Indian Ocean Developments

Yusuf

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Diego Garcia

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/diego-garcia.htm

Diego Garcia "Camp Justice" 7º20'S 72º25'E
Diego Garcia is a British territory mostly populated by the US military, the British colony that's been colonised by the Americans. Normally the island is home to about 1,700 military personnel and 1,500 civilian contractors. But only about 50 troops are British. The island is used jointly by the Navy and the Air Force. Though the Navy contingent is larger, the Air Force does the flying.

Diego Garcia is a narrow tropical jungle reef in the Indian Ocean, about 1,000 miles south of the southern India coast. Despite the tropical feel to the reef, this is no Margaritaville. It's more of a stationary aircraft carrier. Diego Garcia is exclusively a military reservation located on a small host country atoll in the Chagos Archipelago.

A tropical footprint-shaped island just 7 degrees south of the equator, Diego Garcia is heavily vegetated. The island covers 6,720 acres in area with a maximum height of 22 feet and an average elevation of four feet above sea level. The shoreline is about 40 miles long and the island encloses a lagoon 6.5 miles wide and 13 miles long.

Diego Garcia History
Diego Garcia was discovered by Portuguese explorers in the early 1500s. It is the largest of fifty-two islands which form the Chagos Archipelago, located in the heart of the Indian Ocean. The island's name is believed to have come from either the ship's captain or the navigator on that early voyage of discovery.

In 1965, with the formation of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), Diego Garcia was under the administrative control of the British government of the Seychelles. In 1976, the Seychelles gained independence from England and the BIOT became a self-administering territory under the East African Desk of the British Foreign Office. The Crown's representative on island, the British Representative (BRITREP), acts as both Justice of the Peace and Commanding Officer of the Royal Naval Party 1002.

In the 1960's, America's naval policy in the Indian Ocean had many ingredients. The foremost was to deter Russia from interrupting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf countries to America and Europe. Politically, this entailed American support of Iran to counter Russian influence in Iraq. It entailed maintaining a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and wherever possible, in the countries on the rim of the Indian Ocean, not only to secure the sea lines of communication which criss-crossed the Indian Ocean but also to inject military force from seaward when required. By 1968, the American Navy had effected the necessary adjustments in its global naval deployments.

In 1968, Britain announced its intention to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971 and generated debate on "the Vacuum in the Indian Ocean". Russia's naval presence in the Indian Ocean increased to keep pace with the American naval presence.

America felt that Russia was articulating anxiety to forestall American naval deployment. The Russians on the other hand, felt that the establishing of communication facilities in Diego Garcia and in Northwest Cape in Australia could be interpreted clearly as reflecting an intention to deploy submarines in the Indian Ocean whose ballistic missiles were targeted on Russia.

Fears of a naval vacuum in the Indian Ocean were soon overtaken by fears of the militarisation of the Indian Ocean. America neither denied nor acknowledged the deployment of submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Russian Navy started showing its flag in the Indian Ocean, partly to fill the naval vacuum, partly to counter the American Navy and partly to demonstrate to the littoral states that the Russian Navy was a force to contend with. Since Russia lacked naval bases in the Indian Ocean, an anchorage was developed off Socotra near the Gulf of Aden. Overall, there was a steady increase in the presence of American and Russian naval ships.

In 1969, American President Nixon's "Twin Pillar" strategy entrusted the security of the Persian Gulf region to the monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia. America started heavily arming both countries under the Nixon Doctrine. In 1970, the Russians became active in the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, which was a Persian Gulf choke-point. These moves towards militarisation of the Indian Ocean triggered countermoves to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace. And both these moves and countermoves had to take into account the overall American hyper-sensitivity regarding West Asian oil supplies.

Until 1971, Diego Garcia's main source of income was from the profitable copra oil plantation. At one time, copra oil from here and the other "Oil Islands" provided fine machine oil and fuel to light European lamps. During the roughly 170 years of plantation life, coconut harvests on Diego Garcia remained fairly constant, at about four million nuts annually. The plantation years ended with the arrival of the U.S. military construction.

On 23 January 1971, a nine man advance party from NMCB-40 landed on Diego Garcia to initiate a preliminary survey for beach landing areas. Fifty additional Seabees from Amphibious Construction Battalion Two landed on the island and marked underwater obstructions, installed temporary navigational aids and cleared beach areas for landing additional personnel and materials. On 20 March 1971, an additional party of 160 Seabees from NMCB-40 arrived. Construction for U.S. Naval Communication Facility Diego Garcia was started four days later by the Seabees from NMCB-1 and finished by NMCB-62. The Seabees also started construction of an interim runway - to support the Communication Facility.

In October and November of 1971, Detachment CHAGOS of NMCB 71 and the whole of NMCB 1 arrived, marking the beginning of large-scale construction. NMCB 1 built the transmitter and receiver buildings and placed the base course for the permanent runway and parking apron. In July 1972, NMCB 62 relieved NMCB-1 and took over the departing battalion's projects. On 25 December the first C-141J transport landed on the newly completed 6,000 foot runway with the Bob Hope Christmas Troupe.

During December 1972, a Pre-commissioning Detachment arrived to prepare the Naval Communication Station for operations. On 20 March, 1973 U.S. Naval Communication Station, Diego Garcia was commissioned. The setting was sparse, but communications have been "UP" ever since. The communications facility was later changed to Naval Computer and Telecommunication Station (NCTS) in October of 1991.

Work commenced on the second construction increment, a $6.1 million project which involved the construction of a ship channel and turning basin in the lagoon. This project, however, was contracted to a Taiwanese firm. Seabees continued to work on support and personnel facilities in the cantonment area at the northern tip of the atoll. The second major area of construction was the airfield and its supporting facilities. Revised requirements called for the extension of the original 8,000-foot runway to 12,000 feet and additions were made to the parking apron and taxiways. New hangars and other support facilities were also built. During 1973 and 1974, Seabee units worked on all these projects. Because the final mission of Diego Garcia was still evolving, it was clear that still more construction would take place in the years to come.

In 1975 and 1976, Congress authorized $28.6 million to expand the Diego Garcia facilities to provide minimal logistics support for U.S. task groups operating in the Indian Ocean. Additional projects were undertaken in 1978. World events in 1979 and 1980, however, forced a reevaluation of the U.S. defense posture in the Indian Ocean area which indicated the need for pre-positioned materials to support a rapid deployment force and a more active U.S. presence in the area. It was decided to further expand the facilities at Diego Garcia in order to provide support for several pre-positioned ships, loaded with critical supplies. By the end of 1980 the Naval Facilities Engineering Command had advertised a $100 million contract for initial dredging at Diego Garcia to expand the berthing facilities.

Thus, what began as simply a communication station on a remote atoll became a major fleet and U.S. armed forces support base by the 1980s. By 1983 the only Seabee unit remaining on Diego Garcia was a detachment of NMCB 62. The work the Seabees completed on Diego Garcia since 1971 represented the largest peacetime construction effort in their history. Diego Garcia was the major Seabee construction effort of the 1970s and they acquitted themselves well under the difficult and isolated conditions that exist here. When the Seabees arrived they lived in tent camps, when they departed they left a fully-developed, modern military facility, capable of supporting thousands of U.S. personnel.

Navy Support Facility Diego Garcia was established 1 October 1977, after six years as a Navy communications station. Known as the "Footprint of Freedom," it plays a primary role in support of U.S. military units operating in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf. Diego Garcia is a British Indian Ocean Territory. The island's only occupants are NSF personnel and tenants. Most of the approximately 3,500 people are third country nationals working under the large base operating support (BOS) contract. In addition to a regularly deployed VP squadron, major activities include a Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, maritime prepositioning ships anchored in the lagoon, Military Sealift Command, and COMPSRON TWO (which controls the MSC ships). The Air Force and Army also maintain support elements on the island.

A major change to the island organizational structure occurred with the establishment of the Navy Support Facility (NSF) on October 1, 1977. Commanding Officer, NSF, assumed all duties and responsibilities previously assigned to the Island Commander. The nucleus for NSF came from the original Communication Station enlisted and officer allowances. All billets, other than those dedicated to communications support, were transferred to CO, NSF, who is responsible for maintaining and operating facilities and providing services and materials in support of several tenant shore activities and units of the operating forces. Following the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Diego Garcia saw the most dramatic build-up of any location since the Vietnam War era. In 1986, Diego Garcia became fully operational with the completion of a $500 million construction program.

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait marked the most intense operational period in Diego Garcia's history. From 1 August 1990 to 28 February 1991, NAVSUPPFAC Diego Garcia achieved and maintained the highest degree of operational readiness and provided levels of support which outstripped all contingency planning. As the base population doubled almost overnight, with the deployment of a Strategic Air Command Bombardment Wing and other aviation detachments, workload base-wide increased from 300-2000% over peacetime levels with no personnel augmentation. Diego Garcia became the only US Navy base that launched offensive air operations during Operation Desert Storm and Diego Garcia remains a vital link in the US defense structure.

Det 1, 13th Air Force, is responsible for operating and maintaining a Southwest Asia contingency base on Diego Garcia in support of CINCCENTCOM OPLANs. Provides facilities, munitions, vehicles, Aerospace Ground Equipment, supplies and aviation fuel to sustain deployed bomber and tanker sortie operations.

The 36th Civil Engineer Squadron sent a 24-person Prime Base Engineer Emergency Force detachment to Naval Support Facility, Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territories, in June 2000. The team left Andersen seven weeks ago to complete some construction work as part of the Air Force's Bomber Forward Operating Location initiative. Members from Pacific Air Forces Headquarters and 36th CES identified five requirements for the team, including: constructing a land mobile radio repeater facility, constructing supply and maintenance secure storage rooms, repairing tent city electrical system, constructing a generator pad and testing grounding points on the south ramp.

The mission of putting bombs on target almost 4,000 miles away in Afghanistan is comparable to flying from Chicago to Rio de Janiero, Brazil. Success falls on the backs of bomber and aerial refueling aircraft that commute together from the tropics to Afghanistan. Coalition aircraft at Diego Garcia dropped more ordnance on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan than any other unit during the war on terror.

Force members live in tents, which cyclones occasionally threaten to throw into the sea - or on a merchant ship that leaves residents with sea legs once they get back on shore.

The B-2 Shelters
In mid-September 2002 it was reported that the US had requested permission to build special shelters for four to six B-2 bombers at Diego Garcia. The portable climate-controlled shelters take about a month to erect. According to American Spaceframe Fabricators, the contractor that designed and constructed the B-2 Shelter System, two shelters had been constructed by late November and two additional structures would not be completed until June 2003 due to lack of existing concrete foundation.

The Island
As the United Kingdom owns the island, there are British Representatives on Diego Garcia, responsible for law and order on the island. The British Representative, or BritRep, acts as the Commanding Officer for Naval Party 1002, as well as the local magistrate and judge for all legal matters dealing with British law. Under his cognizance are the British customs personnel, Royal Overseas Police Officers (ROPOs) and a compliment of Royal Marines, who patrol and protect the entire BIOT.

Probably the place's prickliest subject is the issue of the 1,200 to 2,000 members of the Ilois, former inhabitants the British moved off the island in the late 1960s. They now live 1,200 miles away on the isle of Mauritus. As the descendants of workers who arrived on the island in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, they had lived there for several generations. But U.S. and British government texts refer to them merely as temporary workers, not indigenous inhabitants. Before those colonial workers, apparently no one ever settled there. The U.S. lease expires in 2016, and the Ilois are making plans return to turn the place into a sugarcane and fishing enterprise.

Just getting to the site is a challenge in itself - the sandy ridge has no other land within 1,000 miles with India to the north, Madagascar to the west, Indonesia to the east and nothing but Antarctica way to the south. The only way in and out is through government ships or planes.

Diego Garcia is part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) formed in 1965 from territory belonging formerly to Mauritius and the Seychelles. The island is one of 52 in the Chagos Archipelago, which extends over an area of 10,000 square miles. The archipelago is located in the heart of the Indian Ocean, south of India and between Africa and Indonesia. The tropical island is a narrow coral atoll with a land area of about eleven square miles, nearly enclosing a lagoon. Its configuration is that of a "V" drawn by a shaky hand. The island stretches 37 miles from tip to tip, with an opening to the north-northwest. Three small islands dot the mouth of the lagoon which is approximately 13 miles long and up to 6 miles wide. The lagoon is from sixty to one hundred feet deep with numerous coral heads in most areas. Shallow reefs surround the island on the ocean side, as well as in the lagoon. The island's mean height above sea level is 4 feet.

Diego Garcia is the largest of many atolls that form the Chagos Archipelago. The horseshoe- shaped atoll is located seven degrees south of the equator in the North Central Region of the Indian Ocean. It is heavily vegetated, has a land area of 6,720 acres and is 37 miles long, tip- to-tip. The maximum elevation is 22 feet, with an average elevation of four feet above sea level. The enclosed lagoon is approximately seven miles wide and thirteen miles long. The three small islands at the mouth of the lagoon and the shape of the atoll give the impression of a footprint, hence the term "Footprint of Freedom".

Annual rainfall averages 102 inches with the heaviest precipitation occurring during October to February. Humidity remains high throughout the year and temperatures are generally in the upper-80's Fahrenheit by day, falling to the mid-70's by night. The almost constant breezes keep conditions reasonably comfortable.

The atoll has been used primarily for the harvesting of coconuts from which coconut oil and copra were processed. It has also been a coal station and guano mining was carried out for a brief period.

Britain granted independence in the 1950s and 1960s to many of its former colonies in the Indian Ocean. The remaining islands were joined under the title of the British Indian Ocean Territories (BIOT), Diego Garcia being one of these islands. The British and United States Government agreements allowed the US access to part of the island to construct a communication station and subsequently a Naval Support Facility. The British do not charge the US any rent.

Diego Garcia is an unaccompanied tour area; concurrent travel of dependents is not authorized. Furnished BOQ is available upon arrival. Medical and dental facilities may be inadequate and may require treatment at distant locations. Since the BOQ is fully furnished, shipment of household goods into Diego Garcia is limited to one thousand pounds of personal items. Appliances, television, bed, and furniture is provided. EML is available to Singapore. Military flights are the only authorized flights in and out of Diego Garcia to Singapore. Commercial and military flights are available from Singapore. Facilities include a gymnasium, clubs, galley, Ship's Store, library, Post Office, Navy Federal Credit Union, Community Bank, and chapel.

This spectacular location east of equatorial Africa -- where a 30-minute bus tour can show you the entire location -- holds elements of an adventure vacationer's dream. There's tropical windsurfing and fishing for 200-pound marlin. While it's no Pebble Beach, playing the 9-hole golf course is free -- and a hoot to do with no shoes on. And the sea is so warm, snorklers can wade in and play tourist with thousands of brilliantly colored tropical fish.

Diego Garcia, the southernmost island in the Chagos Archipelago and a part of the British Indian Ocean Territory, is centrally located in the Indian Ocean. It is a narrow atoll 39 miles long that nearly encloses a lagoon 13 miles long and up to 6 miles wide. Depths in the lagoon range from 60 to 100 ft; numerous coral heads extend toward the surface and form hazards to navigation. Shallow reefs surround the island on the ocean side as well as within the lagoon. The new channel and anchorage area are dredged to 45 feet (mean low water springs), and the old turning basin can also be used if depth is sufficient for ship type.

Diego Garcia is not a typhoon haven. The surrounding topography is low and does not provide an extensive wind break. Expected winds of 60 kt or greater justify a sortie to the north of all ships in the lagoon. With expected winds around 35-40 kt, sortie is not recommended. Small harbor craft can be moored at existing pier structures and larger ships can be anchored in the lee anchorage. In the past 30 years, the island has not been seriously affected by a severe tropical cyclone even though it is threatened about once a year. The maximum sustained wind associated with a tropical cyclone in the past 30 years at Diego Garcia has been approximately 40 kt.
 

natarajan

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another thing is usa and india dont have any problem like territorial dispute so we need not worry much about them and also they are not going to disrupt our patrols.I have heard from naval officials that us ships used to come to even bay of bengal
 

Yusuf

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Well yes right now we gave good relations with the US. US vessels routinely come to Indian ports. But in 1971 when we were not on good terms, there 7th fleet entered the Bay of Bengal with not so friendly intentions.
 

p2prada

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No ones getting out of this alive, the mortality rate is 100% no matter where you live.
My point is no one in my country is going to cower in front of an "accident" especially assuming it "May" happen in the "Future." It is coming..... is not an excuse.

IN will never wait for an accident to sound the red alert. Most submarine accidents happened when there was little or no automation. You can expect new subs to have a high level of automation that will further reduce accident rates.

Also, considering the fact that IN has not lost a single ship or sub in an accident even after being a small budget, 3rd world nation with very inferior technology is something to be proud of.

60 years of sailing rusty buckets has proven our Navy's track record when it comes to preventing accidents.

A Russian port manager recently commented on Russians taking a leaf out of IN books when it comes to maintaining old ships.

One thing I would like to say: Indians are genetically the most critical people on the planet. A single Naval accident is going to be worse than a war for the IN. Bring our media into the picture and it gets even worse. And you guys already know how our media is. We will come down on the IN like the Huns did on the Romans.
 

Soham

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in our generation cant do then the next will do, first let we start it sir, then our followup generation will finish. if Indians can't then who can. make a change, change will come soon.

first step make our navy king of seas, then we rule the ocean. i want more and more youngster will join our defense service to serve, after my BE i surly going to join Air Force. i have a pledge to serve my nation:india:

Note: Its my personal Wish not today's fact. if im wrong correct me...tnx
Ofcourse. And the whole world will sit with coke and popcorn and cheer as we conquer, eh ?
This ain't the age of Empires. A naval strength comparable to the USN is far far away.
 

Sabir

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Ofcourse. And the whole world will sit with coke and popcorn and cheer as we conquer, eh ?
This ain't the age of Empires. A naval strength comparable to the USN is far far away.
I hope 'far away' doesnt mean 'no where'. Technology curve cant maintain its slope for indefinite time. So oneday, may be around 2050 China and India will match US navy (atleast in South China Sea and Indian Ocean ) if they maintain present tempo.
 

natarajan

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in our generation cant do then the next will do, first let we start it sir, then our followup generation will finish. if Indians can't then who can. make a change, change will come soon.

first step make our navy king of seas, then we rule the ocean. i want more and more youngster will join our defense service to serve, after my BE i surly going to join Air Force. i have a pledge to serve my nation:india:

Note: Its my personal Wish not today's fact. if im wrong correct me...tnx
corruption has not left recruitment for armed forces as religion,region and many things are playing
 

Ray

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Religion plays no major role in recruitment or in the functioning of the Armed Forces.

I can say with authority that it has no role in the Army.
 

Ray

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in our generation cant do then the next will do, first let we start it sir, then our followup generation will finish. if Indians can't then who can. make a change, change will come soon.

first step make our navy king of seas, then we rule the ocean. i want more and more youngster will join our defense service to serve, after my BE i surly going to join Air Force. i have a pledge to serve my nation:india:

Note: Its my personal Wish not today's fact. if im wrong correct me...tnx
We should.

But let us first make the country poverty free, educated, healthy and disease ridden and basic amenities available.

Or are they not important?
 

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Colonel,

Why must we have to have accidents to be good.

Can't we learn from other's mistakes?

I am sure the Chinese did not construct their submarines from scratch. They must have got technology from elsewhere, legal or otherwise (the US claims that they are stealing the US technology, but my question is if you are slack, then they will!) and I am sure they would have also 'stolen' the issues why there are accidents in submarines and rectified them for their own submarines!
Sir,

You quote the Chinese. They've lost a crew to a new technology, AIP, that no one has yet to figure out all the proper procedures for it ... and this is 20 years after the fact that they had a fire aboard the HAN.

I remind you, Sir, that us Canadian had an electirical fire in which we lost a cewman ... simply because we thought the electricals were protected from water ... as per usual SOP on rough seas.

Sir, submariners will tell you that it is not other submarines that will kill you, it is the sea. All other subamarines going to do is to tilt the balance in favour of the sea ... and it is so easy to tilt that balance.

A single man forgot to flip a switch ... or wrote the wrong codes onto a torpedo ... and you're trying to tell me that Indian sailors know better? The Chinese and Russians thought they did ... and that is why they've lost a crew.
 

Ray

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Sir,

You quote the Chinese. They've lost a crew to a new technology, AIP, that no one has yet to figure out all the proper procedures for it ... and this is 20 years after the fact that they had a fire aboard the HAN.

I remind you, Sir, that us Canadian had an electirical fire in which we lost a cewman ... simply because we thought the electricals were protected from water ... as per usual SOP on rough seas.

Sir, submariners will tell you that it is not other submarines that will kill you, it is the sea. All other subamarines going to do is to tilt the balance in favour of the sea ... and it is so easy to tilt that balance.

A single man forgot to flip a switch ... or wrote the wrong codes onto a torpedo ... and you're trying to tell me that Indian sailors know better? The Chinese and Russians thought they did ... and that is why they've lost a crew.
It is not for me to comment as to which country has the best sailors.

However, the accidents that have occurred, does educate, even if they are semi classified.

The interaction during the joint naval exercise are also a fund of information and training.

To believe that wrong codes would be fed in for torpedo launch indicates poor training and gross dereliction of duty. I really wonder if there are not double check procedures. Even when firing such a mundane weapon as an artillery gun there is double checks right from the FOO to the FDC to the gun positions!! Even for infantry weapons we have FC orders.

Before any ship moves out there is a series of fitness checks including procedures.

I would shudder to think that an accident is necessary to shape up or ship out!

Russians had problems since they had no rescue equipment and vessels.

The US also had her problems like the Tresher. How many more ships sank?

As for the Chinese, they are trying to get to US' capabilities and so they are cutting corners and leapfrogging technologies and techniques. I don't find it odd that in this hurry, mistakes can be made!

In WW II how many submarines sank because of accidents due to wrong procedures?

I was associated with submariners and they were quite a confident lot!
 

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It is not for me to comment as to which country has the best sailors.
Sir, you've misunderstood me. I am saying that it is the nature of the beast that the sea renders the best sailors into little children.

However, the accidents that have occurred, does educate, even if they are semi classified.
You can learn from mistakes that have been made but you cannot learn from mistakes that have not been made.

The interaction during the joint naval exercise are also a fund of information and training.
And I do agree.

To believe that wrong codes would be fed in for torpedo launch indicates poor training and gross dereliction of duty.
It was a new torpedo with new technologies and new guidelines. Not everything was known ... and not everything was tested out. The KURSK was out carrying just one such test ... and the unforeseen mistake, ie who would've thought a hypersoinic underwater torpedo can turn and home in on its launch point - the physics alone is astounding for such a feat ... but the physics worked and the KURSK was sunk ... with all hands lost.

In the case of the MING, they were testing a new Air Independent Propulsion system. A single crewman forgot to flip a switch to breathe fresh air instead of the recylcled gases from the AIP. As a result, the entire crew died in less than 20 seconds.

I really wonder if there are not double check procedures. Even when firing such a mundane weapon as an artillery gun there is double checks right from the FOO to the FDC to the gun positions!! Even for infantry weapons we have FC orders.
Sir, you are quoting procedures 100 years after the invention of the gatling gun. I assure you, Sir, we were no where as dedicated as during our muskette years.

Before any ship moves out there is a series of fitness checks including procedures.
If you know what those steps are.

I would shudder to think that an accident is necessary to shape up or ship out!
More U-boats were lost to accidents than enemy actions.

Russians had problems since they had no rescue equipment and vessels.
The KURSK was a famous example but more often than not, rescue was not an option.

The US also had her problems like the Tresher. How many more ships sank?
To accidents? I can name a bigger one. Halifax, Nova Scotia.

As for the Chinese, they are trying to get to US' capabilities and so they are cutting corners and leapfrogging technologies and techniques. I don't find it odd that in this hurry, mistakes can be made!
Seriously, Sir, it was only dumb luck that they made the mistake. It could have easily been the Germans, Austrians, or us Canadians. We learned from them to double, tripple check our procedures ... and it did not worked. We lost a crewman on the HMCS VICTORIA because we left the upper hatch openned.

In WW II how many submarines sank because of accidents due to wrong procedures?
The Kreigsmarine stated they've lost more u-boats to accidents than to enemy actions.

I was associated with submariners and they were quite a confident lot!
And they are. We're military, Sir. Just because we're scared does not mean we let fear stop us.
 

Sabir

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China afraid of India's naval presence in the Ocean
Updated on Thursday, August 13, 2009, 22:55 IST Tags:China, Indian Ocean, India, Navy

Chennai: Days after he said India does not have the capability nor intention to match China's military prowess, Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta on Thursday said "the weak area" for Beijing is the Indian naval presence in the Indian Ocean.


He said China's efforts to help Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Myanmar build ports was a part of its strategy to get a foothold in the area.

"The weak area for China today is the Indian Navy. We sit in the Indian ocean and that is a concern for China and they are not happy as it is not so easy for them to come inside," Admiral Mehta told reporters here.

Mehta had said on August 10 that "in military terms, both conventional and non-conventional," India neither has "the capability nor the intention to match China, force by force".

Asked by reporters today about India being "encirlced" by such ports in its Asian neighbourhood with Chinese cooperation, Mehta said Beijing was building such "dependency ports" as part of their strategy.

"They are not happy and are concerned with our presence in the Indian Ocean. And therefore they have to do this, i.e, build dependency. That is their strategy and they are doing it to come over here and be present in the Indian Ocean in larger numbers," the Admiral said.

However, India should not involve with Beijing in an arms race and should rather try to "nullify" its numerical strength by using better technology.

"We have no intention to catch up on numbers... we will never be able to match up. And it will waste lot of resources. But we need to jump in some manner by using better technology to nullify the aspect of numbers," Admiral Mehta said.

"It's not that you have 50 ships, I have 50 ships.. I may have ten ships which are much smarter and better and let us do that," he said on the sidelines of an event to mark the launch of new hi-tech boats to Tamil Nadu Sailing Association.

However, there was scope for the two Asian giants for cooperation in the area of defence, the Admiral said.

Recalling the words of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Admiral Mehta said "we have enough strategic space for both of us, which means we can cooperate and work together. If both of us have our space, then why (the need for) confrontation?" he said.

To a query on the recent detention of a North Korean ship near the Andaman and Nicobar islands, he said no full detail was available at this point of time.

"But with North Korea, we have to be doubly sure. But prima facie, it looks like it's got some genuine cargo which was destined for Iraq," he said adding different agencies were investigating the matter.

Bureau Report
India`s presence in Indian Ocean weakens China
 

Sabir

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India is strengthening its tie with Indonesia.....it will be of immense help to keep China at bay....from Indian Ocean...here is one such report...

Indonesia May Have Role in India's Regional Plan
NEW DELHI - The Defence Ministry may redraw India's defense strategy in the southeast, giving extra importance to relations with Indonesia. Some active-duty and retired Indian military officials have suggested more diplomacy with Jakarta and joint exercises with Indonesian troops, ministry sources here said.
Efforts also should be made to check the growing Chinese military buildup in the Indian Ocean region, a senior Defence Ministry official said, noting that China already has a base in the Coco Islands, leased from Myanmar, from which it monitors India's ballistic missile testing range. Indian defense planners have been told that India's Sunda-Banka, Lombok-Makassar and Ombai-Wetar straits are becoming strategic sea passages much like the Strait of Malacca, Defence Ministry sources said.
A senior ministry official said India and Indonesia have been strengthening their defense ties for some time, and the two countries have even explored the possibility of joint production of weapons and military equipment.
The two countries have also discussed joint patrols by Indian and Indonesian warships in the Strait of Malacca, the region's favored sea route for large ships, including oil tankers from the Arabian Gulf.
An Indonesian diplomat said that Jakarta is interested in buying the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile, jointly developed by India and Russia. Indonesia also is interested in the co-production with India of radars, electronic equipment and artillery weapons, the diplomat said.
Indonesia May Have Role in India's Regional Plan - Defense News



I have pasted the Map ...it can be seen how important is Indonesia's position in case of a war between India and China Navy
 

Sabir

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China-India Maritime RivalryBy Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana
Issue: Vol. 23.4
Introduction

In the Post-Cold War Era re-distribution of power, the balance is clearly shifting to Asia. This is primarily due to the increasing comprehensive National Power (CNP) of China and India. But as they graduate to the global level, the two countries would need to contend with each other within the region. Besides, their adversarial potential due to the many outstanding security issues cannot be ignored. Whether these translate into a conflict would depend upon how Beijing and New Delhi manage their relationship in the coming years, but as of now the potential is sufficient to fuel strategic rivalry.

Asia is a predominantly maritime-configured region. Much of China-India interactions would thus relate to the seas or the littoral areas. The two countries do not share a maritime boundary, but this does not matter. As emerging powers, their vital security interests have been dilating from their immediate peripheries to regional extremities (and even beyond). In other words, while their immediate security imperatives lie in the western Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean respectively; their strategic spheres have begun to overlap in both areas. This is leading them to stretch their maritime-strategic ‘footprint’ across the entire Asian region. It is logical therefore, for its effects to be felt in the geo-strategic sub-region of Southeast Asia, which lies midway in the ‘India-China rivalry-arc’ extending from north-western Pacific to the Arabian Sea.

China-India Maritime-Strategic ‘Rivalry Arc’ in Asia

Such rivalry is however low-keyed. It figures neither in China-India politico-diplomatic interactions, nor in official policy articulations. It is nonetheless highly discernable to any keen observer. This article attempts to bring out some of its nuances. It deals with the issue by segregating its geographical scope into three parts - the north-eastern Indian Ocean, the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea.

North-eastern Indian Ocean

This area is important for India’s supreme national security interest of ’survival’. For China, it is vital transit route for energy imports sourced from West Asia and Africa. This makes China highly vulnerable in case of a Sino-Indian military conflict. Such strategic vulnerability also restricts Beijing to use force to satiate its strategic objectives in the western Pacific like Taiwan. China could however mitigate this vulnerability through its naval presence in the area. Such presence would also enable Beijing to wield a strategic-leverage against New Delhi to resolve the outstanding issues, and to meet its military objectives in case of a conflict with India.

Since the late-1980s, China has provided much defence assistance to Myanmar. It has built naval facilities, radars and signal-intelligence (SIGINT) posts all along the Myanmarese coast and in Coco Islands, which lie barely 18 km north of India’s Andaman Islands. Various news-reports since then indicated that Chinese military personnel were stationed in Myanmar and were using these facilities to collect sensitive information on India. While these reports could never be backed by hard evidence, the potential could not be ignored either. In the future, it is also possible for these facilities to be used by China as refuelling halts for its naval forces, or maybe even as full-fledged forward bases. The volte face in India’s policy towards Myanmar since early-1990s has undoubtedly succeeded. Besides benign assurances from Myanmar, bilateral defence ties have strengthened in a way hitherto unimaginable. The most notable event in this direction was Myanmar Navy’s participation in Milan-2006 at Port Blair,1 which involved a historic first-ever visit of a Myanmar warship to any foreign port. Myanmar has even offered Indian naval officials to visit the “suspicious” sites. However, Myanmar’s armed forces continue to be heavily dependent on the Chinese military establishment. As recently as in June 2008, a Chinese naval team visited Coco Island upgrade its military facilities.2 The threat to India would persist until such dependence exists.

In April 2008, India and Myanmar signed Kaladan river transportation agreement that involves India’s upgradation of Myanmar’s Sittwe port. It has also made a proposal to build a deep-water port in Dawei.3 Though driven by imperatives of economic development/trade-connectivity, these could also be considered as New Delhi’s move to monitor Chinese activities in Myanmar’s littoral areas. However, owing to Chinese pressure, Myanmar did not permit India to be the sole operator of Sittwe port. Instead of BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) desired by India, the agreement was eventually signed on the basis of BTU (Build, Transfer and Use).

China-India rivalry has also emerged over exploration rights and access to Myanmar’s energy resources. The Chinese companies have always managed to grab a larger share of the contracts, either through their stronger influence in Myanmar, or by exploiting India’s weaknesses. When in 2005, India was awarded its first offshore block A-1, Bangladesh agreed to let India obtain pipeline access to the gas through its territory. But it later became non-committal, imposing unrelated conditions that were unacceptable to India. The delay in India’s firming up an alternate route/plan compelled Myanmar (or gave it an excuse) to decide in 2007 to supply the entire gas to China through a pipeline to be laid from Sittwe to Kunming.4 To a layman, this would be baffling because the shortest distance from the gas-field to China is three times more than that to India.

Another Indian response to China’s presence in the area has been institution of the integrated Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) at Port Blair in 2001. It caused anxieties in Beijing with regard to security of its energy shipments, and particularly so in 2002 when Indian Navy (IN) sea and air units under the ANC commenced coordinated patrols with Indonesian Navy along the maritime boundary. The patrol-axis was coincident with the 6-degree channel that lies between India’s Great Nicobar Island and Indonesia’s Sumatra Island, and where China’s shipping is highly vulnerable. In 2005, India began conducting similar patrols with Thailand in the Andaman Sea. Although the patrols were primarily directed against maritime crimes, these also served to restrict Chinese activities in the area. Beijing concerns may further heighten with the ongoing upgradation of ANC’s defence capabilities. The plans include building naval bases, aircraft facilities, networked radar stations and even fixed underwater sensors at various locations of the island-chain the extends from Narcondum and East Island in the north to Indira Point in the south overlooking the 6-degree channel.5 From the Indian stand-point, such capability augmentation is imperative to maintain good order in the extensive maritime zones of the far-fling island chain, though of course, the imperative to deter China is also likely to have been the key driver. As the ANC upgradation plans materialize, it would also be necessary for India to enhance its naval engagement with its maritime-neighbours of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand & Myanmar) for confidence-building through transparency. This may intensify China-India rivalry.

Malacca Straits

China’s strategic energy supplies are most vulnerable in Malacca Straits, the key maritime ‘choke-point’ passage between Indian and Pacific oceans. India is also a Straits’ ‘user’,6 but more importantly, its security is closely linked to events in this waterway that is contiguous to India’s maritime zones. It is therefore critically necessary for India to be aware of the west-bound movement of naval vessels (particularly Chinese) across this, and other Southeast Asian straits.

Much of the waterway is forms the territorial waters of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. These littorals thus wield the onus of security here. Asserting their sovereignty repeatedly, Indonesia and Malaysia have made it difficult for major powers to resort to direct naval ‘jostling’ in the Straits. China-India rivalry is nonetheless continuing in subtle and indirect ways.

The developments in India’s Andaman and Nicobar, as mentioned earlier, are increasing India’s potential to undertake military missions in Malacca straits, much to the discomfort of China. Chinese analysts note these developments as “revealing India’s growing desire to be ‘keeper’ of the Strait”.7 In September 2007, India participated in the five-nation Malabar-07-2, which was the largest-ever naval exercise yet in the Indian Ocean. While its objective was stated to be “anti-piracy”, the choice of exercise area close to Malacca straits was sufficient to alarm China. A notable participation was that of Singapore. Beijing sent a démarche to all participants. The exercise was reported by the media as a “message” to China, who had conducted a high-level army exercise Peace Mission 2007 just a month earlier within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The exercise involved 6,500 troops, but as in case of Malabar-07-2, its stated aim was to counter ‘low-intensity’ threats.

Ostensibly, the two countries are also taking incremental steps to project naval power in MS. In April 2002, the Indian Navy launched an escort-mission for US high-value ships in MS (Op Sagittarius).8 Barely a month later, Chinese warships conducted an anti-piracy exercise in these waters while on a west-bound transit passage.9

The other means are more subtle. China and India have been making efforts to seek politico-diplomatic influence among the Straits-littorals. Such influence would be invaluable in strategic terms. For example, it would reassure Beijing that in case of a conflict, these littorals would not permit China’s adversaries to interdict its strategic imports. From the Indian perspective, such influence may lead these countries to cooperate in providing New Delhi information on China’s west-bound naval shipping. In the tussle for influence, both countries have been employing various means, including defence cooperation. Ostensibly, China seems to have aptly gauged that Malaysia is in the ‘driving seat’ among the three littorals with regard to security of Malacca straits. This is logical since it is also the most affected by the prevailing maritime crimes in the waterway. This has led Beijing to make conscious efforts to engage Kuala Lumpur through various means, including through sales of military hardware. In Sep 2005, China signed a Defence MoU with Malaysia - the first of its kind with any Southeast Asian country.10 There are indicators that China’s endeavours have been succeeding. In 2003, the Malaysian Prime Minister amply displayed a pro-China tilt by totally dismissing China’s military threat to Southeast Asia.11

India has also used its navy for politico-diplomatic engagement of the littorals. Notable was the first-ever deployment of its aircraft carrier INS Viraat beyond Malacca straits in 2005. The carrier undertook ‘goodwill’ visits to Port Klang (Malaysia) followed by Singapore and Jakarta (Indonesia).12 A few months earlier, the Indian Navy had conducted a large-scale disaster-relief operation following the Indian Ocean Tsunami. China was ‘conspicuous’ by its absence in this relief operation. Not to be left behind, it not only provided relief supplies to the affected littorals worth US$60.46 million, but also made sure that its aid was the largest of all donors and publicly announced later that it had set a ‘record’.13

South China Sea

China’s has outstanding maritime-territorial disputes with many Southeast Asian countries in the hydrocarbon-rich South China Sea (SCS). Since the turn of the century, Beijing has been projecting a benign posture to these countries through measures like the 2002 signing of a ‘non-binding’ China-ASEAN ‘Declaration on Conduct of Parties in SCS’14 and the 2005 agreement with Vietnam and the Philippines for joint exploration of hydrocarbons in disputed areas.15

Notwithstanding several confidence-building measures (CBMs), military tensions have persisted until as recently as November 2007, when Chinese military exercises in the disputed Paracel Islands led Vietnam to lodge a protest.16 A month later, India was also sucked into this. Beijing declared that the exploration rights for blocks 127 and 128 (near Paracel Islands) given by Vietnam to ONGC Videsh was ‘illegal’, and issued a démarche to New Delhi.17 It implies that while Vietnam is permitted to explore for resources under China-Vietnam joint-exploration agreement, it cannot seek financial/technological assistance from India. This is not only symptomatic of China’s rivalry with India, but also indicative of China’s lack of sincerity to proceed to the next step after joint exploration with Vietnam & the Philippines, viz. production and sharing the resources. Such moves may further strengthen India-Southeast Asia strategic convergence.

China has lately increased its defence interactions with IOR-littorals and even major powers through exercises and warship visits. It has however been unwilling to make its military intentions transparent to the Southeast Asian littorals of western Pacific. The only exceptions are the Malacca Straits’ littorals: Malaysia and to some extent, Indonesia (for reasons mentioned earlier). Evidently, Beijing’s benign stance towards South-east Asia is a transient imperative until it achieves Taiwan’s “reunification”. Shen Dingli, a well-known Chinese strategic analyst indicated that “Once the Taiwan front is closed, we may turn to the South China Sea”.18 It is also evident that the organisational ‘centre of gravity’ of Chinese naval power is shifting towards its South Sea Fleet (SSF). This is best exemplified by the latest revelations with regard to the expanse of China’s new naval base in Hainan, with an extensive underground acreage allocated for berthing up to as many as 20 submarines.19 China is also building expeditionary capabilities for the SSF. This has led the Southeast Asian countries to seek strategic relationships with other powers. Amitav Acharya says that “India factors in this approach … (as Southeast Asia’s) countervailing strategy to future Chinese geopolitical assertiveness”.20

On its part, India has thus been steadily increasing its naval forays into the western Pacific. In 2000, India conducted a naval exercise in South China Sea with Vietnam. Although it was a low-level unstructured exercise, it represented an important milestone. It was India’s first-ever exercise in South China Sea that demonstrated India’s increasing naval reach. It invited China’s protest.21 The 2005 SIMBEX was also conducted in South China Sea. In Apr-May 2007, the Indian Navy participated in a series of exercises in the western Pacific.

Events in SouthChina Sea have a strong bearing on China’s security. For India, the SouthChina Sea area is important for security of its trade and even energy imports, but is not as critical as it is to China. What then is India’s motivation in the SouthChina Sea? In a seminar held at Chengdu soon after the 2005 SIMBEX, Colonel Pan Zheng from China’s National Defence University (NDU) called it India’s “revenge for China’s engagement of its South Asian neighbours”.22 Conceding the constraints of English grammar to a Chinese officer, he may be right. You Ji, a Chinese origin expert on the Chinese navy even says, “most analysts would see India’s ‘Look-east’ policy from the hidden position India has taken to support some of the claimants”.23 The validity of this argument cannot possibly be ascertained in the ‘public domain’.

It could nonetheless be stated that from the Indian perspective, ‘forward presence’ is a crucial national security imperative to achieve ‘domain awareness’ in areas of strategic interest, at both strategic and operational levels.24 More importantly, given the high probability of China’s inimical military-strategic intent in the in the Indian Ocean, Indian ‘presence’ in SouthChina Sea becomes critical for ’strategic deterrence’ against Beijing. India’s Maritime-Military Strategy endorses this by stating, “While the option of formal alliances…is not available…we can however reach out to our maritime partners or collaborate with friendly nations to build deterrence.”25

Conclusion

The underpinnings of China-India maritime-strategic rivalry are not difficult to discern. China’s approach is clearly driven by strong strategic imperatives in the in the Indian Ocean Region, which would necessitate fielding of its military power projection capabilities into Indian Ocean in the coming decades. However, given the competitive and even adversarial potential of China-India relations, in these waters, it expects to find itself pitted against India’s potent naval power, possibly even in concert with the US.

For India on the other hand, it is critically important to balance China’s rising power. By not doing so, India’s own increasingly eminent role as a regional power would be dwarfed. This would also have serious ramifications for India’s supreme national security interests. For example, this would make it impossible for New Delhi to negotiate the border dispute on equal terms with Beijing.

India’s strategic ‘footprint’ in the maritime space adjoining Southeast Asia has been more discernable through its navy’s politico-diplomatic role as an instrument of foreign policy. On the other hand, China has largely restrained its naval interactions with Southeast Asia, indicating that it wants to keep its military options open to settle its lingering maritime-territorial disputes. Instead, it has been resorting to establishing geo-political influence through use of all other facets of its national power, such as economic, defence-sales, and so on. This would enable Beijing to buy time until it satiates its foremost strategic objective in terms of Taiwan, and at the same time, lay the foundations for its military power-projection southwards, and eventually into the Indian Ocean.

China-India Maritime Rivalry | Indian Defence Review
 

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US encourages Chinese presence in Indian Ocean

More Chinese Navy in Indian Ocean, US OK, India not

More Chinese Navy in Indian Ocean, US OK, India not


IANS First Published : 14 May 2009 09:44:39 PM ISTLast Updated : 15 May 2009 12:17:20 AM IST
NEW DELHI: A clear disconnect has emerged in the military views of India and the US, with a top American military commander saying Washington is comfortable with the increased presence of the Chinese Navy in the Indian Ocean, a suggestion that New Delhi bristles at.
This apart, Admiral Timothy J. Keating, who heads the Hawaii-based US Pacific Command, said he would like China to come aboard - as an observer and later as a participant - in the annual India-US Malabar naval war games that occasionally take on a trilateral hue. India is hardly expected to root for this.
And, the US would be comfortable with the Chinese Navy acquiring berthing facilities in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, a move that India has been vehemently opposing, Keating, ho was on a two-day visit here, told reporters Thursday.
Keating also felt the broader India-US military-military contact could be considerably ramped if New Delhi signs three rather controversial pacts, one of them on providing mutual logistics support, that have been pending for long. India has often said it is uncomfortable with the language of the pacts and that they would have to be reworked.
"It's not a question of us versus them. There's lots of room in the Indian Ocean for various players," Keating contended.
"We are not in favour of splitting the Indian Ocean into sphere but are talking in terms of cooperating and collaborating and sharing best practices," he maintained.
Keating also welcomed the increased participation of the Chinese Navy in the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden at a time when India has been expressing growing concern over this, viewing it as Beijing's muscling into New Delhi's backyard.
In floating the Indian Ocean Naval Seminar (IONS) last year, India aimed to crate a regional grouping stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to Australia. The US and China were specifically excluded on the ground they were not Indian Ocean littoral states.
Speaking about the Malabar exercises, Keating said the US had "no objection" to China coming on board.
China had created a major ruckus when the trilateral version of the war games - also involving Australia, Japan and Singapore - were conducted in the Bay of Bengal in 2007 against the usual exercise area off India's west coast.
This apart, the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), which was supporting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government at the time, had staged a series of demonstrations during the exercise but they were conducted nonetheless.
The Left had later parted ways with the government over the India-US civilian nuclear deal.
As for the three military pacts, one of these is Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) that enables cashless transactions for fuel and other non-lethal supplies that are balanced at the end of the year.
India says agreeing to this would be tantamount to granting the US navy and air force berthing and landing facilities in India.
This apart there is CISMOA (Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement) and the End-User Agreement.
The first would have the Indian military reconfiguring their communications frequencies to make them compatible with the US grid. While there are some advantages to this, particularly during disaster relief operations and war games, the downside would be compromising India's security setup.
As for the End-User Agreement, Indian Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta is on record as terming this as restrictive.
Under the agreement, India would have to certify that the US military hardware it purchases would not be used in combat.
Thus, even though India has already deployed the troop carrier INS Jalashwa it has purchased from the US, the End-User Agreement for this is yet to be inked.
The End-User Agreement has also not been signed for the eight Boeing P8I Orion long range maritime reconnaissance aircraft that are being purchased for the Indian Navy.
The three pacts were high on the agenda during Defence Minister A.K. Antony's visit to the US earlier this year and there was considerable speculation that they would be signed. This did not happen as India felt it was being tied down too much in return for too little.
During his visit here, Keating held discussions with his Indian counterpart, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan and Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon.
 

kuku

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Great, may be the three ships they have here could grow to five in a decade.
 

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The numbers will go up once the submarine bases and naval bases in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka become fully operational.
 

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