http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_2/comment/2c.htm
BMD and its Impact on Pakistan
The Bush Administration has shown its commitment to the development and deployment of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and has begun an aggressive diplomatic sell of this globally. BMD has two components: National Missile Defence (NMD) based in the US and Theatre Missile Defence (TMD). While the NMD is a fixed, land-based, non-nuclear missile defence system with a space-based detection system – the envisaged TMD focuses on rapid deployment and with an element of high manoeuvrability. And, unlike the NMD, the TMD comprises a number of subsystems.
The NMD is primarily a programme designed for the security of the continental US and the present scheme, with missile-tracking radar and the initial launch site's location in Alaska, is clearly targeted for China and its very limited Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force. The so-called "rogue states" of West Asia are certainly not the targets. In any case, the issue of "rogue" states does not really wash because only the US imagination could think of a missile attack on the US mainland from a state like Iran or even North Korea!
BMD also impacts upon the NATO deterrent shield over allies like Canada, Japan and Europe. This may be weakened now since they can become more accessible targets for anti-West forces than the US – once the NMD is deployed. Which is why the US is now talking of a wider notion of "Missile Defence", which would eventually cover the European allies, to stem the opposition to BMD from these allies.
The TMD systems, which will be stationed across the globe, including on allied territories, will impact China again (through Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) as well as countries like Pakistan and Iran (through India, Israel etc). In addition, the US Seventh Fleet's presence in the Asia-Pacific region will also bolster the TMD further. All the countries chosen to be part of the TMD will be given the relevant missile systems and technology, which would lead to the US thus unilaterally contravening the (Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and other nonproliferation agreements.
So, at the very least, China will have to seek an expansion of its ICBM force including more multiple warheads. It may also choose to develop ICBMs that can escape sensor detection and it may also opt for mobile warheads based in submarines – with a more expansive deployment, perhaps even in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
How will the BMD impact the global arms control agenda in general, and Pakistan's strategic deterrence in particular?
To begin with, the ABM Treaty will stand totally violated. It seems that President Bush regards it as a redundant leftover from the days of the bipolar world and is inclined to violate it unilaterally, should Russia not agree with its complete revision. So far Russia has shown its unwillingness to tamper with the ABM Treaty, but it may be bribed into doing so. In any case, the ABM Treaty has an "extraordinary" cancellation clause, which allows either side to give six months' notice of withdrawal for reasons vital to national security.
More dangerous is the new US line of treating international agreements as "leftovers" of the bipolar era. After all, almost all the arms control measures can be placed in this "leftover" category, including the NPT with its legitimation of only five nuclear weapon states.
BMD will also violate many existing international arms control arrangements beyond the bilateral ABM Treaty. At the multilateral level, the BMD plan directly contravenes the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, especially with the US plans to use Tactical High Energy Laser, developed in cooperation with Israel, as one of the anti-missile systems, which will be deployed in space. The NPT itself will be undermined, especially Article VI. Even the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties will be undermined by the TMD. Worse still, the US will become a major missile proliferator when it seeks to deploy TMD on allied territories and, therefore, transfers sensitive missiles and missile technology. This would directly contravene the MTCR regime.
The BMD factor will also impact on the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty), making such a treaty more of an improbability. The Chinese stance, that the FMCT must be linked with deweaponisation of space, will now be further hardened. So all in all, the BMD will undermine the global arms control and disarmament agenda. Of course, the US will declare its intent of unilateral reduction in warheads along with BMD deployment – but other states will not follow suit unless they too would have acquired a BMD capability. If anything, other nuclear weapon states may have to add to their missile arsenals and to the varied mix of these arsenals.
Apart from weakening the arms control framework, the BMD also threatens the stability of deterrence that has been built over decades. This is because the whole presumption against nuclear weapons' usage has so far been premised on mutual vulnerability. The BMD plan totally destroys this and in so doing, destroys the carefully constructed stability of traditional nuclear deterrence.
As for Pakistan, the BMD with its TMD component will be a source of strategic threats in the future. Already, India has acquired components of the TMD from the Soviet Union and now it is in the process of acquiring the Phalcon radar. This acquisition means that Pakistan's limited missile force and deployments would be completely vulnerable, and therefore, its deterrence weakened, since it would now not be premised on mutual vulnerability in relation to India. Pakistan will have to place its missiles on mobile launchers in Balochistan – until hardened silos can be perfected for deployments in other more forward locations. This, in turn, would put stress on command, control and communications. Also, political stability of the province becomes a vital factor in terms of the safety of such deployed weapons.
In fact, Pakistan may be compelled into going for some triad arrangement of nuclear forces – as well as seeking defence agreements within West Asia and the Gulf region, to make up for its lack of spatial depth. India's missile ranges, as well as its intent of deploying missile defence, means that the distinction between South and West Asia and the Gulf has been eliminated in the military context.
Along with this, with China being compelled to increase its warheads and ICBMs, India is bound to use that as a pretext to amass further missiles and so there is a danger of a missile race in this region. But there is also the opportunity for closer military cooperation with China. After all, in the face of its being targeted twice – through NMD and TMD – China, as stated above, will need to expand its naval military presence to the Indian Ocean. In this regard, Pakistan can offer base facilities along its coastline. There is more of a need now for a formal defence cooperation agreement between China and Pakistan, with a strong focus on some sort of a defensive belt from the Gulf to Myanmar. In such a scheme, Bangladesh may also come in to protect itself from India's growing militaristic policies.
Such cooperation also has an economic side in that it would help secure energy supply sources and routes. It is clear that BMD will lead to a more direct linkage between security and economic issues – with a major focus on maintaining secure sources and routes of oil and gas. India has already been talking of energy security and making strategic inroads in the Gulf region as well as investing in the energy sector in the Central Asian states. The politics of pipelines is going to be a major factor in the strategic relations of this region stretching from the Gulf to Central and South Asia. Pakistan and China cannot afford the luxury of ignoring these developments now that the US has gone overt with its intent of developing and deploying BMD.
Also, given the new likely technological cooperative links in the military field – based on BMD assessments, between the US, Israel, Japan, South Korea, India, Taiwan, etc, – there is a need for Pakistan to expand its military-technological cooperation, not only with China but also with the states of West Asia and the Middle East. How South Africa reacts to BMD would also define the future of Africa in terms of regional nonproliferation and military capabilities and alliances.
Finally, a country like Pakistan will find its political options constrained in the wake of the BMD plan and the evolving Indo-US-Israel nexus in this regard. Those who looked to reestablishing a close strategic alliance for Pakistan with the US need to realise that the US-centric option is simply not there anymore and alternative options must be taken advantage of. These include looking closer within the region for new multiple level alliances with the strategic factor as the core.
Pakistan also needs to put its fears regarding BMD on the top of its dialogue agenda with the US, as a major perceived threat for this country. In other words, for Pakistan this must be pursued as a priority agenda item in any future dialogue with the US.
Also, Pakistan now has to view all its arms control commitments within the context of the threat BMD poses to it – including adopting closer links with China on FMCT negotiations. On the FMCT, Pakistan needs to support the Chinese position that the FMCT must be part of a wider non-proliferation agreement that includes a commitment to deweaponise space. With the US committed to the use of High Energy Lasers, schemes and plans for the deweaponisation of space are not going to be possible in the coming future. Thus, there will be little scope for an FMCT to come into being any time soon, unless China and its allies on this count forego the linkages they are presently seeking. In other words, the global non-proliferation agenda is now going to be more directly linked to an overall scheme with the BMD being a central issue.
As for regional options of non-proliferation – they cannot now be dealt with in isolation from the global situation, given the direct linkages established between the two by the components of BMD. Thus, the viability of nuclear weapon free zones will be called more and more into question with space-based weapon systems and TMD deployed across the globe. In a world which threatens to become a free-for-all in terms of weapons systems, BMD will make the unthinkable thinkable – that is, a nuclear war.
