Indian Ocean Developments

[zraver]

The only Navy close to being capable is the US Navy. However, for the US, in a war scenario, it is not merely that she dominates the IOR but also the Atlantic and Pacific as also guard both her western and eastern seaboards and have assets close to the Chinese and Russian coasts and interests. There are not enough assets to spread around to ‘dominate’ since they will be contested.

Brigadier, the US can dominate its coasts with air assets vs almost any conceivable threat. Especially the Atlantic Coast. P-3, P-8, B-52, F-22, F-15, F/A-18 and F-16. Backing these up are naval assets not assigned to carrier groups, or whose carriers are in port. Nor does the US routinely keep major surface groups off the Russian and Chinese coasts. In a war setting setting the US can conceivably dominate any 2 oceans. if the US has allies, that number goes way up.

The assets of the western navies are not much of significance.

Italy- 2x light carriers, 4x DDG, 17x mine countermeasure ships, 4x modern sub

Spain-1 x light carrier, 4x aegis equipped FFG, 2x sub, 7x minesweepers

Germany 7x FFG, 4x modern subs, 20 mine warfare ships

Holland- 4x FFG, 10x mine warfare ships, 4x subs

UK- 2x light carrier, 1x DDG, 9x SSN

France- 1 fleet carrier, 2x FFG, 6x SSN 19x mine warfare ships.

Individually they are not much, but they are all (excepting France) part of NATO and are all part of the EU.

Thus a combined EU fleet is 1 fleet carrier, 5x light carrier, 5x DDG, 16 FFG, 56 mine warfare vessels, 10 x SS, 15x SSN. That is a very potent force that must be considered.

Note- I only counted the most modern vessels.

 

[Ray]

The question still remains is that would India dare to confiscate cargo bearing the Russian Flag.

First of all, Russia will not help China in the event of war and so the question does not arise.

Secondly, IOR cannot be controlled by just one nation as I hae mentioned. It will be a coalition that will be operating.

 

[Ray]

Brigadier, the US can dominate its coasts with air assets vs almost any conceivable threat. Especially the Atlantic Coast. P-3, P-8, B-52, F-22, F-15, F/A-18 and F-16. Backing these up are naval assets not assigned to carrier groups, or whose carriers are in port. Nor does the US routinely keep major surface groups off the Russian and Chinese coasts. In a war setting setting the US can conceivably dominate any 2 oceans. if the US has allies, that number goes way up.





Italy- 2x light carriers, 4x DDG, 17x mine countermeasure ships, 4x modern sub

Spain-1 x light carrier, 4x aegis equipped FFG, 2x sub, 7x minesweepers

Germany 7x FFG, 4x modern subs, 20 mine warfare ships

Holland- 4x FFG, 10x mine warfare ships, 4x subs

UK- 2x light carrier, 1x DDG, 9x SSN

France- 1 fleet carrier, 2x FFG, 6x SSN 19x mine warfare ships.

Individually they are not much, but they are all (excepting France) part of NATO and are all part of the EU.

Thus a combined EU fleet is 1 fleet carrier, 5x light carrier, 5x DDG, 16 FFG, 56 mine warfare vessels, 10 x SS, 15x SSN. That is a very potent force that must be considered.

Note- I only counted the most modern vessels.

The US can dominate some parts of the Pacific and the Atlantic, but with that force, it cannot dominate the world oceans or the Arctic especially when it will be contested!

There was just a report today of sighting of a Russia sub off the US coast!

I am sure the US is equally busy. One could recall of the US Navy accident with a Chinese sub!

China has called the latest collision between Chinese and U.S. naval vessels an accident, but many of the elements echo previous altercations that have raised concerns that China's navy is growing increasingly aggressive in its patrols of the waters off its coast.

In last week's incident, as before, a Chinese submarine was found to be shadowing a U.S. Navy ship — possibly undetected by sonar equipment being towed behind the American destroyer.

The South China Sea, where the collision occurred and where the U.S. Navy operates amid a complex patchwork of competing territorial claims, is also a familiar backdrop for such incidents.

Even the damaged sonar array that was hit by the Chinese submarine has featured in past confrontations.

 

[Ray]

NAVY TRAINING RANGE EXPANSION IS PART OF US WORLD DOMINATION SCHEME
While the sleepy North Coast is being jarred awake by the prospect of the permanent militarization of the Washington, Oregon, Del Norte and Humboldt County coastlines, the expansion of the US Navy's Northwest Training Range needs to be put into the context of America's ambition to conrol the world.
For the last quarter century, the United States has striven to accomplish what Britain and Russia have always wanted to achieve: global domination. Over the decades, this mission has had various brand names. In the era of Bush 41, it was "The New World Order."
Today, it is called Full Spectrum Dominance," a phrase whose definition can be found in a Joint Chiefs of Staff document called "Joint Vision 2020." www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm
It is no accident that there is simultaneous with this project a renewed thrust by Washington to sell Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas leases off Mendocino and Los Angeles.
The US military runs on oil, and its wars are waged to guarantee American access to the world's best oil patches, not only in the Middle East, but in Central Asia as well.
Iraq alone has enough undeveloped oil to supply domestic US consumption until 2050. Even as US troops are slated to withdraw next year, the country's colonial government will continue to depend on American forces stationed throughout the region, including Naval fleets and strike groups in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman.
Acting in concert with Israel, America is not finished attacking Muslim countries and seeking control of their petroleum resources.
Naval forces have always been key to imperial warfare. This is no less true in the 21st century with web-based satellite intelligence technology, nuclear missile submarines and unmanned drones.
Training the young sailors of today for tomorrow's wars is the mission of the Navy's Northwest Training Range in Puget Sound,Washington where many warfighting ships controlling the Pacific Ocean are based, and the families of their crew memebers live and vote.
Right now, leading Carrier Strike Group Nine is the USS Abraham Lincoln homeported in Everett, Washington. The Abraham Lincoln is stationed with the Fifth Fleet in it's area of operations in Bahrain. It is the flagship commander of Carrier Strike Group Nine whose mission is to plan and conduct war operations and training exercises in surface, subsurface, air, and strike warfare as directed by Numbered Fleet Commanders.
Operationally, The Abraham Lincoln Strike Group has cognizance over eight surface ships and nine aircraft squadrons, including the USS MOBILE BAY (CG 53), Carrier Air Wing Two, and Destroyer Squadron Nine. As such, it actively participates in the development of tactical doctrine, and assists Type Commanders in the preparation and execution of military employment and training schedules.
Another West Coast based carrier is the USS Ronald Reagan which last fall conducted joint maneuvers in the Arabian Sea with the Indian Navy.
Another also based in San Diego is the The USS Peleliu which is cruising in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Peleliu is the Flgg Ship of the Peleliu Expeditionary Strike Group and the 15th MEU which is currently deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations to conduct maritime security operations "which promote stability and global prosperity.
"These operations complement the counterterrorism and security efforts of regional nations and seek to disrupt violent extremists' use of the maritime environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, weapons or other material."
Based in Long Beach is the US Navy flagship The U.S.S. Enterprise a U.S. Navy flagship under deployment to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
Under command of the Enterprise are all the warships and vessels that compose Carrier Strike Group 12 (CSG 12) Destroyer Squadron 2 (DESRON 2), and Carrier Air Wing 1 (CVW 1). The stated objective for the deployment of the U.S.S. Enterprise, a nuclear powered aircraft carrier, and other U.S. Navy vessels including another nuclear powered carrier USS Bainbridge is to conduct naval security operations and aerial missions in the region.
Another strike group of U.S. warships is “Expeditionary Strike Group 5,” are setting sail from Naval Station San Diego with the Persian Gulf in the Middle East as their final destination. Over 6,000 U.S. Marines and Navy personnel are deployed to the Persian Gulf and Anglo-American occupied Iraq from San Diego.
Approximately 4,000 U.S. sailors and 2,200 U.S. Marines from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit at Camp Pendleton make the bulk of the force. They will also be joined by other ships including a US Coast Guard vessel. A Marine air wing of 38 helicopters also is on board in the Persian Gulf.
The 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit is able to “rapidly deploy” on “orders” using large landing craft stowed aboard the strike group’s warships. Expeditionary Strike Group 5 (ESG 5) is being led by the assault ship the U.S.S. Boxer as the flagship.
Expeditionary Strike Group 5 (ESG 5) will also consist of the U.S.S. Dubuque, a “dock landing vessel,” the naval transport ship the U.S.S. Comstock, the battle cruiser the U.S.S. Bunker Hill, the guided-missile hauling destroyer the U.S.S. Benfold homeported in San Diego and the guided-missile hauling destroyer the U.S.S. Howard. Once again, these vessels will all be deployed in the Persian Gulf, in nearby proximity to the Iranian coast.
The warships will also be joined in Hawaii by Seattle-based U.S. Coast Guard and by a Canadian navy frigate, the H.M.C.S. Ottawa.
All these forces can count on the Navy's expanded Northwest Training Complex off our coast for realistic exercizes that test knowledge of battle skills in the stressful context of live fire.

Full Spectrum Dominance
The goal of the US military is to achieve full spectrum dominance -- the ability of US forces to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world.
• maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence.
• theater engagement and presence activities.
• conflict involving employment of strategic forces and weapons of mass destruction
• major theater wars, regional conflicts, and smaller-scale contingencies.
• ambiguous situations between peace and war, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as noncombat humanitarian relief operations and support of domestic authorities.
Full spectrum dominance implies that US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronized operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains – space, sea, land, air, and information.
The domains to be mastered are: space, sea surface and subsurface, land, air, and information in order to rapidly project US power worldwide. Additionally, given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power worldwide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance. The process of creating the joint force of the future must be flexible – to react to changes in the strategic environment and the adaptations of potential enemies, to take advantage of new technologies, and to account for variations in the pace of change. The source of that flexibility is the synergy of the core competencies of the individual Services, integrated into the joint team. These challenges will require a Total Force composed of well-educated, motivated, and competent people who can adapt to the many demands of future joint missions. The transformation of the joint force to reach full spectrum dominance rests upon information superiority as a key enabler and our capacity for innovation. From Joint Vision 2020, a policy document of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jvpub2.htm

 

[Ray]

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities — Background and Issues for Congress

Summary

Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China’s military modernization. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress addressed in this report is: How
should China’s military modernization be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs?

Several elements of China’s military modernization have potential implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These include theater-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and possibly highpower
microwave (HPM) devices.

China’s naval limitations or weaknesses include
capabilities for operating in waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems, anti-air warfare
(AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine countermeasures (MCM), and logistics.

Observers believe a near-term focus of China’s military modernization is to field a force that can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an antiaccess
force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a conflict.

Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or
elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will happen later.

Potential broader or longer-term goals of China’s naval modernization include asserting China’s regional military leadership and protecting China’s maritime territorial, economic, and energy interests.

China’s naval modernization has potential implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific, and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium on the following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities for defeating China’s maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities for operating in an environment that could be characterized by information warfare and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and the use of nuclear weapons.
Certain options are available for improving U.S. Navy capabilities by 2010; additional options, particularly in shipbuilding, can improve U.S. Navy capabilities
in subsequent years. China’s naval modernization raises potential issues for Congress concerning the role of China in Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific Fleet’s share of the Navy; forward
homeporting of Navy ships in the Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers,submarines, and ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defense, air-warfare, AAW, ASW, and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP
hardening of Navy systems. This report will be updated as events warrant

Report to the Congress

Now that is just to taken on the issue of China.

Consider the other threats.

 

[Ray]

I thought it would be a good recap as to what is the ‘Environment’ in the Indian Ocean especially from the Indian standpoint.

Extract from Indian Ocean and India

The Indian Ocean has long been the hub of great power rivalry and the struggle for its domination has been a perennial feature of global politics.

It is third-largest of the world’s five oceans and straddles Asia in the north, Africa in the west, Indochina in the east, and Antarctica in the south. Home to four critical access waterways—the Suez Canal, Bab-el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca—the Indian Ocean connects the Middle East, Africa and East Asia with Europe and the Americas.

Nearly half of the world’s seaborne trade is through the Indian Ocean, and approximately 20 percent of this trade consists of energy resources. It has also been estimated that around 40 percent of the world’s offshore oil production comes from the Indian Ocean, while 65 percent of the world’s oil and 35 percent of its gas reserves are found in the littoral states of this Ocean. Unlike the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, almost three quarters of trade traversing through the Indian Ocean, primarily in the form of oil and gas, belongs to states external to the region. Free and uninterrupted flow of oil and goods through the ocean’s SLOCs is deemed vital for the global economy and so all major states have a stake in a stable Indian Ocean region. It is for this reason that, during the Cold War years when US-Soviet rivalry was at its height, the states bordering the Indian Ocean sought to declare the region a “zone of peace” to allow for free trade and commerce across the lanes of the Indian Ocean. Today, the reliance is on the US for the provision of a “collective good”: a stable Indian Ocean region.

China emerged as the biggest military spender in the Asia-Pacific in 2006, overtaking Japan, and now has the fourth-largest defence expenditure in the world. The exact details about Chinese military expenditure remain contested, with estimates ranging from the official Chinese figure of $35 billion to the US Defence Intelligence Agency’s estimate of $80-115 billion. But the rapidly rising trend in Chinese military expenditure is fairly evident, with an increase of 195 percent over the decade 1997-2006. The official figures of the Chinese government do not include the cost of new weapons purchases, research or other big-ticket items for China’s highly secretive military. From Washington to Tokyo, from Brussels to Canberra, calls are rising for China to be more open about the intentions behind this dramatic pace of spending increase and scope of its military capabilities. The Chinese navy, according to the Defence White Paper of 2006, will be aiming at a “gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counter-attacks.”

China’s navy is now considered the third-largest in the world behind only the US and Russia and superior to the Indian navy in both qualitative and quantitative terms.The Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) Navy has traditionally been a coastal force and China has had a continental outlook to security. But with a rise in its economic might since the 1980s, Chinese interests have xpanded and have acquired a maritime orientation with an intent to project power into the Indian Ocean. China is investing far greater resources in the modernization of its armed forces in general and its navy in particular than India seems either willing to undertake or capable of sustaining at present. China’s increasingly sophisticated submarine fleet could eventually be one of the world’s largest and with a rapid accretion in its capabilities, including submarines, ballistic missiles and GPS-blocking technology, some are suggesting that China will increasingly have the capacity to challenge America. Senior Chinese officials have indicated that China would be ready to build an aircraft carrier by the end of the decade as it is seen as being indispensable to protecting Chinese interests in oceans. Such an intent to develop carrier capability marks a shift away from devoting the bulk of the PLA’s modernization drive to the goal of capturing Taiwan.

With a rise in China’s economic and political prowess, there has also been a commensurate growth in its profile in the Indian Ocean region. China is acquiring naval bases along the crucial choke points in the Indian Ocean not only to serve its economic interests but also to enhance its strategic presence in the region. China realizes that its maritime strength will give it the strategic leverage that it needs to emerge as the regional hegemon and a potential superpower and there is enough evidence to suggest that China is comprehensively building up its maritime power in all dimensions. It is China’s growing dependence on maritime space and resources that is reflected in the Chinese aspiration to expand its influence and to ultimately dominate the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean region. China’s growing reliance on bases across the Indian Ocean region is a response to its perceived vulnerability, given the logistical constraints that it faces due to the distance of the Indian Ocean waters from its own area of operation. Yet,
China is consolidating power over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean with an eye on India, something that comes out clearly in a secret memorandum issued by the director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA: “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians… . We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.” China has deployed its Jin class submarines at a submarine base near Sanya the southern tip of Hainan Island in South China Sea, raising alarm inIndia as the base is merely 1200 nautical miles from the Malacca Strait and will be its closest access point to the Indian Ocean. The base also has an underground facility that can hide the movement of submarines, making them difficult to detect.

The concentration of strategic naval forces at Sanya will further propel China towards a consolidation of its control over the surrounding Indian Ocean region. The presence of access tunnels on the mouth of the deep water base is particularly troubling for India as it will have strategic implications in the Indian Ocean region, allowing China to interdict shipping at the three crucial chokepoints in the Indian Ocean. As the ability of China’s navy to project power in the Indian Ocean region grows, India is likely to feel even more vulnerable despite enjoying distinct geographical advantages in the region. China’s growing naval presence in and around the Indian Ocean region is troubling for India as it restricts India’s freedom to manoeuvre in the region.

Of particular note is what has been termed as China’s “string of pearls” strategy that has significantly expanded China’s strategic depth in India’s backyardThis “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties include the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea. Some of these claims are exaggerated as has been the case with the Chinese naval presence in Burma. The Indian government, for example, had to concede in 2005 that reports of China turning Coco Islands in Burma into a naval base were incorrect and that there were indeed no naval bases in Burma. Yet the Chinese thrust into the Indian Ocean is gradually becoming more pronounced. The Chinese may not have a naval base in Burma but they are involved in the upgradation of infrastructure in the Coco Islands and may be providing some limited technical assistance to Burma. Given that almost 80 percent of China’s oil passes through the Strait of Malacca, it is reluctant to rely on US naval power for unhindered access to energy and so has decided to build up its naval power at “choke points” along the sea routes from the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea. China is also courting other states in South Asia by building container ports in Bangladesh at Chittagong and in Sri Lanka at Hambantota as well as helping to build a naval base at Marao in the Maldives. Consolidating its access to the Indian Ocean, China has signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to finance the development of the Hambantota Development Zone, which includes a container port, a bunker system and an oil refinery. The submarine base that China has built at Marao Island in the Maldives has the potential to challenge the US navy in Diego Garcia, the hub of US naval forces in the Indian Ocean. It is possible that the construction of these ports and facilities around India’s periphery by China can be explained away on purely economic and commercial grounds but for India this looks like a policy of containment by other means.

China’s diplomatic and military efforts in the Indian Ocean seem to exhibit a desire to project influence vis-a-vis competing powers in the region, such as the US and India. China’s presence in the Bay of Bengal via roads and ports in Burma and in the Arabian Sea via the Chinese-built port of Gwadar in Pakistan has been a cause of concern for India. With access to crucial port facilities in Egypt, Iran and Pakistan, China is well poised to secure its interests in the region. China’s involvement in the construction of the deep-sea port of Gwadar has attracted a lot of attention due to its strategic location, about 70 kilometres from the Iranian border and 400 kilometres east of the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil supply route. It has been suggested that it will provide China with a “listening post” from where it can “monitor US naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future US-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean.” Though Pakistan’s naval capabilities do not, on their own, pose any challenge to India, the combinations of Chinese and Pakistani naval forces can indeed be formidable for India to counter.

It has been suggested that the Chinese government appears “to have a very clear vision of the future importance of the sea and a sense of the strategic leadership needed to develop maritime interest.” This is reflected in the attempts that China has made in recent years to build up all aspects of its maritime economy and to create one of the world’s largest merchant fleets with a port, transport and ship-building infrastructure to match. In this respect, the Indian Ocean has an important role to play in the Chinese efforts towards establishing its predominance as the main maritime power in the region, resulting in Sino-Indian competition for influence.

Despite a significant improvement in Sino-Indian ties since the late 1990s, the relationship remains competitive in nature and using its rising economic and military profile, China has been successful in containing India within the confines of South Asia by building close ties with India’s key neighbours, in particular with Pakistan.

 

[Ray]

This is also interesting.

Strategic Analysis: US Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean

Subscription needed.

 

[p2prada]

And you are showing the exact attitude that most submariners dread. A good friend of mine said this is hubris and there is no cure for hubris except to suffer its consequences.

We are still relying on way too much assumption and speculation.

Assuming we make the same mistakes that are already made by other Navies and also other navies assuming we have to make the same mistakes to be more professional is hubris in my view. Submarines come with their own shares of trouble as do other things, including soldiers preventing accidents with their rifles. We can better ourselves without having to resort to your costly mistakes.

What if Russia says US must have its own Chernobyl in order to be better and more professional in Nuclear science? Will US accept it. So, why should we accept your views on similar grounds. Imposing your views is Hubris.

IN is considered the most professional of all our wings. Hopefully they will live up to our expectations without being "stupid."

 

[masterofsea]

It is like race between tortoise and hare but am sure similarly india will overtake and win at some point

dou you really believe tortoise can win hare?

 

[Shiny Capstar]

There was just a report today of sighting of a Russia sub off the US coast!

The subs were tracked, and I quote,

“We’ve known where they were, and we’re not concerned about our ability to track the subs,” the official added. “We’re concerned just because they are there.”

 

[Officer of Engineers]

We are still relying on way too much assumption and speculation.

No, we're relying on what the submariners have said.

Assuming we make the same mistakes that are already made by other Navies and also other navies assuming we have to make the same mistakes to be more professional is hubris in my view. Submarines come with their own shares of trouble as do other things, including soldiers preventing accidents with their rifles. We can better ourselves without having to resort to your costly mistakes.

And that is where you don't understand. It's not the past mistakes nor the future mistakes, it's an entire thought process. You're still assuming that you're smart enough to learn from all others ... and this is exactly why your accident is coming.

What if Russia says US must have its own Chernobyl in order to be better and more professional in Nuclear science? Will US accept it. So, why should we accept your views on similar grounds. Imposing your views is Hubris.

Three Mile Island ... and that happenned before Chernobyl and obviously, the Russians ... and the Canadians ... learned nothing from it.

IN is considered the most professional of all our wings. Hopefully they will live up to our expectations without being "stupid."

Don't be too hard on your people when it does.

 

[kuku]

Not quite true, if India is willing to risk US/Euro displeasure or if they give India the nod and say its none of their business. The IN can cripple the PRC via its control of the Indian ocean and thus the super tanker routes that carry China's life blood (oil) to her.

They might be able to stop some ships, however the pull that PRC has in the region might translate into a lot of shipping going to PRC via other nations.
It might increase the costs though.

Aegis is probably the best battle management system afloat. Not just for anti-air war, but also for surface, anti-sea skimming missile, BMD and now space engagements as well.

Wont the huge PESA of a Aegis give away the location of the ship? (i guess scaring away is a part of the ships role)

Its really old, so many bugs might be worked out already in comparision with all the other systems, the MF-STAR has all the required specs and capabilities, Israel and India do not seem to be interested in Aegis.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

First of all, Russia will not help China in the event of war and so the question does not arise.

Sir, you will find that the history of Russian sales is not so clear. They sold to both Iran and Iraq during their spat when just a couple years before, Iran was anti-Soviet. They have continually supplied both China and India with military hardware and at times, against Indian objections. The JF-17 engines is just one example. Lastly, the Russians signed an oil and gas contract with the Chinese. I'm afraid that your view that they would not support China is not supported by Russian historic choices. If there's a buck to be made, they'll make it ... and history has shown, they have no qualms about doing it at India's expense.

 

[Ray]

The subs were tracked, and I quote,

“We’ve known where they were, and we’re not concerned about our ability to track the subs,” the official added. “We’re concerned just because they are there.”

The point was that we are back to the Cold War days.

US would also be having subs around the Chinese and Russian waters.

 

[Ray]

Sir, you will find that the history of Russian sales is not so clear. They sold to both Iran and Iraq during their spat when just a couple years before, Iran was anti-Soviet. They have continually supplied both China and India with military hardware and at times, against Indian objections. The JF-17 engines is just one example. Lastly, the Russians signed an oil and gas contract with the Chinese. I'm afraid that your view that they would not support China is not supported by Russian historic choices. If there's a buck to be made, they'll make it ... and history has shown, they have no qualms about doing it at India's expense.

Selling and assisting during War are two different things.

If China and US has a confrontation, Russia would not take sides and carrying Chinese goods in Russia ship would hardly be worth the spat with the US for Russia.

 

[Officer of Engineers]

The point was that we are back to the Cold War days.

Sir,

No, we are not. The Cold War saw a hell of a lot more activities than this.

 

[natarajan]

Sir, you will find that the history of Russian sales is not so clear. They sold to both Iran and Iraq during their spat when just a couple years before, Iran was anti-Soviet. They have continually supplied both China and India with military hardware and at times, against Indian objections. The JF-17 engines is just one example. Lastly, the Russians signed an oil and gas contract with the Chinese. I'm afraid that your view that they would not support China is not supported by Russian historic choices. If there's a buck to be made, they'll make it ... and history has shown, they have no qualms about doing it at India's expense.

I think he says during war russia wont help but selling weapons is different as both pakistan and india are getting it from usa,france,uk etc

 

[Officer of Engineers]

If China and US has a confrontation, Russia would not take sides and carrying Chinese goods in Russia ship would hardly be worth the spat with the US for Russia.

Sir,

If China continues to supply North Korea and Moscow to Iran over current US objections, then why would not Russia keep continuing supplies to China? Sir, Chinese silkworm missiles were still being sold to Iran during the Tanker War.

Also, the current debate, Sir, is not about the US and China but India and China. I do not see Russia being scared of India to the point that they would stop trade with China.

 

[zraver]

Now that is just to taken on the issue of China.

Consider the other threats.

Brigadier, that first article you posted, can you provide a good link? its also fiull of errors. For example the nuclear powered CGN USS Bainbridge was stricken from the navy rolls (1996). The current USS Bainbridge is an Arliegh Burke class DDG. Or the battle cruiser Bunker Hill... in relaity the USS Bunker Hill is an aging Ticonderoga class CG that weighs less than the new DDG not a BC.

As for the Chinese PLAN, to the USN it is not a serious threat. If the PLAN were able to gang up on one peace time strike group they might be able to do some serious damage, but there are 10 more carriers behind it.

 

[IBRIS]

I didn't mean to divert attention from the topic. But should put some light on the current discussion. this article is from recent chinese republic or navy day. If i'm not wrong.



China proposed division of Pacific, Indian Ocean regions, we declined: US Admiral

Posted: Friday , May 14, 2009 at 0242 hrs IST
BEIJING:


In a startling disclosure, a top US Admiral has revealed that China offered to divide the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions between China and the US after Beijing launched its own fleet of aircraft carriers.



The offer was made by an unnamed top Chinese Navy officer while discussing the country’s ongoing aircraft carrier program More..me, one of the senior-most officers of the US military, Pacific Command (PACOM) chief Admiral Timothy J Keating said. He added that the incident was disclosed to Indian Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta during their meeting on Thursday.



Keating said that the offer, which was made somewhat “tongue in cheek” was declined by the US but the top Chinese officer indicated that Beijing would pursue the development of aircraft carrier technology.



“We (Keating and Mehta) talked a little about the potential development of a Chinese aircraft carrier. I related (to Mehta) a conversation I had with a senior Chinese Naval officer during which he proposed, in his words, that as China builds aircraft carriers — he said plural — we can make a deal,” the PACOM chief said after meeting the top Indian military leadership besides the National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary.

The proposed “deal” envisaged that after China has its own aircraft carriers — it remains the only major naval power currently without such a capability — the Pacific region could be divided into two areas of responsibility.



“(The Chinese officer said) You, the US, take Hawaii East and we, China, will take Hawai West and the Indian Ocean. Then you will not need to come to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean and we will not need to go to the Eastern Pacific. If anything happens there, you can let us know and if something happens here, we will let you know,” Keating recalled.




Kind of let's you in on the intention of the Chinese.....we go to war with them we have to take out their manufacturing ability.