Indian Army: News and Discussion

Automatic Kalashnikov

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The heck? Only 10 per Regiment? Most regiments have 20+ Battalions. Surely he means 10 per Battalion, right?
Also, says nothing about the spotter. Are we going for the Western approach of sniper-spotter pairs or the Russian approach of single-man?


That will be separate, I think, because he says two levels of courses. So someone completing Basic Sniper Course but not passing Advanced Sniper Course could be assigned the Designated Marksman role while those completing both courses become full fledged Snipers.
I could be wrong, but the orbat might be one or two Designated Marksmen in every platoon of every Rifle Company, and then all 10 Snipers as a separate Sniper Platoon in the Weapons Company. And then Battalion HQ might assign 3-5 snipers to each of the Rifle Companies based on their assigned mission's requirements. (Keep in mind that two rifle companies are kept in reserve and only two are tasked at one time.)
They mean 10 per battalion ig

Quoted from original article:
"Currently, the Infantry School is using Russian-origin Dragunov sniper rifles for training purposes. A total of 100 troops will be trained in every course. As per the official, there are five courses being conducted every year. In an infantry battalion, which usually has a strength of around 850 soldiers, a team of 10 snipers are sanctioned and the personnel are selected from the Indian Army’s units and regimental centres."
 

Okabe Rintarou

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They mean 10 per battalion ig

Quoted from original article:
"Currently, the Infantry School is using Russian-origin Dragunov sniper rifles for training purposes. A total of 100 troops will be trained in every course. As per the official, there are five courses being conducted every year. In an infantry battalion, which usually has a strength of around 850 soldiers, a team of 10 snipers are sanctioned and the personnel are selected from the Indian Army’s units and regimental centres."
Bit confusing. He says only some of those that complete the basic course will be chosen for the advanced one. Then goes on to say that only a team of 10 snipers is sanctioned per Battalion. So doesn't that mean there will continue to be Dragunov toting Designated Marksmen? If not, then what will those who complete the basic but not the advanced course become?

100 troops and 5 courses per year means 500 snipers trained per year. At 10 per battalion, you have 50 battalions worth being trained per year. Total number of Infantry Battalions in Indian Army is around 350 I think. Not counting Mechanized Infantry Regiment and Brigade of the Guards. So 7 years to man all the Battalions in the entire Army with proper snipers. Looks like more orders incoming for the Sako TRG 42.
 

Tshering22

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flanker99

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Some are saying what has been inducted...in what number?
Anyone has any idea?
 

Sridhar

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Kargil redux: A senior Pakistani Air Force officer's account of the PAF's role in Kargil
(NOTE: This article has appeared in the journal, "Defence and Security of India". It is a cold and objective analysis of the kind that we Indians seem incapable of. I am happy that I played a role in getting this article published in India.)

By Air Commodore M Kaiser Tufail (Retd)
Pakistan Air Force

While the Indians were prompt in setting up an Inquiry Commission into the Kargil fracas, we in Pakistan found it expedient to bury the affair in the �national interest�. Compared to the Indians, Pakistani writings on the Kargil conflict have been pathetically few; those that have come out are largely irrelevant and in a few cases, clearly sponsored. The role of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has been discussed off and on, but mostly disparagingly, particularly in some uninformed quarters. Here is an airman�s perspective, focusing on the IAF�s air operations and the PAF�s position.

Operational planning in the PAF

Since an important portion of this write-up pertains to the PAF�s appreciation of the situation and the decision-making loop during the Kargil conflict, we will start with a brief primer on the PAF�s hierarchy and how operational matters are handled at Air Headquarters.

The policy-making elements at Air Headquarters consist of four tiers of staff officers. The top-most tier is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Air Staff (DCAS) who are the Principal Staff Officers (PSOs) of their respective branches and are nominally headed by the Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS). They (along with Air Officers Commanding, the senior representatives from field formations) are members of the Air Board, the PAF�s �corporate� decision-making body, which is chaired by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS). The next tier is made up of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff (ACAS) who head various sub-branches and, along with the third-tier Directors, assist the PSOs in policy-making; they are not on the Air Board, but can be called for hearings and presentations in the Board meetings, as required. A fourth tier of Deputy Directors does most of the sundry staff work in this policy-making hierarchy.

The Operations & Plans branch is the key player in any war, conflict or contingency and is responsible for threat assessment and formulation of a suitable response. During peacetime, war plans are drawn up by the Plans sub-branch and are then war-gamed in operational exercises run by the sister Operations sub-branch. Operational training is accordingly restructured and administered by the latter, based on the lessons of various exercises. This essentially is the gist of the PAF�s operational preparedness methodology, the efficiency of which is amply reflected in its readiness and telling response in various wars and skirmishes in the past.

In early 1999, Air Chief Marshal Parvaiz Mehdi Qureshi was at the helm of the PAF. An officer with an imposing personality, he had won the Sword of Honour at the Academy. During the 1971 Indo-Pak War, as a young Flight Lieutenant, he was on a close support mission in erstwhile East Pakistan when his Sabre was shot down and he was taken POW. He determinedly resumed his fighter pilot�s career after repatriation and rose to command PAF�s premier Sargodha Base. He was later appointed as the AOC, Southern Air Command, an appointment that affords considerable interaction amongst the three services, especially in operational exercises. He also held the vitally important post of DCAS (Ops) as well as the VCAS before taking over as CAS.

The post of DCAS (Ops) was held by the late Air Marshal Zahid Anis. A well-qualified fighter pilot, he had a distinguished career in the PAF, having held some of the most sought-after appointments. These included command of No 38 Tactical Wing (F-16s), the elite Combat Commanders� School and PAF Base, Sargodha. He was AOC, Southern Air Command before his appointment as the head of the Operations branch at Air Headquarters. He had done the Air War Course at the PAF�s Air War College, another War Course at the French War College as well as the prestigious course at the Royal College of Defence Studies in the UK.

The ACAS (Ops) was Air Cdre Abid Rao, who had recently completed command of PAF Base, Mianwali. He had earlier done the War Course from the French War College.

The ACAS (Plans) was the late Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz, a brilliant officer who had made his mark at the Staff College at Bracknell, UK, and during the War Course at the National Defence College, Islamabad.

There is no gainsaying the fact that the PAF�s hierarchy was highly qualified and that each of the players in the Operations branch had the requisite command and staff experience. The two top men had also fought in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, albeit as junior officers.

First rumblings

As Director of Operations (in the rank of Gp Capt), my first opportunity to interact with the Army�s Director of Military Operations (DMO) was over a phone call, some time in March 1999. Brig Nadeem Ahmed called with great courtesy and requested some information that he needed for a paper exercise, as he told me. He wanted to know when the PAF had last carried out a deployment at Skardu, how many aircraft were deployed, etc. Rather impressed with the Army�s interest in PAF matters, I passed on the requisite details. The next day Brig Nadeem called again, but this time his questions were more probing and he wanted some classified information including fuel storage capacity at Skardu, fighter sortie-generation capacity, radar coverage, etc. He insisted that he was preparing a briefing and wanted to get his facts and figures right in front of his bosses. We got on a secure line and I passed on the required information. Although he made it sound like routine contingency planning, I sensed that something unusual was brewing. In the event, I thought it prudent to inform the DCAS (Ops). Just to be sure, he checked with his counterpart, the Director General Military Operations (DGMO), Maj Gen Tauqir Zia, who said the same thing as his DMO and, assured us that it was just part of routine contingency planning.

Not withstanding the DGMO�s assurance, a cautious Air Marshal Zahid decided to check things for himself and despatched Gp Capt Tariq Ashraf, Officer Commanding of No 33 Wing at PAF Base, Kamra, to look things over at Skardu and make a report. Within a few days, Gp Capt Tariq (who was also the designated war-time commander of Skardu Base) had completed his visit, which included his own periodic war-readiness inspection. While he made a detailed report to the DCAS (Ops), he let me in on the Army�s mobilisation and other preparations that he had seen in Skardu. His analysis was that �something big is imminent.� Helicopter flying activity was feverishly high as Army Aviation�s Mi-17s were busy moving artillery guns and ammunition to the posts that had been vacated by the Indians during the winter. Troops in battle gear were to be seen all over the city. Interestingly, Messes were abuzz with war chatter amongst young officers. In retrospect, one wonders how Indian intelligence agencies failed to read any such signs, many weeks before the operation unfolded.
 
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fire starter

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IndianHawk

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Jaishankar is making a lot of Russia-friendly moves. I think this is the government's way of "getting back to the centre" than veering too far to either east or the west. If placating the Ruskies is the agenda, then I'd rather see Igla-S in than see HAL LUH cancelled for Ka-226T.
Ka-226 will also come. Our forces will take much longer to wean off ruski equipment. Probably a decade plus .
 

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