Indian Ballistic Missile Defense System

sayareakd

New Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
17,734
Likes
18,953
Country flag
I have a query, PAD contains a liquid propelled stage, and as per open source information, the liquid fueled Prithvi missile need some like 1 hour to fuel the missile which is not usually kept in ready fueled mode , applying the same to the PAD is the PAD a worthy interceptor missile in real time scenario ?


that liquid fuel in diverters is for TVC, but PAD is only tech demo, real missile would be PDV for the reason only one missile per launcher is not suitable for BMD, plus range of PAD is low, these issues will be taken care in PDV.
 

plugwater

New Member
Joined
Nov 25, 2009
Messages
4,154
Likes
1,082
Saya, PDV has a flight ceiling of only 150 km which may not reach the target if launched from ship. Considering the target missile will be in mid course phase.
So i suggest we use AD-1 and AD-2 for ship based BMD. Hopefully it can intercept targets at more than 250 kms.
 

agentperry

New Member
Joined
Oct 24, 2010
Messages
3,022
Likes
690
they are moving from liquid fueled to solid fueled as they have seen that solid fuel have an edge over liquid fuel in terms of readiness and performance. PDV is a new system and not equivalent to PAD which uses liquid fuel. this has been confirmed by drdo in public statement. moreover early examples of BMD will have old PAD only which will be first supported by PDV and later completely replaced by the latter.
for second stage AAD is speculated to be the answer.
 

Payeng

Daku Mongol Singh
New Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
2,522
Likes
777
that liquid fuel in diverters is for TVC, but PAD is only tech demo, real missile would be PDV for the reason only one missile per launcher is not suitable for BMD, plus range of PAD is low, these issues will be taken care in PDV.
It has not been declared, neither I have seen any discussion upon this matter but how would the Shaurya perform for a BDM role?

Point to note is their is a difference between the launch mechanism between The Shaurya and the Standard Missile-3, while Shaurya employs a gas expelled mechanism Standard Missile-3 relies on its rocket thrust with a huge visible exhaust fume diverted upward. Just curious to make a comparison between the two systems.
 

sayareakd

New Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
17,734
Likes
18,953
Country flag
It has not been declared, neither I have seen any discussion upon this matter but how would the Shaurya perform for a BDM role?

Point to note is their is a difference between the launch mechanism between The Shaurya and the Standard Missile-3, while Shaurya employs a gas expelled mechanism Standard Missile-3 relies on its rocket thrust with a huge visible exhaust fume diverted upward. Just curious to make a comparison between the two systems.
this is most possible (guess) launcher for the PDV

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_8gXQngrI7x8/S3rDH3acm1I/AAAAAAAAAOo/fEMkqaLZA4E/s1600/15022010807.jpg

no idea what shape would PDV would take but those big fins of Prithvi dont be there, we need at least 4 PDV per launcher and 6 AAD per launcher to be effective. You wont find any discussion on this because those who make this dont discuss in open.

here PAD launch (it has only one missile per launcher)


here is arrow missile from Israel notice the number of missile per launcher


in future it will work like this




probably they may take the Shaurya missile first soft launch stage for PDV, lets wait and see.
 

sayareakd

New Member
Joined
Feb 17, 2009
Messages
17,734
Likes
18,953
Country flag
India studying NATO offer on joining missile programme

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) invitation to India in the first week of September to be a partner in its ballistic missile defence (BMD) programme is being analysed, according to V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister.

"We are analysing the report. It is under consideration," he said on September 30 after the successful launch of the Agni-II ballistic missile from the Wheeler Island on the Orissa coast.
The Hindu : News / National : India studying NATO offer on joining missile programme

first we have to see what is on offer, specially for radar and other sensors.
 

utubekhiladi

The Preacher
New Member
Joined
Dec 3, 2010
Messages
4,768
Likes
10,311
Country flag
India hones its missile shield

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan




India hones its missile shield
By Siddharth Srivastava

NEW DELHI - One consequence of the Mumbai terror attack in November 2008 has been an acceleration of India's ballistic missile defense (BMD) program to protect against a sudden missile attack, possibly nuclear tipped, particularly from rogue elements in Pakistan.

The BMD can also be extended to space to protect India's remote and communication satellites especially in the context of China conducting an anti-satellite test in 2007, in what is seen as a


potential "star wars" arms race between the two Asian nations, with America strategically sided with India.

In a continuation of ongoing efforts in that direction, last month India fired an interceptor missile that "pulverized" an incoming "enemy" ballistic missile at an altitude of 16 kilometers in what was described as a "direct kill" over the Bay of Bengal on India's east coast.

The enemy missile was a variant of the short-range Prithvi, versions of which are in the possession of Pakistan that has built them with the help of China. The surface-to-surface Prithvi lifted off at Chandipur, Orissa. In less than three minutes, the interceptor, an Advanced Air Defense (AAD) missile received signals and traveled at a speed of Mach 4.5 (1.4 kilometers per second) to destroy it.

"Our BMD program has matured, and it is really ready now for integration into the air defense assets of the country. India is next only to the US, Russia, France and Israel, which have the BMD capability," said V K Saraswat, scientific adviser to the defense minister and also the head of the apex state-run Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) that is coordinating the effort.

In a statement, the DRDO said that the test "was a copybook launch and all events and mission sequence took place as expected". Earlier, the DRDO said that it would have Phase-I missiles of the BMD system, capable of neutralizing 2,000-km range missiles, ready for deployment by 2011-12. Phase-II will look to thwart threats from missiles up to 5,000 km, particularly from China.

Over the past few years, India has conducted "exo-" and "endo-atmospheric" missile interceptor tests even as threat perceptions with China and Pakistan have gone up.

The first test was held in November 2006, when an exo-atmospheric hypersonic interceptor missile successfully destroyed an incoming missile at an altitude of around 40-50 km, demonstrating a BMD capability similar to the Israeli Arrow-2 system.

The second test, similar to the American Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) system, was held in December 2007, wherein an "endo-atmospheric" interceptor successfully took on the "enemy" missile at a 15-km altitude.

However, in the context of China test-firing in space, India has also made it apparent that it is open to extending the BMD program to space.

"Our country does not have a policy to attack anybody in space. But as part of the BMD program, we have all the technology elements required to integrate a system through which we can defend our satellites or take care of future requirements," Saraswat recently said.

In a parliamentary statement clarifying its position on the militarization of space, New Delhi has said, "India is strongly opposed to any attempt to place weapons in space or conducting any unconventional weapons tests in space as it would pose a perennial threat to all space systems regardless of their use for civilian or military purposes."

Yet, given the different security and strategic realities, India has also been seeking out foreign powers for BMD expertise to fine-tune its own efforts.

This is also in the context of the DRDO's dubious achievement and delayed delivery record in developing indigenous weapons. Observers agree that international expertise will enhance India's BMD abilities and hasten the program.

Thus, acquisition of the Arrow from Israel or Patriot-3 from America forms part of India's BMD agenda, though there has been resistance by the Barack Obama administration on such supplies due to fundamental disagreement about such weapons.

Still, America has already provided Indian DRDO officials access to computer simulations of at least two live missile launches, official sources say. US defense Major Lockheed Martin, the developer of the Patriot and the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system), has been talking to the DRDO. Lockheed has spoken about "exploratory discussions" that have taken place with New Delhi and industry representatives. Official talks between India and the US on the subject have also been held.

Israel and Russia have made similar presentations to India in the past, on their anti-tactical ballistic missile systems the S-300V and Arrow-2, respectively. The French are also in contention.

As far as attack missiles are concerned, India has built Prithvi and shorter versions of Agni covering Pakistan with longer versions of Agni part of a deterrence strategy against China. The missiles are seen as precursor technologies to weapon abilities in space.

Pakistan has test-fired the Shaheen-2 which is a 2,000-km range ballistic missile apart from the short-range Ghaznavi missile. India has tested the 700-km range Agni-I, a sea-to-land version of the Brahmos supersonic cruise missile and the K-15 Sagarika missile from a submerged pontoon.

India has also successfully tested its longest-range ballistic missile 3,000-km-range Agni-III making the country's capabilities at par with global superpowers such as US, UK, China, France and Russia that possess intermediate range capabilities. China's abilities are of-course far ahead of India with its missiles capable of hitting over-11,000 km.

The success of Agni-III has paved the way for the 5,000-km Agni-IV, the platform for inter-continental ballistic missiles. The Agni missile can carry conventional or nuclear payloads of 1.5 tons and put major Chinese cities such as Shanghai within striking distance.
 

JAISWAL

New Member
Joined
Mar 13, 2010
Messages
1,527
Likes
1,027
DRDO to display models of missiles

Jan 01,2012

Bhubaneswar: India's premier military weapons developer, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), will display models of its innovations at the Jan 3-7 Indian Science Congress (ISC) in Bhubaneswar.

The 99th edition of ISC, the largest national science event in India, is scheduled to be held at the KIIT University complex in Bhubaneswar. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will inaugurate it. More than 15,000 delegates, including 500 foreign scientists and 20 Nobel laureates, are expected to participate in the five-day event.


"Glimpses of technological might of DRDO will be on display," senior DRDO official Ravi Kumar Gupta said in a statement. The star attractions among the models will be missiles Agni, Prithvi, Nag, Akash, BrahMos and Astra, he said.

The KIIT and the National Institute of Science Education and Research (NISER) are jointly hosting the ISC.

.
.
.
DRDO to display models of missiles | DRDO | ISC | The New Indian Express
 

JineshJK

New Member
Joined
Dec 20, 2011
Messages
22
Likes
13
Concern over a pernicious agreement

(From The Hindu)
Ashok Parthasarathi
The End-Use Monitoring Agreement with the U.S. seriously compromises India's national security, and no other country has imposed such a requirement on India. It must not go through.
A critical agreement finalised during U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit to India last month was the Indo-U.S. End-Use Monitoring Agreement, or EUMA. It involves U.S. government inspectors continuously monitoring all hi-tech weapons and advanced electronic systems and equipment across a broad front imported by India from the U.S., to ensure that they are used by the Indian defence services and the Department of Atomic Energy and the Department of Space only for the purpose — "end use" — for which they are imported.
External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, in a statement in Parliament on July 21, said that signing such an EUMA was essential under U.S. law for India to undertake such imports. He gave the impression that all that the EUMA does is to bring under one umbrella the case-by-case permissions for such imports India had been seeking and securing from the U.S. government from as far back as the 1990s. Therefore this was largely procedural in nature, he implied.
Simultaneously, the Minister indicated that thanks to two years of intense negotiations, the EUMA was uniquely to New Delhi's advantage: the periodic inspections in India of all U.S.-origin hi-tech and defence equipment would be undertaken by U.S. inspectors only at places and times "mutually agreed" upon, places and times specified by the Indian government. But that is not what "mutually agreed" means. He emphasised that such a provision did not exist in any of the 82 earlier EUMAs concluded by the U.S. and so this was a great victory for the Indian government. What he did not say was that those 82 countries were those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and U.S. military allies.
Despite the Minister's statement, followed by the Prime Minister's defence of the EUMA with the U.S. government there are serious concerns about it among parliamentarians, the media and the military and scientific leaderships on several counts.
First, no other country from which India has imported and is importing hi-tech defence and other equipment — be it France or other West European countries, South Africa, Israel or Russia — has ever asked for an EUMA, even when India imported state-of-the-art weapon systems. Here are some examples:
— The Sukhoi-30 MKI supersonic fighter bomber from Russia especially tailor-made for Indian needs which, apart from carrying a wide range of lethal conventional weapons in a tactical role, can carry nuclear weapons over a 5,000-mile range, that is, to Beijing and Shanghai, (with mid-air refuelling) and is accepted even by the U.S. government as the best such weapon system in the world;
— The 90-mile beyond visual range air-to-air missile, also from Russia, which three former chiefs of air staff have characterised as "the best such missile in the world." They also acknowledged that it was India's possession of the missile that "deterred Pakistan from using its air force in the Kargil War."
— Then there is India's first indigenous nuclear submarine, INS Arihant, which would have just been impossible to realise without the Soviet Union's/Russia's massive allround consultancy, technology transfer, technical services and training, technical "knowhow" and "show how" design of the submarine as a whole, and above all numerous operational "tips" based on 50 years of experience in designing, building and operating nuclear submarines. Although Soviet and Russian assistance was extended throughout the 25-year designing and building of Arihant, at no time did anyone in the Russian government ever even mention any end-use restriction. And yet, if India were to import some incomparably low-tech electronic warfare equipment from the U.S., the U.S. government will demand the application of the EUMA.
Secondly, it is a matter of concern that under the EUMA India has to turn over to U.S. inspectors not only the hardware and software of all U.S.-origin systems and equipment purchased by India for their scrutiny, but also all data and information logs containing the entire history of the equipment as used by India.
Thirdly, for the computer software (so much of which is used nowadays in hi-tech defence and other equipment) in the U.S.-origin equipment, Indian military and civilian computer scientists have often been able to develop modified software known only to India and so secure. However, when such equipment is tested and analysed using U.S. simulators, the software becomes evident to the U.S. inspectors. This will seriously compromise the security of the equipment and of the overall weapon system of which it is often "the brain."
Fourthly, and extremely seriously, India is now fully aware that the end-use it is putting the U.S.-origin weapon systems to and all the technical and operational data relating to it, particularly modifications and improvements India has made as collected by U.S. inspectors, are passed on by the U.S. government to Pakistan.
When any "inspection" of a U.S.-origin equipment at any Indian air /sea/army bases — which the EUMA provides for at the discretion of the U.S. — takes place, the inspection team will consist usually of specialised technical and intelligence personnel from the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. National Security Agency and, of course, the weapon-system supplier. Such teams come with sophisticated simulators to test the U.S.-origin weapon systems and equipment under simulated battlefield conditions.
Then, there is a much larger issue. The situation discussed above is with regard to various U.S.-origin equipment incorporated into Indian aircraft, surface ships, submarines, tanks, artillery guns and so on. What will happen when the weapon system as a whole is of U.S. origin? India has already had a taste of that from its experience with the old troop and helicopter-carrying vessel USS Trenton, which was imported and inducted into the Navy as INS Jalashar. The U.S. undertakes surprise inspections of any part of the vessel; studies all ship logs, requires a U.S. Navy officer to be on board when India makes any modifications or improvements or even repairs to keep the old vessel going"¦ And this for a 30-year-old helicopter-and-troop carrier.
Against such a background, what kind of EUMA will the U.S. apply should India decide to purchase one or other of the two U.S.-origin multi-role combat aircraft — the F-16 offered by Lockheed and the F-18 offered by Boeing — against the Rs.42,000-crore global tender floated by the Defence Ministry for 126 such aircraft last year? The conditions will obviously be far more stringent than the inspection methodology and coverage which apply to the EUM for individual weapons such as artillery and radar. What will the government do then?
It is important to also note that all the three defence service chiefs have vehemently and repeatedly, verbally and in writing, individually and collectively conveyed to New Delhi at the highest levels their strong and total opposition to India entering into an EUMA with the U.S. because of its serious national security-compromising character. But the Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by the Prime Minister brushed aside these acute concerns and went ahead and approved the EUMA.
Then there is the issue of the penetration and suborning of India's armed forces and civil services by U.S. agencies at the operational level. The Indian Express (July 26, 2009) reported how the External Affairs Ministry had expressed concern over a recent senior-level inter-ministerial meeting convened by the Defence Ministry at which some Defence Ministry officials agreed to a purchase contract for U.S.-origin arms in which, at the insistence of the U.S. representatives, the end-use clauses were made extremely intrusive and stringent, and hence more objectionable than those framed under the joint EUMA itself.
The Prime Minister stated in Parliament on July 29 that "there was no provision in the EUMA to allow U.S. inspectors access to Indian military sites and other sensitive installations." But in the very next sentence he said: "Inspections if necessary (as decided by the U.S. government) would happen at a mutually agreed time and venue after a request. United States government "request" [for inspection] was put forward by the U.S." — and the Indian government has got to comply.
With these numerous, wide-ranging and highly deleterious implications for India's national security of the EUMA, it is imperative that the Government of India terminate the EUMA. If the Indian government does not have the will to do so, it should at least announce in Parliament that the purchase of U.S.-origin hi-tech equipment would be "purchases of very last resort."
(Ashok Parthasarathi was Science Adviser to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.)
 

nitesh

Mob Control Manager
New Member
Joined
Feb 12, 2009
Messages
7,550
Likes
1,309
Some important info:

Tarmak007 -- A bold blog on Indian defence: Air Defence for NCR ready | Mumbai, Bangalore next? | Complete deliverable version missile's flight test soon

The size of an incoming missile payload could be just two to three meters and it comes at a speed of approx 5 km/sec, giving very few seconds to the weapon systems to react. This requires very accurate prediction of incoming missile position as well as control of interceptor path. "The coverage has to ensure adequate number of radars, a highly integrated, network-centric system which processes the inputs from various radars, predict the path of the incoming missile and decide when the interceptor has to be launched," sources said.

DRDO claims that these technologies have been developed and demonstrated to Tri Services Command. "The coverage is for an entire area consisting of several hundred kilometers and not for a specific building. However, the deployment ensures that key assets are at the center of the covered area providing highest protection," sources said.
Once the NCR module is deployed, similar modules can be adopted covering other important regions and eventually the entire country. "All modules are interlinked in overlapping fashion to generate networked AD system. Satellites are needed only for time-synchronization of different stations across the country. Once the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System is operational by 2014, we will not dependent upon satellite constellation of other countries,"
The deliverable version of an endo-atmospheric interceptor missile (protection range or down range will be aprox up to 30 km and kill altitude will be up to approx 20 km) is all ready to be flight tested. The missile is part of the twin-layered ballistic missile defence that is being developed by the DRDO which engages the enemy missile in the endo-atmosphere.

The interceptor missile is primarily designed for engaging short to medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBM/MRBM) with ranges up to 2000 km. It has also got the capability to engage quasi ballistic missiles of medium range. The performance in terms of the kill zone and lethality of this missile is significantly higher than contemporary missiles like PAC-3.

Later this month (January), the complete deliverable version of this missile will be flight tested from Wheeler's Island against a SRBM launched from Chandipur.
A significant research has gone into development of highly sophisticated onboard algorithms to enable the DRDO scientists in predicting a near hit-to-kill performance in the next mission.
 

Blackwater

New Member
Joined
Jan 9, 2012
Messages
21,156
Likes
12,211
we can not reply on Indian system.we need two types of cover, we must buy some thing trustworthy system either from Israel or USA


pls no to DRDO,we cant trust their system
 

Kunal Biswas

Member of the Year 2011
New Member
Joined
May 26, 2010
Messages
31,122
Likes
41,041
we can not reply on Indian system.we need two types of cover, we must buy some thing trustworthy system either from Israel or USA, pls no to DRDO,we cant trust their system
Sir, we cannot relay anything " INDIAN " ?!

India is third world country with third world budget for R&D and working on first class systems, First tank, First aircraft are always with flaws..

India is starting to relay on its own which is a good thing, Why you must ask ?


You talk about Israel, During Six day war Israel was almost collapsed coz of lack of weaponry until US shipped, That only happens after satisfying UN..

Now Israeli make their own and they are selling there own to we Indians, We need to learn..


Btw, Our friends have no Problem in R&D or C&D program they produce every thing in country, Which is non stop supply to its armed forces..

India cannot stand a long term war depending on Imports..
 

trackwhack

New Member
Joined
Jul 20, 2011
Messages
3,757
Likes
2,590
we can not reply on Indian system.we need two types of cover, we must buy some thing trustworthy system either from Israel or USA


pls no to DRDO,we cant trust their system
Sorry, but I strongly disagree. One of DRDO's best systems is our BMD. Yes there has been help received from Israel on the radars but it is mostly a homegrown system that has so far been comparable with the best in the world.

We need to absolutely ensure that there is no external reliance on the BMD. Anything but the BMD. We have a plan to upgrade our BMD to a DEW based system. My view on the US offer is that they want to deter us from developing such a system by equipping us with their antiquated missile BMD. As per the current DRDO planning we should have tested the DEW based BMD before the turn of the decade. If we succeed, this will be the biggest military development since the atomic bomb and this is no exagerration. We will be entering the Star wars era of warfare where 90% of current offensive systems become obsolete within a decade.

All SAM's, Anti aircraft and BMD will be replaced by ground based, a little later aircraft based and finally satellite based systems. It will reach a stage where offensive weapons are destroyed over enemy territory, thereby destroying the argument that if you shoot enough missiles at least one will get through.

The US's single biggest defense research expenditure right now after Unmanned Vehicles is DEW based systems - from guns to BMD. And the same is the case with Russia and China and from everything I've read so far, we are ahead of both Russia and China in DEW's and slightly behind the US. So reject every offer from the US on the BMD. Rely only on our own systems.
 

Payeng

Daku Mongol Singh
New Member
Joined
Mar 7, 2009
Messages
2,522
Likes
777
we can not reply on Indian system.we need two types of cover, we must buy some thing trustworthy system either from Israel or USA


pls no to DRDO,we cant trust their system
Please explain whom should we trust. with due respect.
 

Articles

Top