Indian Counter Terror Operations Pictures & Discussions

[Bornubus]

Yout want to know why? So some politcans and diplomats in Delhi could have the "feel good factor" and so they could forever brag about how they secured a "ceasfire agreement" with Pakistan and agreement that, as we can see from the constant firing still going on on the LoC, isn't worth the paper it was written on.

Every realist know that there won't be any peace with Pakis,ever.Even if we resolve the kashmir issue.Already hundreds of rounds of talks completed with pakis since 1947 for what ?

Pakis only learn the language of fist and boots,the treatment we gave them in 65,71 and siachen.

Here is truth about our leaders.Gen P N Hoon convinced Indira to annex siachen,the same general advised Rajiv Gandhi to invade Pakistan in 1987,annex the territory and Bargain for POK but Rajiv Refused the offer as a coward.Imagine if happened there would've been no CPEC.

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Lt Gen Hoon reveals some ‘untold truths’ in his book

• Tanbir Dhaliwal, Hindustan Times, Chandigarh
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• Updated: Oct 04, 2015 13:14 IST

Lt Gen PN Hoon during his book release at Chandigarh golf club on Saturday. (HT Photo )

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Operation Brasstacks was the army’s preparations for a war against Pakistan and not a military exercise, says Lieutenant General PN Hoon (retired), who was the then commander-in-chief of the Western Command. The revelation was made by the veteran during the launch of his book, “The Untold Truth”, on Saturday evening.

In the book, Lt Gen Hoon has revealed behind-the-scene politics of major operations and events that took place during his 40-year service in the army. While in one chapter, the author has called the Operation Blue Star a “botched-up operation”, in another chapter he has revealed that Operation Brasstacks was a “war against Pakistan”.

“I have written about operations I have been part of and no one else knows about till today,” said the author.

The chapter 9 of the book reveals the inside story of Operation Brasstacks. It was in peacetime in January 1987 that the Indian Army began moving to the western border carrying live ammunition. The citizens were told that it was an exercise. The book suggests that “it could only be a preparation for a war”

Talking about the operation, Lt Gen PN Hoon said, “Brasstacks was no military exercise, it was a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan. And what is even more shocking is that the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was not aware of these plans of a war.”

The author said that it was General Sundarji’s (the then chief of army staff) and minister of state for defence Arun Singh’s plan to provoke Pakistan “into launching an offensive in Kashmir”.

“... an attack on Kashmir would be an attack on India and in the garb of the exercise that India was already conducting, India would go into a full-fledged war with Pakistan,” reads the chapter.

Lt Gen Hoon said that it was during a dinner party on January 15, 1987, (Army Day) that the PM came to know about the exercise.

“Rajiv Gandhi asked me, ‘How is the western front?’ To this I replied, “Mr Prime Minister, sir. The western army is in fine fettle and very soon I shall be past our battle stations and will give you Sind on one side and Lahore (Pakistan) on the other,”said the author.

“Rajiv was totally aghast and visibly angered. He left the party immediately. The PM did not want to go into a war. Hence, on January 20, Sundarji, pleaded me to stop moving forward,”he added.

When asked as to why Arun Singh and Sundarji would want a war while keeping the PM in the dark, Lt Gen Hoon said: “It was a power game. Sundarji wanted to become a Field Marshal and Arun Singh wanted to become the Prime Minister.”

Apart from these issues, the book reveals behind-the-scene politics when India was forced to take over Sikkim. The author has tried to expose the true nature of political mindset, which should have been protecting the economic, political and strategic interests of the country.

The author also reveals that how President Giani Zail Singh was planning to take the help of the army in dismissing Rajiv Gandhi. “The army had a role to play in the plans to dismiss Rajiv Gandhi. The conflict between the former President Giani Zail Singh and then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was well known by all. But what is still not known is the real politics that continued during the period and how army was involved in all this,” mentions the book.


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Brasstacks

 

[abingdonboy]

Every realist know that there won't be any peace with Pakis,ever

Then there aren't any realists in postions of power in Delhi.

 

[pmaitra]

Some 60 Paki civilians killed in Indian firing last year.What is the option if our civilians gets killed,they specifically target Sikhs and Hindus living in border villages.

Paki aggression

Indian Retaliation

Indian Army does not target civilians. Targeting civilians is not an option, no matter what PA does. Unless there is solid proof, such suggestions should never be made. It only makes India look like the bad guy in international fora.

 

[Bornubus]

no matter what PA does.

Sorry sir.If you say this in any jammu border village they will probably laugh at you.Paki firing is a big election issue here, people overwhelming supported new govt to do something for it.

I don't understand the logic Why we shouldn't fire on Paki civilian in return, just for our international image ? We are not getting anything from UN anyway.

For the first time govt gave free hand to BSF to retaliate even if Paki civilian get killed.The devastation was so big that Pakis had to call UN observers to stop Indian firing.

On top of it Paki border villages are launch lads for Jihadi terrorists which is an euphemism for Paki Civilians.

 

[aditya g]

The ceasefire:

1. Allowed us to construct the fence.

2. Reduce infiltration

3. Reduce exfiltration

Yout want to know why? So some politcans and diplomats in Delhi could have the "feel good factor" and so they could forever brag about how they secured a "ceasfire agreement" with Pakistan and agreement that, as we can see from the constant firing still going on on the LoC, isn't worth the paper it was written on.

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Simple HE Frag rounds, But sheer speed of the round is capable of penetrating concrete bunkers, It also have a better shrapnel dispersion ..

This photo is taken by me in a tour, you can see the work of 40mm shell shrapnel around and big once go even far..

The red once are tracers..

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Army AD units are also deployed ZU-23-2 from enclosed and position for long range suppression fire, Better than any HMG out there ..

Also, how L 70 devasted the Paki bunkers, are we using some special rounds for it

 

[pmaitra]

Sorry sir.If you say this in any jammu border village they will probably laugh at you.Paki firing is a big election issue here, people overwhelming supported new govt to do something for it.

I don't understand the logic Why we shouldn't fire on Paki civilian in return, just for our international image ? We are not getting anything from UN anyway.

For the first time govt gave free hand to BSF to retaliate even if Paki civilian get killed.The devastation was so big that Pakis had to call UN observers to stop Indian firing.

On top of it Paki border villages are launch lads for Jihadi terrorists which is an euphemism for Paki Civilians.

No innocent should be killed. From what I understand, BSF was asked to target Pakistani military infrastructure. The damage to civilians was most likely collateral damage, and unintentional.

 

[ezsasa]

Damage to Paki civilian houses will be mostly be because their posts are within the villages. Unlike ours where we have a mandatory gap between frontline and village.

Can someone confirm if my assumption is right.

 

[Navnit Kundu]

Damage to Paki civilian houses will be mostly be because their posts are within the villages. Unlike ours where we have a mandatory gap between frontline and village.

Can someone confirm if my assumption is right.

I don't think our army orders intentional firing on civilians because there is no strategic gains to be had from it. But all of this intent is secondary to the fact that the very nature of weapons that are used are inherently inaccurate by their own technical shortcoming (especially mortars) so it is not completely implausible that some civilians on the other side were affected by our firing which is in stark contrast with Pakistani firing which deliberately targeted civilians on the Indian side to make the government seem hapless and to provoke public anger against the Indian government.

Looking at it from a macro perspective, I think the amount of collateral damage that we have unintentionally inflicted on them is justified and commensurate with the nature of provocation we faced. There can be no idealistic, unilateral, voluntary disarmament imposed on us out of some twisted sense of morality about being averse to collateral damage without taking a comparative view of things. We can't be held back in our response simply because there will be collateral. It has to be calculated and minimized but it has to be done, nonetheless. In a way, the military casualties and the collateral that Pakistan faces has to be looked at as, not a conflict of choice, but an inevitable eventuality imposed on us by Pakistanis so it is Pakistan which has to factor in all of these variables before infiltrating terrorists on our side and starting unprovoked shelling to provide cover fire to them.

A clear conscience about whether our response causes some unintentional damage should not be a prerequisite to whether we respond or not. That would be a false binary. If we are provoked, we have to respond. If Pakistan doesn't want casualties, they can stop shelling our villages. The safety of Pakistani civilians is not the primary concern of the Indian government; the safety of Indian citizens is.

 

[Yodha]

The Medak MPV looks ekdum SaF from the outside but it looks a bit cramped with all those soldiers sitting inside the MPV:
Pampore encounter, Feb 22, 2016

IED Diffused in outskirts of srinagar. Mar 11, 2016

Why is there a lot of irregularity in the camo used by each soldier? One uses an old camo, other uses new camo, another uses plain green west. And also that black tactical gear vest on that green camo is like white sheep in the middle of an elephant herd. It easily gives away.

Correct me if I'm wrong and can anybody specify if the irregularity is on purpose.

 

[thethinker]

Damage to Paki civilian houses will be mostly be because their posts are within the villages. Unlike ours where we have a mandatory gap between frontline and village.

Can someone confirm if my assumption is right.

Pak army is based on jihadist ideology and those are classic jihadist tactics. The aggressors use innocent as a shield to confuse the enemy thereby affecting their reaction time and use the collateral damage as a propaganda to further their means.

Suggest to go through below :

God's soldiers: Pakistan army's ideology
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/gods-soldiers-pakistan-armys-ideology/article2515374.ece
Pakistan and the jihadist project

Six years ago, in a book published just before he became his country's ambassador to the U.S., politician-scholar Husain Haqqani recorded that the Pakistan Army's jihadist project was “not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments.” Instead, he argued, the Pakistani state's use of Islam “gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to jihadi ideology.” The Green Books explain just what this strategic commitment entails.

The historical genesis of the Pakistan Army's jihadist project is well known. Following colonial military thinkers like Francis Tuker, who headed the British India's eastern command at the time of independence, Pakistan's strategic community believed that India would collapse under the weight of its ethnic-religious strains.

From 1947-1948, Pakistan's intelligence services thus conducted what Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru described as an “informal war”— a campaign of aid to secessionist insurgencies, in which clerics and religious ideology often had a key role.

Pakistan's political élite also came to increasingly rely on the clerical class for legitimacy.

In 1956, the country's first constitution declared Pakistan an Islamic republic — a notion unknown to classical theology — and mandated that no laws repugnant to the Koran and Hadith be passed.

Later, General Ayub Khan excised the prefix “Islamic” from Pakistan's name, but nonetheless appointed a council of clerics to guide the state. His successor, the hard-drinking General Yahya Khan, allied with Islamists in Bangladesh and Kashmir. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in turn, bowed to clerical pressure, pushed forward with anti-minorities measures and declared Islam the state religion.

General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq oversaw the full bloom of this process: influenced by the ideas of Islamist ideologue Abul Ala Mawdudi, and inspired by the triumph of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, he set about rebuilding the state and the army with jihadist ideology at their core. The new model army Gen. Zia-ul-Haq built was principally concerned not with defending the state's frontiers against its adversaries, but with reinventing Pakistan itself.

Commodore Tariq Majid laid out a road map for this new model army in the 1991 Green Book. He wrote: “the Islamic state, apart from the standing forces, keeps a volunteer force of the people and employs the other lot of able-bodied manpower to strengthen the other elements of the military system during wartime.” His “volunteer force of the people” would, in time, evolve into the ISI-backed jihadist networks Pakistan now sponsors.

Brigadier Saifi Ahmad Naqvi, writing in the 1994 Green Book, provided doctrinal flesh to this project. He began on the premise that “Pakistan is an ideological state, based on the ideology of Islam.” Therefore, “the existence and survival of Pakistan depend upon complete implementation of Islamic ideology in true sense. If the ideology is not preserved then the very existence of Pakistan becomes doubtful.” This, in his view, made the Army “responsible for the defence of the country, to safeguard [its] integrity [and] territorial boundaries, and the ideological frontiers to which the country owes its existence.”

Brigadier Muneer Mahmood explained, in 2002, why Pakistan needed to patronise jihadist groups. Pakistan was being cast as the “torch-bearer of the Muslim ummah [nation] by the biased western media and Jewish lobby.” In time, it was “likely to be the target of these forces.” Even though the prospect of a “conventional war between India and Pakistan appears remote, the environment [therefore] looks ripe for a LIC [low-intensity conflict] confrontation.”

Even as Pakistan became increasingly mired in counter-insurgency operations in the northwest after 2002, elements within its officer corps harboured substantial misgivings about the project. In 2008, for example, Brigadier Waqar Hassan Khan argued in the Green Book that “the superpower's entry into [the] Middle-East and West Asia [sic] was not possible without a Pearl Harbour; 9/11 was either created or supported to be labelled as the second Pearl Harbour.”

“Now,” he asserted, “it has come in the open that people have been missing the jungle for a tree; the so-called Pakistani Taliban was a bogey created by RAW, MOSSAD, and probably the U.S.-led coalition to keep the Durand Line on fire and destabilise Pakistan internally to achieve the ultimate objective of undermining the only nuclear Islamic state on this earth.”

Major-General Muhammad Ahsan Mehmood, then-Director General of Weapons and Equipment, wrote a companion-essay explaining why Pakistan ought not to aid the U.S.' anti-jihadist campaign.

Pakistan's counter-insurgency commitments, he insisted, raised an “issue of legitimacy.” “If a section of society,” he wrote, “is not convinced about the moral standing of the task and a general perception on the similar lines also exists among the masses, it seriously erodes the performance of the military, which gets affected by the societal pressures. Military operations inside one's own country make it fundamental that the troops feel just and fair with regards to the operations being undertaken and popular support of the masses exists. Unless it happens, no amount of training, motivation and technology differential will deliver.”

Pakistan's army simply could not, this line of argument suggested, engage in a war against jihadist militia it had fathered without undermining the foundations of its own legitimacy.

 

[HariPrasad-1]

Damage to Paki civilian houses will be mostly be because their posts are within the villages. Unlike ours where we have a mandatory gap between frontline and village.

Can someone confirm if my assumption is right.

Yes, I heard BSF head saying the same thing in his interview.

 

[Bornubus]

Captured Wannabe Jihadi Ex Cop Shakoor Ahmad who went AWOL with 4 Aks.

 

[Bornubus]

crpf

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[Mikesingh]

When asked as to why Arun Singh and Sundarji would want a war while keeping the PM in the dark, Lt Gen Hoon said: “It was a power game. Sundarji wanted to become a Field Marshal and Arun Singh wanted to become the Prime Minister.”

That's bullshit of the highest order!

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Raptor sight officially used by RR ghatak commandos ..

Here a proper details of the sight.

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This sight was tested back in 2010 in many front-line units, And may be it became operational and certified for mass use ..
@sayareakd Sir, Was first to note this sight details ..

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Ghatak Commandos >>

 

[Kunal Biswas]

Lance Naik Goswami took part in three counter-terrorism operations in the past two weeks. In 11 days and three operations, he gunned down 10 militants and captured one, He was a skilled solider, Camouflage on his rifle is perhaps one of best i have noticed so far, This should be taught to all others in regular units..

Read More Abt him here : http://www.firstpost.com/india/a-tr...o-killed-10-militants-in-11-days-2425708.html

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RL team of RR at Operation ..

 

[Bornubus]

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[Bornubus]

Ak with foregrip

@Kunal Biswas which offers better protection Patka or this regular helmet ?