Indian Military Literature

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This thread is dedicated to creating repository of scholarly literature pertaining to Indian Military (Past,Present and Future).
This would be a Non-Discussion thread, Use Quote option in the post and take up the discussion in appropriate thread if required.
if any of the members want to recommend any material that qualifies for this thread, inform the mods or contributors along with the link, and they would post it here.
Even if material is already posted in other threads, it is still eligible to be posted in this thread.

 

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A Hard look at Hard Power
-U.S Army War College

INDIA: CAPABLE BUT CONSTRAINED
Chapter No.5 by Ashley Tellis

https://carnegieendowment.org/files/India_-_Capable_but_Constrained.pdf

 

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The Need for a Balanced Approach in India's Military Doctrine

Views on Indian Strategy Many feel that India’s Military doctrine is outdated, orthodox and too continentally oriented and neglects the maritime domain. To quote some views. One researcher from Carnegie India feels that The Indian Army’s prevailing doctrine leaves the military with two main choices: do nothing or risk wars it cannot win. The Indian Army needs to rethink its use of force to meet today’s new challenges. Ah ha! Are there any challenges beyond China and Pakistan for India? Another researcher from JNU says India’s obsession with continental strategies has yielded unflattering results — no secure borders or deterrence stability. Therefore, it is high time New Delhi shifted its almost exclusive focus from the continental space to the maritime space, stitching together a maritime grand strategy. Wow! What is this maritime grand strategy to secure our land borders? Yet another feels that India's strategic challenges in the near future will be naval, not continental. Really? The PLA is sitting on our head! He goes on to say that traditionally, the Indian Navy has been the neglected branch of the armed forces. Big words.

Perspectives on Wars and Strategies Let us put strategy and war fighting in perspective. The strategic and military record of USA and China are unflattering. Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are examples of US losses despite being the greatest military on earth. China. Ah China! The superpower aspirant all set to have the greatest military. Its only notable military victory since 1962, has been sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat in South China Sea. On the other hand, the orthodox, outdated and poorly equipped Indian Armed Forces, have been on the winning side of all conflicts barring 1962. Pakistan has been defeated through 1947, 1965, 1971 and Kargil at a time and place of its choosing. China has been tapped hard on the beak in 1967, Doklam and Eastern Ladakh. The much-flaunted PLA strength is deficit on ground. Chinese multi domain war endeavours have been countered more than adequately. What more does a country require from its Armed Forces or its polity? Surely it must do something with strategy. Not convinced? Let us discuss further.

Threats India Faces Every country organises its Armed Forces based on perceived threats. Despite being in an era of multidomain wars, let us recapitulate our threats simplistically. Our land borders of nearly 3500 km with China and over 3000 km with Pakistan are largely disputed and partly occupied illegally. Further, China covets Eastern Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh and Pakistan wants Kashmir. Both are nuclear nations. We have had to defend ourselves repeatedly against their aggression and assertion. They constantly pose individual and collusive threats - conventional and unconventional. These threats come directly and indirectly through other countries and are increasing by the day. Our border areas and states remain/kept unstable. Any weakening on land borders means high likelihood of loss of territorial integrity of the nation and an unacceptable threat to our people. Even a loss of a few kilometres of frigid uninhabited land on Pangong Tso is not acceptable to the nation.

Further, the LAC threatens to present us with a LOC situation. How do we ignore that hard reality? Both adversaries possess nuclear arsenals which can target the entire Indian landmass. The strategic threat is buttressed by space-based assets. If we did not have a second-strike capability, then their first strike is a Damocles sword over our heads. Asymmetric threats to India have been multiple, manifold, constant and lethal –cyber-attacks, three warfare strategy, terrorism, digital and info domination, influence ops, cartographic aggression, economic dependency, political subversion and diplomatic hounding. Asymmetry is also built through the ‘String of Pearls’ in our neighbourhood. The air threat is not a stand-alone threat but accompanies a continental, maritime or a strategic threat. The maritime threat is essentially fourfold. Threat to our mainland, island territories, SLOCs and off shore assets. Of these, our SLOCs can be interfered with to a limited extent and there is some threat to our island territories. Overall, the continental land- based threat from Pakistan and China is of highest priority to our national integrity and security. Hence India must pay more attention to its continental domain. However, it does not mean the maritime domain needs to be neglected.

Thoughts on Maritime Domain If India is to grow as a regional or global power, we must dominate the seas. On that there is no doubt. We can do that by playing the maritime policeman’s role and by denying access to those inimical to us in our seas of interest - Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and part of Indian Ocean which extends from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits. If we can do that, we are largely secure. To a large extent we can. In fact beyond that, we are prepared to even defend our assets since 2012 as per our then CNS. The problem arises when we think beyond this. We are then leaving the security of the firm base of the Indian mainland and the seas we are familiar with to do the ‘Enter the Dragon’ act in the South China Sea. The logic of sticking our neck out into the South China Sea to fight someone else’s battles without adequate resources or a base needs a visit to a psychiatrist. Do not forget, that more than half the ASEAN is in China’s pocket and they are very sensitive to ASEAN centrality. Why would anyone allow us to operate in disputed seas to antagonise China? Even if we did so, what would we achieve with our meagre resources that USA with its three carrier groups has not been able to achieve? At best we may carry out FONOPs, like USA does. However, when FONOPs have not deterred China from building and manning islands in South China Sea why will it deter China from being aggressive on the LAC? Also, in the present situation, China has continued to be aggressive across the LAC despite being engaged in the South China Sea by USA. In fact, it is even planning to attack Taiwan.

Maritime Strategy Outline So, what should our maritime strategy be? India should be the dominant maritime power in its security environment from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits. There is no doubt in that. Are we in that league? Partly. However, we can definitely do better. Does China threaten us in the IOR? Not yet. However, there is a Sino-Indian competition for dominance of the IOR. China wants to get into the IOR. It does not have the reach as yet. Despite everything, the bulk of Chinese Navy has not left the South China Sea, East China Sea or Yellow Sea. It has remained within the safety envelope of the Chinese main land. Are the Chinese preparing to enter the IOR? Oh! sure. If they want to be a world power they have to. So, we should do something which makes the IOR our fortress. That has two components. One, we need to get hold of our neighbourhood – Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. We are slipping there badly. We need to do more there to deny PLAN from developing bases in these countries. Two, Indian Navy must be enabled to deny the IOR to China or any other adversary when needed. That means capability building. Let us discuss that.

Choices We have three choices-increase our surface fleet including a third aircraft carrier; increase our sub surface fleet and strengthen our Island territories. In any option, increasing our maritime domain awareness is a given. Any sensible person will opt for a balanced option and I will agree with him. There is a lot of discussion about the third aircraft carrier. As an Indian I would love to have that. However, its practicability needs to be thought through. After all it is not a matter of just building a ship but also equipping it. When we do not have enough aircraft for the IAF where will we get them for the third aircraft carrier? I wonder if we can get hold of enough aircrafts for even the two aircraft carriers we are shortly going to have. Also, I wonder if we have fully strengthened our Island territories. Well-developed islands in the IOR can be punitive pivots around which the IN, IAF and IA can manoeuvre. Further, has enough discussion and analysis been carried out to take a call on the right mix between surface and subsurface combatants? I think it needs a joint thought and not a single service thought. The DMA has to pitch in. A national consensus and clarity must emerge with due diligence and thought.

A Continental Thought There is an old-fashioned continental thought of mine for consideration by vastly modern maritime enthusiasts. Our orthodox Army has by now tied down at least four to six PLA divisions with a whole lot of other combat power in Eastern Ladakh. Add other PLA forces which are on alert in the Central and Eastern Sectors. Add Chinese obsession with Taiwan. Add other border requirements. Add requirements to keep the CCP in power. Add the new rubric of QUAD. Suddenly one will find that Chinese force dynamics will change. Factor in the one child policy, conscription, inexperience and untested weapons. My guess is that PLA has been shorted. Mark my words. Do an old-fashioned appreciation called ‘Troops to Task’. It will emerge that PLAN has a very long way to go before it becomes expeditionary. A correct joint assessment is on the cards. If the LAC degenerates into a LOC situation, the Chinese apple cart will be fully upset. Whether they like it or not, they will start looking at their own continental vs maritime theories afresh. Unless of course they want to lose Tibet and Xinjiang through asymmetry by sailing into the IOR.

Economic Impact A major factor in all prescriptions is economic clout. We can think of achieving maritime glory when we have pockets deep enough. When we get to being a $5 Trillion economy, we can start dreaming to look over the horizon. Presently, our condition permits us only to consolidate. Modernisation in contracting budgets will be a difficult option. Force expansion in such conditions is La la land. Very importantly we must maintain balance. Fiscal and Physical. We need to be strong enough to deter China and Pakistan from undertaking any further adventures. That kind of deterrence comes through sustained progress in all five main domains – continental, arial, maritime, strategic and asymmetric. We also need to invest more in our joint ISR capabilities on a national scale. The other way of deterring our adversaries is to get into an alliance or an arrangement like the QUAD to contain China in the Indo-Pacific construct. Here exercises like Malabar have great value to develop operational synergy. Even in this scenario we must take a holistic view. We can never forget that there is an ‘Indo’ part of the Indo Pacific. I have highlighted this amply in my previous article @ https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/10/quad-evolving-fast-by-lt-gen-p-r.html

Indian Interests and Strategy At the end of the day we need to cater for Indian interests through Indian strategies in response to Indian threats under Indian conditions obtaining on ground. We have to think through them. Our weakness lies in the inability of our Defence and Security system to work seamlessly, lacking joint structures, inter-ministerial gaps, inability to equip our armed forces and lack of a strategic political culture. We need to strengthen those within democratic norms without aping autocracies or falling prey to wishful thinking. We need a balanced approach which is best for India.



Other articles by the author can be accessed @- https://www.gunnersshot.com/

 

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The Expanding Domains of War​

May 09, 2019 By Kanchana Ramanujam​

Introduction

Technological and sociological changes have brought about a paradigm-shift in the understanding of war, battle-field, and indeed, victory and defeat. Warfare has metamorphosed from the classic military aggression only, to include a number of other domains such as political, legal, diplomatic, etc. This has led to a corresponding change in the weapons used - currency, water, markets, narratives, malware, etc. are the new weapons.
The objective of warfare is changing from imposing a military defeat to rendering the military might of the adversary meaningless, exemplified by the use of lawfare, cabbage tactics, Little Green Men, Little Blue Men, unmanned systems, creation of artificial islands, etc. Former United States Secretary of Defense, James N Mattis, called such actions ‘competition’ (distinguishing it from armed ‘conflict’) in US’ National Defense Strategy released in January 2018.1 The word ‘competition’ initially figured in the 2017 Multi-Domain Battle paper of the US Army.2

There is less emphasis on bloodshed and increasingly more emphasis on incapacitating the adversary, the key to which is capabilities in the domains of cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum. The 7th generation warfare is indeed about paralysing a country by targeting their network-based critical assets - banking, electricity, nuclear facilities, etc.

Domain-Specific Vulnerabilities - The Assassin’s Mace

Targeting the adversary’s domain-specific weakness gives the weaker side the change to dominate in a conflict, and the stronger side to prevail without inviting international intervention.

Hezbollah

Hezbollah, a non-state actor, which used the tactics of suicide bombing and frontal attacks against Israel in the 1990s, could challenge the might of the Israeli Defence Forces in the 2006 Lebanon War when it prosecuted electronic warfare, exploiting the complex communication network it built stretching across Beirut to the Israel-Lebanon border. It simultaneously prosecuted psychological warfare, systematically using al-Manar Television channel. These were in addition to dexterously utilising guerrilla as well as conventional capabilities.

Russia

Russia has mastered the art of what it calls non-linear warfare. Be it shaping the environment by bringing up the issue of Russian identity (psychological operations), leveraging Gazprom as a tool for coercion, economic carrot and stick approach, use of irregular forces, cyber aggression, etc.

China

China’s unrestricted warfare is based on exploitation of economy, law, networks, etc. rather than a direct military confrontation. The same is evident in China’s impressive space and cyber capabilities, exploitation of audio and visual means of mass communication for narrative building, debt diplomacy, use of deceptive, irregular forces (maritime militia), etc.

Integrated, Multi-Dimensional Response for Multi-Dimensional Threats

In response to the Russian and Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, the US established the I2CEWS (Intelligence, Information Operations, Cyber and Electronic Warfare, and Space and Signal) unit.3
Led by an officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, the I2CEWS is a battalion-sized force. It has, as the name suggests, the following four companies :


1.Intelligence
This company would provide a picture of the operating environment for kinetic and non-kinetic actions.

2.Information Operations
This company would provide information support to combat troops. Information operations, including propaganda, would now be a part of combat.

3.Cyber and Electronic Warfare
This company is dedicated to attacking the wireless, tactical networks by hacking/jamming.





4. Space and Signal
This company would collect intelligence data from signals intelligence and/or reconnaissance satellites.
A second battalion of the I2CEWS will come up in the US European Command.



The Indian Scenario

India has already taken the initial steps towards tackling threats in the unconventional domain. During the Combined Commanders’ Conference held in Jodhpur last year, the Prime Minister approved cyber, special forces, and space divisions for the Armed Forces.4 Recently, the Indian Armed Forces conducted Cyberex, a two-day, joint cyber exercise, along with other stakeholders such as the the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team, the National Technical Research Organisation, etc.5

As the battlefield evolves in terms of actors, dimensions, space, and time, India needs to be prepared to act simultaneously and synergistically in every dimension of conflict - be it land, air, sea, space, cyber, as well as electromagnetic spectrum. She also needs to arm herself to seize the first mover’s advantage in these domains.
For a dedicated and integrated, multi-domain structure, the following points require consideration:



1.Agnosticism/Compatibility
For seamless functioning across various platforms, hardware/software agnosticism (compatibility) would be essential.

2.C4 system
A robust, secure, and rapid communication network is another essential requirement. Command, Control, Communications, Computers.

3.Jointness
Multi-domain units/operations would require true jointness. This may also include weapon-systems and capabilities for cross-domain use.
Such a structure should be able to function independently as also seamlessly with the tri-services.

4. Personnel Base
Would the personnel for such a structure comprise of specialists from within the tri-services or will separate recruitment for the same be done.

5. Budgetary allocation
Such a structure would require specific allocation of budget. There cannot be any uncertainty over the amount earmarked.

6. Increasing Awareness at all Levels
Such a structure would be completely new. Proper orientation of the leadership as well as rank and file could be looked at.

7.Nodal agency
Such a structure would require a nodal agency for complete control and functioning. The Integrated Defence Staff may be that agency.



Conclusion

The proliferation of different tools of warfare and resultant expansion of the battle-field means that no particular service can guarantee victory. The modern battlefield needs not just military but political, psychological, electronic, technological warriors too. To win today’s ‘wars’, one needs a whole-of-government (WOG) approach with elements of Comprehensive National Power as part of the action/response system.
The Armed Forces should be prepared to take threats in all domains, as also take offensive actions in those domains. A synergistic, multi-domain, WOG approach may prove to be the decisive factor in battle-field dominance.

The Expanding Domains of War

 

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‘Soft Kill’ or ‘Hard Kill’? The requirements for India’s space and counter-space capabilities

https://www.orfonline.org/research/soft-kill-or-hard-kill-the-requirements-for-indias-space-and-counter-space-capabilities-57832/

 

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Mod comments: copied from DRDO thread
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Very good paper go through it.

 

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Nehru’s Navy: India’s Tryst with Aircraft Carriers

• YOGESH JOSHI

The commissioning of the homegrown INS Vikrant in September has revived debates within India’s strategic community and the decision-making elite, on the desirability and viability of aircraft carriers for the Indian Navy. It remains unclear how these debates are settled among the political, bureaucratic, and military classes, and how decisions are made around the Navy's force structures, particularly on the issue of aircraft carriers. This paper offers a historical account of how India acquired its first aircraft carrier in the 1960s, the various forces that have either supported or resisted the idea of a carrier-centric navy, and the consequences for the Navy. It argues that both, the Indian Navy’s organisational obsessions, and Jawaharlal Nehru’s pride, were responsible for India’s tryst with aircraft carriers.

https://www.orfonline.org/research/nehrus-navy-indias-tryst-with-aircraft-carriers/

 

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Some of the papers authored by Dr. APJ Kalam sir

Future Operational Scenario for Antitank Guided Missile Systems

Integrated design approach for advanced aerospace vehicles

Thanks @Swesh for digging them up..

 

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*A Tambram & The Peking Soup.*

(A Long Post)

It was the summer of 1986, life in India was going as usual. Rajiv Gandhi had been the Prime minister for 2 years and Congress dominated the entire political scenario of the country on the account of the sympathy votes they garnered​

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after the death of Indira Gandhi in 1984. The economy had begun to grow at 5% after roughly 3 decades of stagnancy. The mood in the country was upbeat and the politicians in the Raisina corridor of Delhi were preparing for the next elections (mind you this was the time before the​

Bofors scandals broke out and scandalised the Rajiv Gandhi Government).

On the morning of 2nd May, 1986 a phone rang in the Military Operations Directorate, in Army Headquarters New Delhi. It was no ordinary phone call, it was different. The call had directly come from the​

Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB) informing the Army Headquarters that Chinese had occupied Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh and were stocking up their positions and preparing for a War like which happened in 1962. The message was immediately conveyed to the then Chief of​

Army Staff General Krishnaswamy Sundarji .

Now Sundarji was an unconventional Army Chief. A first generation Army officer, son of a Physics Professor and a Maths Teacher, he was a Tamil Brahmin (Tambram as they call today). He had joined the Army rather than MBBS just to prove​

his father that he was a brave man. In the Army, he had the reputation for being a startegic thinker and an intellectual.

Without any delay, he sprung into action. The Chinese had occupied the Thiag La ridge in Arunachal Pradesh overlooking Tawang and were demanding Indian Army​

retreat from Arunachal Pradesh and the government handover Arunachal Pradesh to China which they claim was South Tibet.

This was preposterous according to Sundarji. He immediately moved the 17th Mountain division to Arunachal Pradesh under Major General JM Singh and asked the 33 Corps to move to Arunachal Pradesh.

For 4 months, the Indian and the Chinese troops looked eyeball to eyeball. The Govt in New Delhi was nervous. The Chinese were dead sure to call the Indian bluff as they knew that India didn't have roads to supply and sustain their troops for more than a year.

The winter continued and politicians in New Delhi grew nervous. In the absence of any roads, the Indian Army was using mules to stock supply, which was unfeasible in the long run according to Major General JM Singh as the Chinese had superior all weather roads. Infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh had been neglected for a long time. The winter was over and the Chinese were preparing to teach India another lesson.

Surprisingly Sundarji was completely quiet during those months refusing to give interviews. For 6 months, he had worked on a plan to mobilise troops and teach the Chinese a lesson. Audacious of him.

The spring of 1987 arrived and the standoff was continuing. The atmosphere was tense. And Sundarji made the first move. Using the newly induced Mi-17 Russian helicopters along with older Mi-8s​

he airlifted 3 brigades (10,000 troops) overnight and outflanked the Chinese. Now Indian troops had an immense advantage sitting at the mountain tops within fortified positions looking down at the Chinese troops below.​

All day, using megaphones and laud speakers Indian Army soldiers would blast messages in Mandarin humiliating and demoralising the Chinese. The logistics and supply lines of Chinese were cutoff. In fact the situation became so bad that the PLA soldiers started committing suicide. The Chinese were incensed at this.​

The Indian Ambassador in Beijing was summoned and was abused by the Chinese Foreign Minister in the most unparliamentary language .

Before the Chinese could react, Sundarji Struck again. He moved another Infantry division based in South India to Arunachal Pradesh and occupied the Namka Chu Valley.

In 1962, Indian Army had been brutally defeated by the PLA there and they had occupied the Namka Chu valley which gave PLA towering altitude advantage over the Indian Army garrisons located in Arunachal Pradesh.​

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Not only was the Namka Chu valley reconquered but the area was supplemented with Mi-35 attack helicopters and Bofor guns ... The Chinese were really terrified then. In a mere 14 days, they had lost the advantage they had gained over 25 years.

All this happened without Rajiv Gandhi even getting a whiff of it. When the complexity of the situation was known, Rajiv Gandhi lost his cool. General Sundarji was summoned to PMO and when he was asked about the plans to deal with Chinese, he replied nonchalantly that the Army was ready to go on an offensive and occupy roughly 10,000 Sq Kms in Tibet ridge line and hold on to it and ultimately force the PLA to retreat to pre-1962 positions. As he said these words, there was silence in the room and Rajiv Gandhi was looking at him bewildered.

What followed was a shameful assertion of Indian political establishment lacking a spine. Sundarji was reprimanded by the PM and was asked to move back, which he unwillingly did. His Military Operations Directorate staff remember that he told the PM and the Defence Minister that India was losing a golden chance and the country would pay for it in future. Ironically it turned out to be true in 2017.

Rajiv Gandhi and Congress got brownie points and won praise from China apologists for dealing with the Chinese in a mature manner. Now 35 years later, the question is 'Was General Sundarji right'? Today, the answer is Yes. We as a country are paying price for short term Political Brownie Points .

Now Sundarji was not limited to China only, he scared the shit out of General Zia in 1987 by conducting an excercise involving 500K troops on the Rajasthan border (Ex-Brasstacks). He was the first Indian Army Chief who openly argued that Pakistan should be prevented from becoming a nuclear state and was an advocate of conducting nuclear tests. In fact the 1998 Pokhran tests were based on the plans formulated by him in 1988.

Ironically, the Chinese were impressed with a man of Sundarji's calibre and invited him for a visit in 1993 after his retirement. In Beijing , when the Marshal of PLA asked Sundarji what he would like to eat, with a poker face, the General replied, "I as an Indian would like to drink Peking Soup", which meant that he could manage​

and predict the Chinese easily, needless to say the PLA Marshal was left red-faced and could smile only in reply.​

Yet today, General Sundarji remains a controversial man, maligned by Congress affiliated media and journalists just because he stood up against the the then PM Rajiv Gandhi.​