alleging RAW presence, and our natural ally (the United States) does not want us in because of fear of inviting Pakistani wrath. But the Pakistanis and the Americans were faced with similarly difficult choices - yet they did assert themselves and muscled their way in. In contrast, India was simply not assertive enough, a perception now publicly reinforced by the likes of Moridian Dawood, Advisor to the Afghan Foreign Minister, who has said, “India seems apologetic about its presence. It’s a regional player and must behave like one, instead of insisting on a benign presence with a penchant for staying in the background.” By design, or more accurately by conscious drift, therefore, we conceded the strategic initiative to Pakistan. We took the burden of a good democracy to Afghanistan, but as is our wont forgot to under gird it with force (not merely its combat dimension, but its numerous softer nuances). Pakistan, on the other hand, chose to pay with blood and leveraged its role in targeting the Afghan Taliban in hideouts on its side of the border with skill. From accused (terror epicentre) it turned approver and is now using arrests of key Taliban leaders (Mullah Baradar) to further muscle its way into the emerging power structure in Afghanistan. It has also deftly nuanced its counter terror response - decisive contest with the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba) and selective engagement with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing to aid and abet the LeT and Jaish as foreign policy tools along its Eastern borders.
With regard to the broader situation, there are of course huge difficulties, but there is also the faint glimmer of hope. The United States has done a great deal and will continue to remain engaged over the next 12 to 18 months in seeking military ascendancy over the Taliban. The fear that America will cut costs and run does sound a little unreal - having invested so much in blood and treasure it will stay for a while, and an early exit will come about only if America begins to cede the military initiative. If it continues with its military ascendancy as seems to be the case now, Obama will be empowered to prolong the American stay (public support for the American involvement in Afghanistan is already growing). The exit time table is more in the nature of a warning to others to get their act together, since the Americans cannot be expected to stay forever. Efforts are on under the stewardship of Maj. Gen. Richard Barrons to lure away the second tier leadership of the Taliban and peel away the hard core fighters by offering them jobs and cash (250 dollars a month as against 300 dollars on offer by the Taliban). In a few years from now, Afghanistan could begin to resemble today’s Iraq - restive, violent, not greatly democratized but not entirely anarchic either. Operation Mushtarak aimed at capturing the drug stronghold - Marjah, and despite the recent Taliban fightback in Musa Qala this may turn out to be the Fallujah moment in Afghanistan (not as bloody but possibly as decisive). If the trend continues in Kandahar (Operation Omaid is due to begin in June) and then in Eastern Afghanistan where the all powerful Jalaluddin Haqqani is ensconced in the provinces of Khost, Pakyta, Pakhtiar and Gardez, the halo of invincibility shrouding the Taliban may begin to disappear.
We do seem to have got it wrong - staying engaged as reiterated by the National Security Adviser and even by the Prime Minister, is of course a symbol of our altruistic resolve, but whether it reflects strategic acuity or even level headed pragmatism is another matter. Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve - an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant. But that would have meant a paradigm shift in our foreign policy construct, leading to a greater role for the military. It was easier therefore to deflect by jumping to the usual conclusions about use of force not being an option - the various reasons being trotted out do seem to be frivolous. The end state in Afghanistan will soon reflect the pusillanimous reality, because in life as in diplomacy you reap as you sow. While we may continue to gain goodwill, we will soon be faced with the prospect of waning influence in the evolving power structure and little security for our civilian presence. Closer home, we may be faced with a qualitatively upgraded terror threat - the ISI/LeT could use surrendered Taliban cadres to bring the menace of deadly suicide bombers to our door step (revelations in the ongoing Headley saga which document his linkages with elements of the Al Qaeda in North Waziristan point to the rather ominous possibilities of collusion). Even at this late stage there is a need to seriously review our options. We lack the necessary military presence and leverage with the security establishment in Afghanistan to secure our interests. Hamid Karzai is simply not in a position to guarantee our security. It may be more prudent to roll back our civilian engagement, unless we wish to lose more civilian lives. Merely pumping in more and more CRPF personnel in defensive rings will be of little help in a country where we have no penetration in the central facets of the security dynamic and no worthwhile military presence, such defensive rings can be easily breached - especially by seasoned rogues from the ISI.
We also need to ponder over our broader approach - instead of going down the familiar road of preachiness/talking down to Pakistan (repeatedly describing it as a state whose creation was fundamentally flawed, a failed/failing state, etc.) and indulging in endless diplomatic gobbledygook without accompanying resolve, we need to change tone and tenor and become less patronising while quietly undergirding our own response with far greater acuity and resolve. It may also be useful if we were to revisit the utility and wisdom of some of our own polemical rhetoric. We need to acknowledge that Pakistan may be a troubled state in many ways but it is neither failed, nor failing. Given its peculiar dynamic it is indeed a smart survivor with an uncanny knack of leveraging its benefactors (the Americans and the Chinese) with particular finesse. We must also avoid the easy temptation of churlishly finding fault for many of our own failings in the persona of the Pakistan Army - the number of people in Delhi’s seminar circuit who needlessly spit venom on the Pakistan military as the mother of all evils is indeed incredible. “Kashmir is merely an obsession with the Pakistan Army, the ordinary Pakistani does not care,” is the frequent assertion. Really? Last week, prominent Pakistani media personality Hamid Mir (who is no friend of the Pakistan military establishment), when asked by CNN-IBN as to what was the central obstacle in India-Pakistan relations, simply stated “Kashmir.” We need to acknowledge this reality. Sample some of the responses to the recently concluded Strategic Dialogue in Washington. As soon as news came that Kayani and Shuja Pasha would attend, we saw a spate of Pakistan military bashing once again. Strategic Dialogues are a great deal about matters military - so if Generals Kayani and Shuja Pasha represented the Pakistani delegation, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman JCS, represented the Americans. That is the global practice. If our own horribly antiquated practices don’t reflect the same, we need to make amends and not curse the Pakistan military. Anyway, while there is little we can do about the US-Pakistan or Sino-Pakistan engagements, there is a great deal we can do ourselves - strengthening our counter terror response domestically, making sure we have viable military response options in the event of another Mumbai (well thought through, swift and decisive), restoring our greatly eroded conventional military edge, enhancing the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, initiating long pending organizational and structural defence reforms in the absence of which we shall continue to field an impaired military capability. This will be far more useful than the endless parroting of strategic nonsense like “force is no option”. Strategic Restraint lies in holding back despite the capacities and not in indulging in a lengthy exchange of dossiers since you neither have the capacities nor the resolve. While the former will inspire respect and may even deter, the latter is more likely to provoke fresh bouts of adventurism (especially when your thresholds are being monitored by smart cookies like Kayani and Shuja Pasha who sense weakness in our predilection to hum and haw).
Unfortunately, while this country has an extremely astute and sagacious political leadership, our National Security Management Structures (those that proffer options and advice) are held hostage to the Indian Foreign Service which may be extremely adept at leveraging diplomacy but has little understanding of instruments of force and their nuanced utilities. So when the odd opportunity does arise to graft the two in the interest of Indian statecraft they choke. Afghanistan is an instructive case in point. The absence of cross cultural inputs and a viable military dynamic in our foreign policy construct is the most serious handicap in our statecraft. A good way to begin might lie in designating somebody with a sound strategic mind and an understanding of the military dynamic as the Special Envoy to Afghanistan - it could be a Lt. General from the Army or somebody like C. Raja Mohan. Such an arrangement will be a welcome departure from the present practice of an extended swaddle (the Ambassador, Special Envoy and key appointments in the National Security Council are exclusively IFS) presenting the political leadership with the usual rigmarole - the same suspects producing the same stereotyped views. But will our combative turf warriors ever be able to place national interest before their own? Or, will our political class summon the nerve to abandon outdated tenets of civilian control and seek direct, unfettered, professional military advice on matters of foreign policy while simultaneously infusing our National Security Structures with cross cultural talent? Desultory consultation (often only when the crisis erupts) must make way for intimate, prior, continuous and informed dialogue with the military and the strategic community. The resultant feed will help to develop and nurture capacities, that allow us, when confronted with challenges like Afghanistan, to apply comprehensive national power to more purposeful effect.
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Af-PakandIndiasStrategicInnocence_rshukla_020410
If the grand design of the Manmohan Singh government is to forge peace with Pakistan as a liberating step in our sub-continental rivalry, India should surely be more understanding of Pakistani sensitivities in Afghanistan and its larger paranoia. Can a nation which has been done in once in the past, of course largely by its own blunders but also with some strategic help from India (the creation of Bangladesh), afford on its Western borders a government which is seen to be kowtowing to India? Much of this haranguing about strategic depth is nothing but a desperate desire in Pakistan for a friendly dispensation on its West, so that it is free from the fear of being destabilized from the rear. India’s good friend Hamid Karzai himself has alluded to the reality of the triangular matrix by describing Afghanistan and Pakistan as “conjoint twins” with India being a mere “friend.” In the dance for influence and power, therefore, why not gracefully allow the “twin” a larger role? Unless of course there are overwhelming compulsions of national interest, in which case we must recognize the prevalent hardball, take necessary risks and act with far greater persuasion and resolve so as to apply soft and hard power in an appropriate mix to get a foothold in the emerging power dynamic. The problem with India’s posture is that we seem to be shying away from the existing realities and simply hoping that economic engagement alone will secure our interests. It takes some strategic innocence to aspire for influence in a country as dangerous, conspiratorial and bloody as Afghanistan, without being willing to muddy our boots. And it is plainly ridiculous to expect Mr. Jayant Prasad and a lone military attaché to match the power and guile of Jallaluddin Haqqani and Shuja Pasha. If we seek greater influence in Afghanistan, we need to recognize the salience of military drivers therein and leverage our capacities accordingly. And if we are unwilling or unable to do so, simply and gracefully stay out. The reason we seem to be falling in between two stools is because we seek influence while being unwilling to take attendant risks (reiterating our resolve to stay engaged times without number, without spelling out as to how precisely we shall secure our interests).
India’s engagement in Afghanistan has been based on a set of soft choices - economic, infrastructural, developmental and humanitarian assistance (an estimated 4000 Indians are involved in the reconstruction effort with an investment of 1.3 billion dollars) with security guarantees coming from the Karzai government and its infantile tools. We eschewed a more deterministic military role for ourselves, even though short of direct military committal we could have done much more to shape the security dynamic in Afghanistan. We could have opted for greater involvement - through some direct military diplomacy and a broad based training commitment for instance (a stake in the planned training of 300,000 ANA/ANP personnel by 2013 is of course a gargantuan challenge but also a huge opportunity), so that we had friends, linkages and far greater leverage in the emerging security framework, but we chose not to. There were many who had cautioned against the adoption of this effete strategic outlook, whereby, even as we kept on enlarging our civilian engagement we did not do enough to shore up attendant security concerns, but we hung on to our bravado. There were others who advocated keeping channels open with some elements in the Taliban leadership but their calls went unheeded, defying not only common sense but also mathematical logic. The Taliban, it bears reiteration, represents the Pashtuns - the single largest ethnic identity in Afghanistan numbering about 40 million - how can you simply refuse to do business with such a numerically significant entity? Today, many liberal Pashtuns complain that India did not back them strongly enough. Of course, the choices were never and are still not easy, with each of the major players being a bundle of contradictions - Karzai is reportedly doing a deal with Pakistan because he feels that India did not put its weight behind him with sufficient resolve, the Taliban is grateful that India did not intervene militarily but openly claims responsibility for the recent attack in Kabul alleging RAW presence, and our natural ally (the United States) does not want us in because of fear of inviting Pakistani wrath. But the Pakistanis and the Americans were faced with similarly difficult choices - yet they did assert themselves and muscled their way in. In contrast, India was simply not assertive enough, a perception now publicly reinforced by the likes of Moridian Dawood, Advisor to the Afghan Foreign Minister, who has said, “India seems apologetic about its presence. It’s a regional player and must behave like one, instead of insisting on a benign presence with a penchant for staying in the background.” By design, or more accurately by conscious drift, therefore, we conceded the strategic initiative to Pakistan. We took the burden of a good democracy to Afghanistan, but as is our wont forgot to under gird it with force (not merely its combat dimension, but its numerous softer nuances). Pakistan, on the other hand, chose to pay with blood and leveraged its role in targeting the Afghan Taliban in hideouts on its side of the border with skill. From accused (terror epicentre) it turned approver and is now using arrests of key Taliban leaders (Mullah Baradar) to further muscle its way into the emerging power structure in Afghanistan. It has also deftly nuanced its counter terror response - decisive contest with the Pakistani Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba) and selective engagement with the Afghan Taliban, while continuing to aid and abet the LeT and Jaish as foreign policy tools along its Eastern borders.
With regard to the broader situation, there are of course huge difficulties, but there is also the faint glimmer of hope. The United States has done a great deal and will continue to remain engaged over the next 12 to 18 months in seeking military ascendancy over the Taliban. The fear that America will cut costs and run does sound a little unreal - having invested so much in blood and treasure it will stay for a while, and an early exit will come about only if America begins to cede the military initiative. If it continues with its military ascendancy as seems to be the case now, Obama will be empowered to prolong the American stay (public support for the American involvement in Afghanistan is already growing). The exit time table is more in the nature of a warning to others to get their act together, since the Americans cannot be expected to stay forever. Efforts are on under the stewardship of Maj. Gen. Richard Barrons to lure away the second tier leadership of the Taliban and peel away the hard core fighters by offering them jobs and cash (250 dollars a month as against 300 dollars on offer by the Taliban). In a few years from now, Afghanistan could begin to resemble today’s Iraq - restive, violent, not greatly democratized but not entirely anarchic either. Operation Mushtarak aimed at capturing the drug stronghold - Marjah, and despite the recent Taliban fightback in Musa Qala this may turn out to be the Fallujah moment in Afghanistan (not as bloody but possibly as decisive). If the trend continues in Kandahar (Operation Omaid is due to begin in June) and then in Eastern Afghanistan where the all powerful Jalaluddin Haqqani is ensconced in the provinces of Khost, Pakyta, Pakhtiar and Gardez, the halo of invincibility shrouding the Taliban may begin to disappear.
We do seem to have got it wrong - staying engaged as reiterated by the National Security Adviser and even by the Prime Minister, is of course a symbol of our altruistic resolve, but whether it reflects strategic acuity or even level headed pragmatism is another matter. Afghanistan was a test case for our foreign policy resolve - an arena where while leveraging other tools of foreign policy, use of instruments of force and military diplomacy/intelligence should have been predominant. But that would have meant a paradigm shift in our foreign policy construct, leading to a greater role for the military. It was easier therefore to deflect by jumping to the usual conclusions about use of force not being an option - the various reasons being trotted out do seem to be frivolous. The end state in Afghanistan will soon reflect the pusillanimous reality, because in life as in diplomacy you reap as you sow. While we may continue to gain goodwill, we will soon be faced with the prospect of waning influence in the evolving power structure and little security for our civilian presence. Closer home, we may be faced with a qualitatively upgraded terror threat - the ISI/LeT could use surrendered Taliban cadres to bring the menace of deadly suicide bombers to our door step (revelations in the ongoing Headley saga which document his linkages with elements of the Al Qaeda in North Waziristan point to the rather ominous possibilities of collusion). Even at this late stage there is a need to seriously review our options. We lack the necessary military presence and leverage with the security establishment in Afghanistan to secure our interests. Hamid Karzai is simply not in a position to guarantee our security. It may be more prudent to roll back our civilian engagement, unless we wish to lose more civilian lives. Merely pumping in more and more CRPF personnel in defensive rings will be of little help in a country where we have no penetration in the central facets of the security dynamic and no worthwhile military presence, such defensive rings can be easily breached - especially by seasoned rogues from the ISI.
We also need to ponder over our broader approach - instead of going down the familiar road of preachiness/talking down to Pakistan (repeatedly describing it as a state whose creation was fundamentally flawed, a failed/failing state, etc.) and indulging in endless diplomatic gobbledygook without accompanying resolve, we need to change tone and tenor and become less patronising while quietly undergirding our own response with far greater acuity and resolve. It may also be useful if we were to revisit the utility and wisdom of some of our own polemical rhetoric. We need to acknowledge that Pakistan may be a troubled state in many ways but it is neither failed, nor failing. Given its peculiar dynamic it is indeed a smart survivor with an uncanny knack of leveraging its benefactors (the Americans and the Chinese) with particular finesse. We must also avoid the easy temptation of churlishly finding fault for many of our own failings in the persona of the Pakistan Army - the number of people in Delhi’s seminar circuit who needlessly spit venom on the Pakistan military as the mother of all evils is indeed incredible. “Kashmir is merely an obsession with the Pakistan Army, the ordinary Pakistani does not care,” is the frequent assertion. Really? Last week, prominent Pakistani media personality Hamid Mir (who is no friend of the Pakistan military establishment), when asked by CNN-IBN as to what was the central obstacle in India-Pakistan relations, simply stated “Kashmir.” We need to acknowledge this reality. Sample some of the responses to the recently concluded Strategic Dialogue in Washington. As soon as news came that Kayani and Shuja Pasha would attend, we saw a spate of Pakistan military bashing once again. Strategic Dialogues are a great deal about matters military - so if Generals Kayani and Shuja Pasha represented the Pakistani delegation, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman JCS, represented the Americans. That is the global practice. If our own horribly antiquated practices don’t reflect the same, we need to make amends and not curse the Pakistan military. Anyway, while there is little we can do about the US-Pakistan or Sino-Pakistan engagements, there is a great deal we can do ourselves - strengthening our counter terror response domestically, making sure we have viable military response options in the event of another Mumbai (well thought through, swift and decisive), restoring our greatly eroded conventional military edge, enhancing the credibility of our nuclear deterrent, initiating long pending organizational and structural defence reforms in the absence of which we shall continue to field an impaired military capability. This will be far more useful than the endless parroting of strategic nonsense like “force is no option”. Strategic Restraint lies in holding back despite the capacities and not in indulging in a lengthy exchange of dossiers since you neither have the capacities nor the resolve. While the former will inspire respect and may even deter, the latter is more likely to provoke fresh bouts of adventurism (especially when your thresholds are being monitored by smart cookies like Kayani and Shuja Pasha who sense weakness in our predilection to hum and haw).
Unfortunately, while this country has an extremely astute and sagacious political leadership, our National Security Management Structures (those that proffer options and advice) are held hostage to the Indian Foreign Service which may be extremely adept at leveraging diplomacy but has little understanding of instruments of force and their nuanced utilities. So when the odd opportunity does arise to graft the two in the interest of Indian statecraft they choke. Afghanistan is an instructive case in point. The absence of cross cultural inputs and a viable military dynamic in our foreign policy construct is the most serious handicap in our statecraft. A good way to begin might lie in designating somebody with a sound strategic mind and an understanding of the military dynamic as the Special Envoy to Afghanistan - it could be a Lt. General from the Army or somebody like C. Raja Mohan. Such an arrangement will be a welcome departure from the present practice of an extended swaddle (the Ambassador, Special Envoy and key appointments in the National Security Council are exclusively IFS) presenting the political leadership with the usual rigmarole - the same suspects producing the same stereotyped views. But will our combative turf warriors ever be able to place national interest before their own? Or, will our political class summon the nerve to abandon outdated tenets of civilian control and seek direct, unfettered, professional military advice on matters of foreign policy while simultaneously infusing our National Security Structures with cross cultural talent? Desultory consultation (often only when the crisis erupts) must make way for intimate, prior, continuous and informed dialogue with the military and the strategic community. The resultant feed will help to develop and nurture capacities, that allow us, when confronted with challenges like Afghanistan, to apply comprehensive national power to more purposeful effect.
http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/Af-PakandIndiasStrategicInnocence_rshukla_020410
India's eager courtship of Afghanistan comes at a steep price
CHELEBAAK, AFGHANISTAN -- Along a rugged stretch of road in the shadow of the snow-covered Hindu Kush mountains, villagers in mud-brick huts praised the newest addition to their vista: a series of massive steel towers that reach into the clouds.
The towers, part of a $1.3 billion aid package from India, carry electricity to a crippled region that has long gone without. They also represent an intense competition between India and arch-rival Pakistan for influence in whatever kind of Afghanistan emerges from the U.S.-led war.
To blunt India's eager courtship of Afghanistan, Pakistan is pouring $300 million of its own money and resources into a nation it also views as key to the stability of volatile South Asia, as well as a potentially lucrative business partner.
The economic stakes are especially enormous for India, the far richer nation, as it seeks energy to fuel its rise as a global economic power. Afghanistan is a bridge to Central Asia's vast gas and oil reserves, which are coveted by India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons but barely enough electricity.
India's efforts have come at a cost: It has suffered four attacks on its interests in Afghanistan in the past two years, which have killed at least 101 people and wounded 239. Attacks on two Kabul guesthouses in February killed seven Indians, including a visiting musician and the chief engineer of the Chelebaak electricity project.
For U.S. officials, India's increasing presence in Afghanistan is causing new security and diplomatic problems in a country where more than 1,000 American troops have died in more than eight years of war. Washington also fears upsetting the delicate balance in its relations with Islamabad.
"Let's be honest with one another: There are real suspicions in both India and Pakistan about what the other is doing in Afghanistan," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters after a recent trip to New Delhi.
Washington is feeling pressure from Pakistan to limit India's role in Afghanistan. Each nation fears, to a degree that outsiders often find irrational, that an Afghanistan allied with the other would be threat to its security. Pakistan considers Afghanistan, another majority-Muslim nation, a natural ally and is deeply suspicious of India's efforts there.
"We don't want to be flanked by hostile elements," said Mansoor Ahmad Khan, deputy chief of mission in the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, referring to Pakistan's location -- sandwiched between Afghanistan to the west and India to the east.
U.S. and NATO officials said they feared militant groups linked to Pakistan would step up attacks on Indian aid workers and other India-linked targets in Afghanistan, complicating efforts to stabilize the country.
Indian officials have publicly stated that they suspect a Pakistani role in the attacks against Indians; Pakistani officials have rejected the charges. Indian and U.S. intelligence officials have linked Pakistan to the 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which killed more than 50 people, saying Pakistani intelligence had collaborated with militants. Indian officials also suspect Pakistani involvement in a suicide bombing at the embassy in October, which killed 17 people.
In the guesthouse attacks, Afghan intelligence officials publicly blamed Lashkar-i-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group that has been implicated in the 2008 siege in Mumbai that killed 165 people. The guesthouse bombings shocked many Indians and intensified widespread popular anger against Pakistan. Indians and Afghans were partly enraged because Bhola Ram, the Chelebaak engineer, and several other victims were Indian nationals working on aid projects.
"Bhola Ram's project was almost done when he was killed," said Giliani Lutfi, 45, an Afghan co-worker at the new electrical plant just outside Kabul. "Please tell India, we are so sorry. Ram gave our people power, and that means life to us. It wasn't the Afghan people who stole his life."
While war still rages in parts of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are building roads, hospitals and schools, as well as undertaking irrigation and power projects -- all while claiming closer links to Kabul.
"Our longest border is with Afghanistan. We have deep cultural and economic and people-to-people ties," said Khan, the Pakistani official in Kabul. "India may be very vocal about their aid projects here, but we don't need to publicize our position. Pakistan's role speaks for itself."
Indian officials note that their country has educated many of Afghanistan's top leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, who has a master's degree from an Indian university.
And when the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taliban, India provided intelligence and other military support, according to Rani Mullen, an upcoming fellow at New Delhi's Center for Policy Research.
The competition between the two nations can seem silly at times: When India donated a fleet of buses in the western city of Herat, Pakistan began donating buses decorated with painted Pakistani flags.
But the rivalry also has serious implications for the U.S.-led war. Karzai favors attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, an idea supported by Pakistan. Indian leaders fear that any Afghan settlement with the Taliban would give Pakistan more influence in Kabul, which they view with alarm.
"If you want to try to reconcile with people who are institutionally and ideologically linked with terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, then caution is advised," Jayant Prasad, the Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, said in an interview at his residence, which is patrolled by armed guards and heavily fortified with sandbag bunkers and razor wire.
New Delhi's diplomatic offensive in Afghanistan is on display at a dusty Kabul construction site, where Indian engineers are working with Afghans to build a $90 million parliament, funded by India.
The floors and walls of the palacelike structure, a gleaming symbol of the new Afghanistan, are to be inlaid with green and rose marble from the Indian state of Rajasthan.
Such Indian-sponsored projects are sprouting from Kabul to Herat, widely considered Afghanistan's cultural heart and home to poets, painters and Sufi mystics. And they continue despite the targeted violence against Indians. In February, Nawab Khan, an Indian musician who plays a percussion instrument known as a tabla, came to Herat to play a concert sponsored by the Indian government.
"He was sitting right here after the performance," said Tara Chand, consul general of the heavily guarded Indian consulate in Herat. "He played to a full house. All the Afghans took photographs of him with their cellphones. It was a lovely night."
Khan returned to Kabul, to fly home to New Delhi. But during the guesthouse bombings that also killed Bhola Ram, the father of six was crushed to death when the roof collapsed on him.
The guesthouse deaths outraged many Afghans, and Ram's co-workers gathered to pray for him after the attack.
Outside Kabul one recent day, at the Chimtala substation where Ram worked, young Afghans proudly inspected the power plant wearing new work boots and coats donated by India.
Sitting in a sun-streamed classroom, Sayed Arif, 25, and other young engineers were learning how to run the power plant.
"We very much want the Indians here," Arif said, looking out at the power lines that India brought to his country. "That much in Afghanistan we are sure of."
CHELEBAAK, AFGHANISTAN -- Along a rugged stretch of road in the shadow of the snow-covered Hindu Kush mountains, villagers in mud-brick huts praised the newest addition to their vista: a series of massive steel towers that reach into the clouds.
The towers, part of a $1.3 billion aid package from India, carry electricity to a crippled region that has long gone without. They also represent an intense competition between India and arch-rival Pakistan for influence in whatever kind of Afghanistan emerges from the U.S.-led war.
To blunt India's eager courtship of Afghanistan, Pakistan is pouring $300 million of its own money and resources into a nation it also views as key to the stability of volatile South Asia, as well as a potentially lucrative business partner.
The economic stakes are especially enormous for India, the far richer nation, as it seeks energy to fuel its rise as a global economic power. Afghanistan is a bridge to Central Asia's vast gas and oil reserves, which are coveted by India and Pakistan, both of which have nuclear weapons but barely enough electricity.
India's efforts have come at a cost: It has suffered four attacks on its interests in Afghanistan in the past two years, which have killed at least 101 people and wounded 239. Attacks on two Kabul guesthouses in February killed seven Indians, including a visiting musician and the chief engineer of the Chelebaak electricity project.
For U.S. officials, India's increasing presence in Afghanistan is causing new security and diplomatic problems in a country where more than 1,000 American troops have died in more than eight years of war. Washington also fears upsetting the delicate balance in its relations with Islamabad.
"Let's be honest with one another: There are real suspicions in both India and Pakistan about what the other is doing in Afghanistan," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates told reporters after a recent trip to New Delhi.
Washington is feeling pressure from Pakistan to limit India's role in Afghanistan. Each nation fears, to a degree that outsiders often find irrational, that an Afghanistan allied with the other would be threat to its security. Pakistan considers Afghanistan, another majority-Muslim nation, a natural ally and is deeply suspicious of India's efforts there.
"We don't want to be flanked by hostile elements," said Mansoor Ahmad Khan, deputy chief of mission in the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul, referring to Pakistan's location -- sandwiched between Afghanistan to the west and India to the east.
U.S. and NATO officials said they feared militant groups linked to Pakistan would step up attacks on Indian aid workers and other India-linked targets in Afghanistan, complicating efforts to stabilize the country.
Indian officials have publicly stated that they suspect a Pakistani role in the attacks against Indians; Pakistani officials have rejected the charges. Indian and U.S. intelligence officials have linked Pakistan to the 2008 bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul, which killed more than 50 people, saying Pakistani intelligence had collaborated with militants. Indian officials also suspect Pakistani involvement in a suicide bombing at the embassy in October, which killed 17 people.
In the guesthouse attacks, Afghan intelligence officials publicly blamed Lashkar-i-Taiba, a Pakistan-based militant group that has been implicated in the 2008 siege in Mumbai that killed 165 people. The guesthouse bombings shocked many Indians and intensified widespread popular anger against Pakistan. Indians and Afghans were partly enraged because Bhola Ram, the Chelebaak engineer, and several other victims were Indian nationals working on aid projects.
"Bhola Ram's project was almost done when he was killed," said Giliani Lutfi, 45, an Afghan co-worker at the new electrical plant just outside Kabul. "Please tell India, we are so sorry. Ram gave our people power, and that means life to us. It wasn't the Afghan people who stole his life."
While war still rages in parts of Afghanistan, India and Pakistan are building roads, hospitals and schools, as well as undertaking irrigation and power projects -- all while claiming closer links to Kabul.
"Our longest border is with Afghanistan. We have deep cultural and economic and people-to-people ties," said Khan, the Pakistani official in Kabul. "India may be very vocal about their aid projects here, but we don't need to publicize our position. Pakistan's role speaks for itself."
Indian officials note that their country has educated many of Afghanistan's top leaders, including President Hamid Karzai, who has a master's degree from an Indian university.
And when the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001 to oust the Taliban, India provided intelligence and other military support, according to Rani Mullen, an upcoming fellow at New Delhi's Center for Policy Research.
The competition between the two nations can seem silly at times: When India donated a fleet of buses in the western city of Herat, Pakistan began donating buses decorated with painted Pakistani flags.
But the rivalry also has serious implications for the U.S.-led war. Karzai favors attempts to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, an idea supported by Pakistan. Indian leaders fear that any Afghan settlement with the Taliban would give Pakistan more influence in Kabul, which they view with alarm.
"If you want to try to reconcile with people who are institutionally and ideologically linked with terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, then caution is advised," Jayant Prasad, the Indian ambassador to Afghanistan, said in an interview at his residence, which is patrolled by armed guards and heavily fortified with sandbag bunkers and razor wire.
New Delhi's diplomatic offensive in Afghanistan is on display at a dusty Kabul construction site, where Indian engineers are working with Afghans to build a $90 million parliament, funded by India.
The floors and walls of the palacelike structure, a gleaming symbol of the new Afghanistan, are to be inlaid with green and rose marble from the Indian state of Rajasthan.
Such Indian-sponsored projects are sprouting from Kabul to Herat, widely considered Afghanistan's cultural heart and home to poets, painters and Sufi mystics. And they continue despite the targeted violence against Indians. In February, Nawab Khan, an Indian musician who plays a percussion instrument known as a tabla, came to Herat to play a concert sponsored by the Indian government.
"He was sitting right here after the performance," said Tara Chand, consul general of the heavily guarded Indian consulate in Herat. "He played to a full house. All the Afghans took photographs of him with their cellphones. It was a lovely night."
Khan returned to Kabul, to fly home to New Delhi. But during the guesthouse bombings that also killed Bhola Ram, the father of six was crushed to death when the roof collapsed on him.
The guesthouse deaths outraged many Afghans, and Ram's co-workers gathered to pray for him after the attack.
Outside Kabul one recent day, at the Chimtala substation where Ram worked, young Afghans proudly inspected the power plant wearing new work boots and coats donated by India.
Sitting in a sun-streamed classroom, Sayed Arif, 25, and other young engineers were learning how to run the power plant.
"We very much want the Indians here," Arif said, looking out at the power lines that India brought to his country. "That much in Afghanistan we are sure of."
nandu
Senior Member
- Joined
- Oct 5, 2009
- Messages
- 1,913
- Likes
- 163
India to stay in Afghanistan despite Pak objections
During an hour-long bilateral meeting held between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President Obama held at Blair house in Washington on Sunday, the Indian PM has made it clear that there was no question of withdrawing from Afghanistan despite Pakistan’s objection.
The uncompromising posture on Afghanistan is based on the efforts India has made in the war-torn country, where many Indians have also been killed. In 2008, India’s Military Attaché Brig R.D. Mehta and IFS officer Venkat Rao were killed in a suicide bombing. This year six Indians, including two Indian army Majors were killed when Taliban terrorists attacked the hotel where they were staying.
India, which did not send troops to Afghanistan to support the US-led global war on terror (GWOT), is involved in large scale humanitarian relief work. As part of the relief work, India has pledged US$1.3 billion in aid to the Afghan government, making it the biggest regional contributor. It is also constructing power stations, schools, hospitals, and training the Afghan national army apart from gifting buses to setup a public transport system and providing aircrafts to Afghanistan’s national carrier.
The meeting that took place on the side-lines of the ongoing nuclear security summit was significant to both countries, since diplomatic relations were strained due to several recent issues like India not getting access to 26/11 Mumbai attacks mastermind, David Headley, who is under US custody and the US' decision to supply more weapons (F-16s, frigates etc) to Pakistan despite India's concerns.
On its part, the US response was positive on both the important issues. OneIndia reports that Obama has assured India will get access to Headley. However, no time, date or place has yet been finalised. Another important outcome of the meeting was President Obama applauding the Indian role in Afghanistan and expressing desire that India continue the good work in Kabul, as well as promising to monitor the US arms aid to Pakistan reports Hindustan Times.
As a consequence of the tough stand taken by PM Manmohan Singh, PTI reports that Obama has prevailed upon the Pakistani PM Yousuf Raza Gilani, in a bilateral meeting, to reign in the terror groups like LeT operating against India from its soil.
http://www.8ak.in/
During an hour-long bilateral meeting held between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President Obama held at Blair house in Washington on Sunday, the Indian PM has made it clear that there was no question of withdrawing from Afghanistan despite Pakistan’s objection.
The uncompromising posture on Afghanistan is based on the efforts India has made in the war-torn country, where many Indians have also been killed. In 2008, India’s Military Attaché Brig R.D. Mehta and IFS officer Venkat Rao were killed in a suicide bombing. This year six Indians, including two Indian army Majors were killed when Taliban terrorists attacked the hotel where they were staying.
India, which did not send troops to Afghanistan to support the US-led global war on terror (GWOT), is involved in large scale humanitarian relief work. As part of the relief work, India has pledged US$1.3 billion in aid to the Afghan government, making it the biggest regional contributor. It is also constructing power stations, schools, hospitals, and training the Afghan national army apart from gifting buses to setup a public transport system and providing aircrafts to Afghanistan’s national carrier.
The meeting that took place on the side-lines of the ongoing nuclear security summit was significant to both countries, since diplomatic relations were strained due to several recent issues like India not getting access to 26/11 Mumbai attacks mastermind, David Headley, who is under US custody and the US' decision to supply more weapons (F-16s, frigates etc) to Pakistan despite India's concerns.
On its part, the US response was positive on both the important issues. OneIndia reports that Obama has assured India will get access to Headley. However, no time, date or place has yet been finalised. Another important outcome of the meeting was President Obama applauding the Indian role in Afghanistan and expressing desire that India continue the good work in Kabul, as well as promising to monitor the US arms aid to Pakistan reports Hindustan Times.
As a consequence of the tough stand taken by PM Manmohan Singh, PTI reports that Obama has prevailed upon the Pakistani PM Yousuf Raza Gilani, in a bilateral meeting, to reign in the terror groups like LeT operating against India from its soil.
http://www.8ak.in/
Look at the mid-range too
There is much irony in the fact that Afghanistan has evolved into a huge rock in the path of relations between India and the United States. Strategically, there is little difference between the two countries. More so than almost any other country, New Delhi hopes that Washington will keep its troops in Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban and establish a democratic and sovereign government in Kabul.
They differ strongly, however, on how this should be accomplished. The cost of the Afghan war and geographical necessity have meant Pakistan has gained a larger-than-life role in Washington's 'Af-Pak' policy. The US has no illusions that Pakistan speaks with a forked tongue on Afghanistan. India may complain, but ultimately it cannot provide an alternative to what Pakistan provides. Thus the irony: Pakistan is more essential to the war than India, but it is far less genuine a supporter of the US's aims.
Unfortunately, neither India nor the US has found out a way to get around this thorny tangle of contradiction. This constitutes a failure of diplomacy on both sides. At the very least, Manmohan Singh and Barack Obama should have provided the relationship enough ballast to let their two countries sail above the Af-Pak conundrum. But nothing of the sort has happened. The conclusion of the civil nuclear agreement left a vacuum in the bilateral discourse and nothing has yet filled that space. The result is that minor irritants and excitable commentary dominate. Access to David Headley is important but hardly the stuff of grand strategy. India is as much to blame as the US. Its feetdragging on various military agreements and bungling of the civil nuclear liability bill's passage is reawakening sceptics in Washington who have long argued India is not ready to be a global player.
Trivial pursuit has replaced chess even when the two heads of government met. What was striking about the Singh-Obama meeting in Washington was how much Pakistan-related issues dominated the proceedings. India lowered its own strategic horizon and the US did not bother to try and lift it. Things can and are likely to change. The US
Af-Pak military game is still unfolding and Pakistan may yet be surprised by its consequences. But more importantly, new and important synergies in education, technology and commerce are just starting to come to fruition between the two countries. It's time New Delhi realises that medium-sized ideas can be as transformational as one big one.
There is much irony in the fact that Afghanistan has evolved into a huge rock in the path of relations between India and the United States. Strategically, there is little difference between the two countries. More so than almost any other country, New Delhi hopes that Washington will keep its troops in Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban and establish a democratic and sovereign government in Kabul.
They differ strongly, however, on how this should be accomplished. The cost of the Afghan war and geographical necessity have meant Pakistan has gained a larger-than-life role in Washington's 'Af-Pak' policy. The US has no illusions that Pakistan speaks with a forked tongue on Afghanistan. India may complain, but ultimately it cannot provide an alternative to what Pakistan provides. Thus the irony: Pakistan is more essential to the war than India, but it is far less genuine a supporter of the US's aims.
Unfortunately, neither India nor the US has found out a way to get around this thorny tangle of contradiction. This constitutes a failure of diplomacy on both sides. At the very least, Manmohan Singh and Barack Obama should have provided the relationship enough ballast to let their two countries sail above the Af-Pak conundrum. But nothing of the sort has happened. The conclusion of the civil nuclear agreement left a vacuum in the bilateral discourse and nothing has yet filled that space. The result is that minor irritants and excitable commentary dominate. Access to David Headley is important but hardly the stuff of grand strategy. India is as much to blame as the US. Its feetdragging on various military agreements and bungling of the civil nuclear liability bill's passage is reawakening sceptics in Washington who have long argued India is not ready to be a global player.
Trivial pursuit has replaced chess even when the two heads of government met. What was striking about the Singh-Obama meeting in Washington was how much Pakistan-related issues dominated the proceedings. India lowered its own strategic horizon and the US did not bother to try and lift it. Things can and are likely to change. The US
Af-Pak military game is still unfolding and Pakistan may yet be surprised by its consequences. But more importantly, new and important synergies in education, technology and commerce are just starting to come to fruition between the two countries. It's time New Delhi realises that medium-sized ideas can be as transformational as one big one.
India role in Af critical, will see it first-hand, says Roemer
NEW DELHI: The US is looking at ways to "partner" India in Afghanistan. After India aired its concerns about the US seeming to "outsource" the solution in Afghanistan to the Taliban-friendly Pakistan, there appears to be a greater interest by the US to understand India's interests in the war-torn country and its contribution to its reconstruction. The US is also more receptive now to India's opposition to the kind of reconciliation that the British and Pakistanis seem to be selling.
US ambassador to India Tim Roemer said India's activities in Afghanistan were "critical," and that he would be travelling to Afghanistan to see Indian projects first-hand, meet Indian ambassador Jayant Prasad and get a better idea of what India wants to achieve in Afghanistan. India has spent over $1.3 billion in development projects all over Afghanistan, and is generally believed to be one of the most benign presences in that country, carrying a lot of popular support.
On the other hand, Pakistan, which continues to maintain links with the Taliban, has asked the US to ensure that India's presence is downgraded. Pakistan has also alleged that India maintains some 26-28 consulates in Afghanistan and engages in serious "anti-Pakistan" activity. This line has been swallowed by sections of the US administration, certainly the Pentagon, because it is reflected in statements by Gen Stanley mcCrystal and Gen David Petraeus.
But India's concerns have clearly generated enough questioning within the US system to warrant a greater interest in India's actual presence.
"India's role has been a great success. The US is looking for additional role for India in Afghanistan. It may include civil services and anti-corruption projects," Roemer told reporters here.
"India's role in Afghanistan is very critical. President Barack Obama has personally said this to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and conveyed gratitude for the contribution," he said, adding that out of three components of international presence in Afghanistan -- defence, diplomatic and development -- India was involved in two of them.
However, since Obama announced his departure date from Afghanistan, there has been a mad scramble within Pakistan to secure a veto for itself in the ultimate reconciliation arrangement inside Afghanistan. The US too has appeared to be giving in to the Pakistani line, and its been left to India to say that leaving a Taliban-friendly dispensation in Afghanistan would be like returning to a pre-9/11 state. During his conversation with Obama, the PM had told him that India would not give up its interests in Afghanistan, which were crucial for its security, and that it was there to ensure that Afghanistan makes the slow but sure transition to a more moderate state.
The US has already alienated Afghan President Hamid Karzai which India feels is counter-productive to what the US really wants to achieve there. India believes that making an enemy of Karzai is probably the worst way of trying to get anything done in Afghanistan, because it would send Karzai to the arms of interests that are inimical to the US, as Karzai looks to cut deals to ensure his survival. It's not clear whether India has any effect on US thinking but after months of public bickering, the Obama administration is making the first moves to re-engage Karzai.
Of course, this is not going to go down well in Pakistan and Islamabad can be expected to make many more strenuous protests against Indian presence.
Meanwhile, India has upped its lobbying against Pakistan army getting sophisticated weapons from the US which were being turned against India. Roemer said the US took these allegations "seriously" and Pakistan could face a range of actions including sanctions. "We will look into it very seriously," Roemer said.
The PM had raised this with Obama and the latter had assured him that military supplies to Pakistan would be "monitored" by the US. "There are allegations of misuse of weapons given to Pakistan for other purposes. We will investigate it, Congress will take the issue seriously," Roemer said.
He added that the US sought India's opinions before the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue and even briefed India afterwards on the dialogue.
NEW DELHI: The US is looking at ways to "partner" India in Afghanistan. After India aired its concerns about the US seeming to "outsource" the solution in Afghanistan to the Taliban-friendly Pakistan, there appears to be a greater interest by the US to understand India's interests in the war-torn country and its contribution to its reconstruction. The US is also more receptive now to India's opposition to the kind of reconciliation that the British and Pakistanis seem to be selling.
US ambassador to India Tim Roemer said India's activities in Afghanistan were "critical," and that he would be travelling to Afghanistan to see Indian projects first-hand, meet Indian ambassador Jayant Prasad and get a better idea of what India wants to achieve in Afghanistan. India has spent over $1.3 billion in development projects all over Afghanistan, and is generally believed to be one of the most benign presences in that country, carrying a lot of popular support.
On the other hand, Pakistan, which continues to maintain links with the Taliban, has asked the US to ensure that India's presence is downgraded. Pakistan has also alleged that India maintains some 26-28 consulates in Afghanistan and engages in serious "anti-Pakistan" activity. This line has been swallowed by sections of the US administration, certainly the Pentagon, because it is reflected in statements by Gen Stanley mcCrystal and Gen David Petraeus.
But India's concerns have clearly generated enough questioning within the US system to warrant a greater interest in India's actual presence.
"India's role has been a great success. The US is looking for additional role for India in Afghanistan. It may include civil services and anti-corruption projects," Roemer told reporters here.
"India's role in Afghanistan is very critical. President Barack Obama has personally said this to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and conveyed gratitude for the contribution," he said, adding that out of three components of international presence in Afghanistan -- defence, diplomatic and development -- India was involved in two of them.
However, since Obama announced his departure date from Afghanistan, there has been a mad scramble within Pakistan to secure a veto for itself in the ultimate reconciliation arrangement inside Afghanistan. The US too has appeared to be giving in to the Pakistani line, and its been left to India to say that leaving a Taliban-friendly dispensation in Afghanistan would be like returning to a pre-9/11 state. During his conversation with Obama, the PM had told him that India would not give up its interests in Afghanistan, which were crucial for its security, and that it was there to ensure that Afghanistan makes the slow but sure transition to a more moderate state.
The US has already alienated Afghan President Hamid Karzai which India feels is counter-productive to what the US really wants to achieve there. India believes that making an enemy of Karzai is probably the worst way of trying to get anything done in Afghanistan, because it would send Karzai to the arms of interests that are inimical to the US, as Karzai looks to cut deals to ensure his survival. It's not clear whether India has any effect on US thinking but after months of public bickering, the Obama administration is making the first moves to re-engage Karzai.
Of course, this is not going to go down well in Pakistan and Islamabad can be expected to make many more strenuous protests against Indian presence.
Meanwhile, India has upped its lobbying against Pakistan army getting sophisticated weapons from the US which were being turned against India. Roemer said the US took these allegations "seriously" and Pakistan could face a range of actions including sanctions. "We will look into it very seriously," Roemer said.
The PM had raised this with Obama and the latter had assured him that military supplies to Pakistan would be "monitored" by the US. "There are allegations of misuse of weapons given to Pakistan for other purposes. We will investigate it, Congress will take the issue seriously," Roemer said.
He added that the US sought India's opinions before the US-Pakistan strategic dialogue and even briefed India afterwards on the dialogue.
No plan to scale down activities in Afghanistan: India
NEW DELHI: India lost a total of 17 citizens engaged in projects in Afghanistan, but it would not scale down its activities there, the government told the Lok Sabha on Wednesday.
Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur said the government had ensured financial and other assistance to families of Indian officials and Indians, who were killed in Afghanistan while working on projects taken up by India there.
It included ex-gratia compensation, insurance payments, liberalised pensionary benefits and other admissible benefits, she said during Question Hour, adding employees of private firms were provided compensation by their company.
The minister said no Indian was among those killed in Afghanistan in 2007, but nine Indians lost their lives in 2008 including seven in the terror attack on its embassy in Kabul, one in 2009 (a private firm employee) and seven in 2010 (in a terror attack on a hotel).
Pointing out that India had "no plan to scale down" its activities in Afghanistan, Kaur said its commitment to assist Afghan people and government in building a peaceful, pluralistic, democratic and prosperous nation remained undiluted.
She said the Indian government had comprehensively reviewed and enhanced security measures for the safety of personnel and other Indians working in Afghanistan.
"It is also in regular touch with the Afghan government, which has assured necessary security for Indians in that country," she said.
Noting that Indian nationals registered with the embassy in Kabul are regularly advised about the prevailing security scenario in the country through advisories, she said it outlined the precautions needed to be taken for their safety.
NEW DELHI: India lost a total of 17 citizens engaged in projects in Afghanistan, but it would not scale down its activities there, the government told the Lok Sabha on Wednesday.
Minister of State for External Affairs Preneet Kaur said the government had ensured financial and other assistance to families of Indian officials and Indians, who were killed in Afghanistan while working on projects taken up by India there.
It included ex-gratia compensation, insurance payments, liberalised pensionary benefits and other admissible benefits, she said during Question Hour, adding employees of private firms were provided compensation by their company.
The minister said no Indian was among those killed in Afghanistan in 2007, but nine Indians lost their lives in 2008 including seven in the terror attack on its embassy in Kabul, one in 2009 (a private firm employee) and seven in 2010 (in a terror attack on a hotel).
Pointing out that India had "no plan to scale down" its activities in Afghanistan, Kaur said its commitment to assist Afghan people and government in building a peaceful, pluralistic, democratic and prosperous nation remained undiluted.
She said the Indian government had comprehensively reviewed and enhanced security measures for the safety of personnel and other Indians working in Afghanistan.
"It is also in regular touch with the Afghan government, which has assured necessary security for Indians in that country," she said.
Noting that Indian nationals registered with the embassy in Kabul are regularly advised about the prevailing security scenario in the country through advisories, she said it outlined the precautions needed to be taken for their safety.
Fresh attacks feared on Indian interests in Kabul
Indian assets and personnel in Kabul could come under fresh attacks in the near future with intelligence inputs suggesting that terror groups like Haqqani faction of Taliban have recently been enquiring about Indian projects and residential complexes of those working on these.
Intelligence inputs available with authorities suggest heightened threat perception, particularly for this month, to Indians working on infrastructure projects, sources said.
Places having Indian concentration like Punjab National Bank, the vicinity of Manochur School in Kalola Pushta and a guest house near the Indian Embassy in Kabul have also been identified as potential targets, they said.
According to the information, at least two car-borne people have been seen making rounds and seeking details about Indian companies, particularly those engaged in construction projects.
They are also said to be enquiring about the residential complexes where the staff is housed, the sources said.
Intelligence inputs suggest that the Haqqani group of Taliban is planning attacks on Indian interests in the near future and are surveying possible targets, they said.
It is feared that vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) may be used to target places where Indians, engaged in developmental projects, stay or frequent.
Restaurants and guest houses frequented by Indians could also be targeted, the sources said.
The sources said intelligence reports earlier had suggested that eight terrorists had been tasked to carry out attacks on Indians in Kabul. Of them, four targeted Park Residency Hotel and Aria Guest House in the February 26 attack in which seven Indians were killed. One terrorist had escaped after that attack.
In view of the fresh inputs, security establishment in Kabul has been alerted and Indians have been advised to reduce their movements and take extra care while travelling, like avoiding use of same routes and keeping movements unpredictable.
Indians have also been asked to live in secure accommodations, which have proper access control systems, possible place of hiding or refuge and escape routes. Indians have been advised to exercise certain other precautions too at the places of stay and work.
It has also been advised that concentration of Indians at any particular place should be kept to the minimum.
About 3,500 Indians are engaged in various construction projects there, including those related to infrastructure development, healthcare and social capacity building.
Indian assets and personnel in Kabul could come under fresh attacks in the near future with intelligence inputs suggesting that terror groups like Haqqani faction of Taliban have recently been enquiring about Indian projects and residential complexes of those working on these.
Intelligence inputs available with authorities suggest heightened threat perception, particularly for this month, to Indians working on infrastructure projects, sources said.
Places having Indian concentration like Punjab National Bank, the vicinity of Manochur School in Kalola Pushta and a guest house near the Indian Embassy in Kabul have also been identified as potential targets, they said.
According to the information, at least two car-borne people have been seen making rounds and seeking details about Indian companies, particularly those engaged in construction projects.
They are also said to be enquiring about the residential complexes where the staff is housed, the sources said.
Intelligence inputs suggest that the Haqqani group of Taliban is planning attacks on Indian interests in the near future and are surveying possible targets, they said.
It is feared that vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) may be used to target places where Indians, engaged in developmental projects, stay or frequent.
Restaurants and guest houses frequented by Indians could also be targeted, the sources said.
The sources said intelligence reports earlier had suggested that eight terrorists had been tasked to carry out attacks on Indians in Kabul. Of them, four targeted Park Residency Hotel and Aria Guest House in the February 26 attack in which seven Indians were killed. One terrorist had escaped after that attack.
In view of the fresh inputs, security establishment in Kabul has been alerted and Indians have been advised to reduce their movements and take extra care while travelling, like avoiding use of same routes and keeping movements unpredictable.
Indians have also been asked to live in secure accommodations, which have proper access control systems, possible place of hiding or refuge and escape routes. Indians have been advised to exercise certain other precautions too at the places of stay and work.
It has also been advised that concentration of Indians at any particular place should be kept to the minimum.
About 3,500 Indians are engaged in various construction projects there, including those related to infrastructure development, healthcare and social capacity building.
India should cut Afghan losses
Sunanda K Datta-Ray
The British joked that Calcutta (then India's capital) and London were "mervous" when the Russians captured the town of Merv on Afghanistan's borders. That was in 1884 when Kipling's Great Game was at its height. It's a moot point whether India need be so sensitive to Afghanistan 126 years later.
Of course, regional stability matters. Access to Iranian and Central Asian energy would be important if possible. But Afghan heroin is more a Western problem. As for terrorism, the assumption that Afghanistan's 'strategic depth' (a much bandied about phrase) enables Pakistan to send jihadis into Kashmir and otherwise harass India recalls Singapore's Mr Lee Kuan Yew vigorously denying that China was responsible for Pakistani mischief. Pakistanis didn't need China, he argued, to attack India. It's "inherent in their Muslim fundamentalism"; it's "something visceral in them".
The Poonch and Gilgit revolts and Kashmir invasion made that evident long before Pakistan gained a foothold in Afghanistan. India was stronger in Afghanistan then. Pakistanis accused it of instigating Pashtun separatism.
Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, disclosed in 1998 that far from invading Afghanistan for territory, oil or warm waters, the Soviets actually walked into an American trap to bog them down in a Vietnam-like war. That revelation should have convinced everyone that rocky landlocked Afghanistan is of little value in itself. But the Great Game's demonic image of horns, forked tail and cloven hoof, revived in 1979 and rampant since 9/11 (caves bursting with Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden) dies hard. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan had to be bombed back into the stone age.
Officers of the American-led coalition and their brave Pakistani jawans are trying to do that. But there is confusion between the country and people or, at least, its politicos. The US did not want Afghanistan; it wanted to exterminate Afghanistan's then rulers. But distinctions are difficult. A 'normal' Afghan by day might be a Taliban by night.
The 1,610-mile Durand Line is equally elusive. Pashtuns, whose homeland it divides arbitrarily, complain they were not consulted when it was drawn in 1893. The treaty enshrining it was in English which Amir Abdur Rehman Khan, the Afghan signatory, could not read. Only 800 miles of the line were surveyed. Despite official contradictions, there were persistent reports that the treaty was valid for only 100 years. If so, it expired in 1993 and was not renewed. The Taliban refused to recognise any artificial division of Muslim lands. Even Afghan President Hamid Karzai calls it "a line of hatred that raised a wall between two brothers".
Pakistan has repeatedly breached (and probably still does) the treaty's Article 2 reading, "The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond the line on the side of Afghanistan." Formally, India accepts that "Government of India" has been replaced by "Government of Pakistan". To leave no doubt on that score, the British clarified in 1950 "that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India" and of the UK "in these territories, and that the Durand Line is the international frontier".
That rules India out juridically. But being housed in the old imperial capital's North and South Blocks as well as the renamed viceregal lodge, and retaining some of the panoply of the Raj, it is not difficult to take for granted that the "successor state" (a legal position India insists on) has also inherited all the rights and duties of the old regime.
That complex may have explained Jawaharlal Nehru's unhappiness at the time of independence at Britain pressuring the Sultan of Muscat to transfer Gwadar, then a sleepy little harbour on the Balochistan coast, to Pakistan. It could be compared to Goa or Pondicherry in the sense of being a foreign possession in a newly independent country. There was never any doubt in any Indian's mind that the Portuguese and French enclaves should be restored without delay to India. Why then should the same principle not have applied to Gwadar?
It is too far-fetched to suggest that in 1947 Nehru foresaw Gwadar's geopolitical importance half-a-century later or the role a China that was very different from the one he knew would play in that transformation. Nor would it be fair to accuse Nehru of disregarding that what was sauce for the Hindu goose was sauce for the Muslim gander only because he sought to diminish Pakistani sovereignty just that little bit through a foreign outpost on its territory. Nehru's reasoning might be simpler. First, all accretions of territory should be to the successor state. And second, he could not emotionally bring himself to regard another Asian presence as colonial. It would have been different if Gwadar were Dutch instead of Arab. After the Suez and Hungary crises, Taya Zinkin, the Guardian writer, took this a stage further to argue that Nehru saw no colonialism without a conflict of colour.
At a recent meeting in London's Chatham House a senior British diplomatist asked why India needed 26 — his figure — consulates in Afghanistan. The strategic value of an entrenched position on Pakistan's other flank may seem to more than justify the $1.3 billion aid budget. But gratuitous offence is not always the most effective defence. Scope to squeeze Pakistan through a pincer movement may not enhance India's security.
Apart from the continual loss of Indian lives in Afghanistan, that tactic could alienate the US which now reportedly welcomes Indian activities there. But having outsourced a large chunk of the problem to Pakistan (as in 1979), President Barack Obama probably believes Pakistan can be persuaded to share the franchise and cooperate with India once the peace dialogue is revived. American optimism falls short of Asian reality. When it comes to the crunch, the US President is likely to back Pakistan and its perhaps by then reconstructed Taliban allies.
The time may have come to take a hard look at geopolitical reality, assess modern security needs and calculate what is possible in Afghanistan. India might stand to gain more by cutting its losses and consolidating economic, technological and strategic ties with the US. If domestic growth is sustained and Americans find India an attractive market, the partnership might be a more effective firewall against depredations than continuing to risk AfPak reprisals. Afghanistan could be unwinnable for India too.
Sunanda K Datta-Ray
The British joked that Calcutta (then India's capital) and London were "mervous" when the Russians captured the town of Merv on Afghanistan's borders. That was in 1884 when Kipling's Great Game was at its height. It's a moot point whether India need be so sensitive to Afghanistan 126 years later.
Of course, regional stability matters. Access to Iranian and Central Asian energy would be important if possible. But Afghan heroin is more a Western problem. As for terrorism, the assumption that Afghanistan's 'strategic depth' (a much bandied about phrase) enables Pakistan to send jihadis into Kashmir and otherwise harass India recalls Singapore's Mr Lee Kuan Yew vigorously denying that China was responsible for Pakistani mischief. Pakistanis didn't need China, he argued, to attack India. It's "inherent in their Muslim fundamentalism"; it's "something visceral in them".
The Poonch and Gilgit revolts and Kashmir invasion made that evident long before Pakistan gained a foothold in Afghanistan. India was stronger in Afghanistan then. Pakistanis accused it of instigating Pashtun separatism.
Mr Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, disclosed in 1998 that far from invading Afghanistan for territory, oil or warm waters, the Soviets actually walked into an American trap to bog them down in a Vietnam-like war. That revelation should have convinced everyone that rocky landlocked Afghanistan is of little value in itself. But the Great Game's demonic image of horns, forked tail and cloven hoof, revived in 1979 and rampant since 9/11 (caves bursting with Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden) dies hard. Taliban-controlled Afghanistan had to be bombed back into the stone age.
Officers of the American-led coalition and their brave Pakistani jawans are trying to do that. But there is confusion between the country and people or, at least, its politicos. The US did not want Afghanistan; it wanted to exterminate Afghanistan's then rulers. But distinctions are difficult. A 'normal' Afghan by day might be a Taliban by night.
The 1,610-mile Durand Line is equally elusive. Pashtuns, whose homeland it divides arbitrarily, complain they were not consulted when it was drawn in 1893. The treaty enshrining it was in English which Amir Abdur Rehman Khan, the Afghan signatory, could not read. Only 800 miles of the line were surveyed. Despite official contradictions, there were persistent reports that the treaty was valid for only 100 years. If so, it expired in 1993 and was not renewed. The Taliban refused to recognise any artificial division of Muslim lands. Even Afghan President Hamid Karzai calls it "a line of hatred that raised a wall between two brothers".
Pakistan has repeatedly breached (and probably still does) the treaty's Article 2 reading, "The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond the line on the side of Afghanistan." Formally, India accepts that "Government of India" has been replaced by "Government of Pakistan". To leave no doubt on that score, the British clarified in 1950 "that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India" and of the UK "in these territories, and that the Durand Line is the international frontier".
That rules India out juridically. But being housed in the old imperial capital's North and South Blocks as well as the renamed viceregal lodge, and retaining some of the panoply of the Raj, it is not difficult to take for granted that the "successor state" (a legal position India insists on) has also inherited all the rights and duties of the old regime.
That complex may have explained Jawaharlal Nehru's unhappiness at the time of independence at Britain pressuring the Sultan of Muscat to transfer Gwadar, then a sleepy little harbour on the Balochistan coast, to Pakistan. It could be compared to Goa or Pondicherry in the sense of being a foreign possession in a newly independent country. There was never any doubt in any Indian's mind that the Portuguese and French enclaves should be restored without delay to India. Why then should the same principle not have applied to Gwadar?
It is too far-fetched to suggest that in 1947 Nehru foresaw Gwadar's geopolitical importance half-a-century later or the role a China that was very different from the one he knew would play in that transformation. Nor would it be fair to accuse Nehru of disregarding that what was sauce for the Hindu goose was sauce for the Muslim gander only because he sought to diminish Pakistani sovereignty just that little bit through a foreign outpost on its territory. Nehru's reasoning might be simpler. First, all accretions of territory should be to the successor state. And second, he could not emotionally bring himself to regard another Asian presence as colonial. It would have been different if Gwadar were Dutch instead of Arab. After the Suez and Hungary crises, Taya Zinkin, the Guardian writer, took this a stage further to argue that Nehru saw no colonialism without a conflict of colour.
At a recent meeting in London's Chatham House a senior British diplomatist asked why India needed 26 — his figure — consulates in Afghanistan. The strategic value of an entrenched position on Pakistan's other flank may seem to more than justify the $1.3 billion aid budget. But gratuitous offence is not always the most effective defence. Scope to squeeze Pakistan through a pincer movement may not enhance India's security.
Apart from the continual loss of Indian lives in Afghanistan, that tactic could alienate the US which now reportedly welcomes Indian activities there. But having outsourced a large chunk of the problem to Pakistan (as in 1979), President Barack Obama probably believes Pakistan can be persuaded to share the franchise and cooperate with India once the peace dialogue is revived. American optimism falls short of Asian reality. When it comes to the crunch, the US President is likely to back Pakistan and its perhaps by then reconstructed Taliban allies.
The time may have come to take a hard look at geopolitical reality, assess modern security needs and calculate what is possible in Afghanistan. India might stand to gain more by cutting its losses and consolidating economic, technological and strategic ties with the US. If domestic growth is sustained and Americans find India an attractive market, the partnership might be a more effective firewall against depredations than continuing to risk AfPak reprisals. Afghanistan could be unwinnable for India too.
DIFFICULT GAME- India must protect its interests when the US exits Afghanistan
The last but one week of March saw major events involving the immediate neighbourhood, the impact of which will undoubtedly have profound strategic implications for India. Even before the Pakistan foreign minister's delegation that included both General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief, and Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Inter-Services Intelligence chief, had left the shores of Pakistan for a much heralded strategic dialogue with the United States of America, the US ambassador in Pakistan stated that a US-Pakistan civil nuclear deal on the lines of the Indo-US deal could be discussed. This was followed by an interview to Pakistan television by the secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in which her body language clearly conveyed a message to the people of Pakistan that the US needed Pakistan badly.
Closer home, the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, was on a formal visit to China where he was given the red carpet treatment. He followed this up with a visit to Tehran, where he participated in the first festival of the international day of Nauroz, attended by some 25 heads of State or senior representatives of countries. Aware that it was his country's future that would form the centrepiece of the US-Pakistan dialogue in Washington, Karzai's travels also had a message.
The Indian foreign minister's absence at the Tehran ceremony after having been invited by his counterpart was because the Iran government shifted invitation dates once, followed by a second time. Clearly, our foreign minister got the hint and mercifully declined. Iran was conveying its own message regarding India's earlier voting in favour of the International Atomic Energy Agency's censure of Iran.
Considering that we have a vital stake in what shape the future of Afghanistan takes, one wondered what message India had for those attempting to shape this future in Washington. Judging by the nation's infatuation with the Narendra Modi-Amitabh Bachchan tamasha, there was none. Those in the corridors of the State department no doubt got the message and drew their own conclusions.
In all fairness, the US has never pretended to be sensitive to our security concerns if they clashed with its national interests. That is why it was not the least apologetic about denying our agencies access to David Headley, who is the self-confessed mastermind of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Although that situation has changed since, it can be asked whether the US would have taken kindly to being denied access to Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor of the Mumbai attackers. Would India have had the courage to deny it access? Since Headley has named serving Pakistan army officers as responsible for planning and executing the Mumbai carnage, the least India expected was a US censure of Pakistani military and intelligence establishments, if not out of conviction then at least out of form.
Instead, it appears that praise was showered on General Kayani and the Pakistan army for their efforts on the AfPak front and commitments extracted that the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and al Qaida — all organizations targeting the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan — would be tackled. No such assurance was considered necessary for Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Haqqani network, both of which are considered Pakistani strategic assets to target India. This in spite of their also featuring on the US president's list of those to be dismantled and defeated. Aware of these double standards and so to appease Indian sentiment, the US promptly announced the conclusion of the nuclear reprocessing agreement with India, hailing it as further consolidation of a strategic partnership.
The US is well on its way towards working out its exit from Afghanistan, and has decided that this needs the support and cooperation of the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies. How this strategy will impact the regional security scene is difficult to tell, but one thing is certain. Unless India is willing to work out a strategy to safeguard its interests and not outsource this to the US or anyone else, it may well be the biggest loser in this game.
Since every bit of action in Washington and in the neighbourhood would have a profound and long-lasting effect on India's internal and external security, one had expected the nation to be treated to loads of informed news and discussion in both the print and electronic media. Instead what we got was Modi mania peppered with Bachchan drama.
It is not this writer's intention to join political issues or defend the person of Narendra Modi who, as an elected representative from Gujarat and holding the constitutional post of chief minister, must abide by the law of the land and face the consequences. But surely, like every citizen, he must be presumed innocent until proven guilty and surely a constitutional authority needs more respect than to be subject to sustained media trial?
The issue that concerns one is the inability to separate the personality of an individual holding a constitutional post from the dignity and sanctity of the post itself and, by extension, the equation of the person rather than the position with the State. Some years ago, Modi, as chief minister of Gujarat, in which constitutional post he would carry a red Indian diplomatic passport, was denied a visa by the US authorities. Denial of a visa to an Indian diplomatic passport holder was a rebuff to the Indian State. The Central government should have strongly reacted to this slight to an Indian diplomatic passport holder. That it failed to do so and in fact relished Modi's discomfiture speaks poorly of our national pride. Perhaps a counter-question would make the point. Would the US have tolerated such a slight at Indian hands to one of its diplomatic passport holders?
Similarly, to target Amitabh Bachchan because he is promoting Modi, when he is promoting Gujarat and its tourism potential, is to target the people of the state and, by extension, the people of India. Is it the case of Modi-baiters that all government functionaries acting on his orders or on his behalf are to be boycotted or their actions considered illegitimate? Such denigration of constitutional posts has other serious ramifications. What would this writer have done today had he been the air force commander of the region that encompasses Gujarat, in which capacity there are occasions to either call on the chief minister or attend formal functions presided over by him? This writer in his time, and as part of protocol, has done precisely this in Gandhinagar, Jaipur, Mumbai and all capitals of the northeastern states. But those were times when, in the words of Rabindranath Tagore, the clear stream of reason had not lost its way in the dreary desert of dead habit.
There is grave danger that today regional commanders with the Gujarat area under their command would rather duck these protocol obligations. If they do they will have conveyed a poor message to the people of Gujarat, to all their formations located within the state and indeed all uniformed people belonging to the state. Before any further damage is done to the constitutional fabric of the country, the prime minister and leaders of all political parties need to draw clear red lines beyond which petty politics must bow at the altar of national interest.
That a person holding a constitutional post is being investigated as per the law of the land speaks volumes for our justice system. But the system fails us by delaying justice. Rather than milk the delay to derive political mileage, our lawmakers would do well to institute laws to ensure that such cases are completed within stipulated time frames, and that during their pendency, the individual concerned steps down from the constitutional post. Whilst this may appear to infringe on individual rights of presumption of innocence until proven guilty, in the larger interest of the sanctity of constitutional posts, the price is well worth paying. Today, we have undermined the authority of the post of a chief minister by putting an incumbent on media trial. This is an indirect affront to the people who have, through a democratic process, elected their chief minister, and to his authority to govern. We are treading on very thin ice.
This brings us to the media, which of late have been in the news in the context of paid media reporting prior to the last elections with some electronic media channels reportedly offering paid news packages to political parties. A cynic could well conclude that the hype in the media over the Modi-Bachchan issue was to camouflage the far more serious ramifications for our future security that were unfolding in Washington under the patronage of our avowed strategic partner, the US. In this age of information warfare and commercialization, one wonders if such cynicism amounts to letting imagination run wild.
The last but one week of March saw major events involving the immediate neighbourhood, the impact of which will undoubtedly have profound strategic implications for India. Even before the Pakistan foreign minister's delegation that included both General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the army chief, and Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the Inter-Services Intelligence chief, had left the shores of Pakistan for a much heralded strategic dialogue with the United States of America, the US ambassador in Pakistan stated that a US-Pakistan civil nuclear deal on the lines of the Indo-US deal could be discussed. This was followed by an interview to Pakistan television by the secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in which her body language clearly conveyed a message to the people of Pakistan that the US needed Pakistan badly.
Closer home, the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, was on a formal visit to China where he was given the red carpet treatment. He followed this up with a visit to Tehran, where he participated in the first festival of the international day of Nauroz, attended by some 25 heads of State or senior representatives of countries. Aware that it was his country's future that would form the centrepiece of the US-Pakistan dialogue in Washington, Karzai's travels also had a message.
The Indian foreign minister's absence at the Tehran ceremony after having been invited by his counterpart was because the Iran government shifted invitation dates once, followed by a second time. Clearly, our foreign minister got the hint and mercifully declined. Iran was conveying its own message regarding India's earlier voting in favour of the International Atomic Energy Agency's censure of Iran.
Considering that we have a vital stake in what shape the future of Afghanistan takes, one wondered what message India had for those attempting to shape this future in Washington. Judging by the nation's infatuation with the Narendra Modi-Amitabh Bachchan tamasha, there was none. Those in the corridors of the State department no doubt got the message and drew their own conclusions.
In all fairness, the US has never pretended to be sensitive to our security concerns if they clashed with its national interests. That is why it was not the least apologetic about denying our agencies access to David Headley, who is the self-confessed mastermind of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks. Although that situation has changed since, it can be asked whether the US would have taken kindly to being denied access to Ajmal Kasab, the lone survivor of the Mumbai attackers. Would India have had the courage to deny it access? Since Headley has named serving Pakistan army officers as responsible for planning and executing the Mumbai carnage, the least India expected was a US censure of Pakistani military and intelligence establishments, if not out of conviction then at least out of form.
Instead, it appears that praise was showered on General Kayani and the Pakistan army for their efforts on the AfPak front and commitments extracted that the Afghan Taliban, Pakistani Taliban and al Qaida — all organizations targeting the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Afghanistan — would be tackled. No such assurance was considered necessary for Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Haqqani network, both of which are considered Pakistani strategic assets to target India. This in spite of their also featuring on the US president's list of those to be dismantled and defeated. Aware of these double standards and so to appease Indian sentiment, the US promptly announced the conclusion of the nuclear reprocessing agreement with India, hailing it as further consolidation of a strategic partnership.
The US is well on its way towards working out its exit from Afghanistan, and has decided that this needs the support and cooperation of the Pakistan military and intelligence agencies. How this strategy will impact the regional security scene is difficult to tell, but one thing is certain. Unless India is willing to work out a strategy to safeguard its interests and not outsource this to the US or anyone else, it may well be the biggest loser in this game.
Since every bit of action in Washington and in the neighbourhood would have a profound and long-lasting effect on India's internal and external security, one had expected the nation to be treated to loads of informed news and discussion in both the print and electronic media. Instead what we got was Modi mania peppered with Bachchan drama.
It is not this writer's intention to join political issues or defend the person of Narendra Modi who, as an elected representative from Gujarat and holding the constitutional post of chief minister, must abide by the law of the land and face the consequences. But surely, like every citizen, he must be presumed innocent until proven guilty and surely a constitutional authority needs more respect than to be subject to sustained media trial?
The issue that concerns one is the inability to separate the personality of an individual holding a constitutional post from the dignity and sanctity of the post itself and, by extension, the equation of the person rather than the position with the State. Some years ago, Modi, as chief minister of Gujarat, in which constitutional post he would carry a red Indian diplomatic passport, was denied a visa by the US authorities. Denial of a visa to an Indian diplomatic passport holder was a rebuff to the Indian State. The Central government should have strongly reacted to this slight to an Indian diplomatic passport holder. That it failed to do so and in fact relished Modi's discomfiture speaks poorly of our national pride. Perhaps a counter-question would make the point. Would the US have tolerated such a slight at Indian hands to one of its diplomatic passport holders?
Similarly, to target Amitabh Bachchan because he is promoting Modi, when he is promoting Gujarat and its tourism potential, is to target the people of the state and, by extension, the people of India. Is it the case of Modi-baiters that all government functionaries acting on his orders or on his behalf are to be boycotted or their actions considered illegitimate? Such denigration of constitutional posts has other serious ramifications. What would this writer have done today had he been the air force commander of the region that encompasses Gujarat, in which capacity there are occasions to either call on the chief minister or attend formal functions presided over by him? This writer in his time, and as part of protocol, has done precisely this in Gandhinagar, Jaipur, Mumbai and all capitals of the northeastern states. But those were times when, in the words of Rabindranath Tagore, the clear stream of reason had not lost its way in the dreary desert of dead habit.
There is grave danger that today regional commanders with the Gujarat area under their command would rather duck these protocol obligations. If they do they will have conveyed a poor message to the people of Gujarat, to all their formations located within the state and indeed all uniformed people belonging to the state. Before any further damage is done to the constitutional fabric of the country, the prime minister and leaders of all political parties need to draw clear red lines beyond which petty politics must bow at the altar of national interest.
That a person holding a constitutional post is being investigated as per the law of the land speaks volumes for our justice system. But the system fails us by delaying justice. Rather than milk the delay to derive political mileage, our lawmakers would do well to institute laws to ensure that such cases are completed within stipulated time frames, and that during their pendency, the individual concerned steps down from the constitutional post. Whilst this may appear to infringe on individual rights of presumption of innocence until proven guilty, in the larger interest of the sanctity of constitutional posts, the price is well worth paying. Today, we have undermined the authority of the post of a chief minister by putting an incumbent on media trial. This is an indirect affront to the people who have, through a democratic process, elected their chief minister, and to his authority to govern. We are treading on very thin ice.
This brings us to the media, which of late have been in the news in the context of paid media reporting prior to the last elections with some electronic media channels reportedly offering paid news packages to political parties. A cynic could well conclude that the hype in the media over the Modi-Bachchan issue was to camouflage the far more serious ramifications for our future security that were unfolding in Washington under the patronage of our avowed strategic partner, the US. In this age of information warfare and commercialization, one wonders if such cynicism amounts to letting imagination run wild.
Logan
Regular Member
- Joined
- Apr 23, 2010
- Messages
- 133
- Likes
- 1
Why the hell should we care about what Pakistan thinks about India's presence in Afghanistan,,,,,India is a free and sovereign nation and its administrators have every right to decide about its strategic and military deployments in foreign countries.Whether Pakistan is threatened about loosing ground in Afghanistan due to increased Indian involvement over there or is it threatened about the growing Indio-American partnership should be put in a cupboard.Rather we should percieve thet India's image on the global arena is on the rise due to it's involvement in the stabilisation and development of Afghanistan.
Last edited by a moderator:
India closes ranks with Hamid Karzai
M.K. Bhadrakumar
The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead, no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy.
The Afghan President Hamid Karzai's two-day visit to New Delhi last week took place at a defining moment in the Afghan civil war. Mr. Karzai is about to embark on a crucial peace and reconciliation project. He just completed talks in three important regional capitals — Islamabad, Tehran and Beijing — explaining his strategy, for the success of which he needs the understanding from the regional powers. Tehran and Beijing were forthcoming in their support of the Afghan government whereas Islamabad views him as a rival claimant to piloting the peace process.
Secondly, "Afghanisation" is set to surge to the centre stage. The foreign minister-level meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) held in Tallinn, the Estonian capital, on April 23 officially set in motion a process to roll back the alliance's operations in Afghanistan. While this would be a natural process and not a "run for the exit," as NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen put it, the political reality is that the western allies have reached agreement on basic guidelines for commencing the hand-over of responsibility for security to the Afghan forces on a case-by-case basis within this year. The international conference, slated to be held in Kabul in June, will further "tweak" the NATO's approach. Mr. Karzai formally invited India to take part in the conference.
The talks in Delhi have made it quite clear that India will remain an effective partner for the Afghan government in the difficult period ahead no matter the vicissitudes of the United States' AfPak diplomacy; the worsening security situation inside Afghanistan; the Pakistani military's undisguised power projection for "strategic depth"; and, least of all, the physical threat from Pakistani agents to the Indian presence in Afghanistan.
Dr. Singh summed up that his discussions with Mr. Karzai were "extremely productive." Delhi underlined their strategic character by including Defence Minister A.K. Antony in the Indian delegation at the talks. Dr. Singh pointedly articulated India's "deep admiration" for Mr. Karzai's "courageous leadership in difficult times," probably administering a word of advice to the Barack Obama administration to have a sense of proportions in judging the highly complex Afghan political situation. Broadly speaking, the Indian viewpoint has been consistently that there is an organic linkage between creating an enabling security environment and setting high yardsticks about an expansion of the footprint of the Afghan government or its accelerated progress on governance issues.
Interestingly, a lowering of the anti-Karzai rhetoric and grandstanding is of late visible in certain quarters within the Obama administration. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton conspicuously voiced a rethink recently. The big question, however, is how far down the ladder Ms Clinton's fair-minded estimation trickles down. Delhi would very much hope that her helpful words translate as U.S. policies on the ground in the aftermath of Mr. Karzai's visit to Washington on May 10-14 — although a systematic Pakistani attempt to queer the pitch of the visit is already afoot.
Two topics dominated Mr. Karzai's talks in Delhi — placing India's development and strategic partnership with Afghanistan within the "Afghanisation" process and, secondly, India's perspectives on the "reintegration" and reconciliation of the Taliban. Dr. Singh said, "India is ready to augment its assistance for capacity building and for its skills and human resource development to help strengthen public institutions in Afghanistan."
India's assistance for Afghanistan already touches a massive figure of $1.3 billion. India can train Afghan specialists in various fields, provide training and equipment to the Afghan army and cooperate in a range of counter-terrorism and counter-narcotic activities. However, Delhi would be aware that any military deployment in Afghanistan is bound to be a potentially exhausting military mission and needs to be avoided. The Indian stance is strikingly similar to that of Russia or China, which also refuse to get militarily involved in Afghanistan. The challenge facing Indian diplomacy will be to figure out how economic expansion can be the key element of India's security strategy in Afghanistan. Arguably, emulating China's model, which places emphasis on making investments in resource-based projects will be a step forward for India. This could be done in collaboration with Afghan partners.
Without doubt, Mr. Karzai's visit helped to further refine the Indian thinking apropos the contours of an Afghan settlement. The Indian thinking rests on the following assessments. One, India regards the forthcoming jirga (tribal assembly) in May in Kabul and the Afghan parliamentary elections in September to be "important milestones." Delhi agrees with Mr. Karzai's stance that in order for these processes to be legitimate and enduring, they should be Afghan-led. Two, these political processes can be optimal only if they go hand in hand with the international community's long term commitment to stability, peace and development in Afghanistan.
Three, the deterioration in the security situation is a hard reality and it needs to be firmly tackled on a priority basis within Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan, where the syndicate of terrorist organisations and other extremist groups operating in the region enjoy support and sustenance. Towards this end, apart from the NATO's surge, the Afghan security forces should be enlarged and developed in a professional manner and provided with adequate resources, combat equipment and enablers and training.
It would appear that Mr. Karzai allayed the Indian apprehensions regarding the strategy of "reintegration" of the Taliban. Delhi takes a cautious view of the process since in its view the Taliban may exploit the political space to capture power with Pakistani support, creating a fait accompli for the region, which was how the ISI implemented a phase-by-phase agenda of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan during 1994-97. Therefore, Delhi would expect the reintegration process to be "tackled with prudence, the benefit of hindsight, foresight and caution." Also, Delhi stresses that any integration process should be "inclusive and transparent," which is predicated on the assessment that Afghanistan is a plural society and the majority opinion is not only vehemently against the Taliban's extremist ideology but also staunchly opposes any role for the outsiders to covertly dictate peace.
Mr. Karzai shared his thinking apropos the upcoming jirga with Dr. Singh and it appears that there are no serious contradictions between the two sides. Significantly, Mr. Karzai made it a point to underline "our common struggle against terrorism and extremism." The joint statement also underlined the two countries' "determination"¦to combat the forces of terrorism which pose a particular threat to the region."
There has been a latent sense of uneasiness among sections of the Indian strategic community that Mr. Karzai appeared to be in a mood to "compromise" or "appease" the Taliban in a self-seeking manner in anticipation of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Much of this misperception stemmed from the western propaganda — often pre-cooked in the ISI's kitchen — intended to dissimulate or to create an impression that Mr. Karzai is raring to go to accommodate the Taliban leadership and if anything at all is holding him back, it is only Mr. Obama's scepticism about the reconciliation strategy.
Delhi seems to understand well enough that what is unfolding is rather a grim struggle for the control of the Afghan peace process itself. Unsurprisingly, Mr. Karzai insists on his prerogative as the elected head of state to lead his country's peace process. On the contrary, Pakistani military would like to cast Mr. Karzai as merely one of the Afghan protagonists. Ostensibly, the Pakistani military wishes to work exclusively with the U.S. to reconcile the Taliban but in reality it wishes to seize control of the peace process or to dominate it, while extracting concessions from Washington in the form of military and economic aid. The Pakistani military banks on exploiting Mr.Obama's haste to effect a drawdown of the U.S. combat troops by mid-2011.
The ISI has not only shed its "strategic ambiguity" regarding its nexus with the Taliban but of late openly flaunts its influence with the hardline "Quetta Shura" and the Haqqani network, making it clear that Rawalpindi is capable of torpedoing any peace process which is left to the Afghans. Ironically, this nexus with elements expressly banned by the United Nations (at the instance of the George W. Bush administration) ought to make Pakistan a rogue state but the U.S. has been pragmatic about it and instead chooses to solicit the Pakistani military's help. An added factor is that influential figures within Mr. Obama's AfPak team who are vestiges of the Afghan jihad, enjoy old links with the Pakistani security establishment and willingly subserve the ISI's agenda pitting Mr. Karzai as the "problem" in any national reconciliation process.
Curiously, this political theatre is unfolding against a backdrop where "almost all Afghans, including Karzai's Pashtun supporters, the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance and even the Taliban oppose any major role for the ISI," to quote Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani commentator, in a recent article in the Washington Post. Quite obviously, the Pakistani military's control of the foreign and security policies is at a high level in Islamabad. Delhi will do well to figure out that Mr. Karzai deserves all the support he needs at this juncture.
India Sponsors a Park for Women in Afghanistan
Afghan women in Kabul have a safe place to take off their burqas for a while as they play with their children and visit in a guarded park funded by India.
Credit: Emily Wax / Washington Post
Kabul — On a recent day when the sun was finally strong enough to dry the Afghan capital's muddy streets, Habiba Sarwe sought her husband's permission to visit a spot that her daughter and all the neighborhood wives were talking about: a park, with swings, benches, flowers and a gazebo. A park for women only.
"Please, let me go," begged Sarwe, who is 44 but whose tired eyes make her look far older. "It's a good place."
Her husband decided it would be OK. So that afternoon, Sarwe put on her favorite fitted gray wool suit under her shapeless, head-to-toe burqa and set out with three of her children for the dusty park on the edge of Kabul.
Once inside the two metal gates, she pushed up the visor of her burqa and stood still, the sunshine warm on her face, while her two daughters and youngest son raced to the swings. She smiled as they soared higher and higher.
"This is the one place that's ours," said an out-of-breath Fardia Azizmay, 19, Sarwe's older daughter, as she jumped off a swing and looked over a pile of a dozen blue burqas, tossed off by women as they entered. "For us, home is so boring. Our streets and shops are not for women. But this place is our own."
The small park, protected by a half-dozen gun-toting guards, has become a favorite destination for Kabul women wanting a safe, quiet place to meet with friends, complain about their husbands, discuss their kids, line one another's eyes with black kohl or just shed their burqas and play, female activists here say.
But play is not the only draw. The park, paid for by India, also feels like a miniature college campus. India's Self-Employed Women's Association, or SEWA, which runs it, has set up a training center on the grounds for mothers and daughters who may never have been to school.
In classrooms overlooking the park, women learn embroidery and organic farming. They pickle tomatoes, bottle jam and sew at a row of new machines. It is all part of a $1.3 billion Indian aid program for neighboring Afghanistan that includes building roads and power plants as well as reaching out to women and girls through clinics and classes.
Although women make up more than half of Afghanistan's population, fear of fundamentalist militant groups has caused them to nearly disappear from public life, especially in the rural south, where U.S.-led forces are trying to root out Taliban fighters. Some of those insurgents still pressure women to cover up and to avoid schools and workplaces, defying the Afghan constitution's guarantee of equal rights for both sexes.
"Our classes and our park are so busy - but only because India went to the Kabul slum areas and talked to the women about coming," said Tamana Ghaznewil, 19, an Afghan who works at the park. "For many women, having someone come from another country and offer this little garden was really new. Some asked me, 'Why would they see me, an Afghan woman, as important?' "
(C) San Francisco Chronicle 2010
'To Talk To Terrorists Is Like Frying Snowballs'
The Indian ambassador in Afghanistan on why his embassy or its staff didn't celebrate Diwali this year and what it means to stay back after the July 7 bombings
AUNOHITA MOJUMDAR ON JAYANT PRASAD
The year 2008 has been one of the most challenging for both Afghanistan as well as India's presence here. For one, the July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy killed five of its staff, including two diplomats, shocking the international community as well as the Afghans. Worse, the security situation continues to deteriorate here amidst talk of negotiating with the Taliban, rearming the tribal militia and increasing the presence of international troops. Simultaneously, pressure has been mounted on Pakistan to deal with the sanctuaries of terrorism on its soil.
The Indian embassy or its staff didn't celebrate Diwali to commiserate with their colleagues who lost their lives. On that day, however, Indian ambassador to Afghanistan Jayant Prasad talked to Aunohita Mojumdar. Excerpts:
Indian Embassy Bombing
Democracy in Afghanistan
India-Afghanistan
International Presence in Afghanistan
India-Afghanistan != India-Pakistan-Afghanistan
What India is doing in Afghanistan
Last edited:
